

THE NOTION OF PRUDENCE IN ARISTOTLE AND THE CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

BY

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the Almighty God for What He is; Who He is and will always continue to be to me.

I also dedicate this dissertation to the loving memory of my parents: Prince Chukwumaobim Metu WOGU and Lolo Florence Nkemjieme WOGU, who have gone to be with the Lord. They dedicated all their life time to ensuring that I got a good education. That I have come this far today is because of the foundation they laid for me during their life time.

Finally, I also dedicate this dissertation to all the leaders out there who wish to make a difference in the art of leadership.

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this work was carried out by WOGU, Ikedinachi Ayodele Power in the Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

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ABSTRACT

Two schools of thought, the Moralism School and the Realism School, have discussed the problem of leadership. Moralists have called for an explicit recognition of the moral nature of leadership but failed to provide leaders with a consistent direction of what ethical leadership should be. Realists argue for a total autonomy of the political sphere. They fail to recognize the existence and relevance of any moral consideration in the political arena; consequently, they subordinate moral standards to those of politics. The ideological confusion arising between both schools of thought is responsible for the absence of an adequate and consistent theory of political leadership. This study, therefore, seeks to provide a theory of political leadership that will constitute a viable framework for good leadership in Nigeria.

Aristotle's notion of prudence which states that prudent judgment is a central moral resource for political leaders was adopted for this research. The study employed the method of conceptual analysis to clarify the concepts of virtue, prudence and leadership. The reconstructive method was also used to synthesize basic elements of the moralist and the realist schools of thought with Aristotle's notion of prudence. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, David Notions' *Democracy and Moral Development and A Politics of Virtue* and Otto Gierke's *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, constitute some of the primary texts for this study. Texts and other library and archival materials used were subjected to content analysis.

Bad political leadership in Nigeria has continued to be one of the root causes of crisis in the nation. This problem is generated by the lack of an acceptable and consistent theory of leadership. There is also the absence of a standard guideline and framework to guide leaders in their daily decision making processes. Moralism insists that an explicit recognition of the moral nature of leadership must be given due priority. However, this opinion failed to provide leaders with a consistent guideline of what the essence of ideal leadership should be. Realists maintain that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of political leaders in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. This realist position creates detached and selfless leaders who allow nothing get in their way of achieving successful political actions. Leadership crisis in Nigeria arises as a result of the absence of practical prudence, which is a core virtue in Aristotle's ethics. Prudent judgment is required to identify the salient aspects of political situations which leaders have obligations to consider before making political decisions. The guidelines prescribed by Aristotle in making prudent judgment include: Disciplined reason and openness to experience; Foresight, Deploying power; Timing and momentum; Proper relation of means and ends; Durability and legitimacy of outcomes; and Consequences for community.

Aristotle's notion of prudence, therefore, provides a consistent guideline for drastically reducing the scourge of bad leadership in Nigeria. Its practical adoption would enhance the quality of political leadership in Nigeria.

Key Words: Governance, Leadership, Political decision, Prudence, Virtue ethics,
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INTRODUCTION

Recent studies on the subject of leadership crisis identified variables such as greed, self centeredness, corruption, divisions along ethnic, political and religious lines, as some of the root causes of leadership crisis all over the world and in Nigeria in particular. In the Middle East for example and in most parts of North Africa, civilian protests and revolts have erupted as people's frustrations with their conditions of living appear to have boiled over due largely to bad and corrupt leadership. Towards the end of 2010 for instance, a 26 year old Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in protest to the kind of treatment meted to him by local authorities. The ensuing public outrage as a result of this event subsequently ousted a 23-year old dictatorship government.¹ But this event is not limited to just Tunisia alone. The same can also be said of Egypt and Libya where crisis resulting from very corrupt and bad leadership, lead to the revolution that removed Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Maman Gadaffi of Libya, both dictators in governments that lasted over 29 years and 31 years respectively. These governments were overthrown at the expense of lives numbering in hundreds of thousands from 2010 to date. The leadership crisis currently going on in Syria has a death toll running into tens of thousands and still counting. The leaders in these countries were known to kill their own citizens with bombs from Fighter Jets, Armored Trucks, Tanks and Long Range Missiles. They refused to relinquish power to the people they were leading, the people who were now frustrated with the corrupt kind of leadership their leaders had to offer them for decades.

Recent reports also show that all through the region of Africa, protests and leadership crisis have occurred throughout the middle east and the major parts of North Africa which include countries and territories like Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara, Yemen.²

The situation in Nigeria is not totally different from the one mentioned above. The leadership crisis currently going on in the country can be traced to the very poor and corrupt leadership which Nigerians have experienced since independence. Consequently, the country has been split along political, ethnic, tribal and religious lines, a factor that has continued to trigger off crisis from every nook and cranny of the nations. The most recent and frequent crisis recorded include:

the ethnic motivated crisis in the Niger Delta area as a result of the struggle for recourse control in the oil rich areas of the south, Politically motivated crisis among individuals, politicians and government seeking to gain control of power and retain power by all means at the expense of fellow politicians or the electorates and the citizens of their country. They achieve their aim by inflicting fear through mob attacks, assassinations and very violent clashes during campaign rallies. Up in the northern parts of the country, a lot of crises have been recorded in places like Jos Plateau State area, where countless numbers of lives have been lost as a result of terrible attacks (tribal clashes) which have been targeted at wiping out villages and certain tribes in a single attack.

The crisis currently making headlines in the country are religious motivated crisis. Certain Muslim sects in the country are seriously seeking to rid the nations of any trace of western education and subsequently Islamatize the nation. This objective they have pursued seriously with series of suicide bomb attacks on churches, schools media houses, police stations, government installations and various other paramilitary organizations. Recent study indicates that the death toll in this area is in tens of thousands since 2007.

No doubt, the deplorable state of the nation is as a result of these rising leadership and civilian crises that have eaten deep into the heart of the country like a canker worm; one that is evidently caused by the very poor quality of leadership which the nations has had since independence. A leadership which has been defined as being very corrupt, greedy and self-centered, one that has no regards for its citizens and the economy.

These waves of crisis all over the world, has caused thinkers and writers to frequently discuss the subject of leadership in conferences, journals, books etc, with the view to finding pathways of addressing the problem of bad leadership and to provide a viable theory of leadership that would largely ameliorate the scourge of bad leadership in a system. This study is conducted with this very aim in focus, bearing in mind the countless numbers of failures recorded in the works of authors and various schools' of thought, that have attempted to address the problem of leadership. We shall present the Aristotelian notion of prudence as that vital resource for political leadership. We shall also prescribe from Aristotle's notion of prudence, a framework

that will guide the actions of leaders which we believe when strictly applied, will birth better and prudent leaders in Nigeria and in other parts of the world.

The background to this study is drawn from the works of Aristotle virtue ethics. As a student of Plato, Aristotle (384 - 322 BC) is widely considered to be the first systematic thinker of a virtue based ethics. He developed a coherent view of moral conduct which integrated his ideas on politics, education, society and human well-being. His influence on the history of ethics in Western philosophy is profound. Aristotle thought that reason is the primary guide to developing the good and happy life. But reason itself is not enough. Living a virtuous life is an ongoing effort, beginning in childhood and continuing through life as we practice right habits and nurture good character. In this research, we shall highlight Aristotle's understanding of virtues in relation to other arts and to the development of good character for leadership.

No doubt, ethics is a branch of philosophy quite different from those we have had to study in the past. In other branches of philosophy, we have had to ask questions such as: "Does God exist?" "What is knowledge?" "How is the mind related to the body?" "Do we have free will?" Put differently, in our study of these other branches of philosophy, we have been attempting to describe what is true about the world. In ethics however, we are concerned with what we ought to do, what consequences ought to be achieved and what type of persons we ought to become.

The entire discipline thus reveals that ethics is a normative inquiry and not a descriptive one. It seeks to establish and prescribe norms, standards or principles for evaluating our actual practices. To this end, we hope to use the principles of ethics as prescribed by Aristotle to closely explore and analyze the behavioral patterns of politicians in Nigeria with special reference to the present political situation and the crisis that has eaten deep into the polity in the last decade. We shall do this with the view to exploring the part ways of understanding the place of virtue and moral character in determining what politicians ought to do, and what sort of persons and character, politicians in Nigeria ought to become and imbibe in other to become better leaders.

The ultimate purpose in studying ethics is not as it is in other inquires, the attainment of theoretical knowledge; we are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, else there will be no advantage in studying it. ³

Let me at this point note that this present inquiry is not only aimed at a theoretical knowledge for we are inquiring not just to know what virtue is but in other to become good, or prescribe an ethical standard that will make our politicians become better and moral persons (leaders), without which, our inquiry would have been of no use. As such, this Project shall among other things, examine the nature of actions of political leaders, with the view to finding how they ought to carry out certain actions with regards to good governance and right leadership. These actions in turn go a long way to determine the nature and the states of character that are produced in the lives of the people lead.

On the statement of problem, we start by noting that the variables mentioned above in the introductory part of this study have been identified as some of the root causes of leadership crisis in the world and in Nigeria in particular. The examples of these crises are too evident for all to see today in Nigeria and in Africa. Consequently, the quest to address the problems of leadership crisis and to proffer a way forward among thinkers and scholars have continued to be top on the agenda of every meetings, conferences, seminars, books, journals etc. Just recently, a joint session of the United Nations Summit (UN), convened on the 26th of September 2012. Top on the agenda of the meeting was the crisis situations in the nations of Syria where children are begin used as target practice for government forces, among other atrocities one can think of. The sad thing about the leadership crisis in Syria is that, even the member states of the UN are yet to find any direct solution to the leadership crisis in Syria. The crises in Syria have continued to claim hundreds of lives daily with women and children topping the chart.

Resent literature on the subject of leadership however indicates that volumes of materials now exist in books, journals, etc, on the subject of leadership. These publications have one major aim and that is to proffering solutions to the leadership crisis all over the world. A broad survey of all these literatures seems to allow us categorize the entire materials on the subject of leadership and leadership crisis into two broad schools of thought. These schools of thought are “The Moralistic School of Thought” represented by the likes of James M. Burns,⁴ Gardner,⁵ Larry D. Terry,⁶ William Galston,⁷ David Norton,⁸ Cooper and Wright.⁹ Otto, Gierke,¹⁰ and Immanuel Kant,¹¹ to mention but a few. The “Realist School of Thought” on the other hand are represented by

thinkers such as Kenneth Waltz¹², Marshall Cohen,¹³ Hans Morgenthau,¹⁴ Richard E. Neustadt,¹⁵ and Robert C. Tucker.¹⁶

These two schools of thought have discussed the problem of leadership extensively. While Moralists call for an explicit recognition of the moral nature of leadership in the light of governance, they failed to provide leaders with a consistent direction or guideline of what ethical leadership should entail. Realists on the other hand have argued for a total autonomy of the political sphere. A position that insists that all political activities, as it relates to governance, must abide by certain objective laws which they believe will prevent moralistic ideas from tampering with an effective use of power in the cause of leadership. This point is very important considering the fact that the Realists regard "Power" as the most important element of leadership. The problem with this realist view is that this view fails to realize the existence and relevance of any moral consideration in the political arena. Consequently, they subordinate moral standards to those of politics.

The ideological confusion arising between both schools of thought, we have cause to believe, are largely responsible for the absence of an adequate and consistent theory of political leadership in the world today. It is on the basis of this disconnect between the works and ideas of these writers which cuts across these two schools of thought, that we seek to provide a viable and consistent theory of leadership from Aristotle's notion of prudence, one which would constitute the basis from where we shall propose a viable frame work for leaders in Nigeria and the rest of the world. A frame work we believe, when strictly applied, could drastically reduce the scourge of bad leadership which has eaten deep into the heart of the nation like a cancer worm.

In all, this dissertation identifies the absence of practical prudence as that fundamental, underlying, and overarching problem with regards to political and leadership crisis in Nigeria. The need therefore arise to employ the notion of prudence in Aristotle to interrogate the Nigerian condition. This paper will argue that this Notion of Prudence in Aristotle is a *sene quanon* for good political leadership in Nigeria, in Africa and in other parts of the world.

On the methodology and theoretical frame work for this study, we started by adopting Aristotle's notion of prudence which states that prudent judgment is a central moral resource for political leaders. There was need for the study to employ the method of conceptual analysis to clarify the concepts of virtue, prudence and leadership. The reconstructive method of philosophy was used to synthesize the basic elements of the moralist and the realist schools of thought, alongside the Aristotle's notion of prudence.

Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, David Notions' *Democracy and Moral Development* and *Politics Among Nations* by Hans Morgenthau, constitute some of the primary texts that were subjected to critical and contextual analysis during the cause of the study. Texts and other library and archival materials used were subjected to content analysis.

The objectives of this study are clearly captured in the outline below:

1. This study among other things, seeks to provide a consistent and adequate theory of leadership via Aristotle's Notions of Prudence.
2. The dissertation seeks to prescribe Aristotle's notion of prudence as a central moral resource for political leaders in Nigeria and the rest of the world.
3. This study more importantly, seeks to also provide a theory of political leadership that would constitute a viable framework for good leadership in Nigeria and other parts of the world. A frame-work that will subsequently guide the day to day salient decision making processes which leaders are bound to take during the process of governance and leadership.

In view of the above objectives, the need arise to present a clear thesis for the dissertation, one that will capture, in one sentence, the direction of work intended for this study. The thesis of this work states: '*Political prudence is a central moral resource for political leadership*'

The thesis of this work presents Aristotle's virtue of *Prudence* as the most essential element of political judgment. It contends that any theory of leadership needs to develop an account of prudence to succeed.

The thesis therefore holds that, *Political Prudence* is a central moral resource for political leaders. Consequently, this thesis presents an account of political prudence focusing on certain operational requirements. These requirements include:

1. Disciplined reason and openness to experience,
2. Foresight and attention to the long term.
3. Deploying Power;
4. Timing and Momentum
5. The proper relation of means and ends.
6. The durability and legitimacy of outcomes, and
7. The consequences for community.

These requirements shall in turn provide a frame work to guide and evaluate the actions of political leaders, a frame work that will drastically reduce the scourge of bad leadership when strictly implemented.

The significance of this study can be captures in the under listed points:

1. The thesis of this work presents Aristotle's virtue of *Prudence* as the *linchpin* of political judgment which any theory of leadership needs to develop an account of, if it seeks to excel in the act of leadership.
2. This dissertation among other things, presents an account of political prudence which focuses on the operational requirements of a leader. The requirements that shall in turn provide a moral frame work to guide and evaluate the actions of political leaders all over the world. A phenomenon which Nigeria is in dear need of.

3. In the face of a rapid erosion of the original conception and meaning of virtue ethics, this dissertation calls for a clearer understanding and a proper insight to the application and meaning of “Virtue Ethics in governance and in all aspects of the political sphere.
4. When the seven tenets prescribed in this dissertation from the Aristotle’s notions of prudence, are strictly adopted and judiciously practiced, we are confident that the practical wisdom contained within these tenets shall drastically reduce the scourge of bad leadership in Nigeria. Its practical adoption would enhance the quality of political leadership generally in Nigeria.

The entire study shall be divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, (The Crisis of Leadership in Nigeria) we shall focus our study on examining various factors influencing the crisis of leadership in Nigeria. In chapter two, (Theories In Leadership) we shall examine the realist and moralist theories of leadership with the view to identifying the gaps and short comings in these theories which are responsible for the lack of a viable and consistent theory of leadership. In chapter three, (Aristotle’s Notion of Prudence) we shall start by examining all Aristotle’s notions on virtue, virtue ethics, prudence, politics and leadership. We shall argue that Aristotle’s notion of prudence is that vital resource which leaders require to excel in the art of leadership. In chapter four (Implications of The Notion of Prudence In Aristotle) we shall, from the notion Aristotle’s prudence, offer a framework for political leadership which we shall argue will aid in reducing the scourge of bad political leadership when strictly adopted.

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THE CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA

1.1 Introduction

Recent studies into the subject and problem of leadership by some schools of thought have identified variables such as corruption, ethnicity, greed and self-centeredness as some of the major factors that breed crisis in leadership all over the world. In this chapter, we shall be examining what we hear refer to as “The Crisis of Leadership in Nigeria”. Under this heading, we shall closely examine the factors that influence leadership crisis in Nigeria. But before all that, there would be need to first consider the various notions and conceptions of leadership. The knowledge from this study shall help lay the foundation for studying and comparing the Nigerian experience of the notion of leadership, which we believe, is a total departure from the standard conceptions of leadership. This also is one of the major factors influencing the so many leadership crises in Nigeria.

Leadership from certain corners, have been conceived as those actions which are “exercised when persons... mobilize... institutional, political, psychological and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers”.¹ For House, R. J. and Adrtya, R. N; they conceive leadership as “the ability.... to influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute towards the effectiveness and the success of the state or organization as the case may be...”². With this conception in mind, we hope to show how countries such as Nigeria which continues to lack individuals and capable citizens who have the capacity to influence and motivate their citizens towards achieving certain set goals and objectives, will have no other option but to continue in crisis.

We shall however, arguing that where a country like Nigeria, is able to breed and cultivate leaders who can “succeed in attempting to frame and define the reality of others”;³ leaders who can “articulate visions, embodying values, and creating the environment within which things can be accomplished;”⁴. leaders who in the words of Jacobs and Jaques, can initiate the process of giving purpose (meaningful direction) to collective efforts and causing willing effort to be

expended to achieve purpose".⁵ Where a country cultivates such disposition, it will bring about peace, stability and unity in the country in question. The need therefore arises to start this chapter by offering, in some detail, a conceptual analysis of various conceptions of leadership. The analysis done in this chapter shall arm us with the right information which shall allow us to interrogate the various conceptions of leadership in Nigeria.

1.2 The Concept of Leadership

Leadership is a subject that has long excited interest among people. The term connotes images of powerful, dynamic individuals who command victorious armies, direct corporate companies from atop gleaming skyscrapers, or shape the course of nations through its political activities. The exploits of brave and clever leaders are the essence of many legends and myths. Much of our description of our history is the story of military, political, religious, and social leaders who are credited or blamed for important historical events, even though we do not understand very well how the events were caused or how much influence the leaders really had.

The wide spread fascination with leadership may be because it is such a challenging disposition, one that touches everyone's life. Consequently, questions about certain perceived leaders have been asked in the past. Questions such as: Why did certain men such as (Ghandi, Mohammed, and Mao Tse-Tung) inspire such intense favor and dedication? How else did certain persons such as (Julius Caesar, Alexander the great) hold such great empires? How and why some distinguished people such as (Adolf Hitler, Claudius Caesar) rise to positions of great power? Why were certain persons such as: (Winston Churchill, Indri Ghandi) suddenly disposed, despite their apparent power and records of successful accomplishment? Why did some other outstanding personalities have some loyal followers who are willing to sacrifice their lives for them, whereas, other such personalities were so despised that subordinates conspire to murder them. The answers to these questions lie within the figures of the personalities holding these leadership positions.

The term leadership is a word taken from the common vocabulary and incorporated into the technical vocabulary of a scientific discipline without being precisely redefined. Consequently, it

carries extraneous connotations that create ambiguity of meaning ⁶ Additional confusion is caused by the use of other imprecise terms such as power, authority management, administration, control and supervision to describe similar phenomenon. An observation by Bennis, a writer on leadership, is as true today as when he first made the statement many years ago.

Always, it seems, the concept of leadership eludes us or turns up in another form to taunt us again with its slipperiness and complexity. Some have invented an endless proliferation of terms to deal with it ... and still the concept is not sufficiently defined.⁷

Researchers would define leadership according to their individual perspectives and the aspects of the phenomenon of most interest to them. After a comprehensive review of the leadership literature, Stogdill concluded that “there are many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept”. ⁸ The stream of definitions has continued unabated since Stogdill made his observation. Leadership from some corners has been defined in terms of trait, behaviour, influence, interaction patterns, role relationships and occupation of an administrative position.

What then is Leadership? Who is a Leader? Dictionaries define *Leading* “as guiding and directing on a cause” and as “serving as a channel”. A leader is someone with commanding authority or influence. Researchers on their own part have developed many working definitions of leadership. Although their definitions share much in common, they each consider different aspects of leadership. Below is a list of such definitions as prescribed by researchers on the subject of leadership:

Krech, D. and Crutchfield, R.S., conceive of leadership as ...“An integral part of the group process.” ⁹ Bass, M. B. conceive leadership primarily as “An influence process.” ¹⁰ Still others see leadership as “The initiation of structure and the instrument of goal achievement”. ¹¹ Several others consider the leaders as “Servants of their followers”.¹² For Hemphill and Coons,¹³ “Leadership is the behaviour of an individual...directing the activities of a group towards a shared goal.” Also, Leadership has been conceived as” the influential increment over and above mechanical compliance with the routine directives of the organization”.¹⁴ For Burns, Leadership

is exercised when persons... mobilize... institutional, political, psychological and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.¹⁵ Leadership is realized in the process whereby one or more individuals succeed in attempting to frame and define the reality of others.¹⁶ Another definition of leadership presented by Rauch and Behrling, captured it as “the process of influencing the activity of an organized group towards goal achievement”¹⁷

Richards, D. and Engle, S. has also attempted a definition which considers leadership as “that which articulates visions, embodying values, and creating the environment within which things can be accomplished”¹⁸ For Jacobs and Jaques, “Leadership is the process of giving purpose (meaningful direction) to collective efforts and causing willing effort to be expended to achieve purpose”.¹⁹ Leadership has also been defined as “the ability to step outside the culture... to start evolutionary change processes that are more adaptive”.²⁰ Leadership is the process of making sense of what people are doing together so that people will understand and be committed.²¹ Leadership for House R.J, and Adrtya, R.N. is “The ability of an individual to influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute towards the effectiveness and the success of the state or organization as the case may be...”²²

Without any doubt, leadership plays a dominant role in the outcome of any organized effort aimed at a particular goal or a set of goals. It is the genius of leadership that mobilizes human and material resources and creates the necessary climate for productivity. As a matter of fact, studies have shown that leadership accounts for most of the outcomes observable in countries. In the view of Jiboyewa,²³ Leadership involves much more than the behaviors exhibited by leaders in any other organization.

Leadership is therefore of particular importance in a country to the extent that without it, goals may be difficult to attain. In fact, Cheng and Townsend²⁴ reported that in the efforts of various countries for education, change and effectiveness, the role of leadership at both the local and national levels is often crucial to their success. It is in the light of this crucial role of leadership that different scholars have tried to interpret the concept of leadership as the process of influencing the activities of an organized group toward goal – setting and goal achievements.²⁵ Leadership is the initiation of a new structure or procedure for accomplishing an organization's goals and objectives.²⁶ Leadership is a force that can initiate action among people, guide

activities in a given direction, maintain such activities and unify efforts toward common goals.²⁷ Leadership is a process of social influence where leaders induce followers to apply their energies and resources toward a collective objective. It is an interactive relationship between leaders and followers, which is characterized by influence and identification²⁸ And in the view of Ogunsaju,²⁹ Leadership is a position of dominance and prestige accompanied by the ability to direct, motivate and to assist others in achieving a specified purpose. For Cheng,³⁰ he found two general elements of leadership in the various definitions. First, leadership is related to the process of influencing others behaviors and secondly, it is related to goal development and achievement.

Accepted that most definitions of leadership reflect the assumption that it involves a process whereby intentional influence is exerted by one person over other people to guide, structure and facilitate activities and relationship in a group, society or organization, numerous definitions of leadership appear to have little else in common. They nevertheless differ in many respects, including who exerts influence, the intended purpose of the influence, the manner in which the influence is exerted and the outcome of the influence attempt. Despite the differences that exist in the above definitions, the various definition of leadership contains three common elements.

"Despite the multitude of ways leaders have been conceptualized, the following can be identified as central to the phenomenon of leadership: (1) Leadership is a process. (2) Leadership involves influence. (3) Leadership occurs within a group context. (4) Leadership involves goal attainment.

When we combine the three preceding elements, we can define a leader as *“a person who influence individuals and groups within a given society, organization or state with the view to helping them establish goals and guide them towards achieving those goals, thereby allowing them to be effective”*.

Based on these components, the following definitions shall form the background of this study.

- Leadership, a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal. This definition is further explicated when Warren Bennis and Bart Nanus expressed it thus: *“Leadership”* development is a process and not an event, by this they mean that leadership develops daily and not in a day. By this definition also, they show that leadership is the capacity to improve and develop skills that distinguish leaders from

their followers.

Our study of the various leadership experience in Nigeria, in view of the meaning of leadership offered above, will show that there are great differences between both conceptions. The situations and meaning of leadership is quite different for the persons aspiring to be leaders in Nigeria. They emerge today and want to be leader's tomorrow. Consequently, those who succeed in becoming leaders are limited in their ability to command any sort of influence on the people they wish to lead. These leaders have their decisions and opinions heavily influenced by some external factors (godfather figures, etc) who tend to run the whole show from the confines of their bedroom. I shall discuss this in details in the preceding chapters that shall follow; as some of the factors responsible for the leadership crisis that Nigeria is currently facing today.

On the issue of leadership being a process and not an event, J.C Maxwell ³¹ further corroborates this singular and essential quality of leaders in his law of the lead which states: "*Your personal effectiveness is determined by the level of your leadership.*" This means that the more time a potential leader puts into training and developing himself, the more he is able to determine the level of effectiveness he could manifest in the field of leadership.

Leadership from other corridors has also been conceived as a process whereby individuals influence a group of other individual to achieve a common goal. Gibbs ³² corroborates this definition when he simply states that "*Leadership is influence*" - When your behaviour influence people that they respond to achieve a desired end, this then is Leadership. By *influence* here, we mean some sort of power that sways or affect an individual by the use of prestige, wealth ability or positions. Influence could also be regarded as the ability to produce an effect on something or someone without the will of direct force or command. In the real sense, influence is a kind of cognitive factor that tends to have an effect on how you behave or in what you do.

Conditions for leading

Effective leaders recognize that what they know is very little in comparison to what they still need to learn. To be more proficient in pursuing and achieving objectives, a leader needs to be open to new ideas, insights, and revelations that can lead to better ways of accomplishing goals. This continuous learning process can be exercised in particular, through engaging yourself in a

constant dialogue with your peers, advisers, consultants, team members, suppliers, customers, and competitors or the citizens in the case of the leader who governs a state or a community.

It is sad to note that the basis for leadership highlighted in the phenomenon or characteristics of leadership above, does not readily exist among Nigerian leaders and those aspiring to be leaders. On the contrary, for most of the people aspiring for leadership positions in Nigeria, it is believed that the most important requirement one needs to get for acquiring all the votes of the electorate is some access to sacks of money in some private account, from where it is occasionally disbursed to influence certain key members of the community into acting otherwise. This mode of operation is occasionally sponsored by some highly influential *god-fathers figures* who often calls the short and dictates what goes on in government from the confines of his bed room.

Where an individual fails to meet up with this requirement, that is, where he is known not to have such financial influence, then that individual cannot qualify to partake in the art of leadership. The place or the importance of *learning* and skills acquisition among persons aspiring to be leaders in Nigerian seem to have been swept under the carpet. This probably explains why persons of high repute and high educational qualifications have in the recent past, continued to fail in making it to the primaries during elections conducted in Nigeria.

Leadership is not just about changing the mindset of the group, but it's also about the cultivation of an environment that brings out the best (inspires) from the individuals in that group. Each individual has various environments that bring out different facets from their own identity, and each facet is driven by emotionally charged perceptions within each environment. To lead, one must create a platform through education and awareness where individuals can fulfill each other's needs. This is accomplished by knowing why people may react favorably to a situation in environment "A", but get frustrated or disillusioned in environment "B".

Leadership has often been based on power. From the conventional view, this means the power of personality, the personality to dominate a group. As such, it has been argued that "Leading others is not simply a matter of style, or following some "how-to- guides recipes". Ineffectiveness of leaders seldom results from a lack of know-how; it is also typically due to inadequate managerial skills. Leaders must therefore go through some specific kind of training as suggested by Plato in

Plato's republic. One of the factors affecting the Nigerian kind of leader is that they largely lack any special kind of training and skill in the areas of leadership sort.

Leadership is even not about creating *a great vision* as we have seen in Yar' Aduwa's "10 point agenda", An agenda that did not see the light of day all through his time of reign. It is about creating conditions under which all your followers can perform independently and effectively toward a common objective. Again it is with dismay that we note that these criteria are far from what the Nigerian leader holds as their core values. This is because the typical Nigerian leader is self centered and cares only about what he can get from the people and the office which he presently occupies. Whatever vision they claim to have has been known to be a 'front,' which is often used for deceit purposes and for amassing wealth for themselves. In our opinion, the contrary should be the case. "Leaders" in the words of President Kennedy, "should think more about what they can do for their country and not what their country can do for them or what they can squeeze out from their country.

To ensure that effective and prudent leadership is attained, the leader should have some wisdom that only comes from knowledge, knowledge acquired through the process of learning and education. It is on this note that we wish to observe that before President Yar' Aduwa's administration, no past head of state or President of Nigeria had gone as far as having a University Degree before attaining the office of the president. Could this be one of the reasons for their very poor performance in the area of articulating ideologies and synthesizing ideas and policies in the area of governance? In our opinion in this study, we submit that these above mentioned reasons may really be some of the major reasons why Nigerian leaders have performed poorly in the past as regards leading and leading well.

1.3 Aristotle's Idea of Leadership

Aristotle says a leader also needs *practical wisdom*. Practical wisdom has "nothing to do with calculating magnitudes," nothing to do with science, theory, disciplinary knowledge, or knowledge of facts in any way. It is concerned "neither with eternal and unchangeable truth nor with anything and everything that comes into being (and passes away again). Instead, it deals

with matters where doubt and deliberation are possible.” In particular, practical wisdom is not concerned with the way things are but with “how things can be other than they are.” In other words, it is about how conditions in society and organizations *could be made better*. And “it implies the use of one’s faculty of opinion in judging matters,” relating to what is right and wrong for a group, or the society as a whole.

In Aristotle’s eyes, such practical wisdom is the prerequisite of “moral excellence,” the *sine qua non* of leadership; that is why *Pericles* and men like him have been voted to be best at the art of leadership since they possess practical wisdom. They have the capacity to see what is good for them and for humankind. Aristotle concludes that virtuous leaders in the *Periclean* mold are rare, but their scarcity is not due to a shortage of leadership capacity in the human race. Instead, he believes the virtue manifested by those rare leaders is an acquired trait; he believes leaders are made, not born. Indeed they are self-made.

At all times, the conscious goal of a just leader is to help followers achieve what is good for them, which, on occasion, may be something different from what they think they want. Hence, in addition to effectiveness, leadership has a moral dimension: the capacity to discern and provide justice.

Aristotle’s idea of leadership compared with those of Plato and Machiavelli

Plato's philosopher-king ruled over the warriors and tradesmen of his ideal republic with rationality. Aristotle's polity enlisted the rich to rule over the rest by knowledge and democracy. Machiavelli's prince used deception and illusion for the better economic good of the state. All have their brilliancies and faults, but Aristotle's pros out measure his cons.

Plato's philosopher-king ruled over the warriors and tradesmen/farmers like the rational part of one's soul ruled over the honor-seeking part and appetitive part. The philosopher-king was in charge of making the state a "utopia" in that everyone had his/her place and all worked together for the common good of the state. Faults with Plato's plan are that the social classes are rigid with little class mobility in that you could not advance from one to another in your lifetime. Women are not regarded as much in the plans for yearly orgies between the upper class to produce offspring. They remain in separate tents while the men visit whichever tent they like and

no one knows whose child is his. They are all raised together and their fates are decided at an early age. Another problem with Plato's plan is that the plans for each man to have a set amount of land without regard to population increases or neighboring countries' boundaries. Overall, because of his disregard for women and the strict social classes accorded in his plan, Plato does not have the right idea for a leader. His "utopia" is a dystopia that is not feasible in modern times.

Machiavelli's principalities are governed by one prince, who should be an immoral opportunist, a fox and a lion, using deception and illusion for power. His people should never know the "real" him through these acts of illusion and he should do whatever it takes to gain more for the state. When the prince is doing "bad" or "cruel" things, he should be a fox so that the people will not hate him. When he is a lion, he can overcome the enemies and win wars for economic gain for the state. The problem with Machiavelli's prince is that the risks are high for being "found out" and in the case that he is, the state will hate him and not remember the good he did. Instead they will remember him as a liar (a modern day example is Nixon: remembered forever as a crook for trying to get ahead of the competition-not remembered for any good legislative actions), and who will rule then? A hereditary prince, perhaps, but if you look at the example of President Bush, success is not granted. When you take over someone else's work, you are not granted the respect and love and tolerance of your previous ruler. For these reasons, Bush does not have full support for his military actions in the Middle East as his father perhaps did. Overall, the risks of living a life of illusion, deception, good immorality run the prince's risks high of being overthrown and maybe killed-making Machiavelli's leader the wrong choice.

Aristotle was an aristocrat-studying the way of political leadership for many years before deciding that two deviant "wrong" governments combined might make a "right" correct one. He thought that democracy combined with oligarchy to form a polity would be the best way to rule. Unlike Plato and Machiavelli, he believed in democracy for some (the upper class or those who owned weaponry) but not for all (women, children, workers). He felt that the political life was a must for those participating in the democracy and that the king put in place of the polity must not have full power but instead should be a minister or guardian of the law. This is similar to what the U.S. has in place today. The masses vote but only the educated - what in the United States of

America is known as - *Electoral College* elects our leaders. And that leader has the legislative branch of government to work with in "ruling" our country. Aristotle's ideas were, in fact, instrumental in the founding of the American Constitution, a constitution which also has some traits with the Nigerian constitution. Jonna Windon, in a similar argument, argues that:

Because of the chance for democracy for some and more extent human rights, Aristotle's state is the best out of the three. His leader has less power than Machiavelli and Plato's, which is better for a state, and is easier to be replaced/overthrown in cases of usurped power than the prince or philosopher-king.³³

Less power and more mobility make for the best political leader. If you have too much power and not enough mobility, you are faced with a tyrant, which is the deviant form of the prince and philosopher-king. Either state looks like they could reach that point easily. Aristotle's leader has the least possible route to tyranny so it is the best.

Aristotle's laws of leadership

Of all the laws for leadership prescribed by Aristotle, two of these laws stand out: The Golden Mean and The Law of Excluded Middle, We will analyze them, one at a time. One of his students, a little chap called "Alexander the Great", history noted, learned so much from Aristotle that he was able to take over and dominate the whole world during his life time

The Golden Mean: The Law of the Golden mean states that "the good" is often to be found between two extremes. To explain: You can have things in one of three amounts: (1) An excess-too much; (2) An optimum - the right amount; (3) A deficiency - not enough. So, in relation to food for example, How much food should you eat at the party? Aristotle would say "Consume only "the mean" amount: Don't overeat and stuff yourself; don't brag about being on a diet and eat nothing; Eat a moderate amount and then stop"

In relation to Money, How much money should you spend or earn? Aristotle would say "Don't spend all your money! But don't be a miser and spend none. Be prudent and spend a moderate amount. Then stop". This also goes for the amount one money a leader should desire to earn.

In relation to work, How much time should you spend working? Aristotle would say "Don't spend all your time working; and don't be lazy: work a reasonable amount every day. Then stop" In All, Aristotle's most outstanding Law was "Moderation in all things"

Looking at the same point in another way: While Aristotle would advice that all should avoid extremes, He identifies the following as some of the extremes that should be avoided: (1) The consumption of Food, (2) Sex, (3) Spending, (4) Saving, (5) High emotions, (anger, excitement), (6) Thrill seeking, (7) Exercise. He would say "In many situations there is "the middle ground" that you should find: For example, in disputes between people, find the middle ground, a "golden mean" compromise". The Golden mean therefore says that "the middle ground is good" simple! But interestingly, Aristotle's second idea is this: "There must be NO middle ground!"

The second idea "The law of excluded middle"

Aristotle also wrote about the "Law of Excluded middle" which says, there must be NO middle ground. This idea states: There are certain circumstances, where upon, once you have set your terms, everything is either: Within that category, or not within that category. In other words, there is "no middle" ground". The law of excluded middle is a "rejection of a golden mean" compromise. Excluded middle says "It is what it is, with 'no compromise'!"

Examples of the Excluded Middle:

How often would you say a leader or an ordinary person should cheat on his citizens or on his wife? (1) Every day? (2) A reasonable amount according to the golden mean? (3) Or never.

Of course the answer is "Never!" Can't we compromise? She says: NO!

How much would you say the leader or the ordinary person should steal from the government or your business? (1) All he can? (2) A reasonable amount according to the golden mean? (3) Or none! Of course the answer is "None" Can't we compromise? Can't we at least allow a middle ground in this case? The answer is NO.

How much would you say the other person should be allowed to swear at his colleagues when in a bad mood? (1) All he likes? (2) A reasonable amount according to the golden mean? (3) Or none! None- with NO compromise! By this, The Law of the Excluded middle is: The Law of No Compromise.

Problems arising from these ideas: Studies conducted on these Aristotelian laws of leadership, often raised certain questions which I shall quickly discuss here for the benefits the answer provides to leaders. I shall offer these answers from the platform of Aristotle's notions of these laws of leadership.

Questions One: (1) What would happen to the leader who failed to compromise in situations when he/she should have given some ground? (2) What would happen to the leader who keeps giving ground in situations where he/she should hold firm? (3) Upon which issues should you apply the principle of "the Golden mean" any give ground? (4) And upon which issues should you apply the principle of the Excluded middle - and not give any ground? These questions, most leaders have argued puts them in a kind of dilemma, but we are of the opinion that a proper understanding of the Aristotelian Laws of Leadership makes offering a vivid and clear-cut answer to the above questions. We believe that the most important thing to do in this situation is simple: (1) You should apply *Excluded middle* to your Principles. (2) And the *Golden mean* should be applied to specific cases within any given principle.

By way of further explaining the answers offered above, let us consider this document (*A Code of Conduct for a Company or Organization*) from a leader who seem to have mastered to a large extent, the leadership laws prescribed by Aristotle:

In this organization, there is a "no compromise" policy with reference to stealing
No stealing allowed. No compromise given.

If you want something, you must pay for it.

But on the Price paid.....Now we might compromise!

There is a "no compromise" policy with reference to laziness,
No doing nothing!

If you want something, you must earn it.

But on the wages paid per hour, "now" we might compromise.

In other words, this is how best to apply Aristotle's Two compelling ideas: (1) Apply Excluded middle to your principles. (2) "Never" compromise on your principles. (3) Figure out what you

stand for and fight for your principles without compromise. (4) Then within the framework of principles, find the golden mean on the specific issues. Remember, If You Compromise You Lose Your Soul! Finding the mean point or the golden mean on some specific issues, as Aristotle puts it, has often been known to be a difficult task for most leaders. Our last discussion on the subject in the above reveals that leaders have found this very task a herculean one. The remaining part of this study shall be dedicated to offering proper insight to what this Golden Mean is all about.

Aristotle's proposition of the "Golden Mean": Thinkers and researchers on the subject in question have often occupied themselves with this common question about Aristotle's law of leadership. "What, then, is the *right* thing to do"? ³⁴ they ask. Aristotle roots his paradigm in actual practice rather than in theoretical ideas or technical skills. Whereas his teacher, Plato, sought to direct the power of the human will toward eternal truths, Aristotle, on the other hand, argued that decisions about the right thing to do is an eminently practical matter, a choice one can select from along seven continua of possible excessive and defective virtues, including courage, liberality, magnificence, pride, anger, truth, and indignation. These are the virtues manifest in the character of those who makes ethical decisions.

Take the virtue of courage for example. It would seem rather obvious that people should be taught about courage as well as how to act courageously, for the good life depends upon an individual who stands *for something* ³⁵ Aristotle reminds his readers, however, that "courage" is located somewhere along a continuum of possible expressions of courage. Furthermore, depending upon the idiosyncratic circumstances in which a person is immersed, this mean is located somewhere between a defect, fear, and an excess, confidence.

For Aristotle, it is not enough to require that people act courageously, as if there is one and only one way to express this virtue in actual practice. In some cases, it would be important that a person experience fear and tread carefully, factoring her fear and trepidation into her deliberations about what she ought to do. The opposite situation might also be the case. That is, a person might be overly fearful of something, becoming paralyzed in one's ability to act courageously. Thus, while some might think that fear is an impediment to courageous action,

Aristotle points out that fear can (and perhaps should) influence one's deliberations. But, extreme fear is a defect, debilitating to ethical practice.

At the opposite end of the continuum is another aspect of courage, "confidence." Confident people act with a sense of calm assurance that what they are doing is the right thing to do. Contrast these people with those who exude supreme confidence, acting with complete assurance when, in point of fact, such self-confidence unwarranted. Like its opposite, fear, confidence can influence a person's deliberations about what she ought to do in a particular situation, positively or negatively. Thus, while some might argue that confidence is a prerequisite to courageous action, Aristotle argues that exuberance is an excess about which people ought to be concerned because this expression of confidence is debilitating to ethical practice.

As a consequence, Aristotle reminds his readers that the virtue of courage is a very practical matter, one that can be expressed in at least four different ways, the most appropriate expression resulting from deliberation. Stated in another way, to be courageous is the consequence of a careful calculation about what good is being sought in a troubling dilemma and the course of action that best resolves the conflicting values manifesting themselves in that dilemma. For people, then, the virtuous thing to do is not to act courageously as if there exists only one courageous way to act. Rather, acting courageously requires balancing the oftentimes conflicting and sometimes contradicting aspects of courage—fear and confidence—enacting the most appropriate mean, given factual circumstances. As Aristotle discusses this matter:

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the [individual] of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme.

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Aristotle maintains that six other virtues are equally bounded by vice, one form revealing an excess in one's character while the other reveals a defect. Liberality, for example, can degenerate into prodigality or meanness³⁷; Magnificence can be polluted by vulgarity or niggardliness³⁸; Pride is bounded by vanity and humility³⁹; Anger by irascibility and equanimity⁴⁰; Truth is destroyed through an excess, boasting, or a defect, modesty⁴¹; And, indignation lies somewhere between envy and spite⁴². Each continuum displays the extreme expressions of a particular virtue, whereby the excesses and defects stand in opposition not only to each other but also to the mean. These seven virtues and their possible combinations along each continuum—as they are enacted by people and exhibited in a virtuous character—distinguish ethical practice.

Aristotle reminds his readers that it is no easy task to find the mean "but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble"⁴³. The philosopher's interest is that ethical practice influence and shape events in the real world in order that real people may experience true happiness. To be truly happy, therefore, one must act virtuously, that is, to experience the virtues "at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way"⁴⁴.

Ethical practice, then, is an exercise of the intellect and will as people meld ideas about what virtue requires with the skills of best practice and direct these efforts toward the attainment of virtue in concrete circumstances. By engaging in ethical practice, human beings express their excellence as rational creatures'⁴⁵

In sum, Aristotle's discussion about leadership ethical practice veers away from abstract theories concerning the good as well as skills that enable the good to flourish. By locating ethical practice in practical wisdom—a golden mean—the philosopher challenges those who teach and study organization theory to concern themselves with the real choices that people make as well as with those principles by which ethical persons act, so that when they are confronted by the realities of practice in human organizations, these women and men avoid falling into excess or defect.

1.4 Political Crisis in Nigeria

The study we have conducted so far in the previous sections on the subject of leadership reveals that the Nigerian experience of the meaning of leadership is grossly inadequate to sustain the process that makes for leadership. We also noted that the lack of either of the salient phenomenon that constitute leadership mentioned above, brings about certain limitations to their conception of leadership which in turn; manifested in various way in the polity. One of the manifestations which shall be examining in this section of our study is the political implications' and subsequent crisis that has resulted from the failure of leaders to live up to the main trusts mentioned above.

The Beginning of Leadership crisis in Nigeria can be traced to 1960. After the Nigerian independence in 1960, it was no surprise to see that the first republic was dominated by ethno-regional groupings. The independent constitution rested firmly on this reality when a federal system of three regions was established, which sought to recognize and balance the needs of these dominant ethnic regions. Each region had a strong, relatively autonomous government. The resultant consequence of this is that Nigerians naturally enough, responded to the ethno-regional constitution by voting for their respective cultural brokers who they charged with the responsibility of capturing federal resources to their regional communities. This most likely explains why no powerful nation-wide political party or constituency emerged. As such, local considerations dominated the front while issues of ethnicity became increasingly politicized. "Each region was governed by a political party that squarely identified with one ethnic group; the Fulani-Hausa governed the North, the Yoruba the West and the Igbo's the East".⁴⁶

Too many suspicions existed between the regions. The Christian south feared the large populated Muslim North, while the underdeveloped North feared the better educated South. Similarly, the West and the North resented the larger presence of the Easterners in the federal bureaucracy. Each region saw itself in a vulnerable position. What is more, the tripartite federal constitution ignored the aspirations of minority ethnic groups which could not break this oligopoly of the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani.

Perhaps the greatest constitutional danger, however, lay with the fact that it was possible for two of the regions to join forces against the third. This fear was soon manifested, when not quite long after the independence, did the Northern parties form a coalition with the eastern party and did just that. There was a later attempt to exploit an internal split within the isolated western Yoruba party. Using their majority in the national assembly, they (the northern and eastern coalition) created a fourth federal region in order to dispose of the power of the Yoruba. The instability this created, along with economic mismanagement and labour agitations, left way open for two military coups in 1966. The military intervened in unstable government of the day which could not keep the nation together. They promised to restore order and discipline back to the nation.

The military intervention however, precipitated even more political turmoil. Igbo politicians, unhappy with the Northern (Hausa-Fulani) dominance of the military government, promptly led their eastern region to secession; the resultant consequence of this was the declaration of the independent state of Biafra in 1967, barely some six years after independence. This was the low point in Nigerian aspiration of national unity and probably, the high point of political mobilization based on ethnicity. The country will eventually be reunited after three years of civil war, but not until up to two million Biafrans' had died as a result of the federal government siege on the west region of Nigeria.

Nigeria's first period of military rule lasted from 1966-1979. The generals attempted to tame ethnic mobilization by installing nationalist political structures instead of what initially existed. Government was to become more centralized, aimed to produce national unity and economic development for the whole country. The number of regions (now states) in the federation now increased from four to twelve in 1968 and then to 19 by 1976. This creation became necessary to lose the strangle hold of the three dominant ethnic groups and thus open up opportunities for smaller communities.

Military rule in so many ways, also assisted in the consolidation of power among national bureaucrats, although ethnic balancing was still a feature of government appointments, political competitions gradually became a channel through federal structures rather than the earlier regional dominance. The military also successfully protected Nigeria's national integrity. No real attempt at secession emerged after the 1967-70 civil war. This is not to say that the country

enjoyed total political stability during this first period of military rule. Officers disaffected with corruption within the bureaucracy and Nigeria's poor economic management overthrew their superiors in 1975, forming a successor military government.

The regime of lieutenant-General, Olusegun Obasanjo returned Nigeria to civil rule in 1979. The second republic had at its helm, President Alhaji Shagari, the leader of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). It is true to say that the lion share of the NPN power laid in the northern region. But the support the organization enjoyed among southern voters did give credibility to its pretensions to be a national party.

The second republic (1979-83) was very much an age of patronage, giving a good illustration of Donald Rothchild's "hegemonial exchange" model.⁴⁷ The federal government at the centre looked after its own interest but also had to acknowledge ethno-regional power. Recourses were distributed accordingly, as well as material goods and budgets, political posts were also part of this ethnic arithmetic. The NPN for instance made sure that the posts of the President, National Chair, Vice President, and Head of the senate were rotated among party nobles who hail from the north east west and the central zones of the country. The federal cabinet was also inclusive, representing all Nigeria's ethnic brokers. In this case, no one ethnic group could be perceived as to be too dominant, nor could any of the groups be excluded from the business of the day.

The Shagari regime, however, was to fall to a military coup on New Year's Eve, 1983. The Army's rejection of this democratic administration was not based on a failure of ethnic arithmetic, nor its nationalistic sentiments. Rather it was the inability of these civilian politicians to manage the economy (at a time when oil revenue was declining), and its failure to stem corruption.

In a system of government that totally relied on ethnic patronage for its survival, corruption was hard to control. Politics has become centered on the short term winnings of the state resources, and gaining accesses to the levels of power. Little long term strategic political or economic planning could survive in this institutional system of political exchange. Resource capture and distribution had become more important to politicians and bureaucrats than the actual development of the economy that produced these resources in the first place.

The military administration of General Muhammedu Buhari failed to find any immediate remedies for Nigeria's economic problem and his regime became more and more increasingly authoritarian as it began to lose popular support. This yet prompted yet another Military Coup in 1985 in head of which Major-General Ibrahim Babangida became Head of State. Babangida imposed an economic structural adjustment programme, and promised a return to civil rule by 1992. In this respect the regime set about attempting to formulate a constitution that could manage Nigeria's social division more successfully than the democratic experiment that the second republic was trying their hands on.

The Babangida's administration introduced a number of new ideas to Nigerian politics. First, the armed forces ruling council (AFRC) declared that former politicians and its own members will not be able to participate as elected officials in the Third Republic, nor will the institutionalized ethnic balancing of the past be reproduced. Instead Gen. Babangida introduced a two party-system based on Nation, rather than regional political competition. Both parties would have to gain support right across the country, if they were to win and gain power.

True to his words, the Babangida's administration invited political parties to form and compete to be one of the two legal political parties within the new constitution. Forty groups applied but only thirteen was deemed fit to meet with the national credentials and requirements set by this regime. The AFRC latter dissolved all 13 of these parties because, they claimed they parties did not have distinctive ideologies (and that they were to closely linked with the old and former proscribed political parties and politicians.) in replacement the AFRC created two political parties of their own along with its manifestos. The transition to civilian rule stalled, however, when pressures from within the military led to the 1993 presidential elections being annulled. The victor of this democratic poll, Moshood Abiola, was subsequently thrown into jail. Evidently, elements of military enjoyed their taste of political power, and were not prepared to relinquish the reins of the state.

Multi-party democracy was not to return to Nigeria until 1999, when President Olusegun Obasanjo was duly elected to lead the Third Republic. This same Obasanjo was the same retired general who led the 1976-79, Military Government in Nigeria. His presence clearly shows the "Veto" that the armed forces still held over Nigerian politics. I wish to add that all efforts made

by subsequent governments towards fully detribalizing Nigeria has not really achieved the desired results seeing the present dimension that politics in Nigeria has taken.

In the pages that will follow, I shall be giving some specific accounts of certain events which will show, to a large extent, some of the new trends among Nigerian politicians, which depict the point from where Nigerian politicians derailed from holding on to the main tenets of leadership and governance. But before we go into all that, there is need to examine the concept of violence and its relations with the crisis of leaderships.

1.5 Violence and The Crisis of Leadership

Violence or the threat of violence is a universal phenomenon. Individuals and groups throughout history have in one form or the other, resorted to violence or its potential use as a tactic for political action. Violence has been used by groups seeking power and by groups in the process of losing power and by groups holding on to power. Violence has been pursued in the defense of order by the privileged, in the name of justice by the oppressed, and in fear of displacement by the threatened. For many decades, however, the study of political violence is regarded as being incidental to the basic character of social structures and processes.

Recently, many political theorists have come to recognize the threat of violence as a dimension of both national and international politics. This is to say, that there is an increasing awareness among contemporary political scientists that violence and any other form of civil strife are always associated with the exercise of power at all levels of political interaction. To this end, Smith noted that:

Violence has always been part of the political process... protest activities of one form or another, efforts to dramatize grievances in a fashion that will attract attention and ultimately the destruction or threatened destruction of life and property appears as expressions of political grievances even in stable, consensual societies....the ultimate ration of political action is force. Political activity below the threshold of force is normally carried out with the knowledge that an issue may be escalated in overt violence if a party feels sufficiently aggrieved.⁴⁸

Writing in the same vein, Charles Tilly remarked that “collective violence has flowed regularly from the political process....men seeking to seize, hold or realign the levers of power have been known to resort to collective violence as part of their struggle.”⁴⁹ Nigerian politics, our main focus of discuss is a good example of an empirical study of political violence. We believe that the source and dynamics of violence in Nigeria are fundamentally compatible to that of civil violence in other parts of the world. Nigerian rioters share with their counterparts throughout the world certain psychological characteristics. Most of them feel frustrated in the pursuit of their political and economical goals and in seeking redress for grievance; as a consequence, they feel free or desperate enough to act on that anger. This will explain why “the Yoruba- including the frustrated opposition parties were in armed revolt immediately after the 1965 parliamentary election which they believed were blatantly rigged”. This frustration can also be used to explain “the so called “rebellion” of the Tiv for most part of the first Nigerian republic, 1960-1966”.

Though the ability to compromise by different actors in the Nigerian political system was very remarkable, especially after independence, it was during this period that violence or its potential use moved to the centre of political action-a weapon in the hands of the state and individuals. For those in authority, violence became a means through which they could enforce both their will and authority and by that, ensure present and future compliance with their wishes. Now for certain alienated groups and individual, violence was used as a technique of opposition and as a means of dramatizing grievances. To this end, Justice Sowemimo noted the increasing tendency on the part of politicians to employ violent means in Nigerian politics in achieving certain goals.

On the evidence before me, it would appear that politics generally in Nigeria has been conducted with a certain amount of bitterness. It appears that a person belonging to a party becomes an enemy to another who belongs to a rival party. Political parties are equivalent... To warring camps - elections are conducted with party thugs protecting the campaigners and this state of affairs has been described to have assumed a pitch that no method will be spared, however vindictive or extreme by any rival political party as against any other in order to score over one or the other.⁵⁰

This trend in Nigerian politics poses some interesting questions for political enquiry. From what source and what process did it rise and how did it affect the political and social order. What light do existing theories and or explanation of political violence shed on its emergence in Nigeria? Our concern among other things in this dissertation will be to emphasize important theoretical explanations and assumptions in the literature on political violence. It is hoped that such efforts will contribute to a better understanding of the origin of political violence within nations in general and particularly Nigeria. For the sake of expositional clarity, however, the discussion is preceded by a conceptual clarification of the word *violence*.

The Meaning of Violence: The word violence defies any precise commonly accepted definition. The concept often serves as a catch for all every variety of protest, military coercion, destruction or muscle flexing which a given observer happens to fear or condemn”.⁵¹ “The frequent conceptualization of force”,⁵² and violence tend to confuse the distinction between “legality”, “legitimacy” and specific acts. Often, force is taken to mean legal and legitimate acts carried out by a government for the protection of the state. While violence is interpreted as illegal and illegitimate acts carried out by non-governmental individuals and groups.

Violence, as Harry Bienen comments, “Carries overtones of “violations” we often used to refer to illegitimate force”⁵³. “The state” according to Marx Webber, “has as its exclusive source, the right to use violence”. “All other individuals or association may use it only to the degree permitted by the authority”.⁵⁴

Studies show that it is methodologically difficult to determine when the state’s use of violence has moved from the legitimate to the illegitimate. But because of the conflicting conception of violence, our analysis will treat state violence as causal explanation for the individual or group’s use of violence. So far research has also shown that peoples disagreement in what they will call violence springs to an important extent, from difference in political perspectives.

For the purpose of this research, we shall define political violence as *the use of threat or physical act carried out by a single individuals or individuals within a political system against another individual or individuals, and / or damage or destruction to property, and who’s objective, choice of target or victims surrounding circumstances, implementation and effects*

have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement of power structure that has some consequence for the political system.

Our working definition suggests that for violence to be political, there must be the intent for affecting the political process (though it may not be immediately apparent whether an action has a political component or not). The political process in this case is considered to be the system of values carried out by specific individuals within specific institutions. The definition excludes accidents and criminal action for personal gains, though in the case of Nigeria, this may not entirely be the case, but it includes acts of both representatives of government or dissidents. More frequently, violence involves the intervention of the authorities-especially their repressive force-because they find their interest or those of their allies, threatened by the actions of dissident groups. In most cases of civil disobedience, there is always the heavy involvement of the presence of the police or army. Charles Tilly describes them as the most consistent initiators and performers of collective violence. He notes “that the repressive forces do the largest part of the killing and wounding, while the groups they are seeking to control do most of the damage to property”.⁵⁵

Violence can be of categories, by types and scales. The forms of violence investigated in this study include, *Religious and ethnic clashes, Riot party clashes, Political demonstrations with violence, ideological clashes, looting, arson and Political assassination*. At one end of the scale, violence may involve thousands of people as in demonstrations, and riots, at the other, individuals isolated incidents involving a handful of people is not left out. Please note also that our working definition also includes revolution and military coups, civil wars and guerrilla wars which present itself as attempts to seize state power or to throw it off”.⁵⁶

A philosophical analysis of the root causes of violence

The efforts to understand the root cause of violence has been the concern of writers and political philosophers over the years. Arnold Forster probably represents the majority of men among contemporary scholars when he considers political violence by its very nature beyond any simple causation”⁵⁷. The causes of political violence have been so numerous and complex that some

scholars have even argued that “the very uniqueness of each conflict defies effort to formulate cross-national hypothesis”.⁵⁸ To this effect, one United States publication concludes.

There is no single cause...which is more or less potent. In that usually there are multiple causes and important contributing conditions rooted in historical relationship and brought to violence by a variety of catalyst. Each conflict has been unique.⁵⁹

Thus a very large number of factors are given by scholars to explain political violence this does not however imply that general hypothesis cannot be drawn from the wide variety of descriptive incidence that have occurred in recent years. From our survey of the literature on the subject, the attempts of scholars to understand political violence in Nigeria and in any other part of the world may be grouped into three distinct but mutually complementary models of a political violence. These are: “(1) The relative deprivation, arising expectation and frustration-aggression hypothesis, (2) The systematic hypothesis, (3) The group conflict hypothesis”.⁶⁰

For the purpose of clarity, relevance and for want of space, we shall in this study, restrict our study and analysis to the relative deprivation hypothesis, because of its prevalence in the Nigerian context. Under the first hypothesis; research has shown that it is by far, the most popular explanation of political violence among social scientists which have a psychological explanation. While there are internal difference in interpretations, definitions, concepts and conceptualization, those who stress this model all emphasize psychological theories of motivation and behaviour, frustration and aggression. Some like the Feierabend's, stress the “revolutionary gap” or in their phrase the, “*want-get-ration*”⁶¹ that is, the distance between expectation and achievement. For Davies, he emphasized the difference between “expected need satisfaction and the actual need satisfaction”⁶². The most comprehensive and systematic elaboration of this explanation to date appears in the works of Ted Gurr who emphasized the relative description gap between expectation and capability.⁶³ All these explanation share the notion of a gap which creates frustration which leads to anger, leading in turn to aggression and violence.⁶⁴

It is clear from the foregoing statement that the causal mechanism posited as underlying the psychological model of violent behaviour is derived from the frustration-aggression theory. This

theory was originally developed by Dollard and his research associate.⁶⁵ The central premise of the frustration-aggression theory, put simply, is; that aggression is always the resultant consequence of frustration. Given the required conditions, an individual whose basic desires are thwarted and who consequently experience profound sense of dissatisfaction and anger is likely to react to this condition by directing aggressive behaviour at what is perceived as being reasonable for thwarting those ideas, or at a substitute. “The greater the perceived importance of the desire, the more comprehensive the checking and the more vigorous the aggressive response”.⁶⁶

A seasonal variant of the frustration-aggression theory is the notion of relative deprivation, interpreted to mean a state of mind where there is a discrepancy, the greater their anger and their propensity towards violence. For Gurr, relative deprivation is a perception of thwarting circumstance. He contends that when we feel thwarted in an attempt to get something we want, we are likely to become angry, and when we become angry, the most satisfying inherent response is to strike out at the source of frustration.⁶⁷ This in effect means that frustration is no longer seen as the blockade of present goal-directed activity, but as anticipated, frustration engendered by the discrepancies between what is realistically attainable, given the social context, and what is sought.⁶⁸

The latter part perspective is intimately related with another version of the frustration-aggression theory “revolution of rising expectations”. The later locates the genesis of violence in the feeling of dissatisfaction rising out of the comparison between what one currently enjoys and what one expects, between what one thinks he ought to have or what one regards as ideal.⁶⁹ The notion that is, the distance between current status and aspirations, is implicit in the works of Feierabend and Daries as mentioned above. According to the exceptional theory, it is hope and not despair which instigates violent political behaviour.

Based on the above lines of reasoning, it is common to explain political instability in African countries in terms of the “revolution of rising frustration” generated by the revolution of rising expectation, thus speaking on the trauma of independence in West Africa, Victor Le Vine, points out that the advent of independence is often expected to offer a panacea for all social ills besetting a country. “When independence does occur, it falls far short of providing a perfect

solution to all problems".⁷⁰ It is thus commonly assumed by students of African politics that independence has generated the expectations and aspirations of various groups in the policy, beyond the capacity of the system to satisfy them. According to this view, the consequence on the part of the frustrated individual or group is aggressive behaviour leading to crisis.

How political violence has become a tool in Nigerian politics will be discussed in the subsequent pages below.

Violence; a tool for political crisis in Nigeria

The next two pages represents an account of political crisis motivated by some leaders who obviously lacked the virtue of prudence, leaders who frequently resort to the use of violence as the best way to achieve their political ambitions. This first report to be discussed here is one that was taken from the Guardian of Friday, November 24, 2006.⁷¹

It was another orgy of violence at Ibokun in Obokun local council area, of Osun state when two factions of the Action Congress (AC) clashed in town during the ward council. By the time the violence subsided, no fewer than 10 persons were seriously injured and property worth millions of naira destroyed. The weekend that preceded this event had witnessed another crisis that erupted among the members of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), in a town called Iwo, leaving about 21 people including a serving commissioner injured. It was gathered that supporters of Kunle Ige, a Governorship aspirant, classed with those of Rauf Aregbesola and Jumoke Ogunkoyede, who also had their eyes on that same exalted seat in the state.

It was learnt that Ige was allegedly supporting one Ademola Adejuwon as Obokun Ward Chairman of the AC. While Aregbesola and Ogunkoyede were said to have pitched their tents with David Ogunniyi, a former Council boss as the Chairman. The event which was scheduled for Ibokun town hall, was disrupted when suspected hoodlums started shooting into the air sporadically; causing pandemonium in the entire town. Besides, the thugs came into the venue of the congress and inflicted about 10 party members with serious machet wounds.

Ogunkoyede, it was said, narrowly escaped death but all the vehicles brought to the venue of the event were vandalized and wrecked by the hoodlums. Efforts to trace and unveil the perpetrators of the violence were to no avail. Now just some few days earlier, (11) eleven people including a

Council Chairman and one Governor Olagunsoye Oyinlola's aides were arrested by the Police and taken to Abuja for allegedly attacking a former Governor of the state, Isiaka Adeleke.

In another report, it was gathered that, following the assassination attempt on the chairman of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in Ekiti State, Mr. Ropo, Adesanya and other eminent members of the party were arrested, it was reported that the Police State Command had arrested four supporters of the former Governor Mr. Ayodele Fayose. The arrest confirmed by the State Police Boss, Mrs. Atinuke Koye, followed a petition written by one of the targets of the assassins and a member of the House of Representatives, Mr. Samuel Adeyemi. Those reportedly arrested included a special admirer to the former Deputy Governor, Deputy Speaker of the suspended State House of Assembly, a member of the board in the state and another notable politician.

This whole incident followed the fact that suspected assassins were on the prowl in the state a week earlier during which they attacked Adesanya, a Governorship aspirant on the platform of (AC) Action Congress, Chief Dapo Alibaloye and another aspirant on the platform of (PDP), Professor Adesegun Ojo. Adesanya was attacked at a hotel in the State Capital during a reception for members of the electoral committee of the P.D.P. which conducted the primaries in the State.

The assassins, about 7 in number, were said to have swooped on the house in search of Adeyemi, who had earlier in the day, won the House of Representatives ticket by defeating Chief Osalomi, a notable supporter of Fayose.

Adesanya escaped with a broken head, Adeyemi was lucky to have escaped uninjured. The Police orderly was however killed by the hoodlums, Alibaloye, during that same incident was attacked in his bedroom by the seven man gang, and left him after dispossessing him of his valuable belongings. His aides were mercilessly beaten and left supposed dead in their pool of blood.

Oji on his own, escaped after his personal security made up of local hunters, engaged the assassins in a shootout. Adeyemi blamed the attack on the supporters of Fayose, who allegedly, had mapped out plans to kill some notable politicians in the P.D.P who were involved in his removal from office.

Fayose, through the former commissioner of information Mr. Gboyega Oguntuase, denied the allegation saying that it had become a fashion in the state for everybody to blame the former governor for any violent action. Fayose, claimed through the same means that he brought Adeyemi to political limelight, thus, he will gain nothing by killing people in the state, thus he asked the police to look elsewhere for the perpetrators of the crime.

A statement from the state public relations office of the party, Mr. Taiwo Emmanuel Omiyale, said that political attacks on the stakeholders in the state was antithetical to the peace reigning in the state, saying that all the people in the state looked forward to installation of a new Government come the month of elections (2007).

The party condemned what it called intolerance among politicians in the state and called on the Police to put every politician under surveillance for peace to reign. The party commiserated with the State Police Command on the death of Adeyemi's orderly during the attacks and advised the people against voting for violent politicians in the view of the recent experience in the State.

Now before the arrest of Fayose's loyalties, a former governor in a statement denied any link with the said attackers. Fayose in a statement declared that the Nigerian public should now begin to see that these are allegations and calculated attempts to rope him into a mess because they know what he stands for in Ekiti Politics. In his own words, he said; "I am quite aware that what sells most in Abuja today is once ability to lie against Fayose and hang on his neck whatever evil plan, they might mastermind in Ekiti state".

This account may not be complete without making mention of the recent scenario which saw the resident INEC chair person of Ekiti State, in the just concluded rerun elections of key - positions in government, throw in her resignation letter to President, Musa Yar' Aduwa; when it became clear that she could no longer discharge her duties as INEC chairperson without fear and favour, mostly because of the powers that-be, powers that are insisting on her swearing into power certain persons that do not represent the mandate of the people in the just concluded rerun elections.

In the final analysis she could not help but do as the powers that-be directed her. At the long run, It was later discovered by some unconfirmed sources that she compromised her position and

integrity as INEC Chairperson. This haunting reality to a large extent goes to validate the claims of the realist school of thought presented in the beginning of this dissertation. But should this be always the case? This goes further to buttress the point indicated above when we stated that the weak and poor conception of the idea of leadership among Nigerians is largely responsible for the leadership crisis that is presently affecting the development of Nigeria.

1.6 Conclusion

The examples of bad leadership examined in the past few pages have established that bad leadership; one ridden with all the variables such as corruption, greed and self-centeredness are some of the major root causes of leadership crisis in Nigeria. This situation has been enhanced by the consistent refusal of leadership candidates in Nigeria to embrace the generally accepted meaning of leadership as indicated in the study so far. The study carried out in this chapter infers the absence of a coherent theory of leadership among Nigerian leaders. The need therefore arises for theorists to provide leaders with a viable and consistent theory of leadership, one that will aid, guide and direct the affairs of leadership from every sector. This is the core reason for embarking on this dissertation.

In keeping with this goal, the next chapter, (Chapter Two), shall be dedicated to the study and consideration of certain theories of leadership, leadership theories from two outstanding schools of thought “The Moralistic School of Thought” and the “Realist Schools of Thought”. We shall be offering a critical study of the postulations of both schools with the view to identifying the various efforts they have made to address the problem of leadership. More importantly, we shall also examine why their theory of leadership failed to address most of the problems they initially set out to solve. We shall then strive to show how the gaps in this theory can be filled via the Aristotelian notion and theory of prudence.

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THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP

2.1 Introduction

The major essence of this chapter is to situate in clearer terms, the major problem which this study identifies in the various literatures that exist on the subject of this Dissertation (Leadership Crisis). We had earlier in the introductory part of this study, noted that the seeming complex nature of the conception and notion of leadership has caused authors and thinkers in the area of leadership to produced various volumes of literature on the subject of leadership with the view to addressing the numerous problems of leadership crisis all over the world.

In the preliminary study conducted for this study we established that most of the literature on the subject of leadership can be categorized into two groups: “The Realist School of Thought” and “The Moralism School of Thought.” We also noted how there exist today, a great confusion between both theories of leadership which consequently is responsible for the epistemic disconnection and the lack of a consistent theory of leadership. This disconnection we propose to argue in this study, are some of the factors responsible for the absence of a consistent and viable theory of leadership which should guide the daily salient actions and decision making processes of political leaders in Nigeria and in the rest of the world.

This chapter is therefore dedicated to a detailed study and analysis of the theories of leadership prescribed by these two schools of thought with the view to identifying the main themes of these schools of thought, identifying the major proponents of the school of thought and the possible problems associated with the ideologies in these schools of thought. We shall generally compare both theories of leadership for the purpose of identifying the reasons for the confusion and the conflicting nature of the two theories of political leadership. Most importantly, we shall strive to show how the Aristotelian Notion of Political Prudence for leadership offers a better platform for drawing or producing a new theory for political leadership, one that will address the scourge of bad leadership which presently, is eating deep into Nigeria and many other African countries today.

To successfully achieve this task, we shall start by identifying the various tenets of the schools of thought in question, after which we will examine the various gaps and flaws that exist in the various ideologies of political leadership which they postulate. We will later identify the reasons for the conflict between the two ideologies in this schools of thought and the difference which the Aristotelian notions of political prudence will make in providing leaders with a more consistent theory for leadership. A theory of leadership, from where we hope to provide a framework that will guide the salient decisions of political leaders in Nigeria and all over the world.

2.2 The Basic Tenets of Realism

Realism, or to be more precise and to avoid any confusion with the identically named philosophical term, *political realism*, is one of the most prominent theories in the study of Political Science and International Relations and has had great influence on both academic thinkers and politicians over many generations. In fact it is still a very important approach for analyzing the international system and has many implications for international politics today. It is a very broad and diverse realm, offering a place for various ideas and concepts. As a consequence some writers do not describe it as a theory, but as a “general orientation”¹ or “philosophical disposition with a recognizable attitude of mind”.² A metaphor which describes the current state of political realism quite well is one proposed by Elman in 1996 that sees it as nothing more than a “big tent, with room for a number of different theories”³.

When we look at the historical development of political realism, three major names come immediately to mind: Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian war* is considered to be the first writing that contains profound realist ideas and the author is therefore often described as “the father of realism”⁴. Likewise, Machiavelli’s *Prince* and Hobbes’ *Leviathan* have had an enormous impact and continue to influence scholars presently.

Even though the timeframe from Thucydides to Hobbes covers roughly 2000 years, they have developed surprisingly similar ideas and thoughts. Of course they offered different arguments ranging from descriptive historical methodology via Machiavelli's empirical attempt to develop a theory that considers how people really are rather than how they "ought to be", and then to Hobbes highly abstract and rational approach of a social contract theory inspired by Euclidean geometry. They all give different weight to certain assumptions or consequences but nevertheless they agree in three major points: firstly a specific (pessimistic) notion of human nature (*egoism*), secondly the idea that at international level there is anarchy (as defined as "the absence of a formal centre of decision-making or a system of government")⁵ and thirdly that states pursue interests defined in terms of power.

The insight that humans are egoistic to a certain amount is shared by all three authors and similarly they agree that this is not likely to change in the future. In addition they observe that on an international level there is anarchy. This does not mean that there is no hierarchy but it is understood as lack of rule and central government. This leads us to the third point: because states act in an area of anarchy, where no one can rely on laws or rules, they find themselves acting in a "self-help system"⁶ where they have to pursue their own interests. These interests are to obtain and to maintain power, since power alone gives states security in a field of anarchy. The area of international relations is therefore seen as a realm of "power and interest"⁷.

Another important figure in the establishment of political realism was without doubt Hans Morgenthau. A refugee from Nazi Germany who like many other intellectuals found his home in America, Morgenthau was one of the leading political realists in the aftermath of World War II and is regarded by many as "the purest as well as the most self-conscious apostle of realism of his generation"⁸. Morgenthau's great achievement was the development of a systematic and comprehensive theory of political realism which featured only six principles.

Besides the well-known assumptions that we already find in similar form in Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, Morgenthau further stresses that "morality for states and individuals are different and the categories in which we evaluate human behaviour cannot be transferred onto states. Moreover he defined politics as an autonomous sphere"⁹. However, in contrast to

Machiavelli he doesn't dismiss ethics totally from politics. He suggests that, although human beings are "political animals", who pursue their interests, they are "moral animals". Deprived of any morality, they would descend to the level of beasts¹⁰. Still, the similarities are overwhelming and to acknowledge this and differentiate his ideas from other forms of political realism Morgenthau later was labeled a "traditional" or "classical realist"¹¹.

The pluralist challenge of the late 20th century then forced the development of different thoughts and a new defense of the political realist worldview. Kenneth Waltz was arguably the most important scholar of what has become known as structural realism or *neorealism*.

In contrast to the thinkers ahead of him, Waltz did not want to base his theory on specific characteristics of human nature, but tried to develop it analogous to microeconomics. For him, states in the international system are like firms in a domestic economy. Both have the same fundamental interest: to survive.¹² After this new explanation of states' interests he follows a common realist pathway. In the opinion of Jonas Daub,¹³ Anarchy is for Waltz the ordering principle of the international system and despite existing non-state actors, the acting units are states. It follows a self-help system in which each state has to look out for itself and states can only be differentiated by their relative power to each other to perform the same function. Yet, a major difference to the classical realism of Morgenthau and others can be found elsewhere. Waltz insists on empirical testability of knowledge and on falsification as a methodological ideal and tries to apply this ideal to his theory¹⁴. A weak point of Waltz' theory is that it cannot be used to explain domestic policies. However it is a very helpful tool for understanding why states behave in similar ways despite their different forms of government, ideologies and growing interdependence, and it has become very influential because of its theoretical elegance and methodological rigour.

Recent forms of realism have increased in complexity and diversity and different authors offer different typologies to distinguish between them. A very sophisticated way to navigate in the jungle of today's realist theories is offered by Jack Donnelly¹⁵. He proceeds in two steps:

First he considers the relative emphasis the theories give to the basic assumptions of egoism and anarchy, then he tries to evaluate the stringency of their commitment to a rigorous and

exclusively realist analysis¹⁶. Following his first step he distinguishes between *structural realists* who place emphasis to international anarchy and *biological realists* who attach more importance to a fixed human nature and see this as the primary source for the existing international system. He refuses the terms of neorealism (neorealist) and classical realism which are often used to describe these two categories because one is simply an effort to emphasize the “newness” compared to earlier structural realist and the other which does not tell anything about the substance of the proposed orientation. In a second step, he then suggests three different categories according to how strictly the theories apply the three assumptions of egoism, anarchy and power politics. A *radical realist* adopts extreme versions of the three assumptions of egoism, anarchy and power politics. As an example he gives the Athenian envoys at Melos in Thucydides’ *History*. A *strong realist* leaves only little space for “non-realist” concerns and he proposes Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau as his examples.

Finally, *hedged realists* accept fully only the first two assumptions of anarchy and egoism but have various problems with the third assumption of power politics and stress that it is important not to forget about other ideas such as liberalism. E.H. Carr and Herz are Donnelly’s examples for this category¹⁷.

After looking at the historical development of political realism and describing the situation today, it has become obvious that there is great variety in the field of this theory. This situation raises an important question: Do we really need all these different theories with all these complicated names? We shall be talking about this issue when we begin to consider the challenges associated with the current ideas of political realism.

2.3 Problems With The Realist Thought

Realism thoughts, we have noted earlier, are of the opinion that the state is a unitary actor that acts rationally. By rationally we mean that the state has some preferences and seeks to maximize these preferences, with disregard for norms, values, ethics etc. Given the anarchic nature of international environment (there is no overarching government that has laws, or judges or prisons for states that violates the law), every country has the fear that others may annihilate them. So for

self-defense purpose, they have to acquire power. And power is ultimately the only preference of the state. So the state will do anything to preserve or acquire power. Put differently, the state has one intuitive and single behavior! Power maximization.

These realist views in so many ways have raised criticism and objections in the field of politics and international relations. Liberals for instance don't believe that states are unitary or rational actors. The state is not a thinking identity; it is an apparatus of a group of leaders and different powerful groups. The outcome of the struggles and interests of these groups is what will end up dictating the behavior of the state. The state behavior is not dictated on the sole purpose of maximizing power, as realist say, but they can show different behavior that sometimes has nothing to do with maximizing power.

In identifying the major issues associated with political realism, we shall mainly confine our analysis to the works of Morgenthau's *Power Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.¹⁸ This work captures political realism as the twentieth century interpretation of theoretical approaches in International Relations as well as the most common approach actually used by actors in foreign affairs and statesmanship since the start of World War II. Hans work was first written in response to the events of World War II and its effects through the emerging Cold War era. The book has been revised through the 60's and 70's, and remains a powerful interpretation of world politics pre-1985. Despite how contemporary this political thought is, it has several criticisms. We shall discuss a few of them here.

1, Realists are strongly anti Utopian: This school of thought is explained by Morgenthau to include the idea that: -

. . . the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them. This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but at best must be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts. This school, then, sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle for all pluralist societies. It appeals to historic precedent rather than to

abstract principles, and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good.¹⁹

This sounds reasonable, but the implications are more problematic. Morgenthau then proceeds to cite six central principles of political realism, which I will here summarize, contrast with Machiavelli's views, and then briefly evaluate.

2, Political realism is rooted in certain objective laws of nature: Han believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure.'²⁰ Here we see some of Machiavelli's claims strengthened and extended. Morgenthau is not only describing what really happens, he also claims that objective laws of behaviour form the basis of proper political activity. Furthermore, these laws are not directed by our moral preferences, and if these laws are ignored, men will fail, just as did the prince who tried to conform to what should be, rather than what is. Morgenthau is making a strongly positivist claim but we might note that such universal laws have not been successfully demonstrated by sociology or psychology, though some limited predictive capacity in certain areas of political behaviour, e.g. voting behaviour, has been achieved.

3, Political realist define their interest in terms of 'Power': The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. . . . It sets politics as an autonomous sphere such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion'.²¹

Here political activity is held to be directed by the aim to achieve power, a view supported also by *The Prince*. Likewise, 'interest' is usually assumed to be the self-interest of whatever group or unit is under study. Ethical judgments about actions are therefore not the same as political judgments - the later are concerned with issues of effective action, will, intellectual capacity, and are measured by how far an action promotes the power of the actor or the group he represents. Promotion of power is held to be of a prime self-interest. In this light, the ethical and ideological

concerns of statesmen are held to be of limited use in predicting the foreign policy or political policy that statesmen will in fact follow,²² since his duty in the political arena must be directed to enhancing and maintaining power. This view is also found in *The Prince*, where leaders seek power due to necessity, but only choose morality as a preference when positive conditions allow.

This view may hold for individual leaders and statesmen. However, it does not hold so well for governments. Thus the foreign policy of the Soviet Union had been conditioned not only by real politik, but also by ideas of class struggle and historical dialectic found in Marxist-Leninism. Likewise, the policies of communist China are largely opaque without a good understanding of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism. Ironically, the U.S.A. post-World War II policy of the world-wide containment of communism is largely based on ideals found in the liberal and capitalist world views. It is exactly this type of idealism which Morgenthau thinks is inappropriate as it has committed the U.S. into taking the role of 'world policemen' and engaged them in economic and military operations world-wide. Yet there is no doubt that such 'ideals' and ideologies have helped generate the conditions in which real-politik was played out for the forty years of the Cold War. Furthermore, it could be argued that the real international basis of conflict during the Cold War was the tension between Communist/Socialism and Democracy/Capitalism, with nation-states acting in a sense as the means for carrying out these political and economic systems.

4, Realism assumes that its key concept of interest is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place: Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.'²³

Morgenthau then goes on to cite the sociologist Max Weber as saying that: -

Interest (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the 'images of the world' created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.²⁴

If so, we might say that ideas can act as means for interests: means of communication, expression and formulation of interests, especially in the public arena. Morgenthau then goes on to add: -

The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything which establishes and maintains the control of man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another.²⁵

Here, as in Machiavelli, we see an emphasis on the control of men by leaders. But Morgenthau admits that cultural traditions and ideas may help condition the 'content and the manner' of the use of power. In other words, the way power is expressed and institutionalized can vary. Furthermore, power is a component of most human relationships. Morgenthau does go on to suggest that the realities of the international environment are such that the range of policy formation is limited, e.g. concern for the balance of power will always exist where numerous countries with similar ranges of power co-exist.

However, Morgenthau has here undermined his own position - if cultural factors, including ideas, provide the means for the pursuit of our interests, and help fashion the manner in which power is used, then ideology will remain a central aspect of power-relations, and in fact will help determine when power is used against others. Put simply, the raw facts of power are insufficient to determine chosen ends, that is, our main interests beyond mere survival. Survival is only a dominant, active interest under conditions of threat, e.g. in World War II and during the Cold War. It was also a major concern in Machiavelli's Italy, and remains a major concern in deeply destabilized environments, e.g. as suggested by events in modern Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

5, Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action: Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension

between moral command and the requirements of successful political action. . . . Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the principle of national survival.' ²⁶

Once again, it is assumed that the survival of the political actor is valid and to be continued, even at the expense of condoning immorality. In Machiavelli the political actor was the prince, in Morgenthau the main political actor is held to be the sovereign state, regardless of whether that state is viewed as legitimate by any other criteria beyond their ability to manage and the control the citizens within their borders.

There are some positive things to be said about this position. If America had been less ideologically and ideally motivated, she may have been less ready to enter the morass of the Vietnam War, for example. Good intentions when unsupported by appropriate means certainly can lead to unintended and bad outcomes. Furthermore, there is no doubt that a government, and the State, does have a duty to maintain the necessary means of life for their citizens (an argument put forward as early as Aristotle).

6, Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation: Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of particular nations with the moral laws that govern the universe. All nations are tempted - and few have been able to resist the temptation for long - to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions as the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another.' ²⁷

This is a reasonable statement, directed against both fanaticism and the imposition of one set of particular moral ideals on every nation. Such notions of 'universal' morality often can be a form of cultural imperialism. On the other hand, Morgenthau has already argued that there are real laws of behaviour on which political and national behaviour should be based. If these supposed laws are not in fact universal, then political realism itself actually becomes an attempt to impose political realism upon others as the implicit rules of international conduct. In other words, it

ceases to be a valid form of political science, and itself becomes an ideology, a tool in the international arena. These 'realistic' rules, of course, are more beneficial to those with measurable and definable power than to those with less power, or with power less readily assessed. In military strategy one of the main policies is to lure your enemy into fighting on unknown ground, or in ways in which he is weak, but where you are strong.

The complexity of political realism and ethics

These general considerations then lead Morgenthau to argue that the difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is “real” and it is “profound”. However much of the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.’²⁸

The second sentence is true, but from it, we should not infer that this particular political philosophy is true, makes valid consistently claims, or is preferable as a norm of the international arena. In particular, 'political realism' actually takes a 'moral stance' in trying to argue that morality is not an issue when survival is at stake, and in some sense, since power is the basis of survival, it is always advisable to augment power over morality. Morality can therefore only be afforded as a secondary goal. This is an attempt to put forward an 'amoral' case for political conduct. However, the use of any power at any time over any person for any goal, no matter how apparently moral or consensus-based, is a profoundly moral and ideological process, guided both by ideas and culture in its formation, execution, and in its later historical interpretation. In other words, the attempt to divide ethics and politics is based on a false understanding of both. Ethical considerations and norms are themselves persuasive tools of political power, while politics emerges out of any social acting out of values. It is precisely this close relationship between ethics and politics which informs the foreign policy and rhetoric of countries such as China, Indonesia, and in a different direction many European nations.²⁹

Elsewhere Morgenthau argues that political realists are aware of the relevance of moral standards: -

The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political ones. As political

realist, he cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of politics. And he parts with other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere.³⁰

Morgenthau is running the implicit idea of a hierarchy of values here - morals or ideals would be subordinated to the requirements of power politics. This notion, too, centers on how power is defined. Furthermore, our hierarchy of interests will tend to shift depending on our appraisal of the situation we are dealing with.

In conclusion, we wish to note that from the foregoing, all the set of assumptions made in political realism, that is, that actors (leaders/states/groups) act to pursue their own interests, that there is no point in trying to achieve aims which are unrealizable or impractical, that consequently, politics is 'the art of the possible', that we shouldn't expect too much of corruptible individuals or institutions, that all social and political systems are imperfect, and that the ability to carry out an action, i.e. power, is a more important determinant of events than ethics or ideology. This claims places realism at a rather critical point where it continues to attract reactions and oppositions from various other schools of thought on account of its critical methods. All the assumptions here are in sharp contrast with Moralism.

In addition, we wish to note that their further claims to: a practical approach, the claims to focus on the actual needs of states and leaders, the claims to guards against threats and crises, and their claims to be based on an accurate assessment of both history and contemporary affairs, has not been largely accepted by other schools of thought. As such there yet remain a gap in the general ideology of what political leadership should really stand for in this 20/21 century.

2.4 Realism And Aristotle on Leadership

Aristotle too was deeply interested in the way politics operated and wrote a foundation treatise called the *Politics* in which he analyzed the different types of constitutions, the way they

developed and were overthrown, and the legitimate basis of their rule. This treatise called upon numerous actual examples known to him from the Greek world, and was not Utopian in its methodology and implications, as was Plato's *Republic*. Rather, Aristotle states that we have to assess the best constitution for 'the majority of states', i.e. his claim is that his analysis is based on facts, and that its recommendations are practical. Essentially, Aristotle feels that the middle class provides the most stable group to rule the state, but draws up various appropriate constitutions relevant to the class structure of the city involved.

Aristotle's thought had enormous influence on what came to be called political theory, as well as early constitutional and legal thought. His comparative and constitutional approach is very much with us today in many modes of political analysis. In passing we might mention that some of his ideas were put into practice by the tyrant Demetrius of Phaleron, who came into power in Athens after 322 B.c., and gave that city 10 years of fairly stable but morally austere government. Likewise, Aristotle's conception of the mixed constitution, including institutions reflecting the democratic, aristocratic and monarchical elements, was used by a later Greek historian, Polybius, to explain the dramatic successes and military might of the Romans as they conquered the entire Mediterranean world.

It is quite possible that Machiavelli's method of analysis in some ways followed Aristotle's in the use of examples to support a set of recommendations which he feels are practical. This is something of a 'case analysis' approach, where individual examples are used to support and demonstrate general principles. We guess this may be why it is on record that Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it actually is.

However, realism continues to maintain that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. Yet, Political realists are aware of the moral

significance of political action. They are also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. So whether the individual may say for himself: "*Fiat justitia, pereat mundus* (Let justice be done, even if the world perish)," the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers Aristotle's notion of prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract sense judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences. Classical and medieval philosophy knew this, and so did Lincoln when he said:

I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.³¹

It is thus clear that realism continues to reject the total existence of any ethical consideration or standards of morality which they, in various quarters, have acknowledged really do exist and is a major prerequisite for Aristotle's notion of leadership. These claims, counter claims, contradictions and further contradiction are some of the obvious reasons why there is yet to be consistent theory of leadership in the world the today.

2.5 The Moralists Conceptions of Leadership

Moralists - someone who demands exact conformity to rules and forms, in other words, he / she could be considered as one who is concerned with casuistic discussions of right action, or who seeks a general characterization of right action, often contrasted with a moral philosopher whose concern is with general philosophical questions about ethics.

Morality - a word that originates from the Latin word which means "*moralitas*" which have also been interpreted to mean either of the following: "*manner, character, proper behavior*"- is the differentiation of intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are good (or right) and those that are bad (or wrong). *Morality* may also be specifically synonymous with "goodness" or "rightness." *Immorality* on the other hand is the active opposition to morality (i.e. opposition to that which is good or right),

Aristotle (384 - 322 BC) is widely considered to be the first systematic thinker of a virtue based ethics. He developed a coherent view of moral conduct that integrated his ideas on politics, education, society and human well-being. His influence on the history of ethics in Western philosophy is profound. Aristotle is of the opinion that living a virtuous and moral life is an ongoing effort, beginning in childhood and continuing through life as we practice right habits and nurture good character. "Although the morality of people and their ethics amounts to the same thing, there is a usage that restricts morality to systems such as that of Kant, based on notions such as duty, obligation, and principles of conduct, reserving ethics for the more Aristotelian approach to practical reasoning, based on the notion of a virtue, and generally avoiding the separation of 'moral' considerations from other practical considerations."³²

If morality is the answer to the question 'how ought we to live' at the individual level, politics can be seen as addressing the same question at the social level. It is therefore unsurprising that evidence has been found of a relationship between attitudes in morality and politics. Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham have studied the differences between liberals and conservatives, in this regard.³³

Group morality develops from shared concepts and beliefs and is often codified to regulate behavior within a culture or community. Various defined actions come to be called moral or

immoral. Individuals who choose moral action are popularly held to possess "moral fiber", whereas those who indulge in immoral behavior may be labeled as socially degenerate. The continued existence of a group may depend on widespread conformity to codes of morality; an inability to adjust moral codes in response to new challenges is sometimes credited with the demise of a community.

Within nationalist movements, there has been some tendency to feel that a nation will not survive or prosper without acknowledging one common morality, regardless of its content. Political Morality is also relevant to the behaviour internationally of national governments, and to the support they receive from their host population. Noam Chomsky states that: ³⁴

if we adopt the principle of universality : if an action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us. Those who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to themselves the standards they apply to others—more stringent ones, in fact—plainly cannot be taken seriously when they speak of appropriateness of response; or of right and wrong, good and evil.

34.

Recent theorists in the likes of Galston, ³⁵ Norton, ³⁶ Cooper ³⁷ and Cooper and Wright, ³⁸ have argued that a virtue based ethics focuses upon the moral quality of the person and can inform an ethics of leadership. In a different context, writers such as Burns, ³⁹ Gardner, ⁴⁰ and Terry, ⁴¹ has however, called for an explicit recognition of the moral nature of leadership. They insist that it is the only way that leadership can be practiced. Max Weber in another study, opined that the ethics of responsibility requires leaders to attend to the consequences of their actions. ⁴²

Their first responsibility, however, resides in what Adam Smith called self-mastery. All virtues and the personal capacity to live up to promises, obey the law, and follow directives depending upon this primary moral capacity.

2.6 Problems With The Moralists' Thoughts

People in positions of responsibility have an obligation to control their passions and overcome temptations. Without this basic self-discipline they could abuse their power for their own purposes. Thoughtless, rash, or impulsive actions could harm or exploit those who depend on the leader or cause the leader to fail in performing vital responsibilities. This reason for this is simple, being moral as an imbibed virtue has been known to be insufficient when it boils down to the basics. When internal or external stimuli affect leaders, they are often expected to have the self-control not to react instantly. Their actions should be based on reflection, not driven by reactive emotions. Without self-command moral life remains impossible.⁴³ But the attainment of the moral life cannot be sustained on its own.

The conception of what is or should stand for "What is Morals," have been known to vary from one community to another community. Consequently, what obtains in town "A" may certainly not be acceptable in town "B". This challenge makes it impossible to effectively leadership, one that would not infringe on the fundamental rights of the citizens in divers communities.

At this point, want to note that virtues as has been presented by the moralist alone, cannot sustain a full political ethics. Many virtues such as courage, temperance, justice, generosity, and mercy cluster around political actions. But virtues understood as simple dispositions without judgment can be blind and fall prey to what Aristotle's says about any aspect of life carried to an extreme. Such in his opinion becomes a vice.⁴⁴ Finally, Smith further shows the limitations of virtue when he argued that virtues can be subsumed by other less desirable ends; For example, a soldier may behave with courage but serve an evil cause; evil dictators can act with mercy; greedy individuals can show generosity to friends. Morals or virtues as some theorist chose to call it, cannot provide the moral foundations of all actions.⁴⁵

2.7 Moralism and Aristotle's Notions of Prudence

What Aristotle does in his definition of Prudence tends to offer substance to make up for the epistemic lack that that exist in the general view of the concept Morality or the generally held

opinion of virtue in the field of ethics. This is explicitly captured in the definition he offered for Prudence also known as *Phronēsis*. In his own words: "Now, the capacity of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself is regarded as typical of a man of practical wisdom" ⁴⁶ So the virtuous person is able to have each thing in its proper amount. This is moderation. One can see how prudence and moderation are necessary for sound political leadership by considering Aristotle's discussion of statesmanship in his *Politics*.

Aristotle distinguishes between two intellectual virtues: *Sophia* and *Phronesis*. *Sophia* (usually translated "wisdom") is the ability to think well about the nature of the world, to discern why the world is the way it is (this is sometimes equated with science); *Sophia* involves deliberation concerning universal truths. *Phronesis* is the capability to consider the mode of actions in order to deliver change, especially to enhance the quality of life. Aristotle says that *phronesis* is not simply a skill, however, as it involves not only the ability to decide how to achieve a certain end, but also the ability to reflect upon and determine that end. This analysis captures prudence as that extra boost that empowers the virtues leader to do as expected even in the phase of adversity.

Gaining *Phronesis* (Prudence) therefore requires maturation, in Aristotle's thought: "Whereas young people become (virtues in certain areas) accomplished in geometry and mathematics, and wise within these limits, prudent young people do not seem to be found. The reason is that prudence is concerned with particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a young person lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce it."⁴⁷ Aristotle therefore holds that "having *phronesis* is both necessary and sufficient for being virtuous; because *phronesis* is practical, it is impossible to be both *phronimos* and *Akratic*" ⁴⁸.

It was on the basis of this that Aristotle called prudence "Practical wisdom" in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and contrasted it with "Intuitive Reason," which is the natural endowment Aristotle thought some people had for understanding what was ultimately right and what was ultimately wrong in any society. Intuitive reason marked out "the ultimate" in both directions," while prudence "makes us take the right means." The link which prudence provides between seeing and acting is what distinguishes it from simple discernment, which is a function of reason. It is the moralist school of thought road builder towards the goals marked out by reason ⁴⁹.

2.8 Conclusion

The chapter we have examined above focused on intimating us with the major tenets of the two schools of thought: The Rationalist School and The Moralism School of thought. Our study in this chapter revealed that two schools of thought, the Moralism School and the Realist School, have discussed the problem of leadership. While the moralists call for an explicit recognition of the moral nature of leadership, they failed to provide leaders with a consistent direction of what ethical leadership should be. Realists on the other hand have argued for a total autonomy of the political sphere. By this position, they failed to recognize the existence and relevance of any moral consideration in the political arena; consequently, they subordinate moral standards to those of politics. The ideological confusion arising between both schools of thought, our study have identified, are some of the major factors responsible for the absence of an adequate and consistent theory of political leadership. The study in this dissertation is thus poised to bridging the gap that exists between these two schools with the view to providing a viable and consistent theory of leadership, a theory that will provide a guideline for leaders who must make very salient decisions as leaders in their community. The entire study in this dissertation is thus set out with the objective of providing, via the Aristotle's notion of prudence, a theory of political leadership that will constitute a viable framework for good leadership in Nigeria.

Since we are proposing the Aristotelian notion of prudence as that vital resource that leaders cannot do without, it becomes very pertinent to offer a detailed study of Aristotle's philosophy with emphases on his ideas on ethics, virtue ethics, prudence and political leadership. This shall be the focus of our study in chapter three.

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3.0 ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF PRUDENCE

3.1 Introduction

At this stage of our study, it becomes pertinent that we offer a detailed study on Aristotle's ideas in relation to the aims and objectives that we hope to achieve in this study. By this we mean that we shall be examining all the ideas and coherent views on moral conduct of Aristotle which integrated his ideas on politics, education, society and human well-being. The study in this section shall provide a justification for the adoption of the Aristotle's notion of prudence for this study over other notions of leadership by other thinkers and philosophers. Consequently, his ideas on ethics, virtue ethics and leadership shall be examined with the view to justifying why his notion of prudence is being adopted as a major prerequisite for providing a viable and coherent theory for political leadership.

Aristotle's ethics builds upon earlier Greek ethics, particularly those of Aristotle's teacher Plato and his teacher, Socrates. One important distinction is that Socrates didn't leave any written work, Plato left works aimed more toward popular consumption, and Aristotle left more scholarly works. More frequently than Plato, Aristotle notes are without exceptions to his general rules and the lack of precision in his ethics. The overall directions of each of these philosophers, however, were quite similar.

Socrates was the first Greek philosopher to concentrate on ethics. This concentration on ethics probably started as a response to sophism, which was a popular school of thought at the time that emphasized rhetoric, moral relativism and argument against traditional Greek religion (they used rhetoric to argue against many other traditions too). Sophists raised many moral problems in contemporary society without offering solutions.

Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all taught character-based ethics in which people should pursue virtue (*arete*) to attain happiness or flourishing (*eudaimonia*). They all saw the virtuous behaviour as something which could be taught and practiced. They all thought that ethics is

based on reason, and that there were logical reasons for behaving virtuously. This contrasted with the moral relativism of the sophists, who argued that several different behaviors' could be seen as ethical by different societies. In fact, similar arguments still occur in philosophical ethics today.

In light of these fundamental similarities, the differences in ethics between Socrates, Plato and Aristotle seem slight. The major difference is that Socrates and Plato thought that knowledge of virtuous behaviour was enough to ensure that people followed it, and that nobody did evil knowingly. Aristotle disagreed (and most later philosophers agree with him on this point), saying that many people know the bad effects of their actions, but give in to their desires anyway because of 'the weakness of the wills' (Akresia). Plato presented only four cardinal virtues: *wisdom, courage, temperance* and *justice*. Aristotle expanded and elaborated on this list quite extensively.

3.2 Aristotle's Ethics

Aristotle believed that ethical knowledge is not certain knowledge (like metaphysics and epistemology) but is general knowledge. Also, as it is not a theoretical discipline, he thought a person had to study in order to become "good." Thus, if a person was to become virtuous, they could not simply study what virtue is, they had to actually do virtuous activity. "We are not studying in order to know what virtue is, but to become good, for otherwise there would be no profit in it"... This was a resolution Aristotle came to adopt as what he believed should be the reason for studying ethics in the first place. We in this project have made practical efforts to ensure that we do not lose focus of this stand point.

Three treatises of Aristotle's ethics survive today: *Nicomachean Ethics*, the most popular, *Eudemian Ethics*, and the *Magna Moralia*. Each is believed to be a collection of Aristotle's lecture notes (although authorship of the *Magna Moralia* is disputed), possibly containing several different lecture courses, which can be sparse and difficult to read. The scholarly consensus is that *Eudemian Ethics* represents Aristotle's early ethical theory, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* appears to build upon it. Some critics consider the *Eudemian Ethics* to be "less mature," while

others, such as Kenny ¹, contend that the Eudemian Ethics is the more mature, and therefore later. Work Books IV-VI of Eudemian Ethics also appears as Books V-VII of Nicomachean Ethics.

Scholars believe that the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics were either edited by or dedicated to Aristotle's son and pupil Nicomachus and his disciple Eudemus, respectively, although the works themselves do not explain the source of their names. Although Aristotle's father was also called Nicomachus, Aristotle's son was the next leader of Aristotle's school, the Lyceum, and historians therefore consider him to be more likely to have influenced the collection of Aristotle's lecture notes.

A fourth treatise, Aristotle's Politics, is often regarded as the sequel to the Ethics; Aristotle's Ethics states that the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the city-state, or polis. Aristotle's 'On the Soul' may be considered a prequel to his Ethics, especially in its discussion of the rational soul. Other scholars believe that this fourth treatise was what birthed his ideas on the subject of Prudence (The main subject of this paper) and in our opinion, a major prerequisite of political office holders.

Aristotle's - Nicomachean Ethics

In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle focuses on the importance of continually behaving virtuously and developing virtue rather than committing specific good actions. This can be opposed to Kantian ethics, in which the primary focus is on individual action. Nicomachean Ethics emphasizes the importance of context to ethical behaviour — what might be right in one situation might be wrong in another. Aristotle believed that happiness is the end of life and that as long as a person is striving for goodness, good deeds will result from that struggle, making the person virtuous and therefore happy.

On *Moderation*, Aristotle believed that every ethical virtue is an intermediate condition between excess and deficiency. For example, fear isn't bad in and of itself; it is just bad when felt to excess or deficiency. A courageous person judges that some dangers are worth facing and others not, the level of fear is appropriate to the circumstances. The coward flees at every danger, although the circumstances do not merit it. The rash person disregards all fear and dives into

every danger no matter the consequences. Aristotle identifies virtue as being the 'mean' of the situation. Thus, there is no way to form a strict set of rules that would solve every practical problem. "The virtuous person sees the truth in each case, being as it were, a standard and measure of them."

This does not mean Aristotle believed in moral relativism, however. He set certain emotions (e.g., hate, envy, jealousy, spite, etc.) and certain actions (e.g., adultery, theft, murder, etc.) as always wrong, regardless of the situation or the circumstances.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle often focused on finding the mean between two extremes of any particular subject; whether it be justice, courage, wealth and so forth. For example, courage is a mean between two feelings (fear and confidence) and an action (the courageous act). Too much fear or too little confidence leads to cowardice, and too little fear or too much confidence can lead to rash, foolish choices. Aristotle says that finding this middle ground is essential to reaching eudemonia, the ultimate form of godlike consciousness. This middle ground is often referred to as *The Golden Mean*.

Influence on Other Thinkers

Aristotle's ethics and philosophy was taught in Athens until 529 AD when the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I closed down non-Christian schools of philosophy. Aristotle's teachings spread through the Mediterranean and the Middle East, where early Islam (unlike contemporary Christianity) supported rational philosophical descriptions of the natural world. Avicenna and Averroes were Islamic philosophers who commented on Aristotle as well as writing their own philosophy in Arabic.

In the twelfth century, Latin translations of Aristotle's works were found, enabling the Dominican priest Albert the Great and his pupil, Thomas Aquinas to combine Aristotle's philosophy with Christian theology. Later medieval church scholasticism insisted on Thomist views and suppressed non-Aristotelian metaphysics. Aquinas' work *Summa Theologiae* contained many volumes, fifteen of which were concerned with ethics and values. It argued that a rational foundation for ethics was compatible with Christianity, enabling it to borrow many ideas from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. *Eudaimonia* or human flourishing was held to be a

temporary goal for this life, but perfect happiness as the ultimate goal could only be attained in the next life by the virtuous. New theological virtues were added to the system: faith, hope and charity. Supernatural assistance was also allowed, helping people to be virtuous. Many important parts of Aristotle's ethics were retained however. Thomism, the name given to the beliefs of Thomas Aquinas, is particularly influential: it has been a part of official Catholic doctrine since the time of Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903).

Seventeenth century empiricism challenged Aristotle's metaphysics so successfully that doubt was cast on the rest of his philosophy too. The Nicomachean Ethics remains viable today however; it relies on neither non-material entities such as souls or rights or on a deterministic view of causation.

Twentieth century philosophers whose ethical works were influenced by Aristotle include Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams and Ayn Rand. These thinkers have in these contemporary times championed the cause of virtue ethics. As a result of their immense contributions, we shall be drawing a lot of thoughts from their wealth of experience in the works of Aristotle and his philosophy for this dissertation.

In the next chapter, we shall examine Aristotle's Virtue Ethics since his philosophy on the subject of virtue ethics is the philosophy upon which we shall premise our arguments for outstanding leadership. Among other issues that shall be treated here include the following questions: What is ethics? What is virtue and why should I be moral? These questions and the answers we shall provide at this early stage, we believe, will set the stage for the arguments we hope to present later on for Aristotle's notion of prudence in this project.

3.3 The Meaning of Ethics

A few years ago, Sociologist, Raymond Baumhart, in a business meeting organized for leaders and businessmen, asked this question: "What does the word "ethics" mean to you?" Among their replies were the following:

Ethics has to do with what my feelings tell me is right or wrong.

Ethics has to do with my religious beliefs.

Being ethical is doing what the law requires.

Ethics consists of the standards of behavior our society accepts.

I don't know what the word means.²

These replies might be typical of our own. The meaning of "ethics" is hard to pin down, and the views many people have about ethics are shaky.

Like Baumhart's first respondent, many people tend to equate ethics with their feelings. But being ethical is clearly not a matter of following one's feelings. A person following his or her feelings may recoil from doing what is right. In fact, feelings frequently deviate from what is ethical.

One should not identify ethics with religion. Most religions, of course, advocate high ethical standards. Yet if ethics were confined to religion, then ethics would apply only to religious people. But ethics applies as much to the behavior of the atheist as to that of the saint. Religion can set high ethical standards and can provide intense motivations for ethical behavior. Ethics, however, cannot be confined to religion nor is it the same as religion.

Being ethical is also not the same as following the law. The law often incorporates ethical standards to which most citizens subscribe. But laws, like feelings, can deviate from what is ethical. Our own pre-Civil War slavery laws and the apartheid laws of present-day South Africa are grotesquely obvious examples of laws that deviate from what is ethical.

Finally, being ethical is not the same as doing "whatever society accepts." In any society, most people accept standards that are, in fact, ethical. But standards of behavior in society can deviate from what is ethical. An entire society can become ethically corrupt. Nazi Germany is a good example of a morally corrupt society.

Moreover, if being ethical were doing "whatever society accepts," then to find out what is ethical, one would have to find out what society accepts. To decide what we should think about abortion, for example, we would have to take a survey of the American society or any other

society and then to conform my beliefs to whatever this society accepts. But no one ever tries to decide an ethical issue by doing a survey. Further, the lack of social consensus on many issues makes it impossible to equate ethics with whatever society accepts. Some people accept abortion but many others do not. If being ethical were doing whatever society accepts, one would have to find an agreement on issues which does not, in fact, exist.

What then is ethics? Ethics is two things. First, “*ethics refers to well based standards of rights and wrongs that prescribe what humans ought to do, usually in terms of rights, obligations, benefits to society, fairness, or specific virtues*”. Ethics, for example, refers to those standards that impose the reasonable obligations to refrain from rape, stealing, murder, assault, slander, and fraud. Ethical standards also include those that enjoin virtues of honesty, compassion, and loyalty. And, ethical standards include standards relating to rights, such as the right to life, the right to freedom from injury, and the right to privacy. Such standards are adequate standards of ethics because they are supported by consistent and well founded reasons.

Secondly, “*ethics refers to the study and development of one's ethical standards*”. As mentioned above, feelings, laws, and social norms can deviate from what is ethical. So it is necessary to constantly examine one's standards to ensure that they are reasonable and well-founded. *Ethics also means, the continuous effort of studying our own moral beliefs and our moral conduct, and striving to ensure that we, and the institutions we help to shape, live up to standards that are reasonable and solidly-based.*

The Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of English language defined ethics as

- A system of moral principles: *the ethics of culture.*
- The rules of conduct recognized in respect to a particular class of human actions of a particular group, culture etc: as in *Medical ethics, Christian ethics.*
- Moral principles, as of an individual: *His ethics forbade betrayal of confidence.*
- The branch of philosophy dealing with values related to human conduct, with respect to the rightness and wrongness of the motives and ends of such actions...³

The term ethics has several meanings. It is often used to refer to a set of standards of rights and wrongs, established by a particular group and imposed on members of that group as a means of

regulating and setting limits on that behavior. This use of the word ethics reflects its' etymology, which goes back to the Greek word "*ethos*", meaning "cultural custom or habit". The word moral is derived from the word *moralis*, which also means "*custom*". Although some philosophers distinguish between the terms *ethical* and morals, we shall in this work, be using the two words interchangeably.

Philosophical ethics also known as moral philosophy goes beyond this limited concept of right and wrong. Ethics as a philosophical discipline includes the values and guidelines by which we live and the justification of these values and guidelines. Rather than simply accepting the customs or guidelines used by one particular custom or culture, philosophical ethics analyzes and evaluates these guidelines in the light of accepted universal principles and concern.

More importantly, ethics is a way of life. In this sense ethics involve active engagement in the pursuit of the good life - a life consistent with a set of coherent values. According to Aristotle, the pursuit of the good life is our most important activity as humans. Aristotle believed that "the moral activities are human *per excellence*" ⁴. Because morality is the most fundamental expression of the human nature, it is through being moral that we are the happiest. According to Aristotle, it is through the repeated performance of good actions that we become moral (and happier) people:

Man becomes just by performing of the just...actions. Nor is there the smallest likelihood of a man's becoming good by any other course of conduct. It is however not a popular line to take, most men preferring theory to practice under the impression that arguing about morals proves them to be philosophers and that in this way, they will turn out to be fine characters....⁵

Aristotle believed that ethical knowledge is not precise knowledge, like logic and mathematics, but general knowledge like knowledge of nutrition and exercise. Also, as it is a practical discipline rather than a theoretical one; he thought that in order to become "good", one could not simply study what virtue is; one must actually be virtuous. Analogously, in order to become good at a sport like football, one does not simply study but also practices. Aristotle first establishes what was virtuous. He began by determining that everything was done with some

goal in mind and that goal is 'good.' The ultimate goal he called the Highest Good: happiness (Gk. *eudemonia* - sometimes translated as "living well").

Aristotle contended that happiness could not be found only in pleasure or only in fame and honour. He finally finds happiness "by ascertaining the specific function of man". But what is this function that will bring happiness? To determine this, Aristotle analyzed the soul and found it to have three parts: the Nutritive Soul (plants, animals and humans), the Perceptive Soul (animals and humans) and the Rational Soul (humans only). Thus, a human's function is to do what makes it human, to be good at what sets it apart from everything else: the ability to reason or *logos*. A person that does this is the happiest because he is fulfilling his purpose or nature as found in the rational soul. Depending on how well he did this, Aristotle said humans belonged to one of four categories: the virtuous, the continent, the incontinent and the vicious.

3.4 The Meaning of Virtue

We are not concerned to know what goodness is, but how we are to become good men, for that alone gives the study of ethics, its principle value;⁶ this is how Aristotle chose to start his discussion on ethics in his book Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics book 2 chapters 2. However, one difficulty in understanding the meaning of the word virtue arises from the fact that it has acquired a number of different associations over the centuries. In our day, to say that someone is "virtuous", suggest that they are very pious or perhaps, sexually pure. Sometimes it even has a negative connotation, for example, when it is applied sarcastically to someone who is obnoxiously sanctimonious. To understand virtue ethics, we have to go back to Ancient Greece where the theory began. In Greek philosophy the concept of virtue was first expressed with the word, "*Arête*". To have *arête* means "to have the quality of excellence" or to be doing what you are doing in an excellent way. This concept of virtue is still alive in our English word virtuosity. A virtuous violinist is one who can play the violin with admirable technical skill.

For the Greeks, anything could be said to have virtue if it was an excellent example of its kind. Thus, they say the virtue of a knife is in its ability to cut things. The virtue of a race horse is in its ability to run very fast. While the ship-builder, the wrestler, the physician and the musician, each

has a particular kind of virtue related to their specific task. But is this what virtue really represents?

Philosophers such as Socrates were concerned with the question “what does it mean to be a virtuous human being?” In other words, being fully human is a task or skill in itself, which is more fundamental than all the specific skills we may acquire. That is why we refer to a vicious tyrant as being “in-human”. This means that he is also lacking in the virtues that constitute an excellent character, that he doesn’t deserve the label “Human”. According to Socrates, being moral implies to being successful at the art of living. People who routinely and without any reservations lie, cheat, exploit people and are insensitive to the suffering of others, lack the virtue of *honesty, integrity, justice and compassion* and hence the corresponding vices. According to Socrates, the character of such a person is malformed, deficient, and dysfunctional and as such, is the moral equivalent of a bodily organ that is diseased. Consequently Socrates asserted that the most important goal for humans is not just “living” but “living well”. This idea is contrary to the contemporary advertisements that equate the good life with possessing popularity, fame, fortune, and premium beverages such as cars. This is a common frame of thoughts found among politicians in Nigerian. Socrates thus identified “living well” with possessing a certain quality of character, for he says that living well and honorably and justly mean the same thing.

A moral virtue is an admirable character or trait or disposition to habitually act in a manner that benefits oneself and others. The actions of a virtuous person stems from a respect and concern for the well being for themselves and others. Compassion, courage, generosity, loyalty are true examples of virtue. However virtue is more than simply a collection of disparate personality trait. We often speak in terms of individual traits. Yet it is more correctly defined as an overarching quality of goodness and excellence that gives unity and integrity to a person’s character. The virtue of *Jung* in Confucianism, for example, is translated as benevolence, love, affection, compassion, altruism, or perfect love.

A vice in contrast, is a character trait or disposition to act in a manner that will bring harm to oneself and others. Vice stands in our way of achieving happiness and the good life. Ills with anger, uncontrolled sexual desires, sloth and torpor, restlessness and worry, for example are

considered in Buddhist ethics to be vice or undesirable character traits. These traits according to them stand in the way of enlightenment and moral perfection.

Aristotle divided the virtues into two broad categories: *intellectual* and *moral*. The intellectual, he claimed, is based on excellence in reasoning skills and they include prudence and wisdom. The moral virtue include courage, temperance, liberality, generosity, magnificence, proper pride, gentleness, truthfulness, justice, patience, and friendliness, modesty and wittiness..⁷. According to Aristotle, the intellectual virtue is cultivated through growth and experience, and the moral virtue is cultivated through habit. *Wisdom* amongst them is the most important virtue because it is the one that makes all other virtue (intellectual and moral) possible. However, knowledge or wisdom alone is not sufficient for moral virtue, practice is also necessary.

The moral virtue we do acquire by first exercising them. The same is true for Arts and Crafts in general. The craftsman has to learn how to make things, but he learns in the process of making them... By a similar process we become just by performing just actions, temperate by performing temperate actions, brave by performing brave actions.⁸

Deontologist, W. D. Ross, likewise lists “self improvement” or the development of a virtuous character as one of his seven *prima facie* duties. Indeed Ross is often considered as Aristotelian in his approach to ethics.⁹

Aristotle also distinguished *moral virtues* and *natural virtues*. Traits and gentleness, friendliness, courage and loyalty in a cat or dog or even in a child, are natural virtues rather than moral virtues because the presumably do not involve the will. In other words, Aristotle will say that Angus, my friend Dan’s dog, who helps to rescue some drowning person swimming, was simply doing what came naturally to him as a Labrador Retriever. In contrast, Aristotle will probably argue that Dan’s courageous action; even though they may have seemed spontaneous were the outcome of years of cultivating the virtue of courage until it became a habitual response to seeing others in danger.

One of the trademarks of virtuous people is that they do not only act on principle but they give us an example to follow: such persons are our heroes. Persons of such character as Harriet Tubman, Buddha, Jesus, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Socrates, and Martin Luther King Jr. do not merely give us principles to follow. More importantly, they gave us examples to follow by acting as role models. Virtuous people can be counted on to act in a manner that benefits others. They also show a willingness to perform supererogative actions – beyond what is required by every day morality. Vicious people, on the other hand, only perform beneficial actions when it benefits them. This is one feature that is predominant among Nigeria leaders.

It is worthy to note here also that people tend to emulate those who are at a higher stage of moral development, a highly virtuous person in a leadership role can have a morally uplifting effect upon the whole community.

3.5 Aristotle on Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is based upon certain assumptions about human nature. Most virtue ethicists believe that virtue is important for not only moral well-being but also happiness and inner harmony. Aristotle referred to this sense of psychological well-being as *Eudemonia*. Eudemonia is not the same as what Utilitarian's or Egoist conceives as happiness. Rather it is the condition of the soul or psyche. It is the good that humans seek by nature and that arise from fulfillment of our functions as humans. Eudemonia is similar to Eastern and Modern Western concept of enlightenment, nirvana, self actualization and proper self esteem ¹⁰

People who are virtuous enjoy being so according to Aristotle and Confucian philosophy. "What must a man be before he is content"? A student once asked Mencius. Mencius replied: "if he receives virtue and delights in rightness, he can be content. By being virtuous, we are truest to ourselves. Therefore virtue is essential for inner harmony and contentment. "There is no greater joy for me" Mencius continued, "than to find, on self examination, that I am true to myself, Try as much to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to the benevolence" ¹¹. The Westerners will recognize this as the *golden rule*. In Chinese ethics, it is known as the *Principle of Reciprocity*.

Just as virtue ethics acknowledge the importance of actions, most (if not all) moral philosophies that stress right action also recognize the role of virtue in bringing about right actions. A courage and compassionate person is most likely to come to someone else's rescue. A loyal and honest person is more likely to carry out the duty of fidelity, a generous person is more likely to act justly than someone who is stingy, and a compassionate person is more likely to refrain from harming others. Although virtue involves right actions,

There is nothing which makes (the virtuous person) so much a blessing to (other members of the society) than the cultivation of disinterested love of interest. And consequently (Utilitarianism) enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things important to the general things...¹²

Aristotle believed that every ethical virtue is an intermediate condition between excess and deficiency. This does not mean Aristotle believed in moral relativism, however. He set certain emotions (e.g., hate, envy, jealousy, spite, etc.) and certain actions (e.g., adultery, theft, murder, etc.) as always wrong, regardless of the situation or the circumstances.

Aristotle on the Role of Action

An action may be morally good because it has certain qualities, such as being beneficial. However, this in itself does not make it a virtuous act; for example a wealthy person may give a million naira to a charity simply because she wants a tax deduction or a building named after her. Although this action itself is good in terms of its consequences, we will probably hesitate to say that she is virtuous for doing it. The action of a virtuous person on the other hand, stems from an underlying disposition of concern for the well-being of others and themselves, or what Aristotle called "A certain frame of mind". A poor widow may give her last coin to the needy out of compassion. Although the consequences of her action are not as far reaching as that of the wealthy person, most people will argue that the widow is the more virtuous of the two.

Aristotle on the Golden mean

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle often focused on finding the mean between two extremes of any particular subject; whether it be justice, courage, wealth and so forth. For example, courage is a mean between two feelings (fear and confidence) and an action (the courageous act). Too much fear or too little confidence leads to cowardice, and too little fear or too much confidence can lead to rash, foolish choices. Aristotle says that finding this middle ground is essential to reaching eudemonia, the ultimate form of godlike consciousness. This middle ground is often referred to as The Golden Mean.

Aristotle on Justice

Aristotle also wrote about his thoughts on the concept of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics. In the chapter on justice, Aristotle defined justice in two parts, general justice and particular justice. General Justice is Aristotle's form of universal justice that can only exist in a perfect society. Particular justice is where punishment is given out for a particular crime or act of injustice. This is where Aristotle says an educated judge is needed to apply just decisions regarding any particular case. This is where we get the concept of the scales of justice, the blindfolded judge symbolizing blind justice, balancing the scales, weighing all the evidence and deliberating each particular case individually. Homonymy is an important theme in Aristotle's justice because one form of justice can apply to one, while another would be best suited for a different person/case. Aristotle says that developing good habits can make a good human being and that practicing the use of The Golden Mean when applicable to virtues will allow a human being to live a healthy, happy life.

Aristotle on Reason and Virtue

The importance of reason for Aristotle cannot be over emphasized; Western philosophy has long considered reason to be more important than sentiments. Sentiments such as sympathy have often been dismissed as residual instincts belonging to our lower animal nature. Aristotle thought for example that the human mind is dividing into the rational and non-rational parts. He regarded humans as basically rational beings who must strive to control our non rational nature, Aristotle

argued that the non rational part “from which springs the appetites and desires” participate in reason in a subordinate role.

Aristotle believed that all life has a function that is particular to its peculiar life form. The function peculiar to human life, he claimed, is the exercise of reason. The function of the excellent man therefore is to exert such activity well.¹³

Virtue thus involves living according to reason and is intimately connected to our proper function as human beings. According to Aristotle, “virtue is essential if we are to achieve the good life. Only by living in accordance with reason, which is our human function, can we achieve happiness (eudemonia) and inner harmony.

Aristotle on the Highest Good

In order to do this (determine the highest good), Aristotle had to first establish the so called virtuous. He began by determining that everything was done with some goal in mind and that goal is 'good':

Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly, every action and choice of action, is thought to have some good as its object. This is why the good has rightly been defined as the object of all endeavors.¹⁴ But, if action A is done with the goal B, the goal B would also have a goal, goal C. Goal C would also have a goal and this would continue until something stopped the infinite regress. This was the Highest Good.

Now, if there is some object of activities that we want for its own sake (and others only because of that), and if it is not true that everything is chosen for something else - in which case there will be an infinite regress that will nullify all our striving - it is plain that this must be the good, the highest good. Would not knowing it have a great influence on our way of living? Would we not be better at doing what we should, like archers with a target to aim at?¹⁵ Aristotle said the Highest Good must have three characteristics: “Desirable for its own sake, Not desirable for the sake of some other good and All other ‘goods’ desirable for its sake”

Aristotle resolves this Highest Good in eudaemonia, which is usually translated as "happiness," but could also be "well-being" or "flourishing." "What is the highest good in all matters of

action? As to the name, there is almost complete agreement; for uneducated and educated alike call it happiness, and make happiness identical with the good life and successful living. They disagree, however, about the meaning of happiness." ¹⁶

3.6 Why Should I Be Moral?

Why should you worry about being a moral person? Is moral goodness something you should pursue for its own sake? Or is it desirable simply because of the consequences? To use an analogy, No one enjoys going to the dentist to get his or her tooth drilled, and most people do not choose to go on a severely restrictive diet for its own sake. Instead we take this action only because of the results they bring - physical health; outside this reasons, we will have little or no reasons to do either one. Is morality like that? Is the only reason for being a morally good person, the fact that the external consequences are desirable while the external consequences of being immoral are undesirable?

The question "why be moral?" was taken up in Plato's dialogue, *the Republic*. In this work Glaucon (Plato's Brother) asked Socrates whether justice (or moral goodness) is something a person must pursue not only for its consequences but for its own sake. In order to provoke Socrates, Glaucon defends the position that most reasonable people (if they were to be truly honest) will agree that being a just and a moral person is not desirable in itself but is only desirable for its social rewards that it might bring and the unpleasant consequences it avoids. For example, people are moral because being so will help them get along with others, giving them a good reputation and generally enhancing their success in the society. Similarly people avoid being immoral because these behaviors will cost them their friends, damage their social standing or land them in jail. In other words being moral is purely an unpleasant but self securing pursuit motivated by desirability of the external results, similar to getting your tooth filled or going on a diet.

To make this point as clear as possible, Glaucon tells a story of a shepherd named Gyges who discovers a ring that will make him invisible when it is turned in a certain way. This ring enables him to do what he wishes without worrying about societies' sanctions. *Glaucon* used this story as

a thought experiment to demonstrate his thesis. He strongly believes that it will reveal to us the true nature of morality. Think about it. If you had the power to make yourself invisible, you will no longer worry about being arrested, punished or rebuked. Under this cloak of invisibility, you can commit any kind of crime and misdeed you wish and the general public as well as your friends will be unaware of your evil behavior.

According to the *Glaucon's* assessment of the human nature, "there will be no reason to be moral under such circumstances". Based on your observable behavior, you will seem to be a model citizen. At the same time, you could act as you wish in terms of your private behavior. Hence according to Glaucon, not only will there be no reason to be moral, there will be every reason to get away with all that you could. Only the fool will do otherwise, since "only appearances and the social consequences of our actions matter".

What do you think? Do you agree with *Glaucon* that most people will act this way? One can't help wondering what his real reactions will be if he / she were to be in possession of such a ring.

Now to expand on this experiment, *Glaucon* asks us to imagine two men. One is perfectly unjust or evil, and the other has a perfectly just or moral character. However, the evil man (being very clever) manages to fool his society and thus he maintained a spotless reputation while committing the worse crimes and immoral actions imaginable. On the other hand, the society totally misunderstands the good man, although he is perfectly just, his society wrongly inflicts him with an evil reputation and persecution and torments him because of it. Under these circumstances, will there be any point in being moral?

Glaucon entertains the cynical view that: "it is not really necessary to be a truly moral person. It is sufficient to merely appear to be moral to one's society (if one could get away with it)". When John F Kennedy was considering entering into National politics, his family members debated among themselves whether he will be a successful congressman. His father Joseph Kennedy ended the discussion by saying "you must remember- it's not what you are that counts, but what people think you are"...¹⁷

Perhaps the elder Kennedy was right. People's opinion of you is important to being a successful candidate. However, do people's opinions make you a qualified candidate? Even if putting forth

the appearance of success is useful in politics or business, is appearance all that matters in ethics? *Glaucon thinks it is*, what do you think? This project hopes to critically address the opinions of most Nigerian Political leaders in the concluding chapters that shall follow in the work.

Some people believe that we can fool society in this way, but we can't fool God. "*Religious persons argue that the true reason for being moral (both on the inside and as well as in our behavior) is because of our desire to be rewarded in truth after our life here on earth is done*". Basically, it is all about avoiding unpleasant consequences". But is this view point a variation on *Glaucon's*? In both cases the motive for being a moral person is a matter of the "*carrot or the stick*" (reward vs. punishment). It is only a matter of detail as to whether you think it is society or God that wields the carrot or the stick.

Based on the subject of this project and the philosophical question raised so far in this work, we wish to make known the fact that our opinions and responses to the above questions will have far reaching consequences for how we live our lives. None else have such a direct and immediate impact on the person we are and how we conduct our daily lives as does our thinking about the issue of morality.

Although the topic of ethics is complex and has many dimensions, the questions raised by Glaucon's story about the ring strikes on the heart of the subject of this study - the subject of Virtue, Prudence and Politics in the Nigerian context. Our study will argue that except leaders begin to provide the right answers to the question, "why should I be moral," they will continue to be in crisis resulting from the failure of leadership.

3.7 Aristotle's Notion of Prudence

"...having phronesis is both necessary and sufficient for being virtuous; because phronesis is practical, it is impossible to be both Phronimos and Akrotic".¹⁸ These were Aristotle's exact words when he first thought about prudence. *Phronēsis* (Greek: φρόνησις) in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is the virtue of practical thought, usually translated "Practical wisdom",

sometimes as "Prudence".¹⁹ I shall interchangeably be using the word Prudence and *Phronesis* hereafter in this work.

Prudence carries with it today the connotation of "*Prude*"— a person of over exaggerated caution, bland temperance, hesitation, a lack of imagination and will, fearfulness, and a bad case of mincing steps. This perception would have surprised the classical philosophers who thought of prudence as one of the "*four cardinal virtues*" and who linked it to shrewdness, exceptionally good judgment, and the gift of *coup d'oeil* — the "coup of the eye"— a situation where one could take in the whole of a situation at once and know almost automatically how to proceed.

Aristotle defines prudence, or practical wisdom, and moderation within the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Practical wisdom is defined thus:

Now, the capacity of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself is regarded as typical of a man of practical wisdom.²⁰

This definition of practical wisdom suggests that by definition, practical wisdom is right reasoning about good ends. As Aristotle puts it, "those who possess practical wisdom calculate well with respect to some worthwhile end."²¹ While practical wisdom does not help us learn what is good and noble, it helps us realize it. The purpose of practical wisdom "is not to know what is just noble and good, but to become just, noble, and good."²² Aristotle's invocation of Pericles suggests that practical wisdom is a particular virtue of the statesman: "That is why we think that Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom. They have the capacity of seeing what is good for themselves and for mankind, and these are, we believe, the qualities of men capable of managing households and states."²³ Aristotle argues that "the main concern of politics is to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions."²⁴

Moderation, while chiefly considered by Aristotle as an individual virtue, in all political ramifications. Aristotle sees moral virtue as a *mean* between the excess and deficiency of a particular virtue. Using the virtue of courage as his example, Aristotle argues, "Excess as well as

deficiency of physical exercise destroys our strength....the man who shuns and fears everything and never stands his ground becomes a coward, whereas a man who knows no fear at all and goes to meet every danger becomes reckless.”²⁵

Thus at the heart of virtue is moderation; to be virtuous is to experience the right things in the right amount.

Accordingly, he is courageous who endures and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right manner, and at the right time, and who displays confidence in a similar way.²⁶

So the virtuous person is able to have each thing in its proper amount. This is moderation. One can see how prudence and moderation are necessary for sound political leadership by considering Aristotle’s discussion of statesmanship in his *Politics*.

3.8 Aristotle on The Meaning of Prudence

Aristotle distinguishes between two intellectual virtues: *Sophia* and *Phronesis*. *Sophia* (usually translated "wisdom") is the ability to think well about the nature of the world, to discern why the world is the way it is (this is sometimes equated with science); *Sophia* involves deliberation concerning universal truths. *Phronesis* is the capability to consider the mode of actions in order to deliver change, especially to enhance the quality of life. Aristotle says that *phronesis* is not simply a skill, however, as it involves not only the ability to decide how to achieve a certain end, but also the ability to reflect upon and determine that end (this latter point is denied by some commentators, who contend that Aristotle considers the desired end, *eudemonia*, to be given, such that *phronesis* is merely the ability to achieve that end).

Gaining *Phronesis* (Prudence) therefore requires maturation, in Aristotle's thought: “Whereas young people become accomplished in geometry and mathematics, and wise within these limits, prudent young people do not seem to be found. The reason is that prudence is concerned with particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a young person lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce it²⁷

Phronesis is concerned with particulars, because it is concerned with how to act in particular situations. One can learn the principles of action, but applying them in the real world, in situations one could not have foreseen, requires experience of the world. For example, if one knows that one should be honest, one might act in certain situations in ways that cause pain and offense; knowing how to apply honesty in balance with other considerations and in specific contexts requires experience.

Aristotle holds that "having phronesis is both necessary and sufficient for being virtuous; because phronesis is practical, it is impossible to be both *phronimos* and Akrotic"²⁸. Aristotle's importance to mediæval European thought led phronesis to be included as one of the four cardinal virtues.

In his book, *After Virtue*²⁹, Alasdair MacIntyre's thoughts have been known to corroborate that of Bent Flyvbjerg, in his book *Making Social Science Matter*³⁰, where they have argued that instead of trying to emulate the natural sciences, the social sciences should be practiced as phronesis. Phronetic social science focuses on four value-rational questions: (1) where are we going? (2) Who gains and who loses, by which mechanisms of power? (3) Is this development desirable? (4) What should we do about it? These questions and more shall form the premise from where I will be proffering a working 'framework' for prudence for political Leadership.

It was on the basis of this that Aristotle called prudence "Practical wisdom" in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and contrasted it with "Intuitive Reason," *which is the natural endowment Aristotle thought some people had for understanding what was ultimately right and what was ultimately wrong in any society*. Intuitive reason marked out "the ultimate" in both directions," while prudence "makes us take the right means." The link which prudence provides between seeing and acting is what distinguishes it from simple discernment, which is a function of reason. It is the road builder towards the goals marked out by reason³¹. It is from this premise that I intend to portray Prudence as the tool which political leaders who desire to excel in the act of transformational and prudential leadership must willfully embrace.

3.9 Other Notions of Prudence

Thomas Aquinas chalked out an even more critical role for prudence, since he regarded prudence as "an intellectual virtue" which performs two vital tasks.

First, it was the nail head which fastened the intellectual and moral virtues together. *Second*, because it was housed in the reason (mental faculties), prudence acted as a restraint on "impulse or passion." It was "*right reason about things to be done.*"

Prudence, moreover, was characterized by the possession of a good *memory* (so that someone always had on call, a mental encyclopedia of material with which to compare current situations); an *understanding* of the present (being able to understand what a given situation really meant); and *foresight* of the future so that a prudent person always could see several jumps ahead to where any actions were likely to lead. Aquinas was not trying to say what modern thinkers usually say about prudence: "that it is an expression of *moderation*, or the attitude of moderates in action, or an instinct for the middle of the road". It was actually the other way round: "Prudence might resort to moderation for a solution, but not always".³²

What separates prudence from moderation is that "moderation" is an attitude preoccupied with the integrity of means but not ends in political action. Moderation is a tragic attitude, because it understands only too well the constraints imposed by limited human resources and by human nature.

This is why "moderation" so often becomes paralyzed and snarled in an effort to placate competing moral demands or to insist on pragmatic process without regard to what the process is producing. Being wise "does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other things according to prudence." Daring, which "leads one to act quickly," might also be the work of prudence, provided that "it is directed by reason." Prudence, then, does not avoid action; if anything, it demands action of a particular kind.

Aquinas also found another difference between prudence and moderation in *foresight*. Moderation is blind, which is why it necessarily leads people to grope forward slowly. Prudence,

however, is based on foresight, which yields a discerning and dependable estimate of the way things are going.

Foresight is the principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular things may be rightly directed to its end.³³

This only made sense, since the term prudence (*prudentia*) was itself derived from providence (*providentia*), the providing-ahead for things.

Aquinas, in fact, introduces a discussion of prudence for the first time in the *Summa Theologica* at the point where he begins his *quaestio* on the providence of God, "for in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong" because both providence and prudence are concerned with "directing the ordering of some things towards an end." Prudence occupied so large a place in providence that one might as well concede that "the perfection of divine providence demands that there be intermediary causes as executors of it."³⁴

At the other remove from prudence stands *absolutism*, which is about the integrity of ends without sufficient attention to the integrity of means so that it invests its servants with the attitude of disdain and certainty? This is the universe where it is supposed that wills are free from ultimate constraints and that only willing and power are lacking to attain a good end.

Prudence, however, pays equal attention to the integrity of ends and of means. Prudence is an ironic rather than a tragic attitude, where the calculus of costs is *critical* but at the same time neither *crucial* nor *incidental*. Prudence prefers incremental progress to categorical solutions and fosters that progress through the offering of motives rather than expecting to change dispositions. Yet, unlike "moderation," prudence has a sense of purposeful motion and declines to be paralyzed by a preoccupation with process, even while it remains aware that there is no goal so easily attained or so fully attained that it rationalizes dispensing with process altogether.³⁵

Based on the two comparison made of the notions of prudence from the works of Aristotle and Aquinas, if we were to create a palm-card for prudence for political leaders in Nigeria and all over the world, it would contain some of the following elements:

- Balancing the integrity of means and ends in political life;
- Accepting reciprocity, imperfection, and concession rather than demanding resolutions;
- The predominance of reason among the faculties;
- Waiting on providence rather than affirming free will;
- The ironic viewpoint rather than the comic, tragic, or didactic.

In closing the section on Aquinas, we want to note that Aquinas identifies a very important factor which we have found predominantly lacking among political leaders in Nigeria. The most important of them all is their inability to “balancing the integrity of means and ends in political life”. So while noting that prudence prefers incremental progress to categorical solutions, it is also important to note that prudence fosters the progresses through the offering of motives rather than expecting to change dispositions. Aquinas admonishes for the need to separate prudence from moderation. As such, Nigerian political leaders must need to embrace integrity in all their political facet of life.

3.10 Contemporary Notions of Prudence

Say the word “*Prudence*” to the ancients, and it would be a virtue; say the word *prudence* to the faculties of the American colleges of the 19th century, and it would be a part of the curriculum in moral philosophy; say the word *prudence* today in the floor of The Senate, The National Assembly or even in the class rooms of our Universities and it would be part of a joke.

This says something of how ideas change over time; but it also serves as a warning for the difficulty we may have in understanding 19th and the 20th century American thought or any other contemporary thought, where virtue is discussed seriously and where prudence was considered a

desirable trait among public leaders. It also explains a major difficulty we have in understanding the prime American example of prudence in political life, and that is Abraham Lincoln'.³⁶

Much as Lincoln was a grass-root, up-from-the-ranks politician, he was perfectly at ease in speaking of the role of virtue (in general) and prudence (in particular) in political life. Lincoln "regarded prudence in all respect as one of the *cardinal* virtues," and he hoped, as President, that "it will appear that we have practiced prudence" in the management of public affairs. Even in the midst of the Civil War, he promised that the war would be carried forward "consistently with the prudence...which ought always to regulate the public service" and without allowing it to degenerate "into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle." Lincoln had little notion that, over the course of 150 years, this commitment to prudence would become a source of condemnation rather than approval.³⁷

This essay-for want of a more adequate phrase-is about a certain style of political activity: about the manner in which a political actor should engage in politics. We are not telling political actors what specific acts to undertake nor are we formulating some (inevitably simple minded) manual of considerations for them to go through. Nor are we outlining a technique of politics, or telling political actors what goals they should have. We are not even concerned to tell them by what means they should pursue whatever ends they have-indeed, we argue that the distinction between means and ends can-not be sustained. We are concerned with the classic question, "What is to be done?" But our point is that this question is often interpreted too simply. The style of activity which is our concern involves "doings" which often go by the board and yet are vital for politics. We call this style of activity "Prudence."³⁸ Its modern connotation of mere caution makes this word far from ideal. But as there are no alternatives, we have chosen to refurbish it as the only word which can accommodate the implications for politics of the ensuing arguments. In arguing that all participants in politics should be prudent, we are suggesting that both political theory and political science need to become more fully aware of some more or less mundane, but deep, realities of politics. No doubt, uncertainties and complexities will ensue.

3.11 The Question of Prudence in Politics

The uncertainties, which follow from the complexity of politics research has shown, is one of the root causes of the crisis experienced in the Nigerian polity and indeed, in all nations of the world. These complexities and the resultant consequence shall form the basis for our argument in this essay. *We present prudence therefore as a political desideratum by arguing that without it, political actors will be thoughtlessly complacent, purely self-interested or inhuman, merely irrelevant to the ongoing life of their society, or the cause of mindless or groundlessly hopeful destruction or violence.*

This is not to say that prudence is the whole of political virtue. We are not presenting anything like an all-encompassing political philosophy, nor engaging in grand theory. We are dealing with a limited (though crucial) range of issues, making no reference to such great questions as the nature of man, of the good society, of good government, or structures of meaning or epistemology. Questions about prudence stand somewhat apart from the grand and intertwining questions that systematically, political philosophy has to do with.

Like politics itself, prudence is a bit like a whore. She will go with almost anyone, almost wholly regardless of what he wants and of his overall theories. Prudence has no single home on the political spectrum. Although it does not lend itself to every political stance, prudence can be variously allied. This is part of its significance. In an important sense, it is both more basic and more subtle than a complete theoretical universe, or a set of programmatic guidelines. This is why we strongly believe it is that tonic that Nigerian leaders need to remove the scourge of bad leadership that is responsible for the so many crisis that now plague Nigeria.

3.12 Conclusion

In this chapter, chapter three, we have tried to present in some detail, a vivid account of Aristotle virtue ethics and the part it plays in ordering the lives of individuals in a civil society. A closer attention was also drawn to his notion of prudence. Further studies on the concept reveal that it is that virtue that when mixed with reason becomes that *political desideratum* without which

political actors will be thoughtlessly complacent, purely self-interested or inhuman, merely irrelevant to the ongoing life of their society, or the cause of mindless or groundlessly hopeful destruction or violence. Prudence or practical wisdom is therefore considered a necessary *sene quanon* for political leadership. In the next chapter we shall show in some details the implications for adopting the Aristotelian notion of prudence for political leaders. We shall also give vivid accounts of leaders who have excelled as a result of their strictly adoption of the Aristotelian notion of political prudence as their modus of operation.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 **IMPLICATIONS OF ARISTOTLE’S NOTION OF PRUDENCE FOR LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA**

4.1 **Introduction**

The tension between moral aspirations and the demands of political achievement lead many to despair of the relationship between ethics and political leadership. This section of our study builds upon the classic theory of “*Normative Prudence*” to argue that “*Political Prudence*” serves as a vital moral resource for leaders to bridge that gap that is so evident in our political system. In other words, we intend to show in this section that, when it comes to the need for Prudential and transformational leadership, the kind that brings about the development of both the people and the economy of a polity, we cannot but acknowledge that a relationship exist between leadership and virtue as portrayed in “*Aristotle’s notion of Prudence*”. A relationship that if ignored will make leaders ineffective and unproductive especially when it comes to the area that requires the leader to build a trust among his / her citizens. We are of the opinion that when the virtue of prudence is explored, it will bread geometric development and ultimately foster peaces in a nation and its surrounding countries.

4.2 **The Ethics of Prudence**

Political prudence covers the normative practices derived from the requirements of political achievement. The ethics of prudence focuses upon the obligation of a leader to achieve moral self-mastery, to attend to the context of a situation, and to, through deliberation and careful judgment, seek concrete outcomes that are legitimate and durable.

Political prudence requires foresight, openness to experience and reason, timing, linking means and ends, seeking durability and legitimacy of outcomes, and building community. This account of political prudence argues that prudence is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for ethical leadership. To this end therefore, I want to start my analysis with the declaration (the thesis of the dissertation) in prentices below.

“Political Prudence Is a Central Moral Resource for Political Leadership”

The connection between virtue and leadership

As mentioned earlier, a vital policy initiative fails due to skilled opposition. A fine program disintegrates under pressure of an unanticipated backlash. A powerful and strong institution collapses when its long-time leader departs. A new leader full of good intentions and aspirations soon flees office, overcome by frustration and ineffectiveness. This was the scenario we tried to capture when we presented the crisis that took place in Ekiti state which caused the present INEC Chairman in the State to present a letter of resignation to President Yar' Adua; when it became very clear that she could no longer uphold or discharge her duties without fear or favour as a result of the forces that sought to have her alter the elections results in their favour.

These all-too-familiar examples highlight the haunting reality that good intentions, moral conviction, and even technical competence do not guarantee success in political and administrative life. This disjunction of ethics and its achievement has inspired so many to despair of the relationship between ethics and leadership. Proponents of this school of thought draw inspirations from a thought once shared by Niccoló Machiavelli when he said;

The man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore if a prince wants to maintain his rule he must learn how not to be virtuous. ¹

Morgenthau, ² Walz ³ and Cohen ⁴ are some of the writers who championed this realist view. They argue that leaders cannot afford ethics in a world of serious responsibilities, powerful institutions, and committed adversaries. Where these factors exist, leaders tend to fail in upholding morality as regards leadership.

The writings of Gierke, ⁵ and Kant ⁶ are some of the realist whose view competes with an alternative moral conception of leadership in the natural law and the Kantian traditions, which argue that leaders should follow the requirements of ethics.

Obviously, these leadership literatures mentioned here reflects the split between realpolitik and moralism. This notwithstanding, research show that the classic studies of writers such as

Neustedt ⁷ and tucker ⁸ focus upon the tactical and personality dimensions of successful Leadership. On the contrary, a number of writers, Burns, ⁹ Gardner, ¹⁰ and Terry, ¹¹ however, call for an explicit recognition of the moral nature of leadership.

The problem with the above study, we observed, is that these writers in their studies succeeded in identifying the moral nature of leadership but failed to provide consistent guidelines about where leadership ethics should focus. Recent theorists in the likes of Galston, ¹² Norton, ¹³ Cooper ¹⁴ and Cooper and Wright, ¹⁵ have argued that a virtue based ethics focuses upon the moral quality of the person and can inform an ethics of leadership. Since none of these writers succeeded with the attempted to offer any sort of guidelines for prudent leadership, the provision of this consistent guideline for a virtues system of leadership is what this paper seeks to present while drawing from the dept and wealth of Aristotle's notion of prudence.

Since the time of Aristotle, contemporary theorists such as Coll, ¹⁶ Dunn, ¹⁷ and Dobel, ¹⁸ have argued that, of all the virtues listed by thinkers, prudence stands out. This is because *Prudence* represents the linchpin of political judgment. It also holds that any theory of leadership needs to develop an account of prudence to excel. Building on this tradition therefore, I shall for the remaining part of this study, offer arguments in support of the claim that "*political prudence is a central moral resource for political leaders*". Here in our opinion, lies the connection that links virtue and leadership. This project therefore presents an account of political prudence focusing upon its operational requirements. These requirements provide a moral framework to guide and evaluate the actions of leaders. In addition, we shall discuss the relationship between virtue and leadership.

4.3 **The Virtue of Prudence and Leadership**

Leadership entails ethics because leaders have responsibilities. Persons in positions of leadership make a difference; they can bring about changes in behaviour that would not occur without their presence and actions. Leading is not always linked to official authority; in fact, leadership opportunities exist throughout political and organizational life. Individuals or institutions rely on leaders to accomplish tasks. Fellow citizens, colleagues, and subordinates depend on the leader

and are vulnerable to the consequences of his or her actions. They rely on the leader's competence and promises. Citizens depend on official leaders to protect their security, welfare, and basic interests. Colleagues and other officials depend on leaders to enable them to perform their work. Leaders who hold office are responsible for respecting that reliance, vulnerability, and dependence.

Max Weber in a study opined that the ethics of responsibility requires leaders to attend to the consequences of their actions.¹⁹ Their first responsibility, however, resides in what Adam Smith called self-mastery. All virtues and the personal capacity to live up to promises, obey the law, and follow directives depending upon this primary moral capacity²⁰. People in positions of responsibility have an obligation to control their passions and overcome temptations. Without this basic self-discipline they could abuse their power for their own purposes. Thoughtless, rash, or impulsive actions could harm or exploit those who depend on the leader or cause the leader to fail in performing vital responsibilities. When internal or external stimuli affect leaders, they should have the self-control not to react instantly. Their actions should be based on reflection, not driven by reactive emotions. Without self-command moral life remains impossible.²¹

Self-mastery, however, only lays the groundwork for ethical leadership. Virtue ethics extends self-mastery to the way people should develop their character and patterns of reaction and engagement with life. For Cooper, it attempts to identify the characteristics required by a person who has responsibilities.²² A virtue therefore embodies a pattern of habitual perception and behaviour. The patterns and habits arise from how a person is raised, but also from his or her training and self-development. To possess a virtue such as *prudence* means that a person's emotions and perceptions are trained and aligned with moral purposes so that they support rather than subvert responsible judgment. Personal actions play out over time as choices that react back and form habits. On this subject, Sherman is of the opinion that choices build a pattern of judgments that habitually identify and internalize the morally important aspects of a situation.²³ But on the other hand, Budziszewski believes that personal virtues are not immutable. People can train themselves over time to approach problems in different manners, to judge according to different standards, and to choose different ways.²⁴

A virtue-based ethics reinforces leadership ethics because it focuses on the responsibility of the person. Without this focus, the exercise of power reduces to what Vaclav Havel called the “innocent power” of the individual actor who becomes an “innocent tool of an ‘innocent’ anonymous power, legitimized by science, cybernetics, ideology, law, abstraction and objectivity—that is, by everything except personal responsibility to human beings as persons and neighbors”²⁵.

Anderson,²⁶ Beiner²⁷ and Steinberger,²⁸ collectively believe that responsible political leaders should therefore exercise judgment that unites moral and practical concerns in a world of conflict. A leader’s virtues define the stable cognitive and emotional responses to that world which guides, informs, and sustains judgments and actions. This involves not just trained emotions but also a trained perception where an individual identifies the morally salient aspects of a situation and frames a judgment around these aspects.²⁹ Virtues do not replace laws, norms, or duties in political life, but they give life to these moral imperatives. When situations grow complicated or no self-evident moral answers emerge, virtues provide the stability of judgment and endurance to pursue moral commitment across time and obstacles.

At this point we want to note that virtues alone cannot sustain a full political ethics. Many virtues such as courage, temperance, justice, generosity, and mercy cluster around political actions. But virtues understood as simple dispositions without judgment can be blind and fall prey to what Aristotle’s says about any aspect of life carried to an extreme. Such in his opinion becomes a vice.³⁰ They require judgment in their exercise. If a person wishes to be generous, she or he still needs to decide when to be generous, to whom, and how much. Similarly, multiple virtues, like principles, might confront other virtues and it will often be unclear what concrete action is required of a moral commitment or virtue.

Finally, Smith further shows the limitations of virtue when he argued that virtues can be subsumed by other less desirable ends; For example, a soldier may behave with courage but serve an evil cause; evil dictators can act with mercy; greedy individuals can show generosity to friends. Virtues alone cannot provide the moral foundations of all actions.³¹ They co-exist in dialogue with norms, principles, and conceptions of the good society that bound them and give them a direction. Consequently, classical discourse about political judgment as in the case of

Aquinas³² and Pieper³³ who cites prudence as the central virtue because it gives concrete “shape” to the moral aspirations, responsibilities, and obligations of a person.

Unfortunately, modern accounts of political prudence have done little to bolster prudence’s traditional role. Building on Hobbes³⁴, the modern contemporary accounts of Grundstein,³⁵ and Smith,³⁶ generally postulate prudence as a form of extended rational self-interest. Prudence reduces to algorithmic accounts of how to maximize goals within constraints and over time or becomes the engine for garnering consent among self-interested agents. For Parfit³⁷ and Bricker,³⁸ prudence suffers from a very high level of abstraction and offers little help in the formation of the goals themselves. Adam Smith referred to such prudence as important but limited, a virtue commended with “cold esteem,” but incapable of sustaining a full moral life.³⁹

This dissertation builds on an older account of political prudence, which Alberto Coll,⁴⁰ identifies as “*normative prudence*.” Normative prudence focuses upon the obligation of the leader to achieve moral self-mastery, attend to the context of the situation, and through deliberation and careful judgment seek the ends of political excellence.

4.4 The Essence and Implications for Political Prudence in Leadership

Most virtues can best be understood as the normative practices entailed in seeking excellence in a domain of human conduct. For MacIntyre⁴¹ and Cooper⁴², it is the standards of excellence derived from the ends of the activity within the domain of conduct. This dissertation argues that political prudence encompasses the logic of excellence in political achievement and extends the range of moral concerns and justifications. Dobel, therefore suggests that excellent political achievements consist of outcomes that: (1) gain legitimacy, (2) endure over time, (3) strengthen the political community, (4) unleash minimum unforeseen consequences, (5) require reasonable use of power resources, and (6) endure without great violence and coercion to enforce the outcome.⁴³ We shall be talking about this later in the pages that will follow.

In all, what we seek to do here in this section is to present arguments that will show the virtue of prudence as one of the most outstanding virtues that when applied, has the ability to produce

excellence in the actions of leaders. We shall be doing this through the frame-work that we shall present here, a frame work that was carefully structured from the notions of Aristotle's virtue of prudence. The frame-work that we shall propose shall be presented under the sub-title, Political Prudence. Other issues for discursion in this section include: Prudence meets Politics, here we shall consider some examples of leaders who have excelled as a result of the application of the virtue of prudence. Lastly we shall offer a general discussion on the essence and value of prudent leadership.

4.5 A Framework For Political Leaders

Political prudence consists of a family of justifications derived from excellent achievement in the domain of politics. Prudent judgment identifies salient moral aspects of a political situation which a leader has a moral obligation to attend to in making a decision. This approach moves the understanding of prudence beyond recitation of examples and extracts reference points that give an intellectual content to virtue's demands.

Political prudence encompasses *seven* overlapping dimensions of political achievement clustered into three related areas. The first area clusters around the capacities a leader should cultivate to act with prudence: (1) disciplined reason and openness to experience, and (2) foresight and attention to the long term. The second area clusters around the modalities statecraft leaders should master: (3) deploying power; (4) timing and momentum and (5) the proper relation of means and ends. The third area clusters around the attributes of political outcomes to which prudent statecraft should attend: (6) the durability and legitimacy of outcomes, and (7) the consequences for community. To be politically prudent, a leader should attend to each of the seven dimensions. Failure to account for them means a leader is guilty of negligence. We shall in the next few pages; see how these seven dimensions of the virtue of prudence will enhance the art of leadership in any community. This is the guideline or frame work which we believe every prudent leader must abide and pay very close attention to in order to attain the prudential leadership cadre.

Disciplined reason and openness

The Latin derivation of prudence means to view or see and reinforces the emphasis upon self-mastery. Prudence requires disciplined reason—the ability to see and think clearly and not be overcome by passions or egocentricity. Talleyrand suggested that good leaders should bear little malice and hold few grudges in politics ⁴⁴, and passim. Emotion-driven decisions undisciplined by reflection can lead to irresponsible judgments, failure, or great loss for little gains. Everyone who depends upon a leader relies upon the leader to remain clear-eyed and think through actions.

Prudent reason builds upon openness and attention to the complexity of reality. Good judgment requires good information and a willingness to learn. Prudent leaders strive to see the world clearly and seek out knowledge of the physical, social, and economic world around them. Additionally, reason and openness lead to deliberation and learning. Cardinal Richelieu, ⁴⁵ like Machiavelli, ⁴⁶ urged public officials not to listen to flatterers and friends in making official judgments. A clear sign of prudence is the willingness of a person to seek the advice and help of skilled experts in making policy. Richelieu emphasized the need to build a capacity for honest and expert advice into institutions and encourage individuals to speak the truth, not hide it.

This approach requires self-knowledge so leaders can hire to complement their knowledge and strengths. This capacity to learn from and utilize others more capable than oneself highlights the centrality of reason, deliberation, and openness to prudent judgment. Goldhamer, ⁴⁷ and Janis, ⁴⁸ believes that this approach also guards against the self-deception to which many leaders fall prey to. Attention to openness also means that a prudent leader does not close off options needlessly or prematurely, or over commit to one solution. Any action might generate unanticipated consequences and harms. Prudence requires that leaders be willing to rethink actions and confront the problems as well as the good of their actions. A consistent enemy of prudent judgment is ideological rigidity, which interprets all information within one frame of reference and drives to one outcome regardless of costs. To be driven by emotion, vengeance, anger, ambition, or pride violates the responsibilities of leadership and the requirements of prudence.

Much prudent knowledge focuses upon historical knowledge. Such knowledge involves discovering as much as possible about the history of institutions, allies, and adversaries. A leader

should try to learn their practices and understandings, to be able to work with them and avoid being manipulated or making ignorant mistakes. Leaders have special obligations to understand the level of trustworthiness as well as the intentions and capacities of people, especially adversaries. Neustadt and May,⁴⁹ believes that attitude will obliges leaders to develop a capacity to project themselves into the minds of others and know their cultural and historical background. Not exploring and understanding the historical aspects of a case violates political prudence.

Foresight and the long term

Viewing from the long term enables a leader to link achievements to the discovery and unfolding of what one's moral commitments requires in a constrained situation. The Latin derivation of the term prudence also suggests that prudent leaders exercise foresight. They try to anticipate future issues and scan the power and interests of the actors in their political world. For Machiavelli,⁵⁰ the hallmark of a good leader was the capacity to foresee and address political problems early. Foresight also requires that leaders try to think through the consequences of action and avoid actions where probable negative consequences will overwhelm the good sought. In a similar way, this foresight and attending to reality causes leaders to give special consideration to preparation for reasonable contingencies and to dealing with the power and hostility of others. Successful foresight also enables leaders to act when opportunity arises. Foresight drives a leader to a long-term view. Thinking of the long term disciplines reason to think more clearly and be less overwhelmed by the passions of the moment or the clamor of groups demanding immediate solutions. Although everyone is dead in the long run, this discipline of reflection focuses upon issues of durability and legitimacy and drives prudence beyond the narrow self-interest of a particular person.

For instance, Cooper,⁵¹ in his book *Talleyrand*, captures how the moment of victory truly tests prudent statecraft. When Napoleon defeated Austria at Ulm, Talleyrand could not convince him to treat Austria well. Napoleon's short-term ambition sowed the seeds of the long-term alliances against him. After the German victory at Sadowa, on the other hand, Bismarck persuaded the Kaiser to treat Austria leniently and sowed the seeds of a future alliance.

The long-run perspective will compete with and conflict with the short-term requirements of power and maintaining a coalition to attain a goal. Lentin,⁵² in a paper, showed how, at the Versailles conference, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, usually allied with President Woodrow Wilson, constantly fought to ameliorate the worst impositions upon Germany. At several points, however, he acceded to issues like war reparations and the war-guilt clause either to hold France in the coalition or satisfy his parliamentary supporters.

Viewing from the long term enables a leader to link achievements to the discovery and unfolding of what one moral commitment requires in a constrained situation. When Dag Hammarskjold became secretary general of the United Nations, he worked with great care to build the office of the secretary general into a significant factor in the international arena. The institution had no real resources and little stature. With a constant attention to “the long run,” he created an important role by building on the rhetorical and legal possibilities of the United Nations Charter, incessantly practicing self-disciplined civility, and creating a crucial role as an intermediary who enabled leaders to escape from the rhetoric and confrontation in which they were enmeshed as in the Lebanon crisis of 1958.

Jones records that every action he took was predicated on the notion that “only partial results can be expected in each generation” and humans and institutions must “grow” into solutions to problems.⁵³ Prudent leaders understand that preparation for windows of opportunity, building coalitions, and building acceptance of policies all depend on sustained efforts that often play out as momentum and direction of movement rather than as a static and determinable outcome.

Nigerian leaders over the years have been found guilty of not having foresight and long term focus as regards the policies that they make every now and then. Every President that is elected into power reels out plans and projections that do not take in to consideration, the long term goals and needs of the country and its people. As a result, all such plans fail to meet the desired targets. This is because such goals are often born from a selfish aggrandizement that either does not have the people’s needs in mind or due to its sort sightedness, fails to meet with the yearnings of the people. President Ya’Aduwa’s seven point agenda is one of such example which for over two years now since his administration came into power, is yet to see the light of day. This we believe is as a result of pursuing goals and visions that do not have a long term yearning

of the people in its focus. If a new administration were to come into power now, they are forced to start all over again with ideals that fall short of this point.

Deploying power

In political life, *Power* determines the range of possibilities for achievement. Too often, people in positions of authority disdain the exercise of power as contaminating them or the office. They believe their technical competence or authority should ensure their position. No one with responsibilities, however, can stand above the play of power. All official life is rife with politics, and official or unofficial leadership requires skilful mastery of the art of acquiring and deploying power. Political achievement depends upon attention to one's own power as well as the ability to perform the hard work of marshalling power and resources to the achievement of goals. A leader should also understand and appreciate the power of adversaries and allies. When Konrad Adenauer became president of a war-devastated Germany after World War II, he presided over a desperately weakened country with little effective power.

Yet he developed his own power base by gaining the trust and respect of his allies as well as playing on their own fears to gain their aid in Germany's redevelopment and to gain support for Germany's rearmament and reintegration into the Western European community⁵⁴. Good leaders understand power in all its manifestations and know how to create it even when none exists. Power must also endure for achievements to endure, and the deployment of power should look toward durability as well as initial success. When Nancy Hanks took over the fledgling National Endowment of the Arts in the late 1960s, the agency struggled with little support and much skepticism. Hanks built allies within the executive office, Congress, and the arts community and worked to build a rhetorical mission that connected arts funding with the aspirations of democratic life. Her nonpartisan institution building enabled the endowment to flourish through numerous changes of administration and controversy⁵⁵.

Titian's painting *An Allegory of Prudence* embodies the Renaissance understanding of the prudent leader that highlights these concerns. A man's head has three facets, youth, maturity, age. Each aspect of the man looks in a different direction surrounded by an animal avatar. A dog looks to the rear, a lion looks across the plane to the viewer, and a boar looks forward. The dog

respects history and what came before; the lion looks to the present with strength and fortitude; the boar seeks to divine the future and anticipate the consequences of action. In more colloquial terms, prudent leaders cover their rear, their flanks, and their front.

Be that as it may, power to Nigerian leaders is a red wine that leaders must get drunk with. It is the force that is only unidirectional. A weapon that is used to bring to subjection, the weak and any that is not in the corridors of power. Power to the Nigerian leader simply means more and more power. Power to the Nigerian leader is a birth right, one that cannot be shared with a neighbor, relation or friend. This is evident in the orientation that the northern part of Nigeria have concerning the retention of power and any available leadership position in Nigeria. Any contrary opinion will be met with violence and ethnic clashes. The Jos, Kaduna, Bauchi and Kano riots are indicative of these facts.

Until Nigerian leaders begin to learn and understand that one fundamental function of power is not for the subjection of the people but mainly for the purpose of serving and meeting the needs of the people whose votes and mandates brought them into power in the first place. Until this is achieved, the crisis of leadership and governance could continue unabated.

Timing and momentum

Given the importance of circumstances and power to achievement, the ability to time one's actions to accord with the greatest strength of a position and the weakest position of an opponent is crucial. Sometimes this takes years of patient preparation and working to attain a particular alignment of power and produce the cultural and political conditions for acceptance. It may mean working patiently for a shift in the terms of debate or an incident that galvanizes support around an issue, as President Lyndon Johnson did when he used John Kennedy's assassination to make the civil rights bill a testimony to a martyred leader.

Similarly, President Harry Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall used the communist threat in Eastern Europe as the opportunity to overcome domestic opposition and isolationism and push the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe after World War II ⁵⁶. Political leadership involves the ability to act with care and wait with patience, then move with quickness and surety

when the opportunity arises. As Machiavelli suggests, the lion and the fox should dwell in the same person or leadership cadre. ⁵⁷.

Prudent leadership does not mean cautious or cramped leadership. Although it is profoundly important to avoid harm and loss, Saint Thomas Aquinas argued that prudence actively seeks to accomplish good. ⁵⁸. A prudent leader's intelligence looks for opportunities that permit action to be taken consonant with goals and power. Principles, laws, and norms seldom dictate one clear action in concrete situations. As long as one does not expect a utopian fulfillment of all goals, then every action and attainment will only approximate moral aspirations. Achievements often consist of a direction and unfolding of goals, of initiating and sustaining momentum towards greater achievement later.

For ten years US Congress could not revise the Clean Air Act because of the complex politics involved. Senator George Mitchell, Democratic majority and minority leader during this period, was committed to a revision that did not destroy the law's intent. He spent much of that decade laying down the foundations of a compromise one step at a time by authorizing reports or keeping various issues alive in subcommittees. When President Bush signaled his willingness to work for a bill and break a decade of gridlock, Mitchell pulled together the various strands which he had woven together over the years to make a compromise possible. ⁵⁹ Patience and timing do not reduce to opportunism or quiescence but represent a dialogue between possibilities and ideals.

Statecraft never achieves final or perfect solutions. Given the constraints of politics and the power of others, most outcomes comport only partially with one's moral aspirations. They will be imperfect. In such a world, leaders need to think in terms such as movement, direction, and momentum as they adapt and learn from the possibilities and from experience. ⁶⁰ An achievement may not be perfect, but when thinking of the long term, of the need to build the foundations of legitimacy and durability, a leader may often settle for movement along a road. Timing also involves the capacity to remember, as Titian hints, that the past, the future, and the present must always be seen as a continuum. Actions should account for the past, attend to the present with its constraints and opportunities, and aim with care and humility to future consequences. Any leader who does not account for all these dimensions of time risks moral

negligence. it is sad to note that in Nigeria, leaders have not been known to have any sense for timing, neither do they have a sense for knowing when the moments is write for declaring certain plans and policies they wish to introduce to the masses. On too many occasions, we find the leaders in government coming out with many projects that do not match with the time and moment, i.e. declaring to go into full scale sale of rubber boots and umbrellas in the dry dusty hamattern season is an example of taking an important decision in a totally wrong time.

To this end, contracts and projects are often embarked upon that are not a direct and exact representation of the people's needs and aspirations. I recommend that Nigerian leaders needs now to consolidate on her huge reserve of crude oil; now is the *time* to embark upon building refineries to meet with the teaming need of petroleum and other oil products. But instead of embarking on such projects that are timely, the leaders rather import hundreds of tankers and trailers to transport already finished and refined crude oil from the ports to the northern parts of the country. Few of the existing refineries have been earmarked for sale in the name of privatization. This really is not the timing fir such action.

The proper relations of means and ends

The tradition of normative prudence emphasizes the importance of aligning the means and the ends. In the press of daily politics, pressures to reach an end often override qualms about the means. Linking the two is crucial to prudent leadership. This has three dimensions. The first dimension is finding the right means to attaining an end. The means of influence are many and varied, and the right combination of deliberation, persuasion, incentives, coercion, and authority is crucial. Misfits between means and ends will result in failure. Just as important the means used affect the quality of relations in an organization or politics at the end.

Second, the means used, the resources expended, and the opportunities forgone should be proportionate to the end sought. Additionally, the means must substantially contribute to the end and not be gratuitous, wasteful, or inefficient. While the use of coercion is most often cited as the test case for the requirements of proportionality and contribution, these standards apply to all dimensions of political action. In 1986, the Reagan administration sought to deter leaks and spying by pushing a program to require lie detector tests of all government officials with access

to classified material. Secretary of State George Shultz fought the program to the point of threatening resignation. He believed the proposed solution would undercut his entire leadership style of building trust on trust. It would sabotage the culture of the State Department and put innocent people at risk while not deterring trained spies. In all these terms the lie detector test failed the proportionality test ⁶¹

Third, prudent leaders recognize that means profoundly affect the end. Ends achieved with morally problematic means can be undermined by the illegitimacy, resentment, and anger that are the moral residuals of excessive and immoral methods to attain goals. The means used can also rebound and affect the quality of humanity of the people pursuing the policy. The United States learned during the Vietnam War that the means used can undermine the legitimacy of the leaders and institutions pursuing the policy. Additionally the means used, as in forming a coalition, rebound forward upon the outcome of the goals. Mitchell's final bill on clean air was shaped by the needs to keep the coalition together, ranging from tax breaks for ethanol to subsidies to end acid rain ⁶²

Coercion looms as the most dangerous means and poses special concerns. Politics often appear to take on a Mephistophelian character because it seems to reduce to issues of coercion and violence. But all prudent political achievement should breed accomplishments that endure and gain legitimacy with an economical use of coercion. The more sustained coercion is required to enforce an achievement, the less likely it is that the achievement has earned legitimacy or will endure over time.

Coercion, however, is often necessary to define the boundaries of acceptable behavior. The threat of coercion is often crucial to give others the incentive to comply with an outcome. At other times, government coercion can deter, defend, and set boundaries on regime behavior and protect individuals from exploitation. Prudent leaders, however, recognize coercion and violence as dangerous means that can entangle and poison the ends sought. They should be used with economy and care ⁶³ Gains wrought by coercion have their own dynamic and exact a never ending cost from a society in terms of resources spent, investment deferred, and social strictures

imposed. Over time coercion can silence and induce grudging acceptance, but it also elicits violent counteractions. Forced compliance strategies can create a world of illusory agreement and brittle acceptance, but unending application of coercion generates moral problems and is inconsistent with the core of prudence.

We are of the opinion that Nigeria and Nigerian leaders need to take time out and understand the very importance of this very factor of prudent leadership. The time has come to stop using the innocent electorates and the poor masses as a means to an end, by this I mean, a situation where leaders who seek power into key government offices see the electorates votes and the poor masses as the means to acquiring that goal. When these goals are attained, they relegate them to the corner and are forgotten. Matter of fact, they cease to exist from that moment when they have achieved their selfish aims. Their end in this case is the amercing of wealth and all the premium beverages that they can lay their hands on. This indeed has to change. Where a leader truly desire to be prudent in his dealing with his people, then the proper end is the electorate and the poor masses who voted them into power to represent their interest. Where a proper understanding of this is achieved, the leader now uses every other resource including the wealth of the nation to improve the lot of the poor masses. Where leaders begin to seen the individual as the **end** and not the means to an end in the day to day running of governance, then and only then can we say that the government is now for the people and to the people. This is prudent leadership.

Durability and legitimacy

Excellent political achievement endures. Fleeting success or actions that arouse backlashes to what a leader sought to achieve should not qualify as acts of excellent political achievement. A prudent leader will work to ensure that achievements will endure and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the individuals who must live with them. Political achievement earns its legitimacy with people by the provision of benefits, respect for the people's interests and commitments, and links to their cultural terms of right.

Prudent leaders should always attend to their government's legitimacy and credibility. These are essential social and political resources for the society, and leaders are responsible not to squander but to protect, restore, and augment them.

Hodge,⁶⁴ and Ellwood,⁶⁵ for instance were writers who capture When Konrad Adenauer worked to establish democratic practices in Germany after World War II, he realized that provision of economic welfare and prosperity would earn the government trust and legitimacy in a way nothing else could. Adenauer, allied with his brilliant finance minister, Ludwig Erhard, devoted time and energy to forge a viable and vibrant economy even as he used fear of the communists to unite his state and gather American support and aid for his fledgling state. Together they helped create a strong viable democracy and the greatest European political success of the post-war era. The means used also affect the quality and durability of the outcome.

When George Washington led the fight for independence in the United States, he instructed his soldiers not to steal or forcibly take supplies but wherever possible to buy them and respect the property rights of the landowners. At the same time, he treated the loyalists with leniency to prevent long-term alienation from the new state. He believed that only such treatment could build loyalty and legitimacy for the beleaguered American government⁶⁶. In perhaps his greatest act of prudence, Wills Garry captured how he retired from the presidency after two terms. This set an indelible precedent, ensured a peaceful transition of power for a revolutionary regime, and ended all aspirations for a monarchical government⁶⁷.

On the contrary, here in Nigeria and in Africa, leaders have a much more different orientation from those of George Washington. The Obasanjo's administration witnessed a great clamor for a third term in office, a phenomenon that has become so prominent among African leaders. Records show that it is only in Africa that leadership positions are held till they die in office. Any attempt to remove them from office is usually met with very stiff oppositions. Time will fail me to mention the endless list of leaders in Africa who for over many years now refused to relinquish power on account of some unfinished project which they want to see finished, one which never really finishes.

This single attitude found predominantly among Africans and now Nigeria leaders, we believe, is responsible for about 75% of all havoc and political crisis caused in their government. The present crises sweeping through nations of Africa are a typical example. The masses have risen to revolt against all the leaders who have spent donkey years in office amercing through corrupt means, all the wealth of the nation and refusing to relinquish power to another group of leaders. The crisis in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, where hundreds of thousands lives were lost and destroyed as a result of the masses wishes for change, is a typical example of what this wrong opinion of power can do to the nations of the world.

Obviously, the conception of leadership from these nations of Africa could be considered myopic. Their conception of the Aristotelian notion of prudence is certainly very poor or it does not exist. Where traces of it are found; the quality of leadership here it is nothing to write home about. One may not be totally wrong if he or she declares that the virtue of prudence in this regard, may really not exist among Africans and Nigerian leaders.

In all these cases mentioned above, durability depends upon connecting the achievement to the perceived interests of the parties and citizens involved and realizing the intimate connection of ends to means. Accomplishments or policies, however well-intentioned or morally defensible, will not endure if they do not ground themselves in the interests of those affected. Without this focus, many solutions will erode, dissipate, or require greater and greater amounts of coercion to maintain.

Building community

Prudent leaders hold special responsibilities to maintain and strengthen community foundations. Excellent political achievements do not stand in isolation but sustain the legitimacy of institutions and build community. Vaclav Havel has argued that “those who find themselves in politics therefore bear a heightened responsibility for the moral state of society, and it is their responsibility to seek out the best in that society, and to develop and strengthen it.”⁶⁸ Havel discusses the special obligation of leaders to sustain an inclusive society where diverse groups and interests can engage in political and civil conflict and cooperation. The conditions of social integration, the capacity of members and groups within a society to interact peacefully, and to act

with a modicum of civility and respect towards each other, cannot be controlled by leaders, but they can be influenced by example and policy.

The possibility of political community depends upon trust. Trust for each other and trust in institutions are the social resources and capital that leaders and major institutions should work to create and sustain.⁶⁹

President Nelson Mandela of South Africa responded to just these concerns about long-term community when, after years of imprisonment and with terrorism and tensions rising, he became the first black leader of his country. He initiated a careful campaign of national reconciliation designed simultaneously to reassure the once dominant white minority and provide hope and rewards for the newly enfranchised black majority. The policies attempted the very difficult feat of creating a political community where civil war once raged, and establishing trust where little existed.⁷⁰

This obligation to strengthen the communal affiliations and bonds among members of the society should inform and constrain judgments as a substantive demand of political prudence. The possibility of political community depends upon trust. *Trust* for each other and trust in institutions are the social resources and capital that leaders and major institutions should work to create and sustain. Without trust among citizens, institutions, and leaders, the capacity of the society to act for common purposes declines. The cost of common endeavors increases as does the interaction costs of all social relations. Like all social capital, trust is created by interactions over time and is solidified by the meaningful creations of social welfare from the pattern of interactions and communal affiliations. Prudent leadership entails special responsibilities to maintain this dimension of community and its common possibilities⁷¹.

In closing this section, we wish to note that whenever a leader adheres to these cardinal points from the virtue of prudence as outlined above, the result what you'll have is a leader who will make meaningful impact to the electorate, and the entire community; a leader that will curb all forms of crisis and bring peace and development to its community.

Before we conclude on this section we shall offer vivid examples of leaders who took the pains to observe all these seven virtues of prudence and have administered them while serving in the capacity of the “*Chancellor*” of their nation. The resultant consequence can best be described as what happens when *Prudence meets with politics*.⁷²

4.6 Gains of Prudent Leadership

Like a maestro debuting his fourth and finest symphony, *Gordon Brown's* hour at the dispatch box on the 21st of May, should have been his most golden. The climate shines on him more generously than any chancellor you can name. Just days ago before his presentation, Britain learnt that its economy had nudged ahead of France to become the fourth mightiest in the world. Under Brown, the country's accounts have moved from blood red to reassuring black. Yesterday he could brag and boast his way through an astonishing battery of numbers: growth higher than predicted, inflation lower than planned, unemployment at its lowest for 20 years and a deficit in 1997 converted into a £12bn surplus today. Even the usually ascetic chancellor couldn't resist offering a toast to himself. This fine record was the result of a strong economy and "*our prudent management*", he said.

But self-congratulation was not enough for the restless Mr. Brown. He quickened the pace, the maestro wowing his audience with sheer audacity. He revealed delights that would have made even his Tory predecessors blush. He slashed through capital gains tax too fast for the scribblers on the opposition benches to keep up. Within seconds he was on to inheritance tax, hacking away at it at such speed that the thing was in ribbons before MPs could pause for breath. Once he was done, the House could only marvel at a Labour chancellor who had served up a budget that could have been written by the Elders of Middle England. They will now pay the lowest corporation tax anywhere and, if they inherit money, only four in a hundred of them will pay tax on it. The reviews on planet Daily Mail should be stellar.

But he was not done yet. Having tickled the New Labour converts, he would soothe the old Labour faithful. "Something for the heartlands," was the tacit message as he announced bundles of cash for education and health. He had pulled it off again. Just last year, he seemed to squeeze

a £40bn injection to schools and hospitals into the same budget as a penny tax cut, so yesterday he simultaneously announced giveaways for the well-off and spending for the needy. Within 50 rapid-fire minutes, galloping Gordon had cut taxes, increased spending and still kept the public coffers in the black. Surely this was yet another Brown blockbuster, satisfying left and right alike.

And yet, it didn't quite feel that way. Despite the confidence of the opening, the final flourish on health sounded oddly defensive. That was because a performance which had begun with economics ended in politics. Far from displaying Gordon Brown as the unchallenged master of the universe lionized in Westminster mythology, yesterday's speech revealed him as a mortal politician - as vulnerable to the gusts of mood and "events" as any of his colleagues.

For although Brown's speech lasted less than an hour, it looked as though it began two months ago - on David Frost's sofa. There, on January 16, Tony Blair sought to cool anger over the winter crisis in the NHS by admitting that spending was too low - and promising increases of around 5% above inflation for the next six years. To the naked eye, yesterday's speech seemed like an urgent attempt to honour that pledge - with a commitment to spend a staggering £69bn on health over five years. (In fact Brown exceeded Blair's promise, pledging cash rises at 6.1% above inflation.)

That may be unfair. An alternative version says Brown and his aides realized more than a year ago that health was too hot a political issue to be handled like the rest of government activity. Where other departments could be told to reform first and receive new money later - and to wait for the Treasury's comprehensive spending review to take its course - health, the Brownies realized, was a special case. Ministers might be able to attack teachers for low standards, withholding extra cash until they changed their ways, but no politician could dare do the same to doctors and nurses. When David Blunkett appears on the Today programme pitted against a teacher, chances are the audience is rooting for him. When Alan Milburn squares off against a cancer specialist, it's the doctor demanding money who wins every time. Brown's team calculated that they would have to cut through the "noise" about resources by breaking their own

rules and announcing money up-front first, insisting on reform second. That's why Brown promised the cash yesterday, with Tony Blair launching the major review today.

Either way, the chancellor acted like a conventional politician yesterday, reacting to events rather than shaping them. With most ministers that would be no big deal; but you notice it with Brown - partly because normally he does such a good job of appearing above the everyday fray. Colleagues dislike the way he dodges the flak - ducking when trouble looms over Kosovo or the NHS crisis - but it adds to the aura of Brown as a heavyweight, a grown-up among political juniors. Sometimes he seems more like an emissary from the global economy than a humble British cabinet minister. But that mystique was punctured a little yesterday.

There are three other worries. First, BMW's dumping of Rover left many Britons anxious to hear Brown say something for manufacturing industry. BMW insists its hand was forced by the strong pound: it made exporting British goods economically unviable. Yet nothing in the Budget hinted at a fall in the sterling: on the contrary, tax cuts and increased spending, as promised yesterday, could well have the opposite effect. But Treasury insiders argue that their record of fiscal discipline - turning debts into surplus - should have begun to reduce the value of the sterling by now. The fact that it has not, suggests not that the pound is too strong - but that the euro is too weak.

A second concern centers' on one of Brown's loudest applause lines yesterday. He announced sack loads of money for schools - going straight to the head teacher's cash-box and bypassing the local education authority. That has obvious, anti-bureaucratic appeal. But that logic could eviscerate local government; eventually depriving authorities of half their budget and a large chunk of their *raison d'être*. This is hard to square with Brown's constant rhetoric about a decentralized, devolved Britain flowering into a rich, civic society.

Finally, the chancellor may come to regret bowing to politics on health. What's to stop other ministers now demanding similar up-front injections of cash ahead of reform? Has he perhaps created an incentive against reform, by rewarding the service with the deepest problems ahead of those which have most improved?

These are not urgent worries. Gordon Brown's centrality to this government was confirmed rather than undermined yesterday. He is still, at the very least, a co-conductor of the Labour orchestra - standing at the front, calling and dictating the tune.

In our opinion, Irrespective of the fears of the last two paragraphs, we see a man who has from all indications, demonstrated the virtues of Prudence in his government as the chancellor of Great Britain. This laudable fit wouldn't have been possible if Brown did not systematically apply all the seven phases of the virtue of prudence into his government, and hardly following after it to see it work.

A pledge to prudent leadership

To further portray the point made above how advantageous the application of the Aristotelian notion of prudence can be in a given government, Alex Stevenson's report of Thursday, 25th Jun 2009, in politics .co.uk; says it all. His report captures a leader who understands the integrity of his office and the responsibility that goes with it. This understanding was why he (Gordon Brown) publicly took all the members of his cabinet to pledge that their tenure will be guided by the virtues of prudence. The reports with the caption, "Brown responds with 'prudence' pledge". The article reads;

Gordon Brown was with young Labour candidates and activists as they signed a pledge promising to "put the country's interest first" this afternoon.⁷³

As the Conservatives published details of 45 MPs' repayments on questionable expenses claims, the Prime Minister attended an event at the Labour party's headquarters where he called for politics to be cleaned up "once and for all". Among the qualities he promoted were Integrity, Accountability and Prudence with public money. In his own words he said:

We've got to make sure that people see that their politicians are in it not for what they can get, but for what they can give,⁷⁴

On the same platform, he continued by saying:

That's why today we promise that we will uphold the highest standards of integrity, we promise that there will be transparency

in everything we do, we promise that we will report to our constituents and do so as regularly as possible.⁷⁵

That same evening, the 100 activists and candidates signing the pledge promised to “subscribe to high standards of accountability and prudence with public money”.⁷⁶

They also promised that constituents will always come first, and that:

I will regularly report back to my constituency party as well as to my constituents" and that "I seek elected office for the honour of serving the public and our democracy and not merely for any self aggrandizement."⁷⁷

At the end of the reading, Mr. Brown joined the 100 activists and candidates who had joined in making the pledge to also sign the pledge.

Where in Nigeria will you see such patriotism? Leaders coming out boldly to declare with a “pledge”, that they are out to serve with a special commitment of wanting to give something to their community and not necessarily because of what they think they can get from their community or the office.

The report I made earlier on Gordon Brown explains why he had done so remarkably well with the financial state of the economy of Great Britain. We need our leaders to begin to take a cue from this pattern of leadership, a scenario where Ya’Aduwa, the sitting president at the time of this research, and all the other members of his cabinet will come out publicly to declare their assets and thereafter, pledge to serve their country as prudently as they can. Except we begin to see things like this take place, Nigeria, I am afraid, will continue to have great distrust for her leadership. I have already highlighted what the consequences of such great distrust can result to in any polity.

In concluding this section, I want to say that the nature of political achievement generates a family of justifications for action which carry moral weight and to which leaders have an obligation to attend. They should structure perception and reflection in a situation. These

justifications provide guidance for the leader, but they also provide standards of judgment for others to assist or criticize actions of leaders. These standards as mentioned before are:

- (1) Disciplined reason and openness to experience and knowledge;
- (2) Foresight and attention to the long term;
- (3) Deployment of power and resources;
- (4) Timing, momentum, and direction;
- (5) The proper alignment of means and ends;
- (6) The durability and legitimacy of outcomes;
- (7) Building and sustaining community.

If leaders account for each aspect of prudence here represented, they would have lived up to part of their ethical responsibilities as leaders; if they fail, they are guilty of moral negligence and irresponsibility. Finally, we want to note that though we have in this dissertation, said so much about the importance of *Political Prudence*, we also wish to observe that this virtue does not cover all morality, neither does it guarantee all the success we desire in governance, but there is no doubt that when practiced, it will to a large extent, bring about qualitative and good governance. Negligent leaders can succeed by accident, by luck, or by the incompetence of others. Paradoxically, even prudent leaders can fail. But one thing sure is that Political Prudence flows from the responsibilities of leadership, it provides a *necessary* ground for ethical leadership.

4.7 Prudent Leadership

As we begin to conclude all arguments presented for our thesis in this dissertation, it is important to note that prudence does not encompass all public ethics. It does, however, expand the range of moral resources available to leaders and avoids the overdrawn distinctions between politics and morality. The morality of statecraft is neither demonic nor romantic, but built upon the foundations and circumstances of human ethics. To the extent that all moral action is underdetermined and takes place in a world of limited resources and constraints set by circumstances, all morality is imperfect. All relational morality strives for the best outcome “all things considered” or “given the circumstances.” Politics does not differ fundamentally from the morality by which most people live every day. Political leadership may be shaped by the

responsibility to others and by the lack of mutuality or problems posed by hostility and threats, but it differs from everyday morality in degree, not in kind.

Understanding prudence as a shaping and active virtue connected to foresight and dynamic judgment means that prudence does not reduce to caution or conservatism. The British historian G. M. Trevelyan described Lord Grey's actions in the Reform Act of 1832, which abolished the rotten boroughs in Britain and extended the suffrage, as "one of the most prudent acts of daring in history." Trevelyan added that "a more perfect bill (judged by 20th century standards) would have failed to pass in 1832, and its rejection would sooner or later have been followed by a civil war" ⁷⁸. As many prudent leaders do, Lord Grey saw the need to act boldly to avoid severe problems, and then he carefully set out to gain the greatest good permitted by the circumstances of the time as well as building a coalition and solution that would endure and earn its own legitimacy despite its imperfections. In a similar vein, when Secretary of State George Shultz recognized the fundamental shift that had occurred in the Soviet Union with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev, he began the arduous task of changing President Ronald Reagan's ideological hostility toward the Soviet Union. Shultz worked to persuade a recalcitrant administration to change 40 years of unremitting enmity towards the Soviet Union to one of cautious support of reform ⁷⁹.

Political prudence possesses extraordinary versatility, and it has been a modern mistake to narrow its application to self-interest or a cautious and tepid disposition. Prudence understood as shaping solutions within constraints also questions the importance of "circumstances" or "necessity" as the overpowering moral force they often appear to be in justifications. What often distinguishes a great from a good leader is his or her capacity to understand that circumstances themselves can be subject to prudent action and change.

The argument so often offered as a justification or really an "excuse" for action by "necessity" assumes: (1) that the public purposes remain immutable; (2) that the action required is the only way to achieve the fixed purpose; (3) that the circumstances and time constraints require one to do only *this* action at *this* time to achieve those goals. According to the insights of political prudence, individuals choose that goal from among many. Individuals choose to accept one particular shape as the content of that goal. Individuals choose to accept the circumstances as

determinative and do not choose to try and change them or the rules of the game. Statecraft, however, demonstrates that enemies can become friends with effort, imagination, and self-interest; coalitions can be restructured, and resources can be rearranged and redirected to meet goals.

Richard Nixon's opening to China demonstrated his grasp that the rules of the Cold War were limitations on action, not laws of history. Through careful preparation, he waited for the right opportunity and transformed the relations of the United States to the dominant partners of the communist world. In forging the Marshall Plan, President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall helped change the political landscape and co-opt the opposition by connecting European exports to the Midwestern farmers. This gained conservative support, just as the later creation of a food stamp program for the poor transformed political constraints by using vouchers, solidifying the support of conservative Midwestern farm states for the program.

Political prudence understood in this way narrows tremendously the argument from necessity and rejects an unimaginative acceptance of "circumstances" or "conditions" as permanent necessities.

4.8 Conclusion

In closing, we affirm that political prudence, deeply informs ethical leadership. Starting with the obligation for self-mastery, it generates a checklist of concerns that responsible leaders have a moral obligation to account for in their judgments. The arguments so far indicate that political prudence is not simply a disposition of character to act, or a narrative of exemplars. It is a virtue linked to the moral responsibilities of political leadership to discern the prudential aspects of a situation. Political prudence's intellectual content arises from the full dimensions of excellence in political achievement. The frame work provided in this chapter for leaders, it is believed, will go a long way in changing the orientations of leaders when fully implemented.

The title of the study in the first chapter of this dissertation is “The Crisis of Leadership in Nigeria”. This chapter was devoted entirely to critically assessing most of the factors that are responsible for the crisis of leadership in Nigeria. One of the reasons that were identified as one of the major causes of crisis in Nigerians is rooted in the misconception that exists in concepts of *leadership*, and *politics*. Our study revealed that the concept of politics means something quite different from the generally accepted conception of politics. Politics for the typical Nigerian is a “win and not lose” game by all means; So while the study identified that politics are the activities associated with government; the theory and practice of government, especially the activities associated with governing, with obtaining legislative or executive power, or with forming and running organizations connected with government. Studies show that the conception of politics for the typical Nigerian’s is slightly different and opposite from the generally accepted meaning. For the Nigerian politician, politics have been conceived as a game only for the rich and the influential; it is one of the quickest means through which wealth and riches is acquired; it is all about self aggrandizement and nothing about the service to the people.

In chapter one also, we had cause to consider another important concept, the conception of *leadership*; as one of the factors that is largely responsible for the crisis in Nigeria. There in the chapter, the study revealed that, against the generally accepted conception of Leadership which holds that: Leadership is a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal, Nigerians have a different understanding of the concept of leadership is. For Nigerian leaders; Leadership is a position that is exclusive for a particular class of persons, the “Northern caliphate”. For these classes of people, leadership is a birth right that is exclusive to the Hausa’s and to them alone. As such; they will stop at nothing to ensuring that they always occupied the leadership positions that are available at all cost, irrespective of their qualifications. The records of the past heads of states and past Presidents of this country are indicative to this fact. The tussle and crisis that comes from these contest for power and leadership position, our research has shown, are some of the factors that has continued to breed leadership crisis in Nigeria. The absence of a viable and a consistent theory of leadership by theorist and experts in this area were also identified as one of the major reason for leadership crisis. The recent Nigerian civil is indicative of this fact.

The concept of violence was also considered and analyzed in this chapter with the view to understanding the remote cause of violence and how Nigerian leaders have used it to pursue their cause and quest for leadership. We also considered some of the salient ways through which violence can be avoided.

In Chapter two certain Theories of Leadership” were considered for discussion and analysis. The schools of thought focused on include: “The Realist and The Moralism school of thought.” In this chapter we basically set out to examine the theories of leadership put forward by these two schools of thought amongst other theories from several other schools of thought.

Our study in this chapter observed that the series of conflicts between the theories of leadership presented by writers in the Realist school of thought and the theories provided by writers in the Moralism schools of thought and the attendant confusion rising from the disagreement between these two schools of thought, are largely responsible for the leadership crisis that nations like Nigeria now experience. While Moralists call for an explicit recognition of the moral nature of leadership in the light of governance, further studies show that they fail to provide leaders with a consistent direction or guideline of what ethical leadership ethics should entail. Realists on the other hand have argued for a total autonomy of the political sphere. A position that insist that all political activities should abide by certain objective laws which they believe will prevent moralistic ideas from tampering with an effective use of power in the cause of leadership. This point is very important considering the fact that the Realist considers “Power” as the most important element of Leadership. However, the problem with this drastic / critical realist view is that the view fails to realize and recognize the existence and relevance of any moral consideration in the political arena. Consequently, they subordinate moral standards to those of politics.

The ideological confusion arising between both schools of thought, we have cause to believe, are largely responsible for the absence of an adequate and consistent theory of political leadership in the world today. We later in the chapter subjected both theories of leadership to the Aristotelian theory of leadership from where we prescribed a theory of leadership that is premised on Aristotle’s notion of prudence as the most viable theory of leadership that should bridge that exist between these two schools of thought.

In Chapter three “Aristotle’s Notion of Prudence”, we devoted the entire chapter to examining in some detail, all that Aristotle had to say about Ethics, Virtue, Morality and Prudence. Here, a conceptual analysis of the above mentioned concepts were treated, defined and analyzed in relation with the subject of this project. We established among other things that ethics is that branch of philosophy that deals with the values related to human conducts with respect to the rightness and the wrongness of the motives and the ends of such actions.

We later noted that for Aristotle, intellectual virtues are cultivated through growth and experience, while moral virtues are cultivated through habits. Aristotle held that wisdom and prudence are the most important of all virtues because they are the ones that make all others virtues possible.

In his *Eudemonian* ethics, Aristotle noted that Eudemonia is not the same as what utilitarian’s or egoists consider when they refer to the word ‘happiness’. Rather it is the condition of the soul or psyche. It is the good that humans seek by nature that arise from fulfillment of our functions as humans. Eudemonia in this sense is similar to the Eastern and Western concepts of enlightenment, *Nirvana*, self actualization and proper self esteem. We also noted specially, the comments Aristotle made about reason; when he said that: “In the moral make-up of the Virtuous man, there is nothing which is at variance with reason”

Aristotle believed that all life has a function that is peculiar to its peculiar life form. The function peculiar to human life, he claimed, is the exercise of reason. The function of the excellent man therefore is to exert such activity well. For Aristotle therefore, virtue involves living according to reason and is intimately connected to our proper function as human beings. According to Aristotle, “virtue is essential if we are to achieve the good life. Only by living in accordance with reason, which is our human function, can we achieve happiness (eudemonia) and inner harmony.

Later in the chapter, there was need to examine Aristotle’s notion of Prudence while focusing on the uncertainties which follows from the complexities of politics. Consequently, we presented Aristotle’s prudence as a political desideratum by arguing that without it, political actors will be thoughtlessly complacent, purely self-interested or inhuman, merely nonchalant to the on goings of life in their society, or the cause of mindless or groundlessly hopeful destruction or violence.

We came to this conclusion because Aristotle called prudence "*Practical wisdom*" in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This practical wisdom he contrasted with "Intuitive Reason," which is the natural endowment Aristotle thought some people had for understanding what was ultimately right from what was ultimately wrong. Intuitive reason therefore marked out 'the ultimate' in both directions, while prudence makes us take the right means. The link which prudence provides between seeing and acting is what distinguishes it from simple discernment, which is a function of reason.

For the purpose of objectivity, we saw the need to examine other notions of prudence by ancient thinkers and contemporary thinkers of leadership. This was done with the view to offering justifications for adopting Aristotle's notion of prudence as the linchpin for this study.

In chapter four "Implications of Aristotle's Notion of Prudence for Leadership in Nigeria," attention was focused on the classic theory of "*Normative Prudence* with the view to showing why this virtue, of all the other virtues in ethics, was considered as the vital resources for ideal leadership. Further studies on the chapter also acknowledge that a relationship exist between leadership and virtue as portrayed in "Aristotle's notion of prudence". A relationship that if ignored will make leaders ineffective and unproductive, especially when it comes to the area that requires the leader to build the virtue of trust among its citizens. We also showed how the ethics of prudence focuses upon the obligation of a leader to achieve moral self-mastery. A prudent leader is thus equipped with the power for deliberation and careful judgment, which makes for concrete outcomes and decisions that are legitimate and durable.

Against the realist backdrop, we argued that Leadership entails ethics because leaders have responsibilities. This is because persons in positions of leadership make a difference; they can bring about changes in behaviour that ordinarily would not occur without their presence and actions.

The chapter sought to establish the implications of prudence as presented by Aristotle. To this end, arguments were offered to show that political prudence encompasses the logic of excellence in political achievement and extends the range of moral concerns and justifications. Excellent political achievements therefore, consist of outcomes that: (1) gain legitimacy, (2) endure over

time, (3) strengthen the political community, (4) unleash minimum unforeseen consequences, (5) require reasonable use of power resources, and (6) endure without great violence and coercion to enforce the outcome.

After further studies and analysis in the chapter, we were able to identify that political prudence encompasses *seven* overlapping dimensions of political achievement clustered into three related areas. This we presented as the frame-work that leaders need to adopt for excellence in governance. The first area clusters around the capacities a leader should cultivate in order to act with prudence: (1) Disciplined reason, and (2) Foresight (Vision). The second area clusters around the modalities statecraft leaders should master: (3) Deploying power; (4) Timing and momentum and; (5) The proper relation of means and ends. The third area clusters around the attributes of political outcomes to which prudent statecraft should attend: (6) The durability and legitimacy of outcomes, and (7) The consequences for community. We therefore concluded that to be politically prudent, a leader should attend to each of the seven dimensions. Failure to account for any of them would amount to negligence on the part of the leader.

There was need to offer vivid examples of leaders who excelled in government because they totally embraced the virtue of prudence, a move we feel Nigerian leaders should emulate if they truly desire to become better leaders. We wish to end this section by noting that the results of the study undertaken in this research offers great insight to the causes of the various kinds of crisis that have thronged Nigerians and Africans at large for a while now. A careful effort was also made to identify and state clearly, some of the frame works and steps that when taken could drastically reduce the problems that are responsible for the crisis that are associated with leadership and poor governance in Nigeria.

It is on the basis of our findings that we make bold to recommend the results and findings of this research to the government and people of Nigeria since we believe, without any doubt, that the application of the framework and guidelines given here; based on the Aristotelian notion of prudence, will go a long way in ameliorating the crisis that are often associated with leadership and governance especially in Nigeria and in Africa.

The tension between moral aspirations and the demands of political achievement we have identified in this study, as one of the factors that leads many to misinterpret the relationship between ethics and political leadership. This research is therefore built upon the classic theory of normative prudence from an Aristotelian perspective, to argue that political prudence serves as a vital moral resource for leaders to bridge that gap.

All through the study, we strove to show how *political prudence* covers the normative practices derived from the requirements of political achievement. We also showed how the ethics of prudence focuses upon the obligation of a leader to achieve moral self-mastery, to attend to the context of a situation, and to through deliberation and careful judgment, seek concrete outcomes that are legitimate and durable.

It was from this back drop that we, among other things, argued that political prudence is the necessary prerequisite virtue for leadership among Nigerian political leaders and indeed, among all other leaders of nations in Africa and around the world. The virtue of prudence from where we prescribed a frame-work for leadership, we noted, *requires foresight, openness to experience and reason, timing, linking means and ends, seeking durability and legitimacy of outcomes, and building community*, which are among the tenets of prudence we have recommended. We thus affirmed through the arguments presented in this dissertation that the account of Political Prudence is a necessary condition for ethical leadership, one that can reduce the scourge of bad leadership when strictly applied. We therefore strongly recommend the virtue of prudence to the people aspiring for the positions of leadership in Nigeria and other nations of the world.

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