

CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE AS BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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CERTIFICATION

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the Most Triune God for the wonders of my being.

I also dedicate it to my parents: Michael Oladele **Olatunji** (of blessed memory) and Cecilia Mojirola **Olatunji** for their efforts in nurturing the art of cultural realities in me.

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ABSTRACT

Cultural knowledge, centred on the belief systems of a people and abstracted from the totality of their skills and values, is very crucial to the development of a society. Previous studies on development have proved to be inadequate in resolving the dilemma of development in Africa because they emphasised economism – a uni-dimensional idea and approach to development that gives primacy to individualism, market liberalisation, and material aspect of development, while ignoring the cultural realities of the people. This study, therefore, examined the centrality of cultural knowledge to development in Africa.

The study adopted Arturo Escobar's Ethnographic model, which argues that societies of the Global South should be allowed to pursue their own development as they deem fit without the influence of the Global North. Ten relevant texts in Philosophy of Culture including Escobar's *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (ED), Hoppers' *Culture, Indigenous Knowledge and Development* (CIKD) and Verhelst's *No Life Without Culture* (NLWC); eight texts in Epistemology including Descartes' *Discourses on Method* (DM), Hobbes' *Leviathan* (LN) and Bacon's *The New Organon* (TNO); and six texts on Political Economy including Sachs' *Common Wealth* (CW), Stiglitz' *The Price of Inequality* (TPI), Stiglitz and Charlton's *Fair Trade for All* (FTA) were analysed. These purposively selected texts dealt with the idea of development and how it should be approached from the cultural and economic perspectives. Conceptual analysis and reconstruction were adopted for analysis.

Texts in Philosophy of Culture revealed that Western conception of development is ethnocentric, authoritarian and technocratic and rejected models that provided Western theories alone as ideal models for the Global South, which Africa has been following (ED, CIKD and NLWC). Texts in Epistemology upheld the quest for social change through the essence of knowledge in order to liberate and expand the horizons of intelligence of the people (DM, LN and TNO). Texts on Political Economy emphasised that market forces built on capitalist ideology made development linear and tailored towards economism (CW, TPI and FTA). Critical intervention shows that the totality of skills, experiences, beliefs, values, taboos, norms and insights of a people guide the contents and processes of their development. Knowledge of these cultural elements not only forms the basis for decision-making but also informs the survival strategies adopted by people in matters relating to critical issues of life.

The challenge of development in Africa has remained because of the uni-dimensional approach to development, which emphasises economism, to the neglect of other cultural elements that define the people's reality. Therefore, cultural knowledge can better enhance development in Africa.

Keywords: Cultural knowledge, Development in Africa, Escobar's Ethnographic model

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INTRODUCTION

The discourse of development is a fundamental one as it affects everything that man does. It could be seen as a form of social change, in which new ideas are introduced into a social system, to produce better living standards. In other words, it could be interpreted as man's capacity to expand his own form of consciousness, awareness and power over himself and the society; that is, the optimal realisation of the well-being of individuals and the common good. It is the power of a people to solve their own problems with their own wisdom, experiences and resources. It must, in every aspect of life, affect individuals and institutions of the society, which is dependent upon the outcomes of man's efforts. All societies of the world have experienced and are still experiencing one aspect of development or the other but areas and levels of such development vary from one society to another.

Development is multi-dimensional in nature as against the uni-dimensional view in economic/scientific manner. And since development is a multi-dimensional concept and process, there is the need to state its objectives as follow: to raise the availability and widen the distribution of life-sustaining goods to all members of the society; to raise the level of living, which includes the provision of more jobs, good education, attending to cultural and human values, other aspects of human endeavours that enhance material well-being and also greater individual and societal self-esteem; and to expand the ranges of economic and social choices to individuals and societies by freeing them from servitude and dependency not only in relation to other people and societies but also to the forces of ignorance and human history.

The discourse on development has been hinged on the twin theories of rationalism and empiricism, which have served as the sources of knowledge in Western tradition of philosophical discipline during the modern age. This was based on the understanding of the Renaissance era (during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), which dealt with the classical ideas that sparked explosive progress in natural philosophy, that is, science and consequently the material well-being of people. John Haldane posits that, "the principal concerns of Renaissance writers were philosophy of nature (embracing science, occultism, and metaphysics), psychology (including theory of knowledge), and moral and political philosophy – one of the main contributions to which was the employment of fables of golden ages, past and future, in order to retrieve and refashion personal and social virtues associated with

antiquity.”¹ Development, is considered during this period, with the utmost intention of solving multifarious problems encountered by man.

In the Enlightenment era, attention turned to the nature of the human mind and its abilities to master the natural world. The thrust then was to examine all phenomena in relation to either rationalist or empirical approaches. Hence, development was based on the phenomena in the human society. It should be stated that the discourse of development is seen and grounded upon the lopsidedness of what the term progress is since Renaissance period. The concept of development is not progress as Maurice Izunwa opines that there is a demarcation between development and progress. He argues that:

Progress as understood refers to advancement and growth, which do not target the perfection of the subject but “usefulness”, the utility of the structures of advancement. Therefore, progress is synonymous with change located out-there, precisely as co-terminus with achievement. If change has a spirit and form, progress is the phenomenology of change bereft of every formal object . . . Thus, dry progress as set by science and technology became the rule and the norm. It is no longer *value or virtue* but efficiency that matters. The god of progress is effectiveness and “the norms of the technological society are utility, productivity and efficiency. The goal is a conformist society in which every point is made to contribute to the growth and expansion of the whole. From such ambience, a person’s worth is only proportional to achievement.”²

The above analysis on the concept of progress as examined differs completely from what development is,; and not of “the end justifies the means” as it is the case in the concept of progress.

Kola Ogundowole also examines and differentiates between the two concepts in the same thought-pattern thus:

‘Development’ as a process and as a concept is broader and is multi-dimensional. It may merely mean a mechanistic motion, the spatial displacement of objects. It may mean forward, backward, sideways, upward and/or downward movement . . . When development lingers backward, we speak of regress. When it is merely a rotatory, oscillating and without any established trajectory, we notice self-cancelling motion, then we speak of development, *movements without progress*.

¹ Haldane, John. 1995. Renaissance philosophy. *The Oxford companion to philosophy*. Honderich, Ted Ed. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., p. 768.

² Izunwa, Maurice. 2009. Philosophical humanism: inspiration for authentic development in Africa. *West African Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 12, pp. 19-20.

In this sense, the development of a given object is said to be *stagnant*. It is when development represents a forward and upward-thrust movement that *progress* may be said to be taking place. Unlike development, it (progress) is a unidirectional process, not multi-dimensional. Progress represents in truth, a forward, an upward-thrust motion along an *optimal trajectory*.³

In another parlance, he reiterates the sharper differences between development and progress that:

In general, the existence and validity of a piece of development are independent of the social acceptance of it. Progress, on the other hand, and in our own usage here, is a realisation in the field of economics, social life, politics and culture a commendable general upliftment of the masses. In other words, a piece of development, which influences or changes the social being, that is, the real life or conduct of a people in a positive upward direction has the status of progress in our sense of the term.⁴

In line with the above, is the central issue about development, which concerns the fact that it is about people. Progress is, in fact, the necessary condition of material development as against non-material (intangible/moral) development. Here, the scientific mind reduces the concept of development to its technical and economic aspects, which became the ideal of the materially civilised life. In this understanding, Tedros Kiros states that:

The concept of development emerged from discussions of progress. This concept grew out of the debates and arguments concerning science around the beginning of the seventeenth century Europe. The concept of development then is grounded upon the concept of progress; progress is in fact the necessary condition of material as opposed to non-material development. The term progress was a controversial term among the writings of philosophers of science, sociologists, and economists. Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, Smith in the eighteenth century, Emmanuel Kant, Hegel, and Marx in the nineteenth century have directly or indirectly commented on the concept of progress.⁵

The term was a controversial concept among scholars of different traditions – empiricists and rationalists – and others who were not members of these schools of thought as stated above. While Georg Hegel examines the discourse from the

³ Ogundowole, Kola. 2004. *Philosophy and society*. Lagos: Correct Counsels Ltd, p. 95.

⁴ Ibid. pp. 95-96.

⁵ Kiros, Tedros. 1992. *Moral philosophy and development: the human condition in Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Centre for International Studies Monographs in International Studies, Africa Series No. 61, p. 118.

development of the Spirit – the struggles and processes of self-determination; Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz look at the market forces where economics dictates the pace of growth in human society.

The Enlightenment project embodied tremendous intellectual and social advancements, especially in the areas of education, which imparted knowledge rather than moulding of feelings or developing characters; participatory politics of diverse ideologies – that men and women share the same brotherhood and are equal in respect of their rationality and should be granted such before the law and individual liberty; improvement of human lives through the emerging and improved science and technology. It was a dramatic shift toward a world-view based on reason and manifested as the right to question received authority and re-define the moral and political realms of philosophy historically relegated only to the Church hierarchies. The Enlightenment then can be understood as the extension of the same principles of reason - where the Renaissance was the rebirth of reason, the Enlightenment was its maturity. Some of the doctrines and teachings of the period include but not limited to the following, namely: that reason is man's central capacity; individuals and the community can progress to perfection; the equality of all persons in the society; tolerance is an accomplished word for all creeds; and that beliefs are accepted not based on the authority of religions but simply on reason, among others.

The post-modern discourse on development seems to revolve round the presidential inaugural address of Harry Truman's *Point Four Agenda* that:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.⁶

⁶ Truman, Harry. 1949. *Text of the speech in department of State bulletin*, Jan. 20, p. 123.

This sets the tone that a greater part of the world as under-developed and declared that a greater production was the key to welfare and peace. Albert Dalfovo maintains from this point that, “development became a supreme objective motivating the policies of individuals and nations; production, which meant industrialisation and later modernisation, became the means of development. The assumption of a world divided between the developed and the not developed set off on a race with a few nations at immediate advantage in the lead and the rest of the world behind.”⁷ This shows that the concept of development is both a mental and phenomena idea that has set the whole world apart from the above quotation that: one, ‘developed’ and the other, ‘under-developed’ or ‘developing’. This wrong categorisation maintains the unequal level of human existence in man’s world today. Hence, a great dichotomy is in existence among societies of the world essentially as it affects societies of the Global North as against societies of the Global South. Here, the process of making development a worth-while venture and aspiration in any human society will be to make man improve the conditions of his life, either in developed world or under-developed societies.

The above understanding of what development is, from the Western paradigm, has led to the total sacrifice and surrender of fundamental principles of man’s existence and alternatives in Africa. By this analysis, we shall be creating option of defending the project that, for Africa’s development, theories and practices must be founded on cultural knowledge, which is a necessary condition to the success and survival of African world. Hence, we will come to the reality that development is necessarily culture-derived and culture-driven, with the preservation and improvement of human dignity and welfare as its ultimate objectives. In that manner, there is a necessity for a framework meant for Africa’s development to be founded on cultural knowledge, which will restore and liberate Africa’s development efforts, from the prison of economic/scientific model of development bequeathed by the imperialists. In accordance with this, our effort will be to recognise wholeness and inclusiveness as the basis for understanding the praxis of cultural knowledge towards the advancement of development in the African spirit.

⁷ Dalfovo, Albert. 1999. Development in sub-saharan Africa: the state and the people. *Social Reconstruction in Africa*, II.4. p. 11.

The sustainability of this wholeness and inclusiveness through cultural knowledge is that any form of conception about development must be based on the specificity of the society seeking to be developed, if there is any quest for relevance and recognition. It then becomes clear that any idea of development must be derived from the needs, aspirations, values and ideals expressed by the people's understanding of what they intend to become both in the moment and in the future. Our understanding of cultural knowledge, which will inform developmental realities in Africa as this thesis shows, is rooted in the belief systems of the people, which are basically beyond the theories of the Western traditions. It is a world-view structured with assumptions, values, ideals and principles, among others, upon which a way of perceiving the phenomenal and noumenal world is based. This essentially shall be examined in five chapters. By doing this, we will be able to attain our aspirations and interests, in bringing out the fact that development should be understood from the cultural knowledge of the society, as a society cannot experience development without the culture of the people.

The first chapter shall attempt to examine development from its diverse natures. In doing this, a conceptual analysis of what development is, will be addressed. That is, we will devote our understanding of development from diverse variations essentially from its meanings to man and his environment. It shall also focus on the different theories on which development has been understood and discussed. The theories to be examined are as follow: modernisation, dependency and neo-liberalism theories respectively. The second chapter of this work will focus on the examination of the nexus between knowledge and development, that is, how knowledge aids and enhances development. By this, we will be able to justify the fact that knowledge is crucial to human survival. It is one of the means by which human beings seek to master and control their space. Through this pattern, we will establish the link between knowledge and development stemming from the analysis of views of some scholars in the field of philosophy.

In the third chapter, we shall examine Arturo Escobar's ethnographic model, but first, from the understanding of post-development theory, which is the platform upon which Arturo Escobar developed his theory, in the quest for development among societies of the Global South. Whereas the fourth chapter will examine the notions of culture and cultural knowledge, which will engender authentic development in Africa; the fifth chapter will tie the loose ends of the former chapters and unequivocally state

that cultural knowledge is the basis for development in Africa. This means that our pre-occupation in this chapter will be to argue that cultural knowledge is the hallmark towards the achievement of authentic development in Africa. That is, cultural knowledge is integral and imperative to enhancing strategies for the over-all analysis of development and improvement in the quality of lives and well-being of the people.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPT AND THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

1.1 Introduction

Development, as a concept, is one among several other concepts such as democracy, justice, equity, fairness, common good among others, which lend themselves to simple daily usages but which, at the same time, defy interrogation. The reason for this is because, amongst other reasons, they are deeply philosophical and have the capacity of accommodating changes and transformations of human societies from one age to another. That is to say, their definitions are dynamic and elastic, which make for an endless process of definitions and re-definitions in keeping with the changes from one historical epoch to another. However, the contemporary definitions and re-definitions took a dramatic turn in intellectual discourse with the emergence of modern industrial capitalist society as distinct from the perception of them in classical times. And even within the context of the emergent industrial capitalist society, there have been changing shifts in the definition of these concepts to include concerns in keeping with the dynamics and progress within the capitalist mode of production itself which is on-going.

Development could be described in so many diverse terms, namely: as social change in which new ideas are introduced into a social system to producing better living standards. It is also peoples' capacity to expand their own consciousness and, therefore, power over themselves, their environment and society. In another dimension, it could be power and ability of a people to solve their own problems with their own wisdom, experiences and resources and the optimum realisation of the well-being of individuals in their community. Simply put, it is a process through which human beings strive to improve the conditions of their lives. That is, it is a process of social transformation that involves the capacity of the individuals for self-realisation, self-direction and the promotion of social co-operation with others in the society.

Development, in all aspects, must affect individuals and institutions of a particular society. That is why it is an over-all social process, which is dependent upon the outcome of man's efforts to dealing with his natural atmosphere. All societies of the world have experienced one aspect of development or the other in their history; but areas and levels of development vary from one society to another. In thinking about development, one can say that it is a process, which is full of value

judgement. Here, Dudley Seers avers that, “the starting point is that we cannot avoid what the positivists often disparagingly refer to as “value judgements”. ‘Development’ is inevitably treated as a normative concept, as almost a synonym for improvement. To pretend otherwise is just to hide one’s value judgements.”⁸ This understanding by Seers, from the positivists’ angle, is mechanistic in nature and, therefore, cannot be over-looked. To say that it is a normative concept in the like of improvement is to think of the concept as a scientific form of improvement. But, it should be understood from the outset that the meaning of development is more than a mechanistic view.

This chapter, therefore, shall attempt to examine development from its diverse natures. In doing this, a conceptual analysis of what development is all about will be thematised with the over-all interest in bringing out the so many understandings concerning the discourse. It shall also look into the different dimensions on how development is understood, as it does not only entail economic or scientific aspect alone, but that it has to be understood from its many ideas. Here, different theories of development shall also be examined.

1.2 A Conceptual Analysis of Development

Development as an unfolding Concept

Uma Kothari and Martin Minogue opine that, “development is an idea, an objective and an activity. These are all interrelated.”⁹ Aram Ziai examines the concept of development from four assumptions, namely: existential, normative, practical and methodological assumptions respectively that these assumptions are, however, quite abstract. They determine that there are developed and less developed countries. They determine that ‘development’ should be achieved, but not what it looks like and how this can be done.¹⁰ Farzana Naz argues that, “the concept of development is an extremely vague and all-encompassing term, which appeals to various groups who often view it in different ways, although related terms such as growth, modernisation

⁸ Seers, Dudley. 1969. *The meaning of development*. IDS Communication 44, Institute of Development Studies, p. 2.

⁹ Kothari, Uma Minogue, Martin. 2002. *Critical perspectives on development: an introduction. Development theory and practice*. Uma Kothari and Martin Minogue. Eds. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, England, p. 12.

¹⁰ Ziai, Aram. 2011. *Some reflections on the concept of ‘development’* Working Paper Series 81, University of Bonn, Germany, pp. 3-4.

and socio-economic progress are less difficult to understand.”¹¹ The concept of development is a fundamental issue in every society. The concept is being abused due to its mis-interpretation; its usage has often combined ideas of necessity, influenceable change and fundamental improvement. This is so because development is a seductive term, which has had different connotations. The term means different things to different persons and scholars and every scholar is likely to use the term in several ways; and across people, we see different and further variations.

The critical analysis on development was the trade-mark of the post-development’s theorists. While earlier theories like dependency, modernisation and neoliberalism were usually focusing on inadequacies that prevented its achievement among societies in the South, the post-development theory rejected the totality of entire paradigm and denounced it as a myth. Matthews Sally avers that, “the problem, from the perspective of post-development theorists, is not that the project of development was poorly implemented and that it is necessary to find a better way to bring it about, but that the assumptions and ideas that are core to development are problematic, and so improved implementations is not the answer.”¹² The post-development theorists: Rist, Escobar, Rahnema, Bawtree, Kothari, Minogue argue that development has been seen essentially from Western societies, into the deficiencies and inadequacies of societies of the Global South to develop, portraying them as regions in need of modernising along the Western models.

Gudrul Dahl and Gemetchu Megerssa complement the fact that development has divergent meanings and implications that, “‘Development’ is an abstract notion, the use of which is ambiguous even in the industrialised and urbanised West. Translation between the expressions used in the dominant Western European languages is difficult enough. The aim of comparing different notions of ‘development’ between cultures and languages, which are distant in terms of space, origin and social context is thus futile.”¹³ What development is, in relation to space and origin, emphasises that the concept itself is a problematic one, which unfolds to man because it is an ever-alive concept. All human societies aspire towards development,

¹¹ Farzana, Naz. 2006. Arturo Escobar and the development discourse: an overview. *Asian Affairs*, 28.3, p. 65.

¹² Matthews, Sally. 2004. Post-development theory and the question of alternatives: a view from Africa. *Third World Quarterly*, 25.2, p. 375.

¹³ Dahl, Gudrul. & Gemetchu, Megerssa. 1997. The spiral of the Ram’s Horn: Boran Concepts of development. *The post-development reader*. Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree. Eds.. London & New Jersey: Zed Books, p. 52.

as it is an integral factor. Apart from the fact that development as a concept is an unfolding one; it is also a misleading concept. It is misleading because scholars examine the concept depending on the level of their society. This is in a way, as Western scholars like David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, among others, have diverse notions concerning development outside their Western societies. This is misleading as what one names as development in all ramifications would neither be what others accept as development paradigm based on their different societies. It is a complex concept, as all attempts to examine it, would surely lead to divergence of opinions because it is difficult to understand in its entirety, as there is no ideal society in terms of development. The use of the word 'developed' to refer to the Western societies is a problematic because such societies are daily seeking ways and avenues where they could amend and continue in the process of emancipation as against the concept in its past form.

In this analysis of the concept of development, Johan Galtung examines development from the aspect and process of overcoming structural violence in any human society. He writes about development "as unfolding of the potentials in the nature, human, social and world spaces; and that development as unfolding accommodates development as freedom."¹⁴ While Francis Nyamnjoh sets "the problems of development in terms of the alienating education forced on Africans through colonialism - European education is a forecourt of empiricist and materialist epistemology. He writes that development for Africa is a theme fraught with a multiplicity of Western-generated ideas, models and research paradigms, all with the purported goal of 'alleviating poverty'.¹⁵ This discourse is carried on mainly by economists and other social scientists who limit the question of development to the problematic of achieving economic growth within the context of neo-liberal economic principles.

Development as a multi-dimensional concept

Galtung examines that, "a general development concept should be matched with a general development theory, which will be holistic, that is, accommodating the nature, human, social and world spaces, and dialectical, that is, catching

¹⁴ Galtung, Johan. 2000. *A theory of development*. Kolofon Press, p. 16.

¹⁵ Nyamnjoh, Francis. 2004. A relevant education for African development – some epistemological considerations. *Africa development*, XXIX.1, p. 162.

contradictions that may turn development into de-development and vice versa. Rejected is any grotesque reductionism to social space in general and the economic sector in particular, like reducing humans to weight growth only.”¹⁶ This is figuring development, in two most basic aspects; holistic and dialectic, that is, development is a multi-dimensional concept, which cannot be examined from political economy and scientific arrangements alone. This sharp distinction makes development as an all-encompassing discourse in human society. The above is a truism as development is linked to maintenance, maturity, resilience and reproduction.

It will be of no value to think of development from purely economic angle alone, that is, to conceive development solely in terms of material prosperity as this will lead to disintegration of societies if patterned on economic or material terms. It makes it one of the reasons this exercise is germane as it considers development from other levels that are beyond material possessions. This is in consonance with the position of the Catholic Church that:

A society risks integration if it patterns development solely in economical terms, ignoring the cultural, ethical and religious dimensions. Material goods are necessary for the survival and improvement of the quality of life; however, the human person is much more than the material. A people may be materially poor in economic goods, but rich in wisdom and other spiritual values. Each people have the responsibility to evolve a network of mechanism to ensure that their cultural heritage, artistic, intellectual and religious, is not shipwrecked in the name of modernity.¹⁷

Moreover, it is in line with the position of Pope Paul VI who distinguished authentic development from mere growth. “To be authentic, it must be well rounded; it must foster the development of each man and of the whole man . . . We cannot allow economics to be separated from human realities, nor development from the civilisation in which it takes place. What counts for us is man – each individual man, each human group, and humanity as a whole.”¹⁸ Dipo Irele argues that, “genuine development has to be rooted in the cultural values of society. Any development that

¹⁶ Galtung. p. 20.

¹⁷ Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria. 2009. *Salt of the earth and light of the world: manual for the laity*. Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria Publications, No. 167.

¹⁸ Paul VI. *Populorum progressio (On the development of peoples)*. No. 14.

is detached from the culture of the people concerned would be meaningless . . .”¹⁹ In this manner, Olusegun Oladipo is of the opinion that:

. . . development process is not an abstraction, the integrity of which can be measured simply in quantitative terms, . . . Rather, it is a process of social transformation, which involves the replacement of those factors that inhibit the capacity of the individual for self-direction and the promotion of social cooperation with those which promote these ideals. In short, it is a process whose essence concerns the quality of life (including the quality of social relations) of the people.²⁰

What these translate to is the question of humanity in development paradigms. This determines the conditions of human survival in any society as it poses the practicality of the concept of development to the general populace.

Development as Market Forces

The analyses of Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs, from market forces, are in the realm of economic development, which is built on capitalist ideology. Economic form of development is based on self-interest motive in the framework of competitive markets. In such a situation, there is hardly any government interference. The private sector, which takes part in the process of development, is mainly guided by the principle of profit maximisation. Economic progress largely depends on labour productivity and capital endowment. The labour productivity becomes a function of many types of material incentives, which are given by the private sector.

Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton see development from market forces and how trade could promote development. In *Fair Trade for All*, the duo aver that, “trade liberalisation is, in general, welfare-enhancing; stating that the problems of poverty, inequality, incomplete risk and capital markets cause the experience of liberalisation to vary across societies depending on individual characteristics.”²¹ While they opine on trade towards achieving development especially among the developing societies, they equally theorise on market forces, which will lead to emancipatory development.

¹⁹ Irele, Diipo. 2010. Economic and social stability in Africa. *The development philosophy of Eammanuel Onyechere Osigwe Anyiam-Osigwe*. Dipo Irele and Adebola Ekanola. Eds. Ibadan: Hope Publications, Nigeria. 3, p. 99.

²⁰ Oladipo, Olusegun. 2009. *Philosophy and social reconstruction in Africa*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, Nigeria, pp. 96-97.

²¹ Stiglitz, Joseph. and Charlton, Andrew. 2005. *Fair trade for all*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 6.

It is these market forces that Stiglitz says, are shaped by political processes. According to him, markets are shaped by laws, regulations and institutions saying that:

Every law, every regulation, every institutional arrangement has distributive consequences – and the way we have been shaping America’s market economy works to the advantage of those at the top and to the disadvantage of the rest. Indeed, politics, to a large extent, reflects and amplifies societal norms. In many societies, those at the bottom consist disproportionately of groups that suffer, in one way or another, from discrimination. The extent of such discrimination is a matter of societal norms.²²

Stiglitz offers a viable position in the discourse of development examining the issue from inequality, stating that it is on inequality that there seems to be an endangered future, which is anchored on a divided society.

Jeffrey Sachs’ intent about development is that, “there is the need for a new economic paradigm, which includes global, inclusive, co-operative, environmentally aware, and science-based that will salvage the emerging realities of the world today. Sachs writes that, “our global society will flourish or perish according to our ability to find common ground across the world on a set of shared objectives and on the practical means to achieving them. A clash of civilisations could well result from the rising tensions, and it could truly be our last and utterly devastating clash.”²³ In this argument, the alternative to the seemingly problematic issues is a series of threats to global well-being, all of which are solvable but potentially disastrous if left unattended. Prosperity must be maintained through new strategies for development that complement market forces, spread technologies, stabilise the global population and enable the billion poorest people to escape from the trap of extreme poverty.

Sachs also argues that in the process of escaping from the trap of extreme and emerging poverty, “a science for development, because many of the core breakthroughs in long-term economic developments have been new technologies recognising that the poor are, therefore, likely to be ignored . . . it is critical to identify the priority needs for scientific research in relation to the poor, and then to mobilise the requisite donor assistance to spur the research and development.”²⁴ In these analyses, Sachs postulates fundamental set-backs to the issue of development

²² Stiglitz, Joseph. 2012. *The price of inequality*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 52-53.

²³ Sachs, Jeffrey. 2008. *Common wealth: economics for a crowded planet*. New York: The Penguin Press, p. 4.

²⁴ Sachs, Jeffrey. 2005. *The end of poverty: economic possibilities for our time*. London: Penguin Books, p. 282.

especially from the developing societies, that is, “how they continue to move backward instead of moving forward. He lists the following ways, namely: lack of saving, absence of trade, technological reversal, natural resource decline, adverse productivity shock, and population growth.”²⁵

Sachs propounds a theory that will promote development in all human societies, not relying and leaning on market forces alone cum social, cultural and political cleavages. He writes that, “Sustainable development means prosperity that is globally shared and environmentally sustainable. In practice, sustainable development will require three fundamental changes in our business-as-usual global trajectory.”²⁶ For development to be realised, the above are what Sachs has propounded apart from examining it from the market forces.

In the analysis of his theory, he avers that there is the need to build from within even though importation from other societies is also a necessity. This is significant when the economy has become an emerging market that development from market forces will affect the society in positive manners. Here, he states thus:

By the time an economy has become a middle-income emerging market, there is an important measure of domestic technological innovation under way. The economy is no longer simply importing technologies from abroad but is also improving them and beginning to export technology-based manufactures and services . . . At all stages of development, the government must also ensure that the basic conditions of a functioning market-based economy are in place. These include a relatively stable monetary unit, a banking system adequately buffered against banking crises, reasonable physical security for persons and property, a rudimentary legal system to enforce contracts and property rights, and a modest level of official corruption that is kept from getting out of hand. Nothing is ever present, even in high-income countries, in these various dimensions of social order and rule of law. Still, outright lawlessness and violence must be eliminated for there to be hope of climbing the development ladder.²⁷

²⁵ Ibid. pp. 54-56.

²⁶ Sachs. *Common wealth: economics for a crowded planet*, pp. 31-32: First, we will have to develop and adopt on a global scale, and in a short period of time, the sustainable (high-S) technologies that can allow to combine high levels of prosperity with lower environmental impacts. Second, we will have to stabilise the global population, and especially the population in the poorest countries, in order to combine economic prosperity with environmental sustainability. And third, we will have to help the poorest countries escape from poverty trap. These three basic goals – environmental sustainability, population stabilisation, and ending extreme poverty – are of course the essence of the millennium promises.

²⁷ Ibid. pp. 211-212.

This, therefore, means that there is the need to bring in the factor of science and technology to the discourse of economic growth in any society for effective development.

In the quest for effective development as mentioned above, Sachs propounds a strong strategy that will move development to its apex as he writes that, “we glimpse the pivotal roles that science and technology play in the development process. And we sense a progression of development that moves subsistence agriculture toward light manufacturing and urbanisation, and on to high-tech services.”²⁸ In the analysis of this paradigm shift, he opines thus:

At every stage of development, and for every sector of development, the public sector and private sector have mutually supportive roles. Public-sector capital – roads, clinics, schools, ports, nature reserves, utilities, and much more - are essential if private capital in the form of factories, machinery, and skilled labour are to be productive. Economic development is a complex interplay of market forces and public-sector plans and investments.²⁹

In arguing for the interplay between public and private spheres in the struggle for development, it is impossible outside the discourse and praxis of good governance. Good governance is both an art and a process; the art and process have to do with exercising legitimate political authority. It connotes and denotes the achievement of socio-economic comfort, which enhances the standard of living and generally makes life worthy, a situation in which there is little or no economic and social tension among the populace. The underlying principle and thrust behind good governance is the focus on people as the ultimate objective of development. In short, good governance entails the following indicators: accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency among others. Sachs clearly states on this issue thus:

Implementing a development strategy presents several deep challenges of governance. The first and most basic challenge is to ensure that politics and policy choices actually support development . . . Governance could fail for many reasons: civil strife; massive corruption; ethnic divisions; the concentration of power in the hands of a narrow, unaccountable elite; and more. Bad policy choices were also an obvious threat. Many well-intentioned leaders of poor countries simply made poor policy decisions, for example, by

²⁸ Sachs. *The end of poverty: economic possibilities for our time*. p. 18.

²⁹ Sachs. *Common wealth: economics for a crowded planet*, p. 219.

adopting state ownership of farms and factories and imposing state barriers that blocked the inflow of technologies.³⁰

It is in line with the above that Stiglitz is of the opinion that the government has fundamental roles to play in policy making and good governance. This is in the realm of setting rules that must be attended to in the development of market policies that will, in the end, affect positively, the state of the society as he asserts that:

The most important role of government, however, is setting the basic rules of the game, through laws such as those that encourage or discourage unionisation, corporate governance laws that determine the discretion of management, and competition laws that *should* limit the extent of monopoly rents.³¹

“Development as Freedom”

The discourse of freedom is very crucial to human existence. That is, talking about freedom is equivalent to talking about the existence of man, and as such, trying to prove the fact that, if I am free, is the same as trying to prove whether I exist. In existentialism as a school of thought in philosophy, freedom is not a property of the will but the very structure of being human and a basic condition for human existence. The concept, in itself, is a slippery term, with so many over-lapping meanings and understandings in common usages. An attempt to unravel so many questions about freedom will not evade the ontological fact that freedom presupposes essentially non-restriction of the exercise of the free will, the mind and the ability to make choices either at theoretical or practical level and/or both. In other words, it suggests being free from external forces or any form of coercion.

In Jean-Paul Sartre, man is condemned to freedom, but in using his freedom, he is responsible for his actions since man is the creator of his actions. Hence, responsibility, for Sartre, is the logical consequence of man’s freedom. This is because it is the essential being of consciousness in the manner that to be conscious is to have freedom. Freedom, for Sartre, does not mean to obtain what someone has wished for; rather, it means someone determining his/her wish, as “the first condition of action.”³² Thus, he avers that, “the will, far from being the unique or at least the privileged manifestation of freedom, actually – like every event of the for-itself – must presuppose the foundation of an original freedom in order to be able to

³⁰ Ibid. pp. 221-222.

³¹ Stiglitz. pp. 57-58.

³² Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1956. *Being and Nothingness*. Washington: Washington Square Press, p. 559.

constitute itself as will. The will in fact is posited as a reflective decision in relation to certain ends. But it does not create these ends. It is rather a mode of being in relation to them: it decrees that the pursuit of these ends will be reflective and deliberative.”³³ This is basically founded on the notion that only conscious beings can be free because it is only in the distinctive capacities of a conscious being that one can think of what s/he lacks or what one does not have, and what one’s possibilities are. Non-conscious beings cannot and do not have these capacities to be aware of themselves. Through freedom, man continually chooses his goal, and it is this choice that controls the way and manner man interprets the objects that he deals with, in everyday life. To be conscious being, therefore, is to be free – free in relation to any particular object of consciousness; free from the causally-determined world of things, free to negate, that is, to say no, to raise doubts, to imagine possibilities, which are not present, among others.

In Amartya Sen’s *Development as Freedom*, greater attention is paid to the analysis of development and the freedom of individuals when he says that:

There are two distinct reasons for the crucial importance of individual freedom in the concept of development, related respectively to *evaluation* and *effectiveness*. First, in the normative approach used here, substantive individual freedoms are taken to be critical. The success of a society is to be evaluated, in this view, primarily by the substantive freedoms that the members of that society enjoy . . . The second reason for taking substantive freedom to be so crucial is that freedom is not only the basis of the evaluation of success and failure, but it is also a principal determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness.³⁴

The argument, for Sen, is that freedom is the principal goal and purpose of development. While Julius Nyerere avers that, “freedom and development are as completely linked together as are chickens and eggs! Without chickens you get no eggs; and without eggs you soon have no chickens. Similarly, without freedom you get no development, and without development you very soon lose your freedom.”³⁵

And from another point of view, Nyerere reiterates that, “even personal freedom becomes more real if it is buttressed by development. A man can defend his rights effectively only when he understands what they are, and knows how to use the

³³ Ibid. pp. 571-572.

³⁴ Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as freedom*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, p. 18.

³⁵ Nyerere, Julius. 1974. *Man and development*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, Tanzania, p. 25.

constitutional machinery which exists for the defence of those rights - and knowledge of this kind is part of development.”³⁶

Sen examines the intrinsic, constitutive and instrumental roles of freedom towards attaining development. The “agency-aspect” – one who brings positive change, is the intrinsic role of freedom. In constitutive role, it relates to the importance of substantive freedom in enriching human life. In this aspect, he puts more emphasis on what he calls the freedom of choice, which translates to the discourse of self-esteem, sustenance and freedom from slavery of all kinds in an effort to understand the concept of human well-being. Here, Sen writes that, “The concept of “functionings,” which has distinctly Aristotelian roots, reflects the various things a person may value doing or being. The valued functionings may vary from elementary ones, such as being adequately nourished and being free from avoidable diseases, to very complex activities or personal states, such as being able to take part in the life of the community and having self-respect.”³⁷ Development, in this view, “is the process of expanding human freedoms, and the assessment of development has to be informed by this consideration.”³⁸ This, he examines as different from the instrumental importance of freedom, which includes political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. Sen avers that:

The instrumental role of freedom concerns the way different kinds of rights, opportunities, and entitlements contribute to the expansion of human freedom in general, and thus to promoting development. This relates not merely to the obvious connection that expansion of freedom of each kind must contribute to development since development itself can be seen as a process of enlargement of human freedom in general.³⁹

This idea, was emphasised in *Inequality Reexamined*⁴⁰, that some well-known approaches to the evaluation of individual advantage and to the assessment of good social orders have been concerned directly with achievement only, treating the importance of the freedom to achieve as being entirely instrumental – as means to actual achievements. He avers that, “development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance

³⁶ Ibid. p. 26.

³⁷ Sen. p. 75.

³⁸ Sen. p. 36.

³⁹ Sen. p. 37.

⁴⁰ Sen, Amartya. 1992. *Inequality reexamined*. New York: Harvard Universities Press, pp. 31 -32.

or over-activity of repressive states.”⁴¹ In the analysis of freedom towards development, he opines that, “freedom is valuable for at least two different reasons. First, more freedom gives more *opportunity* to pursue our objectives – those things that we value. Second, we may attach importance to the process of choice itself. The distinction between the ‘opportunity aspect’ and the ‘process aspect’ of freedom can be both significant and quite far-reaching.”⁴² It should be noted here that Sen’s approach to development focuses more on individual freedom with little consideration for the other in the society. Even though his argument lays a good foundation for conceptualisation of development, such freedoms as projected are built on and compatible with economic foundation.

Lansana Keita, in a review of Sen’s *Development as Freedom*, posits clearly that, “the crucial aspect of ‘development as freedom’ for Sen is the increased agency and opportunities for a better life that accrue to women and society as a whole as societal freedoms increase.”⁴³ This means that for meaningful development in any society, the women’s factor is a prerequisite, as major societies all over the world have not allowed the roles of the women’s folk to be a reality. The freedoms that Sen examines include the rights and freedoms of women as causal factors towards development. This is to state the fact that women should not be seen as agent of development that they should not be looked down upon as not contributing anything meaningfully to the development of a society essentially nations and societies of the Global South.

1.3 Dimensions of Development

There are diverse dimensions towards the understanding of what development is. And since the discourse about development is a multi-prone process, that has several dimensions, it is apt to look at it from its different levels as stated above. At individual level, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being. While at social level, it implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships. It is concerned with transformation of the society in its totality. More specifically, it aims

⁴¹ Sen. *Development as freedom*. p. 5.

⁴² Sen, Amartya. 2009. *The idea of justice*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, p. 228.

⁴³ Keita, Lansana. 2004. Review of Amartya Sen’s *Development as freedom*. *Africa development*, XXIX.1, p. 187.

essentially at the maximum improvement of the material (economic) and cultural (religious, political and moral) aspects of the society. This is, in a way to enhancing the capacity of members of a given society, in their quest to fulfil existing and changing social roles and expectations and to attain their various personal goals and ends.

Economic Dimension

Various scholars like Smith, Stiglitz and Sachs among others see development from the realm of economics. The basic goal of this form of development is the maximisation of individual well-being and it could be measured by national income or what we refer to as national output. Jan Pieterse opines thus:

In modern development thinking and economics, the core meaning of development was economic growth, as in growth theory and Big Push theory. . . . When development thinking broadened to encompass modernisation, economic growth was combined with political modernisation, that is, nation building, and social modernisation, such as fostering entrepreneurship and 'achievement orientation'.⁴⁴

He argues that in dependency theory, the core meaning of development likewise was economic growth, under the heading of accumulation. Its distorted form was dependent accumulation, which led to the 'development of underdevelopment', and an intermediate form was 'associated dependent development'. The positive goal was national accumulation (or autocratic development). Here, the gross national product measure has been considered as the most suitable measure of development of an economy. It aims at producing output at larger and larger scale where man is considered simply as one factor of development. In a simple sense, human factor is just an input, that is, a means towards the realisation of an end whereas the end is the development of an output. On the economic dimension of development, Ghosh avers that, "The development is basically promoted by the private entrepreneurs who own the means of production. The private sector, which takes part in the process of development, is mainly guided by the principle of profit maximisation. . . . Economic progress largely depends on labour productivity and capital endowment."⁴⁵ By this,

⁴⁴ Pieterse, Jan. 2001. *Development theory: deconstructions and reconstructions*. London: Sage Publications, p. 6.

⁴⁵ Ghosh, B. 2002. M. K. Gandhi on development and underdevelopment. *Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies*, 21.3&4, p. 72.

economic dimension is looking at the growth level of the society from the physical structure, which cannot be seen and examined from the totality of what development is.

Francis Njoku examines development from the socio-economic terms to mean “the pooling together of resources in order to organise environmental and social relations for the enhancement of the members of the society as the term has come to be conceived exclusively in economic terms, although it is measured against other social features.”⁴⁶ He corroborates this from the idea of Walter Rodney that, “a society develops economically as its members increase jointly their capacity for dealing with the environment.”⁴⁷ This, he also examines from the explanation of Door, as he insists that, “development is not mere relief services nor is there really such a thing as development “for others”.”⁴⁸ Under this form, human beings are considered as simply a kind of input, that is, the investment in human capital formation has the aim of material gain. Development becomes a trickle-down. The whole concept is based on the notion of profit maximisation and in the measurement of economic growth, gross national product method is utilised. Donald Door’s⁴⁹ submission is in line with the above that the science of economics is quite abstract: it generally takes account only of items that are easily measurable. Economists bridge the gap between their science and the real world by making a whole lot of assumptions. Unfortunately, we often find out, too late, that the assumptions were unjustified because some key factors had been over-looked.

Social Dimension

Development from the social sphere is seen as a process of increasing people’s choices, of enhancing participatory democratic processes, “and the ability of people to have a say in the decisions that shape their lives, of providing human beings with the opportunity to develop their maximum potential, of enabling the poor, women, and free independent peasants to organize themselves and work together”⁵⁰. “Proponents of Marxist philosophy, according to Raphael Chiaka, argue

⁴⁶ Njoku, Francis. 2004. *Development and African philosophy: a theoretical reconstruction of African socio-political economy*. iNew Yor: iUniverse Inc., p. 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Door, Donald. 1990. *Integral spirituality: resources for community, justice, peace, and the earth*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, p. 169.

⁵⁰ Cowen, M. & Shenton, R. 1996. *Doctrines of development*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 3.

that the question of distribution and social justice cannot be considered or resolved independently without the dismantling of the system that prevails in production and distribution. And against the background, it is argued that the development of society or country is seen as essentially a transformation of its production mode. Mode refers to those elements, activities and social relationships, which are necessary to produce and reproduce real life.”⁵¹

The social dimension of development is important to the sustenance of any human society. This is because individuals, organisations and communal capacities and abilities are cultivated and allowed for infrastructural development as they see social development as a relationship that must necessarily exist among rational beings as no one will be seen to be island to himself/herself. This corresponds to social consciousness. Towards this understanding, Chiaka states clearly that, “development as socio-economic transformation represents a redefinition of a country’s international relations. It involves a shift from an outward oriented dependent status to a self-centred and self-reliant position with regard not only to the processes of decision making but more importantly the pattern and style of production and consumption.”⁵²

He notes that:

It is easy to see that societal objectives have often changed from one historical epoch to another. Such fundamental changes as distinct from random variations in fashion or taste have enabled us to characterise societies as primitive, communal, feudal, capitalist or socialist. Each of these societies has not only a distinctive set of societal objectives, but also different patterns of social relations, which determine how various activities are undertaken and coordinated and the value placed on the various elements involved.⁵³

This suggests the significance of social factor towards the quest for development in any society today. It means we cannot be talking or discussing about development without the impact of social aspect, which can never be over-looked. Pieterse puts it clearly that, “For a development theory to be significant, social forces must carry it. To be carried by social forces, it must match their worldview and articulate their

⁵¹ Chiaka, Ralph. 1989. *Development aid to the Third World: a moral question*. Ibadan: Shaneson C.I. Limited, Nigeria, p. 18.

⁵² Ibid. p. 23.

⁵³ Ibid. p. 19.

interests; it must serve an ideological function. However, to serve their interests, it must also make sense and be able to explain things.”⁵⁴

Technological Dimension

Another discourse concerning development is examined from technological aspect, which today is accepted as the basis for development in all societies of the world. It is man’s quest to cultivate and subdue the universe for his own interests and benefits through discovery, imagination and creativity. On technological dimension, Rodney asserts that:

One of the features associated with technological advance is a spirit of scientific inquiry closely related to the process of production. This leads to inventiveness and innovation. During the period of capitalist development in Europe, this was very much the case, and historians lay great emphasis on the spirit of inventiveness of the English in the eighteenth century. Socialist societies do not leave inventions merely to chance or good luck – they actively cultivate tendencies for innovation.⁵⁵

Rodney pays greater attention to the benefits, which will be accrued from the significance of technology in the realm of development because, “it (development) means a capacity for self-sustaining growth. It means that an economy must register advances which in turn will promote further progress. . . .”⁵⁶ This form of progress will be achieved when it is in tandem with technological approach as he affirms that, “apart from inventiveness, we must also consider the borrowing of technology. When a society for whatever reason finds itself technologically trailing behind others, it catches up not so much by independent inventions but by borrowing.”⁵⁷

In the quest for making the world a single village thanks to technology, George Ehusani portrays the poverty in the midst of affluence in man’s society today states that, “There must be an end to the consumption patterns that rely so heavily on the victimization of the world’s poor. For the affluent, solidarity should translate into “the willingness to live more simply so that others may simply live”. The tremendous achievements of technology in the twentieth century have reduced our world to one global village. The world is now so small that there is no place in it for pockets of

⁵⁴ Pieterse. p. 5.

⁵⁵ Rodney, Walter. 2012. *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. Pambazuka Press and CODESRIA Dakar, p. 105.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 106.

prosperity, isolated from the general life around them”⁵⁸, as science and technology multiply around humanity. To an increasing extent, science and technology dictate the languages in which man speaks and thinks. Either s/he uses those languages, or s/he remains mute, science and technology, no doubt, are good for the survival and sustenance of man, within the purview of his environment, but it will be absurd to claim only the goodness of these without the negative effects and impacts of them on man and the human society. This is to say that, as science and technology make serious advancements in the realms of production, health care, transportation, among others; their impacts on cultural lives of man are affected due to low management of technological and scientific development.

Cultural Dimension

A people’s conception of development is determined by the values of the society, and the values of any society are determined by the accumulated experiences, which the people have had over time. This experience may be called culture. Hence, it can be argued that there is always a cultural context to development outside, which a development change may not be appreciated. The impetus of a development trend can be aided or retarded by culture, thus, development is always the development of an existing culture. And just as development cannot take place outside a culture, every culture needs development in order to survive.

In ‘our’ rat-race for educational patterns in the society; the need to develop man’s level of cultural heritage is of significance in man’s quest for development. This will take the changes that have occurred in African continent, for instance, over the years seriously and portray the fact that man needs to critically re-examine his culture with a view to separating its upward paths from its downward trends. This urges not to hesitate to recognise the positive contributions of other cultures that could aid the achievement of man’s goals and the fulfillment of his aspirations in contemporary times. In the words of Olusegun Oladipo, “the need to borrow from other cultures does not imply that one culture is superior to another since no culture is

⁵⁸ Ehusani, George. 1991. *An Afro-Christian vision “OZOVEHE!” toward a more humanised world.* Maryland: University Press of America, USA, p. 224.

sufficient unto itself'.⁵⁹ The content of such an educational system should, therefore, not be mere acquisition of facts and figures as Wande Abimbola observes:

There was very little sign of development of a lively curiosity and a desire to know about the immediate environment and the world outside. One got the impression that pupils were just sponges imbibing knowledge not understood but digested for the sole purpose of 'regurgitating' it for examination, which would give them certificates and a right to life of ease, big cars and comfort.⁶⁰

Sylvannus Nnoruka, in his understanding, avers that:

It should rather be a gradual and tested pedagogical process, which if adequately carried out, makes the recipient at each stage more mature. This maturity is manifested in his thinking and acting more meaningfully both to his own benefit and to the benefit of others. He is not mechanical nor are his actions dominated by routine. He is neither authoritarian nor resistant to change. Rather, he is positively progressive and both encourage and recognise the diversity among individuals.⁶¹

This education, from the outset, has been to make the individual recipient an asset to the society and the community of men. This type of education is not meant only for the recipients because as it contributes to the growth and development of the recipients, so also, it contributes and benefits the society that produces such educated fellows for the emancipation, socialisation and the humanisation of such society. In the quest for this cultural dimension of development, Door opines thus:

. . . Third World countries should give up the idea of development. Rather is that there is need for a more authentic development. It must be realised that the cultural aspect of development is the primary one, since it determines the success or failure of any technological changes. . . real development must give priority to helping people to understand and appreciate their own cultural heritage and tradition. Of course this should not be a totally uncritical acceptance of the past. But people need to find ways of living that are in continuity with their own tradition.⁶²

⁵⁹ Oladipo, Olusegun. 1998. *The idea of African philosophy: a critical study of the major orientations in contemporary African philosophy*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, Nigeria, p. 84.

⁶⁰ Abimbola, Wande. 1975. *Yoruba oral traditions*. Ibadan: Offset Lithography, Nigeria, p. 395.

⁶¹ Nnoruka, Sylvannus. 1998. Education and African development. *Africa: philosophy and public affairs*. Oguejiofor, O. Ed. Enugu: Delta Publications., p. 248

⁶² Door. p. 160.

Moral Dimension

The task of any society, race or tribe, ultimately depends for its success on the character of its citizens, on the extent to which a critical mass of its people hold, find their identity in, and act upon a shared moral or character vision. There is a lot of concern for the moral values and character development in any society today because of its importance. There is no gain-saying that no country or society has a monopoly of these character and moral problems, which are not even particular about the other countries and societies because they cut across boundaries. The point of character-building is the main topic in any idealist society today because of the dwindling of good and moral values among the citizens. It is like education of citizens is for only intellectual, physical, psychological but not in character development. This dimension makes a comparison of man with his society as it checks how man develops morally because the individual is and lives in the community in which s/he finds himself.

It should be known that development is of two basic dimensions in the form of moral and the technical aspects. There is no doubt that the two complement each other as Oladipo puts it thus:

The intangible or moral aspect of development . . . has to do with improvement of “the quality of human relations between people”. It involves, for instance, the reduction of social inequality, which globally is a major source of conflicts among people, and the promotion of positive social values, such as freedom, justice, tolerance, compassion, co-operation, and so on. Although the tangible is the most visible, the intangible is very crucial. This is so because it is that which enhances the capacity of the individual to actually shape his or her own life without being insensitive to the common good.⁶³

What this means is that development of human well-being is the most needed, as individuals with a number of degrees and certificates without the resultant effects positively on the society, is aimless and pointless.

From the moral angle of development, it is a truism that no society or community could be said and acclaimed to be developed when it neglects the less-privileged in the society or the so-called have-nots, of which John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice* is devoted to, that there should be equal distribution of the societal wealth to the worse-off, consistent with the just savings principle and attachment to offices and

⁶³ Oladipo, Olusegun. 2009. *Philosophy and social reconstruction in Africa*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, Nigeria, p. 95.

positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. David Odunsi asks a pertinent question that: in what exactly does national development consist? He answers thus:

It is surely not in the material convenience of egoistic individuals, nor in bringing about either industrial mastery over nature or political subjugation of other nations. It is also not in breeding men who are “intellectual giants” but at the same time “moral dwarfs”. . . It is rather a comprehensive activity whose goal is human, moral and spiritual well-being.⁶⁴

In this aspect, Oladipo, in another work, states unequivocally that there are two key variables that are of utmost importance to national development of which we long for in Nigeria, namely: freedom and decency. Crucial to the meaning of freedom is the achievement of a level of social efficiency that guarantees that things work – for instance, that the services, which make modern social life tolerable and fulfilling, including education, health services, water, electricity, telephones, transportation and so on – work. The level of decency, according to Oladipo, is determined by the extent to which the values that make social cooperation among the people are entrenched in a society.⁶⁵

It is also in this respect that Philip Ujomu reiterates that, “The ultimate aim of education . . . is to re-orientate the minds of the people towards positive values and attitudes that can guarantee a peaceful, secure and progressive social existence . . .”⁶⁶ Here, Ehusani opines that the form of educational attainment Africans must have, is the one that is humanistic in nature, which will call for a serious breach of our present notion and idea about development. To him, “development must be a human fact. It must be more spiritual and cultural than economic and technology . . . It must mean an ongoing commitment to advance from the less human conditions of disease, hatred, crime, war, racism, poverty, oppression, injustice, corruption, faithlessness,

⁶⁴ Odunsi, David. 2006. The ideal end of the state and its basic duties: a challenge to the Nigerian society. *Enwisdomisation Journal*, 3.1, p. 81.

⁶⁵ Oladipo, Olusegun. 2008. *Thinking about philosophy*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, Nigeria, pp. 83 – 84.

⁶⁶ Ujomu, Philip. June 2001 – June 2002). Education and national consciousness in an African Nation-state: problems and prospects. *The sage magazine: a philosophical and general interest magazine*. Ibadan: Catholic Seminary of Ss. Peter & Paul Publications, Nigeria. 14, p. 41: The fundamental task of education for national consciousness is to attempt to foster a sense of belonging and togetherness among the various peoples and interests in the Nigerian polity. Only the imbibing of core values such as honesty, industry and dedication in the discharge of duties and responsibilities can ensure the achievement of national consciousness.

hopelessness to the more human conditions of health, of love, peaceful co-existence, equity, justice, community fellow-feeling, faith and hope.”⁶⁷

The essential aspect of development is what concerns individuals in relation to the community of men. This is evident in the questions raised by Dudley Seers that, “The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned.”⁶⁸ These three critical questions are important in knowing the objectives of development. The meaning is that when these indicators are positive, that is, increasing, then, there is no development. But, when those indicators are negative, that is decreasing, there is development.

There are three basic objectives of development since it should be understood from physical reality and a state of mind in the society through some combinations of social, economic, and institutional arrangements. One of the objectives of development is to increase the availability and the widening of the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods, which are salient to all members of the society. It is also to raise the level of living, including the provision of more jobs, sound education, attendance to cultural values, and other aspects of human endeavour that enhance well-being and also greater individual and societal self-esteem. It is also an objective to expand the range of economy and social choices to individuals and the state by freeing them from servitude and dependency, not only in relation to other people, but also to the forces of ignorance and human history.

Development would be meaningful when peoples’ choices and opportunities are enlarged enough for them to acquire knowledge, have access to resources necessary for standard decent life and their active participation in community life. Anything outside this is not development. *National Human Development Report of 2006* posits that, “The essence of development is, therefore, to enhance people’s choices and access to life-sustaining opportunities. Development should be human-

⁶⁷ Ehusani. p. 243.

⁶⁸ Seers. p. 5: If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result ‘development’, even if per capita income doubled. This applies of course to the future too. A ‘plan’ which conveys no targets for reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality can hardly be considered a ‘development plan’.

centred, with both the process and outcomes revolving around people.”⁶⁹ The objectives and criteria of development, in the real sense, should reflect the following social principles, namely: common good, solidarity, subsidiarity and option for the poor.

The Catholic Church in her *Magisterium* teaches that, “the common good embraces the sum total of all those conditions of social living, economic, political and cultural, which will make it possible for women and men to readily and fully achieve the perfection of their humanity.”⁷⁰ “Solidarity, in this sense, is a firm determination in order to commit oneself towards the attainment of common good. The sense of solidarity is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good, that is to say, to the good of all and of each individual because we are all really responsible for all.”⁷¹ The principle of subsidiarity is for the public authorities towards intervening in social and economic life of a society in order to encourage and complement private initiatives. While, under the option for the poor, development should not be left in the hands of the better-offs to get richer who are known generally to exploit the worse-offs. It is when these principles are put into consideration that development would be meaningful to any human society as Ehusani avers that:

Development must be a human fact. It must be more spiritual and cultural than economic and technical. Development must not just mean an ongoing commitment to advance from the less human conditions of disease, hatred, crime, war, racism, poverty, oppression, injustice, corruption, faithlessness, hopelessness, etc, to the more human conditions of health, of love, peaceful co-existence, equity, justice, community fellow-feeling, faith and hope. Development must be understood in its material, moral, spiritual, social and environmental dimensions, if it is to be a truly human endeavour.⁷²

This approach to development is considered from the angle of the spirit, which ought to exist among the many units in the society. The implication is spelt out by Matthew Izibili and Felix Enegho that the end-product of development ought to be the general good and happiness of the citizens as a whole through the provision of basic

⁶⁹ “National Human Development Report. 2006. Liberia. McCandless, E. and Karbo, A. eds. *Peace, conflict, and development in Africa: a reader*: The process places the expansion of human choices and opportunities at the centre and focuses on creating the necessary economic, social and political conditions in which people can expand their human capabilities and use them appropriately. Development outcomes are measured by the improved quality of life for a majority of people.

⁷⁰ Second Vatican Council. 1965. *Gaudium et spes*, No. 26.

⁷¹ John Paul II. 1987. *Sollicitudo rei socialis (On social concern)*. No. 38.

⁷² Ehusani. p. 243.

necessities of life such as food and shelter, enhancement of the material and spiritual well being of the people; freeing individuals and nations from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and nation states, but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery.⁷³ This means that the issue of development rests on the notion of general good because it always tends to the public advantage and regards the common interest.

1.4 Theories of Development

In order to achieve our objective in this chapter, we shall be examining the following theories concerning development, namely: modernisation, dependency and neoliberalism respectively. It should be known from the outset that modernisation and dependency theories were seen as foundation for neoliberalism approach in development discourse. Then, the two will be examined as pre-figurement for the understanding of neoliberalism.

Modernisation Theory

The major argument of the modernists is that development is a process of qualitative change, that is, a process that is linear, evolutionary and diffusionary particularly from Western Europe and North America to societies in the Global South. This means that Western Europe and North America are symbols of civilisation and modernisation and that for any society to develop, such must necessarily have certain characteristics like universalism, mobility and open diffusion. The modernists' argument, is that societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America, will develop if and only if they copy, borrow, imbibe and adopt values, norms, science, technology and institutions from the developed societies of the West. We will attempt to understand modernisation theory from Tipps and Huntington to universalise historically-specific values and institutions deriving from Western hegemonic societies and their experiences.

Dean Tipps examines the origins of this theory saying thus:

The proximate origins of modernisation theory may be traced to the response of American political elites and intellectuals to the international setting of the post-Second World War era. In

⁷³ Izibili, Matthew and Enegho, Felix. 2002 – 2003. Development in Africa: the challenge of the African philosopher. *Enwisdomisation Journal*, 2.1, p. 87.

particular, the impact of the Cold War and the simultaneous emergence of Third World societies as prominent actors in world politics in the wake of the disintegration of the European colonial empires converged during this period to channel-for the first time, really-substantial intellectual interest and resources beyond the borders of American society, and even of Europe, into the study of the societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. During the two decades after the war, American social scientists and their graduate students, with the generous support of governmental and private agencies, turned increasing attention to the problems of economic development, political stability, and social and cultural change in these societies.⁷⁴

Modernisation theory, emerged following the end of the Second World War, as many colonised nations achieved independence. It is also due to the fact that the Cold War began to take shape. In the two decades that followed, new theories were created to ostensibly explain the likely socio-economic future of these now-independent nation-states of the South. Modernisation theory suggested that all countries would evolve through successive stages of development so long as certain conditions were in place. The modernists' approach, to the discourse of development, stemmed from the fact that industrialisation and urbanisation were seen as the inevitable and necessarily progressive routes. It is a total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organisation, which characterise the economically prosperous and politically stable societies of the Western world. To the post-development theorists, it is through material advancement with social and political progress that development can be achieved. Hence, leading to the acceptance that capital investment is *sine qua non* in the quest for economic growth and development especially among the less-developed societies.

Beyond the task of description, Tipps offers diverse methodological approaches towards the understanding of modernisation theory. In his analysis, he presents some characteristic features as the description and meaning of the theory. He writes that, "the concept tends to be a 'summarizing' rather than a 'discriminating' one, as every effort is made to specify its meaning in terms which are sufficiently general to avoid excluding any of the possible ramifications of this 'multifaceted process'."⁷⁵ In another dimension, he writes that, "it may be conceptualized, whether as industrialization, economic growth, rationalisation, structural differentiation, political

⁷⁴ Tipps, Dean. 1973. Modernisation theory and the comparative studies: a critical perspective. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 15.2, p. 200.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 201.

development, social mobilisation and/or secularisation or some other process, each component of the modernisation process is viewed as representing a source of change operative at the national level, although it obviously may be studied at a variety of other levels as well.”⁷⁶ In all, and despite the variation in both approaches, as outlined by Tipps from his research, there seems to be a common bond and agreement in what modernisation theory tries to achieve. To him, “modernization is a type of social change which is both transformational in its impact and progressive in its effects. It is also generally viewed as extensive in scope, as a 'multifaceted process' which not only touches at one time or another virtually every institution of society, but does so in a manner such that transformations of one institutional sphere tend to produce complementary transformations in others.”⁷⁷

Tipps examines three forms/levels of criticisms against modernisation theorists, namely: ideological, empirical and methodological. From the ideological level, he argues that modernisation theory is purely ethnocentric in form and practice. As he puts it;

One of the most frequently heard complaints against modernisation theories in the dichotomous tradition is that they are the product of an essentially ethnocentric world-view. As modernization theorists began to adapt for their own purposes the dichotomous approach as it was developed by social evolutionists during the late nineteenth century, they did feel constrained to make certain changes. Not only were blatantly ethnocentric terms such as 'civilized' and 'barbarism' clearly unacceptable, but the explicit racism of the biological school of evolutionary theory had to be laid to rest. However, such changes were in many respects merely cosmetic.⁷⁸

This worldview is projected against other ‘developed’ worlds in order for them to imbibe and emulate values, intents and traditions of American platform, which is set by the modernisation theorists for them to be sub-servient and attached to the aprons of the capitalist societies as he claims.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Ibid. pp. 201-202.

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 202.

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 206.

⁷⁹ Ibid. pp. 208-209: Both the values and the cognitions embodied in modernization theory have been highly reflexive of the social and historical conditions under which they have been developed. The idea of modernization is primarily an American idea. . . Two features of this period stand out: a widespread attitude of complacency toward American society, and the expansion of American political, military, and economic interests throughout the world. . . Such an atmosphere of complacency and self-satisfaction could only encourage the assumption among social scientists that 'modernity' was indeed an unmixed blessing and that the institutions and values of American society, at least as they existed in their more idealized manifestations, represented an appropriate model to be emulated by other, less fortunate societies.

Tipps emphasises that, “any theoretical framework which fails to incorporate such significant variables as the impact of war, conquest, colonial domination, international political and military relationships, or of international trade and the cross-national flow of capital cannot hope to explain either the origins of these societies or the nature of their struggles for political and economic autonomy—struggles, it should be added, which all societies face, though perhaps in varying degrees and contexts at different historical moments.”⁸⁰ The meta-theoretical or methodological level, according to him, examines the descriptive aspect and its usefulness to the hegemonic structure that,

In their effort to achieve descriptive inclusiveness, however, they have relied upon conceptualizations of modernisation which are both unparsimonious and vague. Rather than specifying the minimum conditions necessary for the appropriate application of the term, modernisation theorists have attempted to encompass within a single concept virtually every 'progressive' social change since the seventeenth century. Moreover, to obtain this end, they have defined modernization in terms which are so open-ended that it is almost impossible to identify precisely the range of phenomena to which the concept is intended to apply.”⁸¹

Samuel Huntington examines this theory from its basic characteristics as enumerated as follows, “modernisation is a revolutionary process, modernisation is a complex process, modernisation is a systemic process, modernisation is a global process, modernisation is a lengthy process, modernisation is a phased process, modernisation is a homogenizing process, modernisation is an irreversible process and modernisation is a progressive process.”⁸² It is from these characteristics that he discusses modernisation theory from two angles, which are tradition and modernity as based on diverse societies: one developed and the other under-developed. He opines that, “the essential difference between modern and traditional society . . . lies in the greater control which modern man has over his natural and social environment.”⁸³ To him:

At intellectual level, modern society is characterised by the tremendous accumulation of knowledge about man’s environment and by the diffusion of this knowledge through society by means of literacy, mass communications, and education. . . Socially, the

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 212.

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 218.

⁸² Huntington, Samuel. 1971. The change to change: modernisation, development, and politics. *Comparative Politics*, April, 3.3, pp. 288-290.

⁸³ Ibid. p. 286.

family and other primary groups having diffuse roles are supplanted or supplemented in modern society by consciously organised secondary associations having more specific functions. Economically, there is a diversification of activity as a few simple occupations give way to many complex ones; the level of occupational skill and the ratio of capital to labour are much higher than in traditional society.⁸⁴

The above fundamental characteristics separate and make differences known between traditional and modern worlds of which man's world has been polarised. In his critique of modernisation theory, he maintains that the concept of modernity suffers many ambiguities. This derives from a tendency to see that modernity and virtue are identical in nature and structure. To him, there is a failure to distinguish between what is modern and what is Western. The one thing which modernisation theory has not produced is a model of Western society – meaning late twentieth century Western European and North American society – which could be compared with, or even contrasted with, the model of modern society. Implicitly, the two are assumed to be virtually identical.⁸⁵

In another dimension, there is little or zero relationship between the two concepts, which makes it more difficult and problematic for the so-called societies of the Global South to mingle freely with those of the Global North in the reckoning of the modernists. Huntington posits that other issues developed, concerning the relations between tradition and modernity. In this manner, however, modernity supplements but does not supplant tradition. Modern practices, beliefs, institutions are simply added to traditional ones. It is false to believe that tradition and modernity “are mutually exclusive.” Modern society is not simply modern; it is modern and traditional. The attitudes and behaviours patterns may in some cases be fused; in others, they may comfortably co-exist, one alongside the other, despite the apparent incongruity of it all.⁸⁶ These analyses show the fact that modernisation is a cyclical process with both challenges and successes over time. And it shows the fact against the belief that modernisation is progressive to the fact that it dehumanises man in his process to realise his full potentials by which “it sacrifices human, personal, and spiritual values to achieve mass production and mass society.”⁸⁷ And against the

⁸⁴ Ibid. 287.

⁸⁵ Ibid. pp. 294-295.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 295.

⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 298.

successes and qualities alluded to modernisation theory, it can be argued, as Huntington opines that, “the various elements of the modernisation process are historically discreet and that, while they have their roots in common causes, progress along one dimension has no necessary relationship to progress along another. Such a view is, indeed, implied by rejection of the mutually exclusive nature of modernity and tradition.”⁸⁸

From other basic levels, Huntington argues against the fact that modernisation is both evolutionary and complex processes that there is nothing ‘big’ about these nomenclatures. He avers to the contrary that “modernisation is evolutionary; it could be argued that the differences between traditional and modern societies are really not that great. Not only do modern societies incorporate many traditional elements, but traditional societies often have many universalistic, achievement oriented, bureaucratic characteristics which are normally thought of as modern. The psychological and behavioural continuities existing within a society through both its traditional and modern phases may be significantly greater than the dissimilarities between these phases. Similarly, the claim that modernisation is a complex process could be challenged by the argument that modernisation involves fundamental changes in only one dimension and that changes in other dimensions are only consequences of changes in that fundamental dimension.”⁸⁹ This is in tandem with the argument of Francis Njoku that, “the industrial-modernisation process under the guide of the West first sought the help of the local elites, trained in western values to continue the First World agenda. The modernisation process, as accentuated by the First World, did not make the process of development light and considerate for the Third World. Something was still wrong: the relationship at the level of industrialisation was still unequal. Actually, instead of the situation helping matters, the structure of relationship creates all the more a culture of dependence, even when Third countries had taken directives from the First World and borrowed from international financial institutions.”⁹⁰ Arturo Escobar avers against the modernists that the advance of poor countries was thus seen from the outset as depending on ample supplies of capital to provide for infrastructure, industrialisation, and the over-all modernisation of society . . . and because these countries were seen as trapped in a

⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 297.

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 297.

⁹⁰ Njoku, Francis. 2004. *Development and African philosophy: a theoretical reconstruction of African socio-political economy*. New York: iUniverse, Inc., p. 19.

“vicious circle” of poverty and lack of capital, much of that capital would have to come from abroad.⁹¹ The underlying factor in modernists’ intervention is still a form of imperialism, where the Global South is attached to the aprons of the Global North.

Dependency Theory

Dependency theorists provide an alternative explanation of the development process by directly challenging the sacred tenets of modernisation theory. Their basic argument, is that the development of the Global North, is predicated on the active under-development of the Global South. Rather than see the newly-created independent nation-states as similar entities at different stages of development, as suggested by modernisation theorists, dependency theorists argued that poor and wealthy countries are parts of the same global capitalist system, a system in which the relationship between the “centre” and “peripheral” countries was historical, hierarchical, and enduring. Whereas modernisation theorists maintained that the North would guide the development of Global South through aid, investment, and example, dependency theorists argued that the actions of, and ties to, the North actually hindered the emergence from poverty of the South. Thus, in contrast to a fundamental assumption of modernisation theory, that is, the causes of underdevelopment were internal to the societies of the global South—dependency theory stresses the external causes of the South’s lack of development. From this perspective, attributing the South’s underdevelopment to lingering traditionalism rather than the advance of global capitalism is viewed as a historical and political mistake.

Dependency theory emerged as a result of limitation of the modernism theory, and it has a Marxian orientation. The major stand of this school is that development and under-development have dialectical relationship, that is, one leads to the other through the process of exploitations. And that development and under-development are two sides of a coin, which could be explained through material history of the two kinds of the societies – the colonialists and the colonised. The main factors responsible for development, on the one hand, and under-development, on the other, include the following: the pre-colonial trade, slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. These forces are characteristics of imperialism, which is a significant

⁹¹ Escobar, Arturo. 1999. The invention of development. *Current History*, Academic Research Library, p. 383.

feature of Western Europe and North American capitalist expansion. This clearly shows the fact that as long as the same unequal relationships between the developed and under-developed worlds remain; under-development and dependency will also continue to be a problem.

Martin Ajei exemplifies that “a number of interrelated factors accounts for the subordination of Third World economies. First, free trade with the developed world was unfair for the developing world because these worlds were unequal trading partners. The terms of trade between centres and peripheries have perpetually moved in favour of the center as the real prices of the goods for which peripheral countries have a comparative advantage (primary products) progressively depreciate relative to the price of manufactured goods. Secondly, the capacity of the center to import from any number of locations within the global periphery pitted peripheral countries against each other and drove prices further down. Also, the major global sources of finance were controlled and regulated by Western capitalist countries. Such unfair conditions of trade were unlikely to result in development for peripheral countries.”⁹² In such discourse, he itemises the essence of dependency theory into three fundamental factors that affect the notion and praxis of how the world economy should move and how it marked the polarisation of the world into two unequal halves. To him, “the broad sweep of dependency theory analysis can be reduced to three key ideas. The first is the claim that the relationship amongst countries of the world is better conceived in terms of core/centers and peripheries. It, therefore, stresses the historical experience of countries in conceptualising and analysing development. The second key idea is the encouragement of the Third World to focus on import substitution. The third is that, they prescribe an active role to governments in the planning and activation of their economies.”⁹³

Harriet Friedmann and Jack Wayne, bring out the essential characteristics of this theory, saying that, “the value of the dependency approach, then, lies in its recognition that development and under-development have taken place in the context of the growth of capitalism as a world system. The approach usefully analyses relationships between nations and sees both development and under-development as historically observable consequences of those relationships, and it attempts to be

⁹² Ajei, Martin. 2007. *Africa's development: the imperatives of indigenous knowledge and values*. An unpublished Ph.D thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, University of South Africa), pp. 39-40.

⁹³ Ibid. p. 40.

holistic in perspective. The particular success of the approach lies in its view of under-development as a product of the domination of one national economy by another. A primary mechanism in all cases of under-development . . . has been the emergence of a dominant social class within the dependent under-developing nation, which participates in the exploitation of the nation but is itself dependent on the metropolis or centre.”⁹⁴ Ajei buttresses the above opinion in the sense that he propounds two assumptions about dependency theory, which are based on economy and down-playing national cohesions and variations as he avers from his propositions.⁹⁵ The second strand in dependency theory is its economism. As stated above, dependency is analyzed mostly as an economic condition which arises from the flow of economic surplus from the Third World to the Western capitalist countries.

Dependency theory contends that liberal economic theory ignores the particular problems faced by poor economies. Their core principles directly challenge those of liberal economists who conceive of the international trading system as capable of benefitting all through free trade and specialisation. In contrast, dependency analysts argue that free trade is in the interests of businesses in the industrial world and that they use their size and wealth to keep primary commodity prices low by playing suppliers in various countries against each other. They assume that the structural inequalities between the Global North and the Global South worlds result from conscious policies followed by the already developed societies. Free market advocates advise developing economies to open their local markets and allow foreign investment as well as imports of manufactured goods. They also encourage the production of cash crops in which developing countries have a comparative advantage. Dependency theorists counter that such prescriptions will only increase dependency by perpetuating the unequal relationship with the industrialised world, which uses the developing world as a source of raw materials and cheap labour. It is on the basis of this that Smith⁹⁶ avers that the Third World countries cannot do without their dependence because their form of incorporation into the international

⁹⁴ Friedmann, Harriet and Wayne, Jack. 1977. Dependency theory: a critique. *Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie*, 2.4, p. 401.

⁹⁵ Ajei. pp. 2 – 43.

⁹⁶ Tony Smith. 1979. The underdevelopment of development literature: the case of dependency theory. *World Politics*, 31.2, p. 249.

system has tended to inhibit their industrialisation, relegating their economies to the less dynamic form of growth associated with agriculture or the extractive industries.

The need to bring out the unenthusiastic aspects of dependency theory arises. In a globalised world, all countries - either those of the Global North or those of the Global South - are inter-connected. While some are winners of global trade, others are losers. This is as a result of the industrialised and wealthy countries becoming wealthier by exploiting the poorest ones through unfair economic paradigms. The world is divided into two unequal parts: the core and the periphery and they serve different functions in the world economy as the industrialised countries belong to the core while the less-developed ones belong to the periphery.⁹⁷ At this, he is against the dependency theory that:

Dependency theory also commits the fallacy of composition by equating economic development with development. This is partly because it deems import substitution industrialization as a key pathway to development. Secondly, its core/periphery dichotomy serves merely to analyze the structure of economic relationships between the developed and the Third Worlds. This economic orientation is in consonance with its Marxist underpinnings, since a central claim of Marx's materialist conception of history is that the laws of history are economic in nature.⁹⁸

While resources flow into the core for industrial production, high-value consumer goods flow into the periphery, which makes the core wealthier and creates imbalances in the world economy: one, rich and developed, the other, poor and less-developed. And because of this, trade barriers increase the cost of living for citizens of the less-developed societies. It should be noted also that the core contains less people while the periphery contains more people, and therefore, making it more difficult to develop as it is purely uni-directionality. To him,

Another feature of the theory exposed to criticism is its uni-directionality. This is also inspired by Marx, who employed evolutionary theory in describing social change. According to Marx, societies move through four distinct phases: the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and bourgeois phases; and that transition to a subsequent phase is inevitable when the conditions for it are fulfilled. The Eurocentrism of Dependency theory is easily gathered from Marx's description of the phases of social change. The most advanced phases corresponded to European experiences, and Africa was outside of the historical processes of change.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ajei, pp. 43-44.

⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 44.

⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 44.

Core states in Europe and North America are the main beneficiaries of the world economic system at the expense of countries on the periphery. And the main reason Njoku writes that, “the problem with the dependency theory is that it concentrated with fighting the traitor from without (the First World capitalists in the Third World) and forgot the traitor from within (the local elites or oligarchy).¹⁰⁰ Underdevelopment, is understood as a product of imperialism, fostered by industrialisation as core societies search for new markets and raw materials. This encapsulates the fact that societies of Africa particularly will continue to be seen as appendages, and attached to the aprons of the few industrialised societies, as societies of the Global South are not considered as part of such historical social change of which Hegel proposes.

Neoliberalism Theory

Neoliberalism is an ideology based on the primacy of individualism, market liberalisation, entrepreneurship and state contraction. A central assumption of neoliberalism is that open, competitive, unregulated markets represent the optimal mechanism for economic development. Prominent from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, neoliberal ideas represented a major assault on the national development attitudes and approaches and a form of disdain for the state’s role in the development process through such strategies as import-substitution industrialisation and price controls. Neoliberalism has a long gestation period and has been actively promoted by key and well-placed actors especially the World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund and World Bank (The Bretton Woods in Washington). For this intellectual history and some insight into the role of global governance institutions, we will consider the analysis through the works of Harvey and Peet.

David Harvey opines that neoliberalism is, in the first instance, “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and

¹⁰⁰ Njoku. p. 35.

legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action, if necessary. But, beyond these tasks, the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.”¹⁰¹ Dag Thorsen’s understanding of Harvey’s is that, “neoliberalism is tightly knit to his overall analysis, which includes the firmly held belief that the world has experienced “an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970’s”. Harvey proposes with his definition to view neoliberalism, not as the renewal of liberalism in general, but as a distinctive economic theory. It is also apparent that Harvey sees neoliberalism not as a continuation of liberalism, but as something which lives independently of more traditional liberal values and policies.”¹⁰²

Harvey moves the discourse from basically political, modern and classical understanding to the debates on economic paradigm that:

Deregulation, privatisation, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision have been all too common. Almost all states, from those newly minted after the collapse of the Soviet Union to old-style social democracies and welfare states such as New Zealand and Sweden, have embraced, sometimes voluntarily and in other instances in response to coercive pressures, some version of neoliberal theory and adjusted at least some policies and practices accordingly. . . Furthermore, the advocates of the neoliberal way now occupy positions of considerable influence in education (the universities and many ‘think tanks’), in the media, in corporate boardrooms and financial institutions, in key state institutions (treasury departments, the central banks), and also in those international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate global finance and trade. Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has pervasive

¹⁰¹ Harvey, David. 2005. *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, p. 2.

¹⁰² Thorsen, Dag. 2012. *The politics of freedom: a study of the political thought of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper, and of the challenge of neoliberalism*. An unpublished Ph.D thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Finland, p. 184.

effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world.¹⁰³

The major intent of this theory is purely free market forces based on economic freedom as discussed by Jeffrey Sachs' and Joseph Stiglitz' market forces theory as development in the first chapter. The analyses of Stiglitz and Sachs from market forces are in the realm of economic development, which is built on capitalist ideology. Ajei avers in the analysis concerning the intent of the theorists that:

Their central claim is that the free-market capitalist system is maximally effective in producing and equitably distributing the economic, social, political and intellectual necessities of life in a developed society. The free market comprises of atomistic rational individuals who know their needs and wants and who contract with other individuals through the mechanism of the marketplace to satisfy those needs and wants. Based on classical methodological individualist notions, neo-liberal theorists argue that these needs and wants motivate self-interested actions. Consequently, self-interested individuals active on a free market within and beyond their national boundaries become the most competent agents of development because the free market is able to enhance their economic status and that of their nations as a whole.¹⁰⁴

This clearly points to the fact that individuals and nation-states with large amount of resources will determine the economic discourses of other people and states with the sole intention of enhancing their self-interests, which will benefit themselves and the core societies as against the poor people in the periphery. Oliver Harwich posits that, "strict state-run market police in every area of economic activity in which market freedom and market laws apply, to secure a fair performance competition and avoid any impediment competition directed against one's market comrades."¹⁰⁵

In the clear examination of the projects of neoliberalism theory, the adherents postulate diverse paradigms in the process of attaining their set-objectives, which will alone benefit rich individuals and industrialised societies essentially the North America and the Western Europe. Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick state that, "the set of "policy instruments" derived from the Washington Consensus and applied to (mainly Third World) borrowing countries by the World Bank and the IMF to include *Fiscal discipline, Reducing public expenditures, Tax reform, Interest rates,*

¹⁰³ Harvey. p. 3

¹⁰⁴ Ajei. p. 50.

¹⁰⁵ Hartwich, Oliver. 2009. *Neoliberalism: the genesis of a political swearword*. CIS Occasional Paper 114, p. 17.

Competitive exchange rates, Trade liberalization, Encouraging foreign direct investment, Privatization, Deregulation and Securing property rights. In brief . . . the economic positions that Washington agreed upon in setting growth and development policies for the rest of the world could be summarized as “prudent macroeconomic policies, outward orientation, and free market capitalism.”¹⁰⁶ In essence, the neoliberal approach not only lacks a mechanism to combat inequality, on the contrary it promotes it. It also focuses on free trade and disregards other important development factors such as the rights of workers and the effects it has on the citizenry. The principle of non-intervention of the state reveals that this principle is one-sided as it allows for state intervention insofar as creating a suitable business environment, deregulation and privatization, which only benefits the rich and the industrialised nations without a support for the developing societies and nations. This is a clear example of the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) by the Bretton Woods institutions on developing states in the Global South.

In the non-involvement of the state in the running of the economy, Harvey sums it up that, “According to the theory, the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade. These are the institutional arrangements considered essential to guarantee individual freedoms. The legal framework is that of freely negotiated contractual obligations between juridical individuals in the marketplace. The sanctity of contracts and the individual right to freedom of action, expression, and choice must be protected. The state must therefore use its monopoly of the means of violence to preserve these freedoms at all costs. By extension, the freedom of businesses and corporations (legally regarded as individuals) to operate within this institutional framework of free markets and free trade is regarded as a fundamental good.”¹⁰⁷ Ajei corroborates Harvey’s opinion that, “the state must therefore retreat from management of the economy. Its legitimate role is only to provide a basic legal and security system to underpin the individual contractual pursuit of private goals. According to this school, this model represents the essential character of all human economic activity in society. Two major policy measures were advocated in furtherance of the retreat of the state. The first concerns reducing the

¹⁰⁶ Peet, Richard and Hartwick, Elaine. 2009. *Theories of development: contentions, arguments and alternatives*. New York and London: Guilford Publications, pp. 85 – 86.

¹⁰⁷ Harvey. p. 64.

state's role in the economy. To achieve this deregulation and privatization of state assets were prescribed. This required the liberalization of the market typified by reduction in government planning and regulation of economy, and the abolition of tariff regimes, a more hospitable approach to foreign investment regulations and curbing of trade unions. The second measure was the achievement of macroeconomic stability. This required a state reducing its fiscal deficits, and this could be done by the abolition of various subsidies, restriction of government spending especially on social services.”¹⁰⁸

The above implicate on the subjection of local industries and local currencies devaluation, which ultimately increase the flow of goods from the developed economies to the less-developed economies. And by doing this, there is the growth and development of the economies of the colonies as against the colonised. Here, Peet and Hartwick (quoting Brohman) opine that, “development policy came to consist in withdrawing state direction and even government intervention in development in favor of the disciplining of economies by market competition and self-interested individuals “efficiently” choosing between alternatives in the allocation of productive resources. In the external arena, neoliberalism entailed the devaluation of currencies (to make exports cheaper), convertible monetary systems (free conversions of currencies into dollars), and the removal of state restrictions on commodity and capital movements into and out of countries - joining economies together through unrestricted globalization. Internally markets were to be deregulated (including deunionising) while price subsidies on food were to be reduced and then eliminated. Government spending was reduced and taxes lowered, especially on rich people, so that incomes flowed into private investment, stimulating growth.”¹⁰⁹ This model of development, was used in most parts of Africa, Latin America and Asia, through which their economies were deregulated in the interests of the developed world especially through the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes and other World Bank funded projects and programmes. This led to huge borrowings from the Bretton Woods by the developing societies and continues to be burdened with unpaid loans, which make them as appendages to the societies and economies of the Global North.

¹⁰⁸ Ajei. pp. 49 – 50.

¹⁰⁹ Peet and Hartwick. p. 86.

There are major gaps and problems that have been created with the introduction of neoliberalism theory into the world economics and the discussion of development. And these gaps affect societies of less-developed economies while the developed economies continue to be wealthier on daily basis. Here, Harvey points out that, “there is the problem of how to interpret monopoly power. Competition often results in monopoly or oligopoly, as stronger firms drive out weaker.”¹¹⁰ This is the situation of big transnational or multinational companies driving out the local industries of business and, in essence, creates adverse effects on the economy and the survival of the citizenry due to either unemployment or under-development. This will continue as there is declining governments’ power and influence due to increase power of the multinational or transnational companies.

Another factor portrayed by Harvey is the fact of failure in markets and trades.¹¹¹ Harvey’s tacit analysis of the fundamental problem being created by neoliberalism theory is a replica of what transpires in almost all the less-developed societies where the so-called multinationals are. There is a widespread shirking of responsibility due to the people as encapsulated in what is termed as “corporate social responsibility” – a meager sum due to the people. An instance of this problematique, is what the Niger-Delta people of Nigeria, suffer from essentially the pollution of their environment and depletion of huge human resources. Mohammad Wahidi argues that, “workers lose their protection and become vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. This coupled with the unequal distribution of income between the rich and the poor widens disparities even further.”¹¹² In another dimension, he says, “the economic freedom in the form of neo-liberalism where political freedom is either weak or non-existent can only open the door for widespread abuse and exploitation of labour. Political freedom on the other hand enables workers to establish effective mechanisms to protect their rights and entitlements. Neo-liberalism takes away some of the political freedom it does not add to it. Why should political freedom be attributed to economic freedom? Why not argue the opposite, which may even look more plausible?”¹¹³ He also delves into the problem of technological change, which relies on a belief that every problem of man has to be treated by and with technological know-how and with diverse

¹¹⁰ Harvey. p. 67.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 67.

¹¹² Wahidi, Mohammad. 2012. *Strengths and weaknesses of the neo-liberal approach to development*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, p. 4.

¹¹³ Ibid. p. 3.

orientations from different organisations and groups. According to him, “the neoliberal theory of technological change relies upon the coercive powers of competition to drive the search for new products, new production methods, and new organizational forms. This drive becomes so deeply embedded in entrepreneurial common sense, however, that it becomes a fetish belief that there is a technological fix for each and every problem.”¹¹⁴

Another factor concerning this theory is raised again by Wahidi in the sense that it allows the poor to be “used” by the rich, *vis-à-vis* the less-developed economies by the industrialised ones. He writes in this realm that, “the neo-liberal stance on the protection of property rights is also one sided. It only seeks to protect the rights of the rich and disregards the poor by further restricting their powers to protect themselves against a powerful body of capitalists who can exploit them at will. Deregulation on the other hand inevitably leads to labour exploitation fuelled by capitalist greed.”¹¹⁵ Based on these remarks on neo-liberalism theory, one can conclude that this theory has brought more woes to the societies especially the developing ones in the quest towards economic growth and has not translated to any form of development, which is no other than human development. It is on the basis of this that Wahidi¹¹⁶ declares that:

Neo-liberalism has failed to lead to any level of long term development. Placing the fate of the economy and workers in the hands of corporate institutions inevitably creates a situation where action is led by greed and not by passion for development. Reliance on multinational companies to regulate the market creates a volatile situation and there is no effective mechanism to either prevent economic collapse due to external shocks or stop the exit of foreign capital and investment from the country when markets started to perform poorly.

Neo-liberalism resembles an ideology more than a development approach. Ideologies emerge as very seductive and appealing concepts, but in essence they never achieve what they promise.

With these fundamental loop-holes inherent in neoliberalism theory, we now turn our attention towards post-development theory for the discourse of development especially among societies of the Global South.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 68.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 5

1.5 Conclusion

Development, is more than the passage from poverty level to the affluent stage, because it carries along not only from its economic and/or technological dimension, but, greater human integrity, dignity, equity, justice among others are significant. This means that development, as examined, is a social concept and a process through which man strives to improve the conditions of his life. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result 'development', even if per capita income doubled. This applies, of course, to the future too. A 'plan' which conveys no targets for reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality can hardly be considered a 'development plan'. Hence, our discourses and analyses in this chapter, had been devoted to the understanding of development from diverse variations essentially from its conceptual analysis and its meaning to man and his environment. These analyses were carried out in relation to the theories – modernisation, dependency and neoliberalism – of development. This essentially had made clarifications on the different sentiments by which theorists, scholars and professionals have examined development and how it has been used to interpret and polarise the world into two unequal parts. With the achievement of our objective, the focus and intent of the next chapter shall be to examine the nexus between knowledge and development, that is, how knowledge aids and enhances development.

CHAPTER TWO KNOWLEDGE AND DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Introduction

Knowledge is sacrosanct to the development of any society. The development of any society is premised on the level of development of its educational system. Education, no doubt, nurtures, preserves and widens the horizons, creativity, talents and potentials of its members *vis-a-vis* their contribution to societal development. This is to say that knowledge promotes social change and the essence of knowledge is to liberate and expand the horizons of intelligence of the people. It is aimed at mobilising the people towards a patriotic zeal to transforming the society. Knowledge is crucial to human survival and sustenance. It is one of the means by which human beings seek to master and control their space as human beings without knowledge would hardly be better than brutes.

It is a presumption that societies with high degree of ignorant and un-informed people are often easy prey to manipulation, exploitation and destruction by the elite. In such society, chaos, confusion, despair, ethno-religious crises and conflicts, poverty and under-development are the underlining factors of engagement due to the general apathy and mutual suspicions among the various groups, interests and characters. The above is a negation of a society with high level of knowledgeable and informed citizens, which will be easy to govern, mobilise and conscientise in the same direction of transformation with the spirit of patriotism. Hence, the thrust of this chapter shall be devoted to the nexus between knowledge and development, that is, the significance of knowledge to development.

2.2 The Discourse of Knowledge

Olusegun Oladipo argues that knowledge is a process of inquiry and a systematic investigation, which affects human survival. He notes that, “Knowledge is the means by which human beings master and control their environment, regulate their social interactions, and indeed, distinguish themselves from brutes. But the generation, transmission and application of knowledge require a culture of inquiry.”¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Oladipo, Olusegun. 2009. *Philosophy and social reconstruction in Africa*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 24.

This culture of inquiry is a necessity towards the achievement of autonomous life for man in order for him to control and stabilise his world. He says thus:

This is a culture of systematic investigations of natural and social phenomena and the use of reason to conceive of possible explanations for what we are. The culture of inquiry involves seeking and attempting to create a better world. Thus, knowledge is both a product and a process. It is a product of inquiry and, at the same time, a process of seeking to understand the conditions of our existence and to improve those conditions . . . knowledge becomes a tool of self-appraisal and self-understanding without which our human search for meaning is impossible.¹¹⁸

In this realm, John Bewaji reiterates the significance of the quest for understanding what knowledge is and the roles it plays in human society. He argues that:

Attaining knowledge has always been a serious human desire, and because of this, understanding knowledge as a concept and as an instrument has been a serious pre-occupation of the reflective members of all civilised societies from time immemorial, becoming a subject of great intellectual, material, cultural and technological investment. This is because knowledge is the crucial element in all domains of life – be it practical or theoretical. . . Everything, including the process of becoming and extinction, depends on the presence or absence of knowledge. This is a simple fact, which implicates the need for each society to philosophise knowledge in ways suitable to their epistemic and intellectual requirements and agendas, bearing in mind that no epistemology is utilitarianly neutral.¹¹⁹

The ultimate quest for knowledge by man led to many fundamental theories as it is the principal intellectual attainment that is being studied by epistemology, in the field of philosophy. Alvin Goldman explains that, “Virtually all theorists agree that true belief is a necessary condition for knowledge, and it was once thought that justification, when added to true belief, yields a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge.”¹²⁰ The twin-theories of rationalism and empiricism in connection with idealist position served as the sources of knowledge in Western philosophy during the modern age. This is due to the determination of man to rebuild human understanding with only what is clear and distinct to one or another dimension of human knowledge.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Bewaji, John. 2007. *An introduction to the theory of knowledge: a pluricultural approach*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 14.

¹²⁰ Goldman, Alvin. 1995. Knowledge. *The Oxford companion to philosophy*. Honderich, Ted. Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 447.

Hu Yeping, in her argument, avers that, “These three (idealism, empiricism and rationalism) modern forms of epistemology have something in common, that is, that they all emphasised upon one aspect of human intellectual faculty: the subjectively-centred reasoning, either through sensations or through inward capacity of analysis or judgement in terms of verification of what is true or what is false for the purpose of factuality. Empowered with rational capacities, human beings seek universal principles to govern humanity, nature and society, and the entire world.”¹²¹ Although based on the Renaissance (during fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) - a time of rediscovery of classical ideas that are re-applied and sparked explosive progress in natural philosophy, that is, what is known as science today and consequently the material well-being of people. John Haldane posits that, “the principal concerns of Renaissance writers were philosophy of nature (embracing science, occultism, and metaphysics), psychology (including theory of knowledge), and moral and political philosophy – one of the main contributions to which was the employment of fables of golden ages, past and future, in order to retrieve and refashion personal and social virtues associated with antiquity.”¹²² That is, during the Renaissance, a pre-occupation with mathematics and natural sciences began, which was concerned with the elaboration of systems of thought originating in the classical period. While attention turned to the nature of the human mind and its abilities to master the natural world during the Enlightenment period. The thrust then was to examine all phenomena in relation to either rationalist or empirical approaches/theories.

The concept of knowledge could be used in different ways, that is, man has knowledge by, about, of and among others. There is knowledge by acquaintance and there is also knowledge by description (knowledge how) as examined by Bertrand Russell; and there is knowledge by proposition (knowledge that). Knowledge by acquaintance is obtained through a direct causal interaction between a person and the object that person is perceiving. Bertrand Russell unequivocally avers that, “All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation. It is therefore important to consider what kinds of

¹²¹ Yeping, Hu. 2012. Modernisation, identity and culture. Paper presented at an International Conference on the theme: *Africa in the emerging new world order: development, culture and the state*. Kampala: Makerere University from November 19-20, p. 3.

¹²² Haldane, John. 1995. Renaissance philosophy. *The Oxford Companion to philosophy*. Honderich, Ted. Ed. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., USA, p. 768.

things there are with which we have acquaintance.”¹²³ Sense data from such object are the only things that man can ever become acquainted with; he can never truly know the physical object itself. A person can also be acquainted with his own sense of self (Rene Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum*) and his thoughts and ideas. However, other people could not become acquainted with another person's mind (the problem of other minds in Philosophy of Mind). They have no way of directly interacting with it, since a mind is an internal object. They can only perceive that a mind could exist by observing that person's behaviour (third person account/behaviourist account of consciousness). Knowledge by acquaintance, therefore, is a direct kind of knowledge; it is a kind of knowledge that does not depend on inference or mediation.

Whereas knowledge by description is a type of knowledge that is indirect, mediated, and inferential; knowledge by description, according to Russell, is dependent on direct acquaintance in at least two ways. First, knowledge by description depends on acquaintance for its propositional content. Russell unequivocally stated, “every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted”¹²⁴. Although one’s knowledge by description may concern objects that outstrip the range of one’s immediate acquaintance, the propositional content is composed of concepts with which the subject is directly acquainted. Russell adds that, “The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. In spite of the fact that we can only know truths which are wholly composed of terms which we have experienced in acquaintance-, we can yet have knowledge by description of things which we have never experienced.”¹²⁵ While knowledge by proposition (knowledge that) is knowledge of facts, knowledge that such and such is the case. Propositional knowledge, obviously, encompasses knowledge about a wide range of matters: scientific knowledge, geographical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, self-knowledge, and knowledge about any field of study whatever. Any truth might, in principle, be knowable, although there might be unknowable truths. This form (knowledge that) establishes the traditional mode of knowledge in epistemology. That is, that knowledge has three fundamental components (justified truth belief).

¹²³ Russell, Bertrand. 1959. *The problems of philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 48.

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. 58.

¹²⁵ Ibid. p. 59.

An attempt to understand and acquire knowledge in traditional epistemology demands that three conditions must be met and satisfied. They are: what we claim to know must be true; we must believe that thing we claim to know; and we must have evidence for believing that thing we claim to know. The conditions are stated clearly below: P is true; S believes that P; S is justified in believing that P. This means that P must be true is taken to be the first stage of knowledge, which suggests that man cannot know P if P is not true, that is, a condition for one's knowledge about something is that that thing is true and therefore, that the statement, 'I know something but that thing is not true appears to be self-contradiction'. The second stage is that knowing P suggests believing that P is, as it will appear unusual that, 'I know something is true but I do not believe that thing'. While the third stage is the evidence or justification stage, that is, one (S) must be justified in believing something (P). In attaining knowledge, it delves into so many sources, namely: reason, experience, authority, intuition, revelation could provide sure and certain knowledge. The interest about these sources of knowledge is to find out their nature and the validity of their claims.

The question about the sources of knowledge raises further questions about human faculty, which we use in acquiring knowledge. Basically, there are two faculties – the senses and reasoning – in the attainment of knowledge, although, other faculties like intuition among others had been included. Man's main sources of knowledge, that is, the senses are full of errors as they depend on the brain to which they are attached because most of man's knowledge is derived from observations of the external world. For instance, a physician could make a patient have a sensory experience of what is not, thereby stimulating a section of the brain. In the same manner, some optical illusions like dreams are many a time internally generated (internal realities) since illusion duplicates realities. Then, can the senses be reliable sources of knowledge? Plato avers that reliable knowledge cannot be received from the senses because they acquaint man with changing aspects of the world while the real world is immutable.

This traditional mode of knowledge in epistemic claims holds sway until Gettier objects to the proposition that knowledge equals justification, truth and belief. In making a critique of this traditional form of attaining knowledge, he shows convincingly, that it is plausible to have those salient criteria (conditions) of knowledge in place and yet, one would not be able to have knowledge, talk-less of its

certainty. His analysis of knowledge makes a great impact on the philosophical tradition as he applies skeptical doubt to all hitherto existing systems of knowledge. In philosophy according to him, there is no position or argument that is immune from criticisms. By this very exercise, epistemology is raised and carried to a higher level, which emphasises the importance and significance of rigorous self-interrogation. And, in this rigorous self-interrogation, the multi-dimensional nature of attaining and ascertaining knowledge should not be down-played. Gettier nullifies the epistemic tradition that prides itself on a critical self-interrogation or the criticism of a history, society or ideology of people from within or its domain. This is on the fact it is even possible to have these criteria without the possibility of attaining definite knowledge.

With regard to the problem of evidence in epistemology, the whole question revolves around the skeptical argument, which can be presented in this way. And in order for us to know something, we require some kinds of such evidence and, for this evidence to be sure, it must have a character of being conclusive or indubitable. That is, the evidence must offer us a reliable foundation for knowledge claim. But there seems to be a problem of conclusive evidence simply because there is no absolute knowledge. And, more importantly, because the acquisition of knowledge is a gradual process. Hence, if all we can have is sufficient or reliable evidence, then we face the reality of saying that our knowledge is merely probable. Of course, we know that a probable knowledge cannot give any form of epistemic certitude, which a proper system of knowledge requires. Therefore, we are faced with the skeptical problem that raises question about a certainty or probability of knowledge claim. This is the position of Bewaji that, “we cannot have a careful account of knowledge unless we accept the multi-dimensional nature of knowledge. It is reiterated that humans know all kinds of things and with varying degrees of assurance or certainty, that some of these items are accessible to other people while some others are not. This is a fact, which does not make claims to know any less to the subjects of such knowledge.”¹²⁶ Man often claims to know things but how does he know its certainty. Many times, knowledge-claim turns out to be false.

¹²⁶ Bewaji. p. 31.

2.3 The Necessity of Knowledge in Development

Development is the process by which human beings become aware of opportunities and challenges, formulate responses, make decisions, and initiate organised actions. This process follows the sequence from knowledge to inspiration to action. Man acquires knowledge and becomes aware of opportunities and challenges therein. It is when such form of knowledge matures that man acquires a motivation or inspiration to translate such into actuality as when it has not put into actuality; it is still a potential attribute. No matter how great the opportunity or how dire the necessity without knowledge, there is no adaptive response that might occur. Hence, knowledge is fundamental to all aspects of development processes. This is because it is essential for creating awareness of opportunities and challenges, a proper evaluation of alternatives, formulating responses, effective planning and organisation of ideas, and practical implementation of those ideas.

Development depends on a very broad range of knowledge whether from its technical point of view essentially in processes of production; from economic narrative, which delves into business and market forces as Stiglitz and Sachs opine, to political and public structures and the so-called knowledge of the emerging fields in the realm of sciences and most important a conceptualisation of the nature of development itself. Knowledge contributes to development in several different ways: as a productive resource; as an essential input for education, scientific research and industrial technology; as a catalyst for social change and economic development in Marxian language; and as a basis for civilisation and cultural values that promote social integrity and harmony, which is the essential foundation for development. The process of making development a worth-while venture and aspiration in any human society is to make man improve the conditions of his life. This means that the central issue about development is that it is about people. Bewaji consents here that:

Human knowledge has remained an intriguing phenomenon . . . This is because of the advantages of knowledge over ignorance and, in contemporary society, the power that knowledge confers on those who possess it and try to use it. Thus, human beings have not only been concerned with understanding the nature of knowledge, but more importantly, with the important issue of demarcating knowledge from ignorance, mere opinion, conjecture, guess work and even blind faith.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 29

Walter Rodney opines that, “Development in human society is a many-sided process. At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being. . . what is indisputable is that the achievement of any of those aspects of personal development is very much tied in with the state of the society as a whole. . . The relations, which develop within any given social group are crucial to an understanding of the society as a whole. Freedom, responsibility, skill, have real meaning only in terms of the relations of men in society.”¹²⁸ The above indicates the fact that the improvement of the conditions of man’s life and his environment will be built on the level and degree of knowledge acquisition and accumulation of man and the society. This is in line with the saying of Wittgenstein that the limit of one’s language will be the limit of one’s world, which means that the degree of a society’s knowledge is automatically the limit of its development.

The discourse of development has been hinged on the twin theories of rationalism and empiricism that served as the sources of knowledge in Western philosophy during the modern age. Development is considered during this period with the utmost intention of solving multifarious problems encountered by man. In the Enlightenment era, attention turned to the nature of the human mind and its abilities to master the natural world. The thrust then was to examine all phenomena in relation to either rationalist or empirical approaches. Hence, development was based on the phenomena in the human society. It should be stated that the discourse of development is seen and grounded upon the lopsidedness of what the term progress is since Renaissance period. Progress is, in fact, the necessary condition of material development as against non-material (intangible/moral) development. Here, the scientific mind reduces the concept of development to its technical and economic aspects, which became the ideal of the materially civilised life.

The Enlightenment project embodied tremendous intellectual advancements especially in the development of the scientific spirit, which imparted knowledge rather than moulding of feelings or develop characters; participatory politics of diverse ideologies – that men and women share the same brotherhood and are equal in respect of their rationality and should be granted such before the law and individual liberty; improvement of human lives through the emerging and improved science and

¹²⁸ Rodney, Walter. 1982. *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*. Washington: Howard University Press, p. 1.

technology. It was a dramatic shift toward a world-view based on reason and manifested as the right to question received authority and re-define the moral and political realms of philosophy historically relegated only to the Church hierarchies. The Enlightenment then can be understood as the extension of the same principles of reason - where the Renaissance was the rebirth of reason, the Enlightenment was its maturity.

It is within the veracity of diverse orientations by different scholars in philosophical interpretative community that the link between knowledge and development will be examined. That is, our next focus in this chapter will be to discuss the affinity between knowledge and development from theorists' opinions and how they view the necessity of having knowledge before development could be set in and make plausible for the use of man in understanding himself and the nature that surrounds him.

2.4 Views on Knowledge in Development Discourse

Bacon's Pursuit of Knowledge

In the quest for knowledge that will engender development of man and his world, Bacon gives diverse views on how knowledge could be gotten and acquired, and also to be stored and preserved for future purposes, projecting that the utmost search for knowledge should be clearly sought from the sciences. In the *New Atlantis*, Bacon seeks to understand knowledge from what he refers and describes as the "Solomon's House" in the pursuit of knowledge that, "The End of our Foundation is the knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible."¹²⁹ In the *Novum Organum*, he projects new ways of attaining knowledge as against what Aristotle avers. The Greek word *organon* means "instrument" or "tool", and Bacon was referring back to Aristotle's *Organon*; that his work is a "new instrument" designed to supersede the old order, as he says that, "Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in

¹²⁹ Bacon, Francis. 1963. *New atlantis. the complete essays of Francis Bacon including The new atlantis and Novum organum*. New York: A Washington Square Press Book, p. 193.

operation as the rule.”¹³⁰ This is where Bacon’s aphorism comes that knowledge is power. Bacon presents his ideas mostly as a set of aphorisms, rather than in the form of a sustained discussion. Nevertheless, his basic ideas are rather clear. And, in this form, he opines four different things that are seen as veils towards attaining clear knowledge for the use of man and his environment. These, he calls idols – idols that deny man’s attainment of real and clear knowledge.

Bacon, in his analysis of human knowledge, suggests that the mind/nature relationship is meant to be unimpeded just like what transpired among the first humans after “creation” by the originator in the original state of innocence. But he avers that this original state of innocence has been corrupted by the idols depicted as veils, which is making the acquisition of knowledge to be fruitless and making judgements and interpretation of experiences distorted. In the quest for knowledge that will liberate man from the state he is, Bacon feels that one needs to deal first with some of the obstacles standing in the way of its application. In Book I of the *New Organon* (Aphorisms 39-68), he introduces his famous doctrine of the “idols.” These are characteristic errors of the mind, which prevent it from attaining a complete and accurate picture of nature. The idols stand in the same relation to the experimental study of nature, as flawed arguments do to logical argumentation. Bacon uses the word “idol” (from the Greek *eidolon*, meaning “image” or “ghost”) to mean a deception or misunderstanding, which obscures our knowledge of the real physical world. Here, he postulates four kinds of idols, which are, namely: *Idols of the Tribe*, *Idols of the Cave*, *Idols of the Market-place* and *Idols of the Theatre*.

a. The Idols of the Tribe

These are the “natural weaknesses and tendencies common to human nature” as he says that, “The Idols of the Tribe have their foundation in human nature itself, and in the tribe or race of men. For it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe. And the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolours the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.”¹³¹ Because they are innate to humans, we are saddled with them, but they can be compensated for. Hence, the need to discern similarities or even identities between

¹³⁰ Ibid. ,No. III, p. 185.

¹³¹ Ibid, Book 1, No. XLI, p. 193.

phenomena when they may be unrelated, and regularity where there is none, which is referred to as tendency towards wishful thinking. There is also the limitation of our senses, which can fail man both by giving no information and by giving false information as sensation can be a source of error as well as ignorance. To get around this, Bacon advocates the use of instruments, along with observations and experiments, to investigate and correct the misapprehensions of our senses.

b. The Idols of the Cave

The Idols of the Cave arise from our own presumptions and prejudices, which we bring to the table even when doing experiments. Unlike the Idols of the Tribe, which are common to all humans, idols of the cave vary from one person to another. They arise from the culture we are raised in, and are a product of the prejudices and beliefs that come from our different childhood and family backgrounds, educational, religious, social, economic and political stand-points, among others. Bacon avers thus:

The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For every one (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolours the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like . . . ¹³²

The most important of these for many people at that time was religion, which prevented most people from reasoning along certain lines, as religion beclouds people from seeing reality as it is and the pernicious influence of the Aristotelian doctrines on nature and logic.

c. The Idols of the Market Place

These idols emanate, according to Bacon, from the intercourse and association of men with each other as they are seeing, as obstacles to authentic knowledge. What Bacon was focusing on the necessity for critical thinking, and on the limitations on our thinking and understanding imposed by the language we use (particularly the specialised language used by intellectuals). Bacon argues that “the idols imposed by words on the understanding are of two kinds”, namely: that “they are either names of things that do not exist”, or else misleading names for things that do exist. To Bacon,

¹³² Ibid, Book 1, No. XLII, p. 194.

“There are also Idols formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other, which I call Idols of the Market-place, on account of the commerce and consort of men there. For it is by discourse that men associate; and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar.”¹³³ He continues by saying that, “But the *Idols of the Market-place* are the most trouble-some of all: idols which have crept into the understanding through the alliances of words and names.”¹³⁴ Examples of the first kind are easy to think of - unicorns, hallucinations, or celestial spheres come to mind, along with the idea of a 'vital force' or 'vital substance'. As examples of the second kind, Bacon is particularly concerned with phenomena like colour or taste, which presented themselves to the senses but which clearly depended on particular aspects of those senses.

d. The Idols of the Theatre

These are idols which have their origin in the grand schemes or systems of philosophy. These give rise to unjustifiable philosophical prejudices and preconceptions. He writes that, “Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men’s minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theatre; because in my judgement all the received systems are but so many stage-plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion.”¹³⁵ For Bacon, these prejudices came particularly from three specific types of philosophy as “. . . *the Idols of the Theatre* are not innates, nor do they steal into the understanding secretly, but are plainly impressed and received into the mind from the play-books of philosophical systems and the perverted rules of demonstration”¹³⁶, namely: sophisticated philosophies constructed largely in the absence of any empirical evidence, perhaps based on only a few observations of the world, and derived more from abstract argument. Like the Scholastic tradition, empirical philosophies, erected on a base of, in fact, little empirical evidence, which was then extrapolated into a theory, which claimed to explain a wide variety of phenomena like the philosophy of William Gilbert whose experiments with lodestones led him to the conclusion that magnetism was the underlying explanation of a vast array of natural phenomena (an idea which later became quite popular); and superstitious philosophies that depended on or was

¹³³ Ibid, Book 1, No. XLIII, p. 194.

¹³⁴ Ibid, Book 1. No. LIX

¹³⁵ Ibid, Book 1, No. XLIV, p. 194-195.

¹³⁶ Ibid, Book 1, No. LXI, p. 203.

connected to a religious base like many of the Ancient Greeks, going back to Thales, Pythagoras and Plato, of philosophers who fell into this error, and also cited examples in his own day, and philosophies and theories that are connected with passages in the Bible.

As against all these idols, which colour man's quest and certainty for knowledge towards development of himself and the world, Bacon avers that man needs a new method that will assist him read the book of knowledge encapsulated in nature. As he observes:

The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words; words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and over-hastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope therefore lies in a true induction.¹³⁷

He analyses this by saying that "One method of delivery alone remains to us; which is simply this: we must lead men to the particulars themselves, and their series and order; while men on their side must force themselves for awhile to lay their notions by and begin to familiarise themselves with facts."¹³⁸ This means, according to him, that "The formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols. To point them out, however, is of great use; for the doctrine of idols is to the Interpretation of Nature what the doctrine of the refutation of Sophisms is to common logic."¹³⁹ And by this inductive methodology, that is, the organisation of experimental philosophy, as proposed by him in the *New Atlantis*, he envisages a better world capable of being transformed by the scientific humanism.

The basic forms of nature help man to create and re-create a new idea about nature, which new ideology of re-creation is embedded in the power of man as 'knowledge is power' in the dictum of Bacon. And on the basis and foundation of this, Njoku trying to understand Bacon writes that, "man is no longer simply part of nature, but knowledge of man and universe is power. The claim that knowledge is power, by Bacon, underlies the practical value of knowledge. Man is seriously intervening in nature and beginning to control it."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ Ibid, Book 1, No XIV, p. 187.

¹³⁸ Ibid. Book 1, No. XXXVI, p. 192.

¹³⁹ Ibid, Book 1, No. XL, p. 193.

¹⁴⁰ Njoku. p. 26.

Descartes' Search for Foundations of Knowledge

Descartes' quest for development sets out on a relentless search for an infallible ground for knowledge. However, to carry this out, he has to play the sceptic at his own game. Descartes sets out on his quest for clear and indubitable truth from the grounds of doubt; for he had to doubt all which he hitherto held onto, with little or no conviction.¹⁴¹ As he opines that, "I kept on all the time eradicating from my mind any errors that might have slipped into it so far...not that I imitated the sceptics, who doubt just for the sake of doubting and affect to be always undecided; on the contrary, my whole aim was to reach security, and cast aside loose earth and sand so as to reach rock or clay."¹⁴² Descartes' search leads him to the very doorsteps of self, for he soon discovers the *I* – Ego: "*I think, therefore I am*". And more importantly, his doubt reveals the truth of the self, but further still, it opens to the clear and indubitable power of intuition, for he intuits the idea of the self.

In this daunting quest for knowledge that leads man to the development of self and his environment, the reality that stares man in the face is the realisation of his limitedness and his fallibility, as man would quickly learn that he is largely prone to error in all knowledge claims. This is due to the fact that what holds true at a certain time may easily fail the very authenticating test of time and turn out false before the clarity of future insight. For, as Descartes directs, "we must occupy ourselves only with those objects that our intellectual powers appear competent to know certainly and indubitably".¹⁴³ Hence, of the many modes of knowledge, Descartes acknowledges two remarkable ones that offer a significant degree of certainty. These, for him, are intuition and deduction. In this regard, Descartes makes clear the proposition that even intuition possesses greater degree of certainty than that afforded us by rational deduction, particularly due to its cognitive simplicity. It does happen, thus, that at times, we feel the nagging conviction of some out-of-the-way premonition, and later become proven right, with its occurrence. The feeling is one that is simple and direct, and yet, can we validly assume that this right feeling is a justification for some kind of knowledge of this sort. So, his justification is that

¹⁴¹ Cf. Descartes, Rene. *Discourse on Method*, II, Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach. ed. *Descartes Philosophical Writings*, pp. 20-23.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* p. 28.

¹⁴³ Descartes, Rene. 1971. *Rules for the direction of the mind*, II. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach. eds. *Descartes' philosophical writings*. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., p. 153.

intuition is the basic idea in attaining knowledge, which could be achieved if man possesses knowledge that will make him lord of nature.

Descartes delineates his notion of intuition as basically different from the “wavering assurance of the senses, or the deceitful judgment of a misconstruing attention”;¹⁴⁴ it is not based on the input of any of the five senses. Some link it rather to a sixth sense, one that does not detect a physicalist property of matter. It is, for Descartes, thus, “a conception, formed by unclouded mental attention, so easy and distinct as to have no room for doubt, in regard to the thing we are understanding”.¹⁴⁵ It is this easy, distinct and indubitable assurance that offers the self the most basic and fundamental of all propositions: “I am”. Expectedly, the idea of the self - *Ego* is found through the power of intuition, as it becomes the solid basis on which Descartes can build anew his epistemological edifice. This is so because the *cogito* does not merely emerge from some demonstrative syllogism, as an inference, but rather gets this from the simple intuition of the mind.¹⁴⁶ For Descartes, “intuition proceeds solely from the light of reason.”¹⁴⁷

Intuition gives us the groundwork for forming and building propositions and inferences. Descartes gives an example in the fact that our recognition of the similarity between $2+2$ and $3+1$, comes from our ability to intuit their mathematical relationship. And so, the premises of deduction are gotten through intuition, for ‘we know the last link of a long chain is connected with the first, even though we do not view in a single glance (*intuitu*) all the intermediate links on which the connexion depends’.¹⁴⁸ Deduction differs from intuition in that the former does not build on what is momentary evident, but borrows its certainty from memory.¹⁴⁹ In sum, first principles are regarded by Descartes, to be known by intuition. Of these first principles, Descartes highlights some intuited truths. Intuited truths consisted of some kind of necessary connection between what he understood as ‘simple natures’. These simple natures were of three kinds. The first of these, were the material kind that had to do with concepts like shape, extension and motion.¹⁵⁰ From the raw materiality of

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Descartes, Rene. *Objections and replies*, 2nd Replies, 3rd point; *CSM*, II, p. 100, as quoted in *Descartes*, <http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~mab505/teaching/emp/descarte/cogito.htm> (Accessed on 8th May, 2015).

¹⁴⁷ Descartes. *Rules for the direction of the mind*. p. 155.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 156.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 171.

these first kinds, concepts were compounded together and built up. The second category of intuited principles was those of the purely intellectual kind, as ‘those that the understanding knows by means of an innate light, without the help of any corporeal image’.¹⁵¹ These were ideas like knowledge, doubt, ignorance or the action of the will (which we may call volition). The final category housed both aforementioned realms indiscriminately. These, Descartes outlines as, existence, unity, duration, etc. Together with all these, Descartes also makes the point that, “the privations and negations of any of these categories also qualify as basic, on which other secondary propositions and inferences are logically constructed.”¹⁵²

Descartes’ notion of intuition is important for epistemology as it provides us with the first principles upon which epistemic propositions are constructed. Kant supports this position when he stresses that ‘intuitions without concepts are blind; concepts without intuitions are empty’.¹⁵³ Kant tries to point out that both of these are important for our perception of phenomena. Concepts built without the support of intuitions become vacuous, because they lack the meaning, conveyed to them by our intuitive mind. On another level, intuition helps Descartes to achieve his quest for certainty, because intuition is remarkably free from certain sceptical difficulties, as the sciences in which intuition is operative ‘need make no assumptions at all which experience renders uncertain’.¹⁵⁴ As such, Descartes’ notion of intuition affords his general system of logic the benefit of discovery. This was what was lacking in the formal logic of syllogisms that could explain things to others and not encounter new discoveries. The claims of Descartes help to assess, as Njoku says, “both the speculative sciences and morals or manners.” That is, “The Cartesian intuition presents the vision that the principles of physics (sciences) hold the key to the modern world and the enjoyment of mankind. Thus, the technology envisaged by the modern project, in Cartesian terms, is founded on utility.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 172.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 173.

¹⁵³ Thomson, Garret. 2003. *On Kant*. London: Wadsworth Publishers, p. 10.

¹⁵⁴ Kubitz, Alex. 1939. Scepticism and Intuition in the philosophy of Descartes. *The Philosophical Review*, 48.5, p. 484.

¹⁵⁵ Njoku., *Development and African Philosophy*. pp. 27-28.

Hobbes' Quest for Right Reason in Development

Hobbes articulates a modern problematic of reason, where the shared rationality of human beings is an integral part of the danger they present to each other, and where reason suggests a solution, the social contract and the laws of nature, enforced and interpreted by absolute sovereign authority. Hobbes, in his book *Leviathan*, theorises the movement of man from savagery situation, which in itself is nasty, brutish and ultimately short, to that of a civil society where everyone annexes his interests to form an organised society where the laws, rules and regulations reign supreme.

Hobbes sees reason thus:

When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing else but conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part.

In summe, in what matter soever there is place for *addition* and *substraction*, there also is place for *Reason*; and where these have no place, there *Reason* has nothing at all to do. ¹⁵⁶

This understanding of Hobbes's analysis on the importance of reason signifies the essence for the establishment of human capacity project that will be rooted and reckoned with in the quest for the development of human thoughts. This is because thoughts are necessary ingredients in the struggle for balancing individual and societal interests towards humanisation and emancipation. And through the power of reason, Njoku contends, "is the capacity of adding and subtracting when we reckon."¹⁵⁷ And in this process of emancipation of man's world, he clearly defines reason as follows:

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word *Reason*, when we reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Subtracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts: I say *marking* them, when we reckon by our selves; and *signifying*, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men. ¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Hobbes, Thomas. 1968. *Leviathan*. Macpherson, C. ed. London: Penguin Books, Part I, Chapter V, pp. 110 -111 (Author's italics).

¹⁵⁷ Njoku. . p. 29.

¹⁵⁸ Hobbes. p. 111 (Author's italics).

In his analysis of what he terms as right reason, he makes basic distinctions between passion and reason. Passions, he states, are appetites or aversions for particular things as they are closely linked to what Hobbes described as gotten from knowledge by experience or prudence. The underlying feature is that passions are a function of or regulated by desire. However, somewhat opposed to passions or emotions is scientific knowledge or knowledge by reason which is essentially different from that of knowledge by experience.

Hobbes thinks that the world has certain universal, fundamental, unchanging feature very common in all and that these universal features are the cause of those conceptions we reach by ratiocination and thus call universal laws of nature. So, we obtain true knowledge when we use this reason. Hobbes further thinks reason as a motion having an external cause. He must have observed that reasoning is a feature common to all bodies in the world, and they are everywhere the same and it is unaffected by particular causes. This, to him, explains the distinction between passion and reason. It is free from passion and free from resisting causes. Thus, since it is more original and having no affiliation with passion, Hobbes thinks reason as a motion and at the same time serves as the spring of eternal truth. Thus he says: ‘the reason endeavours to preserve the truth it has conceived, and since nothing can resist it, the truths are forever preserved’.

Consequently, this is true of only right reason. He believes that whenever we follow our reason, we cannot err or get into contradictions, and in this sense we can be entirely free as he opines that, “The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred.”¹⁵⁹ If we understand Hobbes, it is as if to say that it means that every truth perceived by man’s use of his rational faculty is sufficient to the effect that reason is adequate. Accordingly, it means that if man perceives that his self-preservation is the most important thing, then he is led by reason and thus right. Also, if he further understands that if everyone continues to pursue his self-preservation in ways that are

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 112 (Author’s italics).

not entirely pure and reasons to submit his will to a sovereign ruler so as to better preserve himself, he is again led by reason and thus right.

Granted that what Hobbes says is to a large extent right, then it has grave implications for the notion of reason. This takes us back to the conception of reason. Reason has many uses and appears in many senses. Sometimes it is conceived as that faculty of human that guides actions and so on. However, the way Hobbes uses reason does not see it merely as a human faculty, he sees reason as instrumental. It is our contention that reason for Hobbes is instrumental because reason now functions as an object that directs man from one means to an end. Hobbes interprets reason to be identified by its output. Thus, someone who desires self-preservation is rational, while someone who does not is not rational. Reason thus identifies and in turn it is used to identify. Reason identifies the means to satisfying one's desires. That is how the laws of nature or natural law could be 'dictate of reason'. To him, rationality would, therefore, mean that a rational man would be one whose reason would lead him or serve his desires well by determining correctly how those desires could be satisfied. On this understanding, Hobbes certainly does not deny that one's reason and rational faculty can play such instrumental role in one's deliberation process as he examines on the significance and importance of the human mind, which sets the pace for reason that, "The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; *Reason* is the *pace*; Encrease of *Science*, the *way*; and the benefit of man-kind, the *end*."¹⁶⁰ This benefit of mankind called the end concerns his thought on man's development in the world through the conscious effort and use of right reason as enunciated by him.

Georg Hegel and the Primacy of Reason in Development Narratives

Hegel writes that, "the process of development, so quiescent in the world of nature, is for Spirit a hard and endless struggle against itself"¹⁶¹ because "the dialectical nature of the concept of development is that it is self-determining – it posits determinations in itself, then negates them, and thereby gains in this negation (*Aufheben*) an affirmative, richer, and more concrete determination."¹⁶² In his principle of development in world history, he affirms that, "world history in general is

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 116.

¹⁶¹ Hegel, Georg. 1988. *Introduction to the philosophy of history*. Leo Rauch (translated). Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, p. 59.

¹⁶² Ibid. p. 67

thus the unfolding of Spirit in *time*, as nature is the unfolding of the Idea in *space*¹⁶³, as reason rules the world. The notion of reason as the sovereign of world history is a recurring theme in Hegel's philosophy. This force is a form of spiritual activity, which strives toward the actualisation of reason's essence and the inner principle of freedom. His suggestion of the actualisation of reason's essence can best be understood in term of the potentiality of development be made into actuality. Hence, the discourse about reason in Hegel's thought cannot be said to be the only force behind history and development. Rather, it is that that unfolds a world into proper actuality on which development in its holistic nature builds upon.

Development, in Hegel's thought, means to bring into actuality what is potential over space and time. This means that the principle of development enables a being to produce and reproduce itself, by making itself actually what it already was potentially. Already, we should note that there are spatial and temporal dimensions to the process of development, which the works of Galtung focused on and which has been examined in the first chapter of this thesis. Actuality, Hegel avers, "is the domain of Spirit while potentiality, on the other hand, is treated as that which is opposed to actuality, that is, it contains within it a kind of directional force, whose aim or yearning is to manifest itself in actuality: as when Hegel describes matter as having weight insofar as it strives towards a central point outside point. It is essentially composed of parts which are separable. It seeks its unity, which would be its own negation, its opposite."¹⁶⁴ For Hegel, "Spirit, on the other hand, is that which has its centre in itself. Its unity is not outside itself; rather, it has found it within its own self. It is in its own self and alone unto itself. While matter has its "substance" (i.e., its source of support) outside itself, Spirit is autonomous and self-sufficient, a Being by itself."¹⁶⁵

The developmental dynamic between potentiality and actuality has something to do with a vital force behind a world unfolded into being. For Hegel, there are essentially two worlds of which he speaks. There is the world of nature and there is the world of Spirit in which development takes different forms. In the world of nature, development is merely quantitative: change in nature happens cyclically, because the development of matter and organisms in nature is one that is a "peaceful process of

¹⁶³ Ibid. p. 75.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 20.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 20.

growth.” Development in nature is peaceful because nothing intrudes from its maturity, for the simple reason that nature needs only to obey its own laws of causality. Hegel writes:

Changes in the world of nature – infinitely varied as these might be – reflect nothing more than an eternally repeated cycle. In nature, there is nothing new under the sun, so that the many-sided play of natural forms carries with it a certain boredom”; as a human embryo is a potential human being and later potential human person, and not that of a reptile or any of other animals. This is as a result of the fact that the principle of development also implies that there is an inner determination, an implicitly presupposed ground that is to bring self into existence. In its essence, this formal determination is Spirit, which uses world history as its theatre, its property, and the field of its actualisation. Spirit does not toss itself about in the external play of chance occurrences; on the contrary, it is that which determines history absolutely, and it stands firm against the chance occurrences, which it dominates and exploits for its own purpose.¹⁶⁶

In short, the development of organic forms in nature merely realises what it is already implicitly, and has no history in its strict sense. Rather, it is the Spirit in Hegel’s purview that determines what and how history unfolds.

Development in the world of Spirit is of an entirely different consequence. Spirit does not share this peaceful process of organic growth as found in the world of nature, and this is also why the “theater” of world spirit is located in world history, and why its historical drama is one of violence. Hegel avers that:

Accordingly, the process of development for Hegel in the realm of Spirit is not the harmless and peaceful progress that it is in the realm of organic life. Rather, it is a severe unwilling working against itself. Further, it is not a merely *formal* process of self-development in general. Rather, it is the fulfillment of an aim that has a specific *content*. What this aim is we established at the outset: it is Spirit, and indeed Spirit in conformity with its essence, the concept of freedom. This is the fundamental object, and thus the guiding principle of development as well. It is through this principle that the historical development receives its sense and meaning.¹⁶⁷

The guiding principle and concept of Hegel’s development of the Spirit is freedom, which becomes gradually objectified, realised, and given concrete form within the purview of an ideal state. For Hegel, the state is the realisation of Spirit in objective form; this is why the precise object of world history is the state as that which gives

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 58.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 59.

Spirit's concept of freedom its objectivity and form. Here, “. . . a state, according to Hegel, is well constituted and internally strong if the private interest of the citizens is united with the universal goal of the state, so that each finds its fulfillment and realisation in the other. This is a proposition of the highest intrinsic importance.”¹⁶⁸ Hegel suggests an individual's humanity can only be fully experienced through the State. But the State, too, needs to be developed. Before individual interests and positions could be universalised with those of the community as individuals cannot live outside the community and the community is a conglomeration of the individuals. In this manner, Hegel reiterates that, “the state needs many institutions, devices and practical arrangements, together with long struggles of the understanding, before it arrives at an awareness of what is appropriate to its goal. The era of such a unity constitutes the period of a state's flowering, the time of its excellence, power, and prosperity.”¹⁶⁹

Karl Marx's Dialectical Materialism as a Form of Social Change

Marx takes from Feuerbach's materialism its “inner kernel” and develops it into a scientific-philosophical theory of materialism. This, he does, by casting aside its idealistic and religious-ethical encumbrances in the quest for development. Materialism asserts the primacy of the material world: that is, matter precedes thought. Materialism is a realist philosophy of science, which holds that the world is material; that all phenomena in the universe consist of “matter in motion,”¹⁷⁰ Wherein all things are interdependent and interconnected and developed according to natural law; that the world exists outside us and independently of our perception of it; that thought is a reflection of the material world in the brain, and that the world is the principle of the knowable. However, since materialism in general explains consciousness as the outcome of being, and applied to the social life of mankind,

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 27.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 27.

¹⁷⁰ Motion is understood by dialectical materialism as any change, a change in general which encompasses all the processes transpiring in the universe- from the simplest mechanical displacement to such an extremely complex process as human thinking. Hence, matter exists only in motion. The facts of daily life, the development of science and practice have given convincing proofs of these. For instance, the sun constantly irradiates countless moving particles into cosmic space. When they reach the Earth, these particles act on our sense organs and make the existence of the sun known to us. If it were not for the movement of these particles we would not even suspect the sun's existence; after all, the sun is about 150 million kilometers away from the Earth.

Marx explains “social consciousness as the outcome of social being.”¹⁷¹ In the preface to his contribution to the critique of political economy, Marx gives an integral formulation of the fundamental principles of materialism as extended to human society and its history, in the following words:

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society- the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political super structure and to which corresponds definite forms of social consciousness.¹⁷²

He endorses this materialist philosophy against Hegel’s idealism; he “turns Hegel’s dialectics upside down.” However, Marx also criticised classical materialism as another idealist philosophy due to its trans-historical understanding of material contexts. In *Theses on Feuerbach*, he states that philosophy had to stop “interpreting” the world in endless metaphysical debates, in order to start “changing” the world, as was being done by the rising workers movement observed by Engels in England (Chartist movement) and by Marx in France and Germany.¹⁷³

The dialectical materialism of Marx is a profound and all-embracing theory of development and universal connection. By giving a general idea of material processes, it comprises a scientific method of cognising the world and helps man to understand the most diverse phenomena of reality and nature. And in addition to be a method of knowledge in the quest for development, it (dialectic materialism) is also a form of weaponry for the revolutionary transformation and social change of the world. Afanasyev opines that, “dialectical materialism rejects everything backward and obsolete in reality; it does not tolerate stereotyped practices and stagnation and dogmatism in theoretical thought”¹⁷⁴, hence, it demands reliance on progressive social forces, and helps to rediscover historically transitory nature of capitalism and proves the inevitability of its doom and its replacement by the new socialist system.

¹⁷¹ Howard, Selsam and Harry, Martel. 1963. *Reader in marxist philosophy*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc, p. 186.

¹⁷² Ibid. pp. 186 - 187.

¹⁷³ Marx, Karl. 1977. *Theses on Feuerbach*. Moscow: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. xi.

¹⁷⁴ Afanasyev, Viktor. 1978. *Marxist philosophy*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, p. 78.

The social order is often marked according to Marx, by a continuous change in the forces of production as he argued that every economic system except socialism produced forces that eventually led to a new economic form. He saw the development of productive forces as the root cause of social change. Following Marx's analysis, there is a clear indication that men will create specific social organisations that are very much in tune with the forces of production in order for their utmost struggle against nature to gain their livelihood. On the long run, these social organisations are characterised by social inequality. Given relative scarcity, whatever economic surplus has been accumulated will be taken over by those who have attained dominance (exploiters) through their control of the forces of production. It is from this template that the quest for a new social change will be created as the exploiters will naturally be challenged by the masses.

In Marx's opinion, however, change only came about through a revolution. For him, revolution has more than an intellectual function. It is an activity in which the changing of oneself coincides with the changing of circumstances.¹⁷⁵ Marx avers that, "man can change his own nature by changing his environment. Thus, by acting on the external world and changing it, mankind at the same time changes his very nature."¹⁷⁶ Marx further opines that all revolutions are simply the accumulation of long drawn out social processes and not the result of some sudden dissatisfactions on the part of the populace but the phase of a process long due. Thus, revolutions are usually characterised by their far reaching political, social, economic and overall cultural consequences. As Engels puts it; "revolutions are . . . necessary consequences of conditions which were wholly independent of the will and direction of individual parties and entire classes."¹⁷⁷ Hence, social revolution entails a process by which the old social order is discarded and a new one erected in its place. However, while Marx asserts that social change can only be brought about through a social revolution, he highlights class consciousness as a necessary element for social change.

Marx suggests that class consciousness on the part of the working class, is a vital element than any other thing in facilitating social change and revolution. He establishes the idea that unless the working class is clearly aware of its condition, both social and economic, they will not realise the need to change it. But from Marx's

¹⁷⁵ Marx, Karl. and Engels, Friedrich. 1845. *German Ideology*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 230.

¹⁷⁶ Marx, Karl. 1990. *Capital*, Vol 1. Ben Fowkes. ed. London: Penguin Books, p. 367.

¹⁷⁷ Engels, Friedrich. 1973. *Principles of communism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 13.

analysis, it is evident that at a certain stage, the working class will become aware of its social state and as well develop the urgent yearnings to bring about social transformation, but this transformation can only be brought about through a revolution. It, therefore, means that the working class itself could arrive at the necessary consciousness needed for social revolution through the understanding of its role in production and its capacity for abolishing class society. Without this consciousness, Marx suggests that the working class would not be able to create the means of liberating itself from the exploitation of capitalism.

Marx's position lies in the fact that the working class must realise itself against capitalism, subsuming all the historical gains for humanity made by capitalism. In other words, the more profound the knowledge of the working class about the laws of social development, the higher the state of awareness, unity and organisation of the working class and at the same time, the more successful the struggle for social change.¹⁷⁸ Thus, one can simply say that the knowledge of the laws of historical necessity demands people's active and conscious participation in order to realise them. So if the proletariat becomes ignorant of these laws then, they are bound either to hopelessness or total defeat. Thus, consciousness on the part of the working class in relation to the activities of the capitalists is a clarion call to the members of the working class in order to liberate themselves from the exploitative nature of capitalism. Hence, Marx in his thought and struggle for the emancipation of the human society, believes that revolutionary movements will lead to the total abolition of capitalist ideology and its off-springs with the subsequent emergence of communism, which is a clear means of social change in the community of men.

2.5 Conclusion

We can reiterate the major points here by saying from Bacon's idea that man can envisage a better world for himself when it is capable of being transformed by the scientific humanism through true induction despite the so-called idols that colour man's knowledge about himself and his world. It is also from the idea of conquering nature that Hobbes proposes reason as it requires the alienation of self-determination of rational human subjects to move away from the state of nature and savagery to a state of civility. That movement in its progressive nature is one of development as it

¹⁷⁸ Engels, p. 13.

rests on the level of right reason in ascertaining the need for human life to move away from the brutish and nasty way of life in the state of nature.

The quest for right reason in Hobbes is a necessary point in Hegel, which stipulates reason as the determinant of development in his dialectism that development can only be realised in union with the ultimate realisation of the Spirit as reason rules the world. This is the fact that the principle of development enables a being to produce and reproduce itself, by making itself actually what it already was potentially. On the basis of this understanding, the duo of Hegel and Marx build their theory of dialectical materialism from different perspectives, which in itself will bring about social change (development) in the society through revolution. As examined, Marx's idea of development comprises of a scientific method of cognising the world and helps man to understand the most diverse phenomena of reality and nature. And in addition to be a method of knowledge in the quest for development, it is also a form of weaponry for the revolutionary transformation and social change.

This chapter has been able to examine the necessity of knowledge to attain development as development depends on a very broad range of knowledge as we have earlier remarked that development is the process by which human beings become aware of opportunities and challenges, formulate responses, make decisions, and initiate organised actions. This process follows the sequence from knowledge to inspiration to action. Man acquires knowledge and becomes aware of opportunities and challenges therein. It is when such form of knowledge matures that man acquires a motivation or inspiration to translate such into actuality as when it has not put into actuality; it is still a potential attribute.

We have come to this point, in order to establish the link between knowledge and development, stemming from the analysis of views of some scholars in the field of philosophy. The need for this movement, from the Western paradigms as encapsulated in the views and analyses of scholars examined here, is premised on the fact that their thoughts and beliefs on development should not be seen and accepted as "article of faith" or as a universal paradigm. Hence, our discussion in the next chapter shall be to examine Arturo Escobar's ethnographic model in the understanding of development from societies of the Global South.

CHAPTER THREE

ARTURO ESCOBAR'S ETHNOGRAPHIC MODEL

3.1 Introduction

The thrust of this chapter will be to succinctly discuss the ethnographic model propounded by Arturo Escobar, which had been projected towards the understanding of development both in its theoretical and practical approaches among societies of the Global South. This analysis, will first examine post-development theory, as a platform, upon which he erected his model for the sustenance and survival of the Global South as against the 'beliefs' of the Global North.

3.2 Post-Development Theory

While the earlier theories (modernisation, dependency and neoliberalism) have clearly differed over the means of attaining the object and essence of development, there has been little discussion of development content or its appeal; post-development theorists argue that certain characteristic "Western" ways of talking about and representing the non-West should be understood as ideological projections rather than as scientific knowledge about peoples and places elsewhere. To them, the ways of conceiving and representing development that are closely bound to the North's development agencies and programmes reveal more about the self-affirming ideologies of the North than insights into the peoples of the rest of the world. In addition, post-development scholars take the position that development has less to do with human improvement and more to do with human control and domination.

In the 1990s, post-development theorists argued against Western theories of development for their reductionism, universalism, and ethnocentrism, that is, examining development from the 'top-bottom' approach, which identifies that societies of the Global South should borrow essentially from the developed societies. While the post-development theorists proffer the discussion to be seen and examined from the 'bottom-up' approach as Gilbert Rist writes that, "it is recognised that 'development' has to be built 'from the bottom up', and that its medium-range objectives may vary from one society to the next"¹⁷⁹. This approach lie in the interest not in development alternatives, but in alternatives to development and thus a

¹⁷⁹ Rist, Gilbert. 2008. *The history of development: from Western origins to global faith*. London and New York: Zed Books, p. 257.

rejection of the entire paradigm from Eurocentric model and the advocacy of new ways of thinking about non-Western societies. Post-development is suggesting that we allow societies at the local level to pursue their own development path as they perceive it without the influences of global capital or other modern choices and forces.

Post-development theory based its discourse on the critical analysis of development. While earlier theories (dependency, modernisation and neoliberalism) were usually focusing on inadequacies that prevented its achievement among societies in the South, the post-development theory rejected the totality of entire paradigm and denounced it as a myth. They argue that development has been essentially from non-Western societies into their diverse deficiencies, portraying them as regions in need of modernising along the Western models. Post-development theory has also been characterized as ‘beyond development’ and ‘anti-development’ for its disruption of development’s reductive nature.

Post-development theory offers radical approaches that challenge the paternalistic and imperialistic tendencies rife within the tradition of Western scholars, even though it has been criticised for offering only polemics and no practical solutions to the myriads of problems surrounding the discourse of development among societies of the Global South. Elliot Siemiatycki argues that, “The critical moment of post-development can be traced to the rejection of universal theories and the decision to focus their analysis on discourse can both be traced to post-structural theory. Post-development authors’ commitment to grassroots community improvement and local, indigenous knowledge is associated with new social movement. Many analysts find that the contributions of post-development critique are undermined by its inability to propose concrete alternatives to mainstream development.”¹⁸⁰

Uma Kothari and Martin Minogue¹⁸¹ aver that development is riddled with paradoxes. While it appears on the face of things to be very much characterised by a set of highly practical concerns, few subjects are more bedeviled by contested theories. Development undoubtedly takes place in some place, as measured by shifts

¹⁸⁰ Siemiatycki, Elliot. 2005. Post-development at a crossroads: towards a ‘real’ development. *Undercurrent: Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, II.3, p. 58

¹⁸¹ Kothari, Uma. and Minogue, Martin. 2002. Critical perspectives on development: an introduction. Uma Kothari and Martin Minogue. eds. *Development theory and practice*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1.

in economic growth; relative poverty and inequality have also increased. And the more precisely we try to identify coherent theories and measure practical changes, the less confidence we have in the predictability of future events, particularly on a global scale. Rist posits that the ‘development’ problematic is inscribed in the very core of the Western imaginary. That growth or progress should be able to continue indefinitely – that is an idea which radically distinguishes Western culture from all others. This characteristic, as strange as it is modern, sets up between nations a division far greater than all those forged in the course of history to justify the ostensible superiority of the West.¹⁸² The argument of post-development theorists, according to Lauren Karplus, is that, “the traditional concept of development is authoritarian in nature and technocratic in execution; that is, whoever decides what development is and how to achieve it is typically in a position of power.”¹⁸³

Stefan Andreasson postulates that, “post-development emphasises the damage to local cultures, and the ways in which man relates to other human beings and the natural world of which he of course is an integral part, in an age of increasing commodification, individualism, competition and, consequently, alienation.”¹⁸⁴ Here, there is the quest for the understanding of development not how to deliver development interventions and to minimise the failure of development as enshrined in the tenets of other theories of development; the post-development theorists believe that no amount of analyses will make the development agenda a success. They argue that the problem with development is not about how it is implemented, but rather that development itself is a flawed concept, which should be eliminated from the discourse on human progress. It is also on the notion of development avowed effects on local or indigenous cultures that post-development theorists are championing against since it is purely ethnocentric and racial in nature and discourse, saying that it must be rejected not merely on account of its results but because of its intentions, its world-view and mind-set, using Pieterse’s analogy.

Jan Pieterse identifies post-development with alternative form of development and examined it as a roving critique of mainstream development, shifting in position as the latter shifts; as a loosely interconnected series of alternative proposals and

¹⁸² Rist. p. 254.

¹⁸³ Karplus, Lauren. 2014. Post-development theory and food security: a case study in Swaziland. *Capstone projects – politics and government*. Paper 20, p. 5.

¹⁸⁴ Andreasson, Stefan. 2007. *Thinking beyond development: the future of post-development theory in South Africa*, A draft paper for British International Studies Association Annual Conference University of Cambridge, 17-19 December, pp. 8-9.

methodologies; or as an alternative development paradigm, implying a definite theoretical break with mainstream development. It can be viewed as concerned with local development, with alternative practices on the ground, or as an overall institutional challenge, and part of a global alternative.¹⁸⁵ He raises a fundamental question against the alternative form of development – post-development – as how alternative is it? What is different from the new alternative models and the so-called mainstream models, which are being castigated by the post-development theorists? Is it because of the methodologies, agents and objectives that the alternative model is different from the mainstream? Does it mean that development, to be of alternative model, is to be people-centred, endogenous and self-reliant to use Nyerere's dictum? In Pieterse's analysis, he is of the view that, "over the years,, alternative development has been reinforced by and associated with virtually any form of criticism of mainstream developmentalism, such as anti-capitalism, Green thinking, feminism, ecofeminism, democratization, new social movements, Buddhist economics, cultural critiques, and poststructuralist analysis of development discourse. 'Alternative' generally refers to three spheres - agents, methods and objectives or values of development. . . alternative development is the terrain of citizen, or 'Third System' politics, the importance of which is apparent in view of the failed development efforts of government (the prince or first system) and economic power (the merchant or second system)."¹⁸⁶

This model of development, according to Pieterse, ought to be endogenous as it is not a matter of importing external models from other societies. This endogenous nature takes everything from within in order to cater for all aspects of development that will be beneficial to people of such society or community. To him, "self-reliance, then, does not simply concern the means but the end of development: the goals and values of development are to be generated from within."¹⁸⁷ That is, an endogenous outlook is significant and important to post-development, which is seen as an alternative model to the Westernised models that are being deconstructed. Peet and Hartwick writes in support of the claim above that, "postdevelopmentalism rejects the way of thinking and the mode of living produced by modern development in favor of

¹⁸⁵ Pieterse, Jan. 2001. *Development theory: deconstructions and reconstructions*. London: Sage Publications, p. 74.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. pp. 75-76.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 86: Endogenous development implies a refutation of the view of development = modernisation = Westernisation.

revitalized versions of non-modern, usually non-Western, philosophies and cultures. From this view, modern Western development is destructive rather than generative, a force to be resisted rather than welcomed.”¹⁸⁸ While Elliot Siemiatycki in *Post-Development at a Crossroad: Towards a ‘Real’ Development* quotes Maiava’s analysis that, “what to term as a real development will involve . . . indigenous people determining their own future, confident, not intimidated, but free people determining what they want to do and doing it for themselves, exercising agency, actively moving forward to create better lives and improve their well-being according to their own priorities and criteria as they have done for millennia.”¹⁸⁹

Matthews Sally avers that, “the problem, from the perspective of post-development theorists, is not that the project of development was poorly implemented and that it is necessary to find a better way to bring it about, but that the assumptions and ideas that are core to development are problematic and so improved implementation is not the answer.”¹⁹⁰ The problem with this kind of model is that it disregards the dialectics of modernity as Pieterse adds that, “Post-development is based on a paradox. While it is clearly part of the broad critical stream in development, it shows no regard for the progressive potential and dialectics of modernity – for democratisation, soft power technologies, reflexivity”¹⁹¹, and a possible return to ethnic chauvinism and primordial ties. In line with the view raised above, he opines that:

‘Post-development’ is misconceived because it attributes to ‘development’ a single and narrow meaning, a consistency which does not match either theory or policy, and thus replicates the rhetoric of developmentalism, rather than penetrating and exposing its polysemic realities. It echoes the ‘myth of development’ rather than leaving it behind. Post-development makes engaging contributions to collective conversation and reflexivity about development and as such contributes to philosophies of change, but its contribution to politics of change is meager. While the shift toward cultural sensibilities that accompanies this perspective is a welcome move, the plea for ‘people’s culture’ or indigenous culture

¹⁸⁸ Peet, Richard and Hartwick, Elaine. 2009. *Theories of development: contentions, arguments and alternatives*. New York and London: Guilford Publications, p. 230.

¹⁸⁹ Siemiatycki, Elliot. p. 58.

¹⁹⁰ Matthews, Sally. 2004. Post-development theory and the question of alternatives: a view from Africa. *Third World Quarterly*, 25. 2, p. 375.

¹⁹¹ Pieterse. p. 110.

can lead, if not to ethnochauvinism and ‘reverse orientalism, to reification of both culture and locality or people.¹⁹²

Rist’s critique of post-development theory is precisely that, “their celebration of initiatives that break with the dominant model is the mark of a kind of anti-modernist romanticism or a dangerous cultural relativism, which is capable of veering into neo-populism or even support for all manner of fundamentalisms.”¹⁹³ This negates the idea of borrowing no matter how little from other backgrounds as no society can stand on its own without the support of others. In this constitutive perspective, development involves expansion of these and other basic freedoms – democracy, equality/equity, fundamental human rights, and good governance among others.

While societies and economies of the Global South do not necessarily have to develop according to Western ideas, post-development theory provides limited practicable and practical alternatives to over-ride and replace foreign assistance. This is another major set-back to the opinions and views of post-development theorists as developing societies still look, and so many times, beg for foreign and external aids even with some strings fully attached. The question still remains: what will be the source(s) of these alternatives to development as against the Western models? Foreign or external aids could be in forms of assistance from diverse groups and institutions like the G8, the Bretton Woods institutions and others.

Apart from the above, post-development theorists project that the rich can never lift the poor (peoples and societies) from the pangs of poverty, and that they need to address their own problems using their own ideologies and ideas, and that they need to develop themselves rather than relying excessively on foreign aids. But the negativity still remains that the poorest of the poor will still struggle to meet their basic needs in the short-time frame. This poses great dangers to how people and societies of the Global South will move themselves from the quagmire they have found themselves. Also, this is the fact that societies and economies of the Global South are not homogenous in nature as the staggering heterogeneity of African societies (cultures, languages, histories, and traditions) receives marginal attention in the discursive practice of development. The basic thrust of modern development scholarship and application returns to the essential notions of Africa’s inadequate

¹⁹² Ibid. p. 111: It presents a conventional and narrow view of globalisation, equated with homogenization.

¹⁹³ Rist. p. 259.

characteristics of heterogeneity, which is also a fundamental problem in the quest for alternative development as different from the Western models and hegemonies.

3.3 Arturo Escobar's Ethnographic Model: An Analysis

Arturo Escobar is a Colombian-American scholar, whose works are more deeply rooted in the discourse of development among societies of the Global South. He received an inter-disciplinary doctoral degree in Development Philosophy, Policy and Planning. Even though he is not a trained philosopher, his works in the area of development cannot be ignored in academic scholarship; and the more reason his theory is introduced in this thesis to serve as theoretical framework. This is in line with Amartya Sen's works, which are being examined and used in philosophy, despite the fact that he is an economist of international repute.

In his analysis, he postulates that development has become a discourse, that is, a particular mode of thinking and a source of practice designed to instil in under-developed world the desire to strive towards industrial and economic growth. This, was focused, on the epistemology of development, the complicity in the modernisation approach to development and the Western world-view assumptions that pervade the discourse and framework for the development process even among its critics. He encourages experts in development discourse and academics to use ethnographic theory in order to furthering the post-development discourse by advancing the deconstructive creations initiated by contemporary social movements. This is, his intention, in the quest to unravelling the dichotomy in the analysis of development among societies of the Global South. It is the case because the concepts 'development' and 'Third World' are inventions of the economically viable societies of the Western hemisphere. Ranaweera Banda opines that, "Development has been considered to exist in reality, solid and material. Even though the broad meaning of development is the promotion of the creativity of humans, economic growth is the primary criterion by which development theory is determined. In measuring development in economic terms, it is assumed implicitly in development theory that growth could proceed without limits in terms of time, ecology, availability of resources and socio-political structure."¹⁹⁴ Escobar adds and states clearly that, "The unidimensional and almost exclusively economic basis of the development paradigm'

¹⁹⁴ Banda, Ranaweera. 2004. Development discourse and the third word. *Proceedings of the second academic sessions*, p. 100.

- said a leading development thinker recently - has ‘undermined the prospects for not just development, but for the sheer survival of large strata of the world’s peoples’. This ‘economism’ has been quite striking a feature ever since the beginning of development in the post-war period.”¹⁹⁵

His opinion about development evolves around the discourse and strategy of development that produced its opposite, namely: under-development and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression of the developing societies. He approaches this through a discursive analysis of the components and relationships of what he calls “the three axes that define development - its forms of knowledge; the system of power that regulates its practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by this discourse, those through which people come to recognise themselves as developed or under-developed. The ensemble of forms found along these axes constitutes development as a discursive formation, giving rise to an efficient apparatus that systematically relates forms of knowledge and techniques of power.”¹⁹⁶

From the outset, his goals in the understanding of development came to the fore, essentially from the writing of his award-winning book, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. His intent is to unearth the discursive field of development by attempting to deconstruct the development discourse through a story-telling process and turned into a nightmare because the intention of scholars and authors concerning development discourse has been to its opposite, as he writes, “For instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive under-development and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression. The debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence are only the most pathetic signs of the failure of the forty years of development. . . Above all, however, it is about how the “Third World” has been produced by the discourses and practices of development since their inception in the early post-World War II period.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Escobar, Arturo. 2005. Economics and the space of modernity: tales of market, production and labour. *Cultural Studies*, 19.2, p. 140.

¹⁹⁶ Escobar, Arturo. 1995. *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 10.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 4.

He first tackles the “problematization of poverty” which he contends is a result of the formulation and solidification of development discourse from the early post-World War II period to the present, through the tale of three worlds and development, reiterating the fact that, “Poverty on a global scale was a discovery of the post-World War II period.”¹⁹⁸ This, he argues that, “whatever these traditional ways might have been, and without idealising them, it is true that massive poverty in the modern sense appeared only when the spread of the market economy broke down community ties and deprived millions of people from access to land, water, and other resources. With the consolidation of capitalism, systemic pauperisation became inevitable.”¹⁹⁹ In analysing this terrain about nascent poverty found amidst the populace of the the Third World, he posits that, “. . . poverty became an organising concept and the object of a new problematisation. As in the case of any problematisation, that of poverty brought into existence new discourses and practices that shaped the reality to which they referred. That the essential trait of the Third World was its poverty and that the solution was economic growth and development because self-evident, necessary, and universal truth.”²⁰⁰

In discussing about the antecedents of development discourse essentially from Latin American experience, he argues that, “the development exemplified by the 1949 World Bank mission to Colombia emerged in the context of a complex historical conjunction. Its invention signaled a significant shift in the historical relations between Europe and the United States, on the one hand, and most countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, on the other. It also brought into existence a new regime of representation of these latter parts of the world in Euramerican culture. But “the birth” of the discourse must be briefly qualified; they were, indeed, important precursors that presaged its appearance in full regalia after World War II.”²⁰¹ He makes clear emphasis on this by stating that,

The historical roots of this new strategy ("development") are to be found in the political rearrangement at the world level that occurred after World War II. The notions of concepts in the "underdevelopment" and "Third World" emerged process by which the West (and the East) redefined themselves and the global power structures. We cannot analyze here the historical conditions that made possible the strategy of the old colonial systems, changes as

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 22

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 24

²⁰¹ Ibid. p. 26.

development; these included the breakdown of in the structures of population the advance of communism in certain parts working and production, of the world and the concomitant fear of communism in the capitalist world; it also included the faith in science and technology, reinvigorated by the success of the Marshall Plan, new forms of economic knowledge and the development of area studies (e.g., "Latin American Studies"), as well as an enriched experience social systems.²⁰²

And due to the problematisation of poverty, according to him, the post-war economy and the re-formulation of capitalistic strategies among societies of the Global North made pauperisation inevitable among the developing societies. But, he argues that people of the South were excluded from the equation and the reason for more poverty among them, saying that, "Development was – and continues to be for the most part – a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of "progress." Development was conceived not as a cultural process (culture was a residual variable, to disappear with the advance of modernisation) but instead as a system of more or less universally applicable technical interventions intended to deliver some "badly needed" goods to a "target" population. It comes as no surprise that development became a force so destructive to Third World cultures, ironically in the name of people's interests."²⁰³

In addressing the problem of development among the developing societies, as envisaged by the Western theorists and scholars, he opines the fact of great misplacement of priorities and a form of categorical mistake on the part of Western scholars in devising model and theory, which will fit a pre-existing approach. Clearly, he posits that, "Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people – the development professionals – whose specialised knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society's history and cultural tradition – as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s – these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of

²⁰² Escobar, Arturo. 1988. Power and visibility: development and the invention and management of the Third World. *Cultural Anthropology*, 3.4, pp. 429 – 430.

²⁰³ Escobar, Arturo. 1995. *Encountering development*. p. 44.

modernity. Like sorcerers' apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality."²⁰⁴ He had already argued against this form of thinking and rationality that, "But even this crude summary of the axioms of development economics in its early years reveals one basic fact: From the very beginning, development was not a process which involved only the material conditions of living, the upgrading of living standards and the modernization of the productive apparatus. More than that, development was, inevitably and perhaps more significantly, a mechanism through which a whole rationality was to be learned. For development to occur, the rationality of 'Economic Man' - orientation towards profit and the market, individual behaviour and forms of production, rational economic choice in the sense of maximizing one's goals given scarce resources, etc. - had to be brought to the peoples of the Third World."²⁰⁵

In arguing against the domination and exploitation of the developing economies, and subjugation of their cultures with the interplay of power, Escobar avers that those who try to understand societies of the Global South have lost the radar from the outset. This, he argues that, "To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognised and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. . . . But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories."²⁰⁶ The homogenisation process taken by development scholars has made it successive through representation of facts concerning poverty and under-development among societies of the developing world as he points out that, "The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenisation (which

²⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 52.

²⁰⁵ Escobar, Arturo. 2005. *Economics and the space of modernity*. p. 140.

²⁰⁶ Escobar, Arturo. 1995. *Encountering development*. p. 53.

entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonisation and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World.”²⁰⁷

He employs an analysis of the emergence of under-development as a notion of post-World War II economic development theories; providing an overview of classical, neoclassical, Keynesian and growth economic theories. He composes a picture of how the development discourse grew due to the emergence of Western hegemonic structures, which “was due to the fact that a certain historical conjuncture transformed the mode of existence of economic discourse, thus making possible the elaboration of new objects, concepts, and methodologies. Economics was called upon to reform societies perceived as under-developed.”²⁰⁸ He is of the opinion that for the less-developed societies to develop, they must from the outset and scratch move beyond modernity, which essentially, is encapsulated in neoliberalism today as such models of the Western hegemony deepen the problem among societies in the Global South. This means that there is the need to deconstruct all forms of Western models of development in order to seek for the alternatives to development from within. Here, he proposes two levels on the deconstruction of Western economic structure that:

There are then two levels, two vectors, that must be considered in rethinking development from the perspective of the economy. The first refers to the need to make explicit the existence of a plurality of models of the economy. This entails placing oneself in the space of local constructions. But this by itself will not make it. Even if all communities of modelers are brought into existence as part of the process of designing development, the process of inscription will not stop. A second level of concern must be added. One must have a theory of the forces that drive this inscription and that keep the inscribing systems in place. What needs to be studied at these levels is the mechanisms by which local cultural knowledge and economic structures are appropriated by larger forces (mechanisms such as unequal exchange and surplus extraction between centre and periphery, country and city, classes, genders, and ethnic groups) and, conversely, the ways in which local innovations and gains can be preserved as part of local economic and cultural power.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 84.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 98.

This will put to end the continual struggle for development in the realms of Western societies, which in any way have not been to the interest of the people in non-Western societies. In his argument, he projects that, “Development was not merely the result of the combination, study, or gradual elaboration of these elements (technology, population and resources, monetary and fiscal policies, industrialisation and agricultural development, commerce and trade); nor the product of the introduction of new ideas; nor the effect of the new international organisations or financial institutions. It was rather the result of the establishment of a set of relations among these elements, institutions, and practices and of the systematisation of these relations to form a whole. . . . And to understand development as a discourse, one must look not at the elements themselves but at the system of relations established among them. It is this system that allows the systematic creation of objects, concepts, and strategies; it determines what can be thought and said.”²¹⁰ In essence, development ought to be about the people saying that, “The most important exclusion, however, was and continues to be, what development was supposed to be all about people.”²¹¹ In talking about the involvement of the people as the best answer to the discourse of development among the developing societies, he says that, “The suggestion that we take into account people’s own models is not only a politically correct position. On the contrary, it constitutes a sound philosophical and political alternative. Philosophically, it follows the mandate of interpretive social science that we take subjects as agents of self-definition whose practice is shaped by their self-understanding. . . . It means that the interpretive social scientist has to take into account people’s own descriptions as the starting point of theory, that is, of what has to be explained.”²¹² In a clear picture, the significance and importance attached to history and culture, in the quest for authentic development, cannot be under-valued and ignored as displayed by Escobar. This is because it (development) should be seen as a process that is rooted in people’s history and cultural tradition.

In his quest to unravelling diverse and many traps towards development among the developing societies, he makes recourse to the use of institutional ethnography as a means of understanding the massive development programmes

²¹⁰ Escobar, Arturo. 1997. The making and unmaking of the third world through development. Rahnema, Majid and Bawtree, Victoria. eds. *The post-development reader*. Bangladesh: The University Press, pp. 86 – 87. Cf. also Escobar, Arturo. 1995. *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 42.

²¹¹ Ibid. p. 91.

²¹² Escobar, Arturo. 1995. *Encountering development*. pp. 100 – 101.

established by the Bretton Woods institutions to solve the challenges of poverty, hunger, illiteracy, and diseases, among others. This approach, is geared towards the organisation and re-organisation of diverse mechanisms, through the systematic production of knowledge and power in specific areas like rural and sustainable development, among other forms of mechanisms, which should not exclude gender discourse. He posits on the significance of this approach that:

What is important is to describe the actual practices organising people's everyday's experience, 'to disclose the non-local determinations of locally historic or lived orderliness'. In the case of institutions, it is necessary to investigate how professional training provides the categories and concepts that dictate the practices of the institution's members and how local courses of action are articulated by institutional functions; in other words, how a textually mediated discourse substitutes for the actual relations and practices of the "beneficiaries," burying the latter's experience in the matrix that organises the institution's representation. Going back to my example, what must be analysed is how the peasant's world is organised by a set of institutional processes. One must also investigate how the institutional practices and professional discourses coordinate and interpenetrate different levels of social relations; that is, how the relations between different actors are rendered accountable only through a set of categories that originated in professional discourse; and, finally, how the latter implicate other types of relations, such as class and gender.²¹³

It is within the purview of the above, as suggested by Escobar, that societies of the developing world would be able to project and anchor their development patterns of what is known to them, and the ability to carry all that matters along is a necessity. In the process of having adequate knowledge concerning the practices of development institutions for the betterment and survival of the locals, Escobar sees to the inevitability, that the local level should be able to reproduce the world, even though most of the practices of the development institutions are forms of abstractions. He states clearly that, "We must analyse how peasants are constituted by the work practices of development professionals; . . . This work of abstraction is a necessary condition for development to work in the process of describing, inquiring into, interpreting, and designing treatment for their clients or beneficiaries. Although most times this process of abstraction and structuring – which goes on in large part unconsciously – takes place at the top (international or national levels), it inevitably

²¹³ Ibid. p. 109

works its way down to the local situation, where most of the work is done. The local level must reproduce the world as the top sees it, so to speak.”²¹⁴

At the turn of making impressive impacts on the development of societies of the Global South, Escobar extends the analysis by focusing on the regimes of representation, that trigger the impetus and reconstruction of three fundamental social actors: women, peasants and the environment towards the attainment of sustainable development. These social factors were examined in the quest for diverse possibilities inherent in the processes of integrated rural development for power and visibility that, “Only those farmers who accomplished successfully their “graduation into small entrepreneurs,” would survive . . . in the overall objective – to increase production and income in the traditional subsector by rationalising its insertion into the market economy”²¹⁵; thereby creating “a reorganisation of visibilities, linking state support, international institutions, class conflict, existing food politics, and the like into a new strategy: integrated rural development.”²¹⁶

He posits the significance of women to development, as against some polemics and theories, that have refused to recognise their productive role, as “women, have been the “invisible farmers.” Or, to be more precise, women’s visibility has been organised by techniques that consider only their role as reproducers.”²¹⁷ At this invisible level that women have been based, Escobar bares his mind on the importance of women in development that, “the participation of women in social productions is necessary but not sufficient to overcome women’s subordination. Even if the new policies provided spaces for this to happen – to the extent that they might generate changes in the social and political relations between women and men and by strengthening women’s organisations at all levels – only the development of gender-based forms of consciousness and organisation can provide a firm basis for a lasting improvement of women’s condition.”²¹⁸ Towards the social re-engineering and the struggle against women’s subjugation in societies of the Global South, is the discourse of liberation, where he argues that, “One final aspect to be discussed in terms of the relation of women to the development apparatus is whether WID (women in development) does not entail a certain idea of “liberation” for Third

²¹⁴ Ibid. p. 111.

²¹⁵ Ibid. 157.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid. p. 172.

²¹⁸ Ibid. p. 188.

World women. This is another aspect of the relationship between First World feminists and Third World women that is being discussed in hopeful ways, as a way of bringing together, rather than dividing, women across cultures.”²¹⁹

In the rise of environment to the quest for sustainable development, Escobar avers the significance of man’s intellectuality to decide on the kind of earth he wants and how to manage the use of nature to the advantage of human society through effective and appropriate management strategies. He argues that, “The rise of the ideology of sustainable development is related to modification in various practices, new social situations, and identifiable international economic and technological factors. What needs to be explained, however, is precisely why the response to this set of conditions has taken the form that it has, “sustainable development,” and what important problems might be associated with it.”²²⁰ In addressing the above, he outlines four possible aspects:

First, the emergence of the concept of sustainable development is part of a broader process of the problematisation of global survival that has resulted in a reworking of the relationship between nature and society. . . A second aspect regulating the sustainable development discourse is the economy of visibility it fosters. . . Third, the ecodevelopmentalist vision expressed in mainstream sustainable development reproduces the central aspects of economism and developmentalism. . . Fourth, this reconciliation is facilitated by the new concept of “the environment,” the importance of which in ecological discourse has grown steadily in the post-World War II period. The development of ecological consciousness that accompanied the rapid growth of industrial civilisation also effected the transformation of “nature” into “environment.” No longer does nature denote an entity with its own agency, a source of life and discourse; for those committed to the world as resource, the environment becomes an indispensable construct. As the term is used today, environment includes a view of nature according to the urban-industrial system. Everything that is relevant to the functioning of this system becomes part of the environment.²²¹

An analysis of these three social factors, as examined by Escobar, has shown the transformation of development, which will take place among societies of the Global South, if made functional and implemented. This is evident in his writing that, “Development continues to reverberate in the social imaginary of states, institutions,

²¹⁹ Ibid. p. 188.

²²⁰ Ibid. p. 194.

²²¹ Ibid. pp. 194-196.

and communities, perhaps more so after the inclusion of women, peasants, and nature into its repertoire and imaginative geographies.”²²²

In his project for the making and unmaking of development for the societies in the Global South, he points out “fundamental importance and roles of grassroots movements, local knowledge, and popular power in transforming development.”²²³ That is, “an interest in local culture and knowledge; a critical stance with respect to established scientific discourses; and the defence and promotion of localised, pluralised grassroots movements.”²²⁴ By this, ethnographic model means the systematic study of people in relation to their cultures, which is designed to explore cultural phenomena as affecting them without external forces. Escobar foresees the many problems inherent in these alternatives, which is in the complicit of cultures in the Third World in the quest for development re-engineering. He says that, “At the bottom of the investigation of alternatives lies the sheer fact of cultural difference. Cultural differences embody – for better or worse, – possibilities for transforming the politics of representation, that is, for transforming social life itself. . . . Because cultural difference is also at the root of postdevelopment, this makes the reconceptualisation of what is happening in and to the Third World a key task at present. The unmaking of the Third World – as a challenge to the Western historical mode to which the entire globe seems to be captive – is in the balance.”²²⁵ Seeing this great challenge from popular groups from the Third World, Escobar proffers solutions to this tragic task and problem that, “in two forms and principles: the defence of cultural difference, not as a static but as a transformed and transformative force; and the valourisation of economic needs and opportunities in terms that are not strictly those of profit and market. The defence of the local as a prerequisite to engaging with the global; the critique of the group’s own situation, values, and practices as a way of clarifying and strengthening identity; the opposition to modernising development; and the formulation of visions and concrete proposals in the context of existing constraints, these seem to be the principal elements for the collective construction of alternatives that these groups seem to be pursuing.”²²⁶

²²² Ibid. p. 210.

²²³ Ibid. p. 215.

²²⁴ Ibid. pp. 215-216.

²²⁵ Ibid. p. 225.

²²⁶ Ibid. p. 226.

3.4 Conclusion

Development means making a better life for everyone to use Peet and Hartwick analogy, which is diverse from one society to another. And because of the diversity of human societies and the interests therein, approaches towards the understanding and application of what development is all about will also be different. And because of this fact, therefore, our effort in this chapter has been to examine Arturo Escobar's theory, which is a step ahead in identifying diverse approach in the discourse of development among societies of the Global South. It should be pointed out clearly here that many philosophers from Africa like Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, Kwame Nkrumah, Kwasi Wiredu, Olusegun Oladipo, among others, have been raising issues, as examined by Escobar, essentially in the areas of identity, self-definition, rationality towards the development of Africa. With the achievement of our objective, our focus and intent of the next chapter shall be to examine the notions of culture and cultural understanding in development discourse.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE NOTIONS OF CULTURE AND CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

4.1 Introduction

Everything that man perceives, knows, thinks, values and feels, is learned through participating in a cultural system. This means that human potentials can only be realised within the structure of human culture and through growing up in close contact with other human beings in the society. Culture, is understood, as the complex and broad set of relationships, values, attitudes and behaviours that binds together a specific community consciously and unconsciously. This is because man is born into specific culture with prevailing values and opportunities. Culture is ordinary as every human society has its own shape, its own purposes, and its own meanings. Every human society expresses these in institutions, arts and learning. It is also expressed in social, political, religious, economic and even personal levels as the quality of human existence.

Our understanding of culture will lead to an analysis of what cultural knowledge is all about. This is because cultural knowledge cannot exist in a vacuum as it has to be based and established in the culture of a people. That is to say, cultural knowledge is situated in the culture of the people, that it finds itself and being used for human survival. As a repository of knowledge, meanings and values that permeate all aspects of human societies, culture defines the way human beings live and interact both at local and global levels. This is because it is a source of innovation, identity and creativity. As source of everything that man participates in, either at local or global level, the onus therein suggests that each culture projects particular knowledge that man uses for his survival. Hence, this chapter shall be devoted to the analysis and understanding of culture and cultural knowledge.

4.2 An Idea of Culture

We often hear culture being used in diverse terms. In some parlances, it is examined from ethnic, tribal and even national concept; while in others, it is looked at as global culture, local culture, dominant culture, sub-culture, folk culture and even high culture. It is also sometimes referred to as mass culture, popular culture and low culture. All these portray the fact that the term is problematic in description. Today, there are nomenclatures about culture from diverse backgrounds as European culture,

Oriental culture, African culture, Jewish culture, British culture, Arabian culture among others. This is clearly to show how culture, as a concept, could be used to establish particular notion about a people in particular places. This understanding, corroborates Remi Bamisaye's idea, that, "Culture is perceived in the overt conduct of a people in their effort at seeking meaningful relationship with one another and attaining social fulfillment. Our cultural practices are essentially social oriented. They embrace our socio-political values, social attitudes and ideas, artistic, scientific, and historical heritage."²²⁷ This understanding suggests clearly that there is no such thing as a human nature that is independent of culture. It should be pointed out that something is common to all these nomenclatures about culture, which is no other than the fact that it refers to people in different situations and conditions of life.

There is the need to restate the fact that culture in every society of men remains the same in definition and thought. What changes are the ingredients and conditions and not the clear meaning of what it is. An instance of this could be likened to the understanding of culture during pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial experiences in Africa. An argument may ensue whether the culture of the people remains the same despite these transitions and experiences. African experiences suggest the fact that culture in itself is dynamic in nature and not a static concept and idea. The experiences of people at one point, will determine how they behave, and what they do and pass across to other generations. The totality of any culture, whatsoever, cannot change even with different transitions and experiences of man. There are some ideas that will still remain despite so many changes that might occur. This stand rests on the position of William Abraham that, "there are three fundamental facets of culture, namely material, including property systems and technology; institutional, including customs and rituals as well as more obviously political, and social institutions; and finally value, including ethics, religion, and literature and art to the extent that these include aspirations or judgment."²²⁸ What changes fast and most are the material and institutional aspects of culture while changes in the value aspect are gradual in nature and even sometimes might be difficult to notice; what might occur are modifications and not total obliteration. Abraham projects in totality the power of value aspect of culture over others, that is,

²²⁷ Bamisaye, Remi. 1992. *Sociological foundation of Nigerian education (an introduction)*. Ibadan: AMD Publishers, p. 77.

²²⁸ Abraham, William. 1962. *The mind of Africa*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 29.

the value aspect lasts longer with man than material and institutional aspects of culture. This, he argues that:

The possibility that certain techniques and institutions are already infused with cultural elements of the people from whom they are lifted, may well make it impossible to effect a simple transplantation. It may become necessary to carry out an operation more in the nature of a graft. The ease with which they can be grafted on to a new culture depends on how alien to the other culture the second is in terms of value aspects.²²⁹

This is due to the fact that value aspect of culture remains the identity and shows who man is. We must understand the fact that the inter-relationship among the different aspects of culture is found everywhere because no culture is static and immune from changes and modifications.

Apart from the changes that might occur from experiences of man from pre-colonial through colonial to post-colonial stages of life, there is also the belief that culture changes with the experiences of industrialisation and technology, beginning from the late eighteenth (18th) century, which has largely affected the terrain of different cultures in the world, and pointing to what may now be referred to as 'global culture' ravaging cultures around the world. This form of ideology is based on the philosophy of the enlightenment era, which sees reason as the basis of everything man involves himself in. The link with reason suggests the fact that man sees himself as the apex of creation supplanting the essence of the divine being with his own essence, culminating in the ideology of rational humanism. In this, William Abraham avers that, "Culture in the age of enlightenment meant cultivation of the reason."²³⁰ It is on the basis of this that Chris Jenks notes that:

the idea of culture can be . . . largely as a reaction to, massive changes that were occurring in the structure and quality of social life. These changes, at the social, political and personal levels, were both confusing and disorientating; and at least controversial. Such changes, through industrialisation and technology, were unprecedented in human experience; they were wildly expansionist, horizons were simply consumed; gross productive, for good and ill; and both understood and legitimated through an ideology of progress. The social structure was politically volatile, being increasingly and visibly divisive. This was a situation brought about through the new forms of ranking and hierarchy that accompanied the proliferating division of labour, being combined with the density

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 34.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

and proximity of populations, through urbanisation, and the improved system of communications. In one sense the overall aesthetic quality of life, compared with the previously supposed rural idyll, was threatened by the machine-like excesses of industrial society.²³¹

This form of 'new life' – industrialisation and technology - with new ideas has greater effects on the culture of a particular people as such gives different understandings and meanings to what it is.

It should be noted from the outset that culture is all about ideas, attitudes, values, behavioural patterns, that is, everything that people have, think, and do as members of a community. We can, therefore, talk about different dimensions of culture, that is, those aspects of culture that are significant in the discourse of the concept. Values, norms, ideas, beliefs, attitudes, symbols, traditions and artifacts are major dimensions of what culture represents. All these are embedded in the discourse of what culture is, and which are important in the relationship of people from one place to the other. Culture provides diverse ways of interpreting the environment and the world, as well as relating to other peoples. To recognise that other peoples can see the world differently is one thing. That is, to view other peoples' interpretations as less perfect than ours is another thing entirely. This is because culture is a regulator of human life and identity.

In a very distinct manner, Edward Tylor, as quoted by Barbara Miller, argues that, "Culture, or civilisation . . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society"²³² while Abraham avers that, "The view of culture that I personally hold is that culture is the common life of the people."²³³ A clearer picture of this description, by Tylor, denotes the fact that it is impossible to assess and examine the concept culture without looking at those variations mentioned. These components are necessary in the understanding of culture whether in the form of political ideology, economic sphere, and religious affiliations, among others. It is when these variations and features are understood from the understanding of the society that one can lay claim towards having adequate knowledge of what culture is. This shows the fact that the concept could only be understood and viewed within

²³¹ Jenks, Chris. 1993. *Culture*. London and New York: Routledge Press, p. 7.

²³² Miller, Barbara. 1999. *Cultural anthropology*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, p. 20.

²³³ Abraham. p. 21.

traditions and not necessarily as a modern construct. This means it has to be understood from history, which is based on the traditions of the people, at a given time, and develop over time for their sustenance and survival.

The pertinent question that arises is: why do we have culture? Of what benefit is culture to man? Ernest Gellner answers the significance of culture in affirmation by stating that, “. . . culture becomes of utmost importance – culture being, essentially, the manner in which one communicates, in the broadest sense. In simple societies culture is important, but its importance resides in the fact that it reinforces structure – the style of being and expression symbolises, underlines the substance, the effective role, activities, relationships. In modern societies, culture does not so much underline structure: rather, it replaces it.”²³⁴ Culture makes the actions of individuals intelligible to others, which shows it to be a means of communication among people of the same cultural background. It is with and through culture that actions of people could easily be understood as without it, people will live as if they are in the realm of lower animals. This links it to the understanding that culture is a tool that is being used to understand man in his relationship with others in his community.

Going by the above, Gellner argues that, “If a man is not firmly set in a social niche, whose relationship, as it were, endows him with his identity, he is obliged to carry his identity with him, in his whole style of conduct and expression: in other words, his ‘culture’ becomes his identity.”²³⁵ This means that it is culture that shows who man is and what he stands for. In another realm, it is a means of identification as it influences our biological processes. This is understood in the debate between nature and nurture. In nature, people are born with some innate abilities that they use to interact with and understand the world. While in nurture, people are born blank (*tabula rasa*) and become who they are through the course of their lives alone. This suggests, in clear terms, that there is a way that nurture, which is close to culture, has over-all impact on nature, which is biological in nature. For instance, the great majority of our conscious behaviour is acquired through learning and interacting with other members of our culture. Even those responses to our purely biological needs (that is, eating, speaking, and greetings among others) are frequently influenced by our cultures. For instance, all people share a biological need for food in order not to allow starvation to occur. It should be put in mind, therefore, that what we eat as a

²³⁴ Gellner, Ernest. 1964. *Thought and change*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 155.

²³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 157.

people and the question of how often we do so, how much and with whom in accordance with set of rules are regulated by the standard culture of the people.

Mairi Levitt's opinion, is apt here, that nurture is more influential than nature as "Parents and family were seen as the most important influences for babies and young children, moving to peer group and other relationships and experiences for a young person. The explanation for the violent behaviour of an adult had more to do with the individual and the importance of nurture/environment in explaining behaviour weakened."²³⁶ He brings out the necessary link between the two in human existence. That is, there is an interplay between nature and nurture, stating that, "People with certain predispositions (e.g. to violence) are affected by society, and society affects how their genes are expressed."²³⁷ He warns that nature should not be more emphasised than nurture as it is dangerous to man and the society:

. . . both nature and nurture were needed to explain behaviour, or, that nurture was more important and that there were dangers in emphasising nature. . . On the contrary, emphasising nurture was thought more likely to lead to non-punitive treatment of offenders. There would be attempts to alter future behaviour through improved education and parenting and spreading of knowledge in society about the impact nurture has on young people. Society as a whole would share the blame rather than the individual.²³⁸

The above stipulates the fact that culture is not private but public in nature, as it determines what people do in a particular time, and not necessarily what individuals do without considering the effects of such in the society. Whereas we refer to the society as a distinct and relatively autonomous community whose members' mutual social relations are embedded in and expressed through the medium of their culture; any portion of a community regarded as a unit is distinguishable by particular aims or standards of living or conduct that we refer to as culture. Or it is a group of people who occupy a specific locality and who share the same cultural traditions, cultural traits, beliefs and ideals.

Chris Jenks understands culture from four different conceptualisations. In the first conceptualisation, he describes it as, "a cerebral, or certainly a cognitive category: culture becomes intelligible as a general state of mind. It carries with it the idea of perfection, a goal or an aspiration of individual human achievement or

²³⁶ Levitt, Mairi. 2013. Perceptions of nature, nurture and behaviour. *Life Sciences, Society and Policy*, 9.13, p. 5.

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

²³⁸ Ibid. p. 8.

emancipation.”²³⁹ This description is categorised into two: one is pointing to the philosophy of individualism as emanated by the tradition of scholars like Rene Descartes, which stipulates the necessity of the knowing person irrespective of others in the society. It could also be understood from the basis of superiority of humanity even among human beings in the society, that is, a class society. To him, the second conceptualisation is, “Culture as a more embodied and collective category: culture invokes a state of intellectual and/or moral development in society.”²⁴⁰ This description sees culture from the angle of societal and collective system of living rather than the philosophy of individualism. A description, that not only cementing every human being together in the community, but also puts and lays down definite rules and regulations to be followed for the survival of the society. This is a communitarian notion of culture where there are intra and inter linkages among families, groups, classes, gender, religions and sects among others through the interdependence of one on the other.

Third, he describes culture, as the symbol and message of the society, that is, without it; there is no community of men stating that, “culture viewed as the collective body of arts and intellectual work within any one society . . .”²⁴¹ whereas the fourth conceptualisation is seen from social category. That is, “culture regarded as the whole way of life of a people: this is the pluralist and potentially democratic sense of the concept . . .”²⁴² This description has been the most acceptable definition of culture in almost all traditions and disciplines today. It is this fourth description, along with Edward Tylor’s, that are being mostly used in the description of culture. In this, all features of what culture stands for are embedded. It is on the basis of this understanding that the Second Vatican Council fathers aver that:

The word "culture" in its general sense indicates everything whereby man develops and perfects his many bodily and spiritual qualities; he strives by his knowledge and his labor, to bring the world itself under his control. He renders social life more human both in the family and the civic community, through improvement of customs and institutions. Throughout the course of time he expresses, communicates and conserves in his works, great spiritual

²³⁹ Jenks. p. 11.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 11-12.

²⁴² Ibid. p. 12.

experiences and desires, that they might be of advantage to the progress of many, even of the whole human family.²⁴³

Catherine Hoppers, in her analysis of what culture is, looks at it from the angle of precipitation of human history, that is, the evolvment of a people in diverse manners of existence. This is because culture in itself is a complex phenomenon. She argues that, “unlike qualities of human life that are transmitted genetically, culture is learned. Thus culture can be seen as that body of learned behaviours common to a given human society. It is the template shaping values, behaviour and consciousness within a human society from generation to generation.”²⁴⁴ This means that culture in itself, is a clear property of a people, as the popular definition that it is the totality of people’s ways of life in its entirety. Culture is that which everyone participates in, as it is how a people construct their reality. Here, Rukooko Byaruhanga opines that, “Conceived as a complex or whole way of life of a people, culture has two fundamental levels of expression, each reflecting on the other by which it is informed. One form of expression is the implicit core of philosophy(ies), of which the other is the explicit material possession: the explicit reflects and vindicates the implicit.”²⁴⁵ Stating further, he affirms that, “In general, therefore, culture is an embodiment of the material, psychological, intellectual, and moral expressions of a people. It identifies and provides them with the basis for stability and progress. Much as it is a social production, it exercises great influence on the choices and actions of a people.”²⁴⁶

Culture has so many variations and orientations. It is seen as an ideological phenomenon, that is, a set of shared understanding that characterise a particular group of people as it provides them with the ability to interpret their world. Here, it is a set of symbols that establish powerful and basic motivations that formulate a conception concerning the order of existence, which might be a form of abstraction. This is because culture provides humanity with meanings and the most definitive aspect of that humanness is the ability for conceptualisations. The most general understanding and view concerning culture, is the conglomeration of customs, traditions, and habits

²⁴³ Second Vatican Council. 1965. *Gaudium et spes – pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world*, No. 53.

²⁴⁴ Hoppers, Catherine. 2004. *Culture, indigenous knowledge and development: the role of the university*. Johannesburg: Centre for Educational Policy Development (CEPD), Occasional Paper, No. 5, p. 2.

²⁴⁵ Byaruhanga, Rukooko. 1999. Ethnicity, culture and social reconstruction. *Social Reconstruction in Africa*, II.4, p. 60.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 61.

of a people, in its material manifestation, which also informs and involves the adaptation to a given environment and considers technological and ecological factors as of prime interests. It could also be understood from its historical development through time or through its institutions, functions and patterned social relationships among individuals in the society.

Among the fundamental elements of culture are the facts that culture is not static but dynamic in nature. This is because of the fact that it undergoes continuous changes, and such changes may be internally or externally generated. It is acquired and learned as cultural systems pass from generation to generation through the process of learning. Every member of a society spends a substantial portion of his life learning part of his culture. It is also integrated – all cultural traits function in diverse ways but they are geared towards the sustenance and survival of the community. This means all cultural traits are interwoven to complete whole like economic systems, political systems, rituals and social patterns are intrinsically interwoven to form a functional whole.

Das Gupta characterises and examines the discourse of culture from the template of its diverse natures, and what each society affirms. This is done with a complete notion about its usage and acceptance by a given people or society as he opines that:

An individual in family/lineage/community/well-organized society gradually develops a knowledge bank. Knowledge, a related aspect with the factors like value system, normative behavior, customs and belief, justification, truth and wisdom, actually involving many aspects like empiricism, rationalism and constructivism, is a subset of both true and that which is believed. Knowledge might be situated or partial, unscientific or scientific, theoretical or practical, unqualified or qualified and basically categorized into knowing-that and knowing-how. These knowledge traits can be taught and learnt and even shared. New knowledge traits can be emerged out through unintentional inventions (trial and error method) or intentionally (experimentation on the basis of hypothesis derived from summation of certain older and newer facts). These knowledge traits are thoroughly documented when they are more associated to a modern civilized life. They can also be kept reserved and preserved within the traditional value system and social norms while being attached more to traditional livelihood. In the second case, knowledge traits have become so much cultural

that they can be treated as integral part of the culture, especially of the intangible culture.²⁴⁷

Similarly, Abraham identifies four main characterisations of what culture is. In the first characterisation, he avers that culture is an instrument for order in human society stating thus:

Culture is an instrument for making the sufferance and co-operation natural. Its success depends on the extent to which it is allowed to be self-authenticating. Though it allows for internal discussion, and is indeed nourished thereby, the principles of decision in such discussions are themselves provided by the culture. By uniting the people in common beliefs and attitudes, or at least, in tolerance for certain beliefs, actions and values, culture fills with order that portion of life which lies beyond the pale of state intervention.²⁴⁸

This is in line with Ali Mazrui's opinion that, "culture provides a basis of stratification, a pecking order in society. Status, rank, and class are partly outcome of a cultural order"²⁴⁹, while the second characterisation is related to the first, which:

arises from the way in which it fills that portion of life which is not subject to state intervention. It fills it in such a way as at the same time to integrate its society, on the basis of common reactions, common actions, common interests, common attitudes, common values. It creates the basis of the formulation of a common destiny and co-operation in pursuing it.²⁵⁰

This analysis points to the fact that culture is a means of social re-engineering as examined by Abraham.

The third meaning and characterisation of culture by Abraham is that it makes events intelligible and significant. Here, he states that, "National problems arise in the context of the national situation. . . Any effective and lasting solution must take its elements from national resources. To sift, to pick, and to synthesise in critical situations, one needs an idea or a cluster of over-riding ideas, and the culture is the repertoire of just these ideas and techniques and attitudes, the spring of effort, which the people understand and with which they are able to cope, and have lived."²⁵¹ In line with Abraham's third characterisation, Mazrui argues in his analysis of functions of culture that, "culture provides standards of evaluation. What is good and what is evil,

247 Gupta, Das. 2011. Does indigenous knowledge have anything to deal with sustainable development? *Antrocom Journal of Anthropology*, 7.1, p. 58.

²⁴⁸ Abraham. p. 27.

²⁴⁹ Mazrui, Ali. 1980. *The African condition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 47.

²⁵⁰ Abraham. p. 27.

²⁵¹ Ibid. p. 28.

what is beautiful and what is ugly, what is legitimate and what is illegitimate are all rooted in criteria provided by culture.”²⁵² While the fourth idea is that, culture is a means of controlling social and societal change, which according to him, “comprises three facets: material, including property systems and technology; institutional, including customs and rituals as well as more obviously political, and social institutions; and finally value including ethics, religion, and literature and art to the extent that these include aspirations or judgment.”²⁵³ In line with the four characterisations of culture by Abraham, Byaruhanga also establishes the four ways in which culture is understood saying that, “. . . culture is understood in a number of ways. Firstly, it refers to a general state or habit of mind or of human perfection, close to the original meaning – civilisation. Secondly, it refers to the general state of intellectual and moral development in society as a whole. Thirdly, it may refer to the general body of the arts and intellectual work. Fourthly, more comprehensive and popular, it denotes the whole way of life of a specific society, whether material, intellectual, spiritual or moral.”²⁵⁴ The value aspect of culture appears to be the dominant arena for rejuvenation, as it performs its role to the future, from the basis of human and natural resources as found in the society.

4.3 Cultural Knowledge Examined

It is important to state from the outset that there is the problem of semantics in the discourse of cultural knowledge. This is because there are various terminologies, as listed below, that are being used depending on the tradition that each scholar or theorist belongs and that is the main reason the term has been called with different terms such as indigenous, localised, rural and even traditional knowledge among others to establish the position of diverse views and opinions of authors and traditions involved. But we must clearly point out here that those concepts and meanings, used interchangeably, are experiential knowledge, based on a worldview and a culture, which is basically relational as it under-scores the totality of social and human practices. They (terms and concepts) are off-shoot of cultural knowledge, that is, they are based in a particular culture, and so, are experiences of what transpire in such cultural background. Such relational aspect of culture suggests that it covers the

²⁵² Mazrui. p. 47.

²⁵³ Abraham. p. 29.

²⁵⁴ Byaruhanga. p. 60.

wholeness and the community-structure of all in any given society, which is embedded in cultural values. This is to state that acquisition of knowledge is collective and community-initiated and integrated. Stating unequivocally that cultural knowledge embraces other types of knowledge that could exist.

The significance of knowledge in any human endeavour and its efficacy to the understanding of who the people are, and what they hope to be in the future, can never be under-played, as it is the fulcrum on which the society sits and builds. It is in this realm that Kwasi Wiredu reiterates the importance and significance of knowledge to human survival and endeavour, saying that “Knowledge is necessary for action. That is axiomatic. Action is necessary for survival. That too is axiomatic. Therefore, most certainly, knowledge is necessary for survival.”²⁵⁵ He argues further that:

The quest for knowledge of any type is a characteristically human endeavour. In the changes and chances of human history some peoples may come to be ahead of others at some particular point of time in some particular area of investigation, but there is nothing to show that such situations must be permanent; and there is also no reason why any form of genuine knowledge should be attributed to any peoples in any proprietary sense.²⁵⁶

For the survival of human race and that of any society, knowledge is sacrosanct and it differs from one society to another, as problems of one society also differ in different societies. This ultimately leads to the fact that knowledge of one society will determine how such society lives and earns its living.

Even though scholars of diverse traditions like Hountondji, have problems with collective knowledge, calling it ethno-philosophy, this does not in any way rule out the possibility and actuality of collective form of knowledge. Leszek Nowak argues that, “To Western thought one of the most surprising properties of African thought is the idea of ascribing knowledge to certain kinds of collective subjects – such as family lines.”²⁵⁷ He states unequivocally that, “It is hardly true that epistemological collectivism is the peculiarity of African thought. It first became apparent in the European thought with Hegel, and manifests itself wherever the

²⁵⁵ Wiredu, Kwasi. 1998. Our problem of knowledge: brief reflections on knowledge and development in Africa. *Remaking Africa: challenges of the twenty-first century*. Oladipo, Olusegun. Ed. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 17.

²⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 17.

²⁵⁷ Nowak, Leszek. 2005. On the collective subjects in epistemology: the marxist case and a problem for the African viewpoint. *Knowledge Cultures: Comparative Western and African Epistemology*, 88, p. 117.

Hegelian influence is or was discernible. . .”²⁵⁸ In order to justify his argument that Hegelian thought essentially is collective in nature, he brings out the fact that, “The belief that the *collective point of view* is inherent in the epistemic perspective of Marxism is very frequent among Marxists; Marxism then concentrates not on individuals’ characteristics, but on larger wholes: classes, strata, entire societies. The epistemic subject then is not this or that individual, but a *collective subject*, equal to the sets of all societies of a given historical era.”²⁵⁹ These claims point to the fact that collective form of knowledge is not place-oriented, that is, it is not about a particular community or culture. Collective knowledge exists in all societies of the world. In this manner, any foreign or alien form of knowledge should not be super-imposed on the cultural knowledge, even though such form of knowledge could be useful for the survival of human endeavours as there is no crime in borrowing knowledge from other climes. But such should be to add value to what is and not to discard it entirely.

Cultural knowledge is a growing field of inquiry, either in its local form or in its cosmopolitan nature, as there are emerging questions, which might defy tangible and clear answers towards its understanding. This is clearly due to the multifarious nature of what constitutes cultural knowledge, and what it means to different individuals and even societies. Knowledge is determined by the nature of its existence, as it involves diverse experiences of living and observations of a people either in the current form or from its past generations.

Cultural knowledge means the skills, experiences and insights of people, applied to maintain or improve their livelihood. It also means a body of knowledge of a people of particular society, which they have survived on for a very long time. This means knowledge of a people who have lived and have common hegemonic structure for a long period of time. This signifies the fact that cultural knowledge inherent in a particular society will not be the same with another cultural background even though they live in the same country at the same time and they come from the same race. This is because problems of particular people living in mangrove region of a country will never be the same with knowledge system of another group of people living and making their lives in the savannah belt of such society. By saying this, we do not mean that people in those cultures cannot communicate with each other, as cross-cultural dialogue is a possibility.

²⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 117.

²⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 119 (Author’s italics).

By way of description, cultural knowledge is a distinctive body of knowledge and skills including practices, technologies that have been developed over time, and enables communities in their specific environments to survive. It is generated within cultures that such knowledge is being used. This shows the fact that it is the basis for decision-making and survival strategies in the society as it concerns itself with the critical issues of human life. This denotes the fact that cultural knowledge determines how people in a particular environment solve their own problems by themselves through their means of livelihood as integral part of their existence. It should be noted that cultural knowledge, is location and culture specific, which means that particular knowledge is rooted and founded in place and consciously determined by the culture of the people.

Cultural knowledge is the agent, which binds society together. This is because of the fact that it constitutes communicative processes through which knowledge is acquired, preserved and transmitted by man in different societies and different stages of life. It is the information base for a society, which facilitates communication and decision-making. This means that the basic composition of any society's knowledge system is its cultural knowledge. These knowledge forms are known by other names, and among them are localised knowledge, traditional knowledge, indigenous technical knowledge, and rural knowledge among others.

While no one can discountenance the above, concerning what cultural knowledge is, it is also pertinent to note that it is passed by man from one generation to another in order that future generations might benefit from the repository of knowledge accrued from past generations. Here, Hoppers writes that, "Most of this knowledge and these skills have been passed down from earlier generations, but individual men and women in each new generation adapt and add to this in a constant adjustment to changing circumstances and environmental conditions. They in turn pass on the body of knowledge to the next generation, in an effort to provide survival strategies."²⁶⁰ In her analysis, she further reiterates the fact that indigenous knowledge is based on the culture of the society it is found, which means that it is a sub-set or a body of the epistemologies of such community that:

Traditional knowledge is thus the totality of all knowledges and practices, whether explicit or implicit, used in the management of socioeconomic, spiritual and ecological facets of life. In that sense,

²⁶⁰ Hoppers. p. 2.

many aspects of it can be contrasted with ‘cosmopolitan knowledge’ that is culturally anchored in Western cosmology, scientific discoveries, economic preferences and philosophies . . . The relationship between people, the knowledge and the technologies for its application are under-girded by a cosmology, a world view.²⁶¹

This is to state that people maintain and manipulate forms of knowledge at a particular given time for their survival and livelihood. Survival and livelihood in this sense cover all areas and facets of human existence as could be described and examined by the people. It also projects that there is a level of cosmology that involves the knowledge of the people. This is because there cannot be knowledge without culture, which binds the people together with the tradition that is built on the cultural structure of the community. This informs all aspects be it technology, science, economy, politics, religion among many others of the people. Cultural knowledge is used by the people to make a living in a particular environment.

Another trait of cultural knowledge is the fact that it is developed by the people therein, which could be scientific or non-scientific, practical or purely theoretical (abstract) among others. It is either taught or learnt as it is the case in culture because it is constructed and built on culture with so many diverse factors. Here, Gupta has this to say about cultural knowledge:

The entire folk life is constructed on assemblage of the following factors: non-reflective intangible part of culture (cultural values, social norms, folkways, taboo and traditional belief); reflective and tangible part of culture (set of material apparatus); reflective but non-tangible part (information, knowledge and traditional technologies; mode of communication (formal and informal) . . .²⁶²

These factors are so important when the discourse of cultural knowledge is being mentioned as it is the information foundation with both open and hidden-ends and also with very much dynamic and functional for the survival of human society. For the survival of man, cultural knowledge has clear-cut relationships with nature, human agency and solidarity. This is so, as knowledge is used, in the understanding of the cosmos by which man associates and relates with it. It is in this understanding of having solidarity that man will be able to subdue his environment and making it habitable for himself.

²⁶¹ Ibid. p. 2.

²⁶² Gupta. pp. 58-59.

In every society of the world, there are sub-sets of knowledge that are possessed, which are not held by all in such society. This, so many times, is seen as a challenge in knowledge narratives but it is seen as usual, as members of a society could be said to be having same pattern of ideology at every time. This supposes that there will be individuals that have more knowledge and skills in one aspect of life than others in the society, which suggests how different knowledge sets interact in the society and the larger meaning and contribution of knowledge in the society. By this, cultural knowledge creates and promotes moral economy because it allows for the identification of individual within a cultural frame-work, thus providing decision-making processes to be followed based on relationships within such events as it provides people with a sense of community, stability and sense of belonging. By this, it influences many areas of life; its role in the social and economic well-being of the society and in the management of its resources and the environment is immense as man cannot do away with his environment and all things therein. It empowers communities, contributes to development and increases self-sufficiency. While in its various manifestations mentioned earlier, it also gives cultural pride and motivation to solve cultural problems with local ingenuity and resources.

In furtherance of the above intent, Mariano Grondona proposes and points out that there are two categories of values, which are essential in cultural knowledge narrative – intrinsic and instrumental. On intrinsic values, he avers, “are those we uphold regardless of the benefits or costs. Patriotism, as a value, demands sacrifices and is sometimes “disadvantageous” as far as individual well-being is concerned.”²⁶³ This stems from the fact that so many times what an individual stands for might not be to such interest but the interest of the community. Here, one talks about altruism as examined by Grondona, which “is the highest and self-denying” – the morality of saints and martyrs - as against the ethical egoism, which is the main ‘value’ inherent in peoples’ lives today among communities.²⁶⁴ This stipulates that when we discuss about cultural knowledge, the onus lies on the moral aspect, which builds the society together as he says that, “The behaviour of someone who acts out of respect for an intrinsic value formerly accepted at will and later incorporated as an inner imperative

²⁶³ Grondona, Mariano. 2000. A cultural typology of economic development. *Culture matters: how values shape human progress*. Harrison, Lawrence and Huntington, Samuel. Eds.. New York: Basic Books, p. 45.

²⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 48

is called “moral.” A person is moral when answering to intrinsic values.”²⁶⁵ On the part of instrumental value, it is, according to him, “when we support it because it is directly beneficial to us.”²⁶⁶ This is argued, by Amartya Sen, in his analysis of the attention and intention of utmost freedom in any society that:

The instrumental role of freedom concerns the way different kinds of rights, opportunities, and entitlements contribute to the expansion of human freedom in general, and thus to promoting development. This relates not merely to the obvious connection that expansion of freedom of each kind must contribute to development since development itself can be seen as a process of enlargement of human freedom in general.²⁶⁷

This idea was re-echoed by him in *Inequality Reexamined* that:

Some well-known approaches to the evaluation of individual advantage and to the assessment of good social orders have been concerned directly with achievement only, treating the importance of the freedom to achieve as being entirely instrumental – as means to actual achievements. Utilitarianism is an obvious example. The utilitarian approach is characterised by confirming inter-personal comparisons for social assessment to achievements only, and identifying achievements with the utilities achieved. The two together yield the utilitarian informational focus on inter-personally compared individual utilities for personal and social assessment.²⁶⁸

Cultural knowledge begins with the understanding that there are differences among cultures, which includes placing value on forms of diversity concerning ideas inherent in individual cultural backgrounds. This understanding allows for cultural sensitivity that cultural differences and similarities exist without necessarily assigning values either right or wrong, better or worse to such differences. In this process, cultural knowledge undergoes various forms of awareness, which involves internal changes in terms of attitudes and values, which in one way or the other refers to those fundamental qualities of openness and flexibility, which necessarily exist that people develop in relation to others. In this manner, Amilcar Cabral argues that cultural knowledge is all about the quest for identity and liberation from domination, imperialism, oppression and humiliation. He first understands culture as a form of ability to produce what is inherent in the historical past of the people. To him, “it is in

²⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 46.

²⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 45.

²⁶⁷ Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as freedom*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, p. 37.

²⁶⁸ Sen, Amartya. 1992. *Inequality reexamined*. New York: Harvard Universities Press, pp. 31-32.

culture that you find the capacity (or responsibility) for the production and the fertilising of the seed, which ensures the continuity of history, ensuring at the same time, the perspectives of the evolution and of the progress of the society in question.”²⁶⁹ This understanding is used to examine the value of those fundamentals residing in culture as a product of history in the quest for emancipation. Here, he avers that:

The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign rule lies in the fact that, in the ideological or idealistic context, it is the vigorous manifestation of the materialist and historical reality of the society already under domination, or about to be dominated. . .

Culture, whatever may be the ideological or idealistic manifestations of its character, is thus an essential element in the history of a people. It is, perhaps the product of history as the flower is the product of a plant . . . culture teaches us what have been the dynamic syntheses, structured and established by the mind of society for the solution of these conflicts, at each stage in the evolution of this same society in the quest for survival and progress.²⁷⁰

In this quest for the emancipation of the society from aliens and slave-owners from within, Amilcar Cabral proffers a better understanding of cultural knowledge in the struggle to achieve this set-objective as without it, the crave for liberation will be fruitless. Here, he writes:

. . . the liberation movement must base its programme on profound knowledge of the culture of the people, and it must be able to appreciate the elements of this culture, giving to each its due weight, and also, appreciate the various levels it has reached in each social category. It must also be able to discern the essential from the secondary, the positive from the negative, the progressive from the retrogressive, the strengths from the weaknesses, in the total cultural complex of the peoples. All this, with a view to the various demands of the struggle, and with an aim of being able to concentrate its efforts on the essential without forgetting the secondary, to arouse the development of positive and progressive elements and to resist flexibility but stoutly, negative and retrogressive elements; and finally, with a view to utilising the strengths and eliminating the weaknesses or transforming the latter into strengths.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Cabral, Amilcar. 1974. National liberation and culture. *Transition*, 45, p. 13.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid. p. 16.

He also suggests, on the other hand, the adaptation of strategic techniques for the survival of the society. It should be pointed out that without the consideration of the local knowledge of the people, moving out of the 'woods' will definitely be impossible. This, he states thus:

The liberation movement must be able to bring about slowly but surely, in the course of political programme, a convergence of the levels of culture of the various social categories, which can be deployed for the struggle, and to transform them into a single national cultural force, which acts as the basis and the foundation of the armed struggle. . . Knowledge of the struggle shows just how utopian and absurd it is to pretend to apply methods adopted by other peoples during their wars of liberation and the solutions, which they found to problems with which they were or are faced, without considering the facts of the locale . . .²⁷²

Developing a culturally competent attitude is an ongoing process. It is important to view all people as unique individuals and realise that their experiences, beliefs, values and language affect their ways of interacting with others and the larger community. Also, one must be aware that differences exist within cultures and which stipulate the emerging differences and divergences in human societies. This shows that cultural knowledge is all about self-identity and self-determination without which man will be stranger to his environment.

In this struggle for self-identification as argued for above, cultural knowledge proposes that it is also about values in cultural traits of a society. These values might be in form of social ethics as *Ubuntu* is devoted to, among the peoples of the Southern part of Africa, which stipulates that society, not a transcendent being, gives human beings their humanity. It is a known fact from this pattern that people with high personal and social identity rely on their stable, internal values as a guide to their social behaviour, which in one way or the other focus on their strong sense of national pride, and family heritage that build upon their sense of collectiveness and bond in the society. It is a re-affirmation of John Mbiti's *I am, because We are and, since we are, therefore, I am*. This means that there is no human survival without the support of others in the society, that is, an individual is a community being from birth to death. This is an affirmation of one's humanity through the humanity of others because it is what sustains the regeneration of humanity through socialisation processes. Socialisation presupposes a community population with which individuals have

²⁷² Ibid. p. 16

vested interests in the collective prosperity of what affects the community. Even though it caters for the community interests, this does not in any way or manner isolate the interests of individuals in the society.

In our quest for the understanding of cultural knowledge and its efficacy in societies of the world either the Global North or the Global South, some factors are of necessity. And here, Grondona examines some factors/values that must be embraced for the survival of such community, which “are ultimately linked to the performance of the cultures involved. The implication is that if people in such cultural backgrounds avail themselves of those salient factors/values like: religion, trust, the moral imperative, the notion of justice, the value of work (dignity of labour), and importance of time among others”²⁷³, as listed in his twenty contrasting cultural factors, the better for such society. Those values are to serve, according to him, “as a bridge between short-term and long-term expectations, decisively reinforcing distant goals in their otherwise hopeless struggle against instant gratification.”²⁷⁴ This is the point by which culture and all the embedded traits play significant roles in the moulding of individuals in the society. And it is on this that Byaruhanga avers that, “*Culture* entails a system of meaning and understanding, implicit and explicit, which underlies the logical unity of human groups, . . . Different situations and events are understood from a cultural context.”²⁷⁵ While Olusegun Oladipo confirms that, “culture does not only provide a framework for thought and action in a society, it is also a veritable source of identity.”²⁷⁶

While the above had examined what cultural knowledge is, with its various colourations (local knowledge, indigenous knowledge, traditional knowledge among others), the thrust of the next sub-section of this chapter is a clear explanation of some salient fundamentals and conditions inherent in cultural knowledge. These will be discussed by bringing to fore those areas that are necessary for the understanding and application of cultural knowledge to the growth, development, humanisation and survival of man in his environment.

²⁷³ Grondona. pp. 47-53.

²⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 46.

²⁷⁵ Byaruhanga. p. 63 (Author’s italics).

²⁷⁶ Oladipo, Olusegun. 2009. *Philosophy and social reconstruction in Africa*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 13.

4.4 Constitutive Elements of Cultural Knowledge

With the analysis of what cultural knowledge is above, our pre-occupation in this sub-section will be to examine those salient factors that characterise cultural knowledge and how they affect man in his environment both mediate and immediate respectively. It will explore how cultural understanding of what knowledge is affects the extent to which human societies achieve or fail to achieve their quest for survival. This understanding, stipulates the fact that culture counts in every decision, and utmost importance of what the society stands for as Samuel Huntington in his distinction between South Korean and Ghanaian experiences of economic progress and growth avers that, “Undoubtedly, many factors played a role, but it seemed to that culture had to be a large part of the explanation. South Koreans valued thrift, investment, hard work, education, organisation, and discipline. Ghanaians had different values. In short, cultures count.”²⁷⁷ This essentially makes the point clear that culture makes the difference when discussing about man in his society as it is the ‘soul’ of the society.

Religion in Cultural Understanding

The discourse on religion is an ever-disturbing question and ever-perennial problem in the life of man. This is because the subject of religion, which is God, holds a sphere over man, that no matter what he does, the question of his absolute being is not always far away. The question of religion and God must always be put in focus and addressed with the view of clarifying man’s possible understanding concerning his existence. Religion, is one of the fundamental features of human existence, as it cannot be simply ignored by people even among the so-called atheists and animists. This is a fact that the history of our world cannot be complete without clear reference to the significance of religion either positively or negatively. It is fundamental in human existence because it has contibuted immensely to social progress, educational development and emancipation among others. As stated earlier, it has been used and it is still being used both positively and negatively depending on the side that adherents of particular religion take. We must understand the fact that religion has no specific and univocal definition. This is not to say that we cannot attempt a definition of it.

²⁷⁷ Huntington, Samuel. 2000. Foreword: cultures count. *Culture matters*, p. xiii.

Ludwig Feuerbach argues that,

Religion . . . is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly to his own nature, but a relation to it, viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine being is nothing else than the human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective – contemplated and revered as another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of the human nature.²⁷⁸

This clearly points to the fact that religion is all about the insatiable nature and wants of man to achieve his objectives in the world. Man, in the quest to understand himself and realities around him, brings out the necessity of a ‘superior’ being when he is faced with hollowness. This hollowness is filled up by seeing the ‘Supreme Being’ as the basis of one’s existence. This, in conjunction with other needs and aspirations, brings about a situation in which man spontaneously projects these needs beyond himself and objectifies them in a fantastic form thereby making the product of this endeavour, ‘who is God?’ mere figment of human imagination, to which he gives the name, God. In this way, man defrauds himself and as a result of this, the poor man possesses a ‘rich God’. Religion is, therefore, transformed into a vampire, which fills upon the substance of mankind, his flesh and his blood. This is an anthropological understanding of religion and God.

Emile Durkheim’s understanding of religion is from the sociological point of view. His main idea is that gods, whom human beings worship, are imaginary beings unconsciously fabricated, made by the society as instruments where the society is able to exercise control over the thoughts and behaviour of individual. His claim is that when men have the religious feeling of standing before a higher power that transcends their personal lives and impresses his will upon them as moral imperative; they are indeed in the presence of a normal reality made supernatural. He argues that, “One idea which generally passes as characteristic of all that is religious, is that of the supernatural. By this is understood all sorts of things which surpass the limits of our knowledge; the supernatural is the world of the mysterious, of the unknowable, of the un-understandable. Thus religion would be a sort of speculation upon all that which evades science or distinct thought in general.”²⁷⁹ The reality in question is not a supernatural being; it is rather a natural fact of reality/society. According to him, the

²⁷⁸ Feuerbach, Ludwig. 1989. *The essence of Christianity*. New York: Prometheus Books, p. 14.

²⁷⁹ Durkheim, Emile. 1964. *The elementary forms of divine life*. London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, p. 25.

sense of the holy and of God, is the source of the sacred demand claiming the allegiance of the adherents. In another attempt of examining religion from the divine nature, he avers that:

Religion is the determination of human life by the sentiment of a bond uniting the human mind to that mysterious mind whose domination of the world and itself it recognises, and to whom it delights in feeling itself united. It is certain that if the word divinity is taken in a precise and narrow sense, this definition leaves aside a multitude of obviously religious facts. The souls of the dead and the spirits of all ranks and classes with which the religious imagination of so many different peoples has populated nature, are always the object of rites and sometimes even of a regular cult; yet they are not gods in the proper sense of the term. But in order that the definition may embrace them, it is enough to substitute for the term "gods" the more comprehensive one of "spiritual beings."²⁸⁰

But this is only a reflection of societies' absolute claim on the loyalty of its members. In other words, the demands of the deities are no more than the human society. Durkheim's theory could also be interpreted to mean that man is a social being and as a result of this social nature, he wants to maintain his hold than to bring in the supernatural. This, according to him, is an interpretation of the observable factor of religion that involves no reference to God as a supernatural being who has created man in the world in which he lives. Accordingly, it is the human-animal who has created God in order to preserve his own social existence.

Frederick Nietzsche's psychological notion of religion and its subjects are only too many. Religion, according to him, is a kind of psychological duplication. God, in his own view, is nothing more than a mirror of man magnified into larger proposition. In his thought, 'God is dead' and we human beings are his murderers. He argues that:

The Christian faith from the beginning, is sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit, it is at the same time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation. There is cruelty and religious Phoenicianism in this faith, which is adapted to a tender, many-sided, and very fastidious conscience, it takes for granted that the subjection of the spirit is indescribably painful, that all the past and all the habits of such a spirit resist the absurdissimum, in the form of which "faith" comes to it. Modern men, with their obtuseness as regards all Christian nomenclature, have no longer the sense for the terribly superlative conception which was implied to an antique taste by the paradox of the formula, "God on the Cross".²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 30.

²⁸¹ Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2013. *Beyond good and evil*. No. 46 (Ebook).

All we need to do is that having put God in his grave, we can now live our own lives according to our own nature totally oblivious of the reality of the existence of God. He argues that religion and God have been made by man in the bid to exercise his own ingenuity but they have turned out to be destructive of man's essence in the world. He would say that God is an idea that makes every straight line crooked and every genuine idea unproductive. The death of God is a cultural event that has not yet become apparently clear to the modern man. It contemplates the collapse of religion, of religious values, of faith, of morality leading to a mounting belief in the Darwinian notion of relentless evolution of species and the collapse of difference between man and animals. This death of God, will lead to the beginning of a new day, when the life-denying the ethics of Christianity (nay religion) will lead to a life-affirming ethics. It is only the death of God that could lead to the realisation of man's utmost potentials and eventually the birth of the super-man. And since God could no longer be the goal and sanction of human conduct, man, therefore, turns to the aesthetic dimension of his nature as an alternative to religion.

The theological interpretation of religion focuses on the nature of man, which makes man an incurably religious animal as Mbiti opines. Augustinian treatise on the theological understanding of religion rests on the nature of man, which consistently seeks for satisfaction in the Supreme Being that cannot be established in man. This consistent search for fulfillment in man makes him relentless as he affirms that, "You have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you."²⁸² In theological postulation about the discourse of religion, theism is seen as belief in God – the creator who is infinite, self-existent, incorporeal, eternal, immutable, non-composite, perfect, omniscient and omnipresent. The problem that a lot of people have identified with classical theism is that it seems to unite ideas that are in systematic conflict. This conflict is seen, for instance, in the ontological difference between being in itself and beings, and between being itself or God as the ground of beings and God as a necessary being. In Thomistic metaphysics, being itself is identified with God because it is the essence of God to exist. Therefore, that being, which exists by its nature, is God. In this case, there are two polarities – the polarity of God and the polarity of man. This, therefore, leads to inescapable conclusion that God is the ground of beings.

²⁸² Augustine. 1961. *Confessions*. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, p. 21.

Religion is regarded with great heart-felt seriousness and this is clearly seen in adherents' attitudes to various forms of sacrifices, and involves a great deal of asceticism. Irene Adadevoh opines that, "Religion is a metaphysical field of philosophy devoted to the study of ideals of virtue with a bid to developing moral knowledge and social wisdom in and amongst individuals."²⁸³ And throughout the history of man, religion has been the continual source of values and sometimes ideals that man lives on in his struggle for survival, as Bertrand Russell opines that, "Religion is primarily a social phenomenon."²⁸⁴ This is because man sees the great significance and relevance of religion to his world. Being a social phenomenon, suggests the fact that it is one of the necessities enshrined in the discourse of culture, as it is the totality of people's ways of life considering the populous description. As a social phenomenon, human beings are saturated with the consciousness of the sacred and the understanding of the divine, and it exercises one of the strongest influences upon people's thoughts and life. This is because as Thierry Verhelst opines that, "There is, therefore, a reasonable basis for examining the way religions can serve as driving forces for peoples' struggle for more justice and dignity. . . religion thrives and plays an important role in the hard, essential social struggle."²⁸⁵ This is seen in the over-whelming consciousness of the sacred, the perfused and diffused nature of religion in the lives and environment of human beings. This idea is apt, in the examination by George Ehusani that, "He or she (man) experiences God as an awesome *Presence*, sustaining him or her from long before birth while still in the mother's womb, to long after death, in the company of ancestors, through the various stages, seasons and pre-occupations of life."²⁸⁶

In the analysis of what religion is and does to the life of man, Adadevoh states that, "The major development tradition drawn from religion subsists in the principles it posits to aid individuals sense of piety and social order."²⁸⁷ Whereas Elechi Amadi, considering the powerful nature of religion, adds thus:

²⁸³ Adadevoh, Irene. 2004. The significance of philosophy, culture and religion to national development. *Philosophy and logic: a critical introduction*. Adeigbo, Felix. Ed. Ibadan: General Studies Programme Unit, University of Ibadan, p. 33.

²⁸⁴ Russell, Bertrand. 1957. *Why I am not a Christian and other essays on religion and related subjects*. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., p. 24.

²⁸⁵ Verhelst, Thierry. 1987. *No life without roots: culture and development*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books Limited, p. 46.

²⁸⁶ Ehusani, George. 1991. *An Afro-Christian vision "OZOVEHE" - towards a more humanised world*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, p. 208.

²⁸⁷ Adadevoh. p. 34.

Clearly, then, religion has always been a very powerful factor in human life. It has inspired wars, heroism, martyrdom, and creativity. One has only to think of the Crusades, the *Jihads*, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Michelangelo's painting in the Sistine Chapel of St. Peter's in Rome, Handel's *Messiah* or the pyramids to recognise the immense power of religious fervour. Like every powerful weapon, religion can and has been used for good and ill.²⁸⁸

It should be clearly stated from this point of view that man consciously or unconsciously has the idea and notion about the nature of religion from his cultural background. Both the theists and even the atheists have the notion about the concept of God, as studied from religious perspective. As stated above, religion from diverse ways, has affected either positively or negatively, the condition of life of man in its entirety and totality. This is due to the idea that it enforces the moral codes and norms therein in any society. As ethos, norms, mores, rules and regulations are the topical discourses in the field of ethics, so also the manner that religion assists in the enforcement of those ethical principles for the survival of man and his society. By this, Amadi adds that, "Religion has played a particularly important role in ethical philosophy all down the ages because it has been a useful instrument for enforcing moral codes. One should do this and not do that because God has said so. Much of the ancient and medieval philosophy of the Western world hinged on religious precepts."²⁸⁹ What this portends is the fact that religion in every sense affects the way and manner man lives for himself and for others in the society. By this, man does not want to make a distinction between religion and morality as one assists the other to achieve its set-objectives. This is clearly stated by Adadevoh that, "The main development pattern inspired by the vehicles of religious knowledge include, exemplary moral experience, leadership construct, elicited from the moral teachings of an inspired religious leader, the sacred scriptures of a religious community and the traditions of a particular cult."²⁹⁰

Apart from the above, religion has been used to be instrumental in the fight against unauthorised and external influences. This might be seen in the many struggles against injustices of all kinds that limit peoples' progress, growth and

²⁸⁸ Amadi, Elechi. 2005. *Ethics in Nigerian culture*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Plc, pp. 2-3 (Author's italics).

²⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 3.

²⁹⁰ Adadevoh. p. 34.

development. Here, Verhelst using African cultural milieu to explain the significance of religion towards the fight against oppression and injustices opines thus:

In Africa, indigenous religions show a remarkable vitality and have proved themselves capable of resisting external influences. Some people even see accusations of sorcery as a 'progressive option', in as much as they are curbs on inequality. Indeed, such accusations have a regulating effect, their aim being to keep social disparities in check. The accused will be a member of the community who, through ambition, is destroying its harmony by creating a social rift.²⁹¹

This could be seen in the many struggles that religion has been used in so many instances where injustices of all sorts had enraged the people to protests, demonstrations among others.

Religion is not seen in this sense from the vertical relationship between man and God alone but that it ought to be transformed to the horizontal level where it affects the relationship of man to man in the cultural environment. This could be likened to the arguments of Ehusani that using the sermons of Cardinal Suenens that, "it is useless to speak to the world's outcast about prayer, about heaven and the rest. He says the world will not listen. Instead . . ., "speak to them of justice, labour with them to obtain indispensable reforms and then Christianity will have some meaning to them. Indeed what the poor, humiliated, oppressed and marginalised people are yearning for is a religion that is consoling, re-assuring, empowering and promising. They want to hear of an all-powerful God that is both capable and willing to remove from their shoulders the awful burden of the oppressor that crushes them."²⁹² It would not be enough to preach daily and people develop spiritually without its efficient realities. This, the Church in Africa (religions), must do and perform in faithfully following the so many strategies that could be undertaken in the over-all struggle for justice and social change.

It is on the basis of this struggle against injustices that Donald Door writes that, "Christians (using Christian ideology to examine how religion plays significant role in society) accept that there is a clash between good and evil in society. But not very many of them have come to think of this as a struggle between sin and grace,

²⁹¹ Verhelst. p. 50.

²⁹² Ehusani, George. 1996. *A prophetic church*. Ede: Provincial Pastoral Institute Publications, pp. 27-28.

between the forces of evil and the power of God.”²⁹³ In Matthew Kukah’s opinion, “it is my belief that, if Christians are to become relevant in consolidating the stability of our nation, then it must be at the highest level of policy formulation and articulation”²⁹⁴ whereas Ehusani corroborates this, stating that, “The Nigerian Christian elite have a role to shape the direction of their society. They cannot be passive onlookers in the unfolding of events in their country . . . they must make a definite commitment to the evolution of alternative, social, economic and political structures that will make for justice, good governance, peace and posterity.”²⁹⁵ So, to put an end to this, the Church hierarchies ought to encourage her children to participate actively in the day-to-day activities of the society as Door avers that, “To struggle against injustice means committing oneself to changing the structures of society so that there is a better distribution of power. The aim is to give effective power to those who have been left out on the margins. This involves reducing the excessive and unchecked power of those in the centres of power in the various sectors of society.”²⁹⁶

For effective running of a society devoid of unjust actions as examined above, religion as examined by Amadi, has over-all control over human life in the society, as it makes the acceptance of moral norms and dictates by people in the society. This is clearly stated by him:

The over-all effect . . . is to enforce a moral standard acceptable to a particular society. A secular interpretation leads to the conclusion that moral precepts have always had their origin in the mind of man. Even where deities are said to have laid them down, they have had to do so through the mind of man. It would appear, then, that while man formulates the moral code, he enlists the influence of religion for its enforcement. In other words, man proposes, god enforces.²⁹⁷

In other words, what the above translates to, is that it is the duty of man to make and create rules and regulations for his guidance and survival, but the same man uses god (religion) to ‘sanctify’ those moral rules and regulations. The ‘making of in-roads’ by religion into moral rules and regulations justifies its significance in the society. In his explanation, he casts aspersions on the modern-day and ‘alien’ religions (essentially

²⁹³ Door, Donald. 1991. *The social justice agenda: justice, ecology, power and the church*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan Ltd, p. 106.

²⁹⁴ Kukah, Matthew. Christians and the vision of Nigeria. *The Catholic witness*. Ede: Provincial Pastoral Publications, Nigeria. p. 15.

²⁹⁵ Ehusani. p. 67.

²⁹⁶ Door. p. 108

²⁹⁷ Amadi. p. 6.

Christianity and Islam) that have diluted influences on the moral uprightness of the society as such create openings for crimes to be committed and without fear of being punished both here and here-after. To him, “The imported religions, namely Christianity and Islam, do not have the same powerful hold on the people as the traditional religions, so their use as ethical instruments is not as effective.”²⁹⁸ This aspersion on the alien religions have greater effects on the building of societies essentially those of the Global South as much efforts and discourses are made and laid on Christianity and Islam wherever the adherents hold sway. Using Bolaji Idowu’s idea in *Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief*, he states that:

Christianity, by a miscarriage of purpose, makes its contribution to the detrimental changes in moral values. Somehow it has replaced the old fear of the divinities with the relieving but harmful notion of a God who is ready to forgive perhaps even more than man is prone to sin, the God in whom ‘goodness and severity’ have been put asunder. So also does Islam unwittingly create the erroneous impression that the fulfillment of the obligatory duties and acts of penance by good works are sufficient for the purpose of winning heaven. The result of all these is that our ‘enlightened’ products of the two ‘fashionable’ religions can now steal without any twinge of moral compunction those articles of food placed for sale cross roads and by road-sides, which used to be quite safe; they can now cheerfully appropriate other persons’ property; they can break covenants, or promises made on oath, with brazen indifference.²⁹⁹

The above analyses examine and show the mis-match of ‘alien’ or foreign religions in the moral dictates of modern societies where people commit atrocities without any thought of being punished by the laws of the land as many are ‘higher’ and beyond the laws of the land. This mis-match comes with the introduction and acceptance of the foreign religions essentially to societies and communities of the Global South.

Economic Discourse in Cultural Knowledge

The analysis of Grondona is apt on the discourse and significance of values for economic development from his two-pattern categories of values – intrinsic and instrumental. To him, “intrinsic values are those we uphold regardless of the benefits or costs. Patriotism (*one of the pivotal aspects of intrinsic values that must be embedded in all citizens without selfish interests and benefits*) as a value demands sacrifices and is sometimes “disadvantageous” as far as individual well-being is

²⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 6.

²⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 6.

concerned.”³⁰⁰ Looking at how patriotic people are to the common bond of the society, the cultural parlance that those in such environment look up to can never be under-played, as it is fundamental to the survival of the society even though might not be economic in nature and not necessarily anti-economic, but still have so dynamic and great impacts. While value is instrumental as it is beneficial to all and sundry irrespective of what individuals have done to salvage the society. This, he states that, “In contrast, a value is instrumental when we support it because it is directly beneficial to us.”³⁰¹ These two approaches and values have significant roles to play in the economic strategy of any human society. To this, it is the culture of the power that determines such an approach as the people define what is beneficial to them at a given time and for a common purpose.

In man’s quest for understanding his environment, economic value is at a vintage position where everyone’s habits and acts must work in consonance with morality, which undermines the prerogatives of individuals to take decisions without taken into consideration the effects of such actions on others and the society. Grondona writes in favour of great values for the survival of the society in cultural understanding as the idea of economy is a cultural process. He states that:

Values fall within that province of culture we call “ethics.”. . . A person is moral when answering to intrinsic values. . . . Without the presence of values favourable to economic development, temptations will prevail. Temptations are bearers of short-term expectations, but economic development is a long-term process. In the struggle between short and long term, the former will win unless a value intervenes in the decision-making process. This is the function of values; to serve as a bridge between short-term and long-term expectations, decisively reinforcing distant goals in their otherwise hopeless struggle against instant gratification.³⁰²

What the above means is that there is a price to be paid, which is an attachment to fairness and a sense of belongingness. And in this realm, two distinct issues are raised. That is, there should not be unnecessary rising of ego that will undermine the integrity and resources of the society, that is, one should not see himself as better and competent than others. This is because the sense of belongingness takes precedence over individual interests and competitive spirits.

³⁰⁰ Grondona. p. 45 (Italics mine).

³⁰¹ Ibid. p. 45.

³⁰² Ibid. p. 46.

In another dimension, it is the same sense of belongingness that plays significant roles in any society as the cultural trait, is a factor in the discussion of economy. This sense of communal culture affects the success or failure in the society's quest for survival. Verhelst argues here that, "This same sense of community plays a decisive role in the success or failure of certain co-operatives, societies (mutual saving societies) and other groups . . . will take charge of local economic activities . . . that collaboration does not function well unless it is based on traditional solidarity and not simply on economic profit."³⁰³ This, is achieved as it is based on the extensions, which is natural, that is, based on birth, membership of groups both social and religious, and the level of one's residency of traditional mutual aid existing in the cultural background of the society. These experiences of naturality build up close-knit relationships in the society as an advantage to the successful structure and survival of common brotherhood. This understanding of the common brotherhood has also its definite factor, attitudes and significance on how traditional societies view the concepts of both financial and natural resources and the roles they play in the society. It connotes and explains the values of honesty and responsibility as deeply rooted in the tradition of the society.

Political and Legal Systems in Cultural Debate

Fundamentally, governance is about power, relationships, and processes of representation and accountability – about who has influence, who decides, and how decision-makers are held responsible and accountable. It should be remembered that governance is all about the society's effort to arrange itself in the best interest of the members of such society. Governance could not be taken in isolation but it must locate itself within a conglomeration or amidst a group of individuals looking for a common objective. As stated earlier, governance is an all-embracing concept, which pertains itself to all the spheres of the society whether be it politics, economic, culture, social and other spheres and functions of the society.

Governance and legal systems in cultural societies, excluding the adopted modern-day legal systems, are centred on the family and community's resource base, which include leadership, kinship, duties and obligations in the society, professional associations among others. These communal and social unifications in the society

³⁰³ Verhelst. p. 27.

often lead to the development of systems of communication that is understood by everyone as well as a care system, which is based on kind and charity. Conflict among individuals is handled at the community level, since it is seen as destabilising the peace of the community if not well-handled. This is the reason conflicts are being settled locally in order not to affect the social fabrics of the society. Indigenous communal leaders do not only excel in various art forms, but their governance projects are aimed at the collective improvement of their peoples and their intents as Verhelst opines that, “policies of self-development are doomed to failure until the Leviathan-State is replaced by a model more respectful of local dynamics and overall pluralism, including legal pluralism.”³⁰⁴ The “Leviathan-State” model, as discussed by Verhelst, is an introduction by the colonialists, which is alien to so many communities in the world. And this alienation takes away the people from who they are and what they conform with and to. Hence, the so many consequences of this form are too many a burden to bear by the people.

In another dimension, secular laws are regarded as sacred, a commandment of the gods embodied by the elders and priests, “as traditional societies have produced a rich, flexible legal system, well adapted to circumstances and, what is more, much less hostile to change than has been admitted.”³⁰⁵ By the rule of law, we understand the efficient carrying out of the rules by the members of the society. It has two aspects; first, the law should rule the people and the people should obey the law; second, the law must be capable of being obeyed, hence, the law must be capable of being ascertained and guiding people’s behaviour. The two aspects of the rule of law mentioned above are indispensable for the good working of the society. In this manner, social formations and interactions are so much established and structured around communal co-operation on the basis of kinship ties and respect in cultural societies to various deities as ancestral opinions and views dictate to the members of the society, which according to Charles Eyong, “essentially preclude the type of abomination that often results in excommunication and/or abandonment of family members to their individual fates like colonialism.”³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Eyong, Charles. 2007. Indigenous knowledge system and sustainable development in Africa: case study on Central Africa. *Tribes and Tribals, Special Volume*, 1, p. 130.

This form of governance through political and legal systems has specific implications for structures, community empowerment, nation and capacity-building and sustainable development. This is because it stems from what the people know and how they live amidst themselves in the community, as it is based on their common law, which shows a clear part of how things ought to be as against what is later introduced by ‘external factors’. Verhelst unequivocally argues in support of the above analysis that:

Indigenous law offers contemporary African populations a range of solutions very well suited to their needs. . . It is fully endogenous, since it is the spontaneous creation of the masses in their struggle for life. It sometimes serves them as a refuge from external threats . . . The legal system, if it is truly to serve people, their liberties and their specificities, ought to be endogenous . . .³⁰⁷

In line with Verhelst’s analysis, Hoppers adds that:

Jurisprudence in traditional law, on the other hand, is anchored in the idea of restorative justice. Here, the central concern is not retribution or punishment, but the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, and the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to heal both the victim and the perpetrator, who can be given the opportunity to reintegrate with the community he or she has injured. The processes are focused not so much on the establishment of the factuality of what has occurred but rather on seeking a way of restoring balance.³⁰⁸

Respect for the norms, rules, laws and regulations (shared values) is a matter of reciprocity in the society as cultural legal systems incapacitate all to respect the laws of the land, as no man is above the law and everyone regardless of rank, is a subject to the norms, rules, regulations and laws of the land. Reciprocity, as a value, being promoted through regard for norms, is an order of greater value in which interaction in the societal good will be and is realisable.

John Rawls, in canvassing for justice in a society, employs a social contract argument that justice and especially distributive justice is a form of fairness, that is, an impartial distribution of goods and resources to all in the society. He rejects the idea of classical utilitarianism as a basis of justice because it does not offer any principle of justice beyond the basic view that everyone’s happiness counts equally. The resultant theory is known as “Justice as fairness”. In *A Theory of Justice* (Section 2),

³⁰⁷ Verhelst. p. 40.

³⁰⁸ Hoppers. p. 5.

he examines the two principles of justice: liberty and wealth. On liberty, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all; wealth, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

For the understanding of his principles, he sets out what he claims are principles of justice through the use of an entirely and deliberately artificial device he calls the “original position”, in which everyone decides principles of justice from behind “a veil of ignorance” – a purely hypothetical situation that essentially blinds people to all facts about themselves that might cloud what notion of justice is developed. He is of the opinion that rather, they (people) would safeguard themselves against the worst possible outcomes³⁰⁹. He acknowledges the fact that there are possibilities that these principles would be in conflict but rather than compromise, he takes the position that there is a specific priority, which is that of liberty. He says that principles are, therefore, to be ranked in lexical order according to him and, therefore, liberty could be restricted only for the sake of liberty³¹⁰. The two principles are a fair way of meeting the arbitrariness of fortunes and while no doubt imperfect in other ways, the institutions that satisfy these principles, are just.

In the dispensation of justice, Plato asserts that it is a virtue not for the individual alone but for the society; it, therefore, means that as one expects justice to be done to oneself, so also, there is the utmost need for individuals to perform their duties and obligations to the state. In this way, he sets that there are duties and obligations every participant owes the community, that is, there is the need for individual to support just institutions.³¹¹ In this sense, only the just institutional arrangements need to be respected. This is to admit the fact that civil disobedience to unjust institutions and laws are right and justified for the restructuring of the society. Civil disobedience is an act responding to injustices internal to a given society and appealing to public’s conception of justice.

³⁰⁹ Rawls, John. 1972. *A theory of justice*. London: Oxford University Press, United Kingdom.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

Education and Culture

The importance of education can never be under-played in any society as it is the most potent weapon left to man to transform, change and liberate himself and the society from the slavery of ignorance and backwardness. Education can be said to be a process of renewal of the meanings of experiences through a process of transmission partly incidental to the ordinary companionship or intercourse of adults and youths; partly deliberately instituted to effect social continuity. This process is seen to involve control and growth of both the immature individual and the group in which he lives. Throughout history, as Cajete remarks, “human societies have attempted to guide, facilitate, and even coerce the instinct of learning toward socially defined ends. The complex of activities for forming human learning is what we call “education”.”³¹² The implication of this is that education is a process of developing knowledge ability in individuals in such a way that they use this knowledge to improve themselves and their society. Education would not just mean the totality of ideas in the world but a combination of methods to mould the individual as a good man to himself and to the society because morality is not only taught, but also, it is lived.

Education is a process of socialisation, inculturation and transmission of what is worthwhile to those who are committed to it, be they children or adults. This means that education is a process of developing knowledge ability in individuals such a way that they use this knowledge to improve themselves and their society. From another perspective, it is a process of acculturation through which the individual is helped to attain the development of his potentialities and his maximum attention necessarily to the right reason in order to achieve his perfect self-fulfillment. “Every society, whether complex or simple, according to Sylvannus Nnoruka, has its process of enabling its people especially the young to recognise and manifest their latent potentials.”³¹³ And this form of education is considered in cultural setting to be a means of initiating individuals into societal values and the process by which society deliberately transmits its cultural heritage through ‘schools’. And any form of education that has nothing to do with the societal norms, rules and regulations, is

³¹² Cajete, Gregory. 1994. *Look to the mountain, an ecology of indigenous education*. Rio Rancho, New Mexico: Kivaki Press, p. 25.

³¹³ Nnoruka, Sylvannue. 1998. Education and African development. *Africa: philosophy and public affairs*. Oguefiofor, Joseph. Ed. Enugu: Delta Publications, p. 243.

pointless and heading to a ruin. This is because such education will not carry along aspects of such cultural traits, which are compulsory for the survival of such.

The purpose of education, for Jones Akinpelu, “is the liberation of man from restraints and limitations of ignorance and dependency. Education has to increase their control over themselves, their own lives, and the environment in which they live.”³¹⁴ This type of education, as described by him, “will let individual learner knows his own limits and how one can develop in the future. In the explanation of how education can aid development, it is the expansion of the learner’s own consciousness and therefore, his own power over himself, his environment and his society.”³¹⁵ This indeed will bestow the gifts of consciousness and awareness upon the recipient, which consequently breaks the yoke of imperialism and slave mentality taken during colonialism. He also explains that educators should be conscious of the cultural backgrounds of their learners so that it will be possible for them to use these backgrounds to make them scientific thinkers so that they can incorporate scientific culture into their own traditions. By this, he lays emphasis on the role and importance of the family in giving a child a good and sound education. The stress on moral education should start from home. And for the family to be able to attain this task of imparting moral education on its offsprings, there has to be remarkable improvement in the home environment for children.

The importance of education can never be under-played in any society as Francis Ogunmodede avers that, “it is the most potent weapon left to man to transform, change and liberate himself and society from the slavery of ignorance, disease, poverty and backwardness, and attain rapid socio-economic and political progress, prosperity, peace and happiness.”³¹⁶ While Babatunde Fafunwa argues that, “the objective and aspect of Yoruba education was an integrated experience.”³¹⁷ He continues by saying that there are seven cardinal objectives of traditional education, which include,

To develop the child’s latent physical skills; to develop character, to inculcate respect for elders and those in position of authority; to develop intellectual skills; to acquire specific vocational training

³¹⁴ Akinpelu Jones. 1981. *Introduction to philosophy of education*. Oxford: Macmillan Press, p. 2

³¹⁵ Ibid. p. 2.

³¹⁶ Ogunmodede, Francis. 1986. *Obafemi Awolowo socio-political philosophy*. Rome: Pontifical Urban University Press, p. 218.

³¹⁷ Fafunwa, Babatunde. 1974. *History of education in Nigeria*. London: George Allen and Unwin, p. 16.

and to develop a healthy attitude towards honest labour; to develop a sense of belonging and to participate actively in family and community affairs; to understand, appreciate and promote the cultural heritage of the community at large.³¹⁸

The teaching of education is the responsibility of all the social organisations and groups entrusted with the care of the young be it the families, peer groups, religious bodies and the society in its entirety.

The society as a form of transmitting education in Yoruba society, for instance, delves into issues of essential principles of life. The individual is taught to acknowledge principles as they touch upon the concept of man, his moral issues, fate, destiny and a host of others. On important issues, he is being taught to reflect on how circumstances of the past, may shape the conditions of the present and the hopes of the future. "It is when individual establishes relationships with others and the society to quote Joseph Ilori that he can attain a relative perspective and learn the range in which status behaviour may be acceptably expressed."³¹⁹ This clearly demonstrates that cultural educational ideology is a functional process; an education productive of a person useful to himself and to the society.

Jean Jacques Rousseau, one of the greatest philosophers of education, reiterates that there are three types of education; the education of nature, the education of man and the education of things. To him, plants are fashioned by cultivation and man by education. This means that the education of man is very necessary and compulsory. A good society (culture) will provide the child with a good education. Conversely, a bad society will provide the child with a bad education. What is important is that we must set down a good pattern of life for the young to follow. Rousseau would say that you must be a man before you try to train another man, you yourself must set the pattern he shall copy. In this cultural background, the range of education extends to almost every field of action. It may arise in the market places, in societal interactions, in personal life, thrift and industry. A well-rounded educated personality must look outwards as well as inwards. Cordiality is, therefore, important, that is, the ability to mingle freely.

³¹⁸ Ibid. p. 20.

³¹⁹ Ilori, Joseph. 1994. *Moral philosophy in African context for universities and colleges of education*. Zaria: Abubakar Balewa University Press, p. 31.

It is on this functional process that any form of education has with its cultural background that Hegel declares that the individual derives his understanding and practice of virtue from the virtuous state of which he is a part – any form of education is derivable from the community in which one lives. While Kant's idea of community consists of men who treat one another as ends rather than means; his famous categorical imperative states that we should always act as though our individual actions were to become a universal law of nature binding on all men in secular circumstances. Therefore, the responsibility of these strata, cannot be over-emphasised and waved aside in the education of the individual. This is to argue that education is an ultimate justification for the existence of both the individual and the society, that is, it is an instrument for life and the ability of the individual to master and survive his environment.

The process of cultural education is a process of social interaction because each person is educated in and for the society. This positive social attitude helps to improve personality and it is the hallmark of the quality of being educated. This form of education, is aimed at producing in Yoruba educational ideology *omoluabi* – an individual of good character - in its entire ramification, in life situations and for the sake of posterity. This type of education makes the individual good assets to the society. And it is not meant only for the recipients because as it contributes to the growth and development of the recipients, so also, it contributes and benefits the society that produces such educated fellows for the emancipation, socialisation and the humanisation of such society.

Language and Culture

Language is a significant instrument for the organisation of realities, social relationships and systems. It is through it that man is continually socialised, build and/or resist authority, worship, greet, argue, imagine among other matters and experiences from diverse perspectives of human existence. And because of diverse understandings of different perspectives, language and culture are so inter-woven in the transmission of knowledge and the construction of social life. This is because language plays vital roles in the establishment and maintenance of what culture is, it is a fundamental instrument and the most important aspect of culture.

It should be known from the outset that language is the most important weapon in culture as Hoppers argues on the significance of language in cultural discourse that, “A system of meaning is a set of relationships between one group of variables and the meanings which are attached to them. When a society agrees upon certain relationships between a certain class of variables and their meanings, a system of meaning is established. Language is perhaps the most formal of human meaning systems.”³²⁰ This points to the fact that any culture without an integrated or developed form of language is set for extinction as language carries and establishes the cultural traits from the past to future generations.

Wiredu affirms the above proposition that, “Communication is the transference of a thought content from one person or group of persons to another. Such a thought content may be a statement or the expression of an attitude, an emotion, a wish, etc. . . . Language, of course, is the vehicle of this transference, but language can have almost any medium – words, gestures, artifacts, etc.”³²¹ Apart from stating what communication and language are, he argues for the essential and significant nature of communication in any human society that, “No human society or community is possible without communication, for a community is not just an aggregation of individuals existing as windowless monads but of individuals as interacting persons, and an interaction of persons can only be on the basis of shared meanings.”³²² This is possible as a human person or even human being is a product of the aggregates of what there is in the culture in which man lives. This vital aspect of culture is what cements human beings together in a society as without language or communication, human society will be reduced to ‘animal kingdom’.

As already examined above considering the significance of language and the impact of communication to human community, John Bewaji categorically looks at meaning and impact of language from four facets. In the first instance, he argues that, “language is the medium through which all animals that have the facility to communicate ideas, impressions, information, feelings, etc. Consequently, language is central to the interactive process.”³²³ Secondly, “people have a sentimental attachment

³²⁰ Hoppers. p. 1.

³²¹ Wiredu. p. 3.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Bewaji, John. 2002. African languages and critical discourse. *The third way in African philosophy: essays in honour of Kwasi Wiredu*. Oladipo, Olusegun. Ed. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 271. See also Bewaji, John. 2007. *An introduction to the theory of knowledge: a pluricultural approach*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 271.

to their language, such that any form of act, which endangers the existence, worth or value of the language is regarded as threat to their corporate existence.”³²⁴ This denotes the importance human beings attach to their language as it is the instrument that they use for their survival. Thirdly, according to Bewaji, “language identifies and distinguishes. It confers socio-cultural traits, creating mannerisms and imposing gestural constraints. It protects the tradition of those who have distinct languages from invasive tendencies, enhances the independence of linguistic groups and is a basis for developing national pride and identity.”³²⁵ That means, language is a means of identification, where one group of human beings is being separated and identified from others. It is on this basis that human beings have definite affiliations to their cultural languages and make them to be part of such.

The fourth facet of language, according to him, stems from the Wittgensteinian analysis of the limit of one’s world or existence. He writes that, “language determines . . . the limit of one’s world. This is to say that there is a certain kind of interdependence between a language and its world such that one cannot conceive one without the other.”³²⁶ All the above facets of what language is, as examined by Bewaji, show that language is the most important aspect of culture – the totality of people’s way of life in its entirety. Whatever goes into the essence of community, and that of human beings, is dictated and made possible by culture, which is integrated by the power of communication, that is, language. This is a clear indication that language is associated historically with culture and it provides the key to the culture and especially to its literature. In line with this analysis, he argues that:

What is undeniable is the fact that in every geo-cultural system, the environment goes a long way in determining culture. But since culture, broadly conceived, is not static, it follows that the language that constitutes the vehicle for its expression must be dynamic, malleable and mutable. If it were not, then language becomes a straitjacket, rather than a tool. There is no gainsaying the way language carries culture, often becomes a serious coefficient; but this is only so because, apart from mere floundering gesticulations, language is the major vehicle for making sense out of diverse experiences.³²⁷

³²⁴ Ibid. pp. 271 – 272. See also Bewaji. *An introduction to the theory of knowledge*, p. 384.

³²⁵ Ibid. p. 272. See also Bewaji. 2007. *An introduction to the theory of knowledge*, pp. 384 – 385.

³²⁶ Ibid. p. 272. .See also Bewaji, J. 2007. *An introduction to the theory of knowledge*, p. 385.

³²⁷ Ibid. p. 390.

This understanding cannot be fully understood otherwise than in the context of the culture in which it is inextricably embedded. In essence here, using a foreign language to teach African students will continue to generate myriads of problems and issues. Hence, language and culture are to be studied together as the two cannot be separated. That is, culture has a direct effect on language. In fact, the two issues are closely correlated and interrelated. Language is the symbolic presentation of a specific community. In other words, language is the symbolic representation of a society. This means that language and culture co-exist and a form of symbiotic relationship occurs between them.

4.5 Conclusion

The word 'culture' does not refer to any specialised body of knowledge, and it does not refer to some things that some people have and others do not. This means that culture is an idea that every human being takes part in. That is, it is an abstraction, that is used to refer to the totality of people's way of life. And it is on this that knowledge is based on the culture of the people, which clearly shows the fact that knowledge could not be ascertained outside the culture of the people. This, we have argued for, in this chapter, that cultural knowledge is determined by the nature of its existence as it involves diverse experiences of living and observations of a people, either in its current nature or from its past generations. We equally examined that cultural knowledge is an agent that binds society together. This is because of the fact that it constitutes communicative processes through which knowledge is acquired, preserved and transmitted by man, in different societies and different stages of life. It is the information base for a society, which facilitates communication and decision-making. This means that the basic composition of any society's knowledge system is its cultural knowledge. They are knowledge forms that have failed to die, for instance, in Africa and Latin America, despite the racial and colonial onslaughts suffered in the hands of the Western imperialists through slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Cultural knowledge, as argued for in this chapter, is concerned with the study of value systems and structural functionings of a people, of which the classifications considered, are significant. In this manner, it is looked at, as a method as well as a programme of human beings and thought-system, designed for the upliftment of people's living conditions. This is premised on laying emphasis considering what

happens to people socially and psychologically, in the cause of societal activities. In its problem-solving process, cultural knowledge helps society to develop skills in order to assess the relative importance of problems facing them and to select appropriate actions open to them in combating their problems without necessarily looking outside for solutions. By this understanding, cultural knowledge as examined, guides the process of development for particular and objective set, which further lays emphasis on the achievement of some definite ends and the procedures as set and organised by the people. Hence, it becomes the means of educating the community in the process of development.

We argued for cultural knowledge through its constitutive elements as a socialising process in the quest for better living standard in a society. This means that social change could only be understood from the foundation of cultural knowledge as it is done through the development of abilities, attitudes and other forms of behaviours, which are positive to the values of a community. And because it reproduces new ideas and abilities in the process for solving problems, it involves a process of total 'religious' re-orientation and teaching that help people to think for themselves, to execute their projects and to effect lasting and enduring solutions to their community challenges by themselves. This does not mean that lending from outside the cultural background is a crime but that any 'foreign or alien' form of knowledge should not be super-imposed on the cultural knowledge, even though such form of knowledge could be useful for the survival of human endeavours. But such should be to add value to what is, and not to discard it entirely. Hence, our next and last chapter will succinctly grapple with the notion and idea that cultural knowledge is a *conditio sine qua non* for authentic development among societies of the Global South particularly Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE AS PARADIGM FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

5.1 Introduction

The understandings of what culture and cultural knowledge are, have been dealt with in the last chapter, where we focused our attention on the study of value systems and structural functionings of a people, of which the classifications considered, are significant. We equally argued that cultural knowledge, through its fundamental and constitutive elements, is a socialising process for the induction of social change for the better living standard in a society. And by this understanding, our pre-occupation, therefore, in this chapter will be to argue that cultural knowledge is the hallmark towards the achievement of authentic development in Africa. This means it is imperative that cultural understanding is integral to enhancing strategies for the over-all analysis of development to the realities of societies, quality of life and well-being of peoples in Africa. Here, Benedict XVI clearly opines on the discourse of development that:

The development of peoples is intimately linked to the development of individuals. The human person by nature is actively involved in his own development. The development in question is not simply the result of natural mechanisms, since as everybody knows, we are all capable of making free and responsible choices. Nor is it merely at the mercy of our caprice, since we all know that we are a gift, not something self-generated. Our freedom is profoundly shaped by our being, and by its limits.³²⁸

This suggests that there is the utmost need to conceive and understand authentic development efforts in Africa in such a way that activities and realities correspond to the aspirations of the community concerned and the culture of the community's know-how are put to use for the survival of the society.

5.2 The Foundation of African Cultural Knowledge

The quest for knowledge gears towards a better understanding of man and his environment as this is strictly part of his inclination and nature to do so. This search satisfies man's curiosity in the struggle to understand who he is and what to be done in order to change his world for better. This is to say that it is inherent in man to

³²⁸ Benedict XVI. 2009. *Caritas in veritate –charity in truth*. An Encyclical Letter, No. 68.

search for knowledge. “The search for knowledge, according to Zubairi Naseem, is inherent in man. What separates or identifies man from other animals who are believed to have intelligence is self-reflection, which includes curiosity to discover both the self and beyond the self. This must occur in a definite paradigm – most specifically an epistemological paradigm.”³²⁹

It should be pointed out clearly that our understanding of cultural knowledge is different from the Western notion and idea about epistemic claims, which negates in totality realities about the mystical and supra-sensible realm. In this manner, our analysis here will not follow the rules as set in Western epistemology but rather a deviation from the *statusquo*. Here, Amaechi Udefi states that epistemology, which is the science of knowledge, cannot exist in vacuum without culture of the people. He argues that, “The point being made so far is that philosophy (epistemology) is the product of a culture because it is inconceivable to say that a culture can exist without those elements of thought that are shared in common. Hence, we can say that all individualised philosophies stem from the general experience and problem confronting a particular people in a given cultural environment.”³³⁰ With this understanding, Chris Anyanwu’s view as quoted by Naseem is apt here, “We are therefore entering into a cultural world whose philosophy of integration, whose principles of understanding and of aesthetic continuum differ completely from the Western ideas of what constitutes the trust-worthy knowledge and reality.”³³¹ Here, we are moving technically away from the Western dimension to the understanding of knowledge, which we have discussed and examined in the second chapter.

The understanding of African cultural knowledge is rooted in the belief systems of the people, which are basically beyond the classical epistemic theories of rationalism and empiricism. It is a world-view structured with assumptions, values, ideals and principles, among others, upon which a way of perceiving the phenomenal and noumenal world is based. Belief systems are structures of norms that are interrelated and that vary mainly in the degree in which they are systemic. The systemic nature in belief systems is the interrelation between several beliefs that people uphold for their commitment and survival.

³²⁹ Naseem, Zubairi. 1992. African heritage and contemporary life: an experience of epistemological change. *Cultural heritage and contemporary change*. II.2, p. 24.

³³⁰ Udefi, Amaechi. 2015. Dimensions of epistemology and the case for Africa’s indigenous ways of knowing. *Tattva Journal of Philosophy*, 7.1, p. 6.

³³¹ *Ibid.* p. 24.

In a clear manner, human beings cannot exist without order, meaning and understanding of what are provided for them by the cultural belief system. At its most basic level, a belief system is a cognitive system or a system of perception shared by members of a group. It provides individuals with all important explanation and meaning of life, and provides them with a means of satisfying their desires. Belief system in a way binds the culture together and anchor individuals firmly within as it guides actions and moulds institutions of the society. It also gives a cohesive view of the world and serves to integrate the various parts of the culture in forms of cosmology, values, myths and rituals; as these are essential parts of belief systems. Cosmology is a theory of the universe and its different parts in a coherent explanation of how things are and not necessarily how they seem. Values help to mould individuals behaviours and thoughts in the society are sometimes explicitly stated in maxims. On another level, myths provide specifics about the origin of the world, and also provide models for righteous actions by showing cultural members how to behave properly in a variety of situations while rituals symbolically recreate belief systems of the people often in dramatic form. The continuous repetition of rituals not only ensures that traditional belief will be passed on, it also allows individuals to participate in the group's shared belief systems, which helps the society to express its unity and collective identity. Simply put, belief systems are the stories we tell ourselves to identify and characterise our personal sense of actuality. Every human being has a belief system that he/she utilises, and it is through this mechanism(s) that we individually and communally make sense of the world around us.

What we call belief systems are embodiments of cultural knowledge, which have clear-cut characteristics that define them, namely: personal commitment, independent existence, psychological mechanism, and belief system's life span, which is longer than that of its believers. There is varying degrees of certitude as Robert Abelson argues that, "The believer can be passionately committed to a point of view, or at the other extreme could regard a state of affairs as more probable than not, as in "I believe that micro-organisms will be found on Mars." This dimension of variation is absent from knowledge systems. One would not say that one knew a fact strongly."³³² They often include representations of alternative worlds, that is, the world as it is and the world as it should be among other characteristics. While also

³³² Abelson, Robert. 1979. Differences between belief and knowledge systems. *Cognitive Science*, 3, p. 360.

there are some fundamental elements in belief systems, which make them to be accepted by the people as the basis of what shape their existence. In the first place, belief systems include values either implicitly or explicitly, which define what is good or valuable. There is the inclusion of substantive beliefs, which are the focus of interest. There is also in belief systems the relevance of orientations and ideologies, which is all about doctrines that groups uphold; and language, which is seen as the logic of a belief system. It is the logical rules that relate one substantive belief to another within the belief system.

Bisi Asonibare and Esere, making allusion to Erinoso, argue that, “A belief system is a person’s way of knowing and understanding his/her world, which can be likened to a “filter” or lens through which events are passed and interpreted. . . This framework is a mixture of traditions, myths, legends, shared assumptions, expectations and prejudices. The belief system of an individual is formed and sustained by a typical pattern of behaviour.”³³³ This perception is more than the way and manner the Western epistemological traditions will perceive man and his world. This perception takes into consideration all aspects of human survival from both physical and non-physical realms. It is so because the world from African conception is composite in nature as it combines both the divine, human, animate and inanimate realities, which are ‘working’ and seeing as parts of human survival. Here, Benson Igboin argues that,

The universe from the African understanding is a composite one; a blending of the divine, spirit, human, animate and inanimate beings, which constantly interact with one another. These visible and invisible elements that comprise the African cosmology are what have been referred to as the “forces of life” or “vital forces”. The vital forces are hierarchically structured in such a way that God, the creator of the universe is at the top. In the pyramidic structure where God is at the top, invisible forces of life, like the divinities, spirits and ancestors, form part of the hierarchy.³³⁴

The universe for Africans is a composite thing as both the living and the dead are parts of the existence of the world. The two work harmoniously and in tandem with each other as existence is not only phenomena but as well noumena. It is on this that Igboin writes in support that, “It is in this case that we say African universe is a

³³³ Asonibare, Bisi. and Esere, Mary. 1999. Belief systems and attribution patterns of mental illness among Nigerians. *The Counsellor*, 17.1, p. 73.

³³⁴ Igboin, Benson. 2011. Colonialism and African cultural values. *African Journal of History and Culture*, 3.6, pp. 98-99.

composite one. In other words, the universe is not made up of human beings alone but the dead and other supernatural forces are essentially parts of the universe.”³³⁵

The contention here, is the idea of moving away from theories of knowledge in Western philosophy, that affirms rationality and sense perception basically as sources of knowledge. These ultimately provide a linear perspective, which appears most compatible with observations, experiences and verifications. Cultural knowledge, is based on the belief systems of the people, that are rooted on social consensus, perception, social, natural and supernatural, conscious and unconscious, and metaphysical realms among others for human survival. This is to say that all aspects and spheres concerning both the noumenal and phenomena worlds are essential sources where knowledge could be gotten from as against the Western orientations and models. Here, the the argument of Asonibare and Esere is apt that, “the individual often uses social consensus as a criterion for validating his/her explanations. In fact, when objective evidence is not available, it is the opinion of relevant others that largely determines the confidence the individual has in his/her explanation of the world.”³³⁶

Errors and fallacies will be made and committed if we base our understanding of cultural knowledge on the Western models as there are divergencies among traditions. This is because there are so many sources of knowledge that are accepted in African cultural background but are *anathema* – forbidden – in the Western tradition. To this end, Africans accept sense perception, rationality, belief, faith, testimony, authority, intuition, revelation, divination, illumination and dogmas among others as sources of knowledge because these are what they live on and with. Andrew Uduigwomen supports the above by stating that there are many sources and means by which knowledge is gotten in African thoughts. He lists the sources as “perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge, wholistic knowledge, extra-sensory or mystical knowledge, premonitive knowledge, ontological knowledge and oral tradition.”³³⁷ To him, “The oral tradition consists of myths, legends, stories, proverbs, beliefs, folktales, songs and dances, liturgies and rituals, pithy sayings, riddles and adages, ideas, social attitudes, conventions, institutions, and customs.”³³⁸ It is on the basis of

³³⁵ Ibid., p. 99.

³³⁶ Asonibare and Esere. p. 73.

³³⁷ Uduigwomen, Andrew. 1995. The place of oral tradition in African epistemology. *Footmarks on African epistemology*. Uduigwomen, Andrew. Ed. Ikeja: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers, pp. 36-39.

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 39.

this understanding that Frederick Copleston argues that, “sense perception, causal theory of perception, non-sensory perception, inference and testimony, and inductive inference are sources of knowledge among the Indian epistemic interpretative community.”³³⁹

Even though African cultural knowledge is not systematically documented, like the written traditions of the Western epistemological orientations, that does not mean it is of no use to man and his quest for development. The linkage of such to oral traditions stipulates the fact that it is significant in making human existence worthwhile. These belief systems, not only provide a lot of materials about the past, but also have equally proved to be quite indispensable in undertaking a reconstruction of aspects of the over-all cultural existence of the people. Despite the challenges associated with the use of these belief systems, these do not detract from their over-all usefulness in the reconstruction of the cultural past and efficacy in the building of the present and the future. The future here, is about the quest for authentic development in African society. It is clear that the history of the Yoruba nation, for instance, is adequately preserved in its various traditions and belief systems. Thus, just as the relevance of written or archival records, is not in doubt; in much the same way, the contributions of unwritten sources especially the belief systems in the reconstruction of the cultural history and past cannot be under-played, as the platform on which cultural knowledge is founded and instituted. Cultural knowledge, as established on belief systems, engenders authentic development for African society.

5.3 The Basis for Authentic Development

An understanding of authentic development in Africa today is one that takes man as the subject and centre of development, which in itself, is brought out from the cultural understanding of the society. This is to jettison the opinion that cultures within African society could not engender development as no one could lay claim to the fact that some cultures are receptive to development while others are unreceptive. It is on the basis of this fact that Ibanga Ikpe avers that, “. . . development is always the development of an existing culture and just as development cannot take place outside a culture, every culture needs development in order to survive.”³⁴⁰ This is in

³³⁹ Copleston, Fredrick. 1980. *Philosophies and cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 20 – 38.

³⁴⁰ Ikpe, Ibanga. 1999. The culture of development and the development of culture. *Viewpoint: A Critical Review of Culture and Society*, 1.1 & 2, p. 5.

consonance with Obafemi Awolowo's philosophy that development should necessarily be rooted in man as its purpose and object, and aimed at the maximisation of the human capital for the advancement of the good of the humanity. He opines that enduring development must be anchored on the development of human capacities to the full when given opportunities to all aspects of human existence. This, he stated clearly that, "A man can contribute to the development of society according to his ability only if he is in a fit position physically and mentally to do so. Besides, since each member of society is going to benefit from the resultant development according to his deed, that is according to his contribution to the social pool, it is essential that he should have equal opportunity like his fellows to make the utmost contribution which his ability allows."³⁴¹

There are challenges concerning the discourse of development in Africa and from the opinions of scholars on what form of development Africans themselves should have and follow. Ikpe raises two fundamental and possible options with both positive and negative sides to the debate. "The first is to continue with the current approach whereby traditional African culture is married to a myriad of foreign cultures to produce a hybrid from which two likely developments are possible."³⁴² To this option of Ikpe, there are two challenges: one is the production of a hybrid culture that will promote development, and on which others will continue to be built and erected upon; and two, the challenge that alien or Western culture will erase the remaining parts of African culture towards extinction. It has been clearly stated in the fourth chapter, that there is nothing wrong in borrowing from other cultural backgrounds, but care and caution must be taken appropriately in order not to dissipate African cultural traits towards the acceptance of the Western paradigm for the emergence of developmental realities for Africa. Here, thoughts about acculturation should be a reality! That is, a position where there will be a 'marriage' of cultures where substantial and good aspects are brought to fore towards the growth, progress and development of society most needful. This points to the fact that there is no culture that is anti-development or unreceptive of development, even though the conceptualisations of development in today's world, are being negotiated from the

³⁴¹ Awolowo, Obafemi. 1977. *The problems of Africa: the need for ideological reappraisal*. University of Cape Coast Kwameh Nkrumah Memorial Lectures, First Series, p. 64.

³⁴² Ikpe. p. 7.

Western understanding, which have damaging effects on societies of the Global South particularly Africa.

The second option, according to Ikpe, “consists in realigning the developmental objectives of the people to their culture in such a way that the development is recognised to be cumulative to the culture rather than opposed to it. What this entails in the first instance is to change the mind-set of the African towards his culture.”³⁴³ This understanding, presupposes the fact that development cannot be ascertained and realised, if done outside the culture of the people. It confirms the fact that one cannot be educated outside his/her culture; doing this without conscious understanding of the culture will only lead to ruins as recipient of such form of education will only be a foreigner in his/her culture and society. In a quest towards the achievement of authentic development in Africa, an African ought to understand the need to make use of what he has to plan for his future without necessarily looking for solution(s) from outside his world. By this, he avers that an African must:

realise that culture provides the foundation for development and that he cannot relate to western development unless he is comfortable with his own culture. Also, that he cannot discard the African culture, even if he tries and that for him to look down on the culture, within which his capacity for development lies, is for him to discard his capacity for development. This does not mean that obsolete practices should be revived just for the fun of it but rather, ennobling aspects of the African culture can be promoted in the bid for development.³⁴⁴

In the discourse of development, Ade-Ajayi reiterates that, “development is growth plus change. Change, in turn, is social and cultural as well as economic. The key concept must be improved quality of people’s lives . . . we need to re-affirm the basic virtues of honesty, diligence and respect for the rights of others, as national virtues essential for our development.”³⁴⁵ This explains the fact that, “integral development is about the development of every person and of the whole person, especially of the poorest and most neglected in the community”³⁴⁶ because the question and place of man in development is inevitable.

³⁴³ Ibid. p. 7.

³⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 7.

³⁴⁵ Ajayi, Ade. 1999. Development is about people. *ViewPoint*, 1&2, pp. 15&17.

³⁴⁶ John Paul II. 1995. *Ecclesia in Africa*. An Encyclical Letter, No. 68.

Paul VI reiterates the fact of development as built on man that:

The development we speak of here cannot be restricted to economic growth alone. To be authentic, it must be well rounded; it must foster the development of each man and of the whole man. As an eminent specialist on this question has rightly said: "We cannot allow economics to be separated from human realities, nor development from the civilisation in which it takes place. What counts for us is man - each individual man, each human group, and humanity as a whole."³⁴⁷

His analysis is geared towards a more human condition, that is, the whole humanity, which is not coloured by any form of preference that development is meant for one society and not for another society. It is only in good human condition that we can discuss about authentic development, which is sought for, by man. To this, he argues emphatically that:

If development calls for an ever-growing number of technical experts, even more necessary still is the deep thought and reflection of wise men in search of a new humanism, one which will enable our contemporaries to enjoy the higher values of love and friendship, of prayer and contemplation, and thus find themselves. This is what will guarantee man's authentic development - his transition from less than human conditions to truly human ones. . .

What are less than human conditions? The material poverty of those who lack the bare necessities of life, and the moral poverty of those who are crushed under the weight of their own self-love; oppressive political structures resulting from the abuse of ownership or the improper exercise of power, from the exploitation of the worker or unjust transactions. What are truly human conditions? The rise from poverty to the acquisition of life's necessities; the elimination of social ills; broadening the horizons of knowledge; acquiring refinement and culture. From there one can go on to acquire a growing awareness of other people's dignity, a taste for the spirit of poverty, an active interest in the common good, and a desire for peace.³⁴⁸

In the same manner, Oladipo is of the opinion that, “. . . development process is not an abstraction, the integrity of which can be measured simply in quantitative terms, . . . Rather, it is a process of social transformation, which involves the replacement of those factors that inhibit the capacity of the individual for self-direction and the promotion of social cooperation with those which promote these

³⁴⁷ Paul VI. 1967. *Populorum progressio – On the development of the peoples*. An Encyclical Letter, No. 14.

³⁴⁸ Ibid, Nos. 20-21.

ideals. In short, it is a process whose essence concerns the quality of life (including the quality of social relations) of the people.”³⁴⁹ A plethora of significant issues concerning development is the factor of the major senses of development, which are the tangible and the intangible (moral) senses, as Olusegun Oladipo writes that:

The tangible aspect of development is concerned with material progress. It involves the control and exploitation of the physical environment through the application of the results of science and technology. The primary goal of this process, of course, is human well-being, which involves, among other things: the eradication of certain human-demeaning social phenomena, such as poverty, illiteracy, and low-life expectancy . . .³⁵⁰

This means that it involves, for instance, the reduction of social inequity, which globally is a major source of conflicts among people, and the promotion of positive social values such as freedom, justice, tolerance, compassion, cooperation, among others. Although the tangible aspect of development is the most visible, the intangible is very crucial. This is so because it is that which enhances the capacity of the individual to actually shape his or her own life without being insensitive to the common good.³⁵¹ From the moral angle of development, it is a truism that no society or community could be said and acclaimed to be developed when it neglects the worse-offs. This is the case that there should be equal distribution of the societal wealth to the worse-offs, consistent with the just savings principle and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, which John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice*, has discussed.

The value added to development based on the people portrays that attention should be shifted to people and not on structures that are built on economic, political and social foundations. Here, Francis Njoku considers the issue of holistic development as it requires peoples’ participatory roles. He points out that, “in the conviction that development is to be weaved around people, one can propose a better platform for human flourishing in which people will not only participate in their development but also take control of it under the principles of sustainability and interdependency. After all, human development is at once person-and community-

³⁴⁹ Oladipo, Olusegun. 2009. *Philosophy and social reconstruction in Africa*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, pp. 96-97.

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 95.

³⁵¹ Ibid, p. 95.

centred.”³⁵² This promotes the necessity of participatory roles of the people towards development as they would be able to make their choices for developmental paradigms in the society.

The idea of building development on imitations would clearly lead to destruction because it would not take along the positions and cultures of people in question into cognizance as it is evident in African continent today. It is within this intention and interest that Maurice Izunwa reiterates that, “any proper development must therefore be as it were, the development of a people. People can only develop as themselves not as others. *Imitation* can only lead to superficial progress albeit its sundry *limitations*.”³⁵³ Panthaleon Iroegbu also corroborates that, “development is originatively from within. That means it must start with the people in question. It is not an imposition, not even a copyism. It is not the importation of foreign cars and machines to a given developing country. Development is the conscious, articulate and beneficial unveiling of the inner potentials of the resources of a given society.”³⁵⁴ This means that there is a conscious effort of linking development with one’s culture as it would lead to futility when examining development without considering the people’s culture, which is a way of life.

George Ehusani’s position is apt here that, “development must be a human fact. It must be more spiritual and cultural than economic and technical. Development must not just mean “to have more”; rather it must mean “to be more.”³⁵⁵ This means that people are of importance to the reality of development as Lewis Gordon affirms that, “the goal of development is to increase the options available for people to live well in a world in which time and space are increasingly pressurised by the social and consumption demands of each coming generation.”³⁵⁶ Human development remains the main target of any meaningful development in the world, as it determines the

³⁵² Njoku, Francis. 2004. Beyond the Western logic of development to initiative-democracy in Africa. *Philosophy and praxis in Africa*. Asiegbu, Martin and Agbakoba, Joseph. Eds. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 231.

³⁵³ Izunwa, Maurice. 2009. Philosophical humanism: inspiration for authentic development in Africa. *West African Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 12, p. 23.

³⁵⁴ Iroegbu, Panthaleon. 2005. Ethics of progress and development. *Kpim of morality: ethics: general, special and professional ethics*. Iroegbu, Panthaleon and Echekwube, Anthony. Eds. Ibadan: Heinemann Books p. 302.

³⁵⁵ Ehusani, George. 1991. *An Afro-Christian vision “OZOVEHE!” toward a more humanised world*. Lanham and New York: University Press of America, p. 243.

³⁵⁶ Gordon, Lewis. 2004. Fanon and development: a philosophical look. *Africa Development*, XXIX.1, p. 87.

essential aspect of humanity where life does not only rest on physical structures and paraphernalia.

In order for development to be built totally and entirely on man, there is a task that must necessarily be promoted towards the achievement of authentic development especially as it affects African society. Paul VI reiterates the task that must be undertaken thus:

We want to be clearly understood on this point: The present state of affairs must be confronted boldly, and its concomitant injustices must be challenged and overcome. Continuing development calls for bold innovations that will work profound changes. The critical state of affairs must be corrected for the better without delay. Everyone must lend a ready hand to this task, particularly those who can do most by reason of their education, their office, or their authority. They should set a good example by contributing part of their own goods . . . ³⁵⁷

This task is geared towards the promotion of cultural knowledge, which is argued for in this work as the basis on which development rests upon. And by this understanding, he unequivocally avers that the deposit of wisdom in some poorer societies that ought to be engaged to the development of such and even by the so-called richer societies of the world. On this, he says:

Cultural institutions also do a great deal to further the work of development. Their important role was stressed by the Council: ". . . the future of the world stands in peril unless wiser men are forthcoming. It should also be pointed out that many nations, poorer in economic goods, are quite rich in wisdom and can offer noteworthy advantages to others." Every country, rich or poor, has a cultural tradition handed down from past generations. This tradition includes institutions required by life in the world, and higher manifestations— artistic, intellectual and religious—of the life of the spirit. When the latter embody truly human values, it would be a great mistake to sacrifice them for the sake of the former. Any group of people who would consent to let this happen, would be giving up the better portion of their heritage; in order to live, they would be giving up their reason for living. ³⁵⁸

The embodiment of true human values leads any society to attain development in all aspects and spheres of their lives of which without those fundamental values as will be examined in the sub-section that follows, there will be no issue of development, talk-less of authentic development in human society. This is clearly understood as

³⁵⁷ Paul VI. No. 32.

³⁵⁸ Ibid. No. 40.

development is more than mere growth or economic progress but the totality of man, as Ralph Chiaka avers that, “Development is more than the passage from poor to rich, from a traditional rural economy to a sophisticated urban one. It carries with it not only the idea of economic betterment, but also of greater human dignity, security, justice and equity. In other words, development is the ability to cope with the problems that come the way of a society or an individual.”³⁵⁹

And for a society or community in the struggle for development, time management as understood from the point of cultural knowledge of man, should be accorded with utmost respect and regard. That is, if there is dignity and respect for the being of man as a cultural being, time should also be respected accordingly, as man could never think of development without time either from its past to its present and finally to its future. And it is on the basis and significance of time management towards the achievement of development that Souleyman Diagne diverts his attention on development through the concept of time that, “what is essential to the very notion of development is time understood as duration, that is, the political culture of temporality.”³⁶⁰ This is contrary to the opinion of John Mbiti that, “time in Africa is not futuristic because the prospective attitude, which is essential to development, is grounded on the notion that the meaning of the present comes from the future.”³⁶¹ The issue at stake is the essence of time towards promoting development. This means that there is no way the issue of development would be examined without considering time factor as the future is embedded in the present.

With the above-setting to the basis of development in cultural knowledge and understanding, it should be noted that man will not be able to make positive impacts into his world without the linking of his culture from time immemorial (tradition) to his life and his society. This makes the analyses of the Council fathers to be apt that:

Thence it follows that human culture has necessarily a historical and social aspect and the word "culture" also often assumes a sociological and ethnological sense. According to this sense we speak of a plurality of cultures. Different styles of life and multiple scales of values arise from the diverse manner of using things, of labouring, of expressing oneself, of practising religion, of forming

³⁵⁹ Chiaka, Ralph. 1989. *Development aid to the Third World: a moral question*. Ibadan: Shaneson C.I. Limited, p. xii.

³⁶⁰ Diagne, Souleyman. 2004. On prospective: development and a political culture of time. *Africa Development*, XXIX.1, p. 57.

³⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 58.

customs, of establishing laws and juridic institutions, of cultivating the sciences, the arts and beauty. Thus the customs handed down to it form the patrimony proper to each human community. It is also in this way that there is formed the definite, historical milieu which enfolds the man of every nation and age and from which he draws the values which permit him to promote civilisation.³⁶²

This definitely, if done properly, will propel the engine-room for effective development, which will affect man's world and his existence. This is because culture is much important in the quest and process of making meaningful achievements in one's life and the general existence of the whole community.

5.4 Conditions for the Practical Realisation of Authentic Development in Africa

Ernest Gellner's position, for a stable social order, leads to our argument in the quest for an authentic development in Africa. He itemises two major factors by which a stable social order could be attained, and in the same manner affect positively the quest for an enduring development. To him, "In our time, a social order is valid, has rightful claims on the loyalty of the members of the society, under two conditions: It is bringing about, or successfully maintaining, an industrial affluent society (that is, conducive to economic growth) and the most important one that is more related to our argument here is that, "Those in authority are co-cultural with the rest of the society."³⁶³ His argument projects the fact that even though a stable economy is a necessity in a given society, the idea of nationalism should also not to be forgotten, which has been our argument. That is, even though industrialisation is necessary, nationalism is more needed in the over-all interests of the people of a particular society. He argues further in support of moral or non-tangible aspect of development to be more important than the tangible as a social order, which fails to satisfy either of these will fail to retain the loyalty of its members where one that is able to satisfy these conditions is likely to survive not minding other defects therein. He argues that:

Virtue, salvation, the good life, consent, the general will, and the rest – those one fashionable criteria – though they may survive in textbooks, when used in real life are merely near vacuous labels attached to quite different criteria and questions. These are – how to become industrialised, and just what to do with an industrial society when one has it. The paradigm of a founder of a state, of a Father of

³⁶² Second Vatican Council. 1965. *Gaudium et spes – pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world*, No. 53.

³⁶³ Gellner. p. 33.

the nation, is no longer the ancestor, or conqueror, divine visitor, hero or lawgiver: it is the liberator-developer, the Atatürk figure. (Liberators who do not modernise or modernisers who do not liberate, are not eligible as symbols of an acceptable order). . . There is also, admittedly, the issue of how much liberty is possible is possible at either stage. (This indeed is a concern whose roots may be quite independent. Still, its relevant current formulations are those against the background of industrialism or industrialisation.)³⁶⁴

The argument being set by Gellner is that values, norms, mores, among others, are necessary in the quest for a stable order in which authentic development could be realised and achieved. There is no doubt about the fact that economy or what we refer to as industrialisation is good but the non-tangible aspects cannot be under-played as they are necessary parts of the culture of the people in which Gellner points at as the basis of nationalism. In his views, he projects that, “The effective conviction of our time was summed up as the doctrine that a social order is made valid by conducting to or maintaining to an industrial society, plus the fact that its members share a common ‘nationality’. An alternative way of formulating this contention is to say that the diffusion of industrialism, carried out by national units, is the dominant event of our time.”³⁶⁵

By nationality, national units, nationalism, we mean culture, which is the totality of people’s way and manner of existence of which strategic conditions will be examined and analysed in our argument, that it will be difficult to achieve and attain authentic development in Africa without recourse to culture, as the basis and foundation. This is to bring about the link between humanity and culture, that is, to be human, one needs to be cultured and, therefore, affects positively the quest for development in all ramifications of man’s existence as he argues that, “And the classification of men by ‘culture’ is of course the classification by ‘nationality’. It is for this reason that it now seems inherent in the very nature of things, that to be human means to have some nationality. In our particular social context, it is inherent in the nature of things.”³⁶⁶

³⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 36.

³⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 40.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 157.

Freedom

Julius Nyerere makes a case for freedom in the quest for development from two factors, which are of importance and significance to the total development of Africa. “The first is leadership through education, and the second is democracy in decision making.”³⁶⁷ That is, “if development is to increase people’s freedom, it must be development for the people. It must serve them, and their interests. Every proposal must be judged by the criterion of whether it serves the purpose of development – and the purpose of development is the people. Yet if a proposal contributes to the development of people, and if it is being carried out by the people of their own free will, it will automatically be for the people’s interests, provided three conditions are fulfilled. First, if the people understand their own needs; second, if they understand how these needs can be met; and third, if they have the freedom to make their own decisions, and to put them into effect.”³⁶⁸

In essence, Nyerere argues that freedom is a *conditio sine qua non* for development once it is development of the people as he writes, “Development brings freedom, provided it is development of *people*. But people cannot be developed; they can only develop themselves. For while it is possible for an outsider to build man’s house, an outsider cannot give the man pride and self-confidence in himself as a human being.”³⁶⁹ By saying this, he avers thus:

Those things a man has to create in himself by his own actions. He develops himself by what he does; he develops himself by making his own decisions, by increasing his own knowledge and ability, and by his own full participation – as an equal – in the life of the community he lives in. . . Development of a man can, in fact, only be effected by that man; development of the people can only be effected by the people.³⁷⁰

In this platform of using freedom to the achievement of development for Africa as encapsulated by Nyerere, Benedict XVI’s dictum that, “The development of peoples is intimately linked to the development of individuals”³⁷¹ cannot be discussed if it is not based and built on freedom. This means that freedom is a necessity to the attainment of authentic and enduring development in Africa. He states that, “The

³⁶⁷ Nyerere, Julius. 1974. *Man and development*. Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, Tanzania, p. 29.

³⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 28.

³⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 27 (Author’s italics).

³⁷⁰ Ibid. pp. 27-28.

³⁷¹ Benedict XVI. No. 68.

development in question is not simply the result of natural mechanisms, since as everybody knows, we are all capable of making free and responsible choices. Nor is it merely at the mercy of our caprice, since we all know that we are a gift, not something self-generated. Our freedom is profoundly shaped by our being, and by its limits. . . we must fortify our love for a freedom that is not merely arbitrary, but is rendered truly human by acknowledgement of the good that underlies it.”³⁷²

In examining the linkage of freedom to development, Nyerere expands on the two essentials of democracy, which are linked to development. One, everyone should be free to speak and there is the essential of being listened to at every time – these are great conditions. Apart from the two essentials of democracy as outlined, he makes a case for discipline as a follow-up to decision-making in the pursuit of development of people and society. To him, “Discipline must exist in every aspect of our lives. And it must be willingly accepted discipline. For it is an essential part of both freedom and development. The greater freedom which comes from working together, and achieving things by co-operation which none of us could achieve alone, is only possible if there is disciplined acceptance of joint decisions. And this involves the acceptance of joint constituted authority.”³⁷³ He opines in a clear language concerning the significance of discipline thus:

If we are to live our lives in peace and harmony, and if we are to achieve our ambition of improving the conditions under which we live, we must have both freedom and discipline. For freedom without discipline is anarchy: discipline without freedom is tyranny. Discipline, however, must be a means of implementing decisions. Only in the very limited sense of orderly debate is discipline involved in the making of decisions. And discipline is not another word for force. . . For discipline allows the orderly conduct of affairs; it is the means by which decisions are implemented – not the way they are made.³⁷⁴

The above stipulates that for authentic development to be a reality, an informed and disciplined freedom is a necessity of which without it, it will be a futile effort in the quest for development in Africa.

³⁷² Ibid. No. 68.

³⁷³ Ibid. p. 32.

³⁷⁴ Ibid. pp. 34-35.

Solidarity

In the discourse of communal way of life and the relationship, which occurs between individuals and the community in which they reside and live in Africa, Olatunji Oyeshile argues that,

The relationship between the community and the individual can be likened to the relationship between a play and its parts or a team and its players. This necessarily presupposes that there is an intricate link between what we know as the community and its individual members such that they have a similar 'destiny' in a metaphorical sense. The well-being of the community is often used as the determinant of the well-being of the individual even though the converse does not always hold.³⁷⁵

This understanding of Oyeshile is subsumed in the treatise of Mbiti's analysis that the individual in a society owes his/her existence to other people in the community of which the individual can only lay claim and say that, 'I am, because We are; and since we are, therefore, I am'. The relationship between the two is a form of symbiotic relationship, which cannot be separated and broken.

Communalism in Africa is a system that is both supra-sensible and material in its terms of reference. Both are found in a society that is believed by the Africans to be originally divinely made because it transcends the people who live in it now; and also it is humanly made because it cannot be culturally understood independent of those who live in it now. Therefore, the authentic African is known and identified by and through his community as the sayings go in Yoruba's proverb that, *Agbajo owo la fi n'soya, ajeje owo kan o gberu d'ori* (The communal chest is beaten with collective palms; one hand cannot lift the load to the head) and *A kii r'eni lodo s'agbara* (One does not go through unnecessary exertion at the riverside where there is a waiting helper). It is on this that Bert Hamminga argues that:

Westerners can be surprised to see us all getting excited (sad) at the same moment. That is because we are one body, a tree. *We sing, we dance, we weep, we know.* We are "together", in such a far-reaching meaning of that word that Westerners will have a hard time understanding and believing this togetherness. Ironically, the

³⁷⁵ Oyeshile, Olatunji. 2006. The Individual-community relationship as an issue in social and political philosophy. *Core issues in African philosophy*. Oladipo, Olusegun. Ed. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 103.

The philosophy behind the African communalism, therefore, guarantees individual responsibility within the communal ownership and relationship. An individual identity is not emphasised at the expense of his community identity. Putting his opinion on solidarity in clear manner, he opines thus:

Since togetherness is the highest value, we want share our views. All of them. Hence we always agree with everybody. Standing up and saying: "I have a radically different opinion" would not, as it often does in the West, draw attention to what I have to say. Instead, I am likely to be led before my clan leaders before I even had the chance to continue my speech. Among us, you simply never have radically different opinions. That is because, and that is why we are *together*. Togetherness is our ultimate criterion of any action, the pursuit of knowledge being just one of them.³⁷⁶

This is why individualism, as an ideology and principle of life, is not encouraged in Africa, though it is not destroyed. Even though an individual is a separate being, and can take decisions on his own, with full authority of whatever he does, Kwame Gyekye argues vehemently that, "the capacity for self-assertion that the individual can exercise presupposes, and in fact derives from, the autonomous nature of the person. By autonomy, I do not mean self-completeness but the having of a will, a rational will of one's own, that enables one to determine at least some of one's own goals and to pursue them, and to control one's destiny."³⁷⁷ This shows that an individual enjoys his existence, self-assertion and even authority to take decisions, such individual enjoys this from the shared values, ideals, thoughts of the shared system in which he lives. This means no one lives in isolation. Here, Joseph Faniran argues that,

The community alone constitutes the context, the social or cultural space, in which the actualisation of the possibilities of the individual person can take place, providing the individual person the opportunity to express his or her individuality, to acquire and develop his or her personality and to fully become the kind of person he or she wants to be. . . One can, therefore, say that African communalism entails a tense relationship between the individual and the community.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 58 (Author's italics).

³⁷⁷ Gyekye, Kwame. 1997. *Tradition and modernity: philosophical reflections on the African experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 54.

³⁷⁸ Faniran, Joseph. 2008. *Foundations of African communication with examples from Yoruba culture*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, p. 39.

The argument is such that individual members are essential parts of the community of which the community guides and guards against all forms of selfish and the quest for individual benefits at the expense of the common good. And to guide against friction between the two entities, Gyekye in another work of his, as quoted by Faniran clearly says that:

The fact that the African people express appreciation for both communal and individualistic values means that for them, these two seemingly opposed concepts can co-exist, however precariously. Their idea is that the individual cannot develop outside the framework of the community, but the welfare of the community as a whole cannot dispense with the talents and initiative of its individual members either. The interaction between the individual and the community (or group) is therefore considered basic to the development of the individual's personality as well as to the overall success and well-being of the community.³⁷⁹

Our argument for solidarity amongst all peoples is set on the ontological foundation of relationship between the two entities – individuals and community. Our search for development in Africa will be realisable when the 'new culture of sentiments', which is founded on provincialities, is uprooted and re-developed through the social indicators of communalism, namely: the supremacy of the community, the sanctity of authority, respect for old age or the elderly, the usefulness of the individual, and religion as a way of life as examined by Faniran.³⁸⁰ What this implies, according to Oyeshile, is that, "in modern African states, the quest for development and social order is not something that can be pursued from one end, either that of the state or that of the citizens. It has to be a joint venture. And there is an ontological basis for this relationship. The community, we should note, is the basis for the actualisation of individual values, aspirations and goals. The individual who has imbibed the spirit of community voluntarily gives up certain desires in order to ensure the continued survival of the community."³⁸¹

The option for solidarity and brotherhood in African consciousness, for survival and authentic development, will be to replace the 'culture' of sentiments, which is largely built on parochial and provincial mentalities across African states. These mentalities are found in our attachment to ethnicity and tribalism, which necessarily impede the actualisation of human survival and the quest for enduring

³⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 45-58.

³⁸¹ Oyeshile. pp. 116-117.

development. This attachment to diverse ethnic groups and tribes resulted from the point that the 'centre' could not hold again as every individual seeks for solutions to the societal problems from his/her enclaves, without looking for solutions to the problems of the society. And in order to correct this anomaly, solidarity and/or co-operation will be required towards the achievement of authentic development in Africa as these sayings go: *Igi kan o le da igbo se* and *Bi enikan ba so pe ohun ko nilo oluranlowo lati sin ara re sinu saare lehin iku, o daju pe owo re ni lati wa loke erupe* – no man is an island onto himself; and *Oju merin lo n b'imo, gbogbo aye lo n wo* - it takes a whole village to raise a child. Solidarity, in this sense, is a firm determination in order to commit oneself towards the attainment of common good. The sense of solidarity is *an article of faith* for the Africans as Ehusani sums it up that, "The African values community living not only because "it is good for kinsmen to do so", but because *life* is his or her ultimate concern, and that life can only grow in relationships. Outside the community, there is no life."³⁸² This clearly suggests that life in the African sense is communal in nature, that is, as an African, birth, life and death are communal. An individual cannot live outside his community and because of this fact; it does express the nature of coming together to establish a virile community, which will achieve the common good. Such common good in the building of a society is essential in the lives of the people. To this, the Second Vatican Council fathers reiterate that,

Everyday, human interdependence grows more tightly drawn and spreads by degrees over the whole world. As a result the common good, that is, the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment, today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race. Every social group must take account of the needs and legitimate aspirations of other groups, and even of the general welfare of the entire human family.³⁸³

This is in line with the analysis of Ehusani that, "Life is drawn from persons, energy is found in the midst of persons, beauty inheres in persons, wisdom is acquired through relationship with persons *et cetera*."³⁸⁴

³⁸² Ehusani. p. 221.

³⁸³ Second Vatican Council. No. 26.

³⁸⁴ Ehusani. p. 221.

The argument is that for the survival of Africa, solidarity and/or co-operation is a watch-word, as there is no way development could be achieved without people and persons coming together to have a common bond, in the best interest of all in the society. That is to say people with a high collective identity are rarely prone to geocentricism and likely to feel deeply connected, which can bring feelings of security, contentment and respect for others in the community. Here, the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria leaning on John Paul II's *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis – On Social Concern*, No. 38, that, "Solidarity is not feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good, that is to say, to the good of all and of each individual because we are all really responsible for all."³⁸⁵

In African society, the love for individual style of life is abhorrent as against what African life has been turned to in this contemporary age, which has nothing good to contribute in the quest for an enduring development in Africa. This new idea about individualistic tendencies has caught out the basis of inclusive life from the Africans, which is setting people and persons apart from themselves, that is, the rich at one side and the poor at the other end – a life of separateness. This suggests borrowing from the discussion paper on *The Issue of Solidarity in the European Union* that, "Solidarity mechanisms are not based on pure generosity but on enlightened self-interests. Our unity (*should be*) is based on deep ties: common roots and common values. It is those values that make us a Community and a Union, not just a market."³⁸⁶ The discourse here, is that societies in Africa must definitely realign themselves back to this inclusive system of life, which is clearly being lost on daily basis in order for development of peoples and survival of human life. This is clearly different from the unnecessary accumulation of wealth today to the detriment of the worse-offs in the society as it is the new life that many Africans are wont to leave and depart from. The quest for authentic development can only be achieved from peoples' solidarity among themselves. That is, for an effective development that will positively affect those in a community, the recourse and return to their co-

³⁸⁵ Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria. 2009. *Salt of the earth and light of the world*. Lagos: Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria Publication – Manual for the Laity, p. 68.

³⁸⁶ Raspotnik, Andreas. Marine Jacob and Ventura, Laura. 2012. *The issue of solidarity in European Union – a discussion paper*. TEPSA Pre-Presidency Conference, June 14-15, 2012, p. 1.

operation is a necessity, because every individual is accorded the regard and respect of being part of the entire community – no one is alien to the community.

In an attempt to achieve authentic development in Africa through solidarity and co-operation in building virile community, the principle of subsidiarity and option for the poor must necessarily be emphasised and implemented. The principle of subsidiarity (a principle in Catholic social doctrines) holds that government should undertake only those initiatives, which exceed the capacity of individuals or private groups acting independently. It is an attempt to articulate a middle course between *laissez-faire* capitalism on the one hand and the various kinds of communism, which subordinate the individual to the state, on the other. In other words, any activity that can be performed by a more decentralised entity should be. The principle was further developed by Pius XI's encyclical that, "It is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry."³⁸⁷ This principle is a bulwark of limited government and personal freedom. It conflicts with the passion for unnecessary centralisation and bureaucratic patterns. Here, John Paul II reiterates that,

The State must contribute to the achievement of these goals both directly and indirectly. Indirectly and according to the *principle of subsidiarity*, by creating favourable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity, which will lead to abundant opportunities for employment and sources of wealth. Directly and according to the *principle of solidarity*, by defending the weakest, by placing certain limits on the autonomy of the parties who determine working conditions, and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum support for the unemployed worker.³⁸⁸

The principle of subsidiarity, is for the public authorities towards intervening in social and economic life of a society, in order to encourage and complement private initiatives while under the option for the poor, development should not be left in the hands of the better-offs to get richer who are known generally to exploit the worse-offs.

³⁸⁷ Pius XI. 1931. *Quadragesimo anno* – An Encyclical Letter, No. 79.

³⁸⁸ John Paul II. 1991. *Centesimus annus* - An Encyclical Letter, No. 15 (Author's italics).

Democratic Ideology

Democratic ideology, from the cultural understanding, has been accepted by many African scholars and political elite in the quest for development in Africa. Here, it should be known, from the outset, that there are various forms of democracy as the way it is being practised in one society could be different from others. No single word is so abused and so easily misunderstood as democracy, like also the concepts of justice, equality and development among others. States claim to be democratic in the same way that they claim to pursue a foreign policy of peace. Usually, it is possible for us to distinguish peace from war, but it is not easy to decide whether a state is democratic. In the words of Kofi Busia, “the difficulty about democracy is that countries with quite different political ideologies use the same word to describe their respective systems. This is no less true of Africa than of Europe where countries both of the ‘East’ and ‘West’ claim to be democratic.”³⁸⁹ The notion about democracy is nebulous, and consequently carries with it the unprecedented problem of universally acceptable definition and description. The concept of democratic ideology could mean a system of government, a rule of the people, a political system, a set of institutions, a set of ideals, and a functional rule of law depending on the schools of thoughts individual scholars belong.

Democratic ideology must be studied and examined by looking for its major features as its contents. These features are embedded both in the ideals and principles of democracy. Busia, quoting Nnamdi Azikwe, “Democracy must include a recognised opposition, and without the opposition, ‘democracy becomes a sham’; insisting on two other ingredients as essential of democracy; the Rule of Law, and the enforcement of fundamental Human Rights.”³⁹⁰ There are also other principles and conditions that are of necessity in democracy like: equality, liberty, informed consent, and majority rule/minority rights, among others. Any form of democratic ideology without these conditions could not be accepted as one. And it is on the basis of the above that democratic ideology will play functional roles in the quest for the attainment of development in African continent. It should be known that democracy is not limited to place as there are various forms about its

³⁸⁹ Busia, Kofi. 1975. *The ingredients of democracy. Readings in African political thought.* Mutiso, Gideon-Cyrus. & Rohio, S. Eds. London; Heinemann Educational Books, p. 453.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 453

adaptations and domestications to particular cultural backgrounds. This is so as democratic ideology is positioned and established on regard and respect for every human being; and it is because of this positioning that we can talk from both its principles and ideals it brings to man and his society. It should also be borne in mind that democratic ideology has been in existence since time immemorial in African settings, as examples abound either as a form of plutocracy, gerontocracy, among other various forms, with their attendant checks and balances in different manners.

While societies in Africa crave for the acceptance of democratic ideology, which by all standards have greater effects on development is so because of the pluralistic nature of Africa. Pluralism, in this sense, is a necessity in any democratic society as it allows for differing notions about issues in the society. This is an advantage that democratic societies should welcome and encourage because it means that no one is totally dependent on any single organisation, group and among others. Such total dependence in any society or the totalist temptation threatens freedom and democracy, for it would mean the exercise of monopolistic power over the individual. Busia opines that, "Democracy caters for pluralistic societies. . . They consist not only of different religious groups but also of many different ethnic groups, and a growing number of different associations, such as trade unions, farmers, traders', youth, or women's associations, and the likes."³⁹¹ Pluralism, in democratic societies, presumes that the enforcement of basic rights of citizenship and of exit rights, suitably understood will suffice. Any form of associational integrity requires a broad though unlimited right of groups to define their own membership to exclude as well as include, and a pluralist polity will respect that right.

Sekou Toure sets the idea of democracy, as the basis for development in Africa, where he raises fundamental ingredients that democratic ideology must have in order to engender authentic development in Africa. He enumerates on the rule of law; separation of powers; equality; unity, which is founded on common aspirations and interests among others. In his work, Toure avers that:

No man can be considered inferior to another. His equality is a measure of his liberty, and the solidarity which governs the quality of his relationship with the various group organisations to which he belongs, ranging from his family to the whole of society, is a

³⁹¹ Ibid. p. 455.

measure of his unity with humanity. This is why racialism, regionalism, and religious sectarianism are objectively reactionary and inhuman.³⁹²

This is basically built on the integrity of man in order to crave for development in the society, that until there is regard and respect for the humanity of man, we cannot talk of development. That is, there must necessarily be harmonious relationships among people and persons with different interests, opinions and beliefs in the community of men. The comfort that man has in the society resides in the respect for humanity that everyone shares from. He writes that, "His happiness and his continual climb towards perfection necessarily lead to the infinite consolidation of his internal and external equilibrium, which characterises the objective and moral condition of his life and the continual improvement of his relationship with the society in which he lives or acts."³⁹³ This, is examined, by stating that the happiness of every man is derivable and derived from the happiness of the community in which he lives and participates in. Toure opines that:

A man's equilibrium, his ability is necessarily a function of the place he holds within society, according to whether he finds protection there for his liberty, his dignity, and his interests. And the social equilibrium can only be acquired through a democracy of a fundamentally social nature, which makes room for individual liberty, equality, and responsibility, in order to bring to light through individual personalities the homogeneous personality of its social group: a democracy which directs its actions in all spheres of life towards a solution of the general problems of human existence.³⁹⁴

Development issue, is one of the fundamental problems, that man has and this could be resolved when done in relation of man to others in his community as 'no one is an island unto himself'. That is to say, the interests (rights) of everyone count in the discourse of what development entails in the society. Respect for the dignity of man carries other implications beside the principle that the dignity of all men should be equally respected. Every man, according to democratic belief, should have certain civil liberties without no social order could be characteristic as democratic. It is through these platforms that development in all aspects of human endeavours could be achieved.

³⁹² Toure, Sekou. 1975. National democracy. *Readings in African political thought*. Mutiso, Gideon-Cyrus. & Rohio, S. Eds. London; Heinemann Educational Books, p. 484 (Author's italics).

³⁹³ Ibid. pp. 484-485.

³⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 485.

Kwasi Wiredu argues in support of democratic ideology from the consensus platform for African and other Global South societies. This form of consensus is that, “. . . the principle of consensus was a premeditated option. It was based on the belief that *ultimately* the interests of all members of society are the same, although their immediate perceptions of those interests may be different.”³⁹⁵ He further argues that:

And, on this view, the means to the objective is simply rational discussion. . . Dialogue, of course, presupposes not just two parties (at least), but also two conflicting positions: “One head does not hold council.” Nor was any suggestion that one voice might be entitled to be heard to the exclusion of others countenanced for one moment: “Two heads are better than one,” says another maxim.³⁹⁶

In this utmost realm canvassing for consensus in the midst of myriads of voices in human society, the suggestion for a rational and communicative consensus is a fundamental one as a popular saying that ‘two good heads are better than one.’ This position calls for human capacity and ability to solve their differences and for more persuasive discourses that will engender human solidarity, which will open up for better understanding essentially as it affects the call for people in positions of authority. Even though it is difficult to achieve rational consensus in any human society, he emphasises that, “the pursuit of consensus was a deliberate effort to go beyond decision by majority opinion.”³⁹⁷ The emphasis is not in any way to look down on the minority in democratic form of political terrain, but ought to be considered because of the procedural aspects that necessitate its practical necessity.

He argues for consensus in the struggle for harmonious relationship in the political landscape in the quest for growth, progress and development of man and the entire society. To him, consensus is the answer to the many problems that Africa faces in its political terrain, as this will cater for everyone’s interest in the society, without relegating one because of majority-minority dichotomy as he avers clearly that:

Consensus is not just an optional bonus. . . it is essential for securing substantive, or what might also be called decisional, representation for representatives and through them for citizens at large. This is nothing short of a matter of fundamental human rights. Consensus as a political decision procedure requires, in principle, that each representative should be persuaded, if not of the optimality

³⁹⁵ Wiredu, Kwasi. 1996. *Cultural universals and particulars*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. p. 185 (Author’s italics).

³⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 186.

³⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 186.

of each decision, at least of its practical necessity, all things considered. . . In a consensus system the voluntary acquiescence of the minority with respect to a given issue would normally be necessary for the adoption of a decision.³⁹⁸

This call, for consensus in the midst of many political options, is set for the general understanding and acceptability of all and sundry in the society. This option, according to him, has been the basis of human survival in the political community of Africans since time immemorial, that must not be pushed aside, by the so-called Western models already brought in, which in one way or the other, are not working for the harmonious relationships of peoples and persons in Africa; although with its own attendant problems as it is easier to arrive at majority opinions than on consensus. He adds that, “I would like to emphasise that the pursuit of consensus was a deliberate effort to go beyond decision by majority opinion. It is easier to secure majority agreement than to achieve consensus.”³⁹⁹

Using the Ashanti people of Ghana, and other cultural backgrounds from all over Africa to examine his consensus plea, which has been the traditional mode of politics through the various stages of life in Africa and through its political leanings – gerontocracy, plutocracy, monarchy, among others, he proposes that reconciliation is used to mitigate against diverse opinions in the society instead of absolutions, collisions and even recriminations. To him, “Reconciliation is, in fact, a form of consensus. It is a restoration of goodwill through a reappraisal of the importance and significance of the initial bones of contention. It does not necessarily involve a complete identity of moral or cognitive opinions. . . Similarly, consensus does not in general entail total agreement. To begin with, consensus usually presupposes an original position of diversity.”⁴⁰⁰ This, to him, will engender political harmony, trust and ‘normalcy’ among the populace, which at the end will not make reference to some as minority and others as majority, of which the model being practised today envisages and clearly creating tensions all over Africa and its peoples.

Cultural Humanism

³⁹⁸ Ibid, pp. 189-190.

³⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 186.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. pp. 182-183.

Our understanding of cultural humanism here, means a form of national culture, which examines trustworthiness in all spheres against the culture of corruption and other social vices holding sway in the continent of Africa, which are affecting the quest for authentic and enduring development. Tedros Kiros opines that, “At present Africa is characterised by the conspicuous presence of poverty, hunger, senseless wars, and incompetent and alienated elites. These characteristics are partly the legacies of slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism, and partly attributable to the African conception of the self and the external nature.”⁴⁰¹ It should be looked into (that is the crisis of Africa) from the problem of the culture of corruption that is widely gaining ‘acceptance’ from all fronts. It is because of this culture of corruption that there is the need for the new culture of rational morality, which will take care of all with the sole aim of building together for the benefits of all.

Corruption and its off-springs have created great gaps among the peoples of Africa thereby affecting their contribution to the building of a virile society because of social inequities. Thus, Ehusani clearly puts across that:

What is wrong today is not only the manifestation of gross social inequities, but the fact that dubious values now form the predominant aspiration of people in the society. . . A person’s character no longer means much to many in our society. It is not who you are, but what you have that matters these days. And it does not seem to matter how you acquired what you have. There are people in society whose wealth is acquired by brazen robbery. There are others that are known drug barons. Some are known to have become rich by sycophancy and political prostitution. Yet they are left to enjoy their loot. So wealth, and the power it brings have become the object of public adulation.⁴⁰²

What we propose here is a kind of morality that will alleviate the many sufferings of Africans from the ‘disease’ of corruption, which is eating deep into the veins and bone-marrow of Africans, especially the elite. Here, the appeal to moral renewal in our cultural humanistic platform will compel people to choose a better option that everyone would be able to go, with logical necessity in which positive realities will be acquired.

⁴⁰¹ Kiros, Tedros. 1992. *Moral philosophy and development: the human condition in Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Centre for International Studies Monographs in International Studies, Africa Series No. 61, p. 137.

⁴⁰² Ehusani, George. 1996. *A prophetic church*. Ede: Provincial Pastoral Institute Publications, pp. 12-13.

This approach to development is a recognition not only of the moral values, integrity and dignity that each human being has, but that it will be based on the utmost need to address the basic human needs for sustenance of life as man is both ends and means of development. In discussing this moral renewal and reconstruction towards the attainment of development in Africa, Kwame Nkrumah critically examines the basis of consciencism as the trigger by which Africa could assess and achieve authentic development in which he devotes much analysis to the issue of standard of morality, which should be based on informed reason. He lends his voice to the ideology, as that which morality is built upon for the survival of the society that, “Just as a morality guides and seeks to connect the actions of millions of persons, so an ideology aims at uniting the actions of millions towards specific and definite goals, notwithstanding that an ideology can be largely implicit. . . An ideology, even when it is revolutionary, does not merely express the wish that a present social order should be abolished.”⁴⁰³ In this understanding, there is the utmost need in the society for a kind of morality that will be acceptable by the people of such community for the standard running of the community, which could either be written and/or oral for the use of the community. Here, he unequivocally looks at morality as “a network of principles and rules for the guidance and appraisal of conduct. And upon these rules and principles we constantly fall back. . . We share within the same society a body of moral principles and rules garnered from our own experience and that of our forbears.”⁴⁰⁴

Using renewed morality, as the tool for social control, shows the significance that it is for total emancipation and humanisation in the society. He articulates this opinion in a clearer manner that:

The ideology of a society is total. It embraces the whole life of a people, and manifests itself in their class – structure, history, literature, art, religion. It also requires a philosophical statement. If an ideology is integrative in intent, . . . then, its instruments can also be seen as instruments of social control. It is even possible to look upon ‘coercion’ as a fundamental idea in society. This way of looking at society readily gives rise to the idea of a social contract.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰³ Nkrumah, Kwame. 1970. *Consciencism: philosophy and ideology for decolonisation*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 58.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid. pp. 59-60.

And for this ideology to be seen as the engine room and guide to societal continual development in all aspects, as the centre of discourse in Africa is founded and established on and in man; hence, looking at the activities of man from their social structure, that is, from communalism, as the essence of man, is seen in his integrity and humanness. By this standard of viewing man in the discourse of survival towards development, he avers:

The traditional face of Africa includes an attitude towards man which can only be described, in its social manifestation, as being socialist. This arises from the fact that man is regarded in Africa as primarily a spiritual being, a being endowed originally with a certain inward dignity, integrity and value. . . This idea of the original value of man imposes duties of a socialist kind upon us. Herein lies the theoretical basis of African communalism. This theoretical basis expressed itself on the social level in terms of institutions such as the clan, underlining the initial equality of all and the responsibility of many for one.⁴⁰⁶

This is to say that the original position of man, in African cultural milieu, is erected on the foundation of communalism where one exists for others and others exist for one in a society that caters for the interests of all, as it caters for the interest of the individuals.

This form of morality, which will negate the 'culture and disease' of corruption, is seen from the understanding of egalitarian society, which is built upon Nkrumah's philosophical consciencism, as he calls his theory. His theory is a form of philosophical knowledge that looks for the rejuvenation of African people in their cultural environment as development should and ought to be construed. As he says:

Our philosophy must find its weapon in the environment and living conditions of the African people. It is from those conditions that the intellectual content of our philosophy must be created. The emancipation of the African continent is the emancipation of man. This requires two aims: first, the restitution of the egalitarianism of human society, and second, the logistic mobilisation of all our resources towards the attainment of that restitution.⁴⁰⁷

In his egalitarian discourse, man ought to be treated as subject of development and not as object alone, that is, man is seen as end-product of all aspects of such humanisation and not alone as means to the end. This means that the search for a better approach/model to development should move from a predominantly economic,

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid. pp. 68-69.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 78.

scientific/technological and physical understanding that the Enlightenment project stands for, where men regard themselves as only people dominated by the hegemonic idea that economic worth and scientific worth are the primary and ultimate worth of development, towards a more humane concern, which recognises man as its principal subject and supreme objective. This is because exploitations in all forms negate the basis of egalitarianism. Hence, his theory of consciencism towards development is that:

Exploitation and class-subjection are alike contrary to consciencism. By reason of its egalitarian tenet, philosophical consciencism seeks to promote individual development, but in such a way that the conditions for the development of all become the conditions for the development of each; that is, in such a way that the individual development does not introduce such diversities as to destroy the egalitarian basis. The social-political practice also seeks to co-ordinate social forces in such a way as to mobilise them logistically for the maximum development of society along true egalitarian lines. For this, planned development is essential.⁴⁰⁸

The above, summarises his intention towards the development of African continent, which hitherto would have definite and significant effects on other societies of the Global South. This ideology of morality, as based on egalitarianism, will be plausible and possible, if and only if, there is the liquidation and extermination of colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their ramifications. This also entails Western models of development from the modernist to dependency theory and finally to the neo-liberal theory of development of which the Bretton Woods institutions stand for. And, in order to achieve this goal, sound education is a necessity in the attainment of authentic development in African continent. Here, Kiros argues that:

African educators are advised to reeducate themselves in order to educate the African generation of students to be responsible citizens for whom thinking or philosophising under the guidance of self-generated principles would become the norm. . . thinking through self-generated moral principles will develop individuals in Africa capable of looking at themselves as moral/rational beings who have the capacity for and to inhabit the horizons of others.⁴⁰⁹

This view stipulates that for the survival and authentic development of Africa and Africans, good and sound education is a necessity towards all round development for

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 98.

⁴⁰⁹ Kiros. p. 158.

the citizenry. It is when there is sound and good education that there could be self-reliance in Africa, as Nyerere clamours for in his *Education for Self-Reliance*⁴¹⁰, that is, a form of education that will be African in nature and content. It is when there is sound education, which facilitates the interests of people that its products will be able to foster goals and objectives of working for the common good of the society in which they live.

Human Condition through Security and Welfare

The thrust of development is the focus on people as the ultimate objective. Fundamentally, the discourse of development could also be examined from the purview of security in any society. It is a truism that development could only thrive when there is adequate security of lives and property. It is in an environment of peace and tranquility that development could take place; this is to say that security is ensuring a better today and a brighter future for the citizenry. This is because human security will also be a reality when there is good governance, which is dependent on both leadership and followership structures in any human society. It is pertinent to note from the outset the significance of knowledge-based society as the foundation for security towards authentic development. This means that security of lives and property is premised on the fact of adequate knowledge necessary for action. Thus, as one of the fundamental principles of development, human security for development is based on the level, attainment and utilisation of knowledge, which will exhibit competence in ensuring peace, order and obedience to the law.

The problem of security, among the Third World countries, especially in Africa, is seen mainly in the inability of the various governments and the state agencies to consistently and institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well-being of the citizens despite massive militarism and build up of military institutions for regime security or the cult of personality of the ruler. This weak point is easily seen in the serious tendency towards fear, chaos and conflicts as these arise from situations of violence and instability. Philip Ujomu and Felix Olatunji argue that:

The problem of national and human security in Africa is seen mainly in the inability of most governments and the state agencies

⁴¹⁰ Nyerere, Julius. 1968. Education for self-reliance. *Uhuru na ujamaa: freedom and socialism – a selection from writings and speeches 1965 – 1967*. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 267-290.

to consistently and institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well-being of the citizens. This situation arises from pervasive social injustices and conflicts generating the serious tendency towards fear, chaos and conflicts arising from situations of threats, violence and instability in the post-colonial African state. The urgent task of national integration in many postcolonial African states necessitates an interrogation of the normative and empirical conditions for a culturally sensitive idea of security.⁴¹¹

It may be noted in the case of a state like Nigeria that the vast size and diversity of the military and para-military agencies may not have resulted in a corresponding increase in the maintenance of traditional functions such as the maintenance of security and territorial integrity of the state and society, the maintenance of domestic and civil order, the provision of humanitarian services. This situation has ensured the failure in attaining operational efficiency, institutional solidarity, stability, welfare of the people and the over-all development that the people crave for.

It should be clearly understood here that the issue of security, is not only limited to maintenance of order but also based on the basic necessities of life, namely: food, shelter and clothing. These are the basic means of security for man, as without these, we cannot talk of human survival and development. This means that what we call human security is understood as prioritising the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being. Here, Kiros establishes the fact that two indispensable principles for African development are significant, “that of the inalienability of food for those who need it and that of the ending of senseless wars, giving rise to peace and freedom. These are grounded on what we may term *continental thinking*.”⁴¹² This means that security should be looked at, from the discourse of human condition, as it affects peoples and persons of African societies.

This human condition is generated from the basic tenets of human survival as listed above, which stipulates food, shelter and clothing as the basic necessities of life. Bringing Rawls to the discourse of human condition in Africa, he examines the two principles of justice: liberty and wealth, which are relevant to human condition in Africa. On liberty, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all; wealth, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to the

⁴¹¹ Ujomu, Philip *et al.* 2013. The value of human life and a philosophy of national security for Nigeria: some theoretical issues. *Annales Philosophici*, 6, p. 47.

⁴¹² Kiros. pp. 137-138 (Author's italics).

greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. In the justification of Rawlsian thesis, concerning the two principles of justice, Friedrich Hayek corroborates the above that:

The planning for security which has such an insidious effect on liberty is that for security of a different kind. It is planning designed to protect individuals or groups against diminutions of their income, which although in no way deserved yet in a competitive society occur daily, against losses imposing severe hardships having no moral justification yet inseparable from the competitive system. This demand for security is thus another form of the demand for a just remuneration – a remuneration commensurate with the subjective merits and not with the objective results of a man's efforts. This kind of security or justice seems irreconcilable with freedom to choose one's employment.⁴¹³

Kiros notes that:

African resources must be used in such a way that they can be channelled to eventually eliminate the urgent needs of poverty and hunger, and address attendant consequences of mental and physical health, hopelessness, and under-motivation. The second principle is a demand for the duty humans may have in the recognition of freedom for those who think that they are unfree. When the basic human material needs of the African are met, then he or she may be able to think about non-material human needs, such as art and religion.⁴¹⁴

Here, we are talking about creating the priorities of enabling poverty-stricken Africans to feed, and move themselves from the situation they have found and created for themselves. Development will not set in and be achieved unless the poverty nature and level of poor Africans are met and corrected.

Human security forms an important part of people's well-being, and it is an objective of development; that lack of human security has adverse consequences on development. Also, such lack of development, or imbalanced development that involves sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important cause and/or determinant of conflict. It is on the basis of the above that David Hastings avers that:

Human and national security are considered to complement each other when they are in harmonic balance. Human security is considered as multi-dimensional. It addresses people's dignity and sense of self-worth as well as material and physical concerns. It concerns protection from self-centred attempts at hegemony (as

⁴¹³ Hayek, Fredrich. 1994. *The road to serfdom*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 135.

⁴¹⁴ Kiros. pp. 148 – 149.

opposed to people-centric services) by individual, institutional/corporate, or governmental elements. Some specialists consider that poverty and inequality are root impediments to human security.⁴¹⁵

This clearly puts the thoughts across in an unequivocal manner, that development without human security, cannot be attained in the atmosphere of poverty and especially poverty of ideas, which will degenerate into crisis and insecurity of lives and property. It is on this basis that Hayek reiterates two kinds of security that are essential to human survival and development. To him,

These two kinds of security are, first, security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all; and, second, the security of a given standard of life, or of the relative position which one person or group enjoys compared with others; or, as we may put it briefly, the security of minimum income and the security of the particular income a person is thought to deserve.⁴¹⁶

National Human Development Report of 2006 clearly states that, “If human development is concerned with the enlargement of people’s choices, human security allows people to exercise these options safely and freely. . . Human security becomes a condition to exercise and enjoy the basic necessities of human development and must therefore be consistent with people’s human development aspirations.”⁴¹⁷

In discussing about development from security point of view as clearly elaborated and examined above, three critical questions are important in the evaluation of the levels of development in any society as Dudley Seers discusses. The questions about inequality, poverty and unemployment are critical in the discussion of human development and these questions clearly base their foundation on the security of the peoples. Dudley Seers puts the analyses thus:

The questions to ask about a country’s development are therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result ‘development’,

⁴¹⁵ Hastings, David. 2009. *From development to human security: a prototype human security index*. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP), A Working Paper – WP/09/03, p. 4.

⁴¹⁶ Hayek, F. (1994), *The Road to Serfdom*, p. 133.

⁴¹⁷ “National Human Development Report of 2006: Liberia” in *Peace, Conflict and Development in Africa: A Reader*, p. 47.

even if per capita income doubled. This applies of course to the future too. A 'plan' which conveys no targets for reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality can hardly be considered a 'development plan'.⁴¹⁸

It is when these questions are declining, according to Seers, that we can talk of development, and which will align with the objectives of development in the society. Development would be meaningful when peoples' choices and opportunities are enlarged enough for them to have access to resources necessary for a decent life. These choices and aspirations concern their survival in the society that security of lives and property will be in tandem with the objectives of development as discussed in the first chapter. These are, namely: to increase the availability of basic life-sustaining goods such as food, shelter and feeding; to raise the level of living standard through the provision of more jobs, good education, among others; and to expand the ranges of economic and social choices in order to free people from ignorance and servitude. Philip Ujomu and Felix Olatunji reiterate that,

What is special and appealing about a good social philosophy is that its basic principles can easily be adapted to the different facets of social and national life. It is this kind of philosophy that a society desiring peace and progress needs. The quest for a philosophy for Nigeria, for instance, cannot be separated from the recognition of the value of human life. This basic principle will allow for the proper and effective utilisation of the principles of human dignity, solidarity (which is already embedded in the social practice of communalism) and subsidiarity (the freedom to release individual potential for personal and social growth). However, such a philosophy should abide by the core value of respect for the principle of the value of human life of all social members, understood as respect for the dignity of man in his freedom and responsibility.⁴¹⁹

This is what we refer to as human security in the discourse of authentic development in African society as the duo posit that, "All of these elements make sense when tied to the goals of security, which comes from the affirmation of life itself, and the value of life. The work of preservation of human and institutional value has become a major aim of security in a developing society. Security is nothing other than the totality of

⁴¹⁸ Seers, Dudley. 1969. *The meaning of development*. Institute of Development Studies, No 44, p. 5.

⁴¹⁹ Ujomu, Philip *et al.* 2017. Security as freedom in the quest for the value of human life: a conceptual analysis. *Tattva Journal of Philosophy*, 9.1, p. 64.

the strategies and efforts to place a value on human life, to make human life worth living.”⁴²⁰

Justice

The discourse of justice in any society is unquestioned, and is closely linked to the idea of impartiality of persons in the society. The biblical “Golden Rule” presupposes a kind of justice to those in the society. Kant’s categorical imperative deals with the notion that justice and equality ought to be given and granted justly to all; his moral reciprocity of doing to others as one would have them done oneself, is closely related to the idea of not doing evil to others, and doing things at the expense of others in the community.

Whereas studying and researching into the issues of value-laden discourses especially that of social justice towards an enduring development in any society, is certainly necessary and important; focusing on conceptualisations and derivations that must be experienced and actualised towards attaining authentic development in Africa, is also germane. And central to the discourse of justice are issues of equality, equity, accountability, responsiveness, transparency, option for the poor and subsidiarity. These values are so important in any society for the development of a society in all its ramifications without leaving any facet of the society unattended to. Kabila reiterates, as quoted by Muderhwa, that:

Development is first and foremost a question of political vision, of managerial culture, of order, of discipline and of ethics. This being the case, to attain our objectives, we must do everything to resolutely engage a veritable morale revolution. We must banish and punish without complacency, the attack of life and human dignity, rape, tribalism, regionalism, favouritism, irresponsibility, theft, corruption, the embezzlement of state funds, scandalous enrichment and other vices.⁴²¹

This is a resonation of the conceptualisation of attaining justice towards the quest for development as a society. In like manner, Oladipo is of the opinion that “. . . development process is not an abstraction, the integrity of which can be measured simply in quantitative terms, . . . Rather, it is a process of social transformation, which

⁴²⁰ Ibid. p. 65.

⁴²¹ Muderhwa, Vincent. 2012. Fundamental pillars of culture of peace in the Great Lakes region: a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Ewusi, Samuel. ed. *Weaving peace: essays on peace, governance and conflict transformation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa*. Trafford Publishing, p. 98.

involves the replacement of those factors that inhibit the capacity of the individual for self-direction and the promotion of social cooperation with those which promote these ideals. In short, it is a process whose essence concerns the quality of life (including the quality of social relations) of the people.”⁴²² A plethora of significant issues, concerning development, is the factor of the major senses of development, which are the tangible and the intangible (moral) senses, as Oladipo writes that:

The tangible aspect of development is concerned with material progress. It involves the control and exploitation of the physical environment through the application of the results of science and technology. The primary goal of this process, of course, is human well-being, which involves, among other things: the eradication of certain human-demeaning social phenomena, such as poverty, illiteracy, and low-life expectancy . . .⁴²³

This means that it involves the reduction of social inequity, which globally is a major source of conflicts among people, and the promotion of positive social values such as tolerance, compassion, cooperation, among others. Although the tangible aspect of development is the most visible, the intangible is very crucial. This is so because it is that which enhances the capacity of the individual to actually shape his or her own life without being insensitive to the common good.⁴²⁴ From the moral angle of development, it is a truism that no society or community could be acclaimed to be developed when it neglects the worse-offs. This is the case that there should be equal distribution of the societal wealth to the worse-offs, consistent with the just savings principle and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, which John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice*, has discussed.

An aspect of justice, which is sacrosanct to development in Africa today, is examined from the realm of liberation from oppression and social discrimination, which must be a watch-word for development discourse. Donald Door argues thus:

Alongside the economic problem of the yawning gap between the rich and the poor, there is a more obviously political issue: some individuals, groups, classes, races and nations are oppressing others . . . Oppression takes place within nations as well as between them. The people of many countries today are crushed down by repressive governments. These make full use of heavily armed security forces; torture and intimidation are

⁴²² Oladipo, Olusegun. 2009. *Philosophy and social reconstruction in Africa*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, pp. 96 – 97.

⁴²³ Ibid., p. 95.

⁴²⁴ Ibid., p. 95.

common; and the most sophisticated technology is used to spy on anybody suspected of being subversive.⁴²⁵

It is only when there is liberation, which is built on justice, that development could be noticed and enjoyed in any human society. Here, liberation from all forms - politics, social, culture, education, religion, among others - will grant and give freedom to the people and raise their egos in the attainment of enduring development for the society. Elechi Amadi opines that, "inequality exists because, first, individuals are not equally gifted and, second, society often discriminates against some of its members on the basis of race, creed, ideology, class or sex . . . Inequality arising from discrimination dies very hard indeed. It exists in all countries of the world, and it is almost always decried."⁴²⁶

Door emphasises on cultural oppression, which is seen as a set-back to development, especially in Africa. He reiterates that, "another form of oppression is cultural. Minority groups in many countries of the world are treated as second-class citizens. Their languages and traditions are ignored and despised. At times, this is a matter of official government policy. More commonly, it arises simply through the insensitivity of governments and of the dominant political groupings whom they represent."⁴²⁷ Amadi Elechi adds that, "the clamour for egalitarianism goes on unabated because much of the noise comes from underprivileged individuals and nations, who always outnumber the privileged by far."⁴²⁸ In this quest for development, cultural liberation should not be seen as *extra*. Rather, it must be at the heart of the struggle as a resolution to the development challenges confronting Africa, which demands an incorporation of cultural knowledge into development.

Another form of justice that will lead to the evolution of enduring development in Africa is that of justice for women from gender oppression. The call for affirmative action from the women-folk, is a fundamental condition, towards the development of the society. A society that relegates the women-folk cannot and will never develop in all encompassing manner. Here, Door avers that, "the struggle against political oppression is a major item on the social justice agenda. But there is another liberation struggle going on in our world – a struggle to overcome

⁴²⁵ Door, Donald. 1991. *The social justice agenda: justice, ecology, power and the church*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, p. 14.

⁴²⁶ Elechi. p. 65.

⁴²⁷ Door. p. 16.

⁴²⁸ Elechi. p. 66.

discrimination and injustice based on gender.”⁴²⁹ An essential insight of feminism today is that society is dominated by and represented by men. The language of public discourses uses male references to speak for women. The laws of inheritance favour men; professional advancement was and still is different for women whose place was supposed to be in home.

In all fronts – family, language, labour, politics, culture, economics, religious and a host of others - there is injustice against womanhood. Door emphasises that, “the issue of gender oppression is wider and deeper than that of overcoming overt sexual discrimination . . . oppression and injustice of all kinds stem from the way men have tried to dominate other people and the Earth.”⁴³⁰ This rejection of gender influences will amount to a myriad of opportunities in the quest for authentic development for societies in the Global South particularly in Africa. In the quest for development in Africa, using the analysis of Ehusani, “there is the utmost need for freedom from all forms of injustices that deny the people their right place in the society saying that the men and women of our society aspire for freedom from all those forces that oppress them. They want to be set free from the unjust socio-political order, which condemns them to marginal existence. They want to be delivered of those customs and habits, those attitudes and values or dis-values that generate, perpetuate or glorify oppression. They want to be free from grinding poverty, joblessness, homelessness, widespread violence, insecurity and disease.”⁴³¹ The aforementioned issues, resonate the idea and notion, that justice in all aspects of human, is valuable and cannot be dispensed with, in our quest for authentic development in Africa.

5.5 Conclusion

Within the framework and ambience of the concerns of peoples and persons to the discourse of authentic development, our focus in this chapter has been devoted to the reconceptualisations and derivations that must be experienced and achieved towards the attainment of development in Africa because of its particular interest and importance. And to get to this point in our discussions, we have argued extensively that cultural knowledge is critical towards the achievement of authentic development in all societies. This means that it is imperative that cultural understanding of

⁴²⁹ Door, p. 22.

⁴³⁰ Ibid, p. 23.

⁴³¹ Ehusani, p. 28.

development is integral to enhancing strategies for the over-all analysis of development to the realities of societies, quality of life and well-being of peoples in Africa. In line with our intent in this chapter, we have argued that an adequate understanding of authentic development in Africa today, is one that is founded on man as the subject and centre of development, which in itself, is brought out from the cultural understanding of the society. Our understanding of cultural knowledge is based on the belief systems of the people, which are seen as the foundation and clearly different from the sources of knowledge, in the Western tradition of epistemology. We argued that the systemic nature in belief systems is the interrelation among several beliefs that people identify and uphold for their commitment and survival. Every human being has a belief system that he/she utilises, and it is through this mechanism(s) that we individually and communally make sense of the world around us.

The starting point of this chapter on the necessity of cultural knowledge towards the achievement of authentic development dove-tailed into analysing salient and fundamental conditions that are necessary to the practical realisation of authentic development in Africa. At this juncture, issues about freedom, solidarity towards the achievement of common good, democratic ideology, cultural humanism and human security were examined in the quest for intent to be achieved. We did examine here that it is only in atmosphere of those conditions among others that could provide a kind of social order in which development in all its ramifications could be achieved. The argument has been centred on man as the subject of development with its processes and outcomes revolving around people. While the processes of and about development centre on the expansion of people's choices; its outcomes are based on the improved quality of human life, as argued for in this work. This ultimately means that attention should be shifted to people and not necessarily on structures that are built on economic/scientific foundations alone. Such attention, according to our understanding, should be based and founded on cultural knowledge of the people, in order for them to solve their problems by themselves. This means that inclusion and participation of people, from their cultural knowledge, are essential for the attainment of authentic development in African societies.

CONCLUSION

Within the context of this study, we have examined and discussed the significance and relevance of cultural knowledge to development. That is, cultural knowledge is imperative and integral for the over-all analysis of development and of societies, quality of life as well as the well-being of peoples as we have argued above that development is about man, that is, it is man-centred. Cultural knowledge is a change process that is characterised by increased skills, capacity, productivity and equality in the distribution of social products within the society. This involves a process whereby an individual develops self-respect and becomes more self confident, self-reliant, co-operative and consciously disposed to economic, social, political, religious values, among others.

We have arrived at this position through our analyses of what development is. We have examined, in the five chapters of the thesis, so many variations and conceptualisations of what development is. In that wise, the first chapter analysed different notions of development. We argued in that chapter that development is more than the passage from poverty level to the affluent stage because it carries along not only from its economic and/or technological dimension but greater human integrity, dignity, justice among others are significant. This means that development is a process through which man strives to improve the conditions of his life. Towards this understanding, we examined development from its many sides, that is, as an unfolding and multi-dimensional concept. Efforts were made also to look at it from market forces and the model of freedom as a necessity towards a clear understanding of the concept. And since the discourse about development is a multi-prone process that has several dimensions, we also made efforts to examine it from its different dimensions and theories as these dimensions affect man at his individual and social levels. At individual level, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being. While at the social level, it implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships.

We come to this point, in the second chapter, to establish the link between knowledge and development stemming from opinions of some major scholars in the field of philosophy. This was the centre-piece of what the third chapter did. Here, we examined how the scholars considered – Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Georg Hegel and Karl Marx - view the necessity of having knowledge before

development could be set in and make plausible for the use of man in understanding himself and the nature that surrounds him. We argued that knowledge promotes social change and the essence of knowledge is to liberate and expand the horizons of people's intelligence. It is aimed at mobilising the people towards a patriotic zeal to transforming the society. That is, knowledge is crucial to human survival and sustenance.

Our attention, after discussing extensively on the link between knowledge and development, was focused on Arturo Escobar's ethnographic model, which was the centre-piece of the third chapter. The notions of culture and cultural knowledge were examined in the fourth chapter, where we extensively argued that cultural knowledge, is seen and accepted as the means of educating the community, in the process of development. This is clearly understood and examined from the basis of value systems and structural functionings of a people, of which the classifications considered and discussed, are significant. We equally argued that cultural knowledge is determined by the nature of its existence as this involves diverse experiences of living and observations of a people either in its current nature or from its past generations.

In the fifth chapter of this work, we argued that cultural knowledge is the hallmark that guides the process of development for particular and objective set. By this, it is stated that cultural knowledge is integral to enhancing strategies for the overall analysis of quality of life and well-being of peoples in Africa. And in order to achieve the objectives, some fundamental conditions were considered, namely: cultural identity, solidarity, democratic ideology, justice, cultural humanism, and security and welfare as they are built and founded on cultural knowledge by which Africa can practically achieve and attain authentic development.

At this juncture, we identify some ideas and values that are of general significance to our arguments in all the chapters. Our idea of cultural knowledge is seriously a way of life that man must not be taken away from his cultural milieu. This means that man lives and understands development through his cultural underpinnings. This is set to mean that cultural knowledge, in the quest for authentic development, is all about life promotion, which is centred on man. This will be achieved, as we have argued, through the core values as identified and discussed. While some scholars consider the justification of development from the many spheres that have been examined, our contribution is that for development to be authentic and

meaningful, it has to be based on cultural knowledge. It will be of no value to think of development from purely economic cum technological patterns, that is, to conceive development solely in terms of material prosperity as this will lead to disintegration of societies if patterned on economic or material terms. It makes it one of the reasons this exercise is germane as it considers development from other levels that are beyond material possessions, essentially and practically from its cultural understanding.

This is in consonance with the positions of some scholars and the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria that, “a society risks disintegration if it patterns development solely in economic terms, ignoring the cultural, ethical and religious dimensions. Material goods are necessary for the survival and improvement of the quality of life; however, the human person is much more than the material.”⁴³² Dipo Irele argues that, “genuine development has to be rooted in the cultural values of society. Any development that is detached from the culture of the people concerned would be meaningless . . .”⁴³³ This is also re-affirmed and re-echoed by Benedict XVI that, “Co-operation for development must not be concerned exclusively with the economic dimension: it offers a wonderful opportunity for encounter between cultures and peoples.”⁴³⁴ In his understanding of Paul VI’s *Populorum Progressio*, Benedict XVI portrays that, “The truth of development consists in its completeness: if it does not involve the whole man and every man, it is not true development.”⁴³⁵ Our analysis is reinforced, by Ade-Ajayi’s view, that development is about people, which will be built and patterned on cultural knowledge. That is, an attempt to remove or alienate development project outside the peoples will lead such project into ruins, miscalculations and anarchies as Gilbert Rist argues that, “The ‘law of the market’ places on stage egositical, atomised individuals devoid of social and moral obligations, who are interested only in the exchange of goods and not at all in their fellow-beings.”⁴³⁶

⁴³² Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria. 2009. *Salt of the earth and light of the world: manual for the laity*. Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria Publications, No. 167.

⁴³³ Irele, Dipo. 2010. Economic and social stability in Africa. *The development philosophy of Eammanuel Onyechere Osigwe Anyiam-Osigwe*. Dipo Irele and Adebola Ekanola. Eds. Ibadan: Hope Publications, Vol. 3, p. 99.

⁴³⁴ Benedict XVI. 2009. *Caritas in veritate – charity in truth*. An Encyclical Letter, No. 59.

⁴³⁵ Ibid. No. 18.

⁴³⁶ Rist, Gilbert. 2008. *The history of development – from western origins to global faith*. London and New York: Zed Books, p. 248.

The argument has been centred on cultural knowledge, which is clearly rooted in the belief systems of the people. Stace Lindsay argues that, “Culture is a significant determinant of a nation’s ability to prosper because culture shapes individuals’ thoughts about risk, reward, and opportunity.”⁴³⁷ This means that development should not be seen and accepted as purely an economic cum technological and/or scientific phenomenon, but rather a multi-dimensional process, involving re-organisation and re-orientation of entire economic, social, political, religious systems, among others. It is a process of improving the quality of all human lives with three equally important aspects. These are: raising peoples’ standard of living; creating conditions conducive to the growth of peoples’ self-esteem through the establishment of social, political and economic systems and institutions, which promote human dignity and respect; and increasing peoples’ freedom to choose by enlarging the range of their choice variables in form of varieties of goods and services. These are essentially built on cultural knowledge of the people for the survival of their world. This is to state that development must be human in nature, contents and aspirations. Thus, when development is human and centred on man, it involves a process whereby an individual develops self-respect and becomes more self-confident, self-reliant, co-operative and consciously disposed to values inherent in the society that he/she lives. Our submission is that cultural knowledge is a necessary tool towards the attainment of authentic development, which is not only human-centred but sensitive to African cultural values and aspirations.

The value added to development, based on the people, portrays that attention should be shifted to people and not on structures that are built on economic, political and social foundations. Here, Francis Njoku considers the issue of holistic development as it requires peoples’ participatory roles. He points out that, “in the conviction that development is to be weaved around people, one can propose a better platform for human flourishing in which people will not only participate in their development but also take control of it under the principles of sustainability and interdependency. After all, human development is at once person-and community-centred.”⁴³⁸ This promotes the necessity of participatory roles of the people towards

⁴³⁷ Lindsay, Trace. 2000. Culture, mental models, and national prosperity. *Culture matters*. Harrison, Lawrence and Huntington, Samuel. eds. New York: Basic Books, p. 282.

⁴³⁸ Njoku, Francis. 2004. Beyond the Western logic of development to initiative-democracy in Africa. *Philosophy and praxis in Africa*. Asiegbu, Martin and Agbakoba, Joseph. Eds. Ibadan: Hope Publications, p. 231.

development as they would be able to make their choices for developmental paradigms in the society.

This submission, that cultural knowledge is the hallmark of authentic development, does not in any way negate the aspirations that borrowing good ideas, ideals and values from other cultural background outside Africa, is totally wrong-headed. In other words, we laid claim to the fact that foreign knowledge should not be super-imposed on the cultural realities of the community, but on the contrary, creates multiplying effects, which will engender authentic development. This is, by all standards, the significance of one's culture to the quest for an enduring development that, "Man comes to a true and full humanity only through culture, that is, through the cultivation of the goods and values of nature. Wherever human life is involved, therefore, nature and culture are quite intimately connected one with the other."⁴³⁹ Hence, borrowing from other cultures, to make one's intent on enduring development a reality, is a necessity as there are other values from other parlands that would be of utmost significance to the survival of one's society essentially as it affects Africa. There is the utmost need to bring African cultural heritage to development discourse. This urges us not to hesitate to recognise the positive contributions of other cultures that can aid the achievement of our goals and the fulfillment of our aspirations in contemporary times. In the words of Olusegun Oladipo, "the need to borrow from other cultures does not imply that one culture is superior to another since no culture is sufficient unto itself".⁴⁴⁰ In all these, therefore, all must exercise strength to develop their level of cultural knowledge as embedded in belief systems; it is in itself a source of development. As the Westerners are concerned, they put their cultural understanding, in their struggles for development. So also, in Africa, for our level of development to be meaningful and authentic, we need to develop important realities and ideals in our culture, which will be able to suit our own level of developmental aspirations and interests.

This proposition enhances the interrogation of cultural knowledge of African conception, which conspicuously differs from the economic/scientific model of the Western spirit. This struggle affirms that there is a viable alternative to the Western notion, which is based on indigenous thoughts and practices. This means that the

⁴³⁹ Second Vatican Council. *Gaudium et spes – pastoral constitution on the church in the modern world*. No. 53.

⁴⁴⁰ Oladipo Olusegun. 1998. *The idea of African philosophy - a critical study of the major orientations in contemporary African philosophy*. Ibadan: Hope Publications, Nigeria, p. 84.

search for a better approach or model to development in Africa must definitely move from a predominantly Western understanding, towards a more humane concern that recognises man as its principal subject and supreme objective, which is clearly rooted in cultural knowledge. The idea of building development on imitations, would clearly lead to destruction, because it would not take along the positions and cultures of people in question into cognizance as evident in Africa today. This means that there should be a conscious effort of linking development with one's culture as it would lead to futility when examining development without considering the people's culture.

The argument is that our understanding of African cultural knowledge is rooted in the belief systems of the people, which are basically beyond the classical epitemic theories of rationalism and empiricism. It is a world-view, structured with assumptions, values, ideals and principles among others upon which a way of perceiving the phenomenal world is based. Belief systems are structures of norms that are inter-related and that vary mainly in the degree in which they are systemic. The systemic nature in belief systems is the inter-relation between several beliefs that people uphold, for their commitment and survival. In a clear manner, belief systems are the stories we tell ourselves to identify and characterise our personal and communal sense of actuality. Every human being has a belief system that he/she utilises, and it is through this mechanism(s) that we individually and communally make sense of the world around us.

It is imperative and significant to note that constitutive elements in the culture of the people as discussed in the fourth chapter are given necessary attention in the over-all interests of Africa. The prevalence of these vital forces points to the commitment of every individual, towards participating meaningfully in the quest for development, which will affect the society positively. That is to re-state the fact that the quest for an enduring development will be futile if all those fundamental conditions are not adhered to. This is because authentic development affects man in his entirety and not some persons or group of persons in the society. According to George Ehusani, "development must necessarily be a human fact. Development has to be integral or 'holistic'. In addition to material advancement, development has to embrace the soul and the spirit of the human person, and the physical environment in

which he or she thrives.”⁴⁴¹ This projects to the fact that, our understanding of development in Africa, must change from essentially economic angle, which has been obsolete and inadequate to cultural dimension. Rist argues:

The aim, then, is to change our perception. To see the world differently. To get the measure of the dead-ends into which we have strayed. To stop believing in promises of a better future from the very people who mortgage it so heavily. To abandon the headlong rush that serves as a panacea. To change our model of society. In fact, our governing model has been around for barely two centuries – which is not much in the history of humanity. For a long time it was able to create illusions. But today it has reached its limits: not only because it is fundamentally obsolete but because it is positively dangerous. We now know why it is suicidal to continue believing in it. The most difficult task, however, is to ensure that knowledge triumphs over faith – and to persuade ourselves that there is a life after ‘development’.⁴⁴²

For development to be, it ought to reflect and elicit the fundamental principles of solidarity, subsidiarity and the option for the poor. It is when these principles are put into consideration that development would be meaningful to the people. This is because development has to be human-centred and integral in the sense of communal interests towards attaining the common good. And when there is investing in people that informs the common good, it is impossible to say that such society is developed because there is no way that a society develops when it neglects its citizens, as they are the most important for authentic and enduring development.

And for development to take centre-stage in African society, the recourse to people’s initiatives, is a must because without the interests of the populace, any idea about development is in vain and that is why Toba-Nah Tipoteh argues that:

The fundamental mistake in efforts directed at finding the way forward is to conduct a search outside of the concrete actions being taken by the African people to improve their living conditions. Development has to do with the people. Therefore, it is not possible to construct a realistic approach to development outside the context of people’s initiatives. . . The crux of the people’s initiatives is that they continue to struggle to adjust the social structure, thus power relations, in their interest. Growth with development can only take

⁴⁴¹ Ehusani, George. 1991. *An Afro-Christian vision “OZOVEHE” - towards a more humanised world*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, p. 243.

⁴⁴² Rist. p. 264.

place if this struggle of the African people were to become successful.⁴⁴³

In reference to the above, the decisions and interests of the people, are of utmost importance. This is to argue that investing in people results in a free and open society where people can pursue their hopes and dreams. It is in such a society where the interests of the people are considered, that development could be achieved. These interests of people are based on their utmost needs and aspirations for survival. That is, development from cultural knowledge is backed by “the discourse of public policy amidst the development of Africa: alleviation of the food crisis, and the preparation of the continent for modernisation with a moral vision – a vision that may result in the construction of an African ethical community.”⁴⁴⁴ This understanding of interests and aspirations by citizens will project the justification of cultural knowledge towards the resolution of development challenges in Africa.

The thesis argued that cultural knowledge is the hallmark that guides the process of development and lays emphasis on the people, which can only be achieved through an analysis of core values, embedded therein that will aid development in Africa. This idea of cultural knowledge is a way of life that man must not be taken away from his cultural milieu. The significance of cultural knowledge in any human endeavour and its efficacy to the understanding of who the people are and what they hope to be in the future can never be ignored as it is the fulcrum on which the society sits and builds. For the survival of human race and that of any society, knowledge is sacrosanct and it differs from one society to another as problems of one society also differ in different societies. This ultimately leads to the fact that the knowledge of one society will determine how such society lives and earns its living. This means that the discourse of cultural knowledge or what might be referred to as indigenous/rural/localised/traditional knowledge opens up; and it should be known from the outset that this form of knowledge is paramount for the survival of the society.

⁴⁴³ Tipoteh, Tobah. 1992. Towards development in the African economy. *Africa: rise to challenge*. Obasanjo, Olusegun & Mosha, F. Eds. Sango-Ota: Africa Leadership Forum Publications, Nigeria, p. 148.

⁴⁴⁴ Kiros, Tedros. 1992. *Moral philosophy and development: the human condition in Africa*. Athens: Ohio University Centre for International Studies Monographs in International Studies, Africa Series No. 61, p. 176.

The thesis adopted Arturo Escobar's ethnographic model, as its theoretical framework, which suggests that societies at the local level should be allowed to pursue their own development as they perceive it without the influences of global capital and other modern choices, and thus a rejection of the entire paradigm from Eurocentric model and the advocacy of new ways of thinking about non-Western societies. However, Escobar's model alongside post-development theory, is insufficient for development in Africa because it is a kind of cultural relativism, which is capable of veering into fundamentalism and does not allow for mutual borrowing. Therefore, a combination of cultural knowledge and Western development theories, through an adaptation of Escobar's model, is needed for development in Africa. This means that an all-inclusive model encapsulating life promotion and centred on man, as both the subject and object, should be adopted as a model of development for Africa. This alternative paradigm will restore and liberate Africa's development efforts from the prison of economic model, as development is culture-derived and culture-driven, with the preservation and improvement of human dignity and welfare as its ultimate objectives. It also determines the conditions of human survival in any society as it poses the practicality of the concept of development to the general populace.

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