THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS, PRACTICE AND CHALLENGES OF THE UNITED NATIONS/AFRICAN UNION PARTNERSHIP IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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A Thesis in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies,
Submitted to the Institute of African Studies,
in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

of the

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

AUGUST 2015

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ABSTRACT

The peacekeeping partnership between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), which started in 2002, occurred at three levels: strategic, institutional and operational. The strategic partnership involves the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC); the institutional partnership comprises the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, while joint peacekeeping operations have been carried out in Sudan, Somalia and Mali. Existing studies on how to improve the partnership have focused on the operational level to the detriment of the other two. This study, therefore, moved from the minimalist view to a more comprehensive approach, by focusing on the normative frameworks, practice and challenges of the partnership.

The study adopted a qualitative approach and utilised a combination of descriptive, explorative and case study research design. Purposive sampling technique was used to select respondents who had knowledge of the partnership. The respondents included officials of the UN, AU, and sub-regional organisations; military, police and civilian personnel; and academics. A total of 39 in-depth interviews were conducted in Ethiopia (12), Mali (13), Sudan (seven) and Ghana (seven). Four focus group discussions were held with police personnel of varied nationalities and peacekeeping backgrounds. Secondary data were sourced from UN and AU official documents especially the provisions of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the AU Constitutive Act and the AU PSC Protocol. Others consisted of books, journal articles and conference reports. Data were subjected to descriptive content analyses.

The frameworks forming the basis of the partnership embody the general principles, values, expectations and prescriptive guidelines of responsibilities of both organisations. However, both institutions lack a shared understanding of the interpretation and application of these frameworks, partly due to the unclear nature of roles. The partnership has, in practice, remained asymmetrical with the UN always taking the decisions and responsibilities. Apart from Somalia, all the joint operations are controlled by the UN, with the AU playing minimal roles. While the partnership has resulted in pragmatic and flexible responses to conflicts in Sudan and Mali, and provided a way of sharing resources, it suffers from a variety of challenges. Between the UNSC and PSC and their respective secretariat, power differential has generated mutual suspicion, disagreement, competition, coordination and bureaucratic problems. These have undermined consensus and cohesion during joint operations. In Mali and Sudan, the two organisations competed over the mission's chain of command, disagreed on the appointment of senior officials, and took decisions without consulting each other. Although the situation was different in Somalia, both organisations continue to have contradictory approaches regarding the resolution of the conflict.

A comprehensive approach to understanding the nature of the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping partnership revealed some fundamental challenges. Future partnerships should be based on mutual trust, comparative strengths, and a shared interpretation of the normative frameworks especially the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

Keywords: Peacekeeping operations, Peacekeeping partnership, United Nations, African Union

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I thank the Almighty God for giving me the strength, knowledge and good health to carry out this study. Many well-meaning personalities have contributed to this thesis and I am pleased to acknowledge them here. My Supervisors, Professor I.O. Albert and Dr. Kwesi Aning deserve a special note of thanks and appreciation for the critical role they played in shaping the content of this work. I benefited enormously from their guidance, dedication, valuable and constructive comments, prompt feedbacks, fatherly advice and encouragements which together inspired me to complete this study on time.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the former Commandant of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Air Vice Marshal C.E.K. Dovlo who approved the request for me to undertake the PhD programme at the University of Ibadan (UI). The current Commandant of the KAIPTC, Major General Obed B. Akwa and members of the Executive Management of the Centre also deserve my appreciation for their support. Furthermore, I owe special gratitude to the following personalities at the KAIPTC for their advice, encouragements and dedicated support throughout my study: Dr. (Col) Emmanuel W. Kotia; Dr. Thomas Jaye; Professor Osei Hwedei; Mr. Kodjo Menka, Mrs. Louisa Duncan Williams; and Mr. Larry Asare Bediako and his team at the KAIPTC finance department, especially, Ms. Mercy Pokoo.

My greatest debt of gratitude also goes to the lecturers and staff of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan (UI), especially, Professor Oladele .O Layiwola, Professor O. Olasehinde-Williams, Dr. Kayode M. Samuel, Dr. Nathaniel D. Danjibo, Dr. S.A. Faleti, and Dr. I.A Jimoh, for the different roles they played in the completion of this study. In particular, I am extremely grateful to Dr. Kayode M. Samuel for his exceptional role and guidance from my admission to UI to the completion of this study.

I was also fortunate to enjoy, in the course of writing this thesis, a research grant from the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) through the Small Grants Programme for Thesis Writing in African Institutions. The support and financial assistance of CODESRIA is gratefully acknowledged.

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Special thanks also go to the African Union Commission (AUC), the UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the African Union/ECOWAS Political Offices in Mali, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) for giving me the permission and opportunity to carry out my field study. Without their approval and support, my fieldwork would not have been possible. I would like to appreciate the warm hospitality, time and useful thoughts shared with me by staff of all these organisations. Especially, I thank Ms. Sandra Oder, Ms. Mariame Camara, and Mrs. Rinass Abdullah, for their administrative assistance during my stay at the AUC in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

I am also pleased to thank my parents, Mr. David Kofi Aubyn and Mrs. Dinah Efua Aubyn; Professor Dora Edu-Buandoh of the University of Cape Coast; and all my close friends for the love, encouragements, spiritual and moral support while I labored over this work. Profound thanks and appreciation also go to my colleagues at the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR), KAIPTC, especially, Serwa, Afua, Frank, Mustapha, and Nana for their insightful feedbacks and comments on the final draft thesis. This note of gratitude will be incomplete if I fail to acknowledge my course mate, friend, and colleague, Fiifi Edu-Afful, who has been an indispensable source of inspiration and moral support, I say a big thank you my brother.

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
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CERTIFICATION

I certify that this work was carried out by **Festus Kofi Aubyn** of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Mr. David K. Aubyn and Mrs. Dinah E. Aubyn and my siblings, David, Albert and Christa for their support, advice and encouragements throughout my education.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AMIB	African Union mission in Burundi
AMIC	African Union mission in Comoros
AMIS	African Union mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture.
APSTA	African Peace Support Trainers Association
APF	African Peace Facility
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AUPST	AU Peacekeeping Support Team
CAR	Central African Republic
CMD	Conflict Management Division
CONOPS	Concept of Operations Coordination Mechanism
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DUF	Directives on the Use of Force
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union
FDGs	Focus Group Discussions
GOS	Government of Sudan
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
ICC	International Criminal Court

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ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JSCM	Joint Support Coordination Mechanism
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LAS	League of Arab States
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
MILOBs	Military Observers
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISCA	African-led International Support mission to the Central African Republic
MISMA	ECOWAS-led International Support Mission for Mali
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
P5	Permanent Five
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PCCs	Police Contributing Countries
PCRD	Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PDA	Political Affairs Department
PKOs	Peacekeeping Operations

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PLANELMs	Planning Element
PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Department
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Department
PSS	Peace and Security Secretariat
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROs	Regional Organisations
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SHIRBRIG	Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations
SLA/M	the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
SNA	Somali National Army
SOPs	Standard Operational Procedures
SRCC	Special Representatives of the Chairperson of the Commission
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TYCBP	Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNLO-AU	United Nations Liaison Office
UNLOAU	United Nations Liaison Office to the African Union
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa

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UNPAERD	United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development
UNPBC	UN Peace Building Commission
UNPT	UN Planning Team for the AU mission in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office to the AU Mission in Somalia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
USA	United States of America
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNSG	UN Secretary-General

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Partnerships between the United Nations (UN) and regional organisations (ROs) in the field of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have become a central feature of global security cooperation. The genesis of this phenomenon, according to Adebajo (2011), can be traced to the early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent failures of the UN in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia (see also Aning, 1997; Anyidoho, 1997; Bowden, 1999; Dallaire, 2003). These three high-profile setbacks, which stemmed from the multifaceted nature of contemporary conflicts and the strains on UN's operational capacity, in terms of personnel, logistics, funding and polical support, contributed to a situation where the UN Security Council (UNSC) became reluctant to establish new operations in the mid and late 1990s. A report by the Lessons Learnt Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in March 1999, for instance, indicated that, the number of UN peacekeepers fell from a peak of 78,744 men and women in mid-1993 to approximately 14,500 in November 1998 (DPKO, 1999: 4). While this trend was global in scope, it became most evident in Africa. For instance, in 1993, the number of peacekeepers on the continent was about 40,000. However, by 1999, the number had decreased to less than 10,000 (Adebajo, 2011). Likewise, the number of peacekeeping operations also dwindled from seven in 1993 to three in 1999 (Adebajo, 2011).

The reduction in UN PKOs in the 1990s was accompanied by a rise in the active role of regional and sub-regional organisations in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement actions globally. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) deployed peacekeeping missions to the Western Balkans and Afghanistan (Gowan and

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Sherman, 2012). Similarly, the Arab League, which deployed its first military peacekeeping force in Lebanon in 1976 was also instrumental in the resolution of conflicts in the Middle East and Somalia. Likewise, the Organisation of American States (OAS) in Latin America, also deployed small observer missions to the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Honduras in the 1990s (Fortna, 1993:1-2). In Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) undertook peacekeeping initiatives in Chad (1982) and Burundi (1996), whilst the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed what Aning (2007) describes as the first African-led and funded peacekeeping mission to Liberia in 1990 and later in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. However, similar to the UN's experiences, many of these regional and sub-regional organisations also faced the same resource constraints.

Subsequently, to confront the peacekeeping challenges in the 1990s, the UNSC responded by encouraging a move towards decentralisation in the field of peacekeeping operations, including the increased involvement of regional organisations (ROs) under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter[1] (UN, 1992: para. 64, 2005). In demonstrating this relationship, Gray (2000: 202, cited from Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010: 305) posited that unlike the period between 1945 and 1990, when UNSC Resolutions contained only three references to ROs, the situation changed dramatically after 1992, as many references were made to ROs in UNSC Resolutions relating to Angola, Haiti, Mozambique, Western Sahara and Former Yugoslavia. Particularly, in 1992, the prospect of increased cooperation with ROs prompted Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), to urge the UN to make better use of their potential in five peace-related activities: preventive diplomacy, early warning systems for crisis prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding (UN, 1992, 1995). This proposal was contained in the UNSC report, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, issued in 1992. The Supplementary report to *An Agenda for Peace* in 1995, further reinforced it and outlined the forms that the cooperation between UN and ROs should take namely, consultation, diplomatic support, co-deployment, joint operations and operational support (UN, 1992, 1995).

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Following a series of meetings and discussions between the UN and regional bodies on how best they could coordinate their efforts to maintain peace and security, the concept of global-regional security partnerships became more prominent. From this period (mid-1990s) onwards, the UN entered into a variety of relationships with regional and sub-regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security, but on an *ad hoc basis* (UN, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2008 and 2011). In Europe, NATO, for example, cooperated with the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina during its first peacekeeping operation, the Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995.[2] In the same way, the UN also cooperated with ECOWAS in Liberia in 1993 and Sierra Leone in 1998/9. After the adoption of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) in 1993, it also cooperated with the UN in a number of peacemaking and conflict prevention initiatives in countries such as Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s (Aning, 1997; Adebajo, 2002; Boulden, 2003; Adebajo, 2004; Francis, 2006).

Over the past two decades, the partnership between the UN and ROs have continued to expand, especially, in Africa when the OAU was transformed to the AU in 2002 (Murithi, 2009; Bah and Lortan, 2011:5). Having adopted one of the most comprehensive security regimes anywhere in the world, the AU, in partnership with its Regional Economic Communities (RECs), is playing a more pivotal role in the management and resolution of Africa's security predicaments. Since its establishment, the AU has deployed several peacekeeping operations to countries like Burundi, CAR, Mali, Somalia and Sudan (Appiah-Mensah, 2005; Birikorang, 2009; Murithi, 2009; Bah and Lortan, 2011:5). Consequently, since 2002, the UN's relationship with the AU in the maintenance of peace and security, primarily through peacekeeping operations has developed as one of the most vibrant partnerships in the world. In practice, the partnership has occurred at three different levels namely, the strategic,[3] institutional[4] and operational[5] levels respectively.

At the strategic level, links have been established between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) through annual joint consultative meetings (AU, 2012, 2013). Eight of such consultative meetings have been

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held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and New York, United States of America (USA) since it began in 2007. Generally, members of the two Councils discussed issues of common interest pertaining to peace and security in Africa during these joint meetings. At the institutional level, the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission which are the operational arms of both organisations have also been working together since 2002. Officials of the two secretariats maintain constant working-level interactions through desk-to-desk exchanges and capacity-building programmes.[6] In praxis, while there is no accurate way of cataloging the various peacekeeping partnerships between the two organisations at the operational level given their *sui generis* character, four possible sets of categories appear.

The first type of partnership which is the most pronounced involves the construction of a hybrid or joint operations, where both the AU and the UN operate within a single or joint chain of command (Bah and Jones, 2008; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010:65-66). An example of this type of partnership is the ongoing UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The second type involves AU-led peacekeeping operation with UN logistics, technical and financial support. The UN Support Office to the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) is a typical case in point. The third form of partnership involves a kind of sequential operations, where the AU initially conducts an operation, and then passes the peacekeeping baton to the UN. The transformation of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) into a UN mission in 2004 is an example (Malan, 2008; Murithi, 2009:5-7). The last form of partnership, which is similar to the sequential operation, is also a kind of 'trilateral peacekeeping operation where a UN mission follows a peacekeeping operation by the AU and its RECs. An example is the transformation of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in July 2013 by the AU and ECOWAS to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Evidently, these different forms of partnerships are symptomatic of the shifting nature of how peacekeeping operations are being conducted on the African continent. But in general terms, through these partnerships, the UN and the AU have demonstrated the capacity to respond with the required flexibility and pragmatism to complex political realities on the African continent.

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1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Although the UN/AU partnership is organised within the spirit and intent of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the Article 17 (1) of the AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, a wide range of challenges and limitations hamper its effectiveness. Currently, one of the principal difficulties is how to apply Chapter VIII without prejudice to the role of the UNSC and at the same time, without undermining the efforts of the AU to develop its own capacity to provide adequate responses to African security problems (Bah and Lortan, 2011:6). A typical case in point, according to Akande, Plessis and Jalloh (2010), as well as Bah and Lortan (2011), was the failure of the UNSC to formally consider the AU's repeated requests for a deferral of the prosecution of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Another instance was the differences in approach between the UN and the AU during the Libyan crises in 2011 (Ping, 2011; Aning, et al., 2013; Sally, 2013; Smith-Windsor, 2013; Abass, 2014).[7] In this particular case, for instance, while the AU insisted on a political solution to the crises, the UN and the Western countries opted for a military intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). These existing difficulties and incoherence in approach undoubtedly raises some fundamental questions about the status of the partnership, especially, when a principled position by one is openly disregarded by the other.

What factors explain these differences in approach, and in what ways do these differences affect the relationship between the two organisations? And do these challenges call for a re-examination of the relationship envisaged under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter? These issues which mostly emanate from the normative frameworks underlying the partnership need further interrogation to ensure a more coherent and systematic partnership. But more explicitly, the lack of political coherence raises two key questions. First, what are the consultative decision-making frameworks between the two organisations and how effective are they? And second, what are the existing modalities for division of labour and burden-sharing given that partnership refers in theory, to equality, shared values and a high level of trust and reciprocity? Whereas the issue of burden-sharing was addressed by the UN Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on modalities for support to African

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Union peacekeeping operations, commonly referred to as the ‘Prodi Report’, the issue of frameworks for decision-making and division of labour is yet to be adequately addressed (UN, 2008a, 2008c).

With respect to the issue of burden-sharing, in particular, the Prodi Report recommended the use of UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support only UNSC authorised AU peacekeeping operations for a period of six months, instead of what Gelot, Gelot and Coning (2012:28) describes as a generic framework of support. The AU, however, thinks otherwise about this proposal and argues that once the UN authorises an AU mission, it has to provide all the necessary resources (funding and especially, logistics) to sustain it because the AU is undertaking the mission on its behalf (AU, 2012). Besides, the AU also argues that it contributes to the UN assessed funding for peacekeeping through its 54 members states that are part of the UN. However, the UN has not yielded to this idea because of its implications on funding all unauthorised peacekeeping operations conducted by regional organisations.

Most importantly, the lack of a clear decision-making framework in responding to conflicts on the African continent has also posed several daunting challenges in the management and sustainment of the partnership. This is particularly evident, during joint field operations regarding issues such as decision-making, appointments and modalities of burden-sharing as well as the division of labour. The problem this generates is clearly indicated by Anyidoho (2012:50), who noted that the initial stages of UNAMID were complicated by misunderstandings and disputes between the UN and the AU on issues such as senior level appointments, division of labour and reporting. Williams and Boutellis (2013b) also indicate that the initial stages of MINUSMA were fraught with disagreements between the UN and the AU over senior mission leadership appointments (i.e. the head of mission, his/her two deputies, the force commander and the police commissioner). For example, the UN appointed Albert Koenders from the Netherlands, as head of the mission instead of the AU’s candidate, Pierre Buyoya, a former president of Burundi and head of AFISMA. The UN also sidelined Nigeria’s Major-General Shehu Abdulkadir who was the AFISMA force commander and appointed Rwanda’s Major-General, Jean-Bosco Kazuran, as force commander. Undeniably, these tensions and disagreements are just nothing, but a

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clear manifestation of mistrust, weak communication, bureaucratic politics, and different institutional cultures.

Aside the issues raised above, the doctrinal gap between the UN and the AU, with regards to peacekeeping deployments have also not been adequately addressed. Thus, whiles the AU and ECOWAS are willing to deploy peacekeepers in the absence of peace agreements or what the 2000 'Brahimi Report' terms as "no peace to keep", the UN is not (ECOWAS, 1999; Murithi 2009; UN 2009; AU, 2012). The practical implication of this on the division of labour and burden sharing cannot be underestimated. The role of the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the UN/AU partnership is also not clear. What role, for example, can RECs play to strengthen the partnership between the UN and the AU? This issue is missing or not given particular attention in the debates and discussions about the future of the partnership.

Undoubtedly, all these dilemmas bring to the fore the need for a proper appreciation and application of the principle of subsidiarity. But more ominously, though peacekeeping partnership looks likely to dominate the African security landscape in the years to come due to the rising level of complex conflicts and the resource constraints of both the UN, the AU and its RECs, few attempts at comprehensively evaluating the associated problems, lessons learnt and outcomes, especially at the strategic and institutional level have so far been made. Instead, most of the existing studies like Appiah-Mensah (2006); Nethling (2006); Kreps (2007); Othieno and Samasuwo (2007); Murithi (2007b, 2009); Andrews & Holt (2007); and Bah (2010) look at isolated cases, such as specifics of AU/UN partnership in Darfur, without any holistic approach to the issue. In other words, although the partnership occurs at three different levels, existing studies on how to improve the system for effectiveness have focused largely on the operational level to the detriment of the other levels. These gaps are what this study sought to fill – to provide a more comprehensive review of the partnership, instead of focusing on isolated case studies and how the partnership can be strengthened to address the complex African peace and security challenges. The study, therefore, moved from the minimalist view of the UN/AU partnership to a more comprehensive approach, by focusing on the normative frameworks, practice and the inherent challenges of the partnership.

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1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of the study was to examine the normative frameworks, practice and challenges of the partnership between the UN and the AU in peacekeeping operations.

Specifically, the objectives of the study were to:

i. explore the motivations behind the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations;

ii. examine the normative frameworks guiding the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations;

iii. interrogate how the UN/AU partnership works in practice at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively;

iv. assess the intended or unintended outcomes and benefits of the UN/AU partnership; and

v. identify the challenges facing the UN/AU partnership and the modalities for resolving them.

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Based on the objectives outlined above, the following research questions were posed:

i. What are the motivations behind the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations?

ii. What are the normative frameworks guiding the UN/AU partnership and their implementation challenges?

iii. How does the UN/AU partnership work in practice at the strategic, institutional and operational levels;

iv. What are the intended or unintended outcomes and benefits of the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations?

v. What are the challenges impeding effective cooperation and collaboration between the UN and the AU and how can they be resolved?

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1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study contributes to knowledge, policy, practice, and future research. In terms of contribution to knowledge, the study demonstrates that the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations can and should be studied from a multiplicity of levels. Apart from UN and AU official documents, scholarly studies of the partnership have focus more on the operational level, which is just one of several potential levels of analysis. The strategic and institutional level politics that usually influence the nature, direction and impact of a peacekeeping operation have not received much research attention. The analytical focus on the operational level is not enough, therefore, this study illustrated that the partnership can be studied from three different but interrelated levels. In that regard, the study has widened the scope of analysis beyond the operational level, highlighted its relationship with the strategic and institutional levels, and what is often overlooked when the focus is only at that level.

The policy contributions are twofold. First, the policy implications of this study are important for improving the effectiveness of inter-organisational partnerships in peacekeeping operations globally. The lessons learnt from the case study, in particular, will help the organisations to improve their operational partnerships and better integrate their approaches in the peacekeeping environment. I also propose that the partnership should be institutionalised with a memorandum of understanding (MOU), specifying the roles and responsibilities of each organisation, to avoid the problems caused by *ad hoc* cooperation and personnel turnover. Although the past decade has witnessed a strengthened UN/AU partnerships, it still occurs on an *ad-hoc* basis and largely driven by operational exigencies. To enhance the predictability and sustainability of the partnership, it is important to formalise it with an MOU, which clearly delineates the responsibilities of each organisation in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. Admittedly, whiles the signing of an MOU may not necessary ensure compliance or bind the two organisations to the principles inherent in the document, it does set the stage for the modification of the vague provisions of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the clarity of roles.

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Second, the findings of this research could be applied to other areas of inter-organisational cooperation beyond the field of peacekeeping operations. Thus, there is also partnership between the following organisations: EU and AU; NATO and AU; UN and EU; OAS and UN; UN and Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); AU and World Bank; ECOWAS and EU, in the areas of infrastructure development, governance, economic development, agriculture, science and technology, climate change, information technology, transnational organised crimes, and counter-terrorism. Understanding the motives and mechanisms of the UN/AU partnerships in peacekeeping operations could be beneficial for understanding how these partnerships also work in practice. In other words, the findings of the research, in terms of, what motivated the partnership between the UN/AU could be applied beyond the field of peacekeeping operations.

Practically, there is a general lack of shared understanding regarding the application and implementation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter within the context of the UN's collective security framework. This study brings into focus a re-examination of the normative frameworks that guides the United Nations cooperation with regional organisations as far as implementation issues are concerned by bringing out the shortfalls and gaps. The study does this by providing an alternative perspective to the understanding and real meaning of the Chapter VIII in order to encourage concrete and improved partnership between the UN and the AU as well as other regional organisations.

With respect to the contribution to future research, the study has shown that the effectiveness of the UN//AU partnership is also connected to the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa and how the AU, especially, manages its cooperation with other organisations like the EU and NATO on the continent. Presently, the RECs do not play a major role in the UN/AU partnership although they are the building blocs of the AU Peace and Security Architecture. The importance of the RECs was, in particular, illustrated in the Malian case study where the UN/AU cooperation involved ECOWAS. Moreover, in the case of Somalia, the study also revealed the role that the EU, in particular, plays in that mission. Currently, no comprehensive studies exist to examine the roles that the RECs and organisations like the EU that are also undertaking peacekeeping in Africa

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can play in the partnership. Future research on how to strengthen the partnership can focus on the roles these organisations can play.

1.6. SCOPE OF STUDY

The study covered all aspects of the UN/AU partnerships, both at the headquarters level and at the field level. Principally, it covered the strategic partnership between the UNSC and the AUPSC; institutional partnership between the UN Secretariat and the AUC; and operational partnership in Mali, Sudan and Somalia. This was to provide a more comprehensive review of the partnership, rather than focusing on specific cases of UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships which limits the in-depth understanding and proper appreciation of how it works in practice, its associated challenges, outcomes and benefits. The study extended over the period since the establishment of the AU in 2002 to 2014. The selection of this time frame was not a random one, but rather premised on two major considerations. First, apart from the fact that the AU was established in 2002, the period also witnessed an ambitious partnership between the AU and the UN in peacekeeping operations. This was evidenced by the various forms of partnership that emerged between the UNSC and the PSC in the deployment of peacekeeping missions to Burundi, Sudan, Somalia and Mali. The second reason had to do with the more distinctive and 'revolutionary' way in which these partnerships emerged. Thus, the spontaneous manner in which the UN and the AU responded to the fast changing peacekeeping environment during the period.

Clearly, the choice of this period promises a rich contribution to the in-depth understanding of the partnership and how it should evolve in the future. But while the study concentrates on the period since the inception of the AU, it is important to also mention that there can be no clear-cut date for a research of this kind. Therefore, the study also draws on the events that took place during the period of the OAU, the predecessor of the AU in the 1990s when it also cooperated with the UN.

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1.7. ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS

The study is organized into six (6) chapters. Chapter one constitutes the introduction and background to the study. It covers the statement of the problem, the research objectives, research questions, significance of the study, and the scope of the study. Chapter two presents the literature review of the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations and the theoretical framework adopted for the study. Chapter three discusses the research methodology of the study which includes the research design, sampling techniques, and the methods of data collection and analysis. Chapter four discusses and analyses the research findings based on the research objectives of the study. Chapter five illustrates the research findings using three case studies of UN/AU partnership in Mali (AFISMA to MINUSMA); Somalia (UNSOA & AMISOM); and Sudan (UNAMID). Lastly, Chapter six presents the summary of findings, states the conclusion and offers pragmatic recommendations on how to further strengthen the UN/AU partnership at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively.

1.8. CONCLUSION

The partnership between the UN and the AU in the field of peacekeeping has become a central feature of global security cooperation since 2002. Despite the fact that both organisations pursue similar objectives in Africa, their efforts in responding to existing and emerging peace and security threats have not always been coherent and consistent as it should be. It has been fraught with a range of challenges and difficulties. Moreover, the relationship remains more *ad hoc* than systematic and piece-meal than comprehensive. Also, although the partnership occurs at three different levels (strategic, institutional and operational), most existing studies apart from UN and AU official documents on how to improve the system for effectiveness have focused largely on the operational level to the detriment of the other two levels. These were some of the gaps and difficulties that motivated this research, in order to find ways through which both organisations can create a more coherent and systematic partnership. After the introduction and background to the study, this chapter presented, among others, the statement of the problem, the research

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objectives, the research questions, significance of the study, the scope of the study and the arrangement of chapters.

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ENDNOTES

[1]Chapter VIII of the UN Charter acknowledges the scope for contribution of regional organisations or coalition force to the settlement of disputes and the maintenance of international peace and security.
[2] See NATO, 2014, "NATO's relations with the United Nations" http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm, accessed 20 October 2014.
[3] The decisions and management of peacekeeping operation at the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council is considered to be the strategic level.
[4] The management of peacekeeping operation at the level of the UN Secretariat in New York, USA and the level of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia is referred to as the institutional level.
[5]The field-based management of peacekeeping operations at the mission headquarters is considered to be the operational level (UN, 2008)
[6] Department of Political Affairs. (2014). United Nations – African Union Cooperation. http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/unlo. Accessed on 20 December 2014.
[7] See the Communique, of the Peace and Security Council, 265th meeting, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2011, PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCLXV).

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the existing literatures on UN/AU partnerships in peacekeeping operations in line with the research objectives, defines the major concepts and discusses the theoretical framework adopted for the study. It begins with a discourse of two major concepts used in the study namely, peacekeeping operation and partnership. Second, the available literatures on UN/AU partnerships are reviewed, with a view to identifying the gaps and how they inform or justify the study. Lastly, the theoretical framework adopted for the study is discussed. In this particular section of the chapter, two different types of inter-organisational cooperation theories, exchange theory and attraction theory are emphasized.

2.2. THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP

Partnership is a topic of considerable interest in disciplines such as business management and administration, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology and political science. The term was first used in business law during the second half of the 20th Century to refer to a contract for sharing fairly the profits and loss of a joint business (Uhlik, 2007: 33). However, over time this understanding of partnership as a fair division of profit and loss was translated into the organisational development and management fields. Since the past two decades, partnership has been employed as one of the predominant architectures for global peacekeeping operations, particularly, in Africa (Derblom, Frisell, and Schmidt, 2008:39; Murithi, 2009; Balas, 2011). However, there exists a lack of conceptual clarity surrounding what exactly is meant by partnership. Commenting on this difficulty, Ling (2000:82) concludes that the literature on partnership amounts to methodological anarchy

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and definitional chaos because of the lack of a common and accepted meaning of the term. Generically, it has been used without any precise definition, resulting in multiple interpretations. This is why Sullivan and Williams (2007), for instance, posit that many partnerships encounter difficulties due to different interpretations of their nature and purpose. More often than not, partnership is typically used interchangeably to describe other forms of inter-organisational relationships such as collaboration, cooperation, coordination, alliance and joint working, though these terms mean different things to different people. Accordingly, in line with the literatures on partnership, collaboration and cooperation will be the associated synonyms for this study.

Sullivan and Skelcher (2002:1) assert that "partnership is about sharing responsibility and overcoming the inflexibility created by organisational, sectoral and even national boundaries." Stuart, Walker and Minzner (2011:3) on the other hand, also define partnerships as a "strategically formed relationships between organisations that involve varying degrees of resource sharing, joint decision-making and collaborative work to address common interests, achieve shared goals or benefit mutual stakeholders." Likewise, Mohiddin (1998:5) also defines partnership as the 'highest stage of working relationship between different people or organisation brought together by commitment to common objectives, bonded by long experience of working together, and sustained by subscription to common visions.' Although, the various conceptualizations above are very useful in better understanding what partnerships are, the study finds the explanation by Stuart, Walker and Minzner (2011:3) very useful. Hence, it was adopted as the working definition for the study. Since the purpose of the study is to examine the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations, it is important to adopt a restrictive definition that will facilitate the analysis of the research findings. And predictably, the conceptualization of partnership by Stuart, Walker and Minzner sufficiently does that.

Admittedly, while the definition of partnerships by Stuart, Walker and Minzner (2011:3) is not very comprehensive, it does help distinguish partnerships from other forms of relationships. What their definition implies is that a partnership is a shared commitment, where all partners have a right and an obligation to participate and will be affected equally by the benefits and disadvantages arising from the partnership. Essentially, their definition

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emphasizes three important points: (a) it shows that partnerships are initiated by organisations with common objectives or goals; (b) it shows that there should be a mutually agreed division of labour; and (c) there should be equal share of benefits and risks. Significantly, these points reverberate well with Walsh's (n.d) assertion that, the partnering process implies a commitment to working towards common objectives; a high level of mutual trust; a willingness to cooperate, share responsibility and accept accountability; and where necessary, to alter the prevailing institutional structures. Put differently, partnership goals are generally premised on the need for organisations to combine their resources and strengths to produce positive outcomes and reduce unintended negative outcomes.

Carroll and Ashford (1995) opine that partnerships can occur at two levels: The formal and informal levels. According to them, formal partnerships are characterized by contractual obligations and formal structures of control. This type of partnership requires formal hierarchy, or rules and regulations, where organisational structures and processes can detail how they function. On the other hand, informal partnership involves adaptable arrangements in which behavioural norms, rather than contractual obligations, determine the contributions of parties. This type of partnership is voluntaristic and organic according to Astley (1984, cited from Carroll and Ashford, 1995). The conditions under which informal partnerships can arise include: Partners perceiving they will be in contact with each other for a long time; believing that it is to their advantage to be in partnership; and recognising the need to reciprocate for any benefits received (Axelrod, 1984, cited from Carroll and Ashford, 1995:10). For Carroll and Ashford (1995), the type of partnership can also vary with how organisations are horizontally or vertically connected to each other. A horizontal linked organisation involves those organisations engaged in common tasks or even competitors while vertical linked organisations are those where there is a superior and subordinate or the top and down levels of organisations.

2.2.1. Key Components of Partnerships

According to Fowler (2000), partnerships are associated with the following characteristics: long-term shared responsibility, reciprocal obligation, equality, mutuality and balance of power. Equally, Wanni (2010) and Crawford (2003) also identified or emphasized

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principles such as reciprocity, accountability, joint decision-making, respect, trust, transparency, sustainability and mutual interests as underlying partnerships. In the same way, Newman (2001:123) also points to the fact that partnerships could as readily be characterised by instrumentalism, bargaining and pragmatic compliance as well as trust, equality and reciprocity. While these elements of partnership are not exhaustive, they nevertheless help in understanding the range of factors that may influence the development and efficacy of partnerships. Particularly, following these elements will ensure whether there would be effective working relationships that will successfully enable partner organisations to achieve their overall goals or not. Some of these elements of partnerships are examined in much more details below.

To begin with, a common or a shared understanding of what organisations can collectively achieve must exist for a partnership to succeed (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Thus, whether or not organisations will cooperate with each other depends, to a larger extent, on: (i) their expectations about whether such partnerships will yield meaningful results, particularly, against the balance of time and energy that it requires, and (ii) the perceived achievement of their goals to be dependent on cooperation from other organisations. Also important is a clear understanding of each organisation's roles and responsibilities regarding the division of labor as well as an understanding of the frameworks, culture, values, and approaches of partnering organisations (Tett, Crowther and O'Hara, 2003, cited from Ansell and Gash, 2007 ; Bailey & Dolan, 2011). Having shared objectives and purposes help to build trust and openness and recognizes the value and contribution of each partner organisation. In addition, it also leads to improved coordination of policies, programmes, and service delivery, and ultimately, better outcomes. Lastly, organisations must acknowledge the existence of separate organisational aims and objectives and their connection to jointly agreed aims and objectives in order to succeed in a partnership (Bailey & Dolan, 2011).

The level of commitment and compliance with agreed norms and objectives of participating organisations is another critical variable in explaining the success or failure of partnerships (Aning, 1999; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 2000; Gunton and Day, 2003; Tett, Crowther, and O'Hara, 2003). Some organisations may engage in partnerships for some

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egoistic reasons such as to either secure legitimacy for their position or to fulfil a legal obligation. Commitment also requires the willingness of partner organisations to abide by the results of joint deliberations even if they do not support it fully. However, this is not necessarily so in practice as the interests of organisations may influence them to take arbitrary actions and ignore joint deliberations. Above all, it is also contingent on deepening the trust that all organisations will respect the perspectives and interests of others.

Closely related to the above is the need for effective communication at all levels within the partnership and within organisations to share and access all knowledge and information (Brinkerhoff, 1999; Ansell and Gash, 2007). This is an effective mechanism for developing and maintaining trust which is a very important characteristic of partnerships. Ideally, in partnerships, there is the need for an open and honest communication between partners for the exchange of information in an open network to build shared understanding and values. To put it briefly, effective communications lie at the heart of the process of building trust, mutual respect, shared understanding and a commitment to the processes in partnership. However, in reality, factors such as power dynamics, organisational interests and bureaucratic politics makes communication between partners sometimes very difficult to achieve. This is particularly true for the UN and the AU, where both organisations struggle to build trust, mutual respect and shared commitment due to the bureaucratic politics and power imbalance between them. For example, in the UN, any decision about the partnership is subject to the explicit consent of the members of the UNSC, especially, the Permanent five (P5) members, who by virtue of their influence and financial muscle or 'power of the purse', control the way the UN operates in general (Adebajo, 2007, Othieno and Samasuwo, 2007: 34). This bureaucratic dynamics makes it difficult for strategic decisions and policies to be taken without the influence of the P5.

A shared decision-making process in which partners have equal powers must also exist in partnerships. Brinkerhoff (1999), for instance, argues that equality of decision-making and mutual influence is the key characteristics distinguishing partnership from other types of relationships. Issues of power, especially, in partnerships are very critical because it has an impact on trust and the development of effective and sustainable cooperation (Bailey &

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Dolan, 2011). But in reality, as argued by Rummery (2002), partnership sometimes reinforces power inequalities that are already in existence, placing stronger organisations in a relatively powerful position vis-à-vis weaker ones. Murithi (2009: 16) observes this in the UN/AU partnership and argues that, the relationship remain an asymmetric one due to the fact that the UN is a much older institution, with more resources and experience as compared to the AU.

Clear working arrangements are required if the shared decision-making process in partnerships is to be successful as it will help avoid domination by some organisations (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Bailey & Dolan, 2011). Specifically, partnerships must emphasize the clarity of roles and responsibilities while valuing the separate roles and the different experiences and skill levels required from each organisation. In the UN Prodi report in 2008, the UN Secretary-General reiterated the importance of this in the UN/AU partnership and encouraged the UNSC and the AUPSC to clarify their relationship (UN, 2008a). The significance of this, he noted, is for both organisations to exercise their comparative advantages in initiating peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Joint work also enhances the perception of one's own role and expands the knowledge of the partners' work (UN, 2008a; AU, 2012). It also helps organisations to learn about each other much better, and strengthens organisational trust which can result in a more intensive and open sharing of information (Haugevik, 2007). Raisiene (2010), for instance, posits that sufficient information increases efficiency of joint work and prompts performance progress. For example, the sharing of information has inspired the UN and the AU to work together at various levels to respond to African conflicts, and also to learn from each other's experiences, knowledge, skills, administrative procedures and working methods (Boutellis and Williams, 2013a).[1]

2.2.2. Benefits and Limitations of Partnerships

Ideally, partnership in the generic sense is to help organisations achieve their overall goals more effectively and efficiently. However, in practice, this is not always the case as it is often fraught with numerous barriers. This section assesses some of the potential benefits and limitations of partnerships.

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In terms of the potential benefits or advantages of partnerships in general, Kogut (1988) and Polanyi (1966) argue that effective partnerships help in reducing transaction costs, enables an improved strategic position and afford an opportunity for organisational learning, particularly, the transfer of tacit knowledge. Contractor and Lorage (1988) also point out that it helps in risk reduction, achievement of economies of scale or rationalisation, technological exchange and to gain comparative advantage in relation to organisations outside the partnership. Partnerships also facilitate the sharing of ideas and formation of creative solutions, enhances more effective communication internally and externally, provides increases in jobs and training opportunities for organisation staff (Miller & Ahmad, 2000; Frank & Smith, 2006; Radermacher et al., 2011). Equally important is the fact that partnerships also benefit the target population who are recipients of service provision (Newman, 2001; Frank & Smith, 2006).

Additionally, partnership involves mutual benefits that range from additional resources which results from the exchanging and sharing of resources to achieve jointly agreed purposes, increased credibility, better understanding and responsiveness to common problems or needs (Newman, 2001; Skelcher & Sullivan, 2008). More significantly, partnerships adopt a multi-agency approach to multidimensional problems and have the ability to manage uncertainty and complex problems. It also helps organisations to do more with less resource and provides the incentives to specialise or diversify. For Skelcher & Sullivan (2008), partnerships can as well bring about some accomplishments that could not have been achieved by organisations acting independently. The partnership between the UN and the AU in Somalia and Sudan is a typical example. Both organisations could not have made any significant progress in stabilizing the situation in the two countries by acting independently due the dependency on each other's resources and comparative advantages. Taken together, these benefits or advantages offer a clear explanation of why organisations may seek to collaborate.

On the limitations or disadvantages of partnerships, it can include a loss of status and legitimacy, loss of control and autonomy, conflict over domain, goals and methods, and delays in finding solutions to problems. According to Newman (2001), cooperation can render decision-making more complex and time consuming, leading to increased delays and

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reduced responsiveness. Partnerships may also lead to the loss of autonomy and the ability to unilaterally control outcomes. In the context of the UN/AU partnership, both organisations have to consult each other or agree on any decision concerning how, for example, UNAMID should operate in terms of its mandate. None of the organisations has exclusive control over the operations of the mission. This is a typical example of how organisations loose their autonomy in partnerships. However, this is not always the case as there have been instances where partners take decisions without consulting each other. The request by the UNSC to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to assess whether war crimes had been committed in Darfur which led to the indictment of President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan is one specific instance (Bah and Lortan, 2011:6; Anyidoho, 2012; Agwai, 2012; Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012;). The AU was not consulted on the issue and even when the AUPSC made repeated formal requests for a deferral of his prosecution, the UNSC failed to consider it.

In partnerships, organisations also risk being linked with failure because they have to share the costs of failing such as loss of reputation, status and financial position (Newman, 2001; Frank & Smith, 2006). Partnership can also result in the loss of resources which can be time, money, information, loss of technological superiority; risk of losing competitive position. Furthermore, organisations may not always share the same values and interests, which in turn can create difficulties in reaching an agreement on partnership and service delivery goals. Partnership difficulties may also commonly stem from lack of trust, difficulties of accountability, inequalities and power differentials between organisations (Newman, 2001 Frank & Smith, 2006; Radermacher et al., 2011).

2.3. DEFINING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The practice of peacekeeping began in 1948 when the first United Nations military observers were deployed to the Middle East. However, the Charter of the United Nations does not contain any explicit provisions for peacekeeping operations. As a result, peacekeeping operation is seen as an innovative creation of the United Nations. The former UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Dag Hammarskjöld, described it as "Chapter VI and Half" of the UN Charter, placing it between the traditional method of resolving disputes

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peacefully (Chapter VI) and more forceful action such as embargoes, sanctions and military intervention (Chapter VII) (UN, 1945; Goulding, 1993; Diehl, 1993; Thakur, 1994; Galadima, 2006: 298; Bildt, 2011). Generally, there is no clear-cut definition of peacekeeping operations. Many of the definitions including that of the UN itself according to Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010:18), have depended on the lessons learnt since the first peacekeeping deployment in 1948 and peoples own experiences, knowledge and understanding of the concept.

Historically, the concept was first used and developed by Dag Hammarskjöld in 1957 to mean the deployment of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops to monitor or observe a ceasefire between hostile parties with their consent (Goulding, 1993; Diehl, 1993; DPKO, 2012; Bildt 2011). Hammarskjöld's definition represented the traditional form of peacekeeping operations where peacekeepers mainly served as a buffer zone between hostile factions and provided crucial support for political efforts to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. Diehl (1993) also defines peacekeeping operations as any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes. Other scholars like Goulding (1993) also defines it as a technique set up to help settle armed conflicts.

In its traditional sense, Nkiwane (2001) maintained that peacekeepers do not usually play a direct role in the political efforts to resolve the conflict. The political processes were left for regional organisations, bilateral partners and special United Nations envoys (UN, 2008b). Moreover, in the traditional peacekeeping operations, there were also peace agreements that were being monitored or implemented by peacekeepers. Examples of this type of operations included the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). These missions were mainly deployed as an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed (UN, 2008b). As noted by Shimizu and Sandler (2002), the tasks usually assigned to traditional peacekeeping operations were essentially military in character. They included: observation, monitoring and reporting; supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms; and interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure.

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Traditional peacekeeping operations also highlighted the significance of the basic principles of peacekeeping which consist of: consent of the parties; impartiality; and the non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mission mandate (UN, 2008b, 2013). This body of guiding principles were developed after the deployment of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF1) in 1956 in Egypt, following the Suez Crisis. According to Marrack Goulding (1993, cited from Nkiwane, 2001), these principles, "arose from the fact that peacekeeping operations were interim arrangements set up, as UNEF had been, without prejudice to the claims and positions of the parties."

More concretely, whilst consent implies that peacekeepers are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict, impartiality requires peacekeepers to implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any party (Goulding, 1993; Diehl, 1993; UN, 2008b). Non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate means that, although peacekeeping operation is not an enforcement tool, it may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the UNSC, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate (Goulding, 1993; Diehl, 1993; UN, 2008b). Although most of these principles have been contested and challenged, according to Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, (2004:3) in recent times, they still define the essence of peacekeeping in contemporary times. Indeed, they distinguish peacekeeping from other forms of military actions.

2.3.1. ***The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping Operations: From Traditional to Multi-dimensional Operations***

The realities of the post-Cold War period led to an evolution in the structure and meaning of traditional peacekeeping missions. In the early post-Cold War era, Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2004:3) assert that peacekeeping operations were characterised by a fundamental change in their nature, function and composition. The functions associated with traditional peacekeeping operations according to them became more diverse and complex. In their book, "Keeping the Peace: United Nations in an Emerging World Order", Durch and Blechman (1992) attributed this changing context to the shifting nature of conflicts from inter-state to intra-state conflicts and the internationalisation of modern conflicts. The 2008 Capstone Doctrine of the UN reiterated this and noted that, while the

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end of the Cold War coincided with a general decline in the incidence of conflict around the world, internal armed conflicts constitute the vast majority of wars (UN, 2008b). The challenges posed by intra-state wars in countries such as Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, thus called into question the traditional conceptualisation of peacekeeping operations, as the UN‘s capabilities was tested to the limit.

In the early 1990s, the conceptualisation of peacekeeping by Dag Hammarskjöld changed considerably. Traditional peacekeeping which mostly involved observational tasks by the military and police shifted to complex "multidimensional" peacekeeping operations (Goulding, 1993; Diehl, 1993; Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2004; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010). In his important report "*Agenda for Peace*" in 1992, the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali gave an institutional voice to the changing nature of peacekeeping. He argued that peacekeeping was one of four tools that the UN could use to prevent and resolve conflicts, the other three being preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding (UN, 1992). He further described peacekeeping operations as the "deployment of UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well (UN, 1992). Although his definition marked a watershed in the way peacekeeping was conceptualised, it excluded non-UN actors like regional organisations such as ECOWAS and OAS who were also involved in peacekeeping operations at the time. Nevertheless, his definition distinguished the nature of post-Cold War peacekeeping and the traditional notion of the concept.

Generally, the new "multi-dimensional" operations combined robust military forces capable of limited peace enforcement tasks with a strong civilian component including, police, civil administration, humanitarian agencies, justice and correctional officers (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010). In contrast to traditional operations, multi-dimensional operations play a direct role in the political efforts to resolve conflicts and are often mandated to provide good offices or promote national political dialogue and reconciliation. Peacekeepers also perform a wide range of tasks comprising, assisting in humanitarian relief, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants,

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protecting civilians, restoring the rule of law, promoting human rights, and development assistance. The missions were usually deployed in the context of internal or civil wars to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and sometimes, the transition to legitimate government, in the absence of a formal peace agreement (UN, 2008b; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010). Examples of such missions included the: UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) and the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II); UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); and the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

In some exceptional cases, peacekeeping operations were temporarily deployed to assume the legislative and administrate functions of the state, in order to support the transfer of authority from one sovereign entity to another, or to help the state to establish administrative structures that may not have existed previously (UN, 2008b; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004). The UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), and the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, were examples of such missions. Peacekeeping missions were also deployed in situations where conflicts were still ongoing in countries such as: former Yugoslavia, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR); Rwanda, UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); and Somalia, UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) (Stewart, 1993; Bowden, 1999; Boulden, 2001; Dallaire, 2003; Ndulo, 2011).

The transformation and expansion of peacekeeping was not without challenges. In Somalia, Bowden (1999) maintained that the UN and the United States had to pull out, after several military disasters that killed eighteen US soldiers in October 1993 (Spear and Keller, 1996; Fleitz, 2002; Aning and Bah, 2008; Aning and Aubyn, 2013a). The consequences of the UN's retreat from Somalia became apparent in Rwanda when it watched from the sidelines as 800,000 people were killed in the 1994 genocide (Anyidoho, 1997; Jones, 2001; Dallaire, 2003). A year later after the Rwandan genocide, the Bosnian Muslim town of Srebrenica, was besieged by Serb militias. This was one of the worst war crimes committed in Europe since the end of the Second World War. During this siege,

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8,000 Muslims were killed under the eyes of the UN peacekeeping contingent deployed there (Thakur and Thayer, 1995; Boulden, 2001; Fleitz, 2002; Ndulo, 2011).

Following these setbacks, the UN came under severe criticisms. From then onwards, the UN limited the number of new peacekeeping deployments and began a process of self-reflection to prevent such failures from occurring again (UN, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). In order to better improve the capacity of the UN to respond to the various forms of conflict, and also to address the mistakes of peacekeeping in the 1990s to meet future challenges, the UN launched the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (also known as the "Brahimi Report") in August 2000 (UN, 2000). According to Gray (2001), the Brahimi report just like Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 Agenda for Peace, renewed the commitment of UN member states to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Report made several recommendations on strategic, political and operational level to ensure a more effective peacekeeping operation.

Among the numerous recommendations issued by the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000), there are five key issues which can be assumed as the minimum criteria for peacekeeping operations. These include: (i) The international community must ensure that peacekeeping is an appropriate option, given the nature of the conflict; and (ii) there must be peace to keep. Thus, the parties to a conflict must be willing to cease fighting and pursue their objectives through political and other non-violent means; (iii) all key parties to a conflict must agree to the UN's involvement and its role in helping them resolve their conflict; (iv) peacekeeping operations must be part of a more comprehensive strategy to help resolve a conflict by taking into account its regional dimension, and addressing the political, economic, developmental, institution-building, humanitarian and human rights aspects; and (v) the UNSC must ensure that the mandate is achievable. This includes authorising the deployment of an appropriate number of troops to implement a mission's mandate and the provision of adequately trained and equipped troops (UN, 2000; Gray, 2001; Durch, 2001; Durch, Holt, Earle and Shanahan, 2003; Durch, 2006; Murithi, 2009).

While these five recommendations are not representative of the complete range of suggestions proposed by the Brahimi Report, they can be conceived as embodying the

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minimum “Brahimi Criterion” to ensure the successful implementation of peacekeeping operations. However, Murithi (2009) argues that the reality of contemporary conflicts is such that even this minimum Brahimi criterion is not always met when undertaking peacekeeping missions. For example, Murithi underscores the fact that the basic conditions required for an effective peacekeeping operation based on the Brahimi criterion were absent in Darfur. Thus, there was no peace to keep as the government and the parties pursued a military solution to the conflict even when UNAMID was deployed (Appiah-Mensah, 2006; Patrick, 2008). In spite of the shortcomings, the progress made by UN peacekeeping since 2000 has been partly, influenced by the publication of the report (Shireen, 2002; Williams and Bellamy, 2007; Johnstone, 2010; Ban Ki Moon, 2010).

Essentially, one important area that has been influenced by the Brahimi report is the focus of today’s peacekeeping operations on conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, development and sustainable peace. Specifically, following the publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000, and the changing strategic context within which peacekeepers operate, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) further broadened the concept of peacekeeping in 2008 in the Capstone Doctrine[2] (UN, 2008b). Without giving any explicit definition, the DPKO and the DFS categorised peacekeeping operations as one of the following range of peace and security activities (this is represented in figure 2.1):

i. **Conflict prevention and mediation**: Conflict prevention involves diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.
ii. **Peacemaking**: It generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.
iii. **Peacekeeping**: it is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.

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iv. **Peace enforcement**: It involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force which requires the explicit authorization of the UNSC.

v. **Peacebuilding:** it aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. (DPKO, 2008: 17-18)

Figure 2.1. Range of Peace and Security Activities of UN Peacekeeping Operation

Source: UN, 2008b

The DPKO/DFS definition, as illustrated in figure 2.1, shows that peacekeeping operations are rarely limited to one type of activity. Thus, whiles peacekeeping missions may be deployed, in principle, to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and peacebuilding activities (UN, 2008b). Peacekeeping missions may also use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the UNSC, to defend themselves and their mandate, mainly in situations where the state is unable to provide security and maintain public order (UN, 2008b). As figure 2.1 shows, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention,

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peacemaking and peacebuilding, are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, they do not provide a comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict if used in isolation.

The recognition of these linkages led to the development of the concept of "integrated missions" where all actors, including the military, police, humanitarian agencies, civil administration, correctional and justice officers, political officers, electoral officers and human rights officials, work together with the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) as the overall head of mission (Eide, et al , 2005).[3] The ultimate objective of integrated missions is to foster coherence between the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and development branches of missions to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace and sustainable development. It was initially developed for Kosovo and has since been revised, refined and adapted to UN missions in Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, DRC, Burundi, Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, and Mali.

Importantly, the study finds the conceptualisation by the DPKO and DFS very pertinent, in the sense that it situates peacekeeping operations in the broader spectrum of measures designed to prevent and limit the incidence and lethality of armed conflicts. Hence, for the purposes of this study, peacekeeping operation is used to refer to the broader range of operations including conflict prevention; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace enforcement; and peacebuilding as illustrated in figure 2.1. In this sense, it is not used in the traditional form or generic sense of the term which implies that there is a peace agreement or ceasefire in place that is being monitored or implemented (Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012). Rather, peacekeeping operation is used to refer to the broad range of activities described by the DPKO and DFS thus what the UN and the AU would today refer to as peace operations and peace support operations respectively. For that reason and to avoid any confusion with traditional 'peacekeeping', peacekeeping operations, peace operations and peace support operations are used interchangeably in the work.

The transformation of the nature and scope of traditional peacekeeping operations to multi-dimensional operations was also accompanied by the rising role of regional organisations in peacekeeping. Thus, more and more regional organisations became engaged in peacekeeping operations independently of, or in parallel or cooperation with the UN.

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Therefore, having defined PKOs and examined the changing dynamics of UN peacekeeping from traditional to multi-dimensional operations, the subsequent section reviews literatures on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in general as well as UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships in Africa, in particular. For the purposes of simplicity and easy understanding, the review is categorized into three clusters or thematic areas, but the lines between the categories are blurred, and more importantly, many of the works also belong to more than one category. The three clusters are: UN cooperation with regional organisations in peacekeeping operations; AU peacekeeping operations; and the evolution and nature of UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships. A summary of the existing gaps in the reviewed literatures is also provided.

2.3.2. Cooperation between the UN and Regional Organisations in Peacekeeping Operations

Cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in PKOs has become a central feature of the global peacekeeping landscape. Whilst Norrie MacQueen (2006, cited from Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004:65) refers to this as "partnership peacekeeping", St-Pierre (2007) calls it "hybrid operations." In reality, most contemporary or post-Cold War UN missions have arguably been hybrid in nature. Jones and Cherif (2004) identify four different types of cooperation that exists between the UN and regional organisations. These are described in table 2.1.

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Table 2.1: Various forms of UN/Regional Cooperation in PKOs

Type	Characteristics	Examples
INTEGRATED	UN and regional organisation operate with single or joint chain of command	Darfur (UN and AU), Kosovo (UN/EU/OSCE)
COORDINATED	UN and regional organisation are coordinated but operate under different chains of command	Kosovo UN/NATO Somalia (AU, UN)
PARALLEL	UN deploys alongside other regional organisation with no formal coordination	Afghanistan (UN, NATO, EU), Democratic Republic of Congo (UN, EU), Iraq (UN, NATO)
SEQUENTIAL	UN precedes or follows a regional peacekeeping forces	Liberia (ECOWAS, UN), Burundi (AU, UN), Mali (UN/AU/ECOWAS)

Source: Jones and Cherif, 2004.

Each category as illustrated in table 2.1 differs, in terms of its nature and motivations. Sequential operations, for instance, usually work when the UN lacks the political will or simply do not have the capacity to deal with an urgent violent conflict situation according to (Bah and Jones, 2008) and Bubna (n.d). For parallel, coordinated and integrated operations, several factors such as: institutional competition; concerns about UN command and control systems; logistical and financial issues; political divisions at the Security Council; and challenges to the legitimacy of the UN can motivate their formation (Jones and Cherif, 2004; Mancini, 2011; Gowan and Sherman, 2012, Koops).

As noted by the UN (1945, 1992, 1995); Malan (1998); Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004); Gray (2004); Diehl and Cho (2006); and Aning (2008a), the normative framework underlying the UN's cooperation with regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security can be found in the UN Charter, particularly under the Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements. Referring to some provisions of the UN Charter, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004) point out that majority of regional activities relating to international peace and security is governed under Article 33 (Chapter VI) and Article 52-4 (Chapter VIII). These Articles encourage 'regional arrangements or agencies' to be

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proactive in peacefully resolving conflicts that occur within their neighborhood. Specifically, Article 33(1) specifies that parties to a dispute should first of all seek to resolve their difficulties through negotiations and/or by 'resort to regional arrangements or agencies.' According to Article 52, regional organisations or agencies may engage in matters of international peace and security provided their activities uphold the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. It further stipulates that regional organisations or agencies must keep the UNSC fully informed of their activities. Article 53, on the other hand, emphasizes that regional organisations or agencies may not conduct enforcement actions without authorization from the UNSC.

For Robert (2003), the meaning of these provisions is that the UN created a system flexible enough not to grant the Security Council a monopoly of authority on issues of international peace and security. However, Gray (2004) posits that despite this relatively clear framework, in practice the legal bases both for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations for peacekeeping and enforcement actions have not been made clear within the resolutions of either the UNSC or the organisations concerned. There is vagueness in the division of responsibility between the UN and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Aning (2008a:17) seems to support this view by indicating that in seeking to improve the cooperation and coordination between the UN and regional organisations, there are several issues that should be resolved concerning how to interpret Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. According to him, the type, nature and division of responsibilities must be clarified. This will involve addressing some of the definitional and conceptual issues inherent in the relationship. But on the contrary, for scholars like Henrikson (1996:43), the ambiguities in Chapter VIII was deliberately intended by its designers to enable the UN and regional bodies to work, at least theoretically in unison.

According to Henrikson (1996:38), the UN was intended to be the paramount world institution, nonetheless, some fundamental concessions were made in 1945 to the idea of regionalism and region-based peacemaking in order to give regional entity elbowroom to deal with local disputes in the first instance and make it less necessary for the UN itself to become involved. Agreeing with this assertion, the UNSC Special Research Report in 2011 (UN, 2011a:3) also concluded that the ambiguity and imprecision of Chapter VIII were

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most likely deliberate and allows flexibility for future understandings and arrangements. Murithi (2007b) draws on this argument and makes the point that the UN and AU were able to establish the hybrid mission in Darfur because of the flexibility of Chapter VIII which provides the leeway to interpret and operationalise such a relationship. Gelot, Gelot and Coning (2012) also maintain that the flexibility and 'constructive ambiguity' with respect to the regional arrangements serve many useful purposes. According to them, they enable the UNSC to rapidly share the burdens with an array of actors. Moreover, some strong states and regional actors have also at times preferred flexibility, so that they do not have to share authority over ownership of a particular intervention with the UNSC (Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012).

Related to Gelot, Gelot and Coning's line of thought is the argument proffered by Barnett (1995:441). He maintains that though Chapter VIII of the UN Charter did stake out a potential role for regional organisations, the language adopted reflected the contentious and unresolved nature of the proceedings at San Francisco Conference in 1945. But more importantly, it also suggests that the UN found only limited use for regional organisations. In addition, he states that the lack of lasting and well-defined relationship between the UN and regional organisations should also be attributed to superpower conflict that both paralysed the UN and viewed regional organisations as an extension of the Cold War. In the same way, Durward (2006) is also of the view that the origins of Chapter VIII lie in disquiet about the legitimacy of the UNSC as the prime source of authority for regional action. She maintains that during the drafting of the UN Charter, Chapter VIII came about as a compromise solution between those who wanted a single collective security body in the form of the UN, with a Security Council that was free to consider the problems of any region, versus those, particularly from the Americas, who wanted to preserve their independence and limit United States hegemony. She concluded that essentially, it was a bargain between the powerful and the weak, in which the weak agreed to cooperate in return for a strengthening of their own position.

On whether or not cooperation between the UN and regional organisations represents a better mechanism for pacific dispute settlement, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004: 304-305), in their book, "understanding peacekeeping" argue that although regionalisation of

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peacekeeping is a very important issue, it is misleading in several aspects. First, they maintain that regional organisations are not the only important non-UN actors in relations to peace operations: coalition of the willing and individual states as well as private security contractors all play significant roles. Second, regionalisation is occurring unevenly across the planet. Thus, while some parts of the world have regional organisations that are willing and able to conduct peace operations, others have the will but lack the relevant capabilities (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004). Moreover, some regional organisations dislike the idea of conducting military operations but are keen to undertake political and observer missions. Others have no desire at all to engage in collective peacekeeping operations of any sort and also some parts of the world have no regional organisations that deal with conflict management issues. Lastly, they conclude that not all regional organisations have confined their activities to their own region as some especially those in the West have operated beyond their neighborhood. However, they failed to provide specific examples and evidence to support these assertions.

In another article by Williams and Bellamy (2005), they reiterated and supported the views expressed by some former UN Secretary-General and other officials of the UN and concluded that regional arrangements do not offer a panacea to the challenges of contemporary peacekeeping. According to them, former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, for example, condemned regionalisation as a "dangerous" idea that threatened to weaken the internationalist basis of the UN. This was after he presented his Agenda for Peace report to the UNSC in 1992 and 1995. Again, they also indicate that former UN Under Secretary-General, Brian Urquhart, also insisted that all peacekeeping operations confront similar challenges and that non-UN actors could make only a limited contribution (Williams and Bellamy, 2005). A former head of the UN's Department of Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, was also quoted to have cautioned that most regional arrangements lacked the experience, bureaucratic structures, and resources necessary to conduct peacekeeping operations effectively (Williams and Bellamy, 2005). Based on the foregoing assertions, Williams and Bellamy (2005) concluded that partnerships between the UN and regional organisations rather bring additional problems. However, they failed to identify the

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specific problems associated with UN-regional organisations partnership in peacekeeping operations in their work.

Arguing along the same lines as Williams and Bellamy, Smith (2011) outlines contemporary peacekeeping challenges such as inadequate personnel, technical and financial constraints and the complex nature of conflicts. And ask the question as to whether a focus on partnerships will endow the UN with ‘predictable, professional and adaptable capacities to confront them. He suggests that partnerships with regional organisations may not solve the most pressing or the most persistent problems because according to him, ‘partnership’ is an overly broad concept that needs to be disaggregated for its implications to be understood. He ended by saying that no matter what the diagnosis, partnerships at least with regional organisation will never be a cure-all for UN peacekeeping.

Tanner (2010:212), however, offers contrasting views on the utility of UN-regional organisation partnerships in peacekeeping operations. He calls for the broadening of partnerships between the UN and the various regional organisations to meet the challenges of global peacekeeping operations. Such efforts, he noted, should rely on existing institutions, normative arrangements and practice. Tanner (2010:212) advocated for a common political framework between the UN and regional organisations to provide a viable foundation for a joint vision, a joint strategy, and the joint responsibility of stakeholders. According to him, the annual retreat between the UN Secretary-General and heads of regional organisations is not sufficient. He advised that the relations between headquarters need to be strengthened and formalised (UN, 2008a; AU, 2012). Similarly, Koops (2012) argues that coordination between the UN and regional organisations is important in order to avoid duplication or outright inter-organisational rivalry. As indicated by Fortna (1993), an institutionalised relation between the UN and regional organisations will lead to beneficial burden-sharing and mutual reinforcement. Therefore, there should be conscious efforts to move from *ad-hoc* cooperation to more permanent and predictable mechanisms because effective peacekeeping partnerships depend on coherent and strategically structured relations at the inter-secretariat level. In that sense, different organisational cultures, agendas and approaches need to be systematically integrated.

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Closely related to the arguments by Tanner and Koops, Gowan and Sherman (2012) opine that although peacekeeping partnerships are complex, it is very necessary. They premised this claim on the fact that while the North African Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the UN are the main actors in global peacekeeping operations today, it is likely that a variety of other organisations including the AU, the Arab League, Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) will play an increasingly prominent role in the future. However, this assertion is untrue because the AU and its RECs like ECOWAS plays a very significant role in global peacekeeping today especially in Africa.

Gowan and Sherman (2012) further argued that these actors would require assistance, ranging from military assistance to administrative back-up and the UN, NATO and the EU will be called upon to play significant supporting roles. In Africa, this seems to be happening now with the establishment of the EU African peace facility which is providing financial support to AMISOM and the establishment of a ten year capacity building programme for the AU by the UN. Managing these complex partnerships will be essential in making existing and new peacekeeping operations succeed because it is likely to involve more and more organisations with very different backgrounds, priorities and abilities in the years ahead. They concluded that organisations will have a better chance of cooperating effectively if they work on three issues in advance: (i) Researching and discussing each others' capabilities and weaknesses; (ii) nurturing strong formal and informal networks across organisations; and (iii) using these networks to share knowledge as freely and quickly as possible.

On the contrary, Mancini (2011), in examining the various peacekeeping partnerships, concluded that partnerships are rarely productive and reliable. According to him, partnerships are increasingly a fact of life for UN peacekeeping operations due to the proliferation of actors involved. However, with the expansion in mandated tasks, and the general complexity of conflict dynamics, he contends that partnerships are inherently complicated and generate further problems. Partnerships create additional challenges including strategic ambiguity, an over-emphasis on process, weakened command and control and unequal burden-sharing. In the same vein, Paddon (2011) also cautions against

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the prioritization of external partnerships by the UN with regional organisations, security alliances and '*ad hoc'* member-state coalitions at the expense of strengthening meaningful internal partnerships among the UN Secretariat, Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) and the UN Security Council (UN 2009; Paddon 2011). Paddon (2011) warns that the heavy focus on external partners which is largely driven by operational exigencies could distract from the ultimately more important task of repairing relations and strengthening partnerships within the UN, among its many components and member states.

Tardy (2010) seems to agree with this argument by asserting that although partnerships are officially promoted by all institutions, internal coordination and coherence are, for each of them, a more important task than building inter-institutional links. He notes that regional organisations are highly heterogeneous in their mandate, institutional form, resources, political clout and level of development as crisis management actors and that make partnerships difficult. Arguably, what the work of Tardy (2010), Mancini (2011) and Paddon (2011) failed to recognise is the fact that in spite of all these challenges, there are at least some benefits and positive outcomes and this study seeks to uncover some of them.

2.4. THE AFRICAN UNION AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The AU has become an important stakeholder in peacekeeping operations in Africa since 2002. In his article "Between Paternalism and Hybrid Partnership: The Emerging UN and Africa Relationship in Peace Operations," Murithi (2007b) probes the AU's efforts in conflict management through peacekeeping operations since its creation in 2002 and compares it with its predecessor, the OAU. He specifically highlights the new innovations in the AU, in terms of, the new bodies, mechanisms, protocols and institutions and how this has caused a paradigm shift from the limited achievements of the OAU.

Equally, Williams (2011) also compares the conflict management capabilities of the AU and the OAU and argues that the AU has conducted a significant number of complex peacekeeping operations as compared to its predecessor, the OAU. And that, although the

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AU still suffers from some of the same structural impediments of its predecessor such as dependence upon external financing and insufficient bureaucrats, standing forces, and logistical capabilities as manifested in its past and current missions in Burundi, Somalia and Sudan, it has pursued a much more active peacekeeping agenda than the OAU. According to Williams (2010) and Murithi (2011), addressing these challenges together with the lack of political consensus among African leaders on collective security norms and practices is the only way that the AU can become more effective in its peacekeeping endeavours. However, the comparison of the OAU and the AU by Williams (2010) and Murithi (2011) is practically inaccurate because peacekeeping was not the OAU's priority. Its priorities, as stated in the OAU charter were: (a) to promote the unity and solidarity of African States; (b) ending colonialism and apartheid; and (c) defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states. These priorities only changed in the early 1990s when apartheid ended in South Africa, and the OAU adopted the "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution" in June 1993 (Albert, 2007). Therefore, to compare the two organisations is methodologically inaccurate.

Writing on the first AU mission in Burundi (AMIB), Aboagye (2004) discusses the rationale behind its establishment, the strategic and operational challenges and draws some lessons for future operations. Whiles AMIB contributed to peace and stability in Burundi, Aboagye (2004), argued that the mission's logistical sustainment and funding was, particularly, problematic due to lack of substantive support within Africa, the UN and the international ccommunity. He noted that the UN and the international community should help build real capacity for African regional bridging operations, in order to plug the gap in the global security architecture, arising from the hesitance of UN intervention and the abdication of the West from UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. In a similar way, Boshoff and Francis (2003) also discuss the AU mission in Burundi, but with a focus on the technical and operational dimensions of the mission. Unlike Aboagye, they focus on the operational level challenges in the theatre of operations such as security threats from the warring factions, weak mandates, troop generation and lack of funds for the effective implementation of the mission's mandate.

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In his article "Working towards an African peacekeeping capability: key issues, challenges and dilemmas in Darfur", Neethling (2006) discusses some dilemmas of the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS). According to him, the challenges faced by AMIS such as political and technical difficulties, weak mandate and poor planning, financial, logistical as well as human resource constraints, suggested that the organisation does not have the capacity to undertake complex peacekeeping operations on its own. He concluded that the AU should join forces with other institutions like the UN, donor agencies and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) whenever it deploys in a complex peace operation where it can exploit it comparative advantage. However, important as his analysis was, Neethling ignored the complexities and challenges involved in such collaborative endeavours as discussed by de Coning (2006:6-7). According to de Coning (2006), the AU's dependency on external resources will deny it the freedom to independently take decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peacekeeping operations it may wish to undertake. Therefore, instead of depending solely on external resources, finding the appropriate balance between Africa and partners interests should dominate the AU's relations with external partners.

In the same way, Mansaray (2008) also argues that although external assistance is required to support AU operations, African-led efforts to resolve these conflicts must be made a priority in the 21st century since Africa is the continent that plays host to more intra-state conflicts. He advised that African leaders must demonstrate genuine political will and make the necessary sacrifice to invest in AU peacekeeping operations on the continent and move away from the tradition of knocking at the UN's door every time there is a crisis. On the contrary, Albert (2007) rather commends the commitment and willingness of African leaders to solve the continents complex conflicts through the adoption of several conflict prevention mechanisms such as the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) of 1993, the AU PSC protocol and the Constitutive Acts of the AU. Nonetheless, Albert (2007) agrees with Mansaray (2008) on the point that inadequate funding and military capacity is a major challenge for the sustainment of AU peacekeeping operations.

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All the same, in spite of the acute resource constraints that confronts the AU, Bah (2010) maintains that its intervention in Sudan demonstrated that it enjoys some degree of political legitimacy among its member states and internationally. He, nonetheless, admits that the intervention exposed the gap between the AU's ambitious mandate and its capacity to implement it. Thus, as a result of the inability of its members to provide resources (financial and logistics), the AU had to rely almost entirely on donors to support AMIS which also highlighted the complex challenges of developing an interlocking system for peace operations. This is to say that in reality, the willingness and the capability gap that dogged the AU in Darfur exposed the risks of mounting a response without the necessary resources to alter the dynamics on the ground in a positive way. Bah (2010) concluded that mandates should be matched by resources, otherwise it would undermine the credibility of the AU in the long-run.

Similarly, Birikorang (2009) also indicates that although the AU declared its intention of seeking 'African solutions to African problems' with the signing of the Constitutive Act and the ratification of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, AMIS highlighted its major challenge in that regard. That is, AMIS revealed the operational challenges of the AU, in terms of the required human, financial and political commitment from the Sudanese government and the rebels that were needed to achieve the mission mandate. She concluded that the concepts of 'African solutions to African problems' and 'Try Africa first' have to be matched by careful planning and coordination at all levels, otherwise they will remain mere 'trials.'

Equally, Appiah-Mensah (2006:2-3) in his article, "The African mission in Sudan: Darfur dilemmas", also examines the operations of the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) and what he describes as the lessons learnt along the tortuous path towards establishing peace in Darfur. He noted that part of the challenges that confronted AMIS came from the intransigence of the parties to the conflict and the cross-border tension between Chad and Sudan. Others included issues of force generation and the AU's over-dependence on external partners for funding and logistical support (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:3). He, however, opined that by all measurable standards, and given the unfavorable environments under which AMIS operated, its performance was remarkable. The mission provided the platform for

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continuous dialogue among the parties and contributed to a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Muganga (2007), however, disagrees and states that it was the challenges and inability of the AU to stabilize the situation that led to the transfer of the mission to the UN which had the sustainable resources and predictable funding to manage and sustain the mission.

The AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is yet another African Union mission that has attracted several scholarly works from different dimensions. Whiles some of the works like Boutellis and Williams (2013a) and Gelot, Gelot and de Coning (2012) looks at the nature of the UN/AU partnership in AMISOM, others such as Beadle (2012), Williams (2012, 2013), Freear and de Coning (2013) examines the successes and challenges that confront the mission. With respect to the nature of the UN/AU cooperation in Somalia, Gelot, Gelot and de Coning (2012) and Gadin (2012) describe it in three forms namely, institutional capacity building: technical advice by the UN to AU to plan, deploy and manage AMISOM; and the provision and delivery of logistical support to AMISOM. While their work examined how the cooperation is working in practice, the aspect about the outcomes of these cooperative frameworks were absent.

Regarding the successes of AMISOM, Freear and de Coning (2013) identified factors such as: The determination of troop/police contributing countries and their funding partners; the blending of bilateral support with a long-term and predictable funding streams; the provision of key specialised equipment and enablers to AMISOM; support of the host population; and mindfulness of the unfolding political process by the mission. These are issues that have contributed to AMISOM's relative success according to them. In the same way, Gadin (2012) also mentions voluntary contributions to the AMISOM trust fund by donors and funding from UN accessed contributions as well as the provision of logistics through UNSOA as some of the factors underpinning the mission's success. While all these factors have been instrumental to the successes of the mission, the role of the AU and IGAD through the numerous political dialogues between the warring factions as well as lead states such as Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia who have consistently provided combat troops to fight Al-Shabaab cannot be underrated.

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On the limitations of AMISOM, Williams (2012) reflects on five main challenges confronting the mission. These challenges include: the legacy of the "Black Hawk Down" episode of October 1993; the shadow of Ethiopia's military campaigns; the African Union's capacity problems; the conflict environment in Mogadishu; and finding an appropriate exit strategy for the mission. He concluded that AMISOM was an ill-conceived mission and a dangerously under-resourced operation that has placed several thousand peacekeepers in harm's way for morally and politically dubious reasons. However, it is important to state that in spite of its challenges, AMISOM has at least done what the UN mission in Somalia (UNISOM) could not do in the 1990s, in terms of, stabilizing the political situation and forcing Al-Shabaab to retreat from certain occupied territories [PSC/Pr/2.(CDLXII)] (AU, 2014).[4] Besides, it is still in operation due to the reluctance of the UN to establish a mission in Somalia. Therefore, for Williams (2012) to conclude that it is an ill-conceived mission is premature and unjustified.

2.5. THE UNITED NATIONS/AFRICAN UNION AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The literature on UN/AU partnerships in peacekeeping operations has grown immensely since the past decade. Essentially, this segment reviews literatures on the evolution of the partnership between the two institutions at the strategic and institutional levels as well as some of the cases where both organisations have cooperated to bring about peace and stability on the African continent.

2.5.1. The Evolution of the UN/AU Partnership in Peacekeeping Operations

The UN forms a very critical pillar in the overall security architecture envisioned by the AU. The genesis of the relationship between the two organisations can be traced to the period during the OAU, when a cooperation agreement was signed between the UN Secretary-General U Thant and the OAU Administrative Secretary-General Diallo Telli in 1965 (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010:305; UN, 2011a:9). This cooperative agreement covered areas such as mutual consultations, reciprocal representation, exchange of information and documentation, and cooperation between secretariats and assistance in

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staffing (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010:305; UN, 2011a:9). The signing of this agreement marked the beginning of the UN's relationship with an African regional organisation. However, due to the paralysis of the UN as a result of the Cold War politics, Gray (2000:202) maintains that this cooperation was not given significant attention until the early 1990s when conflicts in Africa occupied the bulk of the UNSC's time and energy.

The improved cooperation between the UN and the OAU on African peace and security issues in the 1990s was influenced by three main reasons. First, as argued by Aning and Aubyn (2013a), the early post-Cold War period saw a shift from inter-state conflicts to violent intra-state conflicts on the continent, with devastating consequences on human life and property. For example, there were internal conflicts in countries such as Mali, Nigeria, Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Togo, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Burundi. The complex nature of these internal conflicts meant that no single organisation could tackle the challenge on its own, hence the need for collaboration between institutions (UN, 1998).

Second, the 1990s saw an increased role of the OAU and other sub-regional groups like ECOWAS in regional conflict managements in Africa. Albert (2007) notes that the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) in 1993 as a strategic framework for addressing conflicts in Africa, and subsequently undertook important peacekeeping initiatives in Burundi and the Central African Republic (CAR). Therefore, as indicated by the former UNSG, Kofi Annan (UN, 1998), it became necessary for the UN to compliment African efforts to resolve African conflicts, since it holds the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

Lastly, the improved cooperation between the UN and the OAU was motivated by the publication of UNSG, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping* in 1992 (UN, 1992). This report, together with the *Supplementary report to the Agenda for Peace,* in January 1995, identified five possible forms of cooperation between the UN and regional bodies like the OAU through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. This included: consultations to exchange views

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on issues of conflicts; diplomatic support to regional peacemaking efforts; operational support through the provision of technical advice to regional peacekeeping efforts; co-deployment with regional bodies; and joint operations, where the staffing, direction and financing of missions are shared between the UN and regional organisation (UN, 1992, 1995).

However, due to the failures of the UN in Rwanda and Somalia in the 1990s and the subsequent retreat from Africa, these cooperative initiatives did not emerge as a significant issue though there were some periodic meetings on African security issues between the UN Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the OAU (UN, 2011a). From 1997 onwards, when Africa accounted for about 60 per cent of the UNSC's activities, Aning and Aubyn (2013a) posit that deliberations in the UN about possible increased cooperation with African regional organisations gained momentum, particularly, with the launch of the Secretary-General's report in 1998 on "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa" (S/1998/318). In a UN Security Council presidential statement (S/PRST/1997/46) that preceded this report, the Council welcomed the efforts of the OAU and those of the sub-regional bodies in preventing and resolving conflict in Africa and called for a stronger partnership between the UN and the OAU, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. One important statement which is relevant to this study that the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan specifically mentioned in the report was that the UN should strive to compliment rather than supplant African efforts to resolve African problems wherever possible (UN, 1998).

Following this report, the UN intensified its work in Africa. Subsequently, the Secretary-General launched other reports that emphasized the need for UN cooperation with regional organisations such as the OAU in peacekeeping operations. These reports included: the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in August 2000, also known as " the Brahimi Report"; the December 2004 report of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change; the March 2005 follow-up to the High-Level Panel, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All; Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international

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peace and security; and the 2008 report on the African Union-United Nations Panel on the modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations, also known as "Prodi Report." These reports highlighted the vital role regional organisations could play, in terms of preventive diplomacy, early warning systems, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts and recommended to the UN to improve its relationship with regional bodies.

Among all the reports, the "Prodi Report" (UN, 2008a:12-14) appears to be the most comprehensive report on the UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships. The report acknowledged the fact that the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is the starting point for designing a stronger partnership between the UN and the AU. It further noted that although the relationship between the UN and the AU is evolving positively, the role of both organisations in the partnership is yet to be clarified. On this issue especially, Tanner (2010:212) in his article 'Addressing the Perils of Peace Operations: Toward a Global Peacekeeping System' advocated for a common political framework between the UN and regional organisations to provide a viable foundation for a joint vision, a joint strategy, and the joint responsibility of stakeholders. The Prodi report also recommended ways on how best to enhance the relationship between the UN and the AU based on a judicious combination of their respective comparative advantages. The report moreover stressed on the need for a shared strategic vision to enable the UN and the AU to exercise their respective advantages, but also to reduce the likelihood of duplication of effort and organisations working at cross-purposes (UN, 2008a; UN, 2008c). Similarly, Tanner (2010) and Koops (2012) also argued that the coordination between the UN and regional organisations like the AU is important in order to avoid the duplication or outright inter-organisational rivalry.

With respect to the implementation of the Prodi report, Bah and Lortan (2011) maintained that although five years after the report, some progress has been made in strengthening the relationship, as evidenced by the establishment of the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU (TYCBP) and the creation of the UN Office to AU (UNOAU), the relationship still remains largely undefined. Instead, the partnership between the two organisations has focused on individual cases without any clear policy framework for cooperation in peacekeeping operations (Boutellis and Williams, 2013a).

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2.5.2. The Nature and Scope of the UN/AU Partnership in Peacekeeping Operations

Since 2002 when the AU was established, both organisations have cooperated at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively. At the strategic level, there is cooperation between the UNSC and AUPSC. This relationship represents the most important aspect of the UN/AU partnership because of their analogous but different status and mandates in Africa. Thus, whilst on one hand, the UNSC has a universal mandate and primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the AUPSC has, on the other hand, the mandate to address peace and security challenges in Africa within the context of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (UN, 1945; AU, 2002, 2012). Indeed, compared to other regional organisations, the UNSC maintains that the AUPSC has become its most frequent interlocutor and the only body, members of the Security Council regularly meet with (UN, 2011a). Although the UNSC has been working with the AUC since 2002, its relationship with the AUPSC is a recent phenomenon which only began in 2007.

Aning (2007), for example, provides a very detailed analysis of this emerging cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC and how it can be effectively improved. What is very exceptional about his work is that the UN/AU cooperation at the strategic level is provided in a clear, detailed and consistent manner in addition to cooperation in other areas of peace and security. For the first time, he clearly defines the role that non-state actors such as civil society can play in the emerging partnership which is less or not even discussed in any of the existing literatures. Aning (2007) concluded that the discussions on how to deepen cooperation between the UN and AU should revolve around how to interpret the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. To him, this would involve addressing the definitional and conceptual issues inherent in the partnership and the type, nature and division of responsibilities between the two organisations (UN, 2008c). Whiles Aning's work undoubtedly gave an in-depth understanding of the UN/AU partnership, it focused more on the strategic level cooperation with little attention to the operational level cooperation during field missions. The present study takes a broader view by providing a comprehensive analysis of the UN/AU partnership at all levels.

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More significantly, in seeking to improve the partnership between the UNSC and the AUPSC, there have been about seven annual joint consultations between members of the two Councils since 2007, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York (AU, 2012, 2013). The last of these periodic meetings took place in October 2013 during the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. During the first meeting in June 2007 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, members of the UNSC met with the Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, and other members of the AU Commission. In the joint communiqué that was issued after the meeting, both Councils agreed, among other things to: Consider how best to improve the coordination and effectiveness of AU and UN peace efforts in Africa; to consider the modalities for improving the resource base and capacity of the AU; and to examine the possibility of the financing of a peacekeeping operation undertaken by the AU or under its authority (UN, 2012; AU, 2012). Most of these issues have reoccurred in the discussions of almost all the subsequent meetings between the two Councils. However, these meetings have failed to discuss issues on how to systematically integrate their different organisational cultures, agendas and approaches which is one of the most important factors to institutionalise their relations (Boutellis and Williams, 2013a:18). They also make the point that throughout these meetings, the two Councils have purposively avoided discussing the issue of Chapter VIII and focused on specific policy issues rather than broad themes about the relationship between the two councils.

The UN Secretariat and the AU Commission which are the operational arms of both organisations have also been working together since 2002 at the institutional level. In the past, the AU's relationship with the UN Secretariat was dispersed among a number of different departments within the UN (AU, 2012). However, the relationship between the two secretariats was streamlined with the establishment of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in July 2010. The UNOAU integrated the mandates of the different UN offices to the AU namely, the UN Liaison Office to the AU (UNLO-AU), the AU Peacekeeping Support Team, the UN Planning Team for AMISOM and the Joint Support Coordination Mechanism (JCSM) for UNAMID (UN, 2012; AU, 2012; Boutellis and Williams, 2013a). Bah and Lortan (2011) assert that this brought some degree of coherence to the UN's engagement with the AU. In 2010, the UN/AU Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and

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Security was also inaugurated to advance the partnership between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, and to serve as a forum where the senior management of the two institutions would exchange views on matters of common concern, and agree on common actions.

The AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have also established a strong practice of meeting regularly through desk-to-desk encounters as recommended by the 2008 Prodi report to discuss and exchange information and ideas on country-specific and thematic issues of common interest (UN, 2008a; 2008c; AU, 2012, 2013). Cooperation between the AU Commission and the UN with regard to peacekeeping specifically, has covered the areas of planning, development and management of current operations, including support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); and institutional support to the AU Commission for the operationalisation of the ASF, a key pillar of the APSA (AU, 2012). The outcome of these engagements is, however, yet to receive any rigorous scholarly attention.

The two institutions have also entered into various cooperation arrangements in the area of peacekeeping at the operational level in the field. Practically, while there is no accurate way of cataloguing the various peacekeeping partnerships between the two organisations in the field, given their *sui generis* character, four possible sets of categories appear. The type of partnership which is the most pronounced and which most scholars like Jones and Cherif (2004), Appiah-Mensah (2006), Bah and Jones (2008), and Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010:65-66) have referred to, involves the construction of a hybrid or joint operation where both the AU and the UN operate within a single or joint chain of command. An example is the ongoing UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Analyzing the early stages of the UNAMID operations in Darfur, Kreps (2007) gives an important insight into the challenges involved in such hybrid operations. She mentioned some of the challenges as the lack of resources, equipments and personnel and operational challenges such as command and control issues. While her work provided an excellent insight into the challenges that confront hybrid missions, Kreps (2007) failed to give the advantages or benefits involved in

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such operations as well as the specific recommendations on ways to mitigate such problems.

Equally, Othieno and Samasuwo (2007:37) also argue that UNAMID was nothing more than a response to Africa's political, financial and operational constraints. They concluded that there is a critical need to establish the parameters of genuine continental and global partnership, including role clarification between the AU and the UN in such endeavours. Similar to Othieno and Samasuwo as well as Kreps, Murithi (2009:16) also makes a very critical assessment of UNAMID and concludes that the relationship remains asymmetrical due to the fact that the UN is a much older institution, with more resources and experience as compared to the AU. His assertion was based on the premises that it was not clear how the AU can declare total ownership of the conceptualization, design, planning and implementation of its peacekeeping operations, when 'collocated' UN personnel maintain a dominant presence in its affairs (Murithi, 2009). He, therefore, admonished the AU to remain vigilant to ensure that it does not descend into a form of hybrid paternalism. Nevertheless, Murithi (2009) indicates that UNAMID heralded a novel approach to managing Africa's intractable crises and suggested the need to foster more dialogue and open communication between the AU and the UN at the strategic decision-making level on how to improve the model.

The second type of partnership which has also been identified in the works of Jones and Cherif (2004), Boutellis and Williams (2013a:15-18), Gadin (2012: 75-83) and several other scholars involves AU-led peacekeeping operation with UN logistics, technical and financial support. The UN Support Office to the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) is a case in point. According to Boutellis and Williams (2013a:15), the experiences of AMISOM has exemplified both the positive and negative aspects of the UN/AU relationship. As the biggest and most complex AU peace operation, it exposed the limits of the AU's capabilities, in terms of the material, financial and bureaucracy and reiterated the importance of finding workable partnerships with various external actors, including the UN. To them, the debates about how to sustain AMISOM led to the creation of the unprecedented UN/AU collaborative mechanism, UNSOA, which provides logistical support to AMISOM using UN assessed contributions and the AMISOM Trust Fund. They

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concluded that although the partnership has exposed some important differences in the UN/AU approaches to peace operations, it has involved more institutional partnerships than arguably any other peace operation in the post-Cold War era.

Analysing this type of partnership, Gadin (2012: 75-83) also discusses the importance and shortfalls of the UN logistical support to AMISOM. He opined that the logistical support package delivered by UNSOA has contributed significantly to AMISOM's successes. However, the support by UNSOA is inadequate to facilitate the effective implementation of AMISOM's mandate. According to him, this deficiency is as a result of the fact that UNSOA is an implementing agency delivering only what it has been mandated to deliver by UNSC and the UN Secretariat. On ways to improve the operations of UNSOA, Gadin (2012:81) recommended that there is the need for enhanced engagement between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission on, one hand, and the UNSC and AU PSC on the other, for the purposes of shared/joint analysis in order to authorise the required support for the implementation of joint missions like AMISOM.

The third form of partnership involves a kind of sequential operations where the AU initially conducts an operation and then passes the peacekeeping baton to the UN. De Conning (2006:7) looks at this type of partnership and cites the examples of Burundi, where the AU deployed AMIB in 2003 followed by a UN operation (ONUB) in 2004; in Liberia, where ECOWAS deployed ECOMIL in 2003, followed by a UN operation (UNMIL) later in the same year; and again in Darfur, where AMIS was established in 2004 but was later replaced by a UN/AU mission in Darfur. This sequencing of operations, he argued, is working well because it plays on the respective strengths of the UN, AU and RECs. This type of partnership works well according to Bah and Jones (2008) as well as Bubna (n.d), when the UN lacks the political will or simply does not have the capacity to deal with an emergency conflict situation. Regional bodies generally intervene in such situations, with the view of transferring the mission to the UN when situations stabilize. In Burundi, for instance, Aboagye (2004:13) recalls that the AU intervened with the understanding that the deployment of AMIB was a holding operation pending the deployment of a UN Security Council-mandated peacekeeping mission.

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The last form of partnership which is similar to the above is what we refer to as 'trilateral 'peacekeeping partnership where a UN mission precedes or follows a peacekeeping operation by the AU and its RECs. Analyzing this form of cooperation, Ayayi (2008) brings out the challenges and opportunities involved in such enterprises. She identified the lack of established frameworks between the UN and regional bodies that defines their responsibilities in specific crises context as one of the major challenges of cooperation. She concluded by stating that cooperation between the UN, the AU and its RECs like ECOWAS must be based, as far as practicable, on their comparative advantages and informed by the principle of reciprocity. However, Derblom, Frisell, Schmidt (2008) rather state that the peacekeeping partnership between the UN and regional bodies like the EU and AU is predominantly founded on a mutual relationship of resource-dependency, legitimacy and sharing of values. They opined that the UN, EU and AU have different internal structures, levels of experience and resources for peacekeeping operations, and this means different comparative advantages for peace operations in Africa. These 'unequal' traits together with their inherent differences, according to them, impact on inter-organisational coordination. There is, therefore, the need for enhanced strategic direction, enhanced coordination arrangements and enhanced capacity building.

2.6. Summary of the Existing Gaps in the Literature Review

Several gaps were identified in the review of the extant literatures which are critical to this study. First, in general terms, apart from UN and AU official documents, the literatures on the UN/AU partnership is dominated by isolated case studies without any holistic approach. In other words, the literatures do not provide a comprehensive overview of how the partnership works at all levels and the inter-linkages. Second, research focus on the strategic level partnership between the UNSC and the PSC, on one hand, and the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, on the other hand, is scanty. Most of the literatures are official UN and AU documents which are not scholarly in nature. Third, the benefits of the partnership to both organisations have not been well researched. Instead, much of the work has focused on what the AU stands to gain from the partnership rather than what both organisations stand to gain or loose from their cooperation. In that regard, an in-depth

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assessment of the outcomes, benefits as well as the cost implications of the partnership to both organisations should be done. This will help address the possible shortfalls and consolidate the good lessons learnt for future operations.

Fourth, the frameworks for UN cooperation with regional organisations as stipulated in the UN Charter has received tremendous research attention, however, the modalities of cooperation between the UN and AU has not been studied systematically. Fifth, the UN/AU partnership has not effectively involved the RECs that are the building bloc of the AU's peace and security architecture. Overlooking the essential role that the RECs play in the partnership can create operational and strategic problems because they are the first point of call in the sub-regions when there is a conflict. Sixth, there are few studies on the role that non-state parties such as civil society and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) can play in the UN/AU partnership and its implication for their work. In the peacekeeping environment, the UN/AU cooperation also involves the humanitarian agencies and NGOs, especially, in terms of sourcing for funding and materials assistance for the implementation of their mandate and integrating their approaches. What are the implications of the UN/AU partnership for their work in the operational theatres, particularly when they have to work with two organisations with different bureaucratic processes? Seventh, studies on AU peacekeeping operations have predominantly focused on the challenges confronting its peacekeeping efforts and overlooked the critical role the organisation has played in African peace and security. Lastly, there is little research on how the AU should manage its cooperation with the UN in relation to its other cooperative endeavours with other organisations like the EU, NATO and bilateral partners such as the United States of America, Turkey and China, to mention just a few.

While the relevance of all these gaps cannot be understated, the study attempted to fill the first six gaps identified. These gaps are considered critical to the realisation of the objectives of the study. It is, therefore, expected that an analysis of these issues will help draw important conclusions on the UN/AU partnerships and how it can be improved and consolidated at the strategic, institutional and operational levels to address African peace and security challenges.

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2.7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are many theoretical perspectives that can be used to explain the various aspects of inter-organisational partnerships. These include: exchange theory; attraction theory; power and conflict theory; modeling theory; and social structure theories (Oliver, 1990:18-19). Each makes a singular contribution to the understanding of organisational partnerships. For the purposes of this study, two of the above theories, namely, exchange theory and attraction theory were used. These two theories in isolation best explain why peacekeeping partnerships have become the predominant architecture for both the UN and the AU peacekeeping operations in Africa.

2.7.1. Exchange Theory

Exchange theory arose out of the philosophical traditions of utilitarianism, behaviourism, and neoclassical economics. It is a theory that can be found in the fields of psychology, sociology, political science and economics. Although, some differences exist, these diverse disciplines seem to have similar perspectives on how the social exchange process is related to inter-organisational cooperation. As found in the work of Benson (1975, 1982), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Mulford and Rogers (1982), and Mulford (1984), the theory emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century as one of the important theoretical explanations for inter-organisational cooperation. Some of the earliest proponent of the theory included scholars such as Homans (1961), Levine and White (1961), Emerson (1962, 1964, 1972) and Blau (1964). The fundamental principle of the theory is that organisations at any given situation choose behaviours that maximize their likelihood of meeting organisational interests and are more willing to cooperate when the benefits of cooperation exceed the costs (Levine and White, 1961; Blau, 1964). For the UN and the AU, this means that they are cooperating due to their individual organisational interests and not because of an altruistic motive. The key assumptions underpinning the theory can be summarised as follows:

The first assumption is that organisations are generally rational and engage in calculations of costs and benefits in their exchange relations. What this means is that cooperation between organisations such as the AU and the UN is motivated by the desire to increase

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gains and to avoid loss or to increase outcomes that are positively valued and to decrease outcomes that are negatively valued (Molm, 1997, Molm and Cook, 1995). Second, exchange theory builds on the assumption that organisations engaged in cooperation are rationally seeking to maximize the profits or benefits to be gained from such cooperation, in terms of achieving basic organisational needs. In this respect, the theory assumes that exchange relations between organisations are influenced by efforts to fulfil basic organisational needs. In other words, organisations may seek relationships that promote their needs but are also the recipients of behaviours from others that are motivated by their desires to meet their own needs (White, 1961).

Third, an exchange relation develops in structures of mutual dependence. This suggests that both partnering organisations have some reason to engage in exchange to obtain resources of value otherwise there would be no need to form an exchange relation. Lastly, exchange theory assumes that organisations are goal oriented in a freely competitive international system and as such, exchange processes lead to differentiation of power and privilege among organisations. And as in any competitive situation, power in exchange relations lies with those organisations that possess highly valued resources. However, according to Blau (1964) and Emerson (1972), the differences in the nature of the valued resources among actors rather result in interdependence and hence the need for exchange. This is because each actor has a resource which the other actors want.

At the heart of the exchange theory is the *notion of resource dependency* (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The resource dependency aspect of the exchange theory is rooted in open systems framework in which organisations must interact with their environment if they want to acquire resources (Ranaei, Zareei, Alikhani, 2010:24). There are three bases for resource dependency as found in the works of Hall et al., (1977), Molnar (1978), Leblebici & Salancik (1982, 1988), Raelin (1982), Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and Balas (2011). These include voluntary exchanges, power asymmetry and the result of legal-political mandates. Voluntary exchanges involve situations where there is an agreement on the scope of cooperation between organisations which leads to the exchange of information and resources voluntarily (Hall et al. 1977; Raelin, 1982). This is purposely to increase the efficiency of organisations by using the resources and services produced cheaper and better

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by other organisations. In that sense, each organisation focuses on its comparative advantage in producing a specific resource and they exchange these resources so that they can become more efficient. The explanation for power asymmetry maintains that organisations with scarcity of resources cooperate with other organisations, in order to supplement their limited resources (Benson, 1975; Blau, 1964).

But in contrast to this proposition, Aiken and Hage (1968); Paulson (1976), Molnar (1978) and Oliver (1990), have argued that this approach of explaining organisational cooperation rather suggests that resource scarcity prompts organisations to attempt to exert power, influence, or control over organisations that need the required scarce resources. However, using the reciprocity model of inter-organisational cooperation, Emerson (1962) and Levine & White (1961) put forward the case that it is rather motives of reciprocity which motivates organisations to cooperate rather than domination, power, and control. In effect, this perspective suggests that inter-organisational cooperation occurs for the purpose of pursuing common or mutually beneficial goals or interests. Therefore, what the power asymmetry explanation maintains is that resource scarcity may induce cooperation, rather than competition. The legal-political mandates on the other hand, are situations when the mandates of the organisations may provide the impetus for inter-organisational cooperation or require them to work together. For example, the mandate of the UN allows for some form of partnership with the AU, as stated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which acknowledges the scope for contribution of regional organisations to the settlement of international disputes (UN, 1945). Put together, these three bases for resource dependency can be used to explain patterns of cooperation and conflict between organisations such as the UN and the AU.

The link between the resource dependency aspect of exchange theory and inter-organisational cooperation in contemporary peacekeeping operations cannot be understated. In recent times, UN peacekeeping operations have come under severe resource and capacity constraints reducing its reach and operational effectiveness. There is currently a mismatch between the scale and complexity of UN peacekeeping operations and existing capabilities (DPKO, 2013). Peacekeeping operations have now become more robust, multi-faceted and complex and the diversity of mission mandates have stretched the UN's operational

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capacity to meet the expectations on them. The budget for global peace operation has as well soared to almost eight (8) billion US dollars a year (UN, 2014). This is truly an indication that the challenges that confront contemporary peacekeeping operations, especially, in Africa cannot be addressed by any single organisation, in this case the UN, which holds the primary responsibility for global peace and security. Hence, there is the need for productive burden or responsibility sharing with key stakeholders like the AU. Undoubtedly, this may require inter-organisational cooperation as one solution to the quandary of how to make resources stretch to meet the ever increasing needs of the UN.

Over the years, the AU has through its various missions demonstrated the value of undertaking high-risk stabilisation missions needed for a long-term post-conflict resolution (Coning, 2006; Williams, 2011), what the Brahimi report termed as the '*No Peace to keep'* type of missions. In contrast, while the UN is reluctant to deploy peacekeeping operations in situations where there is '*no peace to keep'* like Somalia, it has shown the capacity to sustain and backstop peacekeeping missions in terms of funding and providing logistics for the longer term. Therefore, cooperation between the two organisations is important to maximize their comparative advantages. This explanation is more linked to the power asymmetry aspect of resource dependency of the exchange theory.

Again, another applicable strand of the exchange theory to UN/AU partnerships in peacekeeping operation is the role played by mandates. As noted earlier, the mandate of the UN allows for some form of partnership with the AU, as stated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which acknowledges the scope for contribution of regional organisations to the settlement of international disputes (UN, 1945). The Article 17 (1) of the AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council also allows for some form of cooperation with the UN in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. In reality, as indicated by Balas (2011), actual cooperation between the UN and regional organisations has occurred out of a need of the UN, and not out of an altruistic desire to cooperate. This is evidenced by the fact that though cooperation between the UN and other regional arrangements was stipulated in the UN Charter in 1945, it was only the early 1990s that it became active when the conditions of conflict called for it (Balas, 2011).

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In spite of the significant contributions of the exchange theory to inter-organisational cooperation, there are several limitations. First, Thompson and McEwen (1958) state that inter-organisational cooperation requires 'a commitment for joint decision of future activities and this places limits on unilateral or arbitrary decisions.' This is particularly true for the UN and the AU, as both organisations have to consult each other all the time before taking any decisions on their joint operations like UNAMID. Importantly, this position is further endorsed by Aiken and Hage (1968) who see constraints developing from 'obligations, commitments or contracts with other organisations.' That is, whenever organisations have to work together, their decision-making autonomy diminishes, as they have to pay attention to the other organisations demands.

Second, inter-organisational cooperation may have unfavorable ramifications for organisational image or identity. Inter-organisational cooperative activities may adversely affect organisational prestige, identity, or strategic position. This may create a tendency where organisations in some settings will avoid inter-dependence with other organisations according to Walton (1972). Thus, cooperation means that there is a higher probability of organisations losing their separate identity. This is because usually, organisations will be lumped together and an identity shift may occur for the employees, who may start to identify with the joint organisations (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Aldrich, 1979; Rogers, 1974; Schermerhorn, 1981 Balas, 2011). For instance, UN and AU employees in UNAMID do not identify themselves as workers of any of the two organisations, but rather, they see themselves as employees of the hybrid mission. But more importantly, the identity shifts may also depend on the nature of the cooperation. In sequential operations (where the UN precedes an AU peacekeeping) like AFISMA & MINUSMA and coordinated operations (where the UN and AU are coordinated but operate under different chains of command) like UNSOA, identity shift may not occur. The reason is that although both organisations are cooperating together, they operate under different chain of command unlike UNAMID where they operate under one command structure.

Lastly, inter-organisational cooperation may involve costs by requiring the direct expenditure of scarce organisational resources. UNAMID is a graphical case in point where the UN is paying almost all the cost for the operations of the mission through UN accessed

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contributions. Indeed, it is the first peacekeeping operation where the UN is financing through its peacekeeping budget but lacks exclusive control.

2.7.2. Attraction Theory

Another theory that can help explain why organisations cooperate with each other is the attraction theory. It overlaps with exchange theory to some extent. However, attraction theory emphasizes the non-economic aspects of the formation of relationships. The theory focuses on what attracts individuals and organisations to each other and what seems to create natural affinity or it's opposite (Hollinghead, 1950; Smith, 1995). Attraction theory explains that the motivation for inter-organisational cooperation are based on such variables as value or status similarities and differences, complementary needs, goal congruence and information needs. Furthermore, organisations with similar status such as the UN and the AU in the international community will be more willing to work together, because of their similar position and interest of ensuring peace and stability in Africa within the international network. The theory further suggests that if some organisations are better at specific tasks than others but they perform worse in other tasks, then they may be attracted to each other because of their complementary skills. From this understanding, it is quite evident that attraction theory can be applied to partnerships in peacekeeping operations in several ways. Among them are:

First, international organisations that have complementary activities in peacekeeping operations are more likely to experience inter-organisational cooperation. This perfectly applies to the UN/AU partnership because both organisations have different internal structures, levels of experience and resources as well as different comparative advantages for peacekeeping operations in Africa. Therefore, what they need to do is to engage in dialogue in order to establish a mutually agreed division of labour based on their comparative strengths to ensure effectiveness, foster coherence and limit competition. Second, the attraction theory suggests that international organisations like the UN and the AU with similar experience and background for peacekeeping operations are more likely to experience inter-organisational cooperation. Lastly, the complementarity aspect of the

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theory also means that even though organisations are attracted to similarity, they can also be attracted to organisations that are different. However, for this to work, one of the organisations has to see the other's difference as a positive thing or as a benefit to their organisational needs.

Baker and O'Brien (1971) note that attraction between organisations also depends on the permeability of the institutional boundaries between them. That is to say, the amount of cooperation between organisations is a function of their boundary permeability. The analytical significance of this notion can be explained at two levels, namely, the intra-organisational level and the inter-organisational (comparative) level. At the intra-organisational level, facilitating structural features include the presence of boundary-spanning roles and environmental scanning capacities. What this means is that international organisations are more attracted to each other if they have individuals or special units within each organisation managing lines of communication between them. For example, in the UN, there is the UNSC and the United Nations Secretariat which are managing the lines of communication with the AU, whilst at the AU, there is the AUPSC and the AU Commission which are also managing the relationship with the UN (UN, 2008b).

The second level which is at the inter-organisational level focuses on actual boundary-spanning activities, including overlapping memberships. This notion of boundary permeability applies to the UN/AU relationship because almost all the members of the latter are in the former. Again, both organisations also have overlapping functions, thus they all engage in peacekeeping operations on the African continent. Nevertheless, the possibility of effectively harnessing the cooperation between them is high because they have the boundary-spanning units that would be able to identify opportunities for cooperation.

In summary, the exchange theory and the attraction theory both illuminate our understanding of the UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships and help us to interpret the meaning of the various aspects, nature and patterns of the relationship. Each makes a singular contribution to our understanding of why the UN and the AU are partnering in peacekeeping operations. Both theories also complement each other. Thus, whiles the

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exchange theory focuses on the economic aspects of the formation of relationships such as resource dependency, the attraction theory focuses on the non-economic aspects such as status similarities and differences, complementary needs and goal congruence. This overlapping nature helps to explain and provide insights into the different aspect of the UN/AU partnership and what the partnership ought to be in practice. Collectively, they provide a framework, in which to anchor the research and also provide a blueprint for identifying the appropriate methodological perspectives and procedures for the work.

2.8. CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed the existing literature on UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping and discussed the theories used for the study. It began by reviewing literatures on two major concepts namely, the concepts of peacekeeping and partnerships. Thereafter, specific studies on UN/AU peacekeeping were reviewed under three main categories to comprehend how it informs the study. The three categories are: studies on UN partnership with regional organisations in peacekeeping operations; literatures on AU peacekeeping operations; and studies on UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships at the strategic, institutional and operational levels.

After the review, a number of gaps were identified including: (a) the general literature on UN-AU partnership is dominated by isolated case studies without any holistic approach; (b) research focus on the partnership at the strategic and institutional levels between the UNSC and the PSC as well as the UN Secretariat and AU Commission is minimal or scanty; (c) an in-depth assessment of the outcomes or benefits and cost implications of the UN/AU partnership is also lacking; and (d) much of the work on the benefits of cooperation has focused on what the AU stands to gain from the partnership rather than what both organisations stand to gain or loose from their cooperation. Due to the diverse nature of the gaps identified, the research focused on those which were relevant to the realisation of the study objectives.

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The subsequent section of the chapter discussed the two main theoretical perspectives namely, exchange theory and attraction theory used for the study. These two types of inter-organisational partnerships theories in isolation best explained the motivations underlying the UN/AU peacekeeping partnership. They also provided insights into the various benefits and problems associated with inter-organisational cooperation in complex peacekeeping operations.

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ENDNOTES

[1]Interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head, Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013; interview with Lt. Colonel Joseph Ahphour, Operations Officer, Plans and Operations/AMISOM, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1 October 2013.

[2]The 'UN Peacekeeping Operation: Principles and Guidelines-2008' document is what is called Capstone Doctrine. It defines the nature, scope and core business of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations and identifies its comparative advantages and limitations as well as the basic principles that should guide their planning and conduct. The document is intended to serve as a guide for all United Nations personnel serving in the field and at United Nations headquarters, as well as an introduction to those who are new to UN peacekeeping.

[3]See Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination, 17 January 2006.

[4] African Union, (2014), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia. Peace and Security Council 462nd Meeting Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 16 October 2014 PSC/Pr/2.(CDLXII)

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CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The credibility of any research findings and conclusions depend mainly on the quality of the research design, methods of data collection and data analysis. Accordingly, this chapter describes the methods and procedures that were used to obtain the relevant data and how they were processed, analysed and interpreted to formulate the research conclusions and recommendations. It covers the research design and approach; the sampling techniques; the target population; method of data collection; method of data processing and analysis; ethical issues; and the limitations of the study.

3.2. RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN

The study employed qualitative research approach. Qualitative research according to Morgan (1998) and Seale (1999) describe the form of social enquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and make sense of their experiences and the world in which they live in. It is used to gain insights into people's attitudes, behaviours, value systems, concerns, motivations, aspirations, culture or lifestyles. As Buston, et al. (1998) noted, qualitative research seeks to answer 'what', 'why' and 'how' questions, rather than 'how often' or 'how many.' It was chosen based on the research objectives which sought to examine the normative frameworks, practice and challenges of the UN/AU peacekeeping partnership. The nature of the study coupled with the lack or difficulty in obtaining quantitative data on the subject also provided no sound basis for a quantitative study. Besides, the researcher intends to present the information gathered not as numbers or formulae (no statistical analysis), but to give a descriptive explanation of the UN/AU partnership in a detailed and

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complete form. In view of this, and in line with the research objectives, the study utilized a combination of three forms of qualitative research methods namely: descriptive design, exploratory study and a case study.

While descriptive studies explain social events by providing background information about the issue at stake or present existing conditions and eliciting explanations, exploratory studies help to develop an accurate picture of the research topic as well as the formulation and modification of theories (Morgan, 1997; Mack et al, 2005; Sarantakos, 2005). These two models of qualitative research were selected for the study because they convey a richness and intensity in details in a way that quantitative methods cannot. In other words, they allowed for a more holistic or detailed investigation of issues which aided in obtaining the useful required information needed to formulate rational conclusions and recommendations for the study. The choice of these qualitative methods had their own advantages and disadvantages. Concerning the advantages, they provided detailed data on direct and verifiable individual life experiences, views and feelings about the research topic. They also assisted in getting first-hand information and establishing familiarity and close contact with the respondents. Lastly, they allowed the researcher to probe initial responses of respondents further to elaborate on their points. Notwithstanding these advantages, some sensitive issues or classified information were not voiced out by some of the respondents during the interview. The reasons given were basically for job security and fear of being quoted. However, as argued by Sarantakos (2005), these challenges are characteristics of qualitative methods, therefore, it was seen in their context as strengths and not weakness.

The case study method is an 'empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence is used' (Yin, 1991:23, cited from Sarantakos, 2005:211). In order to complement the exploratory and descriptive designs, an in-depth analysis of three case studies was conducted. This was to allow for a better understanding of the conditions under which the UN and the AU cooperate in peacekeeping operations, the outcomes of their partnership as well as the

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challenges encountered thereof. In addition, it was also to show how well the research findings hold or really mean in practice when applied to empirical cases of UN/AU partnerships in peacekeeping operations.

Since 2002, the UN and the AU have partnered in several peacekeeping contexts. The various forms or models of the UN/AU partnership since 2002 are represented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Various Forms of UN/AU Peacekeeping Operations since 2002

Country	Mission	Date	Type of Partnership
Sudan	The UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	2007 to date	Hybrid/ Integrated
Somalia	The UN Support Office to the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA)	2009 to date	Coordinated operation
Burundi	The transfer of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to the UN operation in Burundi (ONUB)	2004	Sequential Operation
Central African Republic	The transfer of the African-led International Support mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA).	2014	Sequential Operation
Mali	The transfer of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).	2013	Sequential Operation

Source: Fieldwork, 2014

Out of the different missions where the two organisations have partnered, three were chosen namely, UNAMID, AFISMA & MINUSMA, and UNSOA as case studies for the purposes of this study. The study explored them as instances of UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships. Generally, the three partnership models were selected to prevent any generalisation of the nature, motivations, outcomes and challenges underlying each form of partnership at the operational level. In specific terms, UNAMID and UNSOA are the only two missions which are still ongoing. Put together, they present a good case of understanding how the partnership is evolving and working in practice. The partnership in

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Mali which ended in July 2013 after the establishment of MINUSMA was also unique, in the sense that, the UN/AU peacekeeping partnership involved a sub-regional organisation like ECOWAS. Indeed, it sets an example of how the UN could cooperate with the AU and its RECs to jointly maintain peace and security in Africa.

3.3. SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

An important issue to consider when designing a research project is the type and number of people to include in the study. This is imperative because the whole population cannot be studied, therefore, it enables the researcher to study a relatively small part of the population and yet obtain data that are representative of the whole (Sudman & Blair, 1999; Sarantakos, 2005). Sampling is the use of definite procedures in the selection of a part from the population for the express purpose of obtaining from its descriptions or estimates, certain properties and characteristics of the whole (Henry, 1990; Fink, 1995; Kumekpor, 2002: 132). It involves the careful selection of a portion of the population, which is considered to be representative of the population to be investigated (Kumekpor, 2002: 131). Sampling can be based on either probability or non-probability standards. It is referred to as probability sampling when the element of randomness or the law of chance governs the selection process. Non-probability sampling, on the other hand, as the name suggests is when the sampling process lacks elements of randomness. Examples include accidental sampling, purposive sampling, quota sampling and snowball sampling. In order to achieve the research objectives, purposive sampling method, also known as judgmental sampling techniques was used.

Purposive sampling involves the process where the researcher deliberately chooses respondents who, in his/her opinion are relevant to the study (Sarantakos, 2005:164). Babbie (2007:189) defines it as a type of non-probability sampling in which the researcher selects the units to be observed on the basis of his/her own judgment about which one will be the most useful or representative. In this technique, Kumekpor (2002: 138) notes that the units of the sample are selected intentionally for the study because of their characteristics or certain qualities which are not randomly distributed in the population, but are typical or

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they exhibit most of the characteristics that is suitable for the study. The respondents are identified not on any intricate procedures of random sampling but rather, by picking units on the basis of their known characteristics such as age, place of residence, gender, class, profession, marital status, knowledge and expertise.

The purposive sampling technique was very significant for this study because the data collection focused primarily on people who had enormous experiences, knowledge, expertise and insights into the subject of AU/UN partnerships in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, because the data collection was done in tandem with the data analysis and review, the purposive sampling method represented the ideal technique for the study. One advantage of using the purposive technique was that it was less demanding with respect to time and labour requirements. It also offered more detailed information and a high degree of accuracy due to the relatively small number of units.

3.4 THE SAMPLE POPULATION

The sample population comprised actors and stakeholders who play different roles at various stages and levels in the decision-making process, planning, deployment and management of UN, AU and ECOWAS peacekeeping operations. They included:

- Officials of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in Ethiopia;
- Officials of the AU Commission, especially, the Political Affairs Department (PDA) and the Peace and Security Department (PSD) which comprises the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), Peace and Security Secretariat (PSS) and the Conflict Management Division (CMD);
- Officials of the ECOWAS Commission;
- Past and current military, police and civilian officials of UNAMID, AMISOM, AFISMA, MINUSMA and other UN or AU missions in Africa;
- Past and current Force Commanders and their deputies; Police Commissioners and their deputies; and Head of Missions and their deputies of UNAMID, AMISOM, AFISMA, MINUSMA; and

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- Representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), research institutions and academic institutions working on issues related to UN/AU peacekeeping operations.

3.5. METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

3.5.1. Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary sources were used for the collection of data. The primary sources consisted of the researcher's field notes compiled from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) with the relevant actors and stakeholders. The secondary sources comprised official documents of the UN and the AU, books, journal articles, workshop and conference reports, magazines, policy papers, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, working papers and web-based publications.

3.5.2. Data Gathering Techniques

Two main techniques of data gathering were used namely: in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). The combination of these data gathering techniques was instrumental in providing different data sources and also to validate and cross-check some of the findings.

3.5.2.1. *In-depth Interviews*

An in-depth interview is a qualitative research method that allows for a deeper exploration of people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviour about a particular subject. It involves asking questions, listening to and recording the answers, and then probing responses for deeper meaning, clarification and understanding of a particular issue (Sarantakos, 2005; Babbie, 2007, Owolabi, 2014:212). Unlike FGDs, in-depth interviews occur with one individual at a time, or sometimes pairs of respondents, to provide more detailed information and perspectives on an issue (Owolabi, 2014:213). This type of interview is often unstructured; therefore, it permits the interviewer to encourage the respondent to talk at length about the topic. The flow of the conversation usually determines the type of questions asked, those

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omitted and the order of questions. An important strength of this technique is that the interviewer is able to obtain more detailed information about a subject. The weakness, however, is that the interviewer can lose the richness that can arise in a FGDs in which people debate issues (Crewell, 1998: 56-61, cited from Owolabi, 2014:213).

The in-depth interviews were conducted from June 2013 to November 2014 in Ethiopia, Mali, Ghana and Sudan. The list of respondents can be found in appendix 5. In Ethiopia, the researcher visited the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, for an extensive discussion with the relevant actors and stakeholders within the AU Commission and the UNOAU from September to October 2013. The UNOAU was visited instead of the UN headquarters in New York because it represents the UN Secretariats within the AU, and it is more directly engaged and manages the line of communication between the UN and the AU. Within the AU Commission, ten (10) in-depth interviews were conducted with officials of the Peace and Security Department and Political Affairs Department. At the UNOAU, two officers, one from the operational planning and advisory section and the other from the laison office, were interviewed.

Mali was visited in November 2013, March 2014 and May 2014 respectively. In Mali, thirteen (13) in-depth interviews were conducted with police, military and civilian personnel at the MINUSMA Headquarters; the ECOWAS Political Office; the AU Political Office; the Malian Security Services and Government; and Civil Society Organisations. In Sudan, the UNAMID Headquarters in El Fashir, Darfur, was also visited in November 2014. In Darfur, seven (7) in-depth interviews were conducted with personnel from the civilian, military and police component of the mission as well as members of the Sudanese Security Forces. For instance, the Police Commissioner of UNAMID who is part of the strategic decision-makers was interviewed. A field visit was also undertaken in Ghana in June 2013 and August 2013. In-depth interviews were conducted with some past and current military and police personnel who had/are served(ing) with UNAMID, some ECOWAS officials who were attending a conference in Ghana and researchers. Specifically, seven (7) in-depth interviews were conducted with a former Police Commissioner and a deputy SRSG of UNAMID; an official of the ECOWAS Standby

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Force (ESF); a serving military personnel from UNAMID; an official from the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA); and a researcher from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).

Apart from the former Police Commissioner and the deputy SRSG of UNAMID, all the interviews were carried out at the KAIPTC where most of the officials from the missions and organisations mentioned above occasionally attend and facilitate training programmes, workshops and conferences. In that respect, the KAIPTC annual programme calendar was used to track and interview them. Indeed, the in-depth interviews at the KAIPTC proved very beneficial because the researcher was able to interview some officials who were very difficult to reach due to their busy schedules and other financial considerations. In all the in-depth interviews, apart from taking notes, some of the interviews were recorded using an audio recorder with the permission of the respondents.

3.5.2.2. *Focus Group Discussions*

The second data collection method was FGDs. Sarantakos (2005:194) describes FGDs as a loosely constructed discussion with a group of people brought together for the purposes of a study, guided by the researcher and addressed as a group. One important advantage of this method was that it provided a forum that facilitated group discussions and brainstorming on a variety of solutions as well as the generation of diverse and differences of ideas. It is one of the few methods in which important information can be gathered in a relatively short period of time. The choice of this instrument was particularly influenced by these attributes. The major weakness, however, was that the discussions were dominated by one or two participants. It also included a large amount of extra or unnecessary information.

The FGDs were held at the KAIPTC in Accra, Ghana. It involved thirty (30) middle level police officers (i.e. Assistant Superintendents, Superintendents, Chief Superintendents and Assistant Commissioners of Police) from Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Benin with varied backgrounds in UN and AU peacekeeping operations. Whilst some of them were currently in missions like UNAMID and AMISOM, others had

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previous experience in AU missions in Sudan and UN missions in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Liberia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In all, four (4) FGDs were organised in August 2013. The composition of each group was seven (7) and eight (8). The list of each group can be found in appendix 6. The homogeneity of the participants, coupled with their diverse peacekeeping experience did not only enrich the discussions but also brought out very vital information as a result of the cross-fertilization of opinions.

3.5.3. Instrument for Data Gathering

In line with the data gathering techniques, two instruments for data collection namely, unstructured interview guide and FGD guide, were used. These instruments are explained below.

3.5.3.1. *Unstructured Interview Guide*

This type of instrument consists of several open-ended questions, whose wording and order could be changed at will (Sarantakos, 2005). The structure is flexible and restrictions are minimal in terms of the wording of questions. Thus, the interviewer acts freely in this context, on the basis of certain research points, (re) formulating questions as required and employing neutral probing. The unstructured interview guide was used for the in-depth interviews. This instrument was chosen basically due to its singular significance of helping in the in-depth exploration of issues.

Due to the different background of the respondents interviewed, three (3) sets of interview guides were developed (see appendix 1, 2 and 3). One set of unstructured interview guide was developed for the officials of the AU, the UN, RECs, and academics. The other sets were developed for the respondents of the UN/AU cooperation in Sudan and Mali. The researcher followed a set of consistent issues in virtually all the interview guides. There was no fixed wording or fixed ordering of questions during the in-depth interviews. This allowed for greater flexibility and helped the researcher gain more insights about the respondent's perspectives on some pertinent issues. The core issues that guided the researcher during the interviews included the following:

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- **Motivations for the Partnership**: With the issue of resource dependency being generally cited as the sole motive behind the UN/AU relationship, the researcher sought the views of respondents on the factors motivating the partnership.
- **Normative Frameworks:** The researcher was more interested in finding out the various normative frameworks that are guiding the UN/AU partnership and what their implementation challenges are. Here, the normative frameworks of both the UN and the AU were assessed.
- **How the Partnership works in Practice:** As noted in the preceding sections, the UN/AU partnership occurs at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively. The researcher was interested in finding out how the partnership works in practice at each of these levels.
- **Outcomes and Benefits of the UN/AU Partnership**: Based on the experiences of the UN and the AU over the years, the researcher sought to probe what the respondents think are the outcomes and benefits of the partnership. Of particular importance was the researcher's interest in interrogating respondents views on what they think are the outcomes and benefits of the peacekeeping partnerships in Darfur (Sudan), Mali, and Somalia.
- **Challenges and Difficulties confronting the UN/AU Partnership:** In the light of the different organisational cultures and working procedures, the researcher asked respondents particularly those from the UN and the AU some of the challenges and difficulties confronting the partnership. The questions ranged from challenges across a wide spectrum of issues at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively. Respondents views on how those challenges could be mitigated or managed were also interrogated.

3.5.3.2. *Focus Group Discussion Guide*

Preparing a discussion guide is an important step in conducting a focus group session. The guide is used to aid and control the flow of questions during a focus group discussion to ensure that a range of issues vital to the research topic are explored (Crewell, 1998;

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Sarantakos, 2005; Owolabi, 2014). Usually, the research objectives will shape the content or questions asked in the discussion guide. Thus, it outlines the areas for discussion during the focus group, with key research ideas and questions to be discussed.

Before the FGDs were held at the KAIPTC, an FGD guide was developed. The guide contained six different sets of open-ended questions which were based mainly on the research objectives of the study. Similar to that of the unstructured interview questions, the FGD guide covered the motivations of the UN/AU partnership; the outcomes and benefits of the partnership; and the challenges and difficulties of the partnership (see appendix 4).

3.6. METHOD OF DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS

The data gathered from the field was transcribed and typed into a word processing document. It was later analysed to obtain the relevant information needed for the study. The information generated was then categorized into themes based on the research objectives. This was done to subject the research findings to systematic inquiry to first, determine how much of the research questions was answered and whether the research objectives were attained. And second, to ascertain how far the research findings either corroborated or contradicted the theoretical frameworks adopted for the study and the existing literaturs. Descriptive content analysis which aims at identifying and describing the main content of data either thematically or chronologically, as well as the statistical methods of presenting data such as tables and figures were employed to analyse and interpret the data.

3.7. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Adequate care was taken to ensure that all ethical issues were adhered to while obtaining and analysing the data. First of all, all the interviews were conducted and recorded with the explicit consent of the respondents. The objectives of the study were also clearly explained to the respondents and the views of respondents were respected and treated with anonymity to protect their confidentiality. The data collected was also used only for the purpose for which it was intended. In addition, the data gathered was also honestly and objectively

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interpreted and analysed without any fabrication, falsification or bias. Lastly, to respect intellectual property and to avoid plagiarism, all literature cited and figures as well as tables used were properly acknowledged.

3.8. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Two main limitations confronted the study. The first was lack of access to certain classified documents. The researcher could not obtain access to some important documents such as internal mission reports and reports of meetings that could have enriched the analysis of the findings from the AU Commission, UNOAU and MINUSMA. The reason given was that the documents were confidential, therefore, they would not be shared with the public. However, the impact of this on the analysis of the research findings was minimal because efforts were made to collate most of the vital documents regarding the partnership from these institutions as well as interview some individuals who provided some useful information contained in some of those classified documents.

The second limitation had to do with the inability of the researcher to visit AMISOM due to the dire security situation in Somalia. This notwithstanding, the researcher was able to interview personnel of the AMISOM Unit at the AU Headquarters who are more directly involved the UN/AU partnership. Furthermore, the UNOAU which represent the UN at the AU was visited instead of the UN Headquarters in New York. Admittedly, a visit to the UN headquarters could have been very beneficial to the study and further helped the researcher obtain additional data. Nevertheless, the visit to the UNOAU assisted the researcher to obtain all the necessary information needed for the study.

3.9. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the methodology of the research was discussed. The study employed qualitative research approach and utilized a combination of descriptive research design, exploratory research design and case study method. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the sample population for the research which included past and present officials of the UN, the AU, UNAMID, AFISMA, MINUSMA and ECOWAS; research

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institutions; and civil society organisations. Both primary and secondary sources were used for the collection of data. In order to get different data sources and also to validate and cross-check the research findings, two data collection techniques namely, in-depth interviews and focus group discussion were developed. In line with the data gathering techniques, the unstructured interview guide and FGDs guide were used as the instruments for data collection. Field visits were undertaken in Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan and Ghana, to collate data for the study. Descriptive content analysis was used to analyse the data.

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CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Partnerships between the United Nations and the African Union in the field of peacekeeping operations have become a central feature of the African security landscape. As indicated in the earlier chapters, the two organisations have been cooperating in this area since the beginning of the 21st Century. However, although both organisations share a similar commitment to maintaining peace and security in Africa, a wide range of challenges and limitations currently hinder their effective cooperation. In that regard, the study sought to provide an in-depth analysis of the normative frameworks, practice and challenges of the UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships. The preceding chapters provided the background to the study, the literature review and theoretical framework as well as the methodology of the study. In this chapter, the researcher discusses and analyzes the research findings based on the research objectives of the study and the review of the related literatures. Most importantly, this chapter investigates the extent to which the research findings either corroborate or contradict the existing literature and the theoretical frameworks adopted for the study. The chapter is divided into five different but interrelated sections based on the research objectives.

The first section explores the rationale or motivations behind the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations. During the last decade, the partnership between the two organisations has advanced considerably, at both the strategic, institutional and the operational levels respectively. As a result, what this section basically sought to do was to interrogate why the UN and the AU are putting their personnel in combined structures rather than solely in blue helmet (UN) operations or green helmet (AU) operations. An indication of the motivations behind the partnership will help determine whether the relationship is based on altruistic and instrumental reasons and whether the trend towards

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partnership should be resisted or embraced. The second section examines the normative frameworks underpinning the UN/AU partnership. In particular, this section assesses the effectiveness and appropriateness or otherwise of the normative frameworks that regulates the partnership.

The third section examines how the partnership works in practice at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively. Ideally, every form of partnership is expected to help organisations achieve their overall goals more effectively and efficiently. However, in praxis, this is not always the case as it is sometimes encumbered with many problems. In this regard, the fourth and fifth sections identify and assess the outcomes and benefits as well as the challenges and difficulties associated with the UN/AU partnership. When analyzed together, they give an idea about the future prospects of the partnership.

4.2. THE MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE UN/AU PARTNERSHIP

This section summarizes the research findings in relation to the first research question: What are the motivations behind the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations? As already stated in the preceding chapters, the UN has a global mandate to maintain international peace and security, while the AU has a regional mandate to ensure peace and stability in Africa. Given this different but analogous mandates, the question has often been asked as to why the UN and the AU are making frequent recourse to peacekeeping partnerships when they can undertake these operations alone. Six main interrelated reasons were identified as motivating the partnerships. These factors were further catalogued into two: materialist and ideational motivations.

On one hand, materialist motives depict a situation where the two organisations cooperated on the basis of the materialist gains they expect to obtain from the partnership which include, among others, resources in terms of finances and logistics. The ideational motives, on the other hand, refer to a situation where both organisations cooperated because they consider it the right, good, or enlightening thing to do in a given context. The motives identified under this category comprised provisions of the Chapter VIII and the AU Peace and Security Council protocol; issues of legitimization, burden-sharing, organisational learning and the

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changing security environments in Africa. It is instructive to note that both the material and ideational motives have a mutually synergetic effect, and are therefore, not mutually exclusive categories. The subsequent section analyzes these six motives in much more detail.

4.2.1. Parallel Mandates of the United Nations and the African Union in Africa

The first reason identified as motivating the partnership was that the mandate of both organisations required them to work together. [1] On the part of the UN, Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter states that one of its purposes is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." The Charter gives UNSC this primary responsibility and the specific measures available to fulfill this mandate are set out in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. While Chapter VI deals with the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", Chapter VII contains provisions relating to "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression". Chapter VIII provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is within the context of these Chapters, especially, Chapters VI and VIII that the UN/AU partnership can be situated.

Specifically, the language of Articles 33, 51, 52, 53 and 54 of the UN Charter enjoins the UNSC to work with regional organisations like the AU when the need arises in the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 51 recognizes the "inherent right of collective self-defense by regional arrangements until the UNSC has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Article 52 recognizes the validity of regional arrangement especially, for peaceful settlement of dispute, provided that they are compatible with the purposes and principles of the UN. Article 33 requires member states to use regional arrangements "first of all" in peacefully resolving their conflicts. Article 53 suggests that the UNSC might itself use regional mechanisms, albeit, under its authority for enforcement actions. Article 54 admonishes regional arrangements to keep the UNSC fully informed of their activities.

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Although the UN Charter does not explicitly state that the UNSC should work with regional bodies, perhaps as noted by Lepgold (2003:13), its meaning was seen as self-evident, Articles 33, 51, 52, 53 and 54 defines certain roles for regional bodies, which requires them to work with the UNSC in fulfilment of those functions. It also shows that the UNSC has no monopoly on issues of international peace and security, in the sense that the Articles circuitously directs the Council to give regional entities elbowroom to deal with local disputes in the first instance, before the involvement of the UN (Robert, 2003). In view of this, it can be argued that the UN Charter naturally establishes some form of partnership between the UN and regional organisations such as the AU in the maintenance of international peace and security. As noted by Ban Ki-Moon, the current UN Secretary-General (UNSG), the UN's partnership with the AU is embedded in the very "DNA" of the organisation.[2] The UNSC cannot fulfill its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, particularly in Africa by working in isolation. It was in recognition of this natural affinity that the former, UNSG, Boutros-Ghali in his report, *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 called on the UN to work more closely with regional organisations in peace-related activities. He noted that,

> …under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the UN efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs…and should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional organisation to take the lead in addressing a crises within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the UN to the validity of the regional effort (UN, 1992: para. 63-65).

Unlike the UN Charter, the AUPSC protocol explicitly directs the AU to work with the UN. In Article 17(1), the protocol emphatically states that "the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the UNSC, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (AU, 2002). In this particular instance, the use of the word *shall* in Article 17 (1) even makes it obligatory for the AU PSC to work with the UNSC in the fulfillment of its mandate of maintaining peace and security in Africa, which is consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Powell, 2005; Aning and Abdallah, 2012; (Gelot, Gelot & de Coning 2012).

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Put together, the mandates of both organisations as stipulated in the UN Charter and the AU PSC protocol provide the principal basis of the partnership. This argument is supported by scholars such as (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004), Powell (2005:24) and Diehl and Cho (2006), who also mention the impetus for the partnership as embedded in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Theoretically, this can be explained by the legal-political mandates strand of exchange theory, which expressly states that cooperation between organisations can occur when their mandates require them to work together (Hall et al., 1977; Molnar, 1978; Leblebici & Salancik, 1982; 1988; Raelin, 1982; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). This is the case of the UN and the AU who have mutual responsibilities in the maintenance of security in Africa. In short, both organisations can be seen as natural partners united by the core values laid out in their constitutive charters.

4.2.2. Burden or Responsibility Sharing

The next factor identified as motivating the partnership relates to the issue of peacekeeping burden-sharing or responsibility sharing between the UN and the AU.[3] Generally, burden-sharing according to Thielemann (2003:253) refers to how the costs of common initiatives or provision of public goods are shared among states or organisations. It is also described by Abass (2004) as an exchange of resources among organisations to realise common objectives. The motives behind burden-sharing as identified by Olsen (1965) and Bolks & Stoll (2000) include: The provision of valued public goods which individual actors cannot attain alone; and the provision of some degree of mutual insurance against the occurrence of a particular external shock that would affect both organisations. From this explanation, burden-sharing can be equated with a constellation where organisations act not according to the principles of utility maximization but according to the principle of universalisation which forbids free-riding or placing the costs of providing mutually desired goods disproportionately on the shoulders of others (Thielemann, 2003).

Consistent with this conceptualisation, burden-sharing in reference to the UN/AU partnership can be defined in terms of how the two organisations in specific terms share the costs of peacekeeping operations in Africa with respect to the financing, personnel (military, police, and civilians) contributions, logistical and diplomatic/political support. In

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his *Agenda for peace,* report, then UNSG Boutros-Ghali, for instance, reinforced this principle and called on regional organisations to play a robust security roles, not only as a means to lighten the mounting UN overstretch but also to "contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs" (UN, 1992). But essentially, this was hortatory, precatory and more of a moral desire than a legal binding duty on regional bodies.

On the basis of the above understanding, it can be argued that peacekeeping possesses a strong public good element, because the peace and stability achieved through peacekeeping operations in Africa give rise to a non-excludable and non-rival benefit to both UN and the AU. Thus, both organisations gain from the absence of conflict on the African continent due to their similar mandate to maintain peace and stability on the continent (UN, 1945; AU, 2000, 2002). Hence, none of them is expected to free ride due to their shared responsibilities. Francis (2007), for instance, argues that it is this common recognition that no single organisation can shoulder the whole burden of peacekeeping alone that has given the UN and the AU the imperative for partnerships as envisaged under the Chapter VIII. In practice, what this means is that any peacekeeping intervention by both the UN and the AU implies the distribution of burdens or responsibility in maintaining peace, stability and security in Africa.

The ongoing UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is a typical case in point, where both institutions are sharing the cost of maintaining and sustaining the mission. In terms of the personnel (police and military) contributions, for instance, member states of the AU contribute about 15,140 which is almost 79% of the total number of 19,192 personnel of the mission (DPKO, 2014). Non-Africans contribute only 4,052 which is about 21% of the total number (DPKO, 2014). Apart from this, the entire leadership of UNAMID from the Joint AU/UN Special Representative for Darfur and Joint Chief Mediator to the Police Commissioner is all provided by AU member States.[4] But on the other hand, the financial and logistics needed by the mission is provided through the UN peacekeeping budgets. This undoubtedly represents a form of burden or responsibility sharing between the two organisations. Central to the burden-sharing argument is the acknowledgement that collective action between the UN and the AU yields greater dividends than any of them

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acting alone. This is borne out of the realisation that the leverage of both institutions is enhanced when they undertake coordinated and complementary efforts (Mancini, 2011).

4.2.3. Resource Dependency

The third factor and perhaps one of the most important explanations for the UN/AU partnership is the issue of resource dependency.[5]This is validated by the resource dependency notion of exchange theory which maintains that organisations with scarcity of resources (financial, material and human) or lacking in essential resources will seek to establish relationships with other organisations, in order to supplement their limited resources or obtain needed resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ranaei, Zareei, Alikhani, 2010:24). Resource dependency occurs when organisations are not capable of meeting existing demands on their own or have complementary competences and realize they can benefit from gaining access to each other's capacities and resources. With this perspective, organisations are viewed as augmenting their structures and patterns of behaviour to acquire and maintain needed external resources (Ranaei, Zareei, Alikhani, 2010:24).

The premise of the resource dependency aspect of exchange theory can be applied to the UN/AU partnership.To begin with, the current nature, complexity and diversity of peacekeeping mandates have left the UN in a situation of 'overstretch' with very limited capabilities (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2004; Jones and Cherif, 2004; de Coning, 2006:6-7; Derblom, Frisell & Schmidt, 2008; UN, 2008a, 2008c; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010; Mancini, 2011; Gowan and Sherman, 2012). There is high demand for well-trained troops, police and civilians as well as logistics and material resources due to the rising number of operations. Moreover, the budget for global peacekeeping operations has also soared to almost eight (8) billion US dollars a year (DPKO, 2014). These complexities are represented in figure 4.1 which shows the infographic of the scale and scope of UN peacekeeping around the world and the varieties of its partnership with other organisations today.

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Figure 4.1: UN Peacekeeping Inforgraphic



Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2014.

The inforgraphic shows the logistics and the total number of 116, 919 field personnel deployed to 16 peacekeeping missions across four continents in the world, with a budget of 7.23 billion US dollars. Partnership with organisations such as the AU, EU, and the World Bank in peacekeeping is also indicated, with a particular focus on UNAMID. Essentially, the scope and scale of UN peacekeeping as shown in the infographic is an indication that the challenges that confront contemporary peacekeeping operations, especially, in Africa cannot be addressed by the UN alone. Presumably, it would require cooperation with the

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AU and other stakeholders as one solution to the quandary of meeting the increasing needs of the UN.

The contributions of the AU, therefore, have been a major supplement to the activities of the UN in Africa in spite of the challenges that accompany such relationships. In Sudan (Darfur), Burundi and recently in Mali, the UN benefited from the AU's diplomatic and personnel (police, military and civilian) support. In Sudan, AMIS personnel who qualified under UN standards were all "rehatted" to UNAMID when the mission was established.[6] Recently in Mali, AFISMA vehicles and containers of field defence stores, accommodation units, generators and other supplies were all transferred to MINUSMA.[7] Moreover, AFISMA personnel constituted the initial mission support staff that drafted MINUSMA's concept of operations. Below is what one of the MINUSMA personnel interviewed in Mali said:

> Without AFISMA already on ground, the challenges that confronted MINUSMA at its initial stages of deployment could have been possibly worse. AFISMA did all the grounds work for MINUSMA to be established. MINUSMA's concept of operations, for example, was laid down by AFISMA personnel. At the initial stages of its deployment, MINUSMA only existed at the political level because at the operational level, it was only filled with AFISMA structures and logistics, and nothing much changed after five month of its deployment. [8]

On the other hand, the AU also remains highly dependent on the expertise, material and financial resources of the UN to augment and sustain its operations. The AU itself has acknowledged that it currently lacks the "expertise, experience, logistical, financial resources and a management capacity for carrying out a long-term peace support operation" (Haugevik, 2007:12; AU, 2012, 2013). In Somalia, AMISOM is benefiting from the UN logistical support package through UNSOA.[9] At the AU Commission, AU staff at the Peace Support Operation Department benefit from the technical expertise of UN personnel from the UNOAU (AU, 2012). Indeed, this form of dependency is what rendered the close cooperation between the two bodies in several conflict contexts such as Darfur (UNAMID) and Somalia inevitable.

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Another important aspect of the resource dependency argument relates to the doctrinal differences between the two organisations. The UN usually deals with traditional peacekeeping and has always been reluctant to undertake a Chapter VII mandate for peace enforcement actions due to lack of capacity (Boutellis and Williams, 2013b). The only Chapter VII mandate the UN has deployed since its inception is the recent Intervention Brigade mandated to support the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to defeat the M23 rebels. [10] Whiles this represented a policy shift and marked the first time such an operation has been authorised by the UNSC, it has, nonetheless, set a precedent for future missions. On the other hand, the AU has usually undertaken peace enforcement actions in pursuant of the Article 4h of its Constitutive Act which states that the Union has the right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances (AU, 2002; Murithi, 2007a).

Specifically, as noted by Coning (2006) and Williams (2011), the AU has through its various missions demonstrated the value of undertaking high-risk stabilization missions needed for a long-term post-conflict resolution, thus what the Brahimi report termed as the '*no peace to keep'* type of missions. The AU's intervention in Somalia is an example. The AU has also proven its capacity to mobilise and deploy personnel from member states to respond quickly to crises in a cheaper manner than the UN which tends to deploy larger and more costly peacekeeping operations. However, Aning and Aubyn (2013a) argue that while the UN is reluctant to deploy peacekeeping operations in situations where there is 'no peace to keep' like Somalia, it has shown the capacity to sustain and backstop peacekeeping missions, in terms of, funding and providing logistics for the longer term. Deriving from this, it can also be argued that both organisations are cooperating in order to maximize their comparative advantages. This coincides with the attraction theory which maintains that organisations that are better at specific tasks but worse at other tasks than other organisations may be attracted to each other because of their complementary skills.

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4.2. 4. Legitimacy Issues

The contemporary challenge to the legitimacy of the UN in certain conflict zones in Africa is yet another reason contributing to the emergence of the UN/AU partnership. For instance, in an interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy SRSG, UNAMID, he observed that:

> "the African Union and African troops sometimes add political legitimacy and leverage to a peacekeeping operation in Africa especially in a context where the host nation may not welcome a UN presence"[11]

Every organisation values international legitimacy because it functions as a moral, economic and political resource. With legitimacy, Gelot (2012:133) notes that organisations can implement their preferred policies and be regarded by other organisations or states with esteem and approval. In this sense, being seen as illegitimate impairs organisational actions and objectives. As a result, organisations frame their interest and policies and have them validated at the international and regional levels. The legitimacy of the UN is derived from its universal membership and global mandate. Thakur (2010:5) posits that the "basis of the UN's legitimacy includes it credentials for representing the international community, agreed procedures for making decisions on behalf of international society and political impartiality." However, some respondents indicated that the legitimacy of the UN as the authoritative security provider has suffered from a legitimacy deficit in recent time in many ways.[12]

First, the legitimacy of the UN has been attacked for doing too little, or acting too late in certain crises situations.[13] The worst experiences of the UN is in the early post-Cold War periods especially, its great failures in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. These failures affected the legitimacy of the UN (Stewart, 1993; Thakur, and Thayer, 1995; Francis, 2006; Kristine St-Pierre, 2007; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010; Adebajo, 2011; Jones, 2011). Second, because the UN is a membership of governments, in many civil war contexts in Africa rebel forces or non-state actors often see the UN as biased in favor of governments, and therefore, not an 'honest broker' in dealing with conflicts. This is particularly the case where the government party has an ally among the permanent member of the UN Security Council. In other circumstances, however, the UN is also often accused of supporting rebel

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forces or undermining governments. In a recent report by Aljazeera news, for example, the UN was accused by President Salva Kiir of South Sudan of siding with rebel fighters seeking to overthrow him but the UN denied this allegation (Aljazeera, 2014).

Similarly, during the 2010 post-electoral violence in Cote d'Ivoire, the incumbent President, Laurent Gbagbo demanded that the 10,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission be withdrawn from the country, accusing the UN of bias in favour of Mr. Allassane Ouattara (BBC, 2010). In the same way, the rejection of a UN mission in Darfur by the Government of Sudan despite the humanitarian crises in the country was also seen as a symptom of the legitimacy deficit of the conflict management instrument of the UN.[14] In this particular case, the Government of Sudan who is an ally of the People's Republic of China was skeptical about any UN intervention due to concerns about a possible interference in its internal affairs and a breach of the country's sovereignty by the Western countries (Murithi 2009; Bah and Lortan, 2011; Anyidoho, 2012). Although the AU also suffers some legitimacy crises in certain conflict contexts, African states have often preferred an AU intervention to that of the UN. According to Bah (2010) and Gelot (2012), the AU sometimes enjoys some degree of political legitimacy in Africa than the UN, which is sometimes not seen as an honest broker as exemplified in Darfur, Sudan. Indeed, the UN has been struggling in recent times to cope with a string of allegations of bias and failure to swiftly intervene in crises on the continent.

The argument, therefore, is that the UN's partnership with the AU, which is an important source of political authority in Africa, adds to the overall legitimacy of its operations on the continent. The involvement of the AU in UNAMID, for instance, added to the legitimacy of the mission among the Government in Khartoum and the Sudanese people (Haugevik, 2007:14). Legitimacy is important for peacekeeping operations because it often increases buy-in, effectiveness and safety of personnel. Hence, given the refusal to allow UN peacekeepers in places like Darfur, it was quite axiomatic that the AU served as a legitimizing force for the UN's presence in Darfur.[15] However, it must also be pointed out that the African Union also needs to secure international legitimacy from the UN for its own operations, especially, those that have to do with Chapter VII mandates due to the monopoly of the UNSC over enforcement actions. This point conforms to the preposition

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made by Ansell and Gash (2007) that some organisations may engage in partnerships for some egoistic reasons such as to either secure legitimacy for their position or to fulfill a legal obligation. From the argument by Ansell and Gash, it can be concluded that both the UN and the AU are partnering partially, to secure legitimacy for their actions.

4.2.5. Organisational Learning and Transfer of Tacit Knowledge

Another factor which was identified and which is perhaps less discussed in the literature as motivating the partnership relates to organisational learning, principally the transfer of tacit knowledge. Organisational learning in this context can be explained as the process where organisational knowledge is exchanged and imitated by either the UN or the AU (Haugevik, 2007:14). The argument is that the UN has been cooperating with the OAU in the past before it current partnership with the AU. However, their relationship was fraught with many challenges both at the institutional and field level due to the different structures, principles and values, hoarding of information as well as administrative procedures and different mode of operations (Haugevik, 2007:14; Boutellis and Williams, 2013a). Some respondents noted that it was the efforts to overcome these difficulties and ensure greater access to information that motivated the two organisations to work together at various levels to learn from each other's experiences, knowledge, skills, administrative procedures and working methods.[16]

The overall objective of organisational learning is to contribute to organisational growth and development and to provide an effective response to conflicts. This rationale, in particular, explains why the UN is often seen as a role model for the AU, simply because the latter has, since its inception, tried to imitate or model its structures and procedures along the lines of the UN. Now, for example, Boutellis and Williams (2013a) posit that the language and form of AU communiqués and resolutions/decisions even resemble that of the UN. Staff of both organisations are also now undertaking joint assessment missions in countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Mali, DRC, Madagascar and the idea is to learn from each other and use a common approach so they do not compete and also to maximise the use of scarce resources (AU, 2012, 2013).[17] Furthermore, the processes involved in the initiation,

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planning deployment, management and evaluation of peacekeeping operations of the AU missions all resembles that of the UN. For example, in the UN, the UNSC approves and provides the strategic direction for every peacekeeping operation and the DPKO does the planning and management. Similarly, in the AU, the PSC approves and provide the strategic direction for every peacekeeping operation, whilst the PSOD division of the AU Commission does the planning and management (AU, 2010).

Although both institutions are learning from each other through their joint efforts, it appears the AU is rather benefiting more. Within the AU Commission, for example, the UN has seconded its staff under the framework of the Ten year capacity building programme for the AU to help develop the capacity of AU staff since 2006. The UN personnel provide daily technical advice to AU personnel on how to: develop and operationalise the APSA; draft and review AU policy documents and guidelines (UN, 2011a, 2011b; AU, 2012, 2013). They also provide daily technical advice and mentoring of AU personnel on: the planning, mounting, and management of peace support operations; how to establish the African Standby Force (ASF) and the development of standard operational procedures (SOPs) for peacekeeping operations. Moreover, they also support the AUC in conducting training needs assessments and developing training policies for African troop/police contributing countries.[18] The presence of UN staff at the AU is helping to bridge the institutional knowledge gap as both organisations are learning from each other's working methods and procedures. Below is what one of the respondent at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia said about organisational learning:

> "The AMISOM partnership between the two institutions is teaching the AU how the UN works in the areas of mission planning, management, development of peacekeeping SOPs which is good for collaborative efforts"[19]

Thus, through the UN's institutional support and capacity-building, AUC staff have significantly improved and increased their technical skills and knowledge in the area of mission planning and management, and the development of peacekeeping policies and guidelines. As noted by Kogut (1988) and Polanyi (1966), partnership affords an

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opportunity for organisational learning particularly, the transfer of tacit knowledge which can only be possible when people from different organisations work together. And an illustrative example of this is the AU's relationship with the UN.

4.2.6. Changing Security Landscape

The last factor motivating the partnership is the changing nature of the security environment in Africa. Contemporary conflicts in Africa have become complex with multiple actors including governments, sub state actors[20] or 'war lords', non-state actors, militias, criminal elements and armed civilians who are sometimes even difficult to identify (AU, 2006b, 2010, 2012). Moreover, the factors that underlie these conflicts are multifaceted involving a mix of governance, ethnic, resources and religious factors. The intersection of organised crimes, like drug trafficking, piracy and in some instances, terrorism, has further complicated these conflicts (AU, 2010, 2012). The current crises in Mali and the Sahel region of West Africa, Somalia, Central African Republic and South Sudan are typical cases in point. The complexities of these conflicts, in terms of, the numerous actors, issues and the level of violence involved call for multinational, multidimensional and regional responses.[21]

Consequently, a more comprehensive approach involving all stakeholders is required because the continent's security challenges are not sealed from the rest of the world. Most of them are influenced by all manner of transnational forces. Therefore, what is needed is effective partnership among all key stakeholders to tackle these problems. A security expert interviewed endorsed this view and stated that it is within this context that the UN and the AU partnership should be seen because the magnitude of the problems surpasses any solution by one single entity. This point coheres well with Haugevik's (2007) idea that inter-organisational cooperation can be driven by the external environment of security organisations and the internal needs within the security organisations themselves. This is just the same as the UN/AU partnership, where the context of their external security environments is driving them to cooperate.

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4.3. THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS REGULATING THE UN/AU PARTNERSHIP

This section assesses the effectiveness or otherwise of the normative and legal frameworks underpinning the UN/AU partnership in peace operations. Before proceeding to discuss the main issues, two key concepts used here, "normative" and "legal frameworks" are defined due to their varied meanings in the extant literature. The word 'normative' has diverse meanings in different academic disciplines. Whilst in law, for example, the term is used to refer to the way things ought to be done according to a value position, in philosophy, it is used to describe 'how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong' (Dorschel, 1988). The concise Oxford English dictionary, also defined normative as something "relating or deriving from an acceptable standard or norm." According to Krasner (1985), norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. In spite of the different interpretations, one common thesis that runs through all the definitions is that the word normative prescribes ideal standards or norms, especially, rules of behaviors that govern a particular social situation. Legal frameworks, on the other hand, give structures to partnership and define the parameters for the conducts and actions of participating organisations. Specifically, legal frameworks represent a set of laws, statutes, regulations and policies that determine the way things operate in a given society and through which decisions and judgments can be reached (Dorschel, 1988; Canguilhem, 1989).

Based on the explanations above, the term normative and legal frameworks, for the purpose of this discourse, represent the norms, standards, rules, agreements and guidelines that have been set in the form of laws and policies that govern the partnership between the UN and the AU (UN, 1945, 2006b; AU, 2000, 2002). The importance of these normative and legal frameworks cannot be over-emphasized because they more often than not, determine the successes and sustainability of partnerships. In other words, partnerships are more likely to succeed when supportive policies, law and regulations are in place, because they regulate and guide the systems and structures as well as the joint activities of the collaborating organisations (Boydell, 2000, 2007). Regarding the UN/AU partnership, the normative and legal frameworks are defined in several policy documents, guidelines and agreements. The

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research findings showed that the following normative and legal frameworks are expected to regulate the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations: the UN Charter; the framework for the Ten- year Capacity Building Programme for the AU; the Constitutive Act of the AU; and the AU Peace and Security Protocol. These normative and legal frameworks are further discussed below.

4.3.1. The Charter of the United Nations

The United Nations Charter is the constituting instrument and the foundational treaty of the United Nations. It was signed on 26 June 1945 at San Francisco, United States of America, by 50 of the 51 original member countries of the UN and entered into force on 24 October 1945.[22] The Charter sets out the rights and obligations of Member States, establishes the organs and procedures of the UN, and codifies the major principles of international relations (UN, 1945). It contains nineteen (19) explicit Chapters which deal with the different aspect of the UN's work. While some of the Chapters focus on the functions of the various organs of the UN, others deal with issues concerning the pacific settlement of disputes and actions that are to be taken with respect to threats and breaches to world peace and acts of aggression. However, the specific Chapter of the Charter that deals with the UN's relationship with regional organisations such as the African Union is the Chapters VI and VIII. These Chapters provide the constitutional basis and the framework for the UN's cooperation with regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Whilst Article 33 forms part of Chapter VI, the Articles 52-54 constitute Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Excerpts of these Articles are presented in Box 1. Specially, Article 33 requires member states to use regional arrangements "first of all" in peacefully resolving their conflicts. Article 52 provides for the involvement of regional arrangements or agencies in the peaceful settlement of disputes, while Article 53 allows such regional arrangements to take enforcement action, but only with the explicit authorization by the Security Council. In practice, though the provision in Article 53 was largely adhered to for the first four decades of the UN, it was breached in the early 1990s when several regional

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and sub-regional organisations undertook enforcement actions without UNSC authorization. ECOWAS's intervention in Liberia, in 1990, was the first time such enforcement action had been undertaken by a sub-regional entity without the consent of the UNSC (Ero, 1995; Adeleke, 1995; Aning, 1999; Adekeye, 2003, 2002; Jaye and Amadi, 2009). Article 54, on the other hand, stipulates that regional arrangements or agencies shall always inform the Security Council of their activities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Box 4.1.: United Nations Charter- Excerpts of Chapter VI/VIII on Regional Arrangements

-Article 33: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice"

- **Article 52**: "The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council."

-**Article 53**: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council….."

-**Article 54**:"The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Source: United Nations Charter, 1945.

Essentially, what these provisions of Chapters VI and VIII mean in reality is that first, the UN recognizes the existence of regional entities whose roles are to foster the peaceful settlement of conflicts in their neighbourhood. Second, although the prerogative for the authorization of the use of force rest with the UNSC, Robert (2003) notes that the Charter, however, calls on regional organisations to execute such a mandate. Put differently, it can be claimed that Chapters VI and VIII created a mechanism that allows the UNSC to utilize

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regional arrangements to implement its enforcement measures. This is a significant manifestation that right from its creation, the UN recognised and acknowledged the importance of regional organisations as key partners in the maintenance of international peace and security. In short, the provisions of Chapters VI and VIII are the main context and the legal basis within which the UN and the AU partnership in peacekeeping operations have been formed.

However, the interpretation of the role that regional organisations such as the AU should play under Chapter VIII in its relationship with the UNSC remains unclear. There is vagueness in the division of responsibility between the UN and the AU in the maintenance of regional peace and security in Africa (UN, 1945; UN, 1992 and 1995; Henrikson, 1996; Malan, 1998; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004; Gray, 2004; Diehl and Cho, 2006). As Aning (2008a:17) rightly states, the type, nature and division of responsibilities between the UN and regional organisations under Chapter VIII is not clear. The Chapter does not establish the structures, rules and obligations, the parameters as well as the guidelines on how the UN and regional organisations such as the AU should work together. This is obviously not good for such a relationship because one of the success factors of partnerships indicated by Tett, Crowther and O'Hara (2003) as well as Bailey & Dolan (2011) is that there should be a clear understanding of each organisation's roles and responsibilities regarding the division of labour. Otherwise, confusions and disagreements may abound. Within the context of the UN/AU partnership, the ambiguity of Chapter VIII has not only affected the effectiveness of the strategic level relationship, but also their field-based collaborations. This is evidenced in the strategic differences over the best course of action for resolving certain conflicts in Africa such as the Libyan crises in 2011 (Aning, et al., 2013; Sally, 2013; Smith-Windsor, 2013).[23]

It is instructive to note that the existence of Chapter VIII has not automatically generated consensus on how the two organisations should operationalise it or act in a particular crises context. Part of the reason for this is that there is no shared understanding and appreciation of the principles and spirit of Chapter VIII as well as its application and implementation within the context of the UN's collective security framework. This is why Tanner (2010), for example, reiterated on the need for the UN and the AU to have a shared strategic vision

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in order to exercise their respective advantages and reduce the likelihood of duplication of efforts and working at cross-purposes. The importance of having a shared value and understanding of Chapter VIII cannot be overemphasised in the sense that mutual trust, the coordination of policies and programmes as well as better outcomes cannot be achieved if both organisations lack shared objectives and purpose of the partnership.

In efforts to overcome this dilemma, the AU has persistently called on the UN to make renewed efforts to ensure an action-oriented and balanced partnership through a flexible and innovative, interpretation of Chapter VIII (UN, 2008c; AU, 2012). In a report by the Chairperson of the AU Commission in 2012, the organisation even went further and articulated a set of principles aimed at clarifying and enhancing the partnership in the context of Chapter VIII. These principles included: respect for African ownership and priority setting on African peace and Security issues; flexible and innovative application of the principle of subsidiarity; mutual respect and adherence to the principle of comparative advantage; and the division of labour underpinned by complementarity (AU, 2012). A senior official interviewed at the AU PSC Secretariat, for instance, noted that although "there have been calls from the AU's side to the UN to consider these principles as an indication of an innovative interpretation of the Chapter VIII, the UNSC has been reluctant."[24]Most importantly, while these principles are important in clarifying the relationship, they cannot be implemented when both organisations still lack shared values and political convergence on key policy issues regarding their partnerships.

Conversely, the question has also been raised as to the extent to which the UN can forge a special relationship with the AU without setting a precedent for other regional organisations in the world. Presently, the AU is not the only regional organisation the UN is partnering with. The European Union, the North Atlantic treaty organisations (NATO), the League of Arab States (LAS) all cooperate with the UN in different forms (UN, 2008c). Therefore, how can the UN have a special form of relationship with only the AU? As a matter of fact, the UN Charter, in general, and Chapter VIII, in particular, was developed in a very different era of global security cooperation and also preceded the creation of most regional bodies like the AU today. It is, therefore, necessary to revisit the norms and principles inherent in Chapter VIII and assess them based on the current developments of the UN's

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partnership with the AU and other regional bodies in general. Moreover, whiles it is not practicable for the UN to establish a universal model defining the ideal relationship with regional bodies due to their different characteristics, resource availability and institutional capacity, it is possible to identify certain general principles on which cooperation could be based (UN, 1999a). Henrikson (1996:43), however, thinks otherwise and argues that the vagueness of Chapter VIII is good on grounds that it was deliberately intended to enable the UN and regional bodies to work, at least theoretically, in unison with some flexibility. Murithi (2007b) draws on Henrikson's perspective and also indicates that the UN and the AU were able to establish the hybrid mission in Darfur, because of the flexibility of Chapter VIII which provided the latitude to operationalise such a relationship.

Although the UN is yet to develop a clear policy framework for cooperation with the AU, it has made structured attempts within the past decades to establish a systematic relationship with the AU based on Chapter VIII. This was done through several meetings between the two bodies at the highest level and a series of Security Council debates which culminated in the publication of several reports by the UN Secretary-General. One of such important reports was the April 2008 Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security (S/2008/186) and the report by the "African Union-United Nations Panel on the modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations", also known as the "Prodi Report" (UN, 2008a, 2008c). In particular, the Prodi report focused on the strategic, financial and logistical requirements of the UN's cooperation with the African Union. It recommended the capacity building of the AU for conflict prevention in Africa, in terms of, human resources and logistics; and the establishment of two new financial mechanisms to support the AU. On the financial mechanisms, in particular, the report recommended first, the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to support AU peacekeeping capacity; and second, the use of UN assessed contributions to support the Security Council's authorized AU operations for a period of no longer than six months (UN, 2008a). The report, however, noted that two conditions need to be met before such a support can be given to the AU: (a) a case-by-case approval by the Security Council and General Assembly; and (b) an agreement between the African Union

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and the United Nations that the mission would transition to United Nations management within six months.

Another important recommendation of the report was that the UNSC should establish a division of responsibility based on the African Union's comparative advantages (UN, 2008a, and 2008c). Important as these recommendations were, it fell short of providing a generic framework of support to the AU as well as addressing the other two elements embedded in the principle of subsidiarity which are the modalities for decision-making and division of labour. Thus, there is, so far, no consensus between the two organisations on the application of these two elements. Discussions on burden-sharing are also constrained by the absence of consensus on the full implications of implementing Chapter VIII (AU, 2012). Nevertheless, due to the recognition that effective partnership is dependent on the respective organisations having an appropriate capacity, the UN is providing a ten-year capacity building plan for the AU. In that regard, apart from the UN Charter, the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU also provides a framework for the UN system's support to the capacity development efforts of the AU.

4.3.1.1. The Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU

The Declaration on "Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU" (TYCBP) was signed between the former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan and the former Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Alpha Omar Konare in November 2006.[25] The signing of the declaration followed the adoption of UNSC resolution A/RES/60/1 in 2005 by the UN General Assembly at its 60th session which requested the formulation and implementation of a ten-year capacity building plan for the AU. The Programme is aimed at enhancing cooperation between the UN and the AU in their areas of competence and in conformity with the respective mandates of both organisations (UN, 2011a, 2011b). The TYCBP covers a wide range of areas such as:

- Institution-building, human resources development and financial management;
- Peace and security (including crime prevention);

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- Human rights;
- Political legal and electoral matters;
- Social , economic, cultural and human development; and
- Food Security and environmental protection (UN, 2011).

The Programme provides a holistic framework for the UN system to support the capacity development efforts of the AU and it's Regional Economic Communities (RECs). More significantly, the TYCBP attempts to align the AU's initiatives with the UN's mandates. While the TYCBP represents the first ever comprehensive programme of action designed by the UN for the AU, it is vital to note that it is not the pacesetter of UN programme of assistance to Africa. Indeed, the first of such programmes was in 1986 when the UN adopted the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAERD) through a cooperative agreement with the OAU (UN, 2010).

Other programmes of assistance included the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF) in the 1990 and the Africa-owned and Africa-led programme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2002 which was adopted by the UNGA in its resolution 57/7 as a successor of the UN-NADAF (UN, 2010). What is common to the TYCBP in all these previous programmes is that they all prioritize peace and security matters as the *sine qua non* of all the areas covered by the agreements. Thus, though the TYCBP covers issues such as governance, conflict prevention, development, human rights and regional integration, its primary focus is on peace and security, demonstrating the importance the UN attaches to such issues.

On peace and security which was the initial focus of the TYCBP, the UN has supported the AU's capacity-building efforts in the area of conflict prevention and mediation, elections, rule of law and peacekeeping operations. For peacekeeping operations, the UN provides support in the planning, development and management of AU operations such as AMISOM (UN, 2011c). The UN also provides institutional support to the Peace Support Operations Department (PSOD) of the AU Commission for the operationalisation of the ASF, a key pillar of the APSA. To help implement the TYCBP, the AU Peacekeeping Support Team was also established in 2007 within the DPKO by the UN General Assembly. The Team

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provided expertise and technical knowledge to the AU Peace Support Operations Department in the planning, management and evaluation of peacekeeping operations (UN, 2011a, 2011c; Gadin, 2012; Freear and de Coning, 2013; AU, 2014).

Since its inception, the TYCBP has strengthened the strategic partnership between the UN and AU and improved interactions between the secretariats of both organisations at different levels on long-term strategic and ongoing peace and security issues. However, the research findings revealed that the implementation of the programme has been hindered by some challenges. Key among these challenges is the lack of consensus by both the UN and the AU on what constitutes "capacity-building" within the context of the framework (UN, 2010, 2011a, 2011c). Others include the lack of financial resources, the multiplicity of actors on both sides, the absence of a well-defined programme of work for the TYCBP and the inadequate involvement of African RECs in the implementation of the programme.[26] To overcome some of these challenges, the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) was established in 2010 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia under the TYCBP. The overall mandate of the UNOAU is to support the AU's long-term capacity-building efforts and the operationalisation of the African peace and security architecture by taking the lead role in the implementation of the remainder of the TYCBP (UN, 2011c).

The UNOAU integrated three former offices of the UN to the AU namely, the United Nations Liaison Office to the African Union (UNLOAU); the AU Peacekeeping Support Team (AUPST) and the UN Planning Team for the AU mission in Somalia (UNPT-AMISOM), as well as support elements of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Joint Support Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) (UN, 2011a, 2011c). This integration formed part of the broader collective effort of the UN to enhance and upgrade its strategic and operational level partnership with the AU and the RECs on peace and security issues. Even more significant was the fact that it ensured that the UN's support to the AU was provided in a more coordinated and coherent manner on both short-term operational and planning matters, and long-term capacity-building.[27] It also made the representation of the UN to the AU more coherent, cost-effective and efficient by bringing all the different UN offices under UNOAU. What is instructive about the UNOAU, so far, is the African leadership. It was first headed by Mr. Zachary Muburi-Muita, a Kenyan

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diplomat, as an Assistant Secretary-General in 2010 and currently, led by Mr. Haile Menkerios from Eritrea as a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in March 2011. This is relevant because it promotes African ownership of the partnership process and also ensures that only people (*in this case Africans and not foreigners*) who have adequate experience and knowledge in UN and AU issues occupy the SRSG positions.

The UNOAU has since its creation provided a regular interface between the Departments of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Department of the Field Support (DFS) in New York on one side, and the Peace and Security Department and the Department of Political Affairs at the AU headquarters in Ethiopia, on the other. It has also improved the coordination problems and brought some degree of clarity into the complex relationship between the bureaucracies of the two organisations (UN, 2011a; AU, 2012). That is, since 2010, the UNOAU has strengthened and improved the UN's coordination with AU institutions and provided technical advice to the AU in the planning and management of complex peace operations in Africa. One of the AU-led operations that has benefited from this support is AMISOM (Gadin, 2013; AU, 2014).

The UNOAU assisted in the review, update, development and publication of most of the strategic and operational documents for AMISOM in line with UN standards (AU, 2014). Aside specific AU support, the UNOAU has also facilitated training activities and workshops for the RECs on peacekeeping, planning, logistics and other operational and administrative issues. Lastly, one other role of the UNOAU which has not been highlighted in much of the literatures is its lead role in multi-partner coordination for the AU. It coordinates the support of other partners outside the UN system to the AU such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In 2011, for example, the UNOAU coordinated with the EU and NATO to support the peace operations exercise code named AMANI AFRICA which assessed the operational readiness of the African Standby Force (ASF) Road Map II.[28] The UNOAU is currently assisting the AU with the development of the ASF Road Map III, which should culminate in the operationalisation of the ASF by 2015.

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4.3.2. African Union Instruments

The 2000 AU Constitutive Act and the 2002 Peace and Security Council Protocol provide the normative basis of the African Union's cooperation with the UN and the international community. In order to put the provisions of these two documents into proper context, it is important to make reference to the period of the OAU, when it also cooperated with the UN. The OAU's founding purpose and principle emphasized the sovereign independence and the non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. A consequence of the weakness of this approach was that the OAU's Charter provisions for mediation, conciliation and arbitration in Article XIX, as a dispute resolution mechanism was not effectively implemented (Elias, 1964; Amoo, 1992; Motjope, 2011). It did not function as expected. Hence, apart from the African-mandated multinational peacekeeping operation in places like Chad in 1981-1982, the OAU could not undertake many initiatives on peace and security (Sesay, 1982; Zartman, 1985; Foltz, 1991; Deng & Zartman, 1991; Amoo, 1992). Instead, the OAU according to Coning (1996) resorted to various *ad hoc* measures such as mediation committees and the use of a uniquely African tool, the utilization of so-called wise men, normally Ex-heads of State like Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania or Kenneth David Kaunda of Zambia, or other imminent persons to act as mediators in the conflict management process.

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, however, brought about new changes in the international security landscape, as new internal conflicts erupted in several African countries such as Liberia, Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, just to mention a few. To ensure effective response to these internals, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) was established by the OAU in Cairo, in 1993.[29] The adoption of the MCPMR provided the OAU with the necessary instruments to anticipate and prevent conflicts on the continent. The importance of the MCPMR became particularly evident, following the retrenchment of the UN in Africa after its major setbacks in Rwanda and Somalia (Bowden, 1999; Boulden, 2001; Berman & Sams, 2000; Fleitz, 2002; Adebajo & Scanlon, 2006). The expectation was that, since the UN was unlikely to authorise a major peacekeeping operation in Africa, Africans themselves should be equipped to perform this function (Francis, 2006; Adebajo, 2011). The year 1993,

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therefore, became the decisive year when the OAU adopted structured security architecture to deal with African conflicts.

Unlike the OAU's approach to peace and security during the Cold War, the adoption of the MCPMR resulted in some cooperation between the OAU and the UN, as the former viewed the latter's role as complimentary to its own efforts. The MCPMR opened a new era of cooperation with the UN in international peace and security. In particular, the MCPMR entreated the OAU to cooperate and work closely with the UN in peacemaking, peacekeeping and where necessary, request the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the OAU's peace and security activities within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (OAU, 1993). Subsequently, both institutions cooperated, albeit in an *ad hoc* manner, in a number of peacemaking and preventive diplomacy efforts in countries such as Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. However, the scope, complex nature and gravity of African conflicts, soon revealed the limitations of the MCPMR, which, among other things, did not provide for the deployment of peacekeeping operations (AU, 2012). It therefore, became necessary to adapt the Mechanism to the prevailing security landscape on the continent.

Consequently, in 2002, the OAU was transformed into the African Union, following the adoption of a Constitutive Act in Lomé, Togo, in 2000 and a summit meeting by African Heads of States held in Durban, South Africa in July 2002. The transition to the AU was to enable the continental organisation play a more active role in addressing the challenges of Africa and making it relevant to the demands of the 21st Century. Comparatively, the African Union instruments for conflict resolution are more comprehensive than those of the OAU. For the very first time, the AU was given the right in Article 4h of its Constitutive Act[30] to intervene in Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The decision to incorporate Article 4h was premised on the failures of the OAU to intervene in conflicts situations to stop the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes in Africa. In addition, Member States were also given the right under Article 4j to request the intervention of the African Union to restore peace and security, when necessary. Collectively, these provisions provided a major departure from the age-old

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principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Member States to the principle of non-indifference. The codification of the AU's right to intervene in Member States represented a shift from sovereignty as a right in the OAU era to sovereignty as a responsibility (Kuwali & Viljoen, 2013).

With respect to the partnership, the Constitutive Act makes less extensive reference to the UN. The sole substantive reference to the UN is in Article 3(e) of the Constitutive Act which implores the AU to "encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations…" Although the Constitutive Act encourages the AU to promote some form of international cooperation, the connection with the UN is weak. For example, though the UN has the primacy for the authorization of any peace enforcement actions by regional organisations, one would have thought that some reference would be made to that in the Act. But on the contrary, the Constitutive Act has no operative reference for prior approval by the UNSC of any AU intervention, especially, those that have to do with Article 4h, implying that AU enforcement actions can occur without UNSC authorization. This is at variance with Article 53 of the UN Charter, which requires the express authorization by the UNSC of all enforcement actions undertaken by regional organisations, and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which prohibits the use of military force against any sovereign government except in self-defence. Thus, the UN Charter expresses in clear language that regional organisations are prohibited from exercising Chapter VII powers, unless they have obtained prior UNSC authorisation. The important question this raises is that: how can the AU decide on an intervention outside the UN security framework; and what would be the role of the UN in such interventions especially when the UNSC disapproves it. As it remains now, the AU holds the prerogative to decide whether or not the organisation will seek the authorization of the UNSC as required under Article 53 of the UN Charter for its enforcement actions.

Perhaps, the silence on UNSC approval of AU enforcement actions in the Constitutive Act is due to some instances in the 1990s when the international community focused attention on other parts of the world at the expense of more pressing problems in Africa (Kioko, 2003). A typical instance was the conflict in Liberia in the 1990s when ECOWAS had to intervene as well as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. As argued by Kioko (2003:821), Article

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4(h) demonstrates that African Leaders are themselves willing to push the frontiers of collective stability and security to the limit without any regard for legal niceties such as the authorization of the Security Council. Nevertheless, it is important to also see the Article 4(h) and the UNSC as complimentary, in the sense that in cases where there is an impasse at the Security Council, the AU can fill the vacuum (Kunschak, 2013; Kuwali & Viljoen, 2013). Therefore, Article 4(h) does not render the UNSC's ultimate discretion over the legitimate use of force obsolete. On the contrary, it offers a solution to circumvent blockades in the UNSC in situations of urgent humanitarian catastrophes.

Unlike the Constitutive Act, the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council[31] of the AU adopted by Heads of State and Government in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, makes specific recognition of the UNSC's primary responsibility in international peace and security. The PSC protocol further stipulates that its guiding principles are the ones enshrined "in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the UN..."(Article 4). The Article 7 (k) also prescribes the promotion and development of a strong "partnership for peace and security" with the United Nations and its agencies. Moreover, the Article 17(1-3) which is on the AU's relationship with the United Nations and other international organisations categorically states that:

> In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions' activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter ….. The Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission shall maintain close and continued interaction with the United Nations Security Council, its African members, as well as with the Secretary-General, including holding periodic meetings and regular consultations on questions of peace, security and stability in Africa.

It is apparent from the excerpts that the AU anticipated some form of partnership with the UN in the maintenance of peace, and security in Africa. On the AU's side, these particular Articles (4, 7, and 17) of the protocol form the principal basis of its relationship with the

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UN. The provisions in these Articles do not only encourage cooperation between the AUPSC and the UNSC but also among the administrative wings (UN Secretariats and AU Commission) of both institutions. The PSC Protocol makes it mandatory for the AUPSC to work with the UNSC and where, necessary seek its financial, logistical and military support in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. This is in consonance with the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which implores Member States to use regional organisations as first resort in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. What is not clear, however, is the form and modalities that AUPSC and UNSC cooperation should entail or how the AUPSC should work with the UN. Practically, both Councils have been meeting annually to deliberate on African Peace and Security issues but they are yet to clearly define their respective roles and responsibilities in the partnership. The consequences have been misunderstanding, disagreements and differing opinions during joint operation.

4.4. THE UN/AU PARTNERSHIP IN PRACTICE: FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY

Historically, the UN has worked together with the African Union since its establishment in 2002 to maintain peace and security in Africa. However, the genesis of the relationship can be traced to the formative period of the OAU. The first time the two organisations had some kind of inter-organisational relationship was in 1965, when a cooperation agreement was signed between the then UN Secretary-General, U Thant and the OAU Administrative Secretary-General, Diallo Telli (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010:305; UN, 2011a:9). This cooperation agreement marked the beginning of the UN's cooperation with Africa's continental organisation. Some of the key areas covered by the agreement included mutual consultations, reciprocal representation, exchange of information and documentation, and cooperation between secretariats and assistance in staffing (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010:305; UN, 2011a). The implementation of the agreement was, however, hamstrung by the paralysis of the UN due to the Cold War political rivalry (Gray, 2000:202). Therefore, the UN/OAU cooperation remained inactive or was not given the needed attention till the

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end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, when conflicts in Africa occupied the bulk of the UNSC's time and energy.

The revitalization of the cooperation after the Cold War was partly influenced by the publication of the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report titled, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping* in 1992 and its *Supplementary report* in 1995 (UN, 1992). Both reports recommended an enhanced partnership between the UN and regional bodies like the OAU through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Specifically, the two reports of the UN Secretary-General recommended effective consultations with regional bodies to exchange views on conflicts issues; diplomatic and operational support to regional peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts; co-deployment and joint operations with regional bodies (UN, 1992, 1995). Subsequently, the UN worked with the OAU in a number of peacemaking and preventive diplomacy efforts in countries such as Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia and Sierra Leone through technical and material support but in an *ad hoc* manner.

The year 1993 saw a major institutional support to the UN/OAU cooperation following the adoption of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR).[32] The MCPMR opened a new era of cooperation with the UN and requested the OAU to closely work with the UN in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Africa (OAU, 1993). However, the retreat of the UN in Africa following its failures in Rwanda and Somalia in the early 1990s rendered the UN/OAU cooperation inactive although both institutions met occasionally to discuss issues of common interest (UN, 2011a). The cooperation became a significant issue after the publication of the UN Secretary-General's report, "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa" (S/1998/318) in 1998. The report, among other things, called for a stronger partnership between the UN and the OAU, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and noted that the UN should strive to compliment rather than supplant African efforts to resolve African problems wherever possible (UN, 1998). Several UN Secretary-General's reports that followed such as: the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in August 2000, also known as "the Brahimi Report"; the report of the UN

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Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in December 2004 and its follow-up report in March 2005, all recommended enhanced cooperation between the UN and regional bodies like the OAU.

The transformation of the OAU to the African Union in 2002 further advanced the cooperation between the two organisations. With the adoption of a Constitutive Act and the subsequent establishment of new institutional bodies and mechanisms, as well as the adoption of the PSC protocol, the AU worked and expanded its cooperation with the UN on several levels. In particular, since 2002, both organisations have worked together at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively. The strategic partnership involves the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), while the institutional partnership comprises the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission. At the operational level, the two organisations have jointly undertaken peace operations in countries such as Sudan, Burundi, Somalia, CAR, and Mali. In the section that follows, how the UN/AU partnership in peace operations works in practice at the three different but interrelated levels: strategic, institutional and operational is discussed in much more details.

4.4.1. Strategic Level Relationship between UNSC and AUPSC

The strategic level relationship occurs between the UNSC and the AUPSC as represented in figure 4.3. Both Councils have a similar but different mandate in Africa. Whilst the UNSC has a universal mandate and the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the AUPSC has the mandate to address peace and security challenges in Africa within the context of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the AU PSC protocol (UN, 1945; AU, 2002). At the UN, the UNSC provides the legal authority, high-level strategic direction and political guidance for all peacekeeping operations. The AUPSC on the other hand, is also mandated to conduct peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities on the African continent (AU, 2002). In implementing its mandate, the PSC is assisted by the following supporting institutions: the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise (PoW), a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff Committee.

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Although the UNSC has been working with the AU Commission since 2002, its relationship with the AUPSC is a recent phenomenon which only began in 2007, when they held their first annual joint consultations. The partnership between the two Councils is in recognition of their similar mandate and mutual interest in maintaining pace and security in Africa (UN, 1945; AU, 2002). This was, for instance, affirmed in a UNSC Presidential Statement issued on 28 March 2007, where the Security Council recognised the critical role of regional organisations like the AU in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.[33] In seeking to deepen and improve their cooperation, there have been eight annual joint consultations between members of the two Councils since 2007, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York (AU, 2012, 2013). The last of these periodic meetings took place in June 2014 in New York.

During the first meeting in June 2007 in Addis Ababa, members of the UNSC met with the former Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, and other members of the AUPSC and AU Commission. In the joint communiqué that was issued after the meeting, both Councils agreed, among other things, to: Consider how best to improve the coordination and effectiveness of AU/UN peace efforts in Africa; to consider the modalities for improving the resource base and capacity of the AU; and to examine the possibility of the financing of a peacekeeping operation undertaken by the AU or under its authority (UN, 2012; AU, 2012). Most of these issues have occurred in the discussions of almost all the subsequent meetings between the two Councils. At their recent meeting in June 2014, members of the two Councils discussed, among others, peace and security issues in CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Darfur and their cooperation in combating terrorism in Africa. However, throughout the eight meetings, both Councils have failed to discuss issues on how to systematically integrate their different organisational cultures, agendas and approaches which is one of the most important factors to institutionalise their relationship (Boutellis and Williams, 2013a:18).

Throughout the various meetings, the two Councils have also purposively avoided discussing the issue of Chapter VIII and how to operationalise it. The interview with AU and UNOAU officials also revealed that not much has been achieved with respect to the implementation of the issues discussed during the meetings. There are little follow-ups on

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the joint communiqués adopted at the annual meetings of the two Councils and moreover, the annual joint consultative meetings have become discrete events with last-minute preparations (Boutellis and Williams, 2013a, 2014). Therefore, while these annual consultations represent a positive development, it is yet to translate into a shared understanding of the core foundation of the partnership, especially, regarding their respective roles and responsibilities. These deficits have affected the effectiveness of the strategic level relationship as well as the political coherence and approach for resolving conflicts in Africa.

There is also cooperation between the UN Peace Building Commission (UNPBC) and the AUPSC in the area of peacebuilding and in post-conflict reconstruction and development [PSC/PR/2(XCVIII); PSC/PR/BR.(CXIV); PSC/PR/BR.(CCVIII)]. This cooperation is particularly important, considering the adoption of the AU Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and the fact that all the six countries currently on the UNPBC's agenda are from the African continent namely: Burundi, CAR, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The two bodies have also been meeting annually since 2007, on the margins of the UNSC/AUPSC annual consultative meetings in New York and Addis Ababa. Delegations from the UNPBC have, on several occasions, briefed the AUPSC at its meetings on their activities on the African continent and how they can build synergies as well as enhance collaboration with the AU in the field of post-conflict reconstruction [PSC/PR/BR.(CCVIII)].

At its meeting on 19 March 2008, for instance, the former UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Carolyn McAskie, briefed the AUPSC on the activities of the UNPBC in Africa. In the most recent meeting of the AUPSC, on 26 November 2014, the Chairperson of the UNPBC, H.E. Antonio de Aguiar, and members of the Commission, also briefed and exchanged views with the AUPSC on the peacebuilding activities of the Commission in Burundi, CAR and Guinea Bissau, as well the security and economic impact of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa [PSC/PR/BR. (CDLXX)]. On its part, the AUPSC has also stressed on the importance of national ownership of the peacebuilding activities of the UNPBC in African countries emerging from conflict, with a view to avoiding relapse and promoting sustainable peace [PSC/PR/BR. (CDLXX)].

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One area at the strategic level that has not received much attention is the relationship between the UN General Assembly and the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (Executive Council). Apart from the UNSC and AUPSC, both Assemblies which comprise Member States of the two organisations also play key roles in the deployment of peacekeeping operations. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) which is made up of all member states of the UN, for instance, plays a key role in the financing of peacekeeping operations.[34]It is the UNGA that apportions peacekeeping expenses to Member States based on an established special scale of assessments and formula, as specified in UNGA resolution A/RES/55/235 of 23 December 2000. Similarly, the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Government which comprises all member states is also the highest decision-making body on peace and security issues in Africa. It decides on interventions in Member States, in respect of, grave circumstances namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and determines the common policies of the AU (AU, 2000, 2002).

Besides, almost all the Troop/Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs), especially those from Africa, as shown in figure 4.2, to both UN and AU missions form part of the two Assemblies.[35] The TCCs/PCCs to UN/AU operations play a key role in the deployment, management or termination of any missions deployed by both organisations. For instance, whilst the decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation in the UN is taken by UNSC, it is the collective responsibility of all the Member States, who also double as the TCCs/PCCs to contribute personnel and finances, as part of their obligations under Article 17 of the UN Charter. Without their support, any mission deployed by both organisations is bound to fail or encounter financial, personnel and logistical difficulties. In that regard, it is crucial to involve the UN General Assembly and the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in the UN/AU partnership, as they can serve as a unique forum for multilateral discussions on how to ensure a stronger partnership anchored on a clear strategic vision and greater cooperation at the political level.

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Figure 4.2.: Infographics of the diversity of TCCs/PCCs to UN Peacekeeping Operations

ADAN



KENNE

Source: UN DPKO (2014)

Figure 4.3: The Structure of the UN/AU Partnership in Peacekeeping Operations



Source: Fieldwork, 2015

Key

Institutional Level | Strategic Level | Operational Level

4.4.2. Institutional Level Partnership between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission

The institutional level cooperation involves the UN Secretariat in New York and the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa. This is illustrated in figure 4.3 with an orange colour. These two bodies are the operational arms of both organisations who implement the strategic level decisions of the UNSC and AUPSC. At the UN Secretariats, the UNSG is vested with the operational authority for directing all peacekeeping operations by the Security Council. The Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is mandated by the UNSG to provide the administrative and executive direction for all UN peacekeeping operations. As shown in figure 4.3, within the UN Secretariat, three departments play key roles in the execution of this function. They are the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS).[36]

On the part of the AU, the AU Commission under the direction and authority of the AUPSC takes all the initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts (AU, 2002). The lead department within the AU Commission that provides the operational support with respect to peacekeeping operations is the Peace and Security Department (PSD). It is made up of four key units/divisions namely, the Conflict Management Division (CMD), Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), the Peace and Security Council Secretariat and the Defense and Security Division (DSD).[37] In addition, there is also the Political Affairs Division which deals with issues such as conflict prevention, elections and mediation. Put together, these are the critical actors in terms of peacekeeping at the AU Commission.

Since the establishment of the African Union in 2002, the different departments with the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have been working together in support of the UNSC and the AUPSC. Initially, the UN Secretariat's cooperation with the AU Commission (AUC) was dispersed among the different departments within the UN, with varied levels of cooperation (AU, 2012). However, following the recommendations of the UN Secretary-General report on April 2008 (S/2008/186) and the subsequent Prodi report

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in 2008 (S/2008/813), the relationship between the two secretariats was streamlined in July 2010. This culminated in the establishment of the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and other consultative mechanisms represented in figure 4.3 such as the AU Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security and desk-to-desk meetings (UN, 2008a, 2008c, AU, 2012, 2013).

As discussed in the preceding sections, the UNOAU provides operational, planning and long-term capacity-building support to the AU under the framework of the 10-year capacity-building programme. This include support in the area of planning and the management of ongoing missions like AMISOM, and the provision of technical advice as well as support in the development of the policies, guidelines, doctrines and training for the ASF (UN, 2011b:7; AU, 2012, 2013). Essentially, the establishment of the UNOAU has strengthened the flow of information, enhanced consultations at the working level and facilitated coordination between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission (UN, 2011b). Nevertheless, given the high number of UNOAU personnel designated to support the AU, it runs the risk of engaging in "capacity-substitution," where UN staff performs tasks for the AU rather than genuine "capacity-building" where they enhance the capacities of AU staff (Boutellis and Williams, 2013a, 2014). Similar to the UNOAU, the AU has also established an office in New York to manage its relationship with the UN. But it lacks the capacity and mandate to effectively facilitate the interaction between the UN Secretariats and the AU Commission.

The UN/AU Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security was also launched on September 2010 by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary-General to further enhance their institutional partnerships. The JTF meets twice a year, on the margins of the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, in January/February, and the UN General Assembly in New York, in September. The JTF is jointly chaired by the UN Under-Secretaries-General of the DPA, DPKO and DFS, as well as the AU Commissioners for Peace and Security, and for Political Affairs. The role of the JTF is to provide political and strategic guidance to the UN/AU partnership and assist the UNSC and the PSC to strengthen their cooperation (UN, 2011a; AU, 2012, 2013). It serve as a forum where the senior management of the two

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institutions exchange views on matters of common concern, and agree on common actions (UN, 2011a; Bah and Lortan, 2011).

Since the first meeting in 2010, members of the JTF have held several meetings in New York and Addis Ababa. In 2011, for instance, the meeting of the JTF offered the opportunity for both organisations to discuss cooperation in Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Again, at its sixth consultative meeting held in Addis Ababa in January 2013, the JTF reviewed the situations in Mali, Somalia, eastern DRC, Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea Bissau as well as the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (AU, 2012, 2013). Generally, the JTF has proven to be an effective mechanism for both organisations to consult on an array of issues and broadened their understanding of issues of mutual interest.[38]

The AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have also formed a practice of meeting regularly at the working level through desk-to-desk encounters and teleconferences to discuss and exchange information and ideas on country-specific and thematic issues of peace and security in Africa.[39] The desk-to-desk meetings bring together the desk officers of the DPKO and the PSOD of the two secretariats, and sometimes desk officers from the RECs, to discuss and exchange information and ideas on country-specific and thematic issues of common interest (UN, 2011a). Usually, the desk-to-desk meetings do the follow-up on the issues discussed by the JTF. So far, these meetings have been held in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia (July 2008); New York, (February/March 2009); Addis Ababa (December 2009); Gaborone (June 2010); Nairobi (June 2011); and Zanzibar (December 2011). The most recent meetings which were held in New York and Addis Ababa in 2013 and 2014 respectively, focused on peace and security developments in West, Central and East Africa.

Apart from the JTF and the desk-to-desk meetings, there are also interactions between the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary-General on African peace and security issues. However, the frequency and the utility of these interactions are not well documented to be assessed. The UN Department of Field Support (DFS) and the AU Department of Political Affairs have also undertaken joint mission planning and field missions in countries such as Mali, Somalia, and CAR. Furthermore, the AU liaison offices

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and field missions in conflict and post-conflict zones also interact daily with UN personnel in those settings.

Collectively, these institutional consultative mechanisms have helped in information-sharing, the sharing of lessons learned, coordination and regular consultations between personnel of both organisations on issues of common concern. However, it is imperative to note that the existence of these mechanisms have not automatically generated consensus on how the two organisations should act in a particular situation (UN, 2011a; AU, 2012; Boutellis and Williams, 2013a). They are also not formal decision-making frameworks where agreed decisions are taken. Nevertheless, these institutional mechanisms demonstrate an improvement of the partnership, as it has brought some relative level of coherence in approaches between the two bodies.

4.4.3. Operational Level Partnership

The two institutions have also entered into various cooperative arrangements at the operational level since 2002. The operational level partnership started with the transition of the AU's first ever peacekeeping operation in Burundi (AMIB) to the UN operations in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004. This was a kind of sequential operation where the UN mission preceded or followed a regional peacekeeping force of the AU. After years of internecine violent conflicts in Burundi between Tutsis and Hutus in 1965, 1969, 1972, 1988 and 1991, a transitional government was established in 2001 with the support of the OAU and the UN (Abdallah, 2000; Murithi, 2005, 2009). However, the security situation remained insecure and continued to deteriorate. Due to the unwillingness of the warring factions to agree on a solution to the conflicts, the UN refused to deploy any peacekeeping mission. In its place, the AU deployed AMIB in April 2003, with more than 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to help restore lasting peace in Burundi and to prevent the occurrence of genocide similar to what happened in Rwanda (Aboagye, 2004; Murithi, 2005, 2009). Although the deployment of AMIB succeeded in de-escalating the volatile situation, several challenges persisted.

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Subsequently, following the adoption of the UNSC resolution 1545, of 21 May 2004, AMIB was transformed to ONUB with a mandate to support and help implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and national reconciliation. The former AMIB troops were incorporated into ONUB. The ONUB completed its mandate on 31 December, 2006 and was succeeded by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), established by UNSC resolution 1719, of 25 October 2006. In specific terms, AMIB demonstrated the value of undertaking high-risk stabilization missions needed for a long-term post-conflict resolution. In other words, the AU's intervention in Burundi created the space for peace negotiations to be undertaken for the subsequent deployment of ONUB.

After Burundi, the two organisations have also cooperated in Sudan (UNAMID), Somalia (UNSOA) and Mali (AFISMA to MINUSMA). These three cases are comprehensively discussed in chapter five of this study. But going briefly into each case, the most pronounced of all three cases of cooperation is the UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID was established by UNSC resolution 1769 in July 2007 and the AU Peace and Security Council communiqué [PSC/PR/Comm (LXXIX)] of 22 June 2007. It incorporated AMIS and formally took over peacekeeping responsibilities in January 2008. This mission is still ongoing in Sudan and has a mandate that expires in 2015. The two organisations operate with a single or joint chain of command.

The partnership in Somalia involves an AU-led peacekeeping operation (AMISOM) with UN logistics, technical and financial support through the UN Support Office to the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), established by UNSC resolution 1863 (2009) and 1872 (2009). The UN/AU partnership in Somalia is a kind of coordinated operations, but both organisations operate under different chains of command. UNSOA's support to AMISOM is in three forms namely, institutional capacity building and technical advice in the planning, deployment and management of AMISOM; the provision and delivery of logistical support; and voluntary financial and in-kind support to the AU and TCCs to AMISOM (AU, 2014; Gadin, 2012). In practical terms, the eestablishment of UNSOA has resulted in the improvement of AMISOM's logistical and financial capabilities. For instance, between 2009 and 2012, US $729.6 million was disbursed from the UN's assessed

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budget to UNSOA to implement the AMISOM logistical support package (Gadin, 2012; Freear and de Coning, 2013).

The cooperation in Mali involved the UN, AU and ECOWAS. Although this form of partnership was similar to the UN/AU cooperation in Burundi, it differed in terms of the actors involved. The UN/AU/ECOWAS worked together from the planning, deployment and management of AFISMA until its successful transition to MINUSMA in July 2013. The partnership in Mali was a kind of sequential operation where the AU and its REC deployed initially to stabilize the security situation for the subsequent deployment of a UN mission.

Besides Burundi, Mali, Somalia and Sudan, the two organisations recently cooperated in the Central African Republic to restore peace and stability, following a coup d'état that plunged the country into chaos.[40] Specifically, CAR sank into conflict in March 2013 when the largely Muslim rebel coalition, Seleka, overthrew President Francois Bozize and made Micheal Djotodia the head of state. The violence and humanitarian crises that followed the coup and the sectarian violence between the Muslim Seleka rebel coalition and the Christian anti-Balaka movement led to the deployment of the African-led International Support mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) on 19 December, 2013.[41] MISCA was established by UNSC resolution 2127 of 5 December, 2013 to stabilize the country. It was supported by a French-backed peacekeeping force known as "Operation Sangaris." While the swift deployment of MISCA and French forces proved useful in saving the lives of civilians and preventing a greater tragedy in CAR, the scale and geographical breath of the crises far exceeded their capabilities on ground. Therefore, in his report (S/2014/142) on 3 March 2014 to the UNSC, the UN Secretary-General requested for the deployment of a multidimensional UN mission. Subsequently, with the adoption of UNSC resolution 2149 (2014), the Security Council authorized the transfer of MISCA to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA). On 15 September 2014, the official transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA was successfully completed.

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At all the different levels of cooperation, two general observations were made from the information gathered from the field visits. First, the cooperation has been driven by operational realities and field necessities, rather than any grand strategic designs. In Sudan, UNAMID was arguably the only option available for a United Nations intervention with host country consent. In Somalia, the UN technical and financial support package to AMISOM was authorized based on UNSC expressed intent to deploy a UN mission as a follow-on force to AMISOM at the right time under the right conditions (UN, 2011b). Hence, the partnership in both Somalia and Sudan did not come through as a result of any rational strategic planning process. It emerged through a series of compromises that have caused and continues to cause tensions between the two organisations.

Second, the relationship at the operational level remains imbalanced due to the AU's financial and material dependence on the UN. In reality, the UN/AU partnership is asymmetrical and appears to be like a "father-son" kind of relationship, where the UNSC takes the decisions and makes pronouncements on African issues without adequate consultations with the PSC. In Mali, for instance, several requests made by the African Union were ignored or disregarded by the UN in the drafting of the UNSC resolution 2100. These requests included, among others, authorising a peace enforcement mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter for MINUSMA; providing a logistical and financial support package to AFISMA just like AMISOM; and ensuring the continuity of AFISMA's leadership in MINUSMA (AU, 2013; Boutellis and Williams, 2013b, 2014). With respect to Darfur, the UN controls and manages the mission through its operational standards and guidance. The AU is more engaged at the political level than the operational level and its impact in the mission relates to the African dominance of the TCCs/PCCs and the role it plays in the appointment of the senior mission leadership.

4.5. ASSESSING THE OUTCOME AND BENEFITS OF THE UN/AU PARTNERSHIP

As indicated by Stuart, Walker and Minzner (2011:3) and further corroborated by Mohiddin (1998:5), all partnerships are aimed at addressing common interests and achieving shared goals or desired results. Outcomes represent those desired "conditional"

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changes or desired results. Thus, outcomes in partnerships can be described as what is achieved, whether planned or unplanned (Boydell, 2000, 2007). The indicators for measuring the outcomes and benefits of partnerships may differ on the type and area of partnership. For the purposes of this study, four indicators identified by Boydell (2000, 2007) in his partnership framework for the Institute of Public Health in Ireland is used to measure the outcome and benefits of the UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships. These indicators are represented and explained in table 2. Although the indicators were developed for partnerships in the health sector, it can be adapted and applied to different context of partnership. This flexibility is what makes it relevant for this study, as it enabled the researcher to customize and adapt it to the context of the UN/AU partnership.

Table 4.1.: Boydell's Indicators for Measuring Outcomes of Partnerships

Response to Peace and Security Challenges	This deals with how the partnering organisations are able to effectively and innovatively combine their resources and efforts to better respond to the peace and security challenges within the area of their operations.
Policy Development	This refers to evidence of policies and procedures which have changed to support and sustain the partnership and ongoing efforts within organisations. Examples include: changes in how policies or strategies are developed and implemented through the utilisation of consultative networks, which previously did not exist.
Systems Development	This refers to evidence of improvement in co-ordination mechanisms, infrastructure or the development of new services between organisations, working together for a common cause.
Resource Development	This includes increasing knowledge, skills, levels of activity and capacity at a collective and individual level, as well as securing new capital - money, equipment or premises. For example, attracting new funding to support a particular activity is a tangible material outcome. Resources can be grouped into three: In-kind capital which denotes what each organisation contribute to the partnership, such as meeting/conference rooms and logistics; financial capital which involves monetary resources; and human capital has to do with investment of people's time, expertise and energy within a partnership.

Source: Boydell, 2000.

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4.5.1. Better and Innovative Responses to African Peace and Security Challenges

Within the African continent, a consensus seems to exist that the antidote to the continent's peace and security challenges goes beyond the capabilities of any single organization, and that multiple actors are needed to tackle Africa's security problems. Based on this understanding, the UN and the AU have together devised better and innovative ways of responding to Africa's complex security conundrums through joint operations and peacemaking efforts.[42] The UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN support office to AMISOM (UNSOA) are specific cases in point. The establishment of UNAMID, for example, represented a new approach, by which both organisations jointly undertook and are managing a peacekeeping operation. Indeed, not only did the mission bring about the multi-dimensional nature of peacekeeping operations but also, it popularized the concept of Integrated Peace Support Operations (IPSOs) where different actors work together under a political head who is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for a common strategic purpose. The hybrid nature of the mission also helped to optimize the level of complementarity between the UN and the AU. In spite of the complex environment within which it operates,[43] UNAMID has arguably achieved some modicum of peace and stability in Darfur.

More significantly, the importance of UNAMID and UNSOA to both organisations cannot be understated. First, these missions have promoted the sharing of experiences on peacekeeping and offered both organisations the opportunity to learn from each other.[44] Especially, the AU as a budding institution has learnt a lot from the UN in terms of, how to design, plan, deploy and manage a peacekeeping operation in the field from the UN which has over 60 years of peacekeeping experience (AU, 2013, UN, 2011a, 2011c). Second, the involvement of the AU in UNAMID also provided the political legitimacy for the mission, given the Government of Sudan's objections to a standard UN peacekeeping operation (Murithi, 2009; Anyidoho, 2012). The statement below by Ibrahim Gambari, former head of UNAMID and the UN/AU joint special representative for Darfur, further corroborates this assertion:

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> "UNAMID wasn't designed right from the start to be a hybrid…It was just circumstance that pulled it in that direction…Because the government of Sudan was not comfortable with a pure UN peacekeeping force, the Africans stepped in" (Fleshman, 2010:19).

The mission was created only after the UN assured the Government of Sudan that the new mission would retain an "African character" (Murithi, 2009; Anyidoho, 2012).[45]

Third, it can also be argued that UNAMID has actually promoted Africa's leadership and ownership of the peace process in Darfur. Particularly, although the mission is currently run according to UN standards and principles, the leadership and majority of personnel are Africans. In terms of the personnel (police and military) contributions, for instance, member states of the AU contribute about 15,140 which is almost 79% of the total number of 19,192 personnel of the mission (DPKO, 2014). Non-Africans contribute only 4,052 which is 21% of the total number (DPKO, 2014). The leadership comprises: Abiodun Oluremi Bashua (Nigeria) - Joint AU/UN Special Representative for Darfur, Head of UNAMID and Joint Chief Mediator; Abdul Kamara (Sierra Leone) - Deputy Joint Special Representative; Lieutenant-General Paul Ignace Mella (United Republic of Tanzania), Force Commander; and Hester Andriana Paneras (South Africa).[46] According to a political officer interviewed at the AU Commission, the fact that the UN compromised on the leadership of UNAMID, although it is funding the mission gives the AU a sense of ownership of the mission unlike the current leadership of MINUSMA.[47]

Lastly, the logistical support package provided by the UNSOA and funded through assessed contributions has also enabled AMISOM to successfully execute its mandate. Since 2013, UNSOA has carried out 35 medical evacuation, transfer, redeployment and repatriation flights; constructed facilities at Sector hubs in Baidoa and Beletweyne; provided increased communications and information technology services (CITS) support; and supplied AMISOM with 36 different motor vehicles (Freear and de Coning, 2013; AU, 2014). Between 2009 and 2012, an amount of $729.6 million was disbursed from the UN's assessed budget to implement the AMISOM logistical support package (Gadin, 2013;

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Freear and de Coning, 2013). Practically, the delivery of the logistics support package through UNSOA has improved AMISOM's operational capability and working conditions of personnel (Williams, 2013b: 244).

The UN and the AU have also worked in tandem and undertaken peacemaking and mediation efforts in several conflict and post-conflict zones, including the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes region, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia (UN, 2011a; AU, 2012, 2013). In the DRC, the efforts of the two organisations led to the signing by the warring parties in Addis Ababa in 2013, of a Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Great Lakes region. Their subsequent consultation culminated in the adoption of UNSC resolution 2098 (2013) which authorized the establishment within the UN Organisation Stablisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), of an intervention brigade for the first time under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[48] Since the deployment, the intervention brigade consisting of South African, Tanzanian and Malawian soldiers has helped government forces defeat the M23 rebels that seized Goma and improve the security situation in the DRC (AU, 2013).

In Mali, the collaboration between the UN, AU and ECOWAS led to the formation of a transitional government to manage the transition to a constitutional rule after the coup in March 2013 (AU, 2013; Aning and Aubyn, 2013b; UN, 2014). Subsequently, with the assistance of AFISMA and France forces, the transitional government was able to recapture the northern part of Mali from rebel occupation (UN, 2014). The stability that was achieved after the recapture of Mali's northern territories paved the way for the deployment of MINUSMA, which took over authority from AFISMA and successfully supervised the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013.[49] In short, the partnership between the UN, AU, and ECOWAS during the political crises in 2012 significantly contributed to the peace in Mali today.

Similarly, in Kenya, both organisations worked together to restore peace after the 2007 post-election violence (UN, 2011a; AU, 2012). Whiles the AU established the Panel of Eminent African Personalities chaired by former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the

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UN staffed the secretariats and provided the material, logistical and political support for the Panel (Horowitz, 2009; UN, 2011a; AU, 2012). The outcome of the mediation by the Panel led to a power-sharing agreement between the incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, leader of the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the main opposition party, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Raila Odinga. The implementation of the agreement led to the creation of a Grand Coalition government in which executive functions and cabinet positions were shared between the PNU and ODM; and ending of ethnic clashes or inter-communal violence that followed the disputed elections which claimed about 1,200 lives and displaced 600,000 people. Clearly, the partnership between the UN and the AU has prevented, managed and resolved several peace and security challenges in Africa.

4.5.2. Resource Development

Resources according to the Boydell's (2000, 2007) partnership framework are contextual factors which affect the everyday activities of a partnership. Within a partnership, resources refer to three types of capital: in-kind, financial, and human. Financial resources involve the improvement in monetary resources, and how both partners worked to secure or attract new funds to support their activities (Boydell, 2000, 2007; Boydell, Rugkasa, Hoggett, and Cummins, 2007). This is a very tangible material outcome of partnerships. In-kind capital, on the other hand, denotes what each organisations contribute to the partnership, such as meeting/conference rooms and supplies (logistics and other equipments. Lastly, human resources refer to increase in the level of knowledge, skills, and capacity at the collective and individual levels and the investment of people's time, expertise and energy within a partnership (Boydell, 2000, 2007; Boydell, Rugkasa, Hoggett, and Cummins, 2007). Partners have to demonstrate commitment by contributing and/or realigning their resources to the partnership in either one or all the types of resources indicated above.

With respect to human capital, the partnership has resulted in the establishment of a Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the AU (TYCBP). Its establishment was to address the institutional capacity constraints of the AU to better respond to the challenges of security on the African continent. Under the TYCBP, personnel from the UNOAU provides

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daily technical advice, mentoring and operational support to staff of the AU Commission, especially, those at the Peace and Security Department in the areas of the planning, mounting, and management of peace support operations (UN, 2010, 2011a, 2011c). Other supports to the AU through the TYCBP include: how to develop and operationalise the APSA, in particular, the African Standby Force (ASF); the development of standard operational procedures (SOPs) for PKOs; the drafting and review of AU policy documents and guidelines on PKOs; and conducting training needs assessments and developing training policies for African TCCs/PCCs (UN, 2006b, 2010, 2011a, 2011c).[50]

Through these institutional support and capacity building programmes, the staff of the AUC interviewed noted that they have improved and increased their technical knowledge and skills in the area of mission planning and management, and the development of peacekeeping policies and guidelines. [51] The presence of the UNOAU staff within the peace and security department, according to some respondents, has also helped to bridge the human resource gap within the AUC.[52] Another area of human capital which the AU, in particular, has been very instrumental is the provision of peacekeepers (military, police and civilians) to support joint missions. Currently, Africans constitute majority of the personnel in all the missions that are jointly deployed by the UN and the AU. AMISOM is solely African personnel; in UNAMID, Africans constitute about 15,140 (79%) of the total number of 19,192 personnel; and the majority of MINUSMA personnel are from AU member states (DPKO, 2014).

Financially, and in terms of in-kind contribution, the UN through UNSOA is also assisting the AU in the management of AMISOM through the provision of logistics and financial support. This has also improved the financial and logistics management capabilities of the AU (UN, 2011a; Gadin, 2013; AU, 2014). The financial support of the UN to AMISOM, in particular, has reduced the funding challenges of the AU. Arguably, without its support, it would have been difficult for the AU to sustain the mission. Furthermore, in terms of capital accumulation, the UN in collaboration with the AU has created numerous voluntary Multi-Donor Trust Funds to support particular missions in Africa (Sheehan, 2011).[53] In 2009, the UN established a Trust Fund for AMISOM through UNSC resolution 1863 to finance the operation. The Trust Fund accumulated an amount of $76.2 million between

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2009 and 2012 (Gadin, 2013; Freear and de Coning, 2013). So far, Australia, Canada, Czech rep, Denmark, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom have contributed to the Fund. However, contributions to the trust fund have been irregular, and generally been insufficient to cover, especially, the supply and maintenance of contingent owned equipments (Gadin, 2013; Freear and Coning, 2013; Williams, 2013b).

AMISOM has also received or attracted an unprecedented support from donors such as the United States, China and the EU especially, which is using its African Peace Facility to pay allowances to AMISOM uniformed personnel and in-kind (training and equipment) support packages to African TCCs like Uganda and Burundi. Between 2007 to 2010, the EU provided a total of €258/$347 million through the African Peace Facility (APF) for the overhead and operational costs of AMISOM civilian, police and military personnel (EU, 2010; Aning and Danso, 2010; Pirozzi, 2010; Gadin, 2013:77). On 9 September 2013, the European Union announced more than €124 million to increase security in Somalia (European Commission, 2013). The EU's support has been critical in the implementation of AMISOM's mandate.

There is also a Trust Fund for UNAMID established by the UN. The most recent being the UN Trust Fund for AFISMA established in December 2012. The AU organised a donor conference in January 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to raise funds to support this Trust Fund. At the end of the conference, about $455 million was raised. [54] The African Union for the first time promised to provide US$50 million to the fund; Japan provided US$120 million; the United States offered US$96 million; Germany and the UK provide US$20 million apiece.[55] Other donors who also pledged support included ECOWAS, Ethiopia, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. India and China each pledged US$1 million. Although, it is difficult to ascertain the payment of these pledges, the creation of these Trust funds, nevertheless, help mobilize additional funds outside the UN assessed contributions to support African peacekeeping operations.

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4.5.3. Systems Development

This refers to evidence of improvement in co-ordination mechanisms, the infrastructure for cooperation and the development of new services between organisations as well as how the day-to-day activities of the partnership are carried out. Concerning co-ordination mechanisms, the UN and the AU have established closer links at the strategic level through annual joint consultative meetings between the UNSC and the AUPSC, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York since 2007 (UN, 2011a; AU, 2012, 2013). This annual joint consultative meetings is a major system improvement as it never existed until 2007. However, throughout these annual meetings, the UNSC and AUPSC have not been able to address the issues concerning Chapter VIII and how to operationalise it as well as how both organisations can systematically integrate their different organisational cultures, agendas and approaches which are the important factors to institutionalise their partnership (Boutellis and Williams, 2013a, 2014). In that regard, the annual meetings are yet to translate into a shared understanding of the core foundation of the partnership, especially, regarding their respective roles and responsibilities (UN, 2011a; AU, 2012, 2013; Boutellis and Williams, 2013a, 2014).

Furthermore, both organisations in 2010 launched the Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security to coordinate their immediate and long-term strategic issues of common interest (UN, 2011a; AU, 2012). Since its establishment, the JTF has reviewed the situations in Libya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, and agreed on steps and arrangements needed to strengthen, and ensure greater coherence in the UN/AU partnership in those countries. Another important coordinating mechanism is the desk-to-desk exchanges between staff of the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat on peace and security issues (UN, 2008a, 2008c).[56] This brings together the desk officers of the two organisations to discuss and exchange information and ideas on country-specific and thematic issues of common interest. The importance of these consultative mechanisms is that they have facilitated information-sharing and coordination of activities at the institutional levels. However, their existence have not automatically generated consensus on how the two organisations should act in a particular situation.

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On the issue of infrastructure, the relationship between the two organisations has also improved with the establishment of the UNOAU in Addis Ababa on 1 July 2010 (UN, 2011b).[57] The UNOAU has since its official inauguration in 22 February 2011, supported the AU's long-term capacity-building efforts and the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).[58] Now, one of the key issues for the office is how it can maximise the effectiveness of the UN/AU cooperation, especially, by helping to improve the relationship between the UNSC and the PSC. The AU has also established an office in New York to coordinate its activities with the UN. However, unlike the UNOAU, the AU's New York office lacks a strong mandate, technical and human capacity to play an effective bridging role in the partnership. The office is not filled with peace and security experts such as military planners and advisors who could possibly liaise with DPKO at a working level.

Lastly, in terms of, the development of new services, the UN/AU partnership has expanded to include cooperation in the area of electoral support, mediation support, security sector reform, economic, political and governance just to mention but a few. These are the new areas that have emerged, as a result of, the peacekeeping partnership between the two institutions.

4.5.4. Policy Development

Policy development refers to evidence of policies and procedures which have changed to support and sustain the partnership and ongoing efforts within organisations to strengthen the partnership. Examples include changes in how strategies are developed and implemented through the utilisation of consultative networks, which previously did not exist. Generally, the research findings revealed that not much has been done in terms of policy development. The UN/AU partnership has not yet led to the development of joint policies and procedures to guide their operations at the headquarters level as well as the operational level (field missions). Thus, the partnership still remains *ad hoc* and uneven. At the operational level, for example, the partnership is mainly guided by UN standards and policies instead of joint policies developed by the two institutions.[59] The consultative

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meetings between the UNSC and AUPSC are not also guided by any working procedure or policy. Both Councils continue to also have different working methods, including even how both councils adopt communiqués and resolutions.

There are also no agreed working procedures for the AU, in particular, to submit its request whether financial or diplomatic support to the UNSC for consideration.[60] This lacuna explains why the AU has on certain occasions accused the UNSC of not giving due consideration to its requests. There is also no dispute resolution mechanism should any disagreements on specific issues even arise. At the operational level, whiles the joint missions such as UNAMID operate under UN rules, concepts, and procedures, the sequential operations are not guided by any agreed policies and doctrines. As a result, the transfer of UN missions to UN operations has often been fraught with difficulties such as control and command issues as well as the appointment of senior mission personnel. AFISMA presents a clear example: The UN and the AU clashed over the appointment of the Force Commander and the SRSG. The UN appointed Albert Koenders from the Netherlands, as head of MINUSMA, instead of the AU's candidate, Pierre Buyoya, the former head of AFISMA (ECOWAS, 2013).[61] Likewise, the UN sidelined Nigeria's Major-General Shehu Adbulkadir, the AFISMA force commander, and appointed Rwanda's Major General, Jean-Bosco Kazuran as force commander of MINUSMA.[62] The consequences of this led to the withdrawal of majority of Nigerian troops from MINUSMA. In short, the outcome of the partnership in the area of policy development is weak and needs to be strengthened.

4.6. CHALLENGES AND DIFFICULTIES OF THE UN/AU PARTNERSHIP IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Although the UN/AU partnership is theoretically essential and broadly accepted, it is beset with several challenges and difficulties in practice. Whilst some of the challenges and difficulties are/were generic to most collaborative efforts between the UN and regional organisations, others were inimitable and specific to the UN/AU partnerships. Even though Boydell (2000, 2007) sees partnership challenges and difficulties as healthy and

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predictable, in the case of the UN and the AU, it is blocking effective cooperation in peacekeeping operations. In this section, the challenges identified were grouped under general, strategic, institutional and operational challenges. The general challenges included the interpretational ambiguity of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter whilst the strategic and institutional level challenges consisted of mistrust and lack of respect of the views of the AUPSC by the UNSC, lack of parity in the relationship, and the non-adherence to the principle of subsidiarity (Bah and Lotan, 2011; AU, 2012; Boutellis and William, 2013a). The operational challenges comprised philosophical and doctrinal differences about peacekeeping, bureaucratic challenges and practical level challenges during field missions. All these challenges are explained in details below.

4.6.1. Challenges with the Interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

The lack of a mutually agreed understanding on the interpretation and the application of Chapter VIII between the UN and the AU continue to frustrate the partnership. Indeed, almost all the challenges discussed in this section emanate from this problem. It is a general problem which is parallel to almost all the UN's relationship with regional organisations worldwide. More concretely, although the AU holds in high esteem the primacy of the UNSC and views it actions as falling under Chapter VIII, the challenge has been how to operationalise Chapter VIII without prejudice to the role of the UNSC and the efforts of the AU (UN, 2008a, 2008c; AU, 2012, 2013). Thus, as noted by Bah and Lotan (2011), to what extent can the AU maintain its independence in invoking the various elements of it peace and security architecture (APSA) without appearing to usurp the powers of the UNSC?; how much power is the UNSC willing to delegate to the AU, especially, with respect to enforcement actions?; and what is the responsibility of the UNSC when it authorizes AU-led peace operations? Moreover, the responsibilities and roles each organisation is supposed to play is not clearly stated in the Charter.

Due to the failure on the part of both organisations to reach a consensus on these issues, their partnership has on occasions been fraught with misunderstanding and open rifts between the AUPSC and the UNSC. For example, both organisations disagreed on the best

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course of action during the Libyan crises in 2011- while the AU insisted on a political solution to the crises, the UN opted for a humanitarian intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians (Ping, 2011; Aning, et al., 2013; Sally, 2013; Smith-Windsor, 2013; Abass, 2014).[63] Additionally, in late 2012, the AU also asked the UNSC to adopt the same kind of logistical and financial UN support package as AMISOM for AFISMA, however, the Security Council refused the request (AU, 2013; Boutellis and William, 2013a).[64] In trying to address the interpretation difficulties, one other critical challenge that often confronted the UN is how it can forge a special relationship with the AU without setting a precedent for other regions in the world.

4.6.2. Mistrust and Lack of Respect of the Views of the AUPSC by the UNSC

High levels of mutual trust and respect are crucial principles in any partnership endeavor (Wanni, 2010; Crawford, 2003). In actual fact, the success of any partnership is partly contingent on the trust that all organisations will respect the perspectives and interests of others. This is termed as "grounding" in Boydell's (2000, 2007) partnership framework, which refers to organisations valuing and respecting their diversity and the validity of the unique contribution, role and position they all bring to the partnership. One of the overarching challenges that confront the AUPSC and the UNSC relationship is the lack of deep trust and respect for each other's views and perspectives on African peace and security issues. The AUPSC laments that the UNSC does not respect its views and is always bent on marginalizing and not consulting the Council on matters relating to peace and security in Africa (AU, 2012, 2013). This has stemmed from the fact that more often than not, the UNSC has, in most instances, declined to give due consideration to the decisions and requests of the AU and its PSC before arriving at its own decisions. This has particularly been the case whenever the interest of any of the Permanent members of the UNSC is in jeopardy.

During the Libyan crises, for example, the Security Council Resolution 1973 was passed without prior knowledge or consultations with the AU (Ping, 2011; Aning, et al., 2013; Sally, 2013; Smith-Windsor, 2013; Abass, 2014). Again in Mali, the UNSC failed to consider the AU's request to create a UN funded support package for AFISMA as it had

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done for AMISOM. It also rebuffed the views of the AUPSC to appoint the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union and head of AFISMA, former President Pierre Buyoya, as the new SRSG for MINUSMA.[65]

The AU also expressed worries that in the UN Security Council Resolution 2093 on AMISOM in March 2013, it views were not taken into consideration in the drafting of the resolution.[66] Furthermore, in the recent crises in Egypt, for instance, it was also noted during the interviews at the AU headquarters that the AU had not been actively involved in the process of finding amicable solutions to the crises because the AUPSC feels that it would be marginalised if the situation goes to the UNSC. Generally, the AU feels that due to its proximity and familiarity with conflict dynamics in Africa, it is important that its views on peace and security matters are incorporated in decisions taken by the Security Council on Africa. However, this has not always been the case. This was reiterated in the report by the Chairperson of the AU Commission in 2013 as follows:

> As African issues dominate the agenda of the Security Council, it is critical that the continent, through the AU, is adequately consulted by the Security Council prior to the adoption of decisions that are of particular importance to Africa. This would ensure that the Security Council members are well informed of the AU's views and positions on the issues on their agenda, without prejudice to the primacy of the Security Council (AU, 2013).

Is this frequent sidelining of the AU in political decision-making a symptom of the lack of strong African personalities or leaders at the UN who can articulate African perspectives on issues concerning the continent? Or it is just a matter of the UN claiming superiority in handling African crises because they have more capacity than the AU? Whatever the reasons might be, it does not augur for the "grounding" of the partnership as it shows a lack of respect and value for diversity and the perspectives of the AUPSC. However, in response to the AU's claims, former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, for example, emphasized that member states of the AU have not always provided unified or consistent views on key issues, and have on occasion also been slow to act on urgent matters (Boutellis and William, 2013).[67] She further noted that the UNSC is not subordinate to the schedules or capacities of regional groups and that, it cannot cooperate on the basis

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that the regional organisation independently decides the policy and the UN simply bless and pay for it (Boutellis and William, 2013a).

Additionally, in the interview with UNOAU officials, it was noted that the AU's request to the UNSC always goes late. It was also indicated that the two leaders of AFISMA (Pierre Buyoya and Major-General Shehu Adbulkadir) that the AU requested the UN to confirm as SRSG and Force Commander of MINUSMA failed to meet UN standards, in terms of, work experience and human right records.[68] Clearly, this is an issue of the AU's own deficiency in speaking with one strong voice in New York, Addis Ababa and the lack of understanding of the modus operandi and mechanisms of the UNSC in the appointment of the senior leadership positions of peacekeeping missions. In the same way, it is also an issue of the UN trying to exert its superiority in handling international crises.

More significantly, it is imperative to note that the UNSC also views the AU's ambition with some suspicion and as a competition with the UN. For example, there are suspicions in the UNSC about the AU with regards to AMISOM. Some UNSC members have the view that the AU sees itself as more effective and efficient than the UN which has failed to deploy to Somali since the 1990s.[69] In other words, the AU has succeeded where the UN has failed. Again, this portrays a lack of grounding in the partnership as suggested by Boydell (2000, 2007), because both organisations do not seem to understand each others' perspectives or ideas about the course of action to take in certain situations. Although these difficulties are predictable in partnerships, the case of the UN and the AU is a clear indication of the lack of shared objectives and purpose as well as open and honest communication between the two bodies. The way forward for both organisations, therefore, is to use these differences constructively as an opportunity to increase understanding and produce a meaningful, well thought through plan about the purpose of the partnership.

4.6.3. Non-Adherence to the Principle of Subsidiarity

Another challenge is the lack of codification of the principle of subsidiarity between the UN and the AU. The origin of the principle of subsidiarity can be traced to Aristotle, but Tsagourias (2011:5) opines that it was Catholic doctrine that popularized the concept from

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1891 onwards as a principle of social ordering to attain the common good. In its original usage, the principle of subsidiarity entails that "a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good" (Marc & Wallace, 1990; Carozza, 2003; Møller, 2005). The core values that underpin the concept as indicated by Tsagourias (2011) are autonomy, mutual assistance and the fulfillment of each unit and of the referent order as a whole. Although not expressly mentioned in the UN Charter, the principle is enshrined in the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which vaguely defines certain roles for regional organisations. Article 33, 52, 53 and 54 of the Charter[70] summarizes that regional organisations represent the instances of first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflicts is concerned, but also stipulate that no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements without the prior authorization of the Security Council.

The general idea of the norm is that regional and sub-regional organisations should be the "first resort" for problems transcending national borders, leaving the "international community" and global organisations like the UN to deal only with those problems that cannot be solved at the lower level. In practice, however, the principle has not been formally codified by the UN though the AU and its RECs pay due tribute to the subsidiarity principle by acknowledging the supreme authority of the UNSC in matters of international peace and security. As a result, the devolution of decision-making, division of labour and burden-sharing between the UN and the AU and its RECs in terms of responding to security challenges in Africa still remains unclear. Ban Ki Moon, in his first report on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in 2008, for instance, acknowledged this fact and implored the UNSC to properly define the role of regional organisations and to ensure that a structured system of cooperation is put in place to ensure coherence of international and regional responses to existing and emerging conflicts (UN, 2008a, 2008c). Due to the absence of existing framework on subsidiarity, the UN's relationship with African regional bodies has sometimes depicted that of competition and antagonism instead of complementarity of efforts.

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The AU has tried to establish a subsidiarity principle through it PSC protocol to harmonise and coordinate its relations with the RECs. This is found in the modalities for the ASF deployment. Thus, it is envisioned in the doctrine that the Standby Force of the RECs would undertake the less time-critical missions whereas the AU brigade would undertake both swift deployment to intervene in an emergency and filling possible gaps at the sub-regional levels (AU, 2002, 2006b, 2010). But even with this framework, there are always tensions between the AU and especially, ECOWAS when it comes to responding to peace and security issues in West Africa. The latter thinks it holds primacy in West Africa and that the former is only assisting but the AU disagrees on this notion and sees itself as superior to ECOWAS. A similar challenge confronts the UN's relationship with the AU and its RECs, as there is no clarity of responsibilities and roles in crises situations.

What pertains currently is that the AU and its RECs have to sometimes negotiate with the UN on who should do what and when at the mission headquarters and in some conflict situations.[71] This was particularly the case with respect to the UN/AU hybrid mission in Sudan where the mandate did not specify the division of labour in the mandate implementation. One of the respondent interviewed at the AUC, for instance, noted that there was no clarity of roles right from the beginning of the planning and mandate making process of the mission. The AU had to negotiate with the UN on who should do what and when on the field.[72] This problem is further compounded by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which does not also distinguish between regional (AU) and sub-regional organisations (RECs). In particular, this becomes a problem for the UN in cases where the AU and its RECs adopt different policy responses to particular crises, as it happened during the crises in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010/2011 and the initial response to the Malian crises in 2012 (Bellamy and Williams, 2011).

4.6.4. Lack of Parity in the Relationship

Closely related to the challenge of subsidiarity is the problem of power inequalities between the UN and the AU. Ideally, partnerships are to be constructed with a balance of power. However, in certain situations power differentials do exist because not all partners are equal. The failure to openly acknowledge this reality and the refusal of some partners to

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give up some power leads to conflicts within partnerships (Boydell, 2000, 2007). Principally, this is the same situation with regards to the UN/AU partnership. While the AU and its PSC wants the UNSC to see them as equal partners during meetings, the UN thinks otherwise and sees it as too ambitious and unrealistic.[73] The AU thinks that it structures are equal to the UN, however, the UN sees itself as superior to the AU. Because of this misunderstanding, whenever the UNSC meets with AU PSC, the former sees it as some members of the Security Council meeting the AUPSC and not UNSC as a whole.[74] The main argument has been that UNSC meetings are only attended by members of the Council and not members of the AUPSC.

Additionally, though the UN/AU partnership is formed within the context of Chapter VIII, some officials of the UN interviewed argued that it is not shown any where that it is obligatory for the UN to partner with the AU. According to them, the UN Charter only provides the room for the use of force by regional organisations and not the sharing of power.[75] Whilst the UN is not obliged to partner with regional bodies, it is instructive to note that its partnership is an innovative response to the changing patterns of the operational environment which the drafters of the Chapter VIII did not anticipate.

Generally, part of the problem stems from the fact that the UN sees itself as a global organisation with a universal mandate whiles the AU is only a regional body. Furthermore, the huge disparities between both organization in terms of technical, economic and managerial capacities for conducting peacekeeping operations has also contributed to the problem. One of the respondents interviewed at the UNOAU, for instance, argued that:

> Equality in the real sense can never be practically possible because while the UN is a global organisation, the AU is just a regional organisation. By the principle of subsidiarity, there is a hierarchy and the AU would always be under the UN as far as the AU also sees itself as superior to its Regional Economic Communities (RECs)[76]

Another respondent at the AU Commission also remarked that:

> Why is it that the AU wants to be equal to the UN when it has failed to accord the same equality status to its RECs, especially ECOWAS which also expect the AU to see them as equal? I honestly think the AU must deal with

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> its own challenges at home before claiming equality with the UN, as it is too ambitious[77]

From the AU's side, it appears that it is yet to come to terms with this reality and power dynamics because of the perception that it is being treated by the UNSC as a subordinate organisation which ought not to be. On the other hand, the UNSC is very sensitive to this matter and has taken it with some amount of suspicion and resisted any discussion on the subject during its meeting with the AUPSC.[78]This misunderstanding is not unexpected because according to Newman (2001), Frank & Smith (2006) and Radermacher et al., (2011), inequalities and power differentials between organisations is one of the major difficulties that all partnerships face. However, Brinkerhoff (1999) is of the view that for partnerships to be sustainable, a shared decision-making process in which partners have equal power must exist. Indeed, what is happening in the UN/AU partnership is more linked to Rummery's (2002) assertion that partnerships sometimes reinforces power inequalities that are already in existence, placing stronger organisations like the UN, in a relatively powerful position vis-à-vis the weaker ones, such as the AU.

From the theoretical perspective, although the exchange theory deals with the issue of power differentials within partnerships, it does not specifically address the peculiar nature of the power imbalances similar to the UN/AU situation. It rather defines power in terms of the varied nature of the resources among actors and argues that those differences result in interdependence and cooperation because each actor has a resource which the other actors want (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1972). In practical sense, what the theory implies is that power asymmetries as a result of resource scarcity, induce cooperation rather than competition. This thesis is akin to the hegemonic stability theory which also attributes the existence and continuation of cooperation of actors with a disproportionate share of issue-specific power resources (Hasenclever, Mayer, Rittberger, 2000). This is, however, in contrast to Oliver's (1990) assertion that resource scarcity rather prompts organisations to attempt to exert power, influence or control over organisations that need the required scarce resources. In reality, this is exactly what pertains in the UN/AU relationship. The former, who possesses the valued resources (financial and logistical capacity) is dominating the latter who requires those resources, thereby creating frictions and tensions in their relationship.

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4.6.5. Philosophical and Doctrinal Differences about Peacekeeping

The failure of the UN and the AU to harmonize their peacekeeping philosophies and doctrines is yet another challenge militating against the effectiveness of the partnership. The UN peacekeeping philosophy is that for peacekeeping to succeed, one or more of the following minimum criteria should exist: (i) There must be peace to keep, which implies the existence of a peace agreement; (ii) clear and achievable mission mandates with resources to match; (iii) it must have the full backing of the UNSC; and (iv) it must be part of a more comprehensive strategy to help resolve a conflict (UN, 2000). Despite the fact that these four recommendations are not representative of the complete range of UN peacekeeping philosophy, Murithi (2009) opines that they constitute the lowest common denominator for all peacekeeping operations.

In contrast, the AU's peacekeeping philosophy is that instead of waiting for a peace to keep, in certain situations, peace has to be created before it can be kept (AU, 2012). This philosophy is consistent with its policy of *non-indifference* found in the Article 4h of the AU Constitutive Act which states that the African Union has the right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances (AU, 2000). The AU argues that the UN's peacekeeping philosophy does not work in situations like Somalia, a country that has not seen peace for two decades now. For the partnership to be effective, this philosophical gap needs to be addressed because it has practical implications on the division of labour and burden-sharing in the deployment of peacekeepers. It has also given rise to divergent notions of the purpose, configuration, and force requirements for peacekeeping operations. In 2006, for example, the UN and AU disagreed on whether the deployment of AMISOM was the appropriate response to the situation in Somali (Boutellis and William, 2013a).

4.6.6. Operational and Practical level Challenges

The operational and practical level challenges discussed here relates to the specific difficulties faced by the two institutions in the field/missions where they have partnered to bring about peace and stability. As indicated earlier, the two organisations have so far

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cooperated in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Mali and Burundi.[79] All these cooperative endeavours have come with their own distinct set of challenges. For UNAMID, although most of the challenges it currently faces can be attributed to the missions' environment and the complexity of the crisis, there are, however, some difficulties related to its hybrid nature that are particularly illuminating. The challenges relating to its environment comprises: The blocking of vital equipments of TCCs/PCCs at customs; delaying the issuance of visas to mission personnel; refusal of entry to entire national contingents; and the restriction of access to certain regions in Darfur by the Government of Sudan (Murithi, 2009; Anyidoho, 2012; Agwai, 2012; Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012).[80] Others include the conflict dynamics in Darfur which continues to evolve, shifting between tribal, political and resource-based fighting as well as the increase in numbers and motives of the warring factions.

On the hybrid nature of UNAMID, equality between both organisations is missing because the AU is more involved at the strategic political level than the operational level.[81] Put differently, the UN is virtually in total control of the management of the mission in the field. The UN is more often in touch with the mission both physically and electronically than the AU. General Martin Luther Agwai, the first force commander of UNAMID, for instance, indicated that at the initial stages of the mission the AU was always left out of the information loop because the details of personnel deployments to the mission was organised by the UN in New York (Agwai, 2012). Probably, this was so because the UN was better organised than the AU at the time and even now, in terms of administrative procedures, logistical capacity and mission planning as well as management.

The different views and positions of both organisations regarding the ICC arrest warrant for President Omar Al basher of Sudan was yet another challenge that militated against the effectiveness of the partnership in Darfur (Bah and Lotan, 2011; AU, 2012, 2013). Additionally, it was also noted that there were/are sometimes unreasonable delays in the appointments of senior level officials for the mission due to cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and politics. The lack of clear reporting lines and decision-making on emergency situations was also another problem because the mission leadership had to

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consult the AU in Addis Ababa and the UN in New York on all issues before they could take decisions (Anyidoho, 2012; Agwai, 2012). In an interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy SRSG of UNAMID, he indicated that:

> The difficulty with this arrangement was that responses to emergency situations and problems were often delayed due to the bureaucratic procedures in both organisations. These delays actually affected the tactical level decision-making at the mission headquarters which translated into more civilian deaths and casualties on the ground. In the long run, the leadership of the mission had to take unilateral decisions which were very often accepted by both organisations.[82]

The UN/AU cooperation in Mali also had similar difficulties. In the communiqué adopted at its 371st meeting, held on 25 April 2013, the AUPSC noted that the AU and ECOWAS were not consulted in the drafting of the UNSC resolution 2100.[83] Besides, the AUPSC also complained that the resolution did not take into account the concerns formally expressed by the AU and ECOWAS and the proposals they constructively made to facilitate a coordinated international support for the ongoing efforts by the Malian stakeholders.[84] The friction and tensions between the UN and the AU was apparent when the UNSC council denied the request of the AUPSC to provide the same kind of logistical and financial UN support package as AMISOM to AFISMA instead of transferring it to a UN mission.

4.6.7. Bureaucratic Challenges

The UN/AU relationship has also been complicated by different bureaucratic challenges which include issues such as: (a) Different working methods and procedures between the UNSC and AUPSC and how they adopt communiqués/resolutions; (b) lack of coordination between the monthly agendas of the two councils and the agenda for their annual meetings; (c) lack of regular communication between the chairs of the two councils and their staff; (d) lack of regular interaction between the Office of the UN Secretary-General and the AU Chairperson; (e) lack of standard operating procedures for the AU to feed its positions/decisions into UNSC work agenda; and (f) lack of dispute resolution mechanisms

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to address disagreement between the two councils on specific African peace and security challenge (UN, 2008c; AU, 2012; Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 18; Bah and Lotan, 2011).

It must, however, be noted that the two organisations have made efforts over the years, to overcome some of these challenges, especially, those that have to do with coordination problems through the establishment of the desk-to-desk consultations between officials of the two bodies and the UN/AU Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security. Nevertheless, these meetings have arguably been a mere information-sharing forum and the discussions have also not focused on broader policy questions regarding the partnership.[85] What really needs to be done is to strengthen these coordinating mechanisms by addressing the issues raised above to enhance the effectiveness of the partnership.

4.7. CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed and analyzed the research findings based on the research objectives of the study and the review of the extant literatures. The chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the motivations, normative frameworks, outcome and benefits, and challenges of the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations. The study also investigated the extent to which the research findings either corroborated or contradicted with the existing literatures and the theoretical frameworks adopted for the study.

Concerning the motivations underlying the UN/AU partnership, several reasons were identified. The first was the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the Article 17(1) of the AU PSC protocol of 2002 that naturally established some form of partnership between the UN and regional organisations. Theoretically, this motive was explained by the legal-political mandates strand of exchange theory which posits that cooperation between organisations occurs when their mandates provide the impetus for inter-organisational cooperation or require them to work together. Remarkably, this is the case with respect to the UN and the AU. The mandate of both organisations allows for some form of partnership as stated in the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and the Article 17 (1) of the AU PSC protocol. The second motivation that came out strongly during the interviews relates to the

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issue of peacekeeping burden-sharing or responsibility sharing between the UN and the AU. This is due to the common recognition that no single organisation can shoulder the whole burden of peacekeeping alone.

The third factor and perhaps one of the most important motivations is that of resource dependency. This argument was validated by the resource dependency notion of exchange theory that maintains that organisations with scarcity of resources (financial, material and human) will seek to establish relationship with other organisations, in order to supplement their limited resources or obtain needed resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ranaei, Zareei, Alikhani, 2010:24). The contemporary challenge to the legitimacy of the UN in certain conflict zones in Africa such as Darfur in Sudan; organisational learning, principally through the transfer of tacit knowledge from the UN especially, to the AU; and the changing nature of the security environment in Africa were also cited as one of the reasons contributing to the emergence of the partnership.

With respect to the normative frameworks, the Charter of the UN specifically, Chapter VIII was cited as one of the frameworks under which the partnership is formed. The Chapter VIII which comprises Articles 52-54 of the UN Charter provides the constitutional basis and the framework for the UN's collaboration with regional organisations such as the AU in the maintenance of international peace and security. However, it was noted that the interpretation of the roles that regional organisations such as the AU should play under Chapter VIII in its relationship with the UN remains ambiguous. Thus, there is vagueness in the division of responsibility between the UN and the AU in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. Another normative framework identified was the AU Constitutive Act and the 2002 Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (see Article 17(1-3). These two documents guide the AU's relationship with the UN and other organisations in the world. But just like the UN Charter, these two instruments do not explain how the AU should work with the UN and the modalities such cooperation should entail.

In terms of the outcomes and benefits of the partnership, it was observed that the partnership has resulted in better and innovative approaches and responses to African peace

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and security challenges; systems development in terms of, improvement in co-ordination mechanisms and partnership infrastructures; policy development, though much has not been done in the development of joint policies and procedures to guide their operations at both the strategic and operational levels; and lastly, resource development, in terms of, increase in the level of knowledge, skills, and capacity at a both the collective and individual levels, and the increase in new capital accumulation (money, equipments etc).
The following challenges were also identified as hindering the effectiveness of the partnership. They include: lack of mutual understanding on the application of Chapter VIII; mistrust and lack of respect of the views of the AUPSC by the UNSC; non-adherence to the principle of subsidiarity; issues of power inequality or lack of parity in the relationship; philosophical and doctrinal differences about peacekeeping; operational and practical level challenges; and bureaucratic challenges. In spite of these challenges, there are some current developments that augur well for the successes of the partnership in future.

At the practical level, there has been remarkable advancement and improvements compared to the period of the OAU when the UN was reluctant to even support any peacekeeping operations undertaken by a regional organisation. This is reflected in the UN's partnerships with the AU in places like Darfur, Somalia, Burundi, Mali and recently in CAR. At the institutional level, the establishment of the UNOAU has brought some degree of coherence to the UN's engagement with the AU unlike before. Another significant development was the signing of the declaration on "Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU" (TYCBP) in 2006. Through this programme, the UN has provided support in the planning, development and management of AU operations such as AMISOM and provided institutional support for the operationalisation of the ASF, a key pillar of the APSA.

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ENDNOTES

[1]Interview with Mr. Simon Badza, Political Officer, AU peace and Security Secretariat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013; interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013.

[2]See Security Council Issues Presidential Statement Applauding European Union' Partnership with United Nations in Resolving Global Challenges Security Council SC/11279, 14 February 2014.

[3] Interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head of Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013; Interview with Colonel Festus Aboagye (Rtd), President of APSTA, Nairobi, Kenya, Accra, Ghana, July 2013; interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy SRSG, UNAMID, Darfur, Sudan, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013.

[4]They are: Abiodun Oluremi Bashua (Nigeria)-Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur, Head of UNAMID and Joint Chief Mediator; Abdul Kamara (Sierra Leone)- Deputy Joint Special Representative; Lieutenant General Paul Ignace Mella (United Republic of Tanzania), Force Commander; and Hester Andriana Paneras (South Africa) Police Commissioner. See "UNAMID Leadership" http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/leadership.shtml, accessed 13 December 2014.

[5]Interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy Force Commander, UNAMIR, Rwanda and Former Deputy SRSG, UNAMID, Darfur Sudan, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013; interview with Gen. Jaotody Jean De Martha, Head, Plans and Operations/AMISOM Unit AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.; interview with Col (Rtd) Micheal Kodzo Amuzu, Head of the Darfur/Sudan Desk at the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.2 October, 2013.

[6] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1706(2006), S/RES/1706(2006), 31 August 2006; PSC/PR/Comm (LXXIX) (22 June 2007) authorised UNAMID.

[7] See the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, UNSC, S/2014/229

[8] Interview with MINUSMA personnel, Bamako, Mali, November 2013

[9] See the UNSC adopted Resolution 1863, 16 January 2009; African Union, (2014), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia. Peace and Security Council 462nd Meeting Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 16 October 2014 PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII)

[10]The Intervention brigade was mandated to neutralize armed groups and to contribute to reducing the threats posed by these groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098

[11]Interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy SRSG, UNAMID, Darfur Sudan, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013.

[12] Interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy Force Commander, UNAMIR, Rwanda and Former Deputy SRSG, UNAMID, Darfur Sudan, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013; interview with Col (Rtd) Micheal Kodzo Amuzu, Head of the Darfur/Sudan Desk at the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.2 October, 2013; interview with Lt. Col Moses Adegoke Adetuyi, former military officer of UNAMID, Darfur Sudan, Accra, Ghana, 25 June 2013.

[13]Interview with a security expert, Accra, Ghana, July 2013.

[14]Interview with a security expert, Accra, Ghana, July 2013.

[15]Interview with COP James Opong Bonuah, Former Police Commissioner, UNAMID, Ghana, Accra, 30 July 2013.; interview with Ms. Meron Kassa, Senior Political Officer, African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2 October, 2013.

[16]Interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013; interview with Lt. Colonel Joseph Ahphour, Operations Officer, Plans and Operations/AMISOM, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1 October 2013.

[17]Interview with Ms. Yvonne Kasumba, Civilian Planning and Liaison Officer, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013.

[18]Interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013.; interview with Ms. Yvonne Kasumba Civilian Planning and Liaison Officer, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013; interview with Gen. Jaotody Jean De Martha Head, Plans and Operations/AMISOM Unit AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.

[19]Interview with Lt. Colonel Joseph Ahphour, Operations Officer, Plans and Operations/AMISOM, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1 October 2013.

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[20] Sub-state actors are factions which are not part of the recognised state structures.
[21]Interview with Mr. Mustapha Abdallah, Research Associate, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra, Ghana, 16 January 2014.
[22] Poland was the other original member, which was not represented at the conference, but had to sign the Charter two months later.
[23]See the Communique, of the Peace and Security Council, 265th meeting, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2011, PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV).
[24] Interview with a senior officer at the AU PSC Secretariat, Addis Ababa, September 2013
[25] See Declaration on "Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU", UN doc. A/61/630.
[26]Interview with UNOAU and AU officials, Addis Ababa, September and October 2013.
[27]Interview with a Security Expert in Accra, Ghana, June 2013.
[28] Interview with a military officer at the UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013.
[29]See the OAU Declaration on a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Cairo Declaration). 1993.
[30]The Constitutive Act is the foundation treaty of the African Union and was adopted in Lome, Togo on 11 July, 2000 by African Heads of State and Governments. It sets the objectives, principles, membership and organs of the Union and their functions.
[31]The PSC Protocol provided the basis for the African Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA). The five main pillars of APSA are: (i) the PSC, which is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent; (ii) the Panel of the Wise, whose role is to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention; (iii) the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which is tasked to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts; and (IV) the African Standby Force (ASF), composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin, ready for rapid deployment. See the Articles 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 13of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council.
[32]See the OAU Declaration on a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Cairo Declaration). 1993.
[33] UN Security Council S/PRST/2007/7
[34]For more information see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/rolega.shtml, accessed 20 December 2014.
[35]In UNAMID, for example, the TCCs/PCCs include the following countries: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, , Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palau, Peru, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml, accessed 27 December 2014.
[36]While the DPA is the lead UN department for peacemaking and preventive diplomacy, DPKO provides the political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations in the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the execution of Security Council mandates. In other words, the DPKO plans, prepares, manages, and direct UN peacekeeping, political and peacebuilding missions together with the DFS under the overall authority of the UNSC, UN General Assembly and under the authority vested in the UNSG. The Department of Field Support (DFS) on the other hand, provides support in the areas of finance, logistics, information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources and general administration to help peacekeeping operations promote peace and security. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/, accessed 10 November 2014.
[37]The DSD deals with counter-terrorism, Common African Defense and Security Policy, land mines and small arms, whilst the CMD deals with early warning, conflict management and post conflict issues. The Peace and Security Council Secretariat as the name suggests provides secretariat support to the PSC and the PSOD manages peacekeeping operations and the ASF.
[38]United Nations. Remarks to the UN Security Council, January 12, 2012.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1425#.ULzjIlLO-So, accessed 20 December 2014.

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[39]Department of Political Affairs. (2014). United Nations – African Union Cooperation. http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/unlo. Accessed on 20 December 2014.
[40]See MINUSCA. (2014). MINUSCA Background.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/background.shtml, accessed on 23 December 2014; African Union. (2013). Launch of the transition from MICOPAX to the African-Led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic. http://www.au.int/en/content/launch-transition-micopax-african-led-international-support-mission-central-african-republic. Accessed on 24 November 2014.
[41]Aljazeera. (2014). UN peacekeepers take over CAR mission. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/un-takes-over-car-peacekeeping-from-au-201491519244084235l.html. Accessed 13 December 2014.
[42]Interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy SRSG, UNAMID, Darfur Sudan, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013.
[43]Unlike most missions in Africa, It operates within the context of a functional state and not a failed state with the presence of several rebel groups or non-state security actors.
[44] Interview with Gen. Jaotody Jean De Martha, Head, Plans and Operations/AMISOM Unit AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.; interview with Mr. Francis Ayitey Aryee, UNAAMID Training Coordinator, Accra, Ghana, 23 August 2013.
[45] United Nations Security Council resolution 1769; PSC/PR/Comm (LXXIX) (22 June 2007) authorised UNAMID.
[46]See “UNAMID Leadership” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/leadership.shtml, accessed 13 December 2014.
[47]Interview with a Political Officer, AU peace and Security Secretariat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 26 September 2013.
[48]The Intervention brigade was mandated to neutralize armed groups and to contribute to reducing the threats posed by these groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities.
[49]Interview with AU, UN, and ECOWAS Officials in Bamako, Mali, November 2013.
[50]Interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013.; interview with Ms. Yvonne Kasumba Civilian Planning and Liaison Officer, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013; interview with Gen. Jaotody Jean De Martha Head, Plans and Operations/AMISOM Unit AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.
[51]Interview with AU Officials in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September and October 2013.
[52]Interview with Lt. Colonel Joseph Ahphour Operations, Officer, Plans and Operations/AMISOM, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1 October 2013.
[53] Interview with a UN Official in Bamako, Mali, November 2013.
[54] See African Union. Donors’ Conference on Mali: Africa and the International Community United for Mal. http://summits.au.int/en/20thsummit/events/donors-conference-mali, accessed 12 February 2014.
[55]Ibid.
[56]Interview with Mr. Simon Badza, Political Officer, AU peace and Security Secretariat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.
[57]See United Nations. Briefing on UN support for AU peacekeeping. UNSC Update Report. 16 June 2011, No.2
[58]Interview with Interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013.
[59]Interview with AU Officials in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September and October 2013.
[60]Interview with AU Officials and official from the UNOAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September and October 2013.
[61]PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI); PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI)
[62]Ibid; Interview with AU Political Officer, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.
[63]Furthermore, in December 2006, both organisations disagreed on whether the deployment of a peace operation was the appropriate response to the situation in Mogadishu, AMISOM; and the UNSC also refused to formally consider the AU’s repeated requests for a deferral of the prosecution of President Omar al-Bashir

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of Sudan by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Akande, Plessis and Jalloh, 2010; Bah and Lortan, 2011; Boutellis and William, 2013a).

[64]United Nations, (2012). *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali*, UN Doc. S/2012/894 (November 29, 2012). New York:UN; See the Communique, of the Peace and Security Council, 265th meeting, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2011, PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV).

[65]PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI); PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI)

[66]Interview with AU Senior Political Official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013.

[67]See also "Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at a Security Council Open Debate on UN-AU Cooperation," U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York, (2012), Available athttp://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/180554.htm.Accessed 20 October 2014.; UN Doc. S/PV.6702, January 12, 2012, p.15

[68]Interview with UNOAU Official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013.

[69]Interview with UN Official in Bamako, Mali, May 2014.

[70]Article 33 requires member states to use regional arrangements "first of all" in peacefully resolving their conflicts. Article 52 recognizes the validity of regional arrangement, especially for peaceful settlement of dispute, provided that they are compatible with the purposes and principles of the UN. Article 53 suggests that the UNSC might itself use regional mechanisms, albeit, under its authority for enforcement actions. Article 54 admonishes regional arrangements to keep the UNSC fully informed of their activities.

[71]Interview with AU Political Official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013.

[72]Interview with AU officials, Addis Ababa, October 2013

[73]Interview with an official of the AU and the UNOAU, Addis Ababa, September and October, 2013.

[74]Interview with a security expert, Accra, Ghana, June 2013.

[75]Interview with an official of the AU and the UNOAU, Addis Ababa, September and October, 2013

[76]Interview with Interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013; Interview with AU Senior Political Official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013.

[77]Interview with an AU Political Official, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013.

[78]ibid

[79]Somalia, UNSOA-AMISOM (2007 to present); Sudan, UNAMID (2008); Mali, AFISMA to MINUSMA (2013); and Burundi, ONUB (2004).

[80]Interview with UNAMID personnel in Darfur, El Fashir, November 2014

[81]Interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy SRSG, UNAMID, Darfur Sudan, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013 ; Interview with Mr. James Opong Bonuah Former Police Commissioner, UNAMID Accra Ghana, 30 July 2013.

[82]Interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy SRSG of UNAMID, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013.

[83]PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI); PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI)

[84]ibid

[85]Interview with an AU Political Official, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CASE STUDIES OF UNITED NATIONS/AFRICAN UNION PARTNERSHIP IN MALI, SOMALIA AND SUDAN

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter illustrates the research findings through case studies of UN/AU partnership in Mali, Somalia and Sudan. The main purpose is to show the empirical cases of UN/AU partnerships, in terms of, their nature and motivations; the outcomes and benefits; and the challenges encountered. The idea is not to use the same framework of analysis to examine the various case studies but to generally explore how the partnership works in the different contexts: sequential operations (Mali); coordinated operation (Somalia); and hybrid/integrated operation (Sudan). It begins with a discussion of the UN/AU partnership in Mali, followed by the partnerships in Somalia and then Sudan respectively.

5.2 CASE STUDY OF UN/AU/ECOWAS PARTNERSHIP IN MALI

5.2.1. Background, Nature and Motivations of the Trilateral Partnership in Mali

Barely a month to the conduct of scheduled presidential elections in April 2012, Mali was plunge into crises when a group of soldiers led by Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo ousted President Ahmadou Toumani Toure in a military coup d'état on 22 March 2012 (Aning and Aubyn, 2013; UN, 2013, 2014). The coup followed a secessionist rebellion by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) which started on 17 January 2012. Although several factors were cited as accounting for the *coup*, the most prominent among them were: the discontent over government failure to equip the military to effectively deal with the "separatist" rebellion by the Tuareg rebels in northern Mali; poor governance and endemic corruption; proliferation of small arms and weapons from the Sahel region and

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Libya; and grievances over deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the country (WANEP, 2012; Aning and Aubyn, 2013b). The insecurity that followed the *coup d'état* led to the division of the country into two with the Transitional Government controlling the south and the north being dominated by MNLA together with the Islamist fighters of Ansar Dine, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Human Right Watch, 2012; ECOWAS, 2013). Specifically, MUJAO controlled the towns of Douentza, Gao and Ménaka; AQIM occupied the towns of Timbuktu and Tessalit, while Ansar Dine remained in control of Kidal.[1] Figure 5.1 shows the location of these towns in Mali. This led to a full-blown security, political and institutional crises in Mali.

Given its implication on regional and global security, the *coup* attracted an immediate and widespread condemnation from the international community. In a separate statements and communiqués, the UN, the AU and ECOWAS unanimously condemned the *coup* and called on the perpetrators to relinquish power and ensure an immediate restoration of constitutional order (Aning and Aubyn, 2013b; ECOWAS, 2013; UN, 2013, 2014). Subsequently, in efforts to deal with the political crises, ECOWAS supported by the AU and the UN represented by the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) took the lead role. ECOWAS adopted a two-track approach to deal with the situation. The first approach involved mediation and negotiation efforts to return the country back to constitutional rule and the second, involved a proposal to deploy the ECOWAS Standby Force to support the Malian Authorities to recapture the northern part of the country from the rebel occupation.

With respect to the first approach, a framework agreement brokered by ECOWAS's mediator, Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, on 6 April 2012, following the lifting of ECOWAS sanctions[2] on the military junta led to the formation of a transitional government. The transitional government had 40 days to restore constitutional order by organising democratic elections but this was later extended to 12 months by ECOWAS in consultation with all stakeholders of the crises.[3] The tenure of the transitional government ended after the second round of presidential elections in Mali on 11 August 2014, which led to the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, a former prime minister from 1994 to 2000, as

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president (UN, 2013, 2014). Currently, a legitimate government is in place and a semblance of stability exists in the country, although it is still fragile.

Figure 5.1. Map of Mali

Source: United Nations, 2013.

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Regarding the insecurity in the northern part of the country, ECOWAS initially planned to deploy a 3,300 contingent of ECOWAS-led International Support Mission for Mali (MISMA) following a request by the Malian Authorities to help restore the country's territorial integrity and constitutional order (ECOWAS, 2013). However, this decision never went beyond the planning stages as it faced several obstacles including, the military junta's hostility to any foreign armed presence in Bamako; the absence of cooperation on the way forward with Algeria and Mauritania, and logistical as well as financial constraints (ECOWAS, 2013). After several reviews and discussions by ECOWAS and the AU in consultation with the UN, the name of the mission was changed from MISMA to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).[4] The change of name was to allow other African countries to contribute resources, especially, in the form of troops in order to make it a truly continental initiative.[5] In that regard, the AU developed a strategic concept of operation together with the UN, ECOWAS and other international actors that framed the military action in a more global perspective. Chad for example, contributed about 2,250 troops in addition to the ECOWAS troops of 3300 (Maru, 2013).

On 20 December 2012, through UNSC Resolution 2085, the Security Council authorised the deployment of AFISMA for an initial period of one year to assist the Malian authorities in recovering the rebel-held regions in the north, and to restore the unity as well as the democratic legitimacy of the country. However, due to financial and logistical difficulties, the deployment of AFISMA was delayed. Consequently, in early January 2013, the security situation in the country underwent a serious deterioration after a renewed offensive and advancement by the Islamist rebels southwards towards Bamako, the capital city. The rebels captured the town of Konna about 680 km from Bamako, and the town of Diabaly in the west (see figure 5.1) after defeating the Malian army (Aubyn, 2013; UN, 2014). Apprehensive of the eminent threat, the transitional authorities requested the assistance of France to defend Mali's sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity. In response, France launched a military operation code named "Operation Serval" without any Security Council authorization against the Islamist rebels using a combination of air power, Special Forces and a lightly armoured spearhead force (Maru, 2013; Aubyn, 2013; Francis, 2013).[6] The French military operation was later given legitimacy through the adoption of UNSC

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Resolution 2100. In the Article 18 of UNSC Resolution 2100, the Security Council authorised French troops to use all necessary means, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment to intervene in support of MINUSMA.

Following the French intervention, the deployment of AFISMA was accelerated from the original deployment planned date of September 2013, and by the end of January 2013, AFISMA made up of about 6,300 troops arrived in Mali (Maru, 2013; UN, 2014). They were deployed in Bamako and to the three northern regions of the country. After the deployment, the mission's (political, financial, logistical, administrative aspects) was managed jointly by the AU and ECOWAS. However, the UN also played a minimal role in the management of the mission.[7] Together with the French forces and the Malian Defense and Security forces, AFISMA successfully evicted the insurgents from the major northern cities such as Gao, Timbuktu, Mopti by February 2013, except Kidal where the MNLA was still in control (Aubyn, 2013; UN, 2013, 2014). After this relative success, the French Operation Serval faded into the background (reduced its personnel from 4000 to 1000) and allowed AFISMA to take control of the operation.

Meanwhile, ECOWAS and the AU endorsed the transformation of AFISMA into a fully-fledged UN stabilization mission in order to address the logistical and financial constraints that confronted the mission. Specifically, in the Article 13 of the AU communique [(PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCLXXI)], the AUPSC reiterated its supports for the transformation of AFISMA into a UN operation, and requested the UN to comply with certain parameters including the "mobilisation, in favour of AFISMA, of financial and logistical support that makes it possible to build the operational capacity of the Mission and to facilitate its early transformation into a UN operation, particularly through the, establishment by the United Nations of an appropriate logistical support…"[8] This request was not granted but on April 2013, MINUSMA was established through the adoption of UNSC resolution 2100.[9] However, the AU noted "with concern that Africa was not appropriately consulted in the drafting and consultation process that led to the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of a UN Multidimensional Integrated Mission for Stabilization in Mali (MINUSMA) to take over AFISMA, and stresses that this situation is

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not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years, on the basis of the provisions of Chapter VIII Of the UN Charter."[10]

In the Article 16 of the UNSC Resolution 2100, MINUSMA was mandated to support the political process in Mali and undertake a number of security-related stabilization tasks including, the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.[11] On 1 July 2013, MINUSMA formally took over authority from AFISMA and subsumed the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) which was earlier established following the adoption of the UNSC resolution 2100 in 2012. MINUSMA is currently deployed across Mali to support the Government to extend its authority to every part of the country and help maintain peace and security.

As illustrated in figure 5.2, majority of MINUSMA's operational activities as at January 2015 are located in northern Mali which is the hotbed of the country's present security predicament. Figure 5.2 also shows the location of each of the TCCs/PCCs to MINUSMA at the mission's headquarters in Bamako and in the northern regions. The strategic direction, administrative procedures and the appointments of the senior leadership are all done according to UN standards. The AU and ECOWAS have no role in the operations of the mission although they attend stakeholders meetings organised by MINUSMA through their representatives in Mali. Their involvement in the activities of the mission is minimal, raising questions about the effectiveness of the partnership.

It is significant to note that several reasons accounted for the transformation of AFISMA to MINUSMA. The single most important factor that led to the transfer was the absence of requisite strategic airlift capability, military, logistical and financial capacity of AFISMA.[12] Thus, the transformation of AFISMA to a UN mission was basically due its resource constraints. This phenomenon is reflective of the resource dependency notion of exchange theory, which posits that organisations with scarcity of resources (financial, material and

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Figure 5.2. MINUSMA Deployment Map as at January 2015

Source: United Nations, 2015

human) will always seek to establish relationship with other organisations in order to obtain the needed resources. The AU and ECOWAS lacked the requisite resources and capacity to maintain and implement the mission's objectives. One of the respondents interviewed at the ECOWAS Political Office in Mali noted the following:

> AFISMA operated with limited logistics, strategic airlift, attack helicopters, reconnaissance airplanes and financial resources. Most of the AFISMA units remained in southern Mali due to lack of transportation, food, equipment, boots and they also lacked training in desert warfare, making their deployment extremely perilous. As a result, despite its initial success of recapturing most of the northern cities from rebel occupation, the AU and ECOWAS had to request the UN which has the capacity to sustain and backstop peacekeeping missions in terms of funding and providing logistics to take over the mission. The request to the UNSC by the AU to authorize the same kind of logistical and financial UN support package as AMISOM for AFISMA is an evidence.[13]

From the statement above, it can be argued that AFISMA would not have been transformed to MINUSMA, if the UN had not responded positively to the AU's request. In short, the establishment of MINUSMA was basically to respond to the resource constraints of AFISMA.

Second, the multifaceted and complex nature of the crises necessitated the transfer of AFISMA to MINUSMA. The complex nature of the conflict and its international linkages demanded a coordinated international response, rather than a regional intervention. Third, the transfer was also to internationalise the conflict, according to a respondent at the AU political office in Mali, to give an opportunity to all countries in the world to support the mission.[14] As noted earlier, AFISMA was constrained by resources right from the beginning of its deployment. The idea here was basically to move the mission from the regional level to the global level, where every country irrespective of their interest in the crises would be obliged to provide support to the mission. Lastly, the transfer was motivated by the formal request of the Malian government, ECOWAS and AU for the UN to take over the mission. The UN acknowledge all these letters in the UNSC Resolution 2100 before establishing MINUSMA. The following extracts below from the UNSC Resolution 2100 buttresses this point:

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> Taking note of the letter, dated 26 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of the ECOWAS Commission requesting the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization mission and taking note of the communiqué, dated 7 March 2013, of the AU Peace and Security Council, as well as the attached letter dated 7 March 2013 and addressed to the Secretary-General by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, expressing AU support for the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization operation in Mali.

> Taking note of the letter, dated 25 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-General by the transitional authorities of Mali, which requests the deployment of a United Nations operation to stabilize and restore the authority and the sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its national territory.

These extracts show that the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the President of the ECOWAS Commission at various stages of the transitional process sent communications to the UN Secretary-General and joint letters to the President of the UN Security Council for the transformation of AFISMA into a UN operation.[15]

5.2.2. Significance of the Partnership between the UN, AU and ECOWAS in Mali

Arguably, the relative peace that Malians enjoy today is partly due to the outcome of the interventions of these three organisations. The political, diplomatic, humanitarian and military interventions of the three organisations led by ECOWAS are arguably what culminated in the restoration of constitutional order, social normalcy and Mali's territorial integrity.[16] Led by ECOWAS, they first brokered a framework agreement (political transition road map) on 6 April 2012 which led the military junta to relinquish power and the eventual formation of a transitional government. Consequently, through the deployment of AFISMA and the French *Operation Serval*, they helped the Malian authorities to successfully recover the northern territories seized by the Tuareg and terrorist groups, following the military coup in March 2012.[17]The relative success chalked was later consolidated by the deployment of MINUSMA, which supervised the organisation of a presidential and parliamentary election in August and November 2013 respectively. Currently, a legitimate government is in place working assiduously to extend state authority to every part of the country and to address the underlying causes of the crises with the

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support of the UN, AU and ECOWAS as well as other bilateral and multilateral partners. However, difficulties persist in the north especially, in places like Kidal.

The sequencing of operations from AFISMA to MINUSMA also demonstrated the utility of maximizing the comparative advantages between the three organisations. Thus, through the deployment of AFISMA, the AU and ECOWAS demonstrated the value of undertaking high-risk stabilization missions needed for a long-term post-conflict reconstruction. Initially, the UN was reluctant to deploy any peacekeeping mission to Mali because there was 'no peace to keep.' However, the intervention of AFISMA together with the Malian army and French forces stabilized the security situation and paved the way for the deployment of MINUSMA. The intervention significantly improved the security situation leading to the withdrawal of the rebels and terrorist groups northwards into the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains and the restoration of state control in major northern cities such as Diabaly, Douentza, Gao, Konna and Timbuktu.[18] Nevertheless, although the UN was reluctant to undertake any peace enforcement action in Mali, it also showed its capacity to sustain and backstop peacekeeping missions in terms of funding and providing logistics through the takeover of AFISMA operations. In short, the comparative advantages of all the organisations were positively illustrated by the AU and ECOWAS initially deploying to stabilize the conflict situation, and giving the opportunity for the UN to take over the mission with a multidimensional stabilization force, MINUSMA.

In addition, without AFISMA already on ground, the challenges that confronted MINUSMA at its initial stages of deployment could have been possibly worse.[19] According to some respondents in Mali, AFISMA did most of the ground work that eased the establishment of MINUSMA. MINUSMA's concept of operations, for example, was laid down by AFISMA personnel. Furthermore, some of the respondents at the MINUSMA headquarters also indicated that at the initial stages of its deployment, MINUSMA only existed at the political level and at the operational level, it was only filled with AFISMA structures and logistics, which did not change after five month of its deployment.[20] Additionally, most AFISMA vehicles and containers of field defence stores, accommodation units, generators and other supplies were all transferred to MINUSMA.[21]

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On the other hand, it is also significant to note that AFISMA's deployment was accelerated by the support of the UN. Apart from the authorization of the mission by the UNSC Resolution 2085, its concept of operation was jointly developed by the military and security planners from the UN, AU and ECOWAS (ECOWAS, 2013). To be precise, AFISMA's plan of operations was a product of the merging of ideas from the AU, ECOWAS and the UN as well as other international actors. The UN through UNSC resolution 2085 also set up the international Trust Fund to support the operations of AFISMA and the capacity-building of the Malian Defence and Security Forces. This fund helped to mobilize the necessary financial, logistical and capacity- building support for the Malian Defence and Security Forces as well as AFISMA.[22] Therefore, the UN did not only facilitate the creation of AFISMA, but also supported both the Malian government and AFISMA with the planning and preparations for the military intervention.

The involvement of ECOWAS in the partnership was also significant. ECOWAS involvement did not only bring to the fore, the need to strengthen and involve RECs in the UN/AU partnerships, but also showed the critical roles RECs could play in the overall global-regional security architecture. For example, in a meeting in Akosombo, Ghana in 2014 to review the ECOWAS intervention in Mali, H.E. Kadre Desire Ouedraogo, President of the ECOWAS Commission, noted that:

> "the ECOWAS facilitated framework agreement constituted the blue print and the rallying point for the structured international efforts to help Mali resolve its security, political and institutional crises."[23]

This statement shows how the ECOWAS-facilitated Transitional Roadmap and Concept of Operation (CONOPS) served as the basis for the strategic and operational frameworks for the subsequent deployment of AFISMA and MINUSMA. In sum, the partnership brought about the need to actively involve the RECs in the UN/AU peacekeeping partnerships.

5.2.3. Challenges of the Partnership in Mali

The challenges and difficulties that confronted the partnership in Mali can be categorized into two. They include challenges that occurred between the AU and ECOWAS, on one

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hand, and the challenges that involved the UN, AU and ECOWAS, on the other hand. The challenges were encountered in different forms at several levels including, the strategic, political and diplomatic levels; and institutional, coordination and operational levels.

5.2.3.1. *AU/ECOWAS Conundrum*

Between ECOWAS and the AU, the main political and diplomatic challenges concerned how to interpret and implement the principle of subsidiarity (i.e. the division of labour and sharing of responsibilities).[24] Historically, between the AU and its RECs, there is no clarity on the definition and application of the principles of subsidiarity. As a result, the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS, especially, has been that of mutual suspicions, mistrust and competition, with lack of transparency and goodwill.[25] It was, therefore, not surprising that in Mali, a misunderstanding ensued between the two organisations over who takes the lead role in the resolution of the crises.

Specifically, when the conflict erupted, ECOWAS took the lead role and planned MISMA. This was supported by the AU and the UN and later endorsed by the UNSC Resolution 2056. However, when MISMA was changed to AFISMA, the UNSC resolution 2071 and 2085 authorised the AU to provide the political and strategic leadership, while ECOWAS contributed the military and police component of AFISMA. To ECOWAS, this authorization constituted a hostile take-over of AFISMA by the AU (ECOWAS, 2013). ECOWAS expected the AU to cede to the Community the overall leadership of the resolution of the crises, since it was in its "zone of responsibility" and rather, canvass continental and international consensus and support for the mission (ECOWAS, 2013). However, this was not the case as the AU also had different ideas and motives and rather, regarded ECOWAS as a "subordinate" institution (ECOWAS, 2013). Commenting on this, some officials interviewed at the AU argued that the AU has supranational authority over ECOWAS because it is a continental institution whilst ECOWAS is a sub-regional body.[26]In a rebuttal, officials of ECOWAS interviewed disagreed with this position and noted that, West Africa is "their" area of responsibility and that ECOWAS is more experienced in conducting peacekeeping operations than the AU. They even went further to

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indicate that the AU copied the ECOWAS security architecture because the structures and mechanisms of the AU's peace and security architecture was modeled just like the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.[27] Therefore, to them, the AU is only to support and not to impose its will or control ECOWAS in crises situations.

Due to this turf battle, both organisations took certain important decisions without any prior consultation and discussion with the other. For example, it was noted during the interviews that the appointment of the political head of AFISMA by the AU was done without any consultation with ECOWAS. Similarly, ECOWAS also appointed the Force Commander of AFISMA without consulting the AU.[28] Indeed, the entire transition from MISMA to AFISMA was marked by tensions and rivalry between ECOWAS and the AU. The consequence was that it created competition between the two organisations and undermined continental consensus and cohesion during the crises.

Closely related to the challenge above was the problem relating to the absence of effective communication channels at the institutional levels for both organisations to consult each other on important matters and decisions.[29] Part of this problem was due to the lack of effective consultative mechanisms between the AU and its RECs. There was no platform during the crises for consultations or meetings between the President of the ECOWAS Commission and the Chairperson of the AU Commission as well as the senior officers of both institutions. Although the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the AU and it RECs in 2008 established these consultative mechanisms, they have not been effective in strengthening the coordination and harmonization of AU's activities with those of the RECs (AU, 2008). As a result, each organisation was taking its own decisions and actions without proper consultation with the other. This affected the formulation of decisions and the harmonization of positions as well as the transparency of their relations.

At the military and operational levels, ECOWAS and the AU engaged in mutual suspicions and 'corporate' competitions rather than cooperation, with each side seeking control of AFISMA and holding on to its resources and information (ECOWAS, 2013). Furthermore, the AFISMA operation lacked effective command and control. The AFISMA Force

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Commander, Major-General Shehu Abdulkadir appointed by ECOWAS, and the Political head, Pierre Buyoya appointed by the AU were all caught up in the contradictions between mission imperatives and loyalties to their respective organisations (ECOWAS, 2013). They both received instructions from their respective employers and reported directly to them. There was no information-sharing, coordination and harmonisation of actions between the two leaders.[30] Indeed, both organisations failed to demonstrates strategic leadership in the management of AFISMA, strengthening the UN's position of not consulting them in the drafting of MINUSMA's initial mandate in UNSC Resolution 2100.

5.2.3.2. *Challenges of the Triangular Relationship involving the UN, AU and ECOWAS*

The response to the crisis in Mali also revealed the shortcomings of the multilateral security architecture of the UN, ECOWAS and AU. All the three organisations had different interests and strategic and operational concepts for the resolution of the crises (Boutellis & Williams, 2013b, 2014). This was illustrated by the often contradictory approaches and opinions on the course of action regarding the crises. At the political level, the transition process was marked by tensions and mistrust. First, the AU accused the UNSC of not consulting Africa in the drafting of Security Council Resolution 2100 which authorized the deployment of MINUSMA to take over AFISMA.[31] After the adoption of UNSC resolution 2100, an AU Peace and Security Council communiqué indicated that "Africa was not appropriately consulted in the drafting and consultation process."[32] The AU felt that Africa was marginalized and its views were not respected by the UNSC.

Second, several requests made by the African Union were also ignored or disregarded by the UN in the drafting of the UNSC Resolution 2100. These requests included, among others, authorising a peace enforcement mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter for MINUSMA; providing a logistical and financial support package to AFISMA, just like AMISOM; and ensuring the continuity of AFISMA's leadership in MINUSMA.[33] For example, with respect to the leadership of MINUSMA, the UN appointed Albert Koenders from the Netherlands, as head of the mission, instead of the AU's candidate, Pierre Buyoya, the former Burundian president and head of AFISMA. Likewise, the UN sidelined

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Nigeria's Major-General Shehu Adbulkadir, the AFISMA force commander and appointed Rwanda's Major General, Jean-Bosco Kazuran as force commander of MINUSMA.[34] The consequences of this led to the withdrawal of majority of Nigerian troops from MINUSMA. Nonetheless, it is instructive to note that the AU's request were not given consideration because, according to some UN personnel interviewed, the request came late and also the two AFISMA leaders failed to meet UN standards in terms of level of mission experience and human rights records.[35]Besides, they also failed to demonstrate competent strategic leadership skills in the management of AFISMA.

Lastly, the failure to appoint the head of AFISMA as the political head of MINUSMA also meant that the UN stymied the AU's hopes of playing a central political role in the inclusive political process in Mali (Boutellis and Williams, 2013b, 2014). Thus, in UNSC resolution 2100, it was noted that the inclusive political process which was hitherto led by the AU and ECOWAS was to be "facilitated by the UN Secretary-General, through his Special Representative for Mali when appointed in close collaboration with the AU, ECOWAS and the EU Special Representative for the Sahel."[36] Actually, this was not what the AU was expecting as it felt sidelined, especially, when its entire request were not given due recognition.[37]

5.3. CASE STUDY OF THE UN/AU PARTNERSHIP IN SOMALIA

5.3.1. Background to the Establishment of AMISOM

The causes of state failure in Somalia dates back to independence. After independence, British Somaliland in the north, and former Italian Somaliland in the south, united to form the Somali Republic on 1 July 1960 led by Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, as President, and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, as Prime Minister (Fitzgeral, 2002; Bradbury & Healy, 2010; Njoku, 2013; BBC News, 2015). However, the reality after independence was that none of the colonial powers actually prepared the country for self-government. Civil administration in the northern and southern part of Somalia had all inherited different European languages, cultures and administrative structures from the colonial period. With no cohesive trained civil service and no accepted political norms, individual rivalries for power took their toll

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(Fitzgeral, 2002; Bradbury & Healy, 2010). Clan-family and sub-clan rivalries as well as irredentist pressure to incorporate Somalis living under various administrations also became rife (Lewis, 1993; Omar, 2001; AMISOM, 2014b). In that regard, the quest for national integration became a major challenge for the government.

In 1967, the president was defeated by his prime minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in the country's national elections. However, about two years of his reign, President Shermarke was assassinated on 15 October 1969. General Mohamed Siad Barre, seized power in a counter military *coup d'etat* and ruled the country until 1991, when he was ousted by a combined northern and southern clan-based forces. The collapse of the government led to feudal struggles and civil war between the factions supporting the Interim President, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and those supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid, the warlord of southern Mogadishu (Fitzgeral, 2002; Bradbury& Healy, 2010; AMISOM, 2014b). This resulted in serious humanitarian crisis in southern Somalia and the subsequent intervention by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

Following a peace agreement between the two warring parties to the conflict, the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was deployed under UN Security Council Resolution 751 in April 1992 to monitor the ceasefire and facilitate humanitarian relief efforts. However, both parties ignored the ceasefire and continued the fighting. This led to the inability of UNOSOM I to provide a secure environment for the conduct of humanitarian operations. Faced with an impending humanitarian catastrophe, UNOSOM I was subsumed by the United States-led military coalition, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992, made up of contingents from 24 countries (Lowther, 2007; Aubyn & Aning, 2013c; Friedman, 2013). The Unified Task Force which operated under the code name "Operation Restore Hope" was authorized by the UNSC resolution 794 to use "all necessary means" to ensure the protection of relief efforts. The presence of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in southern and central Somalia where its operations covered (Karcher, 2004; Mahmood, 2011). However, incidence of violence still continued, especially, in the north-east and north-west of the country, partly due to the absence of an

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effective functioning government, organised police force and disciplined national armed forces (Aubyn and Aning, 2013c; Franke & Dorff, 2013). Against this backdrop, the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali recommended the transition from UNITAF to the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia.[38]

In accordance with the Secretary-General's recommendations, the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted Security Council resolution 814 on 26 March 1993 and established UNOSOM II. Its mandate included, among others, to provide humanitarian assistance, rehabilitating the political institutions and economy, promoting political settlement and national reconciliation in conjunction with all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialised agencies in Somalia. Considering the threat posed by UNOSOM II, the militia of Mohamed Farah Aidid launched an attack on peacekeepers in June 1993, killing about 24 personnel from Pakistan (Mayall, 1996; Mark 1999; McCoy, 2000). Backed by the UNSC resolution 837, UNOSOM II responded to the attacks and killed hundreds of Aidid fighters in a raid in Mogadishu in October 1993.[39] However, nineteen (19) American Soldiers were also killed in that raid (Aubyn and Aning, 2013c; Friedman**,** 2013). The UN withdrew in March 1995, having suffered significant casualties (Mayall, 1996; Mark 1999; McCoy, 2000). From 1995 to 2003, several international efforts to restore peace and stability in Somalia through National reconciliation conferences in Ethiopia (January 1997), Egypt (December 1997), Djibouti (2000), Kenya (2002 & 2003) proved unsuccessful.

In 2004, an agreement reached by the major factions in a conference held in Nairobi, Kenya led to the inauguration of a Transitional Federal Parliament, election of a President and the granting of the vote of confidence to a prime minister and the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in early 2005. However, the legitimacy of the TFG was constantly threatened by the violent activities of its main rival, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu. In 2006, a United States-backed intervention by the Ethiopian military, helped drive out the ICU and this strengthened the rule of the TFG. Following this

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defeat, the ICU splintered into several different factions and some of the radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia.

5.3.2. The Establishment of the African Union Mission in Somalia

In 2006, a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia called IGASOM was approved by the AUPSC and the UNSC to support the TFG to restore peace and stability (AMISOM, 2014a).[40] The mission was, however, opposed by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) who were at the period fighting the TFG for the control of Mogadishu. The ICU saw the proposed IGASOM as a US-backed, western means to curb the growth of Islamist movements. Therefore, before IGASOM could be deployed, the security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated due to the violence activities of the ICU. In response, at its 69th meeting on 19 January 2007, the AUPSC authorised the deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia, for a period of six months. On 20 February 2007, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1744 and endorsed the deployment of AMISOM with a mandate to take 'all necessary measures' to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by protecting senior Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) officials and others engaged in the political reconciliation process.[41] The mandate of AMISOM also included: conducting an enforcement campaign against A*l-Shabaab* and other actors determined to destroy the TFG; re-establishment and training of an all-inclusive Somali security forces; and the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.[42] Although, AMISOM was initially deployed for six months, its mandate has been renewed with the endorsement of the UN Security Council. The current mandate of AMISOM given by the AUPSC and further endorsed by the UN Security Council in resolution 2182 (2014) expires on 30 November 2015.

Between 2007 and 2011, AMISOM, together with Ethiopian troops, engaged in a series of offensive operations across Mogadishu against the *Al-Shabaab* insurgents with limited success (Williams, 2013:1). Indeed, from 2007 to 2011, *Al-Shabaab* scored military victories, by seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia.

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Figure 5.3 illustrates the areas that were controlled by Al Shabaab as at June 2013. AMISOM faced serious challenges ranging from inadequate personnel and logistics to insufficient funding which severely restricted its ability to operate effectively (Williams, 2013:1; AMISOM, 2014a). For instance, out of the 8000 troops authorised to form AMISOM, there were only 1,600 Ugandan troops and 100 Burundian soldiers as at December 2007.[43]The number increased to 4,300 in April 2009, consisting of only troops from Uganda and Burundi. The fact was that most African states were not prepared to deploy their troops to Somali due to concerns about the safety of their personnel given the chaotic and violent situation at the time. The AU also had to depend on the United Kingdom, United States, the UN, the European Union, China and several bilateral partners for support, in terms of strategic airlift, training, equipment and sustenance, including troop allowances to sustain and maintain the mission (Gadin, 2013: 76-77). For instance, the mission had to depend on the equipment and materials from the defunct UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) for its operations.[44] Furthermore, the EU which is the largest financial contributor to AMISOM also had to provide an amount of €258 million and $347 million between 2007 to 2010 through the African Peace Facility (APF) for the overhead and operational costs of AMISOM civilian, police and military personnel (Gadin, 2013: 77: EU, 2010; Aning and Danso, 2010; Pirozzi, 2010).

In January 2009, the Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia, leaving behind the underequipped AMISOM as the only protection for the TFG. In the latter part of 2011, however, a military combat operation by AMISOM against *Al-Shabaab* which was later complimented by unilateral military interventions by Kenyan and Ethiopian forces succeeded in pushing out the Islamic group out of Mogadishu and key towns (AU, 2014). AMISOM took advantage of these developments, consolidated its presence in the recovered areas by developing a new strategic and military concepts of operations which increased its force strength to 17,731 personnel from less than 10, 000 personnel from the previous years (AU, 2014).[45] In August and September 2012, AMISOM helped facilitate the selection of a new Federal Government of Somalia to replace the TFG. The new Federal Government is currently led by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President.

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Figure. 5.3. Map of Government and Al Shabaab Control Areas (May 2014)



Source: BBC, 2014[46]

Since the establishment of the new Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM has subsequently, undertaken joint military operations with the Somali National Army (SNA) to recapture most of the areas still under the control of the *Al-Shabaab* as illustrated by figures 5.3 and 5.4. In two of the recent joint operations code-named *Operation Eagle* on 3 March 2014 and *Operation Indian Ocean* on 25 August 2014, AMISOM and the SNA succeeded in recovering more than eight districts including, Rab Dhuure, Wajid, Xuduur, Bulo Burto, Warshik, Maxaasand, Ceel Buur, Golweyn, Bulo Mareer, and Kurtunwareey (AU, 2014). On 6 October 2014, Al-Shabaab's "capital" and last stronghold, Barawe was also captured. Indeed, most of the areas that used to be controlled by Al-Shabaab as indicated in figure 5.3 and figure 5.4 have been recaptured by AMISOM and its allied forces. These defeats have forced the *Al-Shabaab* to relocate to the rural areas and the Middle Juba region. However, the group still control some towns inland from Kismayo and Barawe, such as the towns of Dinsoor, Baardheere, Bu'aale, Jam me, Jilib (see figure 5.3)

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and continues to carry out asymmetric campaigns focused on the conventional targeting of AMISOM personnel and SNA defensive positions (AU, 2014).

Figure. 5.4. Map of Al Shabaab Control Areas (June 2013)



Source: AllAfrica.com[47]

5.3.3. The UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA): Motivations and the Nature of Support

The AU established AMISOM with the expectation that it would transition to a UN mission. However, a report by the UN Secretary-General in 2007 indicated that the conditions to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation to replace AMISOM did not exist in Somalia.[48] Instead, in 2009, the Security Council took an unprecedented step through the adoption of UNSC resolutions 1863 (16 January 2009) and 1872 (26 May 2009) by

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authorising the provision of a logistics support package funded by UN assessed contributions. The Security Council further established the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to implement the support package. With the establishment of UNSOA, AMISOM saw a major improvement in its logistical and financial capabilities.

Three main reasons necessitated the establishment of UNSOA or the provision of the support package for AMISOM. The first was based on a formal request by the former AU Commission chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konare to the UN Secretary-General on 20 February 2008, to provide the AU with a logistical support package totalling $817 million to complete AMISOM's deployment (Gadin, 2012: 75).[49] The second reason was the inability of the UN Secretary-General to generate the required financial resources, personnel, and equipment from UN Member States for the deployment of a multinational stabilisation force in Somalia to take over from AMISOM in 2008. Thus, in 2008, the UNSC directed the Secretary-General to approach UN Member States to contribute financial, logistics and personnel to a possible UN mission. However, out of the 50 countries approached, the Secretary-General reported that only 14 had acknowledged his request and only two had offered support and funding (S/2009/210) (Gadin, 2012: 75). As an alternative option, the Secretary-General proposed to the UNSC the provision of a logistics support package to AMISOM, funded from the UN assessed peacekeeping budget comprising equipment and services but not including transfer of funds.

The last reason had to do with the fact that the conditions for a possible UN peacekeeping force to take over from AMISOM were practically absent or non-existent.[50] The UN's philosophy is that for a peacekeeping mission to be deployed there must be "peace to keep", which implies that the parties to a conflict must be willing to cease fighting and pursue their objectives through political and other non-violent means (Murithi 2009; UN 2000).[51] In Somalia, this was not present because the parties in the conflict continued to pursue their objectives through violent means. As a result, the UN Secretary-General, in several of his reports to the UNSC, noted that the conditions for a peacekeeping deployment were not present (S/2009/210). It was based on these factors (not exhaustive

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though) that UNSC adopted Resolution 1863 (2009) authorising the establishment of the UN Support Office for AMISOM to deliver the logistical support to AMISOM.

Consequently, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the United Nations and the African Union (AU) on 12 July 2009 for the provision of support to AMISOM. Under the terms of the agreement, UNSOA's support to AMISOM was to be delivered in three main areas namely, institutional capacity building and technical advice to the AU in the planning, deployment and management of AMISOM; provision and delivery of logistical support to AMISOM; and voluntary financial and in-kind support to the AU and TCCs to AMISOM. The nature of the support in each of the categories is briefly discussed below.

5.3.3.1. ***Institutional Capacity-Building and Technical Advice to the African Union***

Although UNSOA's support package began in 2009, the UN's institutional assistance to the AU dates back to 2007 when AMISOM was established. Based on UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007), ten planning officers from the DPKO were deployed by the UN Secretary-General to provide strategic, technical, and operational assistance to the Peace Support Operations Department (PSOD) of the AU Commission in the planning and management of AMISOM. The team was later reconfigured in 2009 to include 14 planners covering military and police planning; force generation; aviation; medical; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; security; public information; human resources; procurement; budget; contingent-owned equipment; information and communication technology; and other mission support areas (Gadin, 2012).[52] The team has since 2010 been integrated into UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as the AMISOM support component. In accordance with the various UN Security Council resolutions including, resolutions 1863 (2009), 1872 (2009) and 1910 (2010), they worked closely with the operations and planning unit of the PSOD of the AU Commission in the planning and management of AMISOM.

Since 2010, the UNOAU-AMISOM support component has assisted the PSOD in developing or updating AMISOM military and police components concepts of operations, rules of engagement, mission implementation plans, strategic directives, and other standard

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operating procedures (SOPs) (AU, 2014). Aside this, they provide daily technical advice and mentoring of AU personnel on: the planning, mounting, and management of AMISOM and in conducting training needs assessments and developing training policies for African troop/police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs).[53] The UNSOA team has also participated in a number of technical assessment missions of the AU and the inspection of TCCs/PCCs pre-deployment trainings, which resulted in the provision of additional troops, staff officers and equipment for AMISOM (AU, 2014). For example, from 8 to 14 October 2013, a joint AU/UNSOA technical team travelled to Chad, to assess an offer by the Government of Chad to supply AMISOM with combat and utility helicopters (AU, 2014). Additionally, as a means of building institutional capacity, UNSOA has also supported the training of more than 1,000 AMISOM personnel in planning, operations and logistics courses. This training support has also been extended to the Somali National Army (SNA). UNSOA is currently providing training in human rights and humanitarian law, in accordance with the Secretary-General's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy for the SNA (AMISOM, 2014a; AU, 2014).

Through the institutional support and capacity building, the staff of the AUC have significantly improved and increased their technical skills and knowledge in the area of mission planning and management, and the development of peacekeeping policies and guidelines. The presence of the UNOAU staff within the PSOD according to some PSOD officials has also helped to bridge the human resource gap within the AUC.[54]

5.3.3.2. *Provision and Delivery of Logistical Support to AMISOM*

The provision of logistics form a major part of the UNSOA support package to AMISOM as authorised by the UNSC Resolution 1863 (2009) and others like UNSC resolution 2010 (2011). UNSOA has its logistical support base at Mombasa, from where stocks are sent to AMISOM in Mogadishu, and an administrative base in Nairobi. Since 2009, UNSOA has provided logistical and mission support to AMISOM to raise its basic operational standards. The support provided has entailed the delivery of rations, fuel, general stores and medical supplies; engineering and construction of key facilities; health and sanitation; medical evacuation and treatment services and medical equipment for AMISOM medical facilities; communications and information technology; information support services;

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aviation services for evacuations and troop rotations; vehicles and other equipment (Gadin, 2012; Gelot, Gelot & de Coning, 2012; AU, 2014).

In a report submitted to the AU Peace and Security Council at its 462nd meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 16 October 2014 on the situation in Somalia, the Chairperson of the AU Commission pointed out a number of activities undertaken by UNSOA since 2013. Specifically, it was indicated in the report that UNSOA has among others, carried out 35 medical evacuation, transfer, redeployment and repatriation flights; constructed facilities at Sector hubs in Baidoa and Beletweyne; provided increased Communications and Information technology services (CITS) support; and supplied AMISOM with 36 different motor vehicles (AU, 2014). UNSOA has also provided the requisite support for the AMISOM/SNA joint "Operation Eagle" which resulted in the recapture of several districts under *Al-Shabaab* control. Practically, the delivery of the logistics support package through UNSOA has improved AMISOM's operational capability as well as the living and working conditions for AMISOM personnel (AU, 2011, 2014). Indeed, without the UNSOA logistics support, the advancement of AMISOM within the past two years would have been difficult to achieve. UNSOA has improved AMISOM's logistics, turning it into a much more effective operation (Williams, 2013: 244).[55]

5.3.3.3. *Financial Support to AMISOM*

UNSOA's support to AMISOM also include a combined financial structure of UN assessed contributions and voluntary funding for the mission. Funding for the provision of the logistics package for AMISOM all comes from the UN assessed contributions or peacekeeping budget. Between 2009 and 2012, $729.6 million was disbursed from the assessed budget to UNSOA to implement its mandate. However, it does not cater for other critical requirements of AMISOM such as reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment, medical support, civilian and police operational costs, including safety and security equipment, and travel and administration costs (Gadin, 2012; Gelot, Gelot & de Coning, 2012). These support areas are covered by voluntary contributions by UN member states through the AMISOM trust fund established by the UNSC Resolution 1863. The trust fund

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is administered by the UN. It accumulated an amount of $76.2 million between 2009 and 2012 (Freear and de Coning, 2013). Contributors to the trust fund have been Australia, Canada, Czech rep, Denmark, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Contributions have, however, been irregular and generally inadequate to cover especially, the contingent owned equipment. This has sometimes disrupted the supply and maintenance of vital military equipment. To overcome this difficulty, the costs of contingent equipment have now been shifted to the UN assessed contributions budget to provide a more adequate and predictable funding for AMISOM in order to sustain and expand its successful campaign against Al-Shabaab (Gelot, Gelot & de Coning, 2012).

Table 6.1: Trust Fund and UN Assessed Contributions to AMISOM ($ million).

Year	Trust Fund income*	Trust Fund expenditure	Assessed funding expenditure	Total annual expenditure
2009	28.7	5.5	71.9	77.4
2010	4	8.1	160.2	168.3
2011	13.2	20.8	210	230.8
2012	30.3	22.8	287.5	310.3
Total	76.2	57.2	729.6	786.8

Source: United Nations Support Office to AMISOM (2013, cited from Freear and de Coning, 2013)

5.3.4. Challenges of UNSOA's Support to AMISOM

Although UNSOA's support package has contributed significantly to AMISOM's operational success, yet some challenges exist. First, the UNSOA support package is essentially focused on the AMISOM's military component in spite of its multidimensional nature (Gadin, 2012; Gelot, Gelot & de Coning, 2012, AU, 2011). The civilian component which is one of the most critical elements of the mission is excluded from the logistical

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support package. As stated in the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Situation in Somalia in 2011, this approach negates the very essence of the multi-dimensional nature of AMISOM and affects the effectiveness of the mission in delivering support to the Somali people.[56] AMISOM needs more support for its civilian component to remain effective in implementing its mandate.

Second, the support of UNSOA is inadequate and also, lacks flexibility. The UN support package is currently designed as a standard Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, although AMISOM is engaged in a Chapter VII-type robust operation on the ground. For example, AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) are constantly executing a renewed offensive against Al Shabaab. However, the support package is not flexible enough to meet the robust nature of AMISOM's operations in Somalia. In particular, the support does not include the supply of lethal ammunitions which is essential in the fight against Al Shabaab. This disconnect between demand and supply is generating considerable difficulties for AMISOM operations. In that regard, the 2009 UN/AU MOU on the UNSOA support package needs to be reviewed to make it more effective in addressing AMISOM's operational needs.

Lastly, the relationship between UNSOA and AMISOM is also sometimes hindered by coordination problems. One of these coordination problems stems from the cooperation between the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), UNSOA and AMISOM. Thus, there have been instances when TCCs directly engage UNSOA without the necessary involvement of the AU PSOD or AMISOM mission headquarters (Gadin, 2012; Gelot, Gelot & de Coning, 2012). There have also been instances, where the head of AMISOM who is the official AU coordinators of the support package according to the UN/AU MOU is left out of the communication and information loop by UNSOA.

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5.4. CASE STUDY OF UN/AU PARTNERSHIP IN DARFUR, SUDAN

5.4.1. Background to the Establishment of the UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur

In 2003, two armed groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rose against the Government of Sudan and a pro-government militia, the Janjaweed in Darfur (Appiah-Mensah, 2005: 7-8; Mamdani, 2010; Anyidoho, 2012: 43-44; Agwai, 2012). The conflict resulted in widespread atrocities against civilians and the displacement of thousands of people from their homes. The principal cause of the conflict was the neglect and marginalisation of the people of Darfur in national politics and the disparity in terms of socio-economic development between the the "center" of the country around the Nile and the "peripheral" areas such as Darfur (Harir, 1994; De Waal, 2007; Flint, J. & de Waal, 2008; Prunier, 2008; Sikainga, 2009; Mamdani, 2010).

The humanitarian crisis that resulted from the displacement, massacres and famine attracted global attention and varied responses. Under the auspices of the AU with the Government of Chad acting as mediator, the Government of Sudan (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signed a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) in N'djamena on 8 April 2004 (Appiah-Mensah, 2005: 7-8; Anyidoho, 2012:43-44). Following the signing of the HCFA, a ceasefire commission was established by the AU on 9 June 2004, in accordance with Article 3 of the HCFA, in El Fashir, the state capital of North Darfur to monitor, verify, investigate and report on violations, of the agreement by the parties.[57]

In order to operationalise the ceasefire commission, the AU initially deployed the African Union mission in Sudan I (AMIS I), initially made up of 60 military observers (MILOBs) and later, a small protection force of 310. AMIS I was tasked to monitor and observe compliance with HCFA; undertake confidence building; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assist internally displaced persons (IDP) in their camps and eventually facilitate their repatriation; and promote overall security in Darfur (Murithi, 2009:9; AMISOM, 2014b). The mission was deployed with the support of the UN; European Union (EU); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and bilateral partners

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such as the Government of Japan and South Korea. Whilst the presence of AMIS I deterred violence against civilians, it failed to make any significant impact on the worsening security situation due to its limited mandate and its insufficient capacity and resources (Appiah-Mensah, 2005; Prunier, 2005).

Therefore, as the humanitarian and security situation deteriorated, the AUPSC authorised the deployment of AMIS II, comprising 3,320 personnel, made up of 2,341 military personnel, 450 MILOBS, 815 civilian police and 26 international civilian staff (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:9). AMIS II was mandated to monitor and observe compliance with the ceasefire; provide security for humanitarian relief efforts; and facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The mission was subsequently revised and upgraded several times in terms of numbers and equipment. However, it could not cope with the complexities of the situation (Anyidoho, 2012:44). Difficulties with funding, weak mandate, appropriate accommodation in the field, logistics, force generation from troop/police contributing countries and the lack of institutional expertise for managing complex peace support operations by the AU limited the capacity of the mission to operate efficiently and effectively (Appiah-Mensah, 2005; Prunier, 2005; Murithi, 2009:9; Anyidoho, 2012:43-44).

On 5 May 2006, the AU's peacemaking efforts led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), in Abuja, Nigeria, between the Government of Sudan and the SLA led by one of its leaders, Minni Minnawi. The signing of DPA was as a result of the collapse of the HCPA. However, some factions of the SLA[58] refused to sign the agreement together with the JEM. Consequently, the various armed groups begun to fight each other, causing the situation to deteriorate into a military, political and diplomatic problem (Murithi, 2009). At that point, it became evident that AMIS II was incapable of dealing with the conflict. Hence, the AU in a communique issued on 12 January 2006 in Addis Ababa, expressed support for a transition of AMIS to UN operations in Darfur. It is important to note that this communique was issued following the outcome of a visit undertaken by a joint AU/UN technical assessment mission in Darfur from 10 to 20 December 2005.

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Subsequently, series of high level discussions between the AU and the UN and the recommendations of the joint technical assessment mission in Darfur from 9 to 21 June 2006 resulted in the passing of UNSC Resolution 1706 on August 2006. The UNSC Resolution 1706 requested the Secretary-General "to take the necessary steps to strengthen AMIS through the use of existing and additional United Nations resources with a view of transferring it to a United Nations operation in Darfur."[59] In that regard, the UNSC resolution 1706 created the UN Mission in Sudan with an authorised strength of 23, 000 to take over when AMIS mandate expires on 31 December 2006. However, the Sudanese government rejected the attempt to convert the AU mission into a UN mission and requested AMIS to terminate its operations by 30 September 2006. One main reason accounted for the Sudanese government reluctance towards allowing a UN mission on its soil, and that was to prevent Western interference in its internal affairs.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur worsened and AMIS struggled to implement its mandate, especially, the protection of civilians. In response to the deteriorating security situation in Darfur, a meeting involving the UN Secretary-General, the five permanent members of the UNSC, the AU Commission president, Alpha Oumar Konare, the Arab League, the EU and several African nations was held on 18 November 2006 (UNSC, 2011a:17-20). At the meeting, a hybrid operation for Darfur was agreed in principle by the UN and the AU. A decision was also taken to establish a three step approach to peacekeeping in Darfur. The first step was a light support package to AMIS, followed by a heavy support package, and finally, a UN/AU hybrid operation in Darfur (UNSC, 2011a:19). Whilst the light support package was implemented in January 2007, the heavy support package was never deployed due to the resistance of the government of Sudan. Subsequently, the AUPSC authorised the hybrid operation on 22 June 2007, after it was partially accepted by the Government of Sudan.[60] However, the Government of Sudan continued to resist the deployment of the hybrid mission and requested that the mission should be "predominantly African in character".

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Figure 5.5. UNAMID Deployment as at July 2014



Source: UNAMID, 2014.

On 31 July 2007, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1769, authorising the establishment of the UN/AU hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) with the "African character" provision. UNAMID formally took over peacekeeping responsibilities from AMIS II on 1 January 2008. Currently, UNAMID has the protection of civilians as its core mandate, but it is also tasked with facilitating humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation

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of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.[61] Currently, as illustrated in figure 5.4, the mission is deployed in five sectors in Darfur thus, Sectors north (El-Fasher), south (Nyala), east (El Daein), central (Zalingei) and west (El-Geneina) with different TCCs/PCCs. UNAMID's mandate expires on 30 June 2015.

5.4. 2. The Nature and Characteristics of the UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur

UNAMID is currently the only mission authorised by two separate organisations in Africa. Unlike the peacekeeping operations like AMISOM, MINUSMA and others elsewhere in Africa, UNAMID operate within a single or joint chain of command. Both organisations provide the strategic and political direction for mission and appoint the senior leadership of the mission. Therefore, instead of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) or a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union, a Joint Special Representative (JSR) who also doubles as the joint AU/UN Chief Mediator for Darfur is appointed as the head of mission. The head of mission serves in both capacities because the work of UNAMID is also complemented by the joint efforts on the political front. The head of mission reports to both organisations.

Since 2007, both organisations have played key roles in the appointment of the various JSR and UN/AU Joint Chief Mediators from Djibril Yipènè Bassolé of Burkina Faso, in 2008 to Mohamed Ibn Chambas of Ghana in 2013.[62] Apart from the head of mission and their two deputies, all key positions as well as the senior level appointments such as force commanders, police commissioners and their deputies are also jointly appointed by the UN and the AU. Practically, this has often resulted in an extensive and often very lengthy consultation process between the two organisations due to the different bureaucratic procedures and politics. Furthermore, all decisions concerning the renewal and implementation of UNAMID's mandate are also undertaken jointly by both organisations. Nevertheless, there have been some few exceptions when both organisations took decisions without consulting each other. For instance, on 8 April 2011, the AUPSC released a

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communiqué in which it proposed 1 May 2011 as the start date for a new "Darfur Political Process" and requested UNAMID to make all necessary preparations for that process "as a matter of priority (UNSC, 2011a)"[63] without consulting the UN.

One important characteristics of the mission is that, UNAMID personnel (military, police and civilians) mostly come from African and Arabic speaking countries. This is mainly in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1769, which established the mission. It was one of the strong demands made by the Government of Sudan during the drafting of UNSC resolution 1769, and prior to giving its consent to the deployment of UNAMID. The fear of potential Western interference in its internal affairs and overcoming language barriers (because Sudan is an Arabic country), partly informed this decision by the Government. However, this has had both positive and negative consequences on the mission.

In positive terms, personnel from Africa and especially, the Arabic speaking countries have helped bridge the language barrier and increased the trust as well as cooperation between the mission and the Government of Sudan.[64] The fact is that the Sudanese government trust personnel of Arabic and African descent than other nationals due to similarities in terms of language, common history and cultures as well as political affiliations. The challenge, however, is that this has often slowed down the deployment and build-up of the mission[65] because most African and Arabic speaking TCCs/PCCs generally, lack the technical expertise,[66] skills and equipment needed by the mission (Anyidoho, 2012; Agwai, 2012; Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012). Moreover, many African and Arabic countries whose militaries and police have the requisite skills needed by UNAMID have also sometimes been reluctant to make them available for extended periods. As a result, sustaining a sizeable force and attracting people with the requisite skills and technical expertise from African and Arabic speaking countries has remained a challenge for the mission.

Another distinguishing feature of UNAMID is that, although it is managed by two organisations, it operates under UN rules, regulations, command and control procedures. This was agreed by the UN and the AU before the deployment of the mission. For the UN, once the mission is financed through its peacekeeping budget or assessed contributions,

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everything had to be done according to its established rules and procedures. However, in practice the interpretation of this agreement has not been clear to both parties. As Anyidoho (2012) explains, there are often long debates and series of meetings on issues such as selection of senior leadership personnel before an agreed position is taken due to disagreements. In addition, at the mission headquarters in El Fashir, Darfur, the use of UN procedures has also made it easy for the AU headquarters to be left out of the information loop, as details of personnel deployments are always organised from the UN headquarters in New York (Agwai, 2012; Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012). Thus, although the hybrid mission is to increase a mutual sense of ownership, on the ground, the involvement of the AU in UNAMID is minimal. Most respondents in UNAMID noted that the involvement of the AU is usually at the political level.

Regarding the method of financing, UNAMID is funded through UN assessed contributions. This was approved by the UN General Assembly Resolution 62/232 of 22 December 2007. Indeed, this was the first time the UN created a peacekeeping operation for which it assumed full responsibility financially, but did not retain exclusive control (UN, 2011a). UNAMID was authorised in 2007 with a budget of US$ 1.48 billion, representing the UN's biggest ever approved estimate for a single peace operation at the time. The approved budget for the period July to December 2014 was US$ 639,654,200.[67] The mission also benefits from the financial assistance from bilateral partners and donors such as the European Union. As the saying goes that "*he who pays the piper calls the tune*", the UN mostly dictates the strategic direction and controls the operations of the mission, even though they sometimes consult the AU. Put differently, the relationship between both organisations in Darfur remains practically asymmetrical with the UN always taking the decisions and responsibilities.

In terms of its mandate implementation, although UNAMID has a Chapter VII mandate to deliver its core task to protect civilians, it has not been able to successfully prosecute that task, due to constant obstructions from the Government of Sudan and the various armed groups in Darfur.[68] The security situation also continues to deteriorate throughout Darfur with thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and civilian deaths due to inter-tribal

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violence over the control of gold mining areas, land and local political issues. On the political front, successive mediation efforts in N'djamena (2004), Abuja (2006), Tripoli (2007), and Doha (2009–present), among other initiatives, have not been able to resolve the issues between the government and the armed opposition groups in Darfur.[69] In reality, after seven years of its deployment, finding a win-win solution to the Darfur conflict has remained a distant prospect, although UNAMID's presence has helped deterred several atrocities against civilians, especially, those in the IDP camps.

5.4.3. Challenges of the UN/AU Partnership in Darfur

The challenges of UNAMID relates to the context or environment in which it operates as well as its hybrid nature. In political terms, Sudan is perhaps the first country with a strong government to accept a robust peacekeeping mission on its territory. The Government has obstructed UNAMID's operations through an array of bureaucratic bottlenecks such as blocking vital equipments at customs, delaying the issuance of visas, refusing entry to entire national contingents using the "African character" clause as an excuse and restricting the mission's access to certain regions in Darfur (Agwai, 2012; Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012; Anyidoho, 2012). Currently, although the mission has a Chapter VII mandate, unless the government agrees on an issue, it can never be implemented.[70] The conflict dynamics in Darfur also continues to evolve, shifting between tribal, political, and resource-based fighting. The actors are similarly increasing in numbers and motives, making the conflict very complicated to resolve. UNAMID is also constantly being accused by the rebel groups of siding with the government which the mission has consistently denied.

On the hybrid nature of the mission, the first challenge has to do with the power imbalance between the two bodies. On the ground, the UN virtually controls and manages the operations. The interviews with UNAMID personnel indicated that the DPKO in New York is more often in touch with the mission through regular communications, official visits and electronically, through regular emails & teleconferences than the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. Some respondents even indicated that they can barely count the number of times the

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AU had visited the mission. Another respondent, for instance, also noted that they hardly receive responses or feedback from the AU when they send them mission reports. But in an interview with officials of the AU in Addis Ababa and some former UNAMID officials, it was noted that the AU is mostly involved at the strategic political level when it comes to the appointments of senior officials of the mission, mandate renewal and mediation efforts.[71] In praxis, the consequence of this power imbalance is that the AU is frequently sidelined in the decision-making process at the mission headquarters. Most importantly, it does not also promote African ownership of the political processes in Darfur.

The indictment of President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 14 July 2008 and the different positions taken by the AU and the UN on the matter also strained the relations between both organisations to the detriment of UNAMID (Bah and Lortan, 2011:6; Anyidoho, 2012; Agwai, 2012; Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012). After the indictment of President Omar Al-Bashir following a request by the UNSC to the Court to assess whether war crimes had been committed in Darfur, the AU made repeated formal requests for the deferral of his prosecution. However, the UNSC failed to consider the requests. This strained UNAMID's working relationship with the Government of Sudan and jeopardised [72] the safety and security of personnel as they became targets of attacks by pro-government militias.

Another challenge is the unreasonable delays in the appointments of senior level officials of the mission due to different bureaucratic processes and politics. Additionally, the lack of clear reporting lines and decision-making processes on emergency situations was also a problem at the initial stages of the mission. The mission leadership had to consult the AU in Addis Ababa and the UN in New York on all issues before they could take decisions.[73]The difficulty with this arrangement was that responses to emergency situations were often delayed. These delays most often affected the tactical level decisions at the mission headquarters which translated into civilian deaths and casualties on the ground (Anyidoho, 2012; Agwai, 2012).

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5.5. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the research findings were illustrated through three empirical case studies of UN/AU partnership in Mali, Sudan and Somalia. Collectively, these case studies can be grouped under three different partnership models. These are: sequential operations, where a UN mission succeeds an AU/ECOWAS peacekeeping operation (AFISMA to MINUSMA); integrated operation, where the UN and the AU operate with a single chain of command (UNAMID); and a coordinated operation, where the UN and the AU operations are coordinated but operate under different chains of command (UNSOA & AMISOM). Whilst these case studies demonstrate the political commitment of both organisations to prevent and manage violent conflicts in Africa, the motivations for the partnership in each context was not based on any grand strategic designs, but it was rather driven by operational realities and field necessities. In Somalia, UNSOA was established because the conditions for a possible UN peacekeeping force to take over from AMISOM were non-existent. In the case of Sudan, the rejection of UNSC resolution 1706 which created the UN Mission in Sudan to take over from AMIS by the Government of Sudan resulted in the hybrid operation. However, the common motivation that was akin to all three case studies was the inadequate capacity of the AU to fund and sustain those peacekeeping operations for the longer term. AFISMA was, for example, transferred to MINUSMA due to the lack of resources on the part of the AU and ECOWAS.

The nature and characteristics of the partnerships as well as the actors involved also differs from one case study to the other. In Sudan (Darfur), the UN and the AU operate jointly together. However, the UN operates the mission with its own resources, operating standards and procedures. The AU is more involved at the political level and the appointment of senior mission leadership. Apart from both organisations, other actors involved in the resolution of the conflict include, among others, the Government of Chad; the Government of Sudan (GoS); the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M); the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); the European Union and bilateral partners such as the Government of Japan, Jordan, Yemen, and China. In Mali, the UN, AU and ECOWAS were all involved in the planning and management of AFISMA before its transition to MINUSMA. However, until the transition to MINUSMA, the AU maintained and provided the strategic direction

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of the mission. Other external actors in the mission included France, European Union, USA just to mention a few. In Somalia, both organisations operate in a separate chain of command but in a coordinated fashion. The EU, IGAD, Turkey, China, USA, Britain and other partners are also actively involved in the political processes of finding an amicable solution to the crises.

The experiences of the three peacekeeping operations show that there is no generic model for cooperation, and that each situation is context specific. Each of the partnership model (whether hybrid/integrated, coordinated, or sequential) depends on the operational requirements of the peacekeeping context. All the models also have their own advantages and disadvantages. For instance, apart from AMISOM, the partnership in Mali and Sudan were fraught with the challenges of appointment of senior leadership positions and delays in decision-making due to the different bureaucratic procedures and politics. On the positive side, both organisations were/are able to combine their resources and utilize their comparative advantages in the resolution of the conflicts. Mali is a typical case where the intervention of the AU, ECOWAS and UN led to the restoration of constitutional order after almost 18 months of political turmoil. In this respect, it is important for the AU and the UN to document the lessons learnt and experiences of each model to enhance future joint operations and cooperation.

The outcomes and benefits of the partnerships have also differed in each context. In Mali, the relative peace in the country today is partly due to the outcome of the diplomatic and peacekeeping interventions by of the UN, AU, and ECOWAS. The political, diplomatic, humanitarian and military interventions of these three organisations led by ECOWAS and the AU are arguably what culminated in the restoration of constitutional order, social normalcy and Mali's territorial integrity. Similarly, in Somalia, the institutional and capacity-building support provided by UNSOA, has enhanced the technical expertise and knowledge of AUC staff in the areas of mission planning, management, and the development of peacekeeping policies and guidelines. The delivery of the logistics support package by UNSOA has also improved AMISOM's operational capabilities as well as the living and working conditions for AMISOM personnel. In Sudan, although finding a win-

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win solution to the Darfur conflict has remained a distant prospect after seven years of its deployment, the presence of UNAMID has deterred several atrocities against civilians, especially, those in the IDP camps and stabilised the political situation in Darfur.

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ENDNOTES

[1]For more information see Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Mali, /2014/267/, 14 April 2014. New York: United Nations.
[2]ECOWAS sanctions included: a travel ban on members of the CNRDRE; closing all borders of member states with Mali, except for humanitarian purposes; and freezing the assets of the leaders of CNRDRE and their associates and the accounts of Mali held at the Central Bank of West African States.
[3]ECOWAS Press Release N°: 128/2012 ECOWAS Leaders Agree New Measures To Restore Peace To Guinea Bissau, Mali, 4 May 2012
[4]See the Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council 358th meeting, 7 March 2013, PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCLVIII).
[5]Interview with an ECOWAS Political officer, Bamako, Mali, November 2013
[6]Interview with a commissionaire of the Malian Police Force, Bamako, Mali, May 2014.
[7]Interview with an ECOWAS Military Officer, Bamako, Mali, November 2013.
[8]See the PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLVIII) adopted at its 358th meeting held on 7 March 2013.
[9]See United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100
[10]The PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI) adopted at its 371st meeting held on 25 April 2013.
[11]See United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100
[12]Interview with General Hassan Lai, Head of ECOWAS Standby Force, Vienna, Austria, 11 October 2013; Interview with Ms. Yvonne Kasumba, AU Civilian Planning and Liaison Officer, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.3 October, 2013.
[13]Interview with an ECOWAS Officer, Bamako, Mali, November 2013.
[14]Interview with Charles Nyuykonge, AU Human Right Officer, Bamako, Mali, November 2013.
[15]See the PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLVIII) adopted at its 358th meeting held on 7 March 2013; see also the PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI) adopted at its 371st meeting held on 25 April 2013.
[16]Interview with Inspector Pierre Dembele, Malian Police force, Bamako, Mali, 14 May 2014.
[17]Interview with ECOWAS official, Bamako, Mali, 12 November 2013.
[18]Interview with Inspector Pierre Dembele, Malian Police force, Bamako, Mali, 14 May 2014; interview with commissionnaire Bourama Dao, Bamako, Mali, 14 May 2014.
[19] Interview with ECOWAS official, Bamako, Mali, 12 November 2013.
[20] Interview with a MINUSMA Police Officer, Bamako, Mali, November 2013.
[21] See the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, UNSC, S/2014/229
[22]Interview with an ECOWAS Senior Political Officer, Bamako, Mali, November 2013.
[23]Speech delivered by H.E. Kadre Desire Ouedraogo, President of the ECOWAS Commission at the ECOWAS After-Action Review meeting of intervention in Mali at Akosombo, Ghana in 4 February 2014.
[24]Interview with an ECOWAS Senior Political Officer, Bamako, Mali, November 2013; interview with Gen. Hassan Lai, Head, ECOWAS Standby Force, Vienna, Austria, 11 October 2013; interview with Mr. Simon Badza, Political Officer, AU peace and Security Secretariat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.
[25]Interview with both AU and ECOWAS Officials in Bamako, Mali and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September and November 2013.
[26]Interview with AU Political Officer, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.
[27]Interview with an ECOWAS Military Officer, November 2013
[28]Interview with both AU and ECOWAS Officials in Bamako, Mali and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September and November 2013.
[29]Interview with both AU and ECOWAS Officials in Bamako, Mali and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September and November 2013.
[30]Interview with AU Political Officer, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October 2013.
[31]PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI)
[32]PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI)
[33]PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXXI)
[34]Interview with AU Political Officer, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.
[35]Interview with an official from the UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013.
[36]See UN Security Council Resolution 2100

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[37]African Union, AU doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLVIII), 7 March 2013, para. 13iv.
[38]United Nations, "Somalia-UNISOM 11 Background" http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2backgr2.html, accessed30 December 2014.
[39]In August 1996, Aidid was himself was killed in Mogadishu.
[40]See UNSC Resolution 1725 (2006) (S/RES/1725). This resolution authorised Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM).
[41] See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744
[42] Ibid
[43]See Paul Williams, "AMISOM's Five Challenges" http://csis.org/story/amisom%E2%80%99s-five-challenges, accessed 25 November 2014.
[44] Ibid
[45]See UN Security Council Resolution 2036. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel as at November 2014 is 22,126
[46]BBC, (2014). Who are Somalia's Al-Shabab?.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689. Accessed 10 January 2015.
[47]See http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/05/somalia-war-map-al-shabaab-2013.html, accessed 10 January 2014.
[48]UNSC, 2007. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 9 of Security Council resolution 1744 (2007), S/2007/204, 20 April 2007.
[49]James Gadin. 2012. Experiences of UN Support Models for AU Peace-Support Operations: The Case of the AU Mission in Somalia
[50]See the UNSC adopted Resolution 1863, 16 January 2009.
[51]United Nation. (2000). *the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 2000.* New York: UN
[52]For more information see UN Security Council Resolutions 1863 (2009), 1872 (2009) and 1910 (2010).
[53]Interview with Col Azeez Nurudeen Kolawole, Head Operational Planning and Advisory Section, UNOAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3 October, 2013.; interview with Gen. Jaotody Jean De Martha Head, Plans and Operations/AMISOM Unit AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 26 September 2013.
[54]Interview with Lt. Colonel Joseph Ahphour Operations, Officer, Plans and Operations/AMISOM, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1 October 2013.
[55]Williams, P. D. (2013). Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges. *Journal of International Peacekeeping 17 (2013) 222–247*
[56]See Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia (AU doc. PSC/ PR/2(CCXCIII), 13 September 2011), para. 49.
[57] See the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, N'djamena, Chad, 8 April 2004.
[58]The key armed factions include the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) – Abdul Wahid faction, SLA – Minni Minnawi faction, SLA – Free Wing faction, SLA-Unity faction.
[59] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1706(2006), S/RES/1706(2006), 31 August 2006, paragraph 11.
[60]PSC/PR/Comm (LXXIX) (22 June 2007) authorised UNAMID.
[61]See UNSC Resolution 2173 (2014) S/RES/2173 (2014) 27 August 2014
[62]Following its establishment in 2007, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping appointed Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, as the new joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur on 30 June 2008. He was succeeded by Ibrahim Gambari who became the interim JSR and the Joint Chief Mediator in June 2011. On 1 August 2012, UNAMID Deputy JSR (Political), Aichatou Mindaoudou, succeeded Mr. Gambari as Joint Chief Mediator. On 20 December 2013, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, appointed Mr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas of Ghana as UNAMID's JSR and UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator.
[63]See PSC/PR/Comm (CCLXXI)
[64]Interview with civilian and police personnel in UNAMID, November 2014, El Fashir, Darfur, Sudan
[65]By end of July 2008, a year after the adoption of resolution 1769 authorising UNAMID, out of the authorised strength of 19,555 military, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (totalling 6,432 police), only

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7,967 troops, 158 observers and 1,870 police were deployed. There was also one formed police unit from Bangladesh instead of 17 (Anyidoho, 2012; Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012)

[66]For instance, most militaries do not possess specialised units with sufficient equipment or expertise to provide such services as engineering, communications, medical or movement control.

[67]See "UNAMID: Facts and Figures" http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml, accessed 4 December 2014.

[68]Interview with UNAMID personnel in Darfur, November 2014.

[69]See UNSC Resolution 2173 (2014) S/RES/2173 (2014) 27 August 2014; See also "Darfur Peace Process & Chronology"http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/darfur-peace-process-chronology.html, accessed 4 December 2014.

[70]Interview with UNAMID personnel in Darfur, November 2014.

[71]Interview with AU Officials in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2013; interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), former Deputy SRSG of UNAMID, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013; Interview with Mr. James Opong Bonuah Former Police Commissioner, UNAMID Accra Ghana, 30 July 2013.

[72]The issue was whether UNAMID should do any business with the indicted president.

[73]Interview with Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd), Former Deputy Force Commander, UNAMIR, Rwanda and Former Deputy SRSG, UNAMID, Darfur Sudan, Accra, Ghana, 25 July 2013.

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CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the summary of research findings in relation to the objectives of the study, the conclusion, and provides recommendations on how to improve the partnership between the UN and the AU to better respond to Africa's peace and security challenges.

6.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The aim and objectives of the study was to examine the motivations, normative frameworks, practice, outcomes and the challenges of the UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations. Three case studies of UN/AU partnership in Sudan, Mali and Somalia were used to illustrate how the partnership works in practice.

6.2.1. Motivations of the UN/AU Partnership in Peacekeeping Operations

With respect to the motivations underpinning the UN/AU partnership, six reasons were identified. These were further categorised into materialist motives (which represent a situation where the two organisations cooperated on the basis of the materialist gains they expect to obtain) and ideational motives (a situation where both organisations cooperated because they consider it the right, good, or enlightening thing to do). Both the material and ideational motives were seen as having a mutual synergetic effect, therefore, they are not mutually exclusive categories. For the materialist motives, issues of resource dependency and organisational learning were identified. On the issue of resource dependency, the study identified the lack of expertise, logistics, financial resources and managerial capacity of the AU for carrying out long-term peacekeeping operations as one of the important reasons inspiring its relationship with the UN (de Coning, 2006:6-7; Derblom, Frisell & Schmidt,

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2008; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010; Mancini, 2011; Gowan and Sherman, 2012). This was corroborated by the exchange theory which maintains that organisations with insufficient resources will depend on resources provided by other organisations to achieve their goals (Ranaei, Zareei, Alikhani, 2010:24). Organisational learning, which is principally the transfer of tacit knowledge, skills, experiences, and working methods from the UN to the AU and vice versa, was also identified as a factor driving the partnership.

Under the ideational motives, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the AU Constitutive Act and Peace and Security Council protocol; issues of legitimacy, responsibility or burden-sharing; and the changing security environments were identified. It was established that the provisions of Chapter VIII and the Article 17 of the AUPSC protocol naturally establishe some form of partnership between the two bodies. Theoretically, this was explained by the legal-political mandates strand of exchange theory which expressly states that cooperation between organisations can occur when their mandates require them to work together. It was this mutual recognition of joint responsibility based on their respective mandates that was noted as inspiring UN/AU partnership. In that sense, both organisations could be seen as natural partners united by the core values laid down in their constitutive charters.

The issue of burden or responsibility sharing was another motive that came out strongly in the findings. It was indicated that peacekeeping possesses a public good because the peace and stability achieved through peacekeeping operations in Africa give rise to a non-excludable and non-rival benefits to both the UN and the AU. In this regard, neither the UN nor the AU is expected to free ride because they both gain from the absence of conflict on the African continent. Hence, any peacekeeping intervention by both organisations implies the distribution of burdens or responsibility in maintaining peace, stability and security in Africa. UNAMID is an example, where both organisations shared and continue to share the cost of maintaining and sustaining the mission.

The legitimacy crisis of the UN in certain conflict situations in Africa was another factor motivating the partnership. First, it was noted that the legitimacy of the UN has been attacked for doing too little, or acting too late in certain crisis situations such as Somalia

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and Rwanda. Second, it was indicated that the UN is sometimes biased towards non-states actors and not an 'honest broker' in dealing with conflicts because it is made up of a membership of governments. Third, it was indicated that in some civil war context like Darfur in Sudan, the host nations have not welcomed a UN presence due to the fear of external interference in their internal affairs. Against this backdrop, the UN's partnership with the AU is seen as adding to the overall legitimacy of its operations on the continent because the latter is an important source of political authority in Africa. On the other hand, the AU's partnership with the UN is also seen as an attempt to secure international legitimacy for its own operations, especially, those with Chapter VII mandates. Based on this, it was concluded that both organisations were partnering to secure international legitimacy for their actions and to fulfill their obligations.

On the issue of the changing security environments, it was established that modern conflicts have become complex with multiple actors including governments, sub-state and non-state actors. The root causes of these conflicts are also multifaceted. The crisis in Mali and the Sahel region of West Africa, Somalia, Central African Republic and the South Sudan are examples. The intersection of organised crimes like drug trafficking, piracy, and in some instances, terrorism, has further complicated these conflicts. In that regard, tackling these modern conflicts would require multinational, multidimensional and regional responses involving all stakeholders such as the UN and the AU because the magnitude of the problems surpasses any solution by one single entity.

6.2.2. The Normative Frameworks Guiding the Partnership

The normative basis of the partnership is set out in the provisions of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the framework for the Ten-year Capacity Building Programme (TYCBP) for the AU, the AU Constitutive Act and the AUPSC Protocol (UN, 1945, 2010, 2011b; AU, 2000, 2004). These frameworks embody the general principles, values, expectations and prescriptive guidelines for the partnership. The most important normative framework mentioned was the provisions of the UN Charter. Under the Charter, the Chapter VIII which comprises Articles 52-54 and Article 33 of Chapter VI provide the constitutional basis and the framework for UN's cooperation with the AU. However, it was established

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that the roles and responsibilities that each organisation had to play in the partnership remained unclear. The Charter did not also establish the structures, rules and obligations, the parameters, as well as, the guidelines on how the UN and the AU or regional organisations should work together. As a result, both organisations lack shared objectives and purpose of the partnership. This has created tensions in their strategic and operational relationships.

Apart from the UN Charter, the framework for the Ten-year Capacity Building Programme (TYCBP) for the AU was another framework regulating the partnership. The TYCBP is a holistic framework by the UN system to support the capacity development efforts of the AU and its RECs (UN, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; AU, 2012). Through the programme, the UN is supporting the AU's capacity-building efforts in the areas of conflict prevention and mediation, elections, rule of law and peacekeeping operations. For peacekeeping operations specifically, the UN is providing technical support and expertise in the planning, development and management of AU operations like AMISOM. Since its inception, the TYCBP has arguably strengthened the UN/AU strategic partnership and improved interaction between the secretariats of both organisations at different levels on long-term strategic and ongoing peace and security issues. However, the findings showed that the implementation of the programme has been hindered by the lack of consensus on what constitutes "capacity-building" within the context of the framework; lack of financial resources; the multiplicity of actors on both sides; the absence of a well-defined programme of work and the inadequate involvement of African RECs (UN, 2010, 2011a, 2011c). In efforts to overcome some of these challenges, the UNOAU was established in 2010 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The UNOAU coordinates and manages the line of communication between the UN in New York and the AU in Addis Ababa.

The Constitutive Act and the AUPSC are the other instruments that regulate the AU's partnership with the UN. They form the principal basis of the AU's relationship with the UN. It was established that the connection of the Constitutive Act to the UN is weak. Thus, the sole substantive reference to the UN in the Constitutive Act is in Article 3(e), which implores the AU to encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations. Given the primacy of the UNSC in the authorization of peace

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enforcement actions by regional organisations, it would have been appropriate if an operative reference was made in the Constitutive Act for the prior approval by the Security Council before any AU intervention. However, this was not done, implying that AU enforcement actions can occur without UNSC authorization. Similarly, in the AUPSC protocol, it is only the Article 17(1-3) which mandates the AUPSC to cooperate and work closely with the UNSC to maintain peace and security in Africa. Just like the UN Charter, the wording of the texts is unclear because it does not explain how the AU should work with the UN and the modalities such cooperation should entail.

6.2.3. The UN/AU Partnership in Practice

In practice, the UN/AU partnership has occurred at three levels: strategic, institutional and operational. At the strategic level, there have been eight annual joint consultations between members of the UNSC and the AUPSC since 2007, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York. Discussions in these meetings have centered on how best to improve the coordination and effectiveness of AU/UN peace efforts in Africa; modalities for improving the resource base and capacity of the AU; and the possibility of financing peacekeeping operation undertaken by the AU. However, both organisations have failed to discuss issues on how to systematically integrate their different organisational cultures, agendas and approaches as well as issue of Chapter VIII and how to operationalise it, which are important issues to institutionalise their relationship.

The institutional level cooperation involves the UN Secretariat in New York and the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa. The relationship between the two secretariats was streamlined in July 2010 with the establishment of the UN Office to the African Union and other consultative mechanisms such as the UN/AU Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security and desk-to-desk meetings (UN, 2008a, 2008c, AU, 2012, 2013). There are also interactions between the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary-General on African peace and security issues. Furthermore, the AU liaison offices and field missions in conflict and post-conflict zones also interact daily with UN personnel in those settings. The establishment of these consultative mechanisms has strengthened the flow of information, enhanced consultations at the working level and

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facilitated coordination between the UN Secretariat and AU Commission. The JTF, in particular, has proven to be an effective mechanism for both secretariats to consult and broaden their understanding on an array of peace and security issues on the continent. Nevertheless, the existence of these mechanisms has not automatically generated consensus on how the two organisations should act in a particular situation.

At the operational level, the two institutions have also entered into various cooperative arrangements since 2002. This started with the transition of the AU's first ever peacekeeping operation in Burundi (AMIB) to the UN operations in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004. After Burundi, the two organisations have also cooperated in Sudan (UNAMID), Somalia (UNSOA), CAR (MISCA to MINUSCA) and Mali (AFISMA to MINUSMA). It was found that the operational cooperation between the UN and the AU was driven by operational realities and field necessities, rather than any grand strategic designs. In Sudan, for example, UNAMID was arguably the only option available after the Government of Sudan's refused any United Nations intervention. Likewise, in Somalia, the UN technical and financial support package to AMISOM was authorized based on UNSC expressed intent to deploy a UN mission as a follow-on force to AMISOM at the right time under the right conditions (UN, 2011). Hence, the partnerships did not come through as a result of any rational strategic planning process. It emerged through a series of compromises that have caused and continue to cause tensions between the two organisations. The UN/AU relationship also remains imbalanced due to AU's financial and material dependence on the UN.

6.2.4. Outcomes and Benefits of the Partnership

Four indicators identified by Boydell (2000) were adapted and used to evaluate the outcomes and benefits of the partnership. These indicators include: response to African peace and security challenges; system development; resource development; and policy development. In terms of response to conflicts, the UN and the AU have devised better and innovative ways of responding to Africa's complex security conundrums through joint operations and peacemaking efforts in countries such as Sudan, Mali, Somalia and DRC, just to mention a few. In Mali, for instance, the partnership between the UN, AU and

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ECOWAS led to the formation of a transitional government after the coup in March 2013; the restoration of constitutional rule through democratic elections; and the recapture of the northern part of Mali from rebel occupation (Aubyn, 2013; UN, 2014). Arguably, the intervention of the three organisations is what has contributed to the relative peace in Mali today. Similarly, in Kenya, both organisations worked together to restore peace after the 2007 post-election violence. Through the deployment of UNAMID also, there is arguably some relative stability in Darfur as compared to 2003 when the conflict erupted. Without the intervention of the UN and the AU together with other stakeholders, the security situation in these countries might have been worse by now.

The UN/AU partnership has also improved the in-kind resources, financial and human resources of both organisations. With respect to improvement in human resources, it emerged that the AU, for example, has benefited immensely from the capacity-building programmes and technical support offered by the UN under the TYCBP. Although, this cannot be quantified or statistically proven, the findings revealed that staffs of the AU Commission, especially, those at the PSOD have greatly enhanced their knowledge and skills through the technical and institutional contact with UN personnel. Currently, the UN personnel seconded to the AUC provide daily technical advice and mentoring of AU personnel in the areas of planning, mounting, and management of peacekeeping operations; how to operationalise the ASF and the development of standard operational procedures (SOPs) for peacekeeping operations (UN, 2011a, 2011b; AU, 2012, 2013, 2014). It also emerged that the presence of UN personnel at the AUC has also indirectly helped bridge the human resource constraints of the AU. Most significantly, through these joint operations and peacemaking interventions, the UN and the AU have both shared their experiences, knowledge and skills on peacekeeping and learned from each other.

Financially, and in terms of in-kind contributions, it emerged that the partnership has improved the financial and logistics management capabilities of the AU. UNSOA, for example, is assisting the AU in the management of AMISOM through the provision of logistics and funds using UN assessed contributions. Furthermore, the UN in collaboration with the AU has also created voluntary Multi-Donor Trust Funds for missions like

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UNAMID, AMISOM and AFISMA which is now MINUSMA to raise funds from its member states to support the missions. Between 2009 and 2012, for instance, the AMISOM Trust Fund accumulated an amount of $76.2 million (Gadin, 2013; Freear and de Coning, 2013). Some of these funds are used to support the implementation of the mission mandates, to purchase equipment and logistics, and the payment of personnel subsistence allowances. Given the insufficient financial and logistical capabilities of the AU, these support packages have collectively strengthened the AU's peacekeeping efforts on the continent. The Trust Funds have also complimented the insufficient AU Peace Fund as well as the UN's own limited peacekeeping budget.

Concerning policy development, not much has been done to either change or revise the existing policies and normative frameworks that guide the partnership. Efforts to establish new policies or guidelines to enhance their working relationship have also been limited. For example, the consultative meetings and the relationship between the UNSC and AUPSC is not guided by any working procedure or policy. There is also no dispute resolution mechanism should any disagreements on specific issues even arise. The partnership has also not yet led to the development of joint policies and procedures to guide the operations of both organisations at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively. The partnership continues to remain *ad hoc* and uneven.

In terms of evidence of systems development, it came out that the partnership has led to some co-ordination mechanisms that hitherto did not exist. At the strategic level, the UN and the AU have established closer links through annual joint consultative meetings that alternate between Addis Ababa and New York. At the institutional level, the UN Secretariats and the AU Commission have also established a Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security and desk-to-desk exchanges. Through these mechanisms, both organisations have discussed and exchanged information and ideas on country-specific and thematic issues of common interest in Africa. The coordination mechanisms have also helped in information-sharing, coordination of responses and actions, and the strengthening of the relationships. Nonetheless, it was indicated that the existence of these mechanisms have not automatically generated consensus on how both organisations should act in a

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particular situation. Another, important aspect of the systems development is the improvement in infrastructure with the establishment of the UNOAU in Addis Ababa on 1 July 2010. The UNOAU coordinates the UN's relationship with the AU in Addis Ababa. The AU also has an office in New York to coordinate its activities with the UN. However, unlike the UNOAU, the AU's New York office lacks a strong mandate and capacity to play an effective bridging role in the partnership.

6.2.5. Challenges Confronting the UN/AU Partnership

With respect to the challenges facing the partnership, whilst some were generic to most collaborative efforts between the UN and regional organisations, others were unique and specific to the UN/AU partnership. In all, the challenges identified were categorised under general, strategic, institutional and operational level challenges. The general challenges related to the ambiguities of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, where both organisations still lack a shared understanding on it interpretation and application. Some of the difficulties of operationalising Chapter VIII include: (a) how the AU can maintain its independence in invoking the various elements of the APSA, without appearing to usurp the powers of the UNSC; (b) how much power the UNSC is willing to delegate to the AU, especially, with respect to enforcement actions?; and what the responsibility of the UNSC would be when it authorizes an AU-led peacekeeping operations? There is no consensus on these issues, and this has *ipso facto* led to misapprehension and open rifts between the AUPSC and the UNSC.

The strategic level challenges consisted of mistrust and lack of respect of the views of the AUPSC by the UNSC; lack of parity in the relationship, and the non-adherence of the principle of subsidiarity. Especially, on the issue of mistrust and disrespect, the AU complains that the UNSC does not respect its views and is always bent on marginalizing the AUPSC on matters relating to peace and security in Africa. The AU cited the case of how the UNSC ignored its request in the drafting of UNSC Resolution 2100 on the transfer of AFISMA to MINUSMA. Concerning the issue of lack of parity in the partnership, members of the AUPSC want the UNSC to see them as equal partners during meetings, but

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the UN thinks otherwise, and rather sees the AU'S demands as ambitious and unrealistic. This problem is further compounded by the disparities between the UN and the AU, in terms of technical, economic and managerial capacities for conducting peacekeeping operations. The other challenge has to do with the non-adherence of the principle of subsidiarity between the UN and the AU as well as its RECs. Thus, the devolution of decision-making, division of labour and burden-sharing in responding to security challenges in Africa still remains unclear. As a result, the UN's relationship with African regional bodies has sometimes depicted that of competition and antagonism, instead of the complementarity of efforts.

The operational challenges, on the other hand, comprised the philosophical and doctrinal differences about peacekeeping, bureaucratic challenges and challenges during field missions. The UN's philosophy is that before any peacekeeping can be deployed, there must be peace to keep, which implies the existence of a peace agreement. However, the AU rather thinks that instead of waiting for a peace to keep, in certain situations such as Somalia, peace has to be created before it can be kept. This different peacekeeping doctrine has given rise to divergent notions of purpose, configuration, and force requirements for peacekeeping operations.

At the bureaucratic level, the partnership has been complicated by different working methods and procedures, lack of coordination between the monthly agendas of the UNSC and AUPSC and the agenda for their annual meetings, lack of regular communication between the chairs of the two councils and their staff, and lack of dispute resolution mechanisms to address disagreement between the two councils (UN, 2008c; AU, 2012; Boutellis and Williams, 2013; Bah and Lotan, 2011).The operational level challenges include cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, disagreement on the appointment of senior leadership positions in joint missions, lack of clear reporting lines and decision-making frameworks, financial and logistical difficulties. (Murithi, 2009; Anyidoho, 2012; Agwai, 2012; Gelot, Gelot and Coning, 2012)

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6.2.6. Case Studies of UN/AU Partnership

The study also illustrated the research findings through a case study of UN/AU partnership in Mali (AFISMA to MINUSMA), Somalia (UNSOA & AMISOM) and Sudan (UNAMID). The purpose was to understand what the research findings mean in reality when applied to empirical cases of UN/AU partnership in peacekeeping operations. The three case studies fall under three different partnership models. The partnership in Mali was a form of sequential operations, where a UN operation (MINUSMA) succeeds an AU/ECOWAS led peacekeeping operation (AFISMA). That of Sudan (UNAMID) is an integrated operation, where the UN and the AU operate with a single chain of command, while the partnership in Somalia is a coordinated operation, where the UN and the AU operations are coordinated but operate under different chains of command. These three case studies demonstrate the political commitment of both organisations to prevent and manage violent conflicts in Africa. However, the partnership in all the cases was not based on any grand strategic designs, but rather driven by operational realities and field necessities.

The partnership has, in practice remained asymmetrical with the UN always taking the decisions and responsibilities. Apart from Somalia, all the joint operations are/were controlled by the UN, with the AU playing minimal roles. While different factors inspired the cooperation of both organisations in each context, the common reason that applied to all three case studies was the inadequate capacity of the AU to finance and sustain its peacekeeping operations in the long-term. The AU's formal request to the UN to take over AMIS, AFISMA and AMISOM due to its capacity constraints buttresses this point. The other reasons were that, in Somalia, UNSOA was established because the conditions for a possible UN peacekeeping force to take over from AMISOM were practically non-existent. In the case of Sudan, the rejection of UNSC resolution 1706 which created a contingent of 23,000 strong UN Mission in Sudan to take over from AMIS by the government of Sudan resulted in the establishment of UNAMID.

There have been diverse outcomes of the partnership in the three different contexts. In Mali, the relative peace in the country today is partly due to the outcome of the interventions of the UN, AU and ECOWAS. The political, diplomatic, humanitarian and

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military interventions of these three organisations led by ECOWAS are arguably what culminated in the restoration of constitutional order, social normalcy and Mali's territorial integrity. In Somalia, through the institutional and capacity building support provided by UNSOA, personnel of the AUC have improved and increased their technical skills and knowledge in the areas of mission planning, management, and the development of peacekeeping policies and guidelines. The delivery of the logistics support package by UNSOA has resulted in significant improvements in AMISOM's operational capability as well as the living and working conditions for AMISOM personnel. Indeed, without the UNSOA logistics support, the advancement of AMISOM within the past two years would have been impossible (Williams, 2013: 244). In Darfur in Sudan, although finding a win-win solution to the Darfur conflict has remained a distant prospect after eight years of its deployment, the presence of UNAMID has helped deter several atrocities against civilians, especially, those in the IDP camps.

In spite of the positive outcomes of the partnership in the field, they are confronted by different challenges. In Mali, the partnership was marked by tensions and mistrust between the AU, UN and ECOWAS. The AUPSC accused the UNSC of not consulting Africa in the drafting of Security Council Resolution 2100 which authorized the deployment of MINUSMA to take over AFISMA. Furthermore, several requests made by the AU were ignored by the UN in the drafting of the UNSC resolution 2100. These requests included, among others, authorising a peace enforcement mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter for MINUSMA; providing a logistical and financial support package to AFISMA just like AMISOM; and ensuring the continuity of AFISMA's leadership in MINUSMA. Other challenges included turf battles between ECOWAS and the AU; absence of effective communication channels; and mutual suspicions and 'corporate' competitions, rather than cooperation.

In Sudan, although UNAMID has a Chapter VII mandate to deliver its core task to protect civilians, it has not been able to successfully prosecute that task due to constant obstructions from the government of Sudan and the various armed groups. The security situation also continues to worsen throughout Darfur with thousands of internally displaced

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persons (IDPs) and civilian deaths. On the hybrid nature of the mission, the power imbalance between the two bodies has often created tensions and mutual suspicion at the strategic level and bureaucratic problems. Another challenge has to do with uunreasonable delays in the appointments of senior level officials for the mission due to the different bureaucratic processes and politics in both organisations. In Somalia, the UNSOA support package is essentially focused on AMISOM's military component in spite of its multidimensional nature. The civilian component is excluded from the logistical support package. The support of UNSOA is also inadequate and lacks flexibility. Thus, although AMISOM is engaged in a Chapter VII-type robust operation, the UN support package is designed as a standard Chapter VI peacekeeping operation.

6.3. CONCLUSION

The growth of peacekeeping in Africa since the 1990s has relied significantly on partnerships between the UN and the AU as well as it RECs. Overall, it was clear from the study that both material and ideational motives drove the UN/AU partnership. In all the factors identified, the AU's insufficient financial and logistical resources remained the paramount reason that inspired the partnership. The UN/AU relationship is also more *ad hoc* than systematic, and more piece meal than comprehensive. Thus, there is less strategic-level systematic engagement and synergies, as the partnership have largely focused on operational (field-based) cooperation. In other words, the UN/AU partnership has been driven by operational realities and field necessities rather than any grand strategic designs. The annual consultative meetings, for example, have become discrete events with last-minute preparations and little follow-ups on communiqués adopted at meetings. The UN/AU relationship has also been characterised by considerable misunderstanding, mistrust and tensions, often hindering the conduct of effective peacekeeping operations. Other challenges complicating the partnership include, the lack of coherence in responses to conflict situations, as exemplified during the Libyan crises; differences over burden-sharing as well as the principle of subsidiarity; lack of parity in the relationship; philosophical differences about peacekeeping; and bureaucratic challenges. For instance, with respect to burden-sharing, the experiences of the UN/AU partnership in Sudan and

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Mali have demonstrated the importance of ensuring that when working together, roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined.

It is useful to note that most of these challenges have come about as a result of the lack of shared understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities and more obviously, the rivalry for legitimacy on the African continent. Indeed, part of this difficulty emanates from the ambiguities in the UN Charter (Chapter VIII specifically) on one hand, and the AU Constitutive Acts and the AUPSC protocol, on the other hand, which does not clearly provide any guidelines on how the partnership should evolve. Given the fact that most of the decisions made at the UNSC are usually influenced by the national interests of member states, the question that also arises is whether there would be any possibility of a shared understanding between the two organisations on these normative frameworks. All the same, it is important for both organisations to ensure that the partnership is based on the principle of complementarity and added value to engender real operational benefit on the ground. This can be done through a stakeholder analysis, which would, among other things, examine the relative operational strengths and weaknesses of both organisations in a given conflict.

The relationship also remains imbalanced due to AU's financial and material dependence on the UN. Indeed, the relationship appears to be reminiscent of the early decades of the UN, which were defined by an asymmetrical partnership between the world body and Africa, where African voices, according to Murithi (2007b), were not

> sufficiently heard in the formulation of peace, security and development policies at the UN and, where African countries, most of which were still under the yoke of colonialism were, in fact, still being treated in a paternalistic fashion by their former colonial powers who constitute and continue to form, the axis-of power within the UN system.

Thus, in reality the UN/AU partnership is like a "father-son" kind of relationship, where members of the UNSC dominated by the Permanent Five (P5) (comprising USA, France, Russia, Britain and China) take decisions and pronounced on African issues without adequate consultations with the AUPSC and due diligence of its ramifications on the growth of the AU's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Practically, this is expected due to the fact

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that the UN is a global organisation, while the AU is a regional body. However, both organisations need to have a political dialogue on how to best overcome these imbalances to enhance their relationship. Having a flexible and innovative interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and an enhanced strategic consultation between the UNSC and AUPSC as well as their respective secretariats (UN Secretariats and the AU Commission) would be critical in this respect. Both organisations also need to deliberate on the conceptual, philosophical and the practical issues in the partnership.

At the operational level, the motivations of the UN/AU partnership in Mali, Burundi, Somalia, and Sudan and recently, in CAR also indicate that there is no generic model for cooperation and that each situation requires innovative solutions. Each partnership model (whether hybrid/integrated, coordinated, or sequential) depends on the operational requirements of the peacekeeping context. However, both organisations are yet to put in place institutional policies on the modalities of cooperation in each context and to comprehensively document the lessons and experiences of each model for future operations.

Apart from these strategic and operational level issues, it was also clear from the discussions that adequate attention has not been given to the roles and the consequences of the activities of other external actors on the UN/AU partnership. In particular, the African RECs which are the building blocs of the APSA have not been actively involved in the partnership. The Malian case where the UN, AU and ECOWAS cooperated to bring about peace and stability actually illustrated the importance of including the RECs in the partnership. IGAD is also actively involved in the political processes for a sustainable solution to the conflict in Somalia. Most importantly, apart from the UN, the AU also cooperates with the League of Arab States, the European Union, NATO, and bilateral partners like China, France, United States, India and Turkey, that are all supporting the implementation of the APSA. For instance, through the African Peace Facility, the EU partners with the AU through direct financial and in-kind assistance to the AU and African TCCs. Given the plethora of international actors, it is vital to coordinate their activities with the AU in order to minimise gaps and potential duplications.

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In spite of the shortfalls, there are some positive developments which cannot be underrated. At the strategic political level, unlike before, the UNSC and the AUPSC have been meeting annually in Addis Ababa and New York to discuss specific crises situations, including Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali, CAR, DRC, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. With some exceptional cases, both Councils have acted in unison and coordinated their peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts to bring peace in several of these conflict and post-conflict zones. Also, the AUPSC remains the only regional body in the world that meets regularly with the UNSC due to the fact that African issues dominate the activities of the Council (UN, 2011a).

The partnership has also continued to expand significantly in both the operational and institutional levels. At the institutional level, the partnership has led to the establishment of institutional mechanisms such as the Joint Task Force (JTF) on peace and security and the desk-to-desk meetings, which respectively bring together the senior leadership and focal persons to discuss specific issues of common interest to both organisations. Although they are not decision-making mechanisms, they have at least provided the opportunity for the staff of UN and the AU to conduct joint planning and work together on a range of issues within the framework of collective security. Moreover, for the first time, the UN has established the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) to coordinate and enhance its relationship with the AU. While the UN has liaison offices in other regional organisations, their mandate and devoted resources (human and finances) cannot be compared to the UNOAU. This shows the importance the UN attaches to its relationship with the AU.

The operational partnerships in Darfur, Somalia, Burundi, Mali and CAR is a manifestation of how both organisations have cooperated to restore peace and stability, albeit with some difficulties. UNAMID, for example, depicted the practicalities of harnessing the advantages of the UN as a global body, and that of the AU as a regional entity by marrying universalism and regionalism to bring about stability. While the UN provides administrative, logistics, finances, planning and peacekeeping expertise, the AU assists in force generation and provides political leverage in relation to the Government of Sudan.

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Likewise, in Somalia, the AU had the advantage of quick deployment and force generation, while the UN assists through planning, logistics, and finances (UN, 2011a, 2011b).

In a nut shell, both organisations share the same objectives of pacific settlement of disputes as enshrined in the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act. Given the acknowledgement that no single organisation is capable of resolving African problems alone, it is not out of place to suggest that partnerships are needed to implement a cohesive strategy for effective peacekeeping on the continent. Partnerships are the *sine qua non* for successful conflict management on the continent. Two main reasons define this reality in Africa. First, the complexities of contemporary conflicts, in terms of, the numerous actors, issues and the level of violence involved call for multinational, multidimensional and regional responses, as the magnitude of the problems surpasses any solution by one single organisation. Second, the challenges that confront contemporary peacekeeping operations, especially, in Africa cannot be addressed by the UN alone. This is because the current nature, complexity and diversity of peacekeeping mandates have left the UN in a situation of 'overstretch' with very limited capabilities, in terms of, well-trained peacekeepers, logistics and material resources. What this means is that the UN would require cooperation with continental bodies such as the AU and other stakeholders as one solution to the quandary of meeting the increasing needs of the organisation. Indeed, the experiences of the UN and the AU in countries such as Somalia, Mali, Burundi and Sudan have showed that cooperation, rather than disparate initiatives, is necessary to ensure effective response to African conflicts.

While some obstacles still persist, the study has also revealed the considerable progress made, especially, in relation to resolving the complex peace and security challenges in Africa. It is, therefore, essential for both organisations to work assiduously to overcome the existing problems hindering the effectiveness of the partnership and most importantly, ensure that their relationship is anchored on mutual respect and trust, creative interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, recognition of their comparative strengths and greater political coherence at the strategic level. The partnership needs to be seen within the context of collective security as provided for in the UN Charter.

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6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made to enhance the partnership at the strategic, institutional and operational levels respectively.

6.3.1. General Recommendations

Since the normative frameworks of the UN/AU partnership do not specifically specify the roles and responsibilities for both organisations in the partnership, the relationship should be formalised through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU should specify the strategic vision, shared objectives, values and principles as well as modalities of cooperation or guidelines on the responsibilities and roles of each organisation when they partner, especially, in crises situations. This would make the relationship more systematic and comprehensive rather than being *ad hoc* and piece-meal which affects the sustainability and predictability of the partnership. This would require a mutual understanding and re-interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as well as addressing the definitional and conceptual issues inherent in the partnership. Formalising the partnership will help address the differences in approach and methods adopted by both organisations in dealing with conflicts situations in Africa. It would also strengthen the independence of the AU when invoking the various elements of the APSA, without appearing to usurp the powers of the UNSC.

Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity between the UN and the AU as well as its RECs should be properly codified. This will help avoid competition, instead of complementarity of efforts, when conflict erupts in any part of the continent. Having a formal codified subsidiarity principle will clarify the responsibilities and roles of each organisation in crises situations and serve as a code of conduct for all organisations. This would not in any way affect the supreme authority of the UNSC, but rather enhance the devolution of decision-making, division of labour and burden-sharing, in terms of responding to security situations in Africa. It would also ensure coherence in international and regional responses to existing and emerging conflicts instead of different policy responses.

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The philosophical differences regarding the deployment of peacekeepers between the UN and the AU must be addressed. Although it has the advantage of enhancing the complementarity of efforts, it can lead to divergent notions of the purpose, configuration and force requirements for peacekeeping operations. Both organisations have to harmonise their peacekeeping doctrine and philosophy in order to respond effectively and timely to conflicts to save lives and properties. For instance, if the UN is unwilling to deploy peacekeepers in the absence of peace agreements, both organisations can devise a formula, where the AU deploys for about six months to stabilise the situation and then, transfer the mission to the UN. This would enhance predictability and sustainability of the partnership.

6.3.2. Strategic Level Partnership between UNSC and AUPSC

The relationship between the UNSC and AUPSC can be further enhanced through regular consultations as well as open and honest communications both formally and informally. The two Councils should use their differences to increase understanding of each other by having an open and honest communication on a regular basis and through regular consultations to gain each other's insight and inputs into decisions and policies concerning African peace and security. Informal dialogues between members of the two Councils can, for example, help in developing a common vision, approach and coordinated action, prior to the finalisation of their respective decisions during conflict situations. In this connection, the chairpersons and members of the respective councils should establish consultative decision-making frameworks where they can interact regularly as and when the need arises, instead of waiting until their annual joint meetings. In the long-run, this will build trust and respect of each other's views or perspectives on African peace and security issues.

Both Councils should consider holding more regular consultative meetings by establishing a more structured channel for regular communication that can be reviewed periodically for efficiency and reliability. Thus, instead of the annual joint meetings, the UNSC and AUPSC should consider holding at least two meetings in a year at three levels namely, the level of Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Chiefs or Heads of Security Services. The AU can also regularly consult the UNSC representatives (Ambassadors) in

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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Having regular meetings is imperative, given the fluid and unpredictable nature of conflict dynamics on the continent. These meetings would help build mutual trust between the two Councils and enhance information-sharing. In spite of it financial implications, the benefit of these meetings would exceed the cost in the long-run.

The UNSC annual meetings with the AUPSC should be expanded to include all African RECs which are the building blocs of the AU peace and security architecture. Including the RECs will significantly enhance the synergy and coherence between the UN, AU and the RECs in crises situations as exemplified in Mali. However, the AU should strengthen its own relationship with the RECs which is currently weak and depicts more of a competition. The UN/AU partnership may encounter difficulties if the roles of RECs are overlooked, especially, in situations when they are needed to help maintain peace and security. Additionally, the UNSC and the AUPSC should consider holding a joint meeting at the sidelines of their annual meetings with the heads and strategic decision-makers of external actors such as the EU, NATO, France, USA, and Britain who are also engaged in peacekeeping in Africa to brief and update them on their activities. This will help harmonize and coordinate their efforts to avoid competition and duplication of efforts to ensure the effective use of limited resources.

It is important to also establish joint working standard operating procedures, clearly outlining the processes through which the AU can submit its request on, especially, policy, financial and diplomatic issues to the UNSC for consideration. This would contribute to bridging any potential gaps on policy issues and ensure greater synergy and alignments of their respective positions on issues of common interest in Africa.

The AU should also establish a forum where African members of the UNSC (not concurrently members of the AUPSC) and members of the AUPSC can meet, share information and develop common positions and approach on African peace and security issues. The African members of the UNSC can also be granted observer status during AUPSC meetings to acquaint themselves with issues discussed to inform their positions and debates during UNSC meetings.

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The relationship between the UN General Assembly and the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (Executive Council) should also be enhanced. Both Assemblies play key roles in the deployment of peacekeeping operations. The UN General Assembly (UNGA), for instance, plays a key role in peacekeeping financing, although it is not directly involved in the political decisions of establishing or terminating a peacekeeping operations. The UNOAU, for instance, was established by the UNGA by its Resolution 61/296. Similarly, the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Government is the highest decision-making body on peace and security issues in Africa. It decides on interventions in Member States in respect of grave circumstances namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and determines the common policies of the AU. Collectively, the UNGA and the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments can serve as a unique forum for multilateral discussions of the broader issues regarding the conceptual, philosophical and practical issues in the partnership. Therefore, enhancing closer cooperation between both Assemblies can help strengthen the strategic level relationship between the UNSC and the AUPSC. The Troop/Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) to UN/AU peacekeeping missions should also be actively involved in the partnership.

6.3.3. Institutional Partnership between the UN Secretariat and AU Commission

To further improve the institutional level partnership, it is important to enhance the capacity of the AU office in New York to serve as an effective link between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In that regard, the mandate of the office of the AU in New York should be revised and staffed with the qualified personnel who can effectively facilitate the interaction between the UN Secretariat and the AUC as well as communicate the AUPSC's positions to the UN Africa Group and the African Caucus in New York.

There is also the need to increase the frequency of communication and cooperation between the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission to follow up on existing and emerging issues considered by the UNSC and PSC in their meetings. The respective secretariats should not be left out of this, especially, in terms of effective information-sharing, experience sharing on their working methods and timely consultations

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on emerging issues on the African continent. Both Secretariats should see to the full implementation of the joint communiqués adopted by the UNSC/AU PSC during their annual meetings.

Both secretariats should consolidate the lessons learnt and experiences of the UN/AU Joint Task Force (JTF) and the desk-to-desk meetings and expand their agendas to include deliberations on broader policy issues relating to the practical issues in the partnership rather than reviewing ongoing crisis situations all the time. The JTF and the desk-to-desk meetings should also be expanded to include senior representatives from the RECs to enhance the coherence at the strategic level relationships between the AU, RECs and the UN. In addition to these consultative mechanisms, the UN Secretariats and the AU Commission should consider instituting a forum, where they can meet the senior leadership of their joint peacekeeping operations and representatives of TCCs/PCCs to discuss issues of common interest. This will offer both secretariats the opportunity to better understand the activities and challenges of the missions and TCCs/PCCs, and how they can provide tailor-made assistance that addresses their needs.

The UN should continue to strengthen the capacity of the AU Commission by improving the ten year capacity-building programme to enable the latter develop its structures and mechanisms. Efforts should also be made by the UN to rally international support and assistance to build the capacity of the AU Commission to become self-sufficient in the longer-term. Meanwhile, member states of the AU should also endeavour to contribute financially to the capacity development initiatives of the AU, instead of always depending on external actors for funding and assistance. The UN and the AU can also establish a staff exchange programme to increase understanding of the working methods, bureaucratic politics and dynamics in each organisation.

6.3.4. Operational Level Partnership

Both organisations should develop common guidelines and modalities for joint operations aside their individual organisational frameworks. The roles and responsibilities that each

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organisation is expected to play in joint missions, clarity on reporting lines and modalities for appointment of senior officers should be clearly specified in this guideline. It should also include the processes and criterion for transferring an AU/RECs mission to a UN mission as well as control and command issues during joint operations. This would help avert some of the challenges that confronted previous operations in Sudan and Mali.

Additionally, both organisations should engage in early joint technical mission assessment and planning whenever the establishment of a mission is being considered by the UNSC. The respective RECs should also be involved if necessary, in the joint planning processes. This would enhance smooth transition whenever an AU or RECs mission is to be transferred or "re-hatted" to the UN or when hybrid operations are formed after an initial intervention by the AU or the RECs. The shared/joint analysis would help the UNSC to authorise the required support for the implementation of joint missions. The UNSOA support is illustrative of this point, where the authorised support is incongruous with the capacities needed for mission implementation.

6.4. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, future research on the UN/AU partnership can be undertaken in the following areas:

- The roles of the African RECs and TCCs/PCCs in the overall partnership between the UN and the AU and how they can be actively involved at all levels of the partnership;
- The role that non-state parties such as Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) can play in the UN/AU partnership; and
- Research on how the AU should manage its cooperation with the UN in relation to its other cooperative endeavors with organisations like the EU, NATO and bilateral partners such as the United States of America, India, France, Turkey and China to mention just a few.

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