UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath Eghosa E. O saghae Ebere Onwudiwe Rotimi T. Suberu Editors m M t m m (PUBLISHERS) LIMITED IBADAN UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY PUBLICATION OF THIS BOOK IS MADE POSSIBLE BY A GRANT FROM FORD FOUNDATION Published by JOHN ARCHERS (Publishers) Limited G.P.O. Box 4345, Dugbe, Ibadan for PROGRAM M E ON ETHNIC AND FEDERAL STUDIES (PEFS) Department of Political Science University of Ibadan e-mail :pefs@skannet.com Telephone: +234 (0) 2 810 7426 U.I. P.O. Box 20359, Ibadan, Nigeria © 2002 by Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies (PEFS) First published 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of PEFS, the copyright owner. ISBN 978-35767-8-X ABOUT TH E PROGRAM M E ON ETHNIC AND FEDERAL STUDIES Africa provides one of the most important laboratories for the production of knowledge in ethnicity and its management. This is in view of the widely held, but partly misleading, belief that most political conflicts in Africa are ethnic. Ethnic “ productivity” in Africa also extends to the wide diversity and rich complexion of the conflicts. The broad spectrum of ethnic conflicts which arise from minority problems, elite division and competition, bi-ethnic and multi-ethnic situations, state actions, uneven development, as well as multiple cleavage complexes where ethnicity is recursive with religion, race, regionalism and so on, are well represented. The diversity, complexity and intractability of these conflicts have posed some of the greatest challenges to the theory and practice of conflict management and resolution. Tested and conventional formulas of conflict management and transformation have not had much success. This has led to the search for more creative strategies in such previously neglected areas as indigenous or traditional forms of conflict resolution. Theories and paradigms of federalism are also being re-examined for new lights on peaceful and constitutional approaches to constitutional conflicts. It is to give this search the much needed scholarly verve, and to translate theories into practical problem-solving models and strategies, that the Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies (PEFS), an independent, non-profit research programme, was established in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, in May 2000. This was done with the financial support of Ford Foundation. PEFS is located in the Institute of African Studies of the University. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY mailto:pefs@skannet.com Acknowledgements / vii Contributors / vi PART ONE: Chapter 1: Chapter 2: Chapter 3: Chapter 4: Chapter 5: PART TWO: Chapter 6: Chapter 7: Chapter 8: Chapter 9: Chapter 10: PART THREE: Chapter 11: Chapter 12: Chapter 13: PART FOUR: Chapter 14: Chapter 15: Chapter 16: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES General Introduction: The Relevance of the Nigerian Civil War / 3 Eghosa E. Osaghae and Ebere Onwudiwe Civil Wars in Africa: Now and Then / 8 George Klay Kieh, Jr. The War and the Nigerian State / 26 Adigun Agbaje Biafra: A Failed National Project / 31 Adefemi V. Isumonah Continuing the Civil War by Other Means: Points of View in Selected Nigerian Civil War Memoirs / 41 Remy Oriaku HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND The Nigerian Civil War and the National Question: A Historical Analysis / 52 Obaro Ikime The Historiography of the Nigerian Civil Wbr, 1967-1970 / 74 Osarhieme Benson Osadolor What Caused The Nigerian Civil War? / 91 Fred. Onyeoziri The Nigerian Civil War: A Lesson in Breakdown of Democratic Control of the Military and Military Professionalism / 100 Ishola Williams Nigerian Civil War and Some Linguistic Implications / 114 Francis O. Egbokhare THE CIVIL WAR AND POLITICAL CHANGE The Civil War and the Transformation of Nigerian Politics / 125 Pita Ogaba Agbese The Civil War and the Reconstruction of Nigerian Federalism / 146 Rotimi T. Suberu The Effects of the Civil War on the Nigerian Military / 161 O.B.C. Nwolise THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WAR EXPERIENCE Economics of the Nigerian Civil War: A Historical Analysis / 173 Festus O. Egwaikhide and Oyeranti O. Alabi Oil and the Political Economy of tire Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath / 191 Said Adejumobi and Adewale Aderemi In the Name of Oil: The Nigerian Civil War and the Niger Delta Crisis / 207 Chris O. Ikporukpo v UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY Chapter 17: Chapter 18: Chapter 19: Chapter 20: Chapter 21: Chapter 22: Chapter 23: Biafran Women Under Fire: Strategies in Organising Local and Trans-border Trade During the Nigerian Civil War / 216 Gloria I. Chuku Child Refugees and the Nigerian Civil War / 229 Okechukwu Ibeanu The “ North” and the Nigerian Civil Wkr / 247 Dauda Abubakar Religion and the Nigerian Civil War / 260 Kyari Mohammed The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70: The Ibibio Experience / 275 lme Ikiddeh An Evaluation of the Nigerian Civil War: The Case of Kogi Central / 284 A.O. Umoru-Onuka The Nigerian Army and the “ Liberation” of Asaba: A Personal Narrative / 293 Stanley 1. Okafor PART FIVE: Chapter 24: Chapter 25: Chapter 26: Chapter 27: PART SIX: Chapter 28: Chapter 29: Chapter 30: Chapter 31: PART SEVEN: Chapter 32: Chapter 33: Chapter 34: Chapter 35: Index / 467 POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS AND THE IGBO PREDICAMENT Post-war Marginalisation: Problems and Possible Repercussions / 301 M.C.K. Ajuluchukwu The Myth, Reality and Challenges of Nigeria’s Reconciliation with Ndigbo / 309 Isaac Olawale Albert The Post-Civil War Igbo Integration Question: Between Rhetoric and Realism / 326 Obinna I. Ihunna Between Relegation and Reintegration: The Igbo Nation in Post-Civil War Nigeria / 344 Chris C. Ojukwu THE MEDIA AND THE CIVIL WAR The East and Civil War / 358 Godwin Onu The Media and the Nigerian Civil War: An Overview / 380 Ayo Olukotun The War Before the War: The Press and the Nigerian Crisis / 392 Wale Adebanwi The Post-Civil War Newspaper Press in Nigeria: Re-Examining Reconciliation and Reconstruction, Patriotism and Partisanship / 404 Noma Owens-Ibie THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT International Reactions to the Nigerian Civil War / 414 Ebere Onwudiwe The International Dimension of Reconciliation and Re-Integration / 428 A. Irene Pogoson Self-Determination in International Law and the Biafran Experiences / 445 Yemi Akinseye-George, Esq. Conclusion: Can the Nigerian Federation Survive? / 457 Rotimi T. Suberu vt UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY CHAPTER FOURTEEN Economics of the Nigerian Civil War: A Historical Analysis FESTUS O. EGWAIKHIDE and OYERANTI O. ALABI Introduction The Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 was acclaimed to be unique historically from one important standpoint: its style of prosecution and economic manifestations. Indeed, it is hardly argued that the economics preceding the outbreak of the war have always received less attention. The reason why economics is often ignored in the historical analysis of the events culminating into the civil war in Nigeria is purely because of the intermittent, but successive political chaos, crises, and turmoil in the country, particularly in the South-West. Hence, discussions on the Nigerian civil war (see for examples Wangh and Suzanne, 1969; Alufco, 1970; and Akinyemi, 1971; Obe, 1971; Kirk-Greene, 1979; and Osuntokun, 1989) have a for long time been carried out loudly in the laboratory of politics. It is not a surprise that the received explanation from science of politics on why the Nigerian civil war was fought has remained: the desire for political power. However, Appadorai (1961) has since revealed that economics touches politics at more than one point because government largely influences the production and distribution of wealth, and also that the solution of many economic problems must come through political channels. In spite of the relative neglect of related economic issues in the Nigerian civil war, a number of authors have made informative contributions to the discussions on the Nigerian civil war from an economic point of view (see Oderinde, 1968; Uwechue, 1969; George, 1970; Rex, 1970; Aboyade and Ayida, 1971; Ugoh, 1971; Nafziger, 1973; Okigbo, 1989; and Ukpabi, 1989;). These studies often provide a bases for gauging out various economic related issues and arguments, thus allowing for possible inductive and deductive extensions of the economic underpinnings behind the war. Interestingly too, emerging socio-political issues that can hardly be separated from economic fundamentals like resource control and economics of deregulation in the contemporary Nigerian economy are equally suggestive of the existence of a basis for the extension of any available explanation from an economic perspective on the Nigerian civil war. Tlie focus of this chapter is to attempt to examine the economic issues in the Nigerian civil war. Indeed, the worth of this objective so to say, is to create a platform for conflict prevention and/or resolution, particularly if the current economic agitations have semblance of the pre-civil war economic yearnings. The rest of the chapter is organised into four sections. Section II is devoted to the economic factors responsible for the war. Discussed in section III are the financing and consequences of the war on the economy. Section IV dwells on echoes from the civil war in the contemporary Nigerian economy. Matters arising from all the preceding sections and a number of economic suggestions constitute the basis for our concluding remarks in the last section of the chapter. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY 174 THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH Chronology of Events Leading to the War The work of Collier and Hoeffler (1998) provided a solid basis for an understanding of possible economic causes of civil wars. Drawing from the work of Grossman (1995) and Azam (1995), they argued that war occurs if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to the costs. The objective of rebellion is either to capture the state or to secede from it. According to them, two motivations can inform the demand for secession: if the region in question is atypically well endowed with resources, or if the preferences of the region are under-represented in the government. In general, the incentive for rebellion is the product of the probability of victory and its consequences. The probability of victory is consequent upon the capacity of the government to defend itself. For a given population, the military capability of rebellion is unrelated to the domestic economy given the chances of rebels being financed externally, whereas the military capability of the government depends on its military expenditures.1 For purposes of empirical formulation, probability and duration of civil war are considered as a function of the gains from rebellion and the costs of rebellion consisting of the opportunity costs of conflict and the cost of coordination. Five proxies for these variables have been proposed: per capita income, the natural resources endowment, the population size, the extent of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, and the period of time since the previous civil war. Empirical findings from a comprehensive data set of a sample of ninety-eight countries2 of which twenty-seven had civil wars during 1962-92 reveal the following underlying economic variables: • Higher per capita income reduces the duration of civil war and the probability of its occurrence. This suggests that civil war is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low-income countries; • Possession of natural resources is found to initially increase the duration and risks of civil war; • Countries with large populations have higher risks of war and these wars last longer. • The risk of war and its duration gradually decreases as the previous war becomes distant. In addition to these findings, Collier (2000) identified a number of economic characteristics that are found to be significant and powerful predictors of civil war. These are: dependence on primary commodity exports; low average income; slow growth; and large diasporas. He affirmed strongly that rebellions either have the objective of natural resource predation, or are critically dependent upon natural resource predation in order to pursue other objectives.3 In sum, it is theoretically as well as statistically true to believe that more often than not, economic fundamentals are the underlying causes of civil war any where in the world, Nigeria inclusive. Since modem economics has two powerful tools: statistics and theory, both tools have been used to glean the perceived causes of the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970. Rex (1970) provided a vivid account of events culminating into the Nigerian civil war. For purposes of clarity and sequence, the major events are summarised in Table 1. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 175 Tlible 1: Major Events Leading to the Nigerian Civil War Date Event 15th January, 1966 Assassination of the Prime Minister, two Regional Premiers, the Federal Minister of Finance, and all the Army Officers4 of the rank of Colonels and above. 16th January, 1966 • A broadcast by the Deputy President5 (Dr ORizu) announcing his hand-over of power to the Armed Forces in view of the event of 15th January, 1966. • Suspension of the Offices of President, Prime Minister, Regional Governors, and Premiers, with the Ministers and m em bership and pow ers of all L eg isla tu res on asssum ption of office by G eneral A guiyi-Ironsi. Appointment of four new Military Governors for the Regions with former Governors as political advisers. The names of the Military Governors were: Lieutenant- Colonels Ojukwu (East), Ejoor (Mid-West), and Hassan Katsina (North). April, 1966 Promotion of twenty-one Army Officers by General Ironsi Government, out of which eighteen were Ibo officers. 24th May, 1966 Announcement of Decree No. 4 proclaiming the abolition of the Regions and the intent of the government to embark on the policy of unification. This announcement pulled the trigger. July, 1966 Apprehension in the Military over the fate of the remaining senior non-Ibo officers. 28 th July, 1966 Attack on General Ironsi and his host; Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi at the Government House. The two were taken away and shot, though the confirmation was not released for some time. 1st August, 1966 • Enthronment Of Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (the then Chief of Staff) as the Head of State. • Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Constitu­ tional Proposals with the tak of considering the problem of ‘imbalance’ in the Nigerian political structure and the likelihood of increasing the numbers of constituent states as a solution. 12 th September 1966 First meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee was held in the face of Col. Ojukwu’s refusal to recognise the authority of the new M ilitary Government of Col. Gowon. Ojukwu contended that the crimes that brought Gowon to power had underlined the need for a complete reconsideration of the form of association best suited to the needs of Nigeria. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY 176 Egwaikbide & Alabi/Economics of the Nigerian Civil War: A Historical Analysis At the meeting, delegates from the Mid-West proposed a federal arrangement entrusted with the task of correcting past injustices, lowering of tensions, resolving basic conflicts, and provision of essential needs of the various committees together with the assurance of the civil liberties of the people. The Eastern delegates proposed a confederation with the widest of power to the units and the right to secede. End of September 1966 • Broadcast from Radio Cotonou to the effect that Northern people living in the East had been attacked and that several numbers of them had been killed. This news was picked up and relayed by Radio Kaduna in English and Hausa. • Reprisal attacks on the Igbo in places like Kano, Zaria, Kaduna, and Jos. • Movements of the Igbo out of the North and back into their homeland which some of them had never seen before. • Disappearance of Eastern delegates at the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee meeting after the first one. • Refusal of Col. Ojukwu to attend the meetings of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), of which he and other Military Governors were ex-officio members. 4th January, 1967 Commencement of the Aburi Meeting where a Resolution moved by Col. Ojukwu was agreed upon. The Resolution reads thus: “ We the Supreme Military Council solemnly and unequivo­ cally declare that: 1. We renounce the use of force as a means of settling the present crisis in Nigeria and hold ourselves bound by this present declaration. 2. Reaffirm out faith in discussions and negotiations as the only peaceful way of resolving the Nigerian crisis. 3. Agree to exchange information on the quantity of arms and ammunition in each unit in the Army in each region, and also on the quantity of new arms and ammunition in stock. January, 1967 Seizure of two hundred pounds worth of produce belonging to the Northern Marketing Board awaiting shipment in Fort Harcourt by the Eastern Region government. February, 1967 Expulsion of non-Igbo from the Eastern Region. 30th March, 1967 Publication of a Revenue Collection Edit directing that all revenue collected in the East and payable to the Federal Government as their lawful due should be paid into the Eastern Regional Treasury. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY Egwaikhide & Alabi/Economics of the Nigerian Civil War: A Historical Analysis 177 April, 1967 Publication of an Edict setting up the Eastern Region Appeal Court, to be the highest Court recognised by the Eastern government. This was done because the Federal Supreme Court, the lawful Appeal Court could not sit in Enugu. 27th May, 1967 Evolution of twleve states from the existing Regions6 through a Decree. This decision had the approval of the Supreme Military Council (Less Col. Ojukwu). 30th May, 1967 Declaration of the former Eastern Region as a whole as a sovereign state under the new name of the Republic of Biafra. Thus the war commenced. Source: Authors’ construction based on the accounts given by Rex, (1970). Looking at the sequence of events that led to the Nigerian civil war as contained in Ihble 1, it is tempting to subscribe to the opinion that the base line of all the events was more political than economic. While the nature of the events appear to be political, it is equally discemable that the politically motivated events were triggered by economically oriented issues of corruption' on the part of the rulers, fiscal relations among the two tiers of government then (Federal and Regional government), and the all-important question of the welfare of the people. In clear language, the reasons offered by the Major Nzeogwu-led revolutionary group revealed that economic issues formed the backbone of what were later perceived as political problems. Historical records indicate the following as the reasons behind the 15 January, 1966 revolt (it was referred to as mutiny in the language of the military): • Alleged corruption of the Ministers; • The loss of large sums of government money into the pockets of unauthorized persons; • The inefficiency and indifference of the Ministers and Chairmen of the various public bodies; and • Their lack of concern for the welfare of the people. In addition to the clue provided by these factors on the link between economics and the Nigerian civil war, it is on record8 that the Eastern rulers were appalled at the thought of losing the oil and their access to the sea following the adoption of the idea of a federal arrangement at the first sitting of the Ah Hoc Committee. A proof of this line of thought was the outright boycott by the Eastern delegates of the subsequent meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee. Indeed, when the war broke out, it was a widely held opinion that Col. Ojukwu was basing the venture on the oil, which was being produced in the southern part of the Region. At the onset of the war, the fact that most of the oil was found in the territory of people of non-Igbo origin was not an issue as it was right for anyone to believe that if the secession bid were to be successful, it would be no battle for the brains behind it to either brush aside or buy out the non-Ibo areas where the oil was deposited. According to Aboyade and Ayida (1971), the secessionist authorities perceived their strength economically as being equal to one-third of the entire economy combined. This perception had its roots in the statistics reported as the Gross Domestic Product of the Eastern Region and that of the entire economy for the period of 1962 and 1966 (see Tables 2-4). However, a slightly different view of the share of Eastern Nigeria in the country’s Gross Domestic Product was UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY evident from the figures reported in the Second National Development Plan at the early stages of the civil war. (see Table 5). Expectedly, the two warring parties had different conclusions on each other’s relative strength. Indeed, it is believed that neither of the two parties can have the true and/or the exact understanding of the resources at the disposal of the opponent. One direct explanation for this is the possibility of external support for either of the two parties, or both. The case of the Nigerian civil war epitomised this possibility, and this again stood to explain why the war lasted longer than was anticipated, at least by the Federal Government. 178 Egwaikhide & Alabi/Economics of the Nigerian Ciril War: A Historical Analysis Table 2: Gross Domestic Product of Eastern Nigeria Constant 1962-63 Factor Cost Prices: 1962-66 Activity Sector 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1956-66 Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Forestry 510.8 551.0 592.4 555.8 Mining (including Petroleum) 14.6 12.8 18.2 26.4 Manufacturing and Crafts 57.0 61.4 67.0 81.8 Electricity and Water 2.6 2.8 3.6 4.0 Building and Construction 22.4 25.4 27.6 29.8 Distribution 101.2 108.0 117.8 125.4 Transport and Communication 34.0 36.0 44.0 44.2 General Government, Education, and Health Services 29.4 31.0 34.0 39.2 Other Services 59.8 66.8 69.4 68.4 Total 831.8 895.2 974.2 975.0 Note: Figures are in Million Naira. These figures were originally reported in pounds. They were converted to Naira through the multiplication of the figures by two, since two naira exchanged for one pound when the naira was introduced to Nigeria to replace the pound. Source: Aboyade and Ayida, (1971; p. 16.) UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 179 "Bible 3: Gross Domestic Product of Nigeria at Constant 1962-63 Factor Cost Prices: 1962-66 Activity Sector 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1956-66 Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Forestry 1609.6 1741.6 1733.4 1741.8 Mining (including Petroleum) 53.6 62.6 95.0 164.8 Manufacturing and Crafts 151.8 153.6 157.6 183.4 Electricity and Wfoter 12.0 14.6 16.2 18.4 Building and Construction 115.0 132.0 130.0 160.0 Distribution 322.2 361.8 389.8 405.4 Transport and Communication 121.8 136.2 134.4 129.6 General Government, Education, and Health Services 188.4 193.2 209.0 210.2 Other Services 56.4 55.8 61.4 72.4 Total 2630.8 2851.4 2926.8 3086.0 Note: Figures are in million naira. Same conversion as in "Bible 2 is done to this table as well. Source: Same as Table 2, p. 17. Table 4: Implied Share of Eastern Nigeria in the Gross Domestic Product of Nigeria at Constant 1962-63 Factor Cost Prices: 1962-66 Activity Sector 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1956-66 Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Forestry 31.7 31.6 34.2 31.9 Mining (including Petroleum) 27.2 20.4 19.2 16.0 Manufacturing and Crafts 37.5 40.0 42.5 44.6 Electricity and Water 21.7 19.2 2.2 21.7 Building and Construction 19.5 19.2 21.2 18.6 Distribution 31.4 29.9 30.2 30.9 Transport and Communication 27.9 26.4 32.7 34.1 General Government, Education, and Health Services 15.6 16.0 16.3 18.6 Other Services 106.0 119.7 113.0 94.5 Ib tal 31.6 31.4 33.3 31.6 Note: Figures are in percentage. Source: Same as "fable 2. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY 180 Egwaikhide & Alabi/Economics of the Nigerian Civil War: A Historical Analysis Thble 5: Estimated Gross Domestic Product at Current Factor Cost both Excluding and Including Eastern Nigeria, 1967-68 Activity Sector 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1956-66 Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Forestry 1713.0 1485.8 227.2 13.3 Mining (including Petroleum) 81.6 69.0 12.6 15.4 Manufacturing and Crafts 231.2 225.8 5.4 23.4 Electricity and Water 18.2 14.4 3.8 20.9 Building and Construction 148.8 131.0 17.8 12.0 Distribution 419.2 380.6 48.6 11.6 Transport and Communication 122.4 114.2 8.2 6.7 General Government, Education, and Health Services 210.2 184.2 276.0 12.4 Other Services 107.2 104.2 3.0 28.0 Total 3051.8 2699.2 352.6 11.6 Note: Figures in second, third, and fourth columns are in million naira. (Conversion done as in previous Thbles). Source: Second National Development Plan, 1970-74. Financing of the War9 One important aspect of the history of the Nigerian civil war that is of interest to economics as a body of knowledge is the economics behind the prosecution of the war. From the viewpoint of economics, a war will continue until the real and intangible resources of one side fall below a critical minimum. In military terms, that economic threshold is associated with military defeat. The closest approximation to that critical minimum is often considered to be the per capita10 subsistence level or, what is sometimes called the futility margin. A war could go on up to the point at which the total available resources can no longer be redistributed among communities without reducing the increasingly widespread subsistence living or without going below the tolerance limit. A civil war would thus be longer the more net resources flow into the community from outside and the greater the margin of real income redistribution left in the community above the per capita subsistence level. In the case of the Nigerian civil war, this critical factor of resource availability played an important role in the choice of strategies adopted by either side in the prosecution of the war. It is on account of this critical factor that the war was believed to have lasted longer than either side would have anticipated at the beginning of the war. At the level of resource commitment to the prosecution of the war, four stages are identifiable. First, the beginning of the skirmishes up to and including the westward expansion of the secessionist forces, overrunning the Mid-West Region and attempting a break-through to the Federal capital (Lagos). The secessionist side was more prepared in organisation, psychological determination, leadership confidence, and weapons long UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY accumulated from the fairly large legitimate foreign exchange reserves at their disposal. The federal side on the other hand did not commit any significant additional materials to the war either in men, materials or money, beyond remnants of the old colonial army, weapons and logistics. The second phase corresponds to the federal resistance at Ore to the fall of Port Harcourt and Onitsha to federal troops in mid-1968. In this phase, the federal government committed substantial real resources to the war including expansion of the Armed Forces. Recurrent expenditure, domestic borrowing, and defense import increasedsignificantly. The secessionist side was caught up in defensive battles. Its economy appeared to be tottering as it was beginning to show signs of operating near the subsistence level for the bulk of its population. This came out of the federal blockade against the secessionist side. The third stage of the war is the Uli-Ihiala resistance following the loss of substantial parts of the so-called “ minority” areas, notably Port Harcourt and Calabar. The secessionist side resorted to inflow of external resources to ensure the continued sustenance of the war in the face of an unbearable level of living for its people. As would be expected, the federal side committed more of its diminishing foreign reserves to finance more sophisticated defence hard wares for the Air Force. The fourth phase was the push into the “ Ibo heartland” and the dramatic capture of Uli-Ihiala airstrip. Beyond the commitment of more resources to the war, it became clear at this phase to the federal side that the key to the war was in the complete act of economic and financial isolation of the secessionist enclave. The wisdom lying behind the theory that the per capita subsistence level must reach the critical intolerable minimum or futility margin for a war to end informed the federal side of the need to be hard on the secessionist side from the economic alienation standpoint. The theory worked and the war ended dramatically. In terms of the specific policy measures adopted by the federal government, the Second National Development Plan (1970-74) contains the details. Nevertheless, Box 1 contains some of the legislative and administrative control measures that were employed. Box 1: Measures Employed by the Federal Government during the Nigerian Civil Wjr • Treasury Bills (Amendment) Decree No. 21, raising the amount of treasury bills issue as percentage of estimated federal revenue from the 1962 limit of 40 per cent to 50 per cent. • Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree No. 24, conferring powers to arrest without warrant, enter, search, seize, detain, among others. • Open General Export Licence (Goods and Produce of Nigerian origin) (Amend­ ment) Decree, putting additional items (mainly local food) on the list of export produce for which specific licences were required. • Export Prohibition (Goods) Revocation Order, which negated an earlier order, passed in 1966. • Capital Gains Tax Decree No. 44, imposing a 20 per cent tax on gains accruing from disposal of assets. • Finance (Miscellaneous Thxation) Decree No. 47. • Import Licensing Regulations of 1967. • Customs Thriff (Duties and Exemptions) No. 4 Order of 1967, further increasing rates of Customs duties. • Central Bank (Currency Conversion) Decree No. 51, authorising new issue of currency notes to be converted within nineteen days. Egwaikhide & Alabi/Economics of the Nigerian Civil War: A Historical Analysis 181 UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY 182 Egwaikhide & Alabi/Economics of the Nigerian Civil W»r: A Historical Analysis • National Reconstruction and Development Savings Decree No. 52, creating special contributory loan fund to finance reconstruction and development. • Open General Import Licence (Amendment) Order of 1968, removing a variety of goods and commodities from the open to the specific licences. • Customs Tariff (Amendment) Decree No. 8, amending the tariff reconstruction surcharge arrangement. • Excise Tariff (Amendment) Decree No. 19, amending the Excise Tariff Act of 1965. • Customs Tariff (Duties and Exemptions) Order of 1968, aimed at discouraging the importation of certain goods by increased duties. • Open General Import Licence (Amendment) Notice No. 2 of 1968, bringing more imported goods under specific licence. • Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Decree of 1968. • Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) Decree, enabling the Central Bank to finance Marketing Produce crops purchase. • Imports Prohibition (Amendment) Order, removing certain items from the list of absolutely prohibited goods. • Open General Import Licence (Amendment) Notice No. 3 of 1968, putting the non-prohibited goods under specific licence. • Treasury Bills (Amendment) Decree, turther raising the extent of treasury bills issue from 50 to 85 per cent of estimated federal revenue in the fiscal year. • Customs Thrift (Duties and Exemptions) Order No. 2 of 1968, exempting some industrial raw materials from customs duty. • Companies Decree No. 54 of 1968, containing the famous part X clause requiring all foreign-owned companies in the country to be incorporated in Nigeria. • Pioneer Companies (Temporary Taxation Provisions) Decree No. 52. • Export Prohibition (Amendment) Order, cancelling exemptions from obtaining import licence previously conferred in 1959 to public authorities. • Income Tax (Amendment) Decree, empowering tax authorities to levy tax on business turnover. • Customs Thrift (Duties and Exemptions) Order, 1969. • Banking Decree No. 2 of 1969, strengthening the Central Bank in the control of the creation and operation of commercial banks. • Customs Tariff (Duties and Exemptions) Order No. 2 of 1969, increasing duties on certain imported goods but further discriminating in favour of local substitutes. • Excise Tariff (Duties and Exemptions) Order, 1969, increasing excise duty rates on certain goods. • Open General Import Licence (Amendment) Notice, 1969 putting more goods hitherto imported without licence under specific import licence. • Finance Decree 1969, extending the limit of treasury bills issue from 85 to 100 per cent and of treasury certificates from 50 to 60 percent. • Excise Tariff (Duties and Exemptions) Order No. 2 of 1969, reducing excise duty on certain manufactured goods. On the side of personnel resources for the war, there was no conscription into the Armed Forces, at least by the federal government. The enormous expansion in personnel strength was achieved by a combination of economic incentives and psychological persuasion. Indeed, UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 183 it was the general belief that the federal side fought the war with Nigerian resources primarily, save for the blocked account of certain external payments due. Rer?rdless of how well or otherwise the war was fought, the Nigerian economy suffered from the four important consequences of civil war identified by Collier (1998), and Arunatilake et al (2001). First is the destruction of some resources. For example, it can never be contested that part of the labour force was killed or maimed and bridges were blown up. It was recorded that the Ibos naturally blew up bridges and culverts in front of any Federal advance. The destruction of the productive base of the economy by the war is generally considered as part of the historical antecedent of the Nigerian food problem. The second effect is the disruption of welfare consequent upon social disorder. For example, some roads became unsafe and so extra costs were involved in mobility of economic factors. Perhaps, this could be relied upon to explain the rise in general price level coupled with the expansion in the level of money supply, thought for the purposes of prosecuting the war. To elaborate further, there was pent-up aggregate demand caused by the civil war. A direct consequence of this was increased food prices. Consequent upon increased food prices, labour demanded for a rise in pay. The Adebo Wage Review Panel that unified the salary structure in the public service was the immediate response to demands for wage increases. Also, the government implemented the wages and salaries award recommended by the Public Service Commission chaired by Chief Udoji in 1975. It is almost incredible that about N859 million was used to pay the arrears of civil servants of all categories. Even the private sector approved increases of 30 per cent or more and paid arrears of about N292 million to its employees. The Udoji award raised the wage bill of the public service by about 50 percent (Bienen, 1983). The third consequence has to do with the diversion of public expenditure from output-enhancing activities to security strengthening. For example, as the army and its powers expanded, the police force and the rule of law diminished. The enforcement costs of contracts must necessarily rise and the security of property rights is reduced. Table 6 shows statistics on war and war-related expenditure in Nigeria for the period of 1961-1980. The proportion of war and war-related expenditure in total current expenditure reveals indirectly the extent of resources committed to maintenance of law and order in an economy like Nigeria where financial constraints constitute a set of obstacles to economic growth and development. The fourth effect is the loss of income arising from diversion of productive resources which will lead to dissaving, an effect that is analytically similar to the destruction of the capital stock. Statistics on fixed capital formation for the period between 1966 and 1970 show that there was erosion of capital stock in the economy, (see Table 7). Also, Table 8 suggests that there was a negative trend in economic activities as captured by the index of industrial production. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 183 it was the general belief that the federal side fought the war with Nigerian resources primarily, save for the blocked account of certain external payments due. Regardless of how well or otherwise the war was fought, the Nigerian economy suffered from the four important consequences of civil war identified by Collier (1998), and Arunatilake et al (2001). First is the destruction of some resources. For example, it can never be contested that part of the labour force was killed or maimed and bridges were blown up. It was recorded that the Ibos naturally blew up bridges and culverts in front of any Federal advance. The destruction of the productive base of the economy by the war is generally considered as part of the historical antecedent of the Nigerian food problem. The second effect is the disruption of welfare consequent upon social disorder. For example, some roads became unsafe and so extra costs were involved in mobility of economic factors. Perhaps, this could be relied upon to explain the rise in general price level coupled with the expansion in the level of money supply, thought for the purposes of prosecuting the war. To elaborate further, there was pent-up aggregate demand caused by the civil war. A direct consequence of this was increased food prices. Consequent upon increased food prices, labour demanded for a rise in pay. The Adebo Wage Review Panel that unified the salary structure in the public service was the immediate response to demands for wage increases. Also, the government implemented the wages and salaries award recommended by the Public Service Commission chaired by Chief Udoji in 1975. It is almost incredible that about N859 million was used to pay the arrears of civil servants of all categories. Even the private sector approved increases of 30 per cent or more and paid arrears of about N292 million to its employees. The Udoji award raised the wage bill of the public service by about 50 percent (Bienen, 1983). The third consequence has to do with the diversion of public expenditure from output-enhancing activities to security strengthening. For example, as the army and its powers expanded, the police force and the rule of law diminished. The enforcement costs of contracts must necessarily rise and the security of property rights is reduced. Table 6 shows statistics on war and war-related expenditure in Nigeria for the period of 1961-1980. The proportion of war and war-related expenditure in total current expenditure reveals indirectly the extent of resources committed to maintenance of law and order in an economy like Nigeria where financial constraints constitute a set of obstacles to economic growth and development. The fourth effect is the loss of income arising from diversion of productive resources which will lead to dissaving, an effect that is analytically similar to the destruction of the capital stock. Statistics on fixed capital formation for the period between 1966 and 1970 show that there was erosion of capital stock in the economy, (see Table 7). Also, Table 8 suggests that there was a negative trend in economic activities as captured by the index of industrial production. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY 184 Egwaikhide & Alabi/Economics of the Nigerian Civil War: A Historical Analysis Table 6: War and war-Related Expenditure as Proportion of Federal Government Current Expenditure in Nigeria (1961-80) Year War and War-Related Expenditure12 (Nm) Total Current Expenditure (Nm) War and War-Related Expenditure as % of Current Expenditure (%) 1961 29.4 96.9 30.4 1962 36.9 103.4 35.6 1963 53.1 119.6 44.4 1964 59.4 142.6 41.7 1965 68.4 156.9 43.6 1966 79.9 176.8 45.1 1967 82.8 166.8 49.6 1968 138.6 216.8 64.0 1969 212.4 433.6 49.0 1970 n.a 638.3 0.0 1971 369.2 492.8 74.9 1972 n.a 681.4 0.0 1973 422.9 656.2 64.4 1974 529.9 874.0 60.6 1975 962.3 1695.0 56.8 1976 2144.2 2672.5 80.2 1977 956.1 2348.0 40.7 1978 1453.5a 3427.7 42.4 1979 1084.6a 3187.1 34.0 Note: n.a means breakdown of defence expenditure is not available, a. Figures here are estimates. Sources: (a) Mbanefor, F. Gini (1980), “ The Civil War and Its Impact on Government Expenditure in Nigeria,” Mimeo, University of Ibadan, Department of Economics. (b) Central Bank of Nigeria: Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, Dec. 1979. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 185 Table 7: Estimated Fixed Capital Formation at Constant Prices Asset 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 Land, Agriculture and Mining Development 70.6 54.0 43.4 46.2 Buildings 111.0 99.0 91.6 101.2 Civil Engineering Works 102.2 92.6 74.8 81.4 Plant, Machinery & Equipment 145.2 171.8 186.6 178.0 Vehicles 37.6 29.6 31.4 33.6 Total 466.6 447.0 427.8 440.4 Proportion of GDP (%) 14.7 14.8 14.2 13.0 All figures are in million Naira conversion from pound to Naira done by the Authors except for those in the last row. Source: Aboyade and Ayida, (1971, p. 30.) Table 8: Index of Industrial Production (Base 1963 = 100) Industrial Group 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Manufacturing 165.9 171.8 172.6 216.4 246.7 Mining 391.5 302.4 152.6 485.5 939 Electricity 149.5 129.6 125.8 140.2 162.6 Total 235.6 208.5 161 292.7 456.5 Source: Same as Table 7. Emerging Echoes from the Civil War Civil war is a devastating phenomenon that is likely to have profound effects on both the level and composition of economic activity. For this reason, it would be expected that concerted efforts must be made to prevent reoccurrence of civil war in a nation that has gone through a period of civil war. To achieve this would imply doing two things simultaneously: holding tightly to the lessons that can be associated with past crisis, and avoidance of the like of events that led to the previous war or having potential to refresh the memory of secessionists of the need to perfect their strategy in likelihood of another civil war. At the level of lessons learned from the Nigerian experience of her civil war, three important ones were quickly documented as soon as the war ended. Firstly, was a better understanding of the response mechanism to changes in domestic public policy of the economy. The crisis revealed that policy makers in a neo-colonial economy could indeed hold their destiny in their own hands, since the use of economic measures during the war UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY proved that economic development could be achieved through a complex set of carefully designed policy instruments. Secondly, the war revealed that crude petroleum export and a general balance of the external trade sector could be helpful in terms of the growth of the economy, but not as crucial as they were thought to be before the war broke out. By direct extension, it was realised precisely in 1969 that foreign exchange constraint and the prospect of oil might not necessarily be over emphasised13 for an economy that relied on import for its capital goods. The Year 1969 happened to be the only year of the civil war when the economy did not have to draw down its external reserves, even when the oil industry was still recovering from the disruption introduced by the civil war. Thirdly, the victory of the federal side was considered as an end to threat of regional secession. The economic advantage of the new federal structure has remained the fact that no one unit is in a position to pose to the world economy as being able ’to go it alone’. Indeed, the victory of the federal side was seen as the birth of one integrated Nigerian market. An important question that comes to mind at this point is: To what extent has the economy benefitted from the lessons learned from the civil war? It can hardly be substantiated that these lessons have been truly appreciated going by the type and magnitude of economic problems that Nigeria, as a country, has witnessed and is still witnessing. For example, it is common knowledge that economic mismanagement and policy inconsistencies were the bane of the economic crisis that led to the adoption of the adjustment programme in the mid-1980s (see Obadan, 1998). If empirical finding that suggested that low per capita income countries have a high risk of civil war is sufficient, a premise for conclusion on the likelihood of war, then prediction from such proposition will definitely not be favourably for a country like Nigeria. Failure of government diversification policy to date also brings to mind the relationship between civil war and the proportion of primary export in total export. It is however safe to assume that, the proposition that the longer the period when a country had a civil war, the lower the risk of further war would apply to a country like Nigeria. This assumption is however in suspect when it is recalled again that countries in A frica have had many civil wars since 1960 due not to their ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, but to their poverty, (Collier, 1998). In Nigeria at present, a number of issups revolving around politics, economic, religion, and ethnicity among others are suggestive of the fact that some of the economic causes identified with the outbreak of the last civil war in Nigeria are still found in the political economy of Nigeria. Some of these issues have gone beyond the level of political agitation to outright civil violence and breakdown of law and order in the areas where such issues have their roots. Examples include resource control; call for national conference; call for emergence of state police force, introduction of sharia legal system, local and state government creation; revenue allocation formula; corruption; ethnic conflict, tribalism; and poverty as manifested in low per capita income resulting in the general decline in standard of living.14 Agiobenebo and Azibaolanari (2001) observed that resource control has been a major political and economic issue in Nigeria even though it has disguised itself as conflicts over revenue allocation formula from 1946. Of late, it has intensified the forces that drive political instability and economic uncertainty to such an extent that the federal and the thirty-six state governments are in the courts at present over the question of who owns natural resources in Nigeria. It is important to mention that the economic issues that were raised before the eventual outbreak of the civil war, notably corruption and the decline in the welfare of the people are as serious as they were in pre-civil war Nigeria today if not more. Problems like inflation, unemployment and poverty as since argued by Okigbo, (1997) have heightened the extent of insecurity in Nigeria today more than ever before. 186 Egwaikhide & Alabi/Economics of the Nigerian Civil War: A Historical Analysis UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 187 The question is not whether there are facts on the ground indicating that economic factors that brought about the civil war in Nigeria are prevalent in the economy, but how to handle these problems to forestall a re-occurrence of a civil war in Nigeria. Concluding Remarks: How to Prevent the Outbreak of Another Civil War This chapter has shown the various economic factors that led to the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war as well as present economic conditions that appear to resemble what the situation was prior to the commencement of the war in 1967. One message that is clear from the literature on the economics of civil wars in general is that, prevention of conflicts is more amenable to policy intervention than resolution of conflicts once they are started. The reason for this is because resolution of conflict is almost exclusively outside the domain of policy. This position forms the basis of our giving the following suggestions to prevent the possibility of another civil war in Nigeria. One, there is the need to urgently address the poverty problem as an over-arching development objective. This will ensure that a vicious cycle of poverty-to-civil war-to poverty is not allowed to develop in Nigerian polity. Sincere and well-targeted policies and strategies that will confront economic problems like unemployment and inflation will go a long way to bring about succour to the entire populace. For this suggestion to work, corruption and all forms of inefficiencies that go with it at all levels of government must be outlawed. Two, there is the need to realise that economic growth is an important instrument for preventing conflicts and ensuring sustained peace. This then calls for the creation of an enabling environment for forces of economic growth like investment and productivity among others to thrive. The present state of infrastructural development in Nigeria is a suspect for the economy’s unstable pattern of growth. Three, it is common knowledge that participatory and democratic political order is not only a prerequisite for restoring growth, but also a means to ensuring that ethnic diversity could indeed be a relevant factor in national development. The issue involved here is strictly that of equity and justice to all. Lastly, efforts should be made to eliminate phenomenon of unequal distribution of economic resources and its associated unbalanced economic development. This leads to the question of developing policies and strategies that will bring about regional balance, which if realised is likely to end the thought of secession, let alone a civil war in Nigeria. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY 188 Egwaikhide & Alabi/Econom ics o f the N igerian Civil W ar: A H istorical An&iy&s Appendix: Nigerian States, 1967 Form er Region New States Capital Population N orthern North Western Sokoto 5.7 million Kano Kano #.8 million N orth Eastern M aiduguri 7 .9 million North Central Kaduna 4.1 million West Central (now Ilorin Kwara) 2 .4 million Benue-Plateau Jos 3.8 million Eastern East Central Enugu 7.2 million South East Calabar 3 .6 million Rivers Fort H arcourt 1.5 million Western Western Ibadan 9.5 million Lagos Ikeja 1.4 million Mid-Western Mid-West Benin 2.5 million Source: Rex, 1970, p. 103. Notes 1. A number of studies have shown that there exists causality between economic development and military expenditures. See Lim, 1983; Deger, 1986; Payne and Sahu, 1993; Knight et al, 19%. 2. Nigeria was among the 98 countries where ample data were drawn from. 3. It is logical to believe that the relevance of other objectives to the welfare question of the populace that is on the side of rebellion and the sincerity of purpose of the secessionists should provide the justification or otherwise for act of secession. 4. Only one of the Officers killed was an Ibo and it was claimed that he was killed almost by chance. 5. The President (Dr. Azikiwe) was in England for medical consultations. Hence, the Deputy President was in an Acting capacity. 6. See the New states and their capitals in Appendix 1. 7. Olopoenia, 1998 provided detailed discussions on the links between corruption and under-development. 8. See Rex, (1970), p. 92. 9. This section draws substantially from the work of Aboyade and Ayida, 1971. 10. For a developing country like Nigeria, the objective per capita subsistence level would not he too far from the observed or realized per capita real income. 11. Central Bank of Nigeria: Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, December, 1%7, p. 50. 12. Includes defence and public debt servicing. 13. This argument has failed to stand the test of time as foreign exchange constraint and fortunes or otherwise in the oil industry have come to occupy a central position in the explanation of the behaviour of major economic aggregates in Nigeria of late. 14. For discussions on some of these emerging issues see Abumere, 1998; Toyo, 1994; Ayoade, 1988, 1997;Mbanefoh, 1986, 1993; Soremekun and Obi, 1993; andKayode, 1993. UNIV ERSIT Y O F IB ADAN L IB RARY T H E NIG ERIA N CIV IL WAR AND ITS AFTERM ATH 189 References Aboyade 0 . and Allison Ayida (1971) “ The War Economy in Perspective.” The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 13-37. Abumere, S. (1998) “ Distributional Inequality and the Problem of National Integration.” An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, September 3. 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