Resurgent Nigeria Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History •i ■ A Festschrift in Honour of Dahiru Yahya edited by Sa’idu Babura Ahmad Ibrahim Khaleel Abdussalam UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY Resurgent Nigeria Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History A Festschrift in Honour of Dahiru Yahya IbraShaim’id uK ehBdaailtbeeuedlr abA yAbdhumsasdal am UNIVERSIBITAYD APNRE SS PLC 2011 UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY University Press PLC IBADAN ABA ABEOKUTA ABUJA AJEGUNLE AKURE BENIN Contents CALABAR IKEJA IKORODU ILORIN JOS KADUNA KANO MAIDUGURI MAKURDI MINNA ONITSHA OSOGBO OWERRI PORTHARCOURT WARRI YABA ZARIA Biodata ^ Acknowledgements xxiu Foreword xxlv Introduction xxx Section I: The Tragedy of Truth 1 © Sa’idu Babura Ahmad, Ibrahim Khaleel Abdussalam (eds.) 2011 1. Of the Progress of Knowledge and Development of Society: Keynote Address I 3 - Sa’ad Abubakar, FHSN, OFR 2. The Success that Failed: Keynote Address II 12 - Nur Alkali, CON, FHSN First Published 2011 Section II: Intellectual Issues in the History o f the Nigerian State 21 3. Transcending the Limits of Modern Historiography: An Assessment of the Historiographical Approach of Dahiru Yahya 23 All Rights Reserved - Samaila Suleiman 4. The Changing Nature of Nigerian History, 19th Century to the Present 41 -A .I. Yandaki ISBN 978 978 069 795 2 5. Another Intellectual History: Life Narratives and the Foundations of the Nigerian State 50 - Isma’il A. Tsiga 6. Leadership and Good Governance: Lessons from the Founders of the Sokoto Caliphate for Contemporary Nigeria 66 -Asm a’u G. Saeed 7. The Nigerian State and the Responsibility of Historians 88 - Isah Mohammed Abbass Published by University Press PLC Three Crowns Building, Jericho, PM.B. 5095, Ibadan, Nigeria E-mail: unipress@universitypressplc.com Website: www.universitypressplc.com v UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY Section III: The Struggle for Identity 103 18. Igala-Hausa Relations: An Aspect of Inter-Group Relations 8. From the Sarauta System to the Shari’ah: Islam and in the Pre-Colonial Period 279 Good Governance in Pre-Colonial Hausaland 105 - Mohammed Sanni Abdulkadir -M .D . Suleiman 19. Igbo Migrants, the Indigenous Hausa Merchant Class and 9. Voices After the Maxim Gun: Intellectual and Literary the Nigerian Civil War in Kano, Northern Nigeria: Challenges Opposition to Colonial Rule in Northern Nigeria 124 and Opportunities Revisited 287 -A liyu S. Alabi -Ahmed Bako 10. Boko Haram: A Militant Uprising of a Muslim Organization 147 20. History and Coexistence in the Nigerian State: - Tahir Abdu Fagge The Case of Jos 306 - Ibrahim Khaleel Abdussalam 11. The Challenges of the Mosque as a Centre of Mass Mobilization: A Case Study of Kano Central Mosque 162 21. Post-Civil War Inter-Ethnic Relations in Midwest Nigeria 330 - Kabiru Haruna Isa - Daniel Olisa Iweze 12. The “North” in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Section VI: Nostalgia for History 349 British Colonial Legacy in Nigeria 175 22. The Transformation of Traditional Rulership in North- - Dalha Waziri Eastern Nigeria: 1903-2010 351 - Sa’ad Abubakar, FHSN, OFR Section IV: The Economy of Corruption 187 23. The Response of the Emirs to British Colonialism in 13. Economic Development or Economic Servitude: Nigerian Northern Nigeria 378 Economy Since Independence 189 -A .R . Mohammed -Abdurrahman Umar, MCIPR 24. British Colonialism and the Crisis of the Deposition of District 14. Nigeria and the Challenges of Corruption, Democracy Heads in Zazzau Emirate, 1907-1950 391 and Nation-Building 204 - Haliru Sirajo - Omar Farouk Ibrahim 15. Commercial Buses and Economic Growth in the Kano Section VTI: Looking Back at Other Matters 405 Metropolis, 1967-2000: An Assessment 213 25. Nigeria and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa 407 - Yusuf Umar Madugu - Muhammadu Mustapha Gwadabe 16. The Relevance of Poverty Reduction Strategies of the Sokoto Caliphate 227 Notes on Contributors 430 - Aliyu Abubakar Kware and Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i Index 433 Section V: The Comedy of Ethnicity 247 17. The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999-2004 249 - Rasheed Olaniyi vi UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 17 The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999=2004 Rasheed Olaniyi Introduction This paper adopts the political economy approach to discuss the historical relations between two of Nigeria’s most powerful ethnic groups, the Hausa and the Yoruba, who alternate from peaceful cohabitation and conflict. Political economy broadly analyzes the structure of political power, the class content of the state, the influence of state policy on the economy, socio-economic formation and the mutual influence of various socio-economic systems existing in the modern world.2 The productive forces, the nature and level of their development, principally determine the economic relations within society. The relations of production exert an enduring influence on the productive forces.3 The contradiction arising from the relations of production and the allocation of resources could produce inequalities and imbalance, leading to conflicts. The concept of socio-economic formation includes other important elements such as: the superstructure, which is the existing system of political, judicial rule of law and ideological notions. The socio-economic formation is characterized by the aggregation of (1) the productive forces of the given society, (2) the system of relations of production constituting the society’s economic structure or basis, and (3) superstructure in the form of political, juridical and ideological relations and ideas, and the corresponding institutions and organizations.4 Mustapha further argues that ethnic conflict is not specifically about ‘primeval’ differences, but about what unites them in the economic and political spheres.5 Mustapha cited Bardhan that the political and economic logic of exclusion and competition over limited resources accounted for 249 UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 250 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 251 the ‘madness’ of ethnic conflicts.6 The theory of competition over scarce politically segregated until the Richard’s Constitution in 1946. In the resources would be valuable in analyzing the widespread ethnic conflicts 1950s, political and ideological differences, competition for resources in Nigeria, especially between the Hausa and the Yoruba. and power at the centre marked the core of ethnic tensions between the The political economy thesis of ethnic conflicts was further analyzed two. Within the colonial context, ethnic relations between them were in the work of Mbaku.7 He argues that pervasive ethnic conflicts ravaged not only regulated but were a paradox. Colonial rule brought a profound post-independence Africa due primarily to the adoption at independence climate of mistrust and suspicion between the two ethnic groups due of institutional arrangements that (1) failed to adequately constrain the to the role each played in the British conquest of their territories. In power of government, (2) did not guarantee economic freedoms and (3) different contexts, both were used as allies to prosecute the war of failed to provide procedures for the peaceful resolution of the conflict conquest. The British created an apparatus and institution of violence of interests of the various ethnic groups.8 The character of the state to suppress resistance and ensure public order. Both constituted the promoted prebendary and patronage, which excluded many groups apparatus of this colonial violence. Some of the trusted veteran soldiers and social classes from effective and full participation in economic and and spies were appointed as rulers over ‘stateless’ societies. The British, political markets. According to Mbaku, “Many of the excluded ethnic however, prevented unity between the two ethnic groups through the groups turned to violence as a way to minimize further marginalization.”9 use of stereotypes and divide and rule tactics. While the British used He observes that in the post-independence period, ethnic competition Hausa soldiers in the conquest of Yorubaland, the Yoruba formed part of intensified and culminated in the resurgence of the ethnic group as an the forces in the capitulation of Northern Nigeria to British rule. important organizational structure for resource competition.10 Added Both the Hausa and the Yoruba were described as having possessed to this, religion remains an important source of discrimination and the ability to evolve an organized system and exceptional intelligence. mobilization.11 In post-independent Nigeria, access to political markets The Yoruba earned the admiration of being devoted to democracy and and the control of the allocation of resources provoke ethnic competition publicity.14 But Lugard considered the troops composed of Muslim and conflict,12 and the elite seeking public office often organize their Sudanic people as better soldiers than the southern tribes. According to campaigns along ethnic lines.13 Osuntokun: Historical Connectivity The Yoruba, like the Hausa-Fulani, were marked out by the (colonial) Both the Hausa and Yoruba ethnic identities have developed over time administration as a proud and haughty people whose loyalty should with inaccurate images of their own history and interactions. The be cultivated by strengthening their traditional political institutions force of colonial historiography and stereotypes still prevails in ethnic and trying as much as possible to separate the ‘natural’ leaders discourses. Indeed, the paucity of empirically grounded history produced from the parvenu leaders who made their way to the top through rancorous tendencies in ethnic relations. Hausa and Yoruba cultures did education.15 not develop in isolation of one another. There were profound cultural exchanges across centuries between the two. In the old Oyo Empire, the He further states that: Hausa were assigned highly privileged positions in political institutions. Linguistically, alafia or lafia (peace) and wahala (adversity) are two The Yoruba were admired and loathed at the same time. They were words that have everyday usage by the Hausa and the Yoruba, and are seen as the most difficult people to administer because a sizeable fraction o f them had become ‘denationalised’ through their affection equally experienced by both in the trajectory of their ethnic relations. for Western education, and in the tide o f rising expectations this The colonial moment remained salient in understanding the trend minuscule group was demanding too much from the (co lon ia l) of ethnic conflicts between the Hausa and the Yoruba. Even though the administration.16 North and South protectorates were amalgamated in 1914, they remained UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 252 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 253 The Yoruba had literally ruled Nigeria since the British came to the According to Lady Lugard, “Kano was a strong place in Hausaland, exclusion o f the Hausa and Ibo. While the Yoruba had produced the possessing an organized army and a well-fortified town ...”17 She adds second generation of graduates in law, medicine and engineering, that, “Kano represented the principal military power of the northern the Ibo were just starting the first generation. But the Hausa had states, and it was well understood that Kano was the power with which not started at all.21 the British strength would be first seriously measured.”18 Inadvertently, the colonial moment set the stage for mutual ethnic suspicion. Within the This accounted for the preponderance of Yoruba educated elite in context of economic crisis and agitation against taxation and government the civil service of northern Nigeria. Jose observes that: policies during the World War I, there was a growing resentment against the Hausa in Yorubaland. As Osuntokun notes: Yoruba had played a leading and influential role in the government from the amalgamation in 1914 and until the election of 1951 brought Pressure groups like the Ogboni (cult) and the guild o f hunters (and in the NPC as the majority party in the House of Representatives.22 war chiefs), some o f whom resented the large Hausa settlements in Yorubaland as a licence the white man had given to their former He further observes that: enemies from the north. It is in the light o f this medley o f interests, sentiments and resentments that the Okeogun rebellion of 1916 Chief Awolowo and his lieutenants in the Yoruba Action Group had could be understood.19 always shown contempt for the northerners - the condescending attitude people o f Lagos had for the Hausa “beggars” . ...What In March 1916, in the uprising against the imposition of the Red Yoruba politicians did not realize early enough was that when they Cross Fund (gne shilling for men and six pence for women), “about a attacked the northerners’ way o f life, they were in effect attacking thousand Hausa people in Iseyin barely escaped being massacred.” They the religion of the most northerners - Islam.23 got wind of the plan for extermination and escaped. Osuntokun suggests that: The vicissitudes of the great depression in the 1930s further provoked ethnic tension arising from commercial competition between the Hausa The reason why the Hausa were marked out for extermination could and the Yoruba. According to Abner Cohen, in 1934 the Yoruba made have been historical, commercial or religious. The northern Yoruba an attempt to disintegrate the monopoly created by Hausa traders in never really trusted Hausa-Fulani people for historical reasons, the kolanut trade in many parts of Yorubaland. Hausa traders dictated the series o f wars by Jihadists from Ilorin and the devastating prices to the Yoruba kolanut farmers, and incipient ethnicity emerged impact. Secondly, the Hausa were used by the British as ‘spies’ and ‘political agents’ all over Nigeria, and although Yoruba and Hausa in the contest over who should “pay the ‘lada’, a commission for trade predominated in the Nigeria Regiment, the British had always sent in kolanuts, the Yoruba farmers or the Hausa buyers. The farmers who Hausa detachments to Iseyin in the past to shoot down rebels.20 hitherto had paid it wanted the buyers to take over payment.”24 In the Ibadan cattle market in the early 1930s, both the cattle landlords and The Yoruba performed similar inglorious roles in Northern Nigeria butchers were Hausa. However, the Yoruba began to displace the Hausa by acting as ‘spies’, political agents, police officers and soldiers to pacify as butchers. rebellions. Within the space of the long years of segregation, each of the These competitions were a byproduct of the social inequality and regions accused each other of being allies of the British overlord. Yoruba exploitation inherent in the capitalist mode of production, which leaders indicted the Hausa for being pro-British, while the Hausa held colonial rule introduced.25 Between 1928 and 1948, associational Yoruba politicians in distrust on analogous grounds. As Jose remarks: ethnicity gathered more momentum. It was a period marked by the Great Depression and the World War II that witnessed scarcity, inequality and UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 254 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy o f Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 255 socio-economic insecurity. The elite converged on mediocrity to mobilize/ was challenged by the unabating trend of ethnic conflicts. At the onset manipulate the masses on the platform of primordial ethnic identity. of military rule in 1966, ethnic associations were disbanded, but at the According to Ifidon, “The Nigeria of the 1950s had been made unviable verge of military retreat in 1999, there was an explosion in the number by centrifugal regional tendencies, and barely held together by the of ethnic associations.29 There was a banality of militarized ethnicity. British colonial administrative tendencies.”26 At the general conference Nigeria has witnessed a boom in religiosity (traditional, Islamic, held at Ibadan in 1950, “The first separatist tendency of the north was and Christian) and the pervasiveness of religious and ethnic sentiments exhibited when the North threatened to pull out of the country unless sanctioned killings and violence. People killed by ethnic and religious it got half of the legislative seats at the National Legislative Council.”27 sentiments. According to Mamdani, “The modern political sensibility According to A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, the concession to the North “was to sees most political violence as necessary to historical progress. Since dominate the shaping of Nigeria’s political culture until the first republic the French Revolution, violence has come to be seen as the midwife exploded sixteen years later.”28 of history.”30 In cultural terms, political violence, ethnic or communal By and large, in the nationalist struggle for independence, the conflicts in Africa were attributed to the absence of modernity.31 formation of political parties reflected ethno-regional affiliations. In In sum, the post-military era in Nigeria witnessed the pervasive post-independence politics, the political elite mobilized and manipulated struggle in all the geo-political zones for self-determination. In the legal ethnic identity to sustain authoritarian rules. The ethnic tension between regime, there was SharVah in the northwest and northeast. In the self- the Hausa and the Yoruba was further aggravated by the annulment determination in resource control, ethnic militias and the elite in the of the June 12, 1993 presidential election popularly won by the late south-south led. In self-determination in terms of regional autonomy M.K.O. Abiola. The Yoruba felt politically dominated and alienated. The and the restructuring of the Nigerian federalism, ethnic militias tragic consequences of these events were ethnic conflicts between the and the elite in the southwest championed that cause. The elite and two, particularly in Lagos and Ogun States. militia groups in the Middle Belt preoccupied themselves with the Since 1999, unprecedented and episodic violent conflicts have question of self-determination in the assertion of ethnic and indigene occurred between the Hausa and the Yoruba within the context of the identity. The Igbo elite, the legislature and ethnic militia groups are democratization process and neo-liberal economic transition. The era of still nostalgic about self-determination in terms of confederacy and neo-liberal political and economic transitions ended splendid hospitality the rebirth of Biafra, which threatened the legitimacy of the Nigerian between the two ethnic groups and ushered in mutual suspicion, violent state. All the self-determinations provoked conflicts, political instability, conflicts and hostilities. In this work, it is argued that conflict was insecurity, communal hostilities and the resurgence of xenophobia, as inevitable between the two groups given the contention for political well as nostalgia similar to the 1966 political crisis and the civil war power that was historically situated. In 1999, as the political transition atmosphere between 1967 and 1970. The most successful of all the self- intensified, conflict of interests occurred between, the Hausa at the determination struggles was the legal reform in northwest and northeast threshold of losing power and the Yoruba at the summit of gaining it. Nigeria, which introduced the criminal aspects of the existing SharVah There has been an increase in the incidence of conflicts between the law. There was a rise in consciousness and self-development throughout Hausa and Yoruba settler communities living outside their respective the SharVah states. The violence of self-determination remains lingering home regions and between the two in the major cities of southwestern and unabated. Agbese submits that, “The end of the Cold War helped and northern Nigeria. These rising inter-ethnic and communal conflicts to create a political space in which ethnic, cultural and religious groups and clashes resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and massive that had been dis-empowered, dispossessed and marginalized could assert and reassert their identities.”32 destruction. Combatants on both sides have used all means for the prosecution of their objectives, including torture, physical mutilation and Among the Yoruba, the Afenifere replaced the Egbe Omo Oduduwa murder. In Nigeria, an attempt to re-establish democratic governance that was outlawed in 1966 while the OPC (Oodua People’s Congress) UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 256 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 257 and many others sprouted. Between 1993 and 2000, Yorubaland became The Yorubas, for instance, belong to the same racial stock. But they the seething base of agitation towards autonomy. Agitation against are divided into a number o f tribes and clans, each of which claims marginalization was articulated through pan-Yoruba conferences within and strives to be independent o f the others. The same is true o f Nigeria and in the diaspora. In northern Nigeria, the introduction of Hausas, though the ruling Fulanis, and the religion of Islam, exercise the SharTah, which Zamfara State pioneered in 1999, heightened the a strong unifying influence on them, which is absent among the tension in the dichotomy of citizenship. According to Sklar, “ ... the Yorubas.39 introduction of SharVah for Muslims meant that there would be two categories of citizens in the state, each category based on religion; each He continued that, “Politically, the best-organized groups are the with its own set of rights and penalties.”35 The period 1999 - 2003 Hausa, including the Fulani, who form the ruling class in the north, and witnessed an unprecedented combination of events in the political and the Yoruba.”40 economic history of Nigeria, such as democratic rule and neo-liberal Despite this commendation on the political organization, derogatory economic reforms.The decline in industrial production, the upsurge and uncomplimentary remarks influenced the mindset of many Yoruba in ethnic and religious identities, spontaneous ethnic and religious politicians, journalists, and public office holders, which exacerbated conflicts and the oil boom (excess money from sales of crude oil) — the divisive tendencies in their conduct with the Hausa. Mediocrity blighted accumulation of economic surplus at the disposal of the Nigerian state the Yoruba tradition of cultural pluralism by derogatorily attributing to were other factors. It is therefore instructive to note that the structure ‘others’ the stereotypes of ‘enemies, rivals, competitors, and people of of the Nigerian society, particularly political economy, is conducive to inferior intellect.”41 ethnic conflicts. During the 1959 general election campaigns, party politics and Under the Obasanjo presidency, there were attempts in northern diversity in political ideology heightened friction between the Yoruba Nigeria to resist public policies that sought to deny the North of the and the Hausa. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) regarded the gains made during the military era. In some ways, public policies were Action Group electioneering campaign against the thriving feudal perceived to reduce the inequities caused by historical discrimination political system in Northern Nigeria with abhorrence and repugnance. and reduce their wealth as well as standard of living. *6 Government There was a spectre of suspicion between the northern and western policies not only constituted an arena for ethnic struggles, they also Nigerian political elite who were apprehensive of each other plotting aggravated the nature of ethnic tensions and conflicts. Agbese illustrates to destabilize their sphere of political stronghold. Awolowo was that, “The state based pattern of capital accumulation in which the apprehensive of a possible Jihad against the Yoruba from the north. ruling classes use their access to state power as a mechanism for the According to Chief Awolowo: private appropriation of wealth encourages the manipulation of ethnic Sir Ahmadu (Bello) contended that NPC’s new decision to invade and other forms of primordial identities.”37 the South politically was a reply to the recent invasion o f the North by southern political parties ... Sir Ahmadu (Bello) claimed that like Political Elite and Stereotypical Notions his great grandfather, Shehu Othman Dan Fodio whom, he said after Falola makes the point that, “To treat the Yoruba-speaking peoples his conquests, divided the conquered country between his two sons, as a unit can only be justified on cultural and linguistic similarities... ‘I too after conquering the South will also divide Nigeria into two to Yorubaland was never a single socio-political unit.”38 As he argues, the be taken charge o f by two o f my lieutenants.’42 power elite imposed the myth of Yoruba nation. Political incoherency among the Yoruba was eloquently articulated by Chief Awolowo: It was not until the January 1950 Constitutional Review Conference held at Ibadan that the Hausa and Yoruba leaders met for the first time to hold consultation on the political future of Nigeria. At the 1950 UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 258 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 259 Constitutional Conference in Ibadan, a stalemate ensued when delegates Government became a bone of contention between Awolowo and from Northern Nigeria objected to the ministerial system of government Akintola. Awolowo preferred to be in opposition as opposed to Akintola that was considered antithetical to their political interest. It was argued who looked forward to collaboration with other political parties in the that the North suffered from the paucity of indigenous civil servants to formation of the National Government. In Akintola’s view, this was the serve the ministers as Permanent Secretaries. It was a meeting of historic only means through which the Yoruba could benefit from the gains of proportions which laid the foundation of trust between the two.43 This independence they tenaciously fought for. On 2 February 1962, Akintola brave step built serious momentum for a historic breakthrough from the was castigated as a traitor who sold the Yoruba to the Hausa for hosting British-imposed dichotomies, but it was short-lived. the Sardauna in Ibadan while the AG party convention was going on in The gain of the Ibadan accord was squandered by the political Jos.46 intrigues that followed the transformation of ethno-regional groups, In this way, the dialectics of power in the south-west and political such as the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and the Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa, intrigues in the AG had ripple effects on Hausa and Yoruba relations. As into political parties. In a large measure, the political parties were Jose noted: introspective in their orientation. The Action Group was formed in 1950, but was officially launched on 28 April 1951 at Owo. The changes Chief Akintola and his supporters who wanted the Action Group to brought about by the emergent political parties altered the nascent power work with the NPC in a coalition government so that the Yorubas relations between the two groups. Events following the 1953 motion could participate when the national cake was being shared out were the minority in the party. Chief Awolowo and his supporters who of the Action Group (AG), the Yoruba political party, agitating for self- held to the Yoruba adage, which translated into English means: government in 1956 intensified the hostility. When the AG presented ‘rather than prostrate to Hausa man, let us commit suicide,’ were in the motion in March 1953, Northern political leaders, especially Sir the majority.47 Ahmadu Bello, insisted that the self-government question must be based on an equal footing. He unequivocally stressed that the North required A personality clash occurred between Awolowo and Akintola. The human capital development and infrastructure and urged other regions former accused the latter of usurpation of power to become both the to proceed with their self-governments. Northern leaders came under premier and leader of the party, while the latter accused the former virulent attacks. of aspiring to become the de facto premier despite being the leader of In the 1959 general election campaigns, the AG faced stiff opposition the party. Akintola had canvassed the idea of regional security, which and assaults in many parts of Northern Nigeria which was the stronghold prevents any regional government from using its resources tantamount to of the Northern People’s Congress. Prior to the 1959 federal election, destabilizing other regional governments by supporting their opponents. majority of the AG members agreed that the party should take part in During the first Republic, Prince Okunade Sijuade (now the Ooni of Ife) the NPC-NCNC coalition to form a National Government. Awolowo had brokered a meeting between Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Sir Ahmadu earlier held a reception for Tafawa Balewa when the latter visited him at Bello in his efforts aimed at uniting them. However, he was castigated Ibadan on 17 October 1957 for the same purpose. AG leaders considered as “driving the Yoruba into perpetual slavery.”48 the visit very historic.44 But attempts by Chief S.L. Akintola to fraternize On 11 March 1964, Akintola was obliged to explain to the Western with the NPC were received with indignity and mudslinging by the Region the formation of the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) that Yoruba politicians. The fraternity was considered an effrontery and an comprised the NNDR the NPC, the Mid-West Democratic Front, and atrocity. several political parties in the ethnic minority areas of Eastern Nigeria Some leaders in the AG hierarchy resented the rapport between and the Niger Delta. From a deep sense of history and resolution to bring Akintola and the Northern Nigerian political leaders.45 The stake to the realm of politics the inter-ethnic relations between the Hausa and of the AG and indeed the Yoruba in the post-independence National the Yoruba, Akintola asserted that: UNIVER ITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 260 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy o f Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 261 It is, I think, pertinent at this stage to draw attention to a fact, which At the outset o f the transition programme in 1998, the Afenifere (a Pan- is often overlooked by the people o f Western Nigeria. Very strong Yoruba organization) leaders opined that the failure to shift power to cultural links, social and religious, exist between us and the people the south might precipitate the end of Nigeria. It would be difficult to of Northern Nigeria. All over the world, natural advantages of this convince the Yoruba that they belonged to Nigeria. This threat made the type are put to work and used to advantage as the basis o f close All (Nigerian) Peoples Party and the People’s Democratic Party, considered understanding. We in Western Nigeria have, although sheer neglect and loyalty to such friends as we have made in the past, allowed as northern dominated parties, to concede their presidential tickets to ourselves to be manoeuvred into a position in which for several the southwest. The decision produced two Yoruba, Chief Obasanjo and years we were hardly on speaking terms with leaders o f opinion and Chief Olu Falae, as presidential candidates. For the Afenifere, the central thought in Northern Nigeria. In my view, the continuance o f this question remained: Will an Awoist ever emerge as Nigeria’s president? policy is nothing short o f criminal folly, and it is my firm resolve to The Afenifere and NADECO’s grouse about the Abacha government was steer the affairs o f this region resolutely in the opposite direction. I aggravated by a gross record of human rights abuse, the incarceration of have no apologies to offer in this regard. I am content to be judged civil rights activists and the assassinations of Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, Chief by the outcome of events and history.49 Alfred Rewane and Madam Bisoye Tejuoso, as well as the assassination attempts on Chief Abraham Adesanya. Soaring unemployment, grinding Akintola’s foray in politics was made to broaden the horizon of the poverty and collapsing infrastructure, as well as the condemnation Yoruba in national politics, as opposed to the ethnically complacent of the nation by the international organizations, marked Abacha’s politics of Awolowo and other members in the AG. By aligning with administration. According to the leader of the Afenifere, Abacha’s Northern politicians, Akintola merely revitalized the Ibadan political administration witnessed a “programmed and sustained offensive accord between Yoruba Obas and northern Emirs in 1950. against the Yoruba in form of unwarranted harassment, persecution, discrimination and humiliation by a tiny clique of military hegemonists The June 12,1993 Presidential Election and the Upsurge aided by their civilian collaborators with whom they transiently control o f Political Insurgency federal power, and resources.”51 The June 12 debacle was largely a failure of the Nigerian political class. The Yoruba felt that the ruling elite of the Hausa obstructed their As a political party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was too weak to attempt to restructure Nigeria in such a way that the Yoruba would defend the June 12 mandate. It was not surprising then that it conceded be autonomous in the control of their own resources and develop at to the political manoeuvres of the military. Many politicians abandoned their own pace. This was summed up by General Alani Akinrinade, “ ... the party and scrambled for political appointments in the interim Yoruba autonomy is neither irredentism nor secession. We simply want government and the military government that followed. Pro-June 12 the space, free space, which is our birthright, to develop at our pace activists and close confidants of Abiola wittingly or unwittingly gave the without let or hindrance.”52 late General Sani Abacha the needed support to take over power from The Yoruba agenda centres on what Kimenyi calls “Ethnic the Interim National Government (ING), and foreclosed the mandate. governmental units that possess a fair degree of autonomy”, since Most of the former pro-June 12 elements abandoned the struggle and “African experience with unitary states has been disappointing.”53 The supported Abacha even before Abiola’s death. Chief Ebenezer Babatope, election of Obasanjo symbolized a dramatic shift in Nigerian politics. a pro-June 12, did not only serve under Abacha as a Minister but also There was apparent collapse of the traditional north-east alliance that campaigned for his self-succession. This changing political act was dominated the first and second republics. The paradox of the shift was prompted by the alleged Abiola role in the National Party of Nigeria that the coalition in the political terrain could not foster cordial ethnic (NPN) during the second Republic to scuttle the presidential ambition relations between the Hausa and the Yoruba. Indeed, some Yoruba of Chief Awolowo. leaders claimed that the victory of Obasanjo through the support of UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 262 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 263 northern elite was the continuation of Yoruba domination by the Hausa to speak for the Yoruba at the national conference for political reforms. oligarchy through other means. There were diametrically opposed interests: Boom in Ethnic Identity The prevarication is between Afenifere that wants the region to come Hausa and Yoruba conflicts were manifestations of the dysfunction that up with a common agenda that presupposes three main things - true underscore the trajectory of the Nigerian state formation traversing the federalism, regionalism and parliamentary system and restructuring colonial and post-colonial epochs. The conflicts were a logical outcome - and the South west governors, who favour autonomous status for of the brazen mischief and political bickering of the power elite; the local governments, presidential rule and strong opposition against regionalism.55 manifestation of the distortion in the nature of citizenship pre-eminently characterized by exclusion, the prevailing regime of inequality, the According to Liadi Telia: ailing economy and the bourgeoning informal sector which increasingly witnessed fierce competition among the peasants. The conflicts could The Afenifere, YCE, the governors, Bashorun Rock, Egbe Igbimo be considered as the war of the subalterns. The displaced aggression Yoruba and the Lagos delegation all have different agenda. Which of the subalterns prevented them from confronting the exploiters and one will the conference take? When you refuse to appoint a leader, the elite in their domain. The war could not alter the existing status what you have is a kind o f Portuguese parliament. And what you quo of exploitation prevailing in the conflict-prone communities. have is confusion. The Yoruba nation is in confusion now and our Conflicts were fought over markets; and competition intensified over leaders must find a way out.56 the control of diminishing resources. Flashpoints remained peril- urban neighbourhoods, a ‘masses republic’. In these encounters, the These factors have also continued to impede intra-group solidarity socialization of youths on the perception of other ethnic groups requires and unity except when it becomes necessary to compete with other investigation. groups.57 The political process in Nigeria is not devoid of Yoruba and In 1999, democratic governance signalled the era of brigandage Hausa collaboration and alliance. It is therefore ahistorical to consider which denied the citizens the social rights to education, social facilities, the northern and western regions as monolithic entities. In the first health and economic gains within national politics. Politics degenerated republic, Chief Akintola was a close ally of Sir Ahmadu Bello. In the into a “means to personal enrichment”, rather than the overall welfare of second republic, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo obliged to the electoral the community. Many Nigerians relied on their ethnic or religious groups verdict by handing over to Alhaji Shehu Usman Shagari. Shagari enjoyed as the basis for emotional identity. The ‘policy of exclusion’ resulted in support from many Yoruba politicians. In the aborted third republic, the mutual distrust, providing safety in ethnic and religious inclinations, Kaduna Mafia signed a political pact with Chief Awolowo. Before the which in turn bred hatred and repulsion. According to Hamza: annulment of the June 12 presidential election, Chief Abiola garnered more votes in northern Nigeria than Bashir Othman Tofa, a Hausa The relative deprivation theory asserts that a people’s capacity for of Kanuri ancestry. In the fourth republic, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo revenge through the means of violence is contingent on the result earned enormous political goodwill from northern Nigeria more than of the comparison it makes with others, meaning, if a community in his homeland in southwestern Nigeria. But this glaring evidence of perceives that the community is being favoured at their own expense, alliances has remained obscene due to identity politics. General Sani rebellion becomes a natural response.54 Abacha “nursed the paradoxically revolutionary dream of annulling the Under the Obasanjo presidency, Yoruba identity could not create the old northern establishment and the entire Nigerian political class...”58 envisioned political unity. There was a conspicuous absence of a leader The annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, popularly perceived to have been won by MKO Abiola, and the agitation for its UNIVERSITY OF IBAD N LIBRARY 264 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 265 reinstatement created an unprecedented political impasse not seen has always been privy to the myth of northern domination. The 1979 since the outbreak of the civil war of 1967-1970. The annulment election was marred by the two-third of 19 states debacle. It was the of the election was perceived to have been motivated partly by the ‘legal mathematical wizardry’ of a Yoruba legal luminary, Chief Richard geographical/ethnic identity of its Yoruba winner that it was orchestrated Akinjide, which finally sealed Chief Awolowo’s protestations of Shagari to preserve the monopoly of the presidency in the north to the exclusion being declared the winner. The installation of Shagari as President of the southerners.59 The Yoruba mounted opposition against successive through the collaboration of Yoruba elite was a devastating blow to the governments in the post-June 12 era. Such governments, including the presidential ambition of Chief Awolowo. In the 1983 election, some interim government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, General Sani powerful elements in the Kaduna Mafia who were disenchanted with the Abacha, General Abubakar Abdulsalami and Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, Shagari administration reached an accord with Awolowo and supported were considered as illegitimate. Annual celebrations of the June 12 his presidential ambition. In the 1993 election, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, became a major institution and many state governments in the southwest through the tacit support of political entrepreneurs, easily trashed Olu declared June 12 as public holiday. Falae in Oyo State and made impressive victory in many states of the The looming spectre of political uncertainty accelerated the pace southwest. At Ibadan, he defeated Layi Balogun, an indefatigable son of of organized ethnicity among the Yoruba. The surfeit of ethnic-based the soil. associations was floated unequivocally and agitated for the restoration of The annulment of June 12 renewed and exacerbated old rivalries the June 12 mandate, political restructuring and autonomy. In northern and the apprehension the Yoruba had nurtured against the Hausa. The Nigeria, there was a proliferation of Yoruba ethnic associations in both annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential election was perceived as rural and urban communities. Dormant associations were revived and an ethnic agenda of the Hausa aristocracy to perpetually control political new ones of more centralized nature were added. These associations power in Nigeria. The annulment scuttled and truncated the pan-Nigeria made a dramatic swift in their goals from the previous agenda of identity that the massive support for Abiola’s presidency garnered. The developing their hometowns to enriching the welfare of their members. unrelenting attack on Yoruba elite by Abacha’s military junta reinforced Broadly, the June 12 debacle transcends ethnic power struggle between the apprehension of the Yoruba that the Hausa orchestrated plans to the Yoruba and the Hausa, but highlights the political brinkmanship “exterminate them.” It was equally perceived that the Hausa aimed between progressive and conservative forces. In the build-up to the at checkmating the political ascendancy of the Yoruba. But in whose party nomination of M.K.O. Abiola as the flag bearer of the SDlj there interest did Abacha rule? Abacha’s primary constituency was the military were political forces from Yorubaland who attempted to jettison the and he was not accountable to anybody. Abacha used maximum power presidential ambition based on his role in scuttling the presidential to crush his known and perceived detractors in various parts of the ambition of Chief Awolowo in the second republic. country. He ridiculed the traditional power and political authority of The degree of elite collusion and collision is germane in unravelling the Sokoto Caliphate by summarily deposing Sultan Ibrahim Dasuki. the Hausa-Yoruba conflict. The myth of northern political domination Before his demise, he was on the verge of deposing the Emir of Kano is often peddled in many parts of southern Nigeria, especially the or, as it was rumoured, partitioning the Emirate into two by creating southwest. It was a convenient alibi peddled by politicians and their another one for his multi-millionaire friend, Dankabo. A study of primary accolades in academia to portray the Yoruba as a ‘minority ethnic group’, sources on the annulment of June 12 elections reveals that those who in terms of power relations, marginalized and dominated by the Hausa. collaborated on the issue belonged to at least two political groups with According to David-West, “Northern ‘domination’ or the ‘monopoly’ of basically contradictory interests. The conflicting interests of the two the presidency is far from being due to a nebulous divine dispensation” groups could be explained within the context of the internal partisan and the swinging pendulum of'power.60 “It is the south’s constant and politics among the Yoruba and military dictatorship. First, even though decisive support to a northern domination or control.”61 The south the Yoruba had aspired to rule Nigeria, Abiola was perceived as a major UNIVERSITY OF IBAD N LIBRARY 266 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 267 opponent of Chief Awolowo and therefore not pursing Yoruba agenda. The aftermath of the June 12 itself threw the Yoruba into internal power As a businessman and government contractor, Abiola was a close ally of struggles and ideological discontents. The Hausa did not ‘sit on the the military establishment. fence’ concerning the aggression of the OPC to its vested interests and As stated in the Yoruba Agenda: kinsmen. The Hausa floated a counter organization, the Arewa Peoples’ Congress (APC) to checkmate the OPC’s violent threats. The dangers Every Yoruba has a covenant to solemnly undertake, with God’s posed by the activities of the OPC paradoxically acted as a catalyst for the help, to seek, with all his mind and might, every opportunity to revival of “one north.” Under Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the Harmonization achieve autonomy and self government for Yorubaland within one Committee had been formed to unite many of the elite associations such Nigeria.64 as the Turaki Committee, the Northern Elders Forum (NEF) and the United Development Foundation which provided leadership support to Throughout history, men with dejd vu of injustice have resorted the APC. to violence in furtherance of their idealistic vision. According to Gani The APC canvassed to maintain the status quo. Both in structure and Adams, violence is inevitable if Nigeria is to find justice. As he stated, operation, the APC sharply contrasted the OPC. The APC has regional “You can’t give birth to a child without blood. If there is no blood, this identity and invariably protects Yoruba elements, while the OPC has country cannot believe in justice.’65 Political repression galvanized the ethnic appeal. Before his death in 2007, Chief Sunday Awoniyi, a Yoruba process of insurgency and formation of pan-Yoruba organizations which from Kogi State, was the Chairman of the Arewa Consultative Forum, mobilized the Yoruba towards political autonomy. On 29 August 1995, a pan-Northern Nigerian organization, elitist and amorphous in nature. the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC) was formed at Mushin area of Lagos On the other hand, the OPC has standing, registered and organized by nine original members.66 The OPC alleged structural imbalances in membership with mass grassroots support. While OPC orchestrated public service. Northerners were said to have occupied the hierarchy ethnic violence against targeted groups/individuals, the APC is yet to be and dominated military and para-military services and the federal civil linked directly to any violence. Many of the perpetrators of the conflicts service.67 in northern Nigeria remain theAlmajiri, the ‘Yandaba and street urchins. The popular perception of the OPC in many parts of Nigeria, Can one really categorize APC as ethnic militia? There are over 100 particularly in the north, was that, it represents the military wing of the ethnic groups in northern Nigeria with Hausa, Nupe, Yoruba, Tiv, pan-Yoruba organization, the Afenifere, just as the Alliance for Democracy Kanuri, Fulani, Ebira and Igala as major groups. The APC arose out is its political outfit. On the contrary, the OPC constitutes terror in of the political exigencies of checkmating the uncanny monopoly of Yorubaland, its traditional stronghold. The OPC violence impaired the OPC violence against Hausa communities in Lagos and various parts soul of the Yoruba, which it claims to protect, by exacerbating disunity of Yorubaland. However, it could muster or set up an organizational rather than social cohesion. Internally, wrangling polarizes it and structure or “standing army” parallel to the OPC. If anything, the APC the spectre of insecurity imposed by the arbitrary use of violence has remains an ideological and propagandist organization. Its identity is created massive social anomie. Indeed, the OPC has not in any way rather fluid without ethnic, religious and even regional appeal. Prior aided the Yoruba cause. Rather, it has given the Yoruba the pervasive to the formation of the APC youth gangs such as the Yandaba in Kano, identity of militancy, “the wild, wild west.” And for most of Obasanjo’s street urchins and students of the Qur’an, Almajiri, carried out most of administration, the southwest did not achieve a facelift in terms of the violence in the north. These groups of disenchanted youths continue infrastructural developments witnessed in other parts of Nigeria. In a to unleash violence at the slightest provocation. For the APC, the creation large measure, the dividend of democracy was eroded in Yorubaland of an ethnic or regional army was rather elusive. The north is not a as poverty, unemployment ancL school crises persisted. By 1999, the homogenous entity and has experienced violent religious confrontations OPC had transited from civil agitations and violent protests to ethnic more than any part of Nigeria. massacres. UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 268 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 269 The APC was endorsed by the Turaki Committee to checkmate the ... when the Nigerian Tribune visited some northern cities, awareness unconventional approach of the OPC to national events.68 Contrary of the indigenes about the APC was vague and remote. The people, to popular belief, the Gamji Club and the Arewa Consultative Forum who spoke with the Nigerian Tribune said they learnt o f the APC are more vociferous and assertive than the APC in matters that affect through the radio and discussions in town.71 the northern interest. According to Alhaji Sagir Mohammed (Wazirin Ringim), the APC is a “child of necessity” and condemns the proliferation Hausa communities in other parts of Nigeria were contacted to of ethnic militias: mobilize and organize themselves into the APC in order to be vigilant. The original plan was to launch the APC in all states of the federation.72 Let the government first and foremost ban the OPC, ban APC, and In Jos where the indigene and settler question is raging, the Plateau ban TPC. Not only banning them, it should be seen to do it in a Democratic Youth (PDY) vowed to resist the launching of the APC.73 manner that no OPC could come again. If the OPC disappears, the One of the leaders/founders of the APC is Alhaji Sagir Mohammed APC will also disappear. After all, we came to being as a result of (Wazirin Ringim). He was a Permanent Secretary (Government House) necessity. If the OPC disappears, we (APC) will disappear and we and Commissioner of Information in Kano State and a Commissioner of will form a cultural organization for the unification of the north.69 Education in Jigawa State. He was an Intelligence Officer in the Nigerian Army before he voluntarily retired as a Captain. He noted that under But the OPC leaders maintained that the organization could not die and the Obasanjo presidency there was the over-dominance of the Middle- that an unregistered organization could not be proscribed. Belt in the political representation of the north, contrary to the spirit It was widely rumoured that the APC planned to build a standing of the constitution; that there was a massive retirement of military and army around the crop of retired military men of northern Nigeria. political appointees that saw a substantial number of the Hausa flushed According to a report: out under the guise of restructuring. This was alleged to be in line with the plan of General T.Y. Danjuma, the Minister of Defence, that 30,000 Unlike the OPC whose members are not disciplined and well trained military men and women would be demobilized to have a small but and who rely on charms, the APC field personnel will be mainly professional army. There was also the claim that an interdenominational retired military officers who will require little training in the use of service was organized by the Presidency for thanksgiving and spiritual guns.70 carnival without regard to the multi-religious sensitivity of Nigeria; that there was the implementation of the Afenifere agenda and the execution It was alleged that the standing army would be based in the north of AD’s programmes, as out of 49 ministers, 20 were Yoruba.74 and transported to any troubled spot to revenge assaults on citizens The OPC saga raised several questions among Nigerians. To some of northern Nigeria origin. The APC, however, adopted a non-violent it was an epitome of Yoruba arrogance and aggressive nationalism approach in its operation. It was suggested that the APC leadership that perceived the victory in the 1999 polls as a triumph of southern discarded the idea of a standing army since the situation did not democrats over northern oligarchists. Many northern leaders perceived warrant it and the organization was apprehensive of a clampdown by the the government. Rather than build a standing army, the APC relies on the existing structure of violence, the ‘Yandaba and street urchins. The ‘problem’ o f the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) as a manifestation APC uses Islamic religion and ethnic sentiments to mobilize the Yandaba of ‘failure o f the Yoruba to manage power.’ The argument is that to action and sometimes with financial inducements. since 1959, the Yoruba political community (combining leaders and For a long time, the APC has devoted its resources to publicity and the politically mobilized masses) has, by being left out in the political remained ‘media hype.’ According to Opeseitan: rain, developed more skills in managing protests and opposition than in managing being in power ,..75 UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 270 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy o f Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 271 The internal contradictions in Yorubaland could be described in terms distorted facts which often precipitate violence. It obstructs the prospect of what Samuel Huntington calls, “consciousness without cohesion” .76 of dialogue and deepens the dichotomy of citizenship, rumour peddling However, many Nigerians thought that the OPC threat was treated with and propaganda. “placative gestures.”77 In the OPC saga, Bola Tinubu seemed powerless The elite in each of the regions has developed and perfected the due to the “dangerous constitutional lacuna which confers on a state medium of propaganda suitable and accessible to their kinsmen for easy governor the empty status of chief security officer, but effectively mobilization. While the elite in the southwest rely on the indigenous denies him the wherewithal to function as such.”78 President Obasanjo print media, its counterpart in the north utilizes the foreign based cautioned Governor Tinubu and the leaders of the southwest region on electronic (radio) media that broadcast in Hausa. This prevents dialogue the menace of OPC to the nation.79 and exacerbates differences along regional, ethnic and religious divides, The OPC described the threat of the declaration of a State of especially among the masses who are dogmatic about such propagandas. Emergency in Lagos State as an attempt by the Hausa to govern Lagos The media patronized by Nigerians act as tools of propaganda and through the use of emergency powers.80 After the Ketu mayhem, Major provoke conflicts. General Adeyinka Adebayo observed that the OPC’s, “aim was to foment trouble and destabilize the country.”81 Senator Wahab Dosumu, Pow er Shift: Yoruba and H ausa ’s N ew Encounter representing Lagos West, remarked that it was not correct to associate The euphoria that followed the return to democratic rule in May 1999 AD leaders with the actions of the OPC members and that the 114 people was shortlived as the nation became engulfed in internecine ethnic killed in Ketu were Lagosians irrespective of where they came from. He conflicts within a few months. There was a struggle for political power added that Governor Tinubu was incapacitated by the security structure and equitable distribution of resources. The turn of the 20th century in the country, which denied governors the power over the police.82 witnessed explosion in ethnic and religious identities with devastating consequences on the unity of Nigeria. In the southwest, the OPC Tendentiousness o f the M edia epitomized militant ethnic identity, while in the north the introduction Differential access to the media creates a wedge and animosity and of SharVah law marked the resurgence of theocracy, and in several allowed mistrust to thrive in the Hausa and Yoruba relations. The Hausa instances stoked up religious fervour and violence. The intransigence are contemptuous of the print media located in the southwest, which of social groups to transcend the exclusionary boundaries of religion allegedly uses stereotypes to denigrate their culture and the religion of and ethnicity aggravated tension and triggered violence. There was Islam. The Hausa relies on electronic media located in foreign capitals a breakdown of social reciprocities of mutual tolerance spurred by and broadcasted in Hausa to the exclusion of the Yoruba and other non- political inequality and inter-group intolerance. Indeed, the OPC Hausa speakers. The disparity in the access to the media creates a wider violence gathered more momentum with the changes taking place in communication gap and a deliberate distortion of facts on national some states of the north, the launching of the SharVah in Zamfara State, issues. Indisputably, the radio has a broader reach and acceptability which other states emulated. The OPC galvanized its call for autonomy as the key communication channel in northern Nigeria and among as it considered the implication of the SharVah as, “to your tents oh the Hausa diaspora in Yorubaland and elsewhere. Hausa migrants in Israel.” According to the Ani: Yorubaland often listen to international radio broadcasts in Hausa such as the British Broadcasting Service (BBC), Hausa Service and the Voice The imposition of Sharia law is widely viewed as a form of ethnic of America (VOA) rather than radio stations broadcasting in Yoruba persecution by the mostly Christian southerners living in northern or English.83 Radio listening has created communal affinity, solidarity Nigeria. It has increased public backing in Lagos for the OPC’s and culture in the Hausa diaspora. Discrepant access to the media demand for political autonomy or even outright independence for south-western Nigeria.84 stimulates tension and suspicion through the spread of rumours and UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 272 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 273 An increase in the number of cultural organizations among the Yoruba the twin excesses and arrogance of the Afenifere and the northern performing overlapping functions of promoting Yoruba unity/interest, oligarchy, which is made up of the Kaduna Mafia, Turaki Committee, but often clashing due to personal aggrandizement and disparaging and the Northern Elders Forum. The northern oligarchy’s power base political interests, was witnessed. The return to democratic government was not ethnicity but regionalism and sectionalism. Yoruba oligarchy created a vent for the resurgence and reactivation of cultural associations is ethnic chauvinism characterized by anachronism, quest for absolute among the Yoruba. According to the YCE: power and autocratic. These features boomeranged on the Afenifere, as the organization witnessed internal crisis, intrigues and separatist Our own point o f departure really was the fact that the Afenifere tendencies. The weakness of the Afenifere in providing the required was said to be the Alliance for Democracy and we felt we needed a leadership inadvertently paved the way for unprecedented youth Pan-Yoruba organization that will not be partisan. This was what led vagrancy and militarism. to the creation o f the YCE ... There are a lot of Yoruba socio-cultural organizations: You have the YCE, the Yoruba Parapo, the Oduduwa Conclusion Assembly, and so on. They are providing leadership for the Yoruba This study elucidated that the claims of exclusion from the state and the people, for the young generation coming up.85 economy culminated in the fostering of ethnic consciousness and violence. Dr Fredrick Fasheun noted that Afenifere is an umbrella Yoruba The conflicts between the Hausa and the Yoruba have in some ways political organization while the OPC is a socio-cultural pressure group debunked the marginalization thesis that skewed the minority question in ethnic terms and number-game. There are also political minorities. in Yorubaland.86 Ethnic conflicts between the Hausa and the Yoruba became inevitable Marginalization cannot be therefore interpreted in ethnic terms but in due to the emergent political economy of democratic governance. The terms of access to power and resources. The collective inability to make elite of the core north, the Hausa, perceived the Obasanjo’s presidency a shift in political discourse from mundane/parochial issues of statism, as a betrayal of trust. It was alleged that Obasanjo was determined power shift, zoning and quota system reduced the national discourse to reverse the trend of history - the gains of the northerners under to sentimental issues. These created a breeding ground for ethno military rule. They had overwhelmingly supported Obasanjo due religious sentiments and secessionist consciousness. The elite’s cry of to his performance between 1976 and 1979. He was considered the marginalization has been used for power bargaining which occasionally “material for national cohesion, fairness, equal opportunity and a sense led to conflagrations and ethnocentrism. The phenomenon of ethnic of belonging within the Nigerian polity.”87 Indeed, the Yoruba political marginalization was used in the contest for political power and conflicts. establishment exercised much doubt about the transition programme The elite manipulated the historic rivalries between the Hausa and the Yoruba to create ethnic intolerance and conflicting tendencies. and the candidature of Obasanjo.88 Obasanjo’s policies were perceived as that of Afenifere agenda that is anti-core north in all its ramifications. According to Wada Nas, the Afenifere agenda of the Obasanjo administration reflected in the steady elimination of the Hausa in the economy - award of contracts, the purge in the military, lack of trust for the Hausa in sensitive national positions and appointments of Christian northerners and the marginalization of the north in the civil service. In this context, Obasanjo’s presidency was a battlefield characterized by interest aggregation, power contestations among the political blocs and internecine rivalry among the power elite. Obasanjo encountered UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 274 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 275 Endnotes LB. Jose (1987), Walking A Tight Rope: Power Play in Daily Times. 1 The author acknowledges the funding of the research project by the Ibadan: University Press Limited, p. 48. Independent Research Trust, USA and the profound support of its Jose, p. 206. entire staff and board of trustees. Malam Ibrahim Muazzam, former Jose, pp. 47 and 48. Acting Director of the Centre for Research and Documentation O. Nnoli (1978), Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension (CRD) Kano was generous in providing valuable documents Publishers, p. 71. indispensable for this research. I thank all my interlocutors whose Nnoli, p. 87. unwavering support enabled me complete the research for this Ifidon, 2003, p. 24. paper. Ifidon, p. 13. 2 Y. Popov (1984), Essays in Political Economy: Imperialism and the A.H.M. Kirk-Green, 1971, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Developing Countries, Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 49. Documentary Sourcebook: 1966-1970. London: Oxford University 3 Popov, pp. 48 - 49. Press, p. 9. 4 Popov, p. 50. PR Ekeh (2004), “Minorities and the Evolution of Federalism”, 5 Mustapha 2004, p. 167. in A.A.B. Agbaje, L. Diamond and E. Onwudiwe (eds.), Nigeria’s 6 P Bardhan (1996), Method in the Madness? A Political-Economy Struggle for Democracy and Good Governance: A Festschrift for Analysis of Ethnic Conflict in Less Developed Countries. Working Oyeleye Oyediran. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, p. 26. Paper No. C96-070, Centre for International and Development M. Mamdani (2004), Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold Economics Research, University of California, Berkeley, cited by War, and the Roots of Terror. Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series, p. 3. Mustapha, 2004, p. 167. Mamdani, p. 4. 7 J.M. Mbaku (2001), “Ethnicity, Constitutionalism, and Governance RO. Agbese (2001), “Managing Ethnic Relations in a Heterogenous in Africa” in J.M. Mbaku, RO. Agbese and M.S. Kimenyi (eds.), Society: The Case of Nigeria”, in J.M. Mbaku, Pita Ogaba Agbese Ethnicity and Governance in the Third World. Burlington: Ashgate, and M.S. Kimenyi, (eds.), Ethnicity and Governance in the Third pp. 59 - 99. World. Burlington: Ashgate, p. 128. 8 Mbaku, p. 59. Ekeh, p. 26. 9 Mbaku, p. 60. R.L. Sklar (2004), “Foundations of Federal Government in Nigeria”, 10 Mbaku, p. 61. in A.A.B. Agbaje, L. Diamond and E. Onwudiwe (eds.), Nigeria’s 11 Mbaku, p. 62. Struggle for Democracy and Good Governance: A Festschrift for 12 Mbaku, p.65. Oyeleye Oyediran. Ibadan: University Press, p. 7. 13 Mbaku, p.65. Sklar, p. 12. 14 L. Lugard (1922), The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, p. Mbaku, p. 67. 506. Agbese, p. 127. 15 A. Osuntokun (1979), Nigeria in the First World War. London: T. Falola (1986), p. 7. Longman, p. 119. O. Awolowo (1947), p. 32. 16 Osuntokun, p. 119. Awolowo, p. 48. 17 F.T. Shaw (1905), p. 439. Falola, p. 2. 18 Shaw, p. 441. Awolowo, p. 3. 19 Osuntokun, p. 119. Jose, p. 32. 20 Osuntokun, p. 124. UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 276 Resurgent Nigeria: Issues in Nigerian Intellectual History The Political Economy of Hausa and Yoruba Conflicts, 1999 - 2004 277 44 L. Adedibu (1997), What I Saw on the Politics and Governance of G. Adams (2003), “Politics and Agenda of Ethnic Militias: The Ibadan land and the Issue of June 12th, 1993. Ibadan: H.U. A Nigeria Case of OPC” , p. 96. Limited, p. 209. B. Onakoya, “Northern Elders Endorse APC”, in Nigerian Tribune, 45 . Akintola, p. 67. 21 January 2000, pp. 1 and 2. 46 Chief Awolowo had hosted Sir Tafawa Balewa on 17 October 1957 1. Muhammed, “If you OPC us, We Shall APC you”, in Triumph, 16 on AG’s participation in the National Government and Sardauna January 2000, p. 7. on 19 March 1959 on the attainment of independence by the B. Opeseitan, “How APC Plans to Strike”, in Nigerian Tribune, 27 Federation of Nigeria. January 2000, pp. 1 and 2. 47 Jose, p. 206. Opeseitan, pp. 1 and 2. 48 Adedibu, p. 362. A. Ayodele, “North Jittery Over OPC”, in Sunday Tribune, 15 49 Akintola, p. 101. January 2000, p. 4. 50 S.A. Sodimu (1999), Abraham Adesanya: The Unbowed Democrat. T. Obateru, “Plateau Youths Vow to Resist Planned APC Launching”, Lagos: Multigraph Printers and Associates, p. 59. in Vanguard, 8 February 2000. 51 Sodimu, p. 72. Ibrahim Halilu Ibrahim, “Obasanjo Has Committed Impeachable 52 “Yoruba Autonomy Certificate.” Text of Speech made by General Offences - Alhaji Sagir”, interview in Crystal, November 1999. Alani Akinrinade at the official launching of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa O. Oculi, “Between PDP and OPC”, in 'The Guardian January 5th, in Washington DC, 2 May 1998. 2000, p. 41. 53 M.S. Kimenyi (2001), “Harmonizing Ethnic Claims in Africa: A S.P Huntington (1998), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking Proposal for Ethnic-based Federalism” ... p. 102. of World Order. London: Touchstone Paperback Edition. Various 54 P Hamza, “Northern Unity: Whose Responsibility”, in New Nigeria accounts described President Obasanjo, the governors of the Weekly, 22 June 2002, p. 17. southwest, the Inspector-General of Police, Mr Musiliu Smith and 55 H. Aruna, “With Divided Agenda, Yoruba Search for a Leader”, in the Police Affairs Minister, Major-General David Jemibewon (rtd) as Daily Independent, 4 May 2005, p. Cl. 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