A YORÙBÁ PERSPECTIVE ON W. V. O. QUINE’S INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION THESIS BY Y OLUSEGUN AKINTAYO, OJELAKIN R Matriculation No: 69506 RA B. A., M. A. Philosophy (Ibadan) LIB N A Thesis in the DepartmenDt oAf Philosophy, submitted to thAe Faculty of Arts in partial fulfillment of thIeB requirements for the Degree of DOCOTOF R OF PHILOSOPHY ITY of the ER S IV UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN N U DECEMBER 2021 CERTIFICATION I certify that this work was carried out by Mr. Olusegun Akintayo Ojelakin in the Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan Y AR …….………………………… R Supervisor IB Prof. Christopher O. Agulanna L B. A., M. A. (Lagos); MAE (LinkoNping s); M. A. (Utrecht), PhD (Ibadan) Professor of Ethics & Social PhAilosophy Department of Philosophy University of IbadanA, NDigeria B F I O TY RS I E V UN I ii DEDICATION To the glory of the Most High God, the Author and Finisher of our faith. Y RA R LIB N A BA D F I O ITY ER S IV UN iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This is to show my profound gratitude to all those who have contributed in one way or the other in making the writing of this thesis a reality. I would like to express my appreciation to my articulate Supervisor, Prof. Christopher O. Agulanna for his unquantifiable supports and selfless input into this thesis. Thanks Sir for standing by me even when the road was rough. Your guidance, suggestions and corrections have tremendously enhanced the quality of this thesis. I also appreciate the H.O.D, Prof. (Mrs.) Lanre Abass and Prof. Isaac Ukpokolo for thier unwavYering supports, I thank Prof. Francis Offor, Prof. Tunji Oyeshile, Prof. Shina AAfolaRyan, Dr. Tade Adegbindin and all the dynamic, erudite academic staff of theR Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, for their encouragemeInBts. I appreciate you all for your immense assistance towards shaping this thesis to aLn appreciable standard. I appreciate the supports of the Church of Nigeria (AnAgliNcan Communion) Scholarship Board; the Primate, Most Rev. Henry Chukwudum Ndukuba, the former Primate, Most Revd Nicholas Okoh, the Archbishop, EcclesAiastDical Province of Ibadan, Most Revd Dr. „Segun Okubadejo, the Rt. Revd D. KIB. Bello and the Most Revd M. O. Akinyemi (Rtd), for their immeasurable supporFts w ithout which this project would not have seen the light of the day. O I am greatly indebted to mYy parents, late Chief Samson Oladejo Ojelakin and Mrs. Abigail O. Ojelakin wIhTose interest and disposition in the education of their children have contributed gSreatly to my progress today. Special thanks also go to my sister Mrs. Lara Olofin aRnd her husband, Prof. Bode Olofin for their unalloyed support, my brother,V MEr. Femi Ojelakin and all my friends and parishioners who have shown interesIt in my completing the research programme. May you continue to increase in all thaNt is good in Jesus mighty name. Amen. U Deserving of special mention is my loving and caring family, my inestimable wife, Mrs. Caroline Abimbola Ojelakin and my wonderful children, AanuOluwa, IyanuOluwa and IfeOluwa. I cherish the sacrifice you have made, the comfort you have been denied, to ensure the completion of this thesis. May you reap the fruits of your sacrifices in the mighty name of our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen. iv In completion, I bow before the Master of the Universe, the Alpha and Omega, the one who has given me abundant life. I am what I am because I am living. Thank you Lord Jesus Christ. Y R BR A N LI A BA D I F O ITY RS E IV UN v ABSTRACT Ind1e terminacy, a condition of instability of meaning, uncertainty and variations in int2er pretations of grammatical forms and categories in any natural language, has gen3e rated both linguistic and philosophical challenges among scholars. Previous stu4d ies have examined the problem of translation using the theories of conceptual rel5at ivism and universalism. These theories however failed to provide enough bases for res6o lving the dilemma of cross-cultural understanding. This is due to the conflicting nat7u re of the principles they articulate and their disregard for the skill of the translator and8 the purpose of the translation as important factors for providing purposeful action. Th is study, therefore, uses a Yoruba pragmatic perspective to interrogate the „In9d eterminacy Thesis,‟ with a view to determining the crucial role of the translatYor in tra nslation. 1 R Ha0n s Josef Vermeer‟s Skopos Theory, which emphasises the communicative purpose in 1translation, was adopted as the framework, while the interpretive desigAn was used. Th1e texts used in Philosophy of Language included W. V. O. BQuRine‟s Word and Ob1ject (WO) and Ontological Relativity (OR), Donald Davidson‟s On the Very Idea of Co2n ceptual Scheme (OVICS), Thomas Kuhn‟s The Structure of IScientific Revolution (SS1R) and George Steiner‟s After Babel (AB). The texts us edL in African Philosophy inc3lu ded Kwasi Wiredu‟s Cultural Universal and Particular (CUP), Isola Bewaji‟s Afr1ican Language and Critical Discourse (ALCD) and NSegun Gbadegesin‟s African Ph4il osophy (AP). These texts deal extensively with thAe idea of culture, translation and cro1ss-cultural understanding. The texts were AsubDjected to the conceptual, critical and rec5o nstructive tools of philosophy. 1 Th6e WO and OR revealed that the to taIliBty of intrinsic and extrinsic approaches to tra1nslating from one language intoF another fails to determine a unique system of tra7n slation. These approaches are inadequate because of their disregard for the lin1guistic skill and cultural bac kOground of the translator as well as the purpose of the tra8n slation. Variations in soYcio-cultural contexts make it fundamental that what needed to be translated is meanTing rather than language (OVICS and SSR). The CUP and AB dem1 onstrated that in tIhe translation process, contextual factors cannot be overlooked. A m9 eaningful transSlation requires the translator to determine the purpose of translation and2 the most suitable method for achieving it. The AP and ALCD showed that in Yo0r uba linguisRtic philosophy, translation is not only a linguistic act but also a cultural one2. It is thEe intricate relationship between language and culture that shapes reality. Cri1t icalV intervention revealed that the Yoruba indigenous education system, which dep2loyed pragmatic and functional means to denote the essence of concepts as a prNo2d ucIt of culture, bridges the gap in translation created by other linguistic approaches. UTh2is system enables the translator to factor context and culture into the translation pro3c ess. It also readily absorbs necessary linguistic elements from other cultures. 2 Th4e Yoruba linguistic philosophy provides a pragmatic understanding of translation wh2ich privileges the linguistic skill and cultural intelligence of the translator, and the obj5e ctive of the translation. This provides one framework for undermining the ind2eterminacy thesis of W. V. O. Quine. 6 Ke2ywords: Indeterminacy thesis, Meaning in translation, Yoruba linguistic 7 philosophy Wo2rd count: 487 8 vi 2 9 3 0 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Content Page Title Page -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------i Certification----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ii Dedication ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------iii Acknowledgements------------------------------------------------------------------------------iv Abstract ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Y---iv Table of Contents--------------------------------------------------------------------------------vii RA R CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION IB Background to the study--------------------------------------------- -L----------------------------1 Literature Review-------------------------------------------A-----N---------------------------------3 Statement of the Research Problem-----------------------------------------------------------21 Statement of Thesis--------------------------------A-----D-----------------------------------------22 Aim and Objectives of the Study----------I--B--------------------------------------------------25 Methodology-------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------26 Justification of Study-------------O-----F----------------------------------------------------------26 Chapter Outline------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------26 TY RS I CHAPTER TWO LANGUAGE AND MEANING IntrodIucVtio En--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------36 LaNnguage as Communication------------------------------------------------------------------36 USyntax---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------38 Semantics-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------39 Pragmatics----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------39 Language and Culture---------------------------------------------------------------------------42 Meaning in Communication--------------------------------------------------------------------46 Theories of Meaning----------------------------------------------------------------------------46 Denotational Theory of Meaning--------------------------------------------------------------48 vii The Mentalist Theory of Meaning-------------------------------------------------------------50 The Behaviouristic Theory of Meaning ------------------------------------------------------53 The Use Theory of Meaning-------------------------------------------------------------------53 The Naming Theory of Meaning--------------------------------------------------------------53 The Verification Theory of Meaning---------------------------------------------------------54 Theories of Translation-------------------------------------------------------------------------55 The Socio-linguistic Approach----------------------------------------------------------------55 The Communicative Approach--------------------------------------------------------------Y--55 The Hermeneutic Approach-------------------------------------------------------------R-------56 The Literary Approach---------------------------------------------------------------A-----------56 The Semiotic Approach---------------------------------------------------------R----------------56 Conclusion--------------------------------------------------------------L----I--B--------------------56 N CHAPTER THREE A INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATIOAN TDHESIS OF W. V. O. QUINE B Introduction-----------------------------F---- --I----------------------------------------------------62 Indeterminacy of Translation----O--------------------------------------------------------------62 Ontological Relativity---------- -----------------------------------------------------------------65 Radical Translation-----T----Y---------------------------------------------------------------------65 Inscrutability of ReferIence---------------------------------------------------------------------66 Theories of ReRfereSnce---------------------------------------------------------------------------67 TraditionalE View of Reference-----------------------------------------------------------------67 The CIauVsal Theory------------------------------------------------------------------------------68 AnNalytic Statements-----------------------------------------------------------------------------69 USynthetic Statements----------------------------------------------------------------------------69 Quine‟s Attack on Two Dogmas of Empiricism--------------------------------------------72 Quine‟s Notion on Analytic / Synthetic Distinction----------------------------------------74 Quine on Translation and Meaning-----------------------------------------------------------76 Stimulus Meaning-------------------------------------------------------------------------------77 Observation Sentence---------------------------------------------------------------------------78 Occasion Sentence-------------------------------------------------------------------------------79 viii Translation Theory------------------------------------------------------------------------------79 Standing Sentence-------------------------------------------------------------------------------79 Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------81 CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES TO QUINE Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------85 Donald Davidson------------------------------------------------------------------------------Y--85 Belief and the Basis of Meaning (Principle of Charity) ------------------------A----R-------88 Communication and Convention----------------------------------------------R----------------89 Davidson‟s Account of Language and Belief----------------------------B--------------------89 Sapir-Whorf: Linguistic Relativity-------------------------------- --L----I----------------------94 Kwasi Wiredu----------------------------------------------------N--------------------------------96 Thomas Kuhn: Incommensurability----------------------A-----------------------------------102 Methodological Incommensurability----------------D----------------------------------------103 Semantic Incommensurability--------------------A--------------------------------------------104 J. L. Austin: Speech-Act Theory--------- --I--B------------------------------------------------107 Locutionary Acts-----------------------F--------------------------------------------------------108 Illocutionary Acts---------------- -O-------------------------------------------------------------108 Perlocutionary Act----------Y-------------------------------------------------------------------109 Felicity Condition-----I--T-----------------------------------------------------------------------111 Conclusion---------S-----------------------------------------------------------------------------115 ER IV CHAPTER FIVE U N A PERSPECTIVE OF THE YORUBA ON INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION Introduction-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------121 The Meaning of „Meaning‟ and „Translation‟ in Yoruba---------------------------------121 The Evolution of Translation in the Yoruba Culture--------------------------------------122 Translation and Indeterminacy from Yoruba Perspective--------------------------------125 Yoruba Functional Approach to Translation-----------------------------------------------125 ix The Nature of Olodumare and God----------------------------------------------------------130 Esu and the Devil (Satan): Conflicting Interpretations------------------------------------133 Indeterminacy in the Translation from Yoruba to English Language-------------------136 Alternative Perceptions of the Yoruba to Indeterminacy---------------------------------142 Incommensurability----------------------------------------------------------------------------142 Empirical Observation-------------------------------------------------------------------------143 Yoruba Contextualist‟s Approach-----------------------------------------------------------144 Problem of Translation-----------------------------------------------------------------------Y-145 Yoruba on Education and Skill Acquisition-------------------------------------------R-----146 The Philosophical Foundation of Traditional Yoruba Notion of EducatiRon--A---------148 Competent Authority--------------------------------------------------------------------------151 Being concise-----------------------------------------------------------L----I-B-------------------152 Clarity------------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------152 Skilled translator--------------------------------------------A-----N------------------------------153 Yoruba Pragmatic Way of Translation------------------------------------------------------160 Conclusion------------------------------------------A-----D---------------------------------------16 B CHA PITER SIX TOWARDS A PRAGMOATIFC UNDERSTANDING OF MEANING AND TRANSLATION Introduction--------------T----Y-------------------------------------------------------------------171 Pragmatism and the DIifficulties Involved in Translation---------------------------------171 Categories of TRranSslation---------------------------------------------------------------------174 Methods ofE Translation------------------------------------------------------------------------175 EquivIalVence Paradigm-------------------------------------------------------------------------176 SkNopos Theory as a Veritable Tool of Translation----------------------------------------178 USkopos Theory and the Translation Brief---------------------------------------------------180 Status of Source Text and Target Text------------------------------------------------------181 Pragmatic Adaptation--------------------------------------------------------------------------182 Criticism of Skopos as a Translation Theory-----------------------------------------------183 Conclusion--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------191 Contributions to knowledge------------------------------------------------------------------195 REFERENCES---------------------------------------------------------------------------------196 x CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Background to the Study Y There has long been a reasoned inquiry into the origin of language and hoAw Rlanguage is related to reality, as well as how language refers to the real worRld. In the early Western tradition, this area of inquiry was covered by Plato, AristIoBtle and the Stoics of ancient Greece. Plato in general postulated that nature determ inLes names of things. It is therefore the smallest structural unit that represents basicN ideas or sentiments and that convention has only a small part to play. Plato‟s thAeory of names and universals is known as ultra or exaggerated realism. AristoDtle asserted that the meaning of a predicate, that is, the way a subject is eitBher Adescribed or modified in a sentence, is firmly grounded on an abstraction of the Isimilarities between other different individual things. Aristotle‟s theory of names aFnd meaning is known as moderate realism. This theory was later known as nom inOalism. Scholars like Williams oTf OYckham (who is originally associated Nominalism) and John Duns Scotus anticipateId some of the most fascinating problems of modern philosophy of language, suRch Sas the phenomena of vagueness and ambiguity, and the contextual interpretatioEn of terms. Logical positivism, which is the philosophical association put forwarIdV by a group of thinkers who lived in the 1920s (The “Vienna Circle”), which haNs Moritz Schillick as its leader and also closely studied the writings of Wittgenstein, 1Uheld that philosophy does not produce properties which are true or false. What it does is just to clarifies the meaning of statements in order to show that some are scientific, some are mathematical and some (including most-called philosophical statements) are 2 shown to be nonsensical. The attack that W. V. O. Quine made on the two dogmas of empiricism and the Indeterminacy of Translation has much influence today, as his idea gives impetus to relativism. He held that words in our language derive their meanings from the relationship those words have with all the other words in that language. 1 According to him, our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense 3 experience, not individually, but only as corporate body. Translation, as a linguistic concept, has received attention from various scholars; anthropologists, linguists and philosophers alike. Even though translation is a concept that has existed for centuries and cuts across languages, yet it is still very pertinent in the modern day activities of people in education, politics, religion, media, literary and 4 the entertainment world. Translation has various mythologies surrounding it. Some 5 scholars have traced its beginning to the Tower of Babel. It has complications wYhich are attached to it due to the elements involved, these elements inclAudeR culture, language, the translator, and the doubt associated with the reality of traRnslation itself. One of the most dynamic paradigms in translation studies in LtheI tBwentieth century is „indeterminacy‟ which emphasizes that observation of meani ng are not certain and, as a result, any attempt made towards translation of meanNing would be fundamentally 6 unstable. The thesis of Indeterminacy was formulatedA originally by W. V. O. Quine. 7 8 Both Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend Ddeveloped their own theories of incommensurability by taking a leap fromIB Qu Aine‟s idea of radical translation and that of indeterminacy. The thesis of indeFterm inacy is a protest against the uncritical appeal 9to meaning and analyticity that cOharacterised logical positivism. In literary and linguistic stYudie s, the concept of indeterminacy is usually used to refer to the instability of meIaTning, the vagueness of reference and the variations involved in interpretations of gSrammatical forms and categories in any natural language. When a set of alternatiRve theories and a set of observation sentences are given, we have a situation ofE indeterminacy if each of the given alternative theories is underdetermined by theI Vset of observation sentences, and there could not be found to exist any indNependent fact of the matter, as to which of the available alternative theories is the U 10 true or correct one. Milton Munitz, summarises the idea of indeterminacy that no matter how careful a person is in controlling publicly observable stimuli, one cannot be certain that different linguistic responses will match one another completely in meaning and in reference. The probability for there to be elements of „surplus‟ interpretation, which will likely lead to indeterminacy is always present. Even though, it may not be so easy to detect 2 and capture these elements of indeteterminacy that result, when one makes effort to 11 move from one linguistic response to another. Literature Review Despite the theoretical centrality of the issue of translation, there remain a lot of disagreements over the possibility of isomorphic semantic transfer between 12 languages. Scholars have postulated theories to bring out definition and the principle of determinacy and indeterminacy, some have applied an intra-lingual or intrYinsic approach, while some have resorted to the extra-lingual or extrinsic approRach. The intrinsic approach means a concentration on those features influencing detAerminacy or indeterminacy in a given language. The idea here is to scrutinize the inRner composition of the text of the source language to find out its consequence onI Bdeterminacy and/or indeterminacy. Some of the scholars who have taken to this pLerspective to look at the challenges pose by indeterminacy, taken an intrinsic apprNoach include, Jacques Derrida 13 14 and Ferdinand de Saussure. DA Derrida stated that both words and languagBe cAannot stand alone because, on their own, they lack meaning and stability. Every Iword is closely related and interwoven with other words in a language and it is Fthis relationship that affects the determination of meaning. Also, de Saussure em pOhasises that the relationship between words (signifier) and the referents (signified)Y in any language seems to be random and therefore leads to the vagueness of meIanTing. The randomness of the interrelatedness of words and objects leads to inSdeterminacy. Those things we belief that we know are really not certain. The elRements of indeterminacy in language imply that there could be other alternativesE. This shows that there is no objectivity in what we say is our observation. As QuIiVne states, the indeterminacy of translation was always a supposition, even N 15though it is a reasonable one. UThe extrinsic approach has to do with an external point of view, where correlation between two or more languages may be considerable enough to establish the determinacy or indeterminacy principle in translation. Scholars like W. V. O. Quine 16 17 and Anthony Pym represent this category. Quine‟s view of facts of the matter are ontological, and facts of the matter determine the truth. The assertion of indeterminacy of translation would then boil down to a lack of possibility to achieve reality. There is 3 no fact of the matter that favours any of the competing behaviourally equivalent translation manual above the other. It can then be inferred that questions of truth (and falsity) in that context would not arise, for nothing will be available to determine truth, since manuals of translation are just mere correlations of the sentences, over the other. Quine claims that indeterminacy of translation is a point against the reification of meanings, that is, against the view that there are entities such as meanings about which manuals of translation could be said to be right or wrong. Some scholars have observed that words in a language are meaningful „only if there is such thing as uYsing 18 them correctly‟. If words would have determinate meaning they muRst have application in some situations and not in others. RA However, as observed by Patrick Yancey, the same argument for iBndeterminacy could be put forward for any word or sentence in the language of theL naItive, which is not an 19 observation sentence. Any manual of translation that the lin guist can generate for the native‟s language will have to put up with the sameA indNeterminacy of meaning. This has implication for other languages as well. TheD reason being that at some points in 20 history, this is the state of any given pair of Alanguages. Quine raised cultural doubt about the ability of the translator to IiBnfiltrate the abstract conceptual networks immanent in other languages. This Fview has also been expressed by some scholars. 21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, for ins taOnce, held that each society has a form of life distinct from others and that the limYit of our language is the limit of our world. Immanuel Kant also IsTtated that the human mind has categories which make up conceptual schRemeSs and which structure sense data into experiences. He held that there are no sucEh things as „pure experience‟ because our experiences are the results obtainedV from the way our minds have structured these data, so we never really see thiNngsI in themselves, but just how they appear to us. We therefore need a conceptual Uscheme to experience things. It then means that conceptual schemes could not have come from experience. However, it is not innate idea either, because an idea is not a structure of the mind, but a conceptual scheme is a structure of the mind. It is simply an „innate ability‟ (synthetic a priori), knowledge about the world without needing 22 experience. The concern to analyse those senses of meaning which are relevant to understanding language, communication and translation arises out of the barrier seemingly created by the idea scholars have about „conceptual scheme‟, conceptual 4 category or framework. The differences in cultures are said to be due to the differences in conceptual schemes. These peculiarities in cultures and how to understand them have been the concern of philosophers in the last three to four decades. Donald Davidson describes conceptual schemes as ways of organizing experience and 23 points of view from which individuals, cultures or periods survey the passing scene. He states further that what counts as real in one system may not be in another. Elucidating further, Davidson says languages that have evolved in distant times or places may differ extensively on their resources for dealing with one or another rYange of phenomena. What comes easily in one language may come hard in anoAtherR, and the difference may echo significant dissimilarities in style and value. R 24 As Barry Hallen observes, the translator who is a bilinguaLl isI Bnot exempted from these problem, even though he is perfectly fluent in each of the languages that are targeted by a particular bilingual translation, for whAen Ns/he (the bilingual translator) begins to affirm that a certain term „extracted‟ from one language means precisely the same as a certain term in the other language, sA/heD is still imposing the meanings of the one language‟s conceptual network upIoBn the other in hypothetical fashion. The 25response of many philosophers, asF R ichard Rorty points out, was to grant that meaning could shift as a resulOt of new discoveries and that the permanent neutral framework of meanings within which rational enquiry could be conducted was not as permanent as had been tThouYght. There is the problem involved when one is to translate from one sentence to Ianother, in which case the benefits, desires, hopes and bit of knowledge thaRt chSaracterise one person has no true counterparts for the subscriber of another schEeme. ThomIasV Kuhn observes that those brought up by differing exemplars will see the world froNm different perspectives and accordingly often use a concept in different senses and Uthe resultant challenges of communication cannot be overcomed by stipulating the 26 definition of difficult terms. As Richard Bell notes, the effort to see another‟s world “as it is” when one is alien to that culture poses several difficulties, the difficulty of 27 “penetrating metaphoric” as opposed to “literal vocabularies”. John Austin‟s Speech acts theory, which is a pragmatic reflection, postulates that the truth-conditional description of the use of language, as posited by the Logical 5 28 29 Positivists, is faulty. This is due to the “descriptive illusion” which leads to the supposition that the main objective of language is that it is generally directed at saying true things. Rather, language conveys definite piece of information concerning something, either about the world or the thought of the writer or speaker about the world. The pragmatic aspect of language was emphasised by Austin that discourse may lead to action. A speech act as an utterance serves a function in communication. Different types of “Speech acts” may be distinguished, these include: promises, declarations, statements and so on. Any of these has peculiar conditions of feYlicity which are determined conventionally and contextually and which do not have Ranything common with truth-conditions. Thus, a statement felicity would deRpendA on certain 30conventions. B Also, according to John Searle, a person may perform a s pLeecIh act only if he/she shows the intention to act by using such a sentence and if one manifests such intention to carry out every obligation of the speech act he/sAhe Nwants to perform. Therefore, Searle‟s analysis brings together conventional anDd intentional characteristics in order to put up a fresh semantic account of speechA. This new account claims that what is needed to perform a speech act is not ju sIt Ba certain procedure, but a definite cognitive content, which is, the intention. ThuFs, the speech act does not really modify the world any longer, but now has to d oO with the way the audience or listener perceives the intention of the presenter oYf the speech. It directs attention to a modification in concept 31„in the head‟ of the sIpTeaker. If a message isR noSt adequately passed across to the targeted audience, it may lead to semantic noise. Semantic noise occurs when words, phrases or sentences are not easily understoVodE. Speakers and writers sometimes produce semantic noise through the use of jarNgonI or unnecessary technical language, often referred to as register. In summary, Usemantic noise arises when there is uncertainty about what the other person‟s words, 32phrases, or sentences are supposed to mean. Grice puts forward four maxims that can help in effective communication. He called this, „the cooperative principles of conversation.‟ It states that one should make one‟s contribution in such a way as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which the person is engaged. 6 This is elaborated in four sub-principles called maxims, namely: Quality, Quantity, 33 Relation, and Manner. Martin Heidegger uses the expression Dasein to refer to the experience of being that is peculiar to human beings. Heidegger‟s philosophical analytic focused on the human beings‟ existence in their world as individuals and within their social context. From this point of view, both world and being are seen as inseparable. Meaning from this viewpoint therefore represents the co-constituted ideal of being with others in the world, in shared humanness, and in shared interactions in the world. HeRideYgger, believes our understanding is always already there and cannot, nor shouldA, be isolated from our thinking. Further, phenomena need to be scrutinised in their Rexistence, in the living world where people find themselves in the midst of twistsB and tangles, hopes and dread, doors that open and others that slam shut. HLeidIegger‟s hermeneutic phenomenology states that reality reveals itself in perspecti ves or profiles: implying that truth and meaning are based on perspectives. TAo Nremove a story from its rich textual background is to remove meaning and heDnce, the possibility of understanding the experience as it is lived, for we can only Aever live in a context of time, place and 34 situational influences. IB Heidegger presented Dasein‟s OcapaFcity to have pre-understanding and demonstrated that any act of interpretation w as never from a purely neutral stance. The point is rather that those words carry TwiYth them traces of connections of sense that are not only implicit for the writerI and his or her contemporaries but also, even beyond that, are unavailable unRtil Sthe translation draws them out. The poetically and thoughtfully translated wEord can release possibilities of sense that were not explicit in the source text or Vin the translation itself. Translation is not so much a „translating‟ and passing ovNer inIto a foreign language with the help of one‟s own. Rather, translation is more an Uawakening, clarification, and unfolding of one‟s own language with the help of an 35encounter with the foreign language. Richard Rorty, on his own part, states that truth and meaning are products of our 36 cultural needs. They are our consensus values and communal ideas of what should count as true or meaningful. Thus, there may be no dependable means of translating from one universe of discourse to another. He maintains that communicating with the linguistically and culturally other that goes beyond assimilating her, is impossible. 7 Rorty claims that truth and meaning are best derived and derivable from within the confine of the denizens of a culture. The overall conclusion based on this is that, from this radically contextualist perspective, translation and understanding of the linguistic and cultural other are impossible, so that every attempt to inter-cultural understanding and dialogue results in assimilating the other in the light of our own standards. The consequence of this radical contextualism is that, it is impracticable to making a distinction between properly transferring the meaning of a text into a different language and manipulating this meaning ideologically, just as between a true aYnd a 37 distorted understanding of the other. AR Stanley Fish, the American critic, associated with a notion of literarRy interpretation, states that meaning does not reside in the text, but in the mind of Bthe reader. The text functions only as an image onto which the reader projects wh atLeveIr his or her reactions may be. The text is an origin of diverse thoughts, but doeNs not present a reason for one interpretation rather than another. Fish does not beAlieve in authorial intention and thinks the meaning of the text is co-created by thDe reader. He claims that in reading, the interpreter constitutes the text and that Ain reader‟s criticism; the interpreter‟s description constitutes the nature of th e IreBading process according to his interpretive strategies. Fish moved from a phFenomenological emphasis which illustrates the interrelatedness of reader and teOxt, to a structuralist or even post-structuralist position which studies the underlyinYg systems that determine the production of textual meaning and in which the indiIvTidual reader and the constraining text lose their independent 38status. . S OluwadoroE noRtes that although speech communities may share mutual intelligibility, they maVy nonetheless perceive themselves as separate entities for political reasons. ThNis iIs the case observed in the Rivers Readers Project. For instance the Okrika and Uthe Kalabari share mutual intelligibility, yet they do not agree to be a singular speech community due to politics. On the contrary, there is a lesser degree of mutual intelligibility among the speakers of various dialects of Ikwere, yet they perceive 39 themselves as a common entity. Babatunde Fafunwa conducted a research in instruction using the mother tongue as a medium of instruction in schools. This was tagged “The Ife Six-Year Yorùbá Primary Project (SYYPP). Terms and concepts were translated into Yorùbá language for the 8 teaching of all subjects. The intention was to determine the effectiveness of communication in using Yorùbá language to teach the established subjects to the 40 children. 41 The word „Translation‟ in Yorùbá language is „ìtum ‟. Ìtum morphologically contains three morphemes. These are; i. „ì‟ – the act of ii. „tú‟ - „unwrap‟ RY iii. „ìm ‟ - knowledge RA That is, the act of unwrapping knowledge. This suggests that the BYorùbá believe that knowledge is a difficult task to accomplish and it is not acc eLssiIble to everybody but „wrapped‟ and, for access to be gained into it, it has to Nbe “unwrapped.” „Ìm ‟ could also mean „know-how‟ in Yorùbá, which showsA that „ìtum ‟ not only means unwrapping knowledge, but also expertise or skilDl in unwrapping knowledge. It shows that it is not everybody that could attain the Afeat of unwrapping knowledge, but the skillful ones. Ìtum is broad and refers t oI eBvery aspect of interpretation and translation. The interpretation of signs and symbFols, religious actions, practices and rituals, ethical or moral behaviours, riddles andO coded messages, nature, being and existence, all have to do with ìtum in generalY. By implication, translIatTion, from the Yorùbá perspective, could be achieved only by those who are adSequately skilled. Translation as an act, within the purview of traditional YEorRùbá thought, evolved through cultural and religious practices. 42 The YIoVrùbá oral tradition of Ifá describes the manifestations of translation in the traN 43ditional worship of Egúngún (Masquerade) and sanyìn (god of herbal medicine). UThe language of Egúngún and sanyìn are not understood by all, and are therefore expected to be translated by a translator. This translator must translate in the way the client must understand. In these two instances of translation, that is, Egúngún and sanyìn, the Source Languages are not actual mother tongues (as the traditional Yorùbá believe ) neither are they regarded as foreign or alien, but the „voice of the 44 gods,‟ understood only by their assigned translators among their worshippers. 9 Another form of translation among the traditional Yorùbá is found in drumming. The Yorùbá have the talking drum, dùndún. Its sound is expected to be understood by those who are skilled in it. They also have the àgìdìgbό drum. This elicits the proverbial saying in Yorùbá “Bí òwe bí òwe là nlú ìlù àgìdìgbό, l gb n lό ngb , m ràn ló n m ”. Translated, “The àgìdìgbό drum is beaten/drummed in proverbs, the clever ones hear it, and the intelligent ones understand it.” Different people are entrusted with message and the onus is on them to bear this responsibility and deliver the messages from person to person and community to community. Na‟Allah states that any miYstake in translation (not just transmitting speeches and conveying their proper mReanings) may result in serious cultural consequences. The drum, the gong, and firAe making in 45 the bush or forest are all examples of traditional vehicles for conveyBingR messages. These must be correctly interpreted and translated for the uLndIerstanding of others within the community. Yorùbá do not bifurcate betweNen the word “meaning” and “translation”. „Ìtum ‟ is used for both meaning and Atranslation, therefore, there is no real ontological problem of how to translate “meDaning”, for once translation is done, 46 “meaning” is automatically transferred. TheA Yorùbá believe the translator who has acquired adequate skills for translation, cIoBuld penetrate the conceptual network of the „other world.‟ F All these forms of translations Oenumerated above, however, are just the evolutionary trends of translation from Ythe Yorùbá thought system. They are as such not on the same critical pedestaIl Twith the kind of translation Quine is suggesting in his indeterminacy RtheSsis. However, there are values that have implications on indeterminaEcy of translation as posited by Quine. These are: i. ThIeV translator does not choose his own way of translation, he does not convey Nimplied, implicit, inadequate or inconclusive information. (If he does any of this, U there is the expectation of his being visited by the anger of the gods.) ii. The translator does not even consider the state of mind of the client. He must not hijack the message and turn it to his own. 10 iii. The translator holds his office (as the translator) in trust for the community (and the gods). The translator could therefore not “deconstruct” society simply to cause disarray or to challenge the idea of society‟s truth. iv. The translator is not permitted to speak in riddles during translation, but to convey the meaning intended by their deities in the clearest way possible to the receiver. v. The duties of these translators involve decoding the messages correctly and ensuring the receivers or targets understand and go away with the correct inteYnded messages. AR Ìtum - r is the particular sense of ìtum which encapsulates the lRinguistic acts of interpretation and translation in both oral and written texts. The coImBplete expression is ìtú-ìm - r , which means „unwrapping‟ the knowledge or wis dLom concerning words. When considering the perspective of the Yorùbá onA traNnslation as we have it at the level of Quine‟s approach, there is a need to Dconsider some of the earliest texts translated into Yoruba language, as well as othAer Yorùbá language texts translated into English. A comparative analysis of two ItrBanslations of the same Yorùbá text, by two different authors, would show diffFerences in translation. Each translates from his peculiar perspective. The diff erOences in translation of D. O. Fagunwa‟s novel Igbó 47Olódùmarè , by the two translators became evident right from the title of the book. 48 49 While Ajadi translatIedT IgYbó Olódùmarè as „The Forest of God‟, Soyinka translates the same title as, In the Forest of Olódùmarè. As Gbadegesin notes, the differences in 50 the translation RreflSect the goal each of the translators has in mind . The targets of the two individEuals diverge due to the fact that what they have as interests individually 51 influenIcVed the style each used and their translations of the intention of the author. ThNe title, In the Forest of Olódùmarè by Wole Soyinka is a fractional translation of the Utitle of Fagunwa‟s Igbό Olódùmarè a. Ajadi substitutes the word “Olódùmarè a” for „God‟ who he, among others, believes to refer to the most powerful Deity in the Yorùbá cosmology. Soyinka retains the word Olódùmarè a for being not convinced that Olódùmarè and God are the same. This is indeterminacy as posited by Quine. Let us have a comparison of translations of Ajadi and Soyinka of Fagunwa‟s novel Igbó Olódùmarè. 11 Fagunwa: L sàngángan Ìj sí, nígbàtí mo jẹun ẹ kejì tán, mo kúrò ní ilé mi, mo b sí ẹ hìn 52 odi… Ajadi: It was on a sweltering afternoon, after I had eaten the second meal of the day, that I 53 left my house and strolled to the outside of the city wall… Soyinka: One bright afternoon a long while past, after I had lunched, I left my home, strolled 54 outside the fence of my compound… L sàngángan was translated by Ajadi as „on a sweltering afternoon‟ to indicateY the unfavourable weather condition which made the author to remove his cAap Rto allow fresh air to blow on his head. This was however translated by SoyinkRa as „one bright afternoon‟. Soyinka‟s translation would not justify the reason whyI Bthe author had to be „forced to toss the covering‟ of his skull. While Soyinka translLated „Jẹun ẹ kejì‟ as „had lunched‟, Gbadegesin notes that„Jẹun ẹ kejì‟ (oúnjẹ ẹ kejì‟)N is m ore than the second meal as Ajadi translated it. In the traditional culture of thAe Yorùbá, three major meals are eaten per day and each meal is attached to a particDular period of the day. They divide a day into three parts of a continuum; mBornAing, afternoon, and night or evening. Breakfast is the meal eaten in the mor nIing; that of afternoon is the lunch. Dinner is eaten in the evening. F The author‟s focus is not to Oemphasise taking some sequences of food at any unspecified period of thTe dYay. The word that starts the sentence, L sàngángan (sunny afternoon) clears any cIonfusion that may tend to come with „Jẹun ẹ kejì‟. The meal the author refers toR is Sthe one taken in the afternoon (lunch). In another culture where the people takeE four meals each day, “the second meal of the day” would be translated out of conItV 55 ext of the meaning intended by the author. This would not be due to the prNoblem of language, but that of the inability of the translator to key into the correct Uunderstanding of the author‟s cultural reference. Also, the way Soyinka translated „ẹ hìn odi‟ as „outside the fence of my compound‟ distorts the original intention of the author. This has put aside the historical cultural tradition of erecting high fortifications round the city. In Yorùbá culture these strong walls are built as means of protecting the inhabitants against foreign aggressions and hostilities of the external armies. It is worthy of note that the traditional Yoruba lived communally. hìn odi‟ therefore goes 56 beyond a mere fence of a compound. What the author referred to was the city wall. 12 Adebawo‟s translation compared with Soyinka‟s goes thus, Fagunwa: Ìb r Olόwό aiyé. Adebawo: The beginning of Olόwό aiyé. 57 Soyinka: Enter Olόwό aiyé. In the translation of another of Fagunwa‟s novel, Fagunwa‟s Àdììtú–OlόdùmarèY, the 58translator, Olu Obafemi writes in the preface, his intention for translating the novel. He informs the audience the motive for the translation, the approach heA useRd in the translation, the type of recipients the translator aims to target at the time of taking up the translation exercise and the difficulties he came across durBingR the translation exercise. As Obafemi stated, he was fascinated with FagunwLa‟Is fictional novel and started developing interest in it right from his formative yea rs. According to him, he had desired all through those years, when he was youAng Nand inexperienced, to present opportunities to people of other cultures, who Ddo not share Fagunwa‟s world, in actuality and imagination, have access into theA realm of his thoughts. However, he did not expect that the endeavour would resIuBlt into a translation for a target recipient of 59 native speakers. F He emphasised the challenge s Ohe faced in translating the work of Fagunwa from Yorùbá language into TEnYglish language, most especially because of the style in Fagunwa‟s work. SomIe of the challenges Obafemi encountered were majorly owing to the fact that he didS not have the privilege to study Yoruba language, within a formal 60 educationalE setRting, as a Yorùbá child. He also acknowledged the fact that he was not formallyV trained in the act of translation. He stated thus further that he did not receive anNy traIining, neither did he pass through any formal system in the art of translation. He Uemphasized that he was practically inexperienced in translation discipline. He sees translation as a complex discipline which has its nuances. It is an intricate subject of context and actions of grammar of two languages that are different from each other. He came to the conclusion that he did not have the proficiency to evade inter-linguistic 61 spillage. This is an acknowledgement from a translator who knows the importance of adequate training in acquisition of skill in the art of translation. He therefore, prepares the mind 13 of his audience that his translation could not but be „a half-way house‟. It stuck between an outcome of an inaccurate knowledge. He was operating within a circumstance in which there does not exist any act of exact equivalence from Yoruba to English and the result of being a bi-cultural individual. He considers himseif as a personality struggling for an equilibrium between fidelity to the source text in Yorùbá 62 and its plausible conception in English, as the language of the targeted readers. The inter-linguistic spillage which may be avoidable if adequate skill is acquired is not acknowledged by Quine as one of the major factors that may make diffYerent translations of the same text to have wide variations, rather than being inAdeteRrminate. The fact of the matter would then be that some translations would Rbe far from the centre of the continuum whether on the positive side or on tIheB negative. In Igbό Olόdùmarè. L Fagunwa says N …ètè mi gbẹ, it ẹnu mí yi, ikùn mDi riA pẹlẹbẹ, ojú mí rí 63kán-ndό, mo lé góngó lórí igi…A Soyinka translates as: IB …my lips parched, Fmy mouth desiccated, my stomach flattened, my e yeOs bulging like eggs. I was suspended 64 from the treeY… T Ajadi‟s version saySs I ER…my lips dried, the saliva in my mouth became sticky, IV and my stomach was flat; my eyes saw a lot of trouble. I 65N sat roundly on the tree... UThere is the clear evidence of translation differences and contrariness in the two translations of the above text. Quine would want us to see this as an evidence of indeterminacy, whereas there is a vivid error of misjudgement of the meaning of the source text and malapropism on the part of one of the translators. It is observed that Ojú kán-dó (hollowing eyes) is not one and the same with ojú kàndò (large, stick-out, eyes) which is the meaning of “eyes bulging like egg” that has been translated by 14 Soyinka. This is a mistaken understanding of the author‟s sense of using the word. The word “kán-dó” is an adjective which illustrated the effect and discomfort on the eyes of the narrator, after battling with long hours of lack of food during the period he was 66 on the top of a tall tree. Ajadi‟s translation “my eyes saw a lot of trouble” is closer to the author‟s use of the words. In this case, Ajadi‟s translation can be adjudged better. In the two translations, the distortion in the meaning given to one of the translations of the word, “kán-dó, was not due to non-availability of equivalent words in the target language. It was due to the misunderstanding of the translator. However, to judgeY one of the translations as better, would be against the spirit of indeterminacy Rthesis of Quine, where there is no fact of the matter! Of course where thereR areA competent individuals, facts of the matter will be available. IB There are words or concepts that are not readily available Lin other languages. For instance in Igbó Olódùmarè, Fagunwa writes N .... Bí ό ti nb ni ẹsẹ rẹ ndún j Aìnwìnjìnwìn nítorí p lop ìkaraun ìgbín Ani wD n gé wẹ lẹ wẹ lẹ tí etí 67 k kan w n sì rí kiriBbiti bí etí owό sílè… This was translated by two scholars, F I Adebawo: As he was comin gO his legs were tinkling because they are made from 68 broken snail shells... TY Soyinka: As he aSpprIoached, his legs kept up a tintinnabulation from snail shells 69which had beenR broken into little pieces … In the VaboEve text extracted, from Igbό Olódùmarè, the word “jinwinjinwin” is a YoNrùbIá word that derives it meaning from its sound. It is an idiophone. “Jinwinjinwin” Uis a jingling sound which is made when bits and pieces such as broken snail shells are tied together with strings and tinkled. The tone is a description of the outcome of the noisy cymbal sound created by the advancement of one of the mythological creatures which is a character in the novel. The objects tied to the legs of the creature consist of pieces of snail shells. In an effort to make his readers understand the meaning of this word in his target text, Soyinka imported and coined a word from Latin. The word is 70 “tintinnabulum” (wind-chime), from this he derived the word “tintinnabulation”. By 15 translating “jinwinjinwin” as “tintinnabulation” Soyinka has been able to rigmarole a way out of the untranslatable feature of this sound, that does not have exact replacement in English language. However, the distorting predisposition which manifested in the translation of the extract has led to what could be considered as impoverishment of quality. The reason being that, the expression “tintinnabulation” seems to be deficient in the sonority or iconic richness and the cultural connotation intrinsic in the original word, 71 “jinwinjinwin” as observed in the source expression. In like manner, the descriYption of „legs were tinkling‟ by Adebawo has watered down the meaning of the AsenRtence. In as much as it was not actually the legs that were making the sound, buRt the snail shells attached to the legs. Despite the inherent reduction in the two trIanBslations, Soyinka‟s translation may be considered better for formulating the soLund made by the snail shells, while Adebawo did not. N In the English version of Luke Chapter 23 verse 48A of the Holy Bible, we have the statement that, when the multitude that came Ato Dwitness the crucification saw all that 72 took place, they “went home in deep IsBorrow” (New Living Translation), while 73 another version says…“they smote tFhei r breast and returned” (King James Version).The Yorùbá versions describe thOis event as, 74…W n l u ara won li oókan àiyà, w n sì padà (tTheyY smote their breast and returned) (Bíbélì IMím . King James Version). S …. W n padà, w n si káw lé ‟rí pẹ lú ìbànújẹ R (They returned and put their hands on their head E 75in deep sorrow). Bíbélì Ìròyìn Ay . WhileI „Vsmiting of breast‟ is the Jewish manner of expressing sorrow, a Yorùbá person UwoNuld not smite his/her breast (chest) to express sorrow, rather he/she does this to express pride. Instead, to express sorrow he/she puts the two hands on the head. Indeterminacy occurs in these translations, according to Quine. Putting hands on the head and beating of the chest cannot be said to be expressing the same thing. However, if the aim of the author is to enlighten the Yorùbá on how the Jews express sorrow, this fact would be enough to show that „smiting the breast‟ would be a better expression 16 than putting hands on the head. In like manner, if the intention is to express the depth of their sorrow, „putting their hands on the head would be a better expression. This shows that in Yorùbá, such expressions as this could not just cave in into indeterminacy but the degree of accuracy needs to be determined based on the available facts within the cultural milieu. The aim of the translation would determine which of the available alternative schemes would adequately fit into the context. This would allow the translator to make an informed choice. Yet according to indeterminacy thesis of Quine, one of these translations cannot be said to be betterY than the other. However for anyone who is well entrenched in the languageA, onRe of the translations would surely make a better sense than the other. R The controversy on whether „Olόdùmarè‟ is „God‟ in the YLorùIbBá belief system has been seriously debated by scholars. The question of whetNher Olόdùmarè is the same as God has been answered in three different ways by scAholars. Among these scholars are the Western anthropologists who deliberately Dor not deliberately (mis)-translated Olόdùmarè as being lesser than God. The secAond group of scholars is mainly African Yorùbá theologians who have equatedI tBhe status of Olόdùmarè with that of the 76Western God. He is also rFega rded to be omnipotent, omniscient and 77 78omnibenevolent. The third grOoup is a decolonisation school which have tried to divest Olόdùmarè of the foYreig n attributes imposed on His nature. The conceptions of „IOTlόdùmarè‟ by these three groups are at variance with one another. In the QuSinean view however, the translations of „Olόdùmarè‟ from each of these various Rperspectives fits into the structure of each conception. It would, thereforVe, bEe indeterminate. This is because there is no fact of the matter from which we caIn accept one or reject the other. Each will therefore be correct within its own coNnsiderations. Contrary to Quine‟s indeterminacy thesis however, the difference in Uthe conception of Olόdùmarè and God by the adherence of Yorùbá traditional religion and the Western missionaries respectively shows that translating one to mean the other would be a category mistake. Scholars like Sodipo and Hallen have warned against 79 such error. In line with Quine, they disagreed with careless word-for-word translation of a linguistic expression into the other, because of indeterminacy of meaning which may occur between the initial and the other language. 17 The Yorùbá believe the task that is easy for an individual with an adequate skill may be a difficult task for another individual without a well equipped skill. As such they say, àkàrà d‟ nu akáyín ό de‟egun („Bean cake gets to the mouth of the toothless and 80 becomes bone‟). Bean cake is a delicacy in Yorùbá culture that is fried into soft solid form. It is easily crushed with the teeth and swallowed. However, for someone who does not have any teeth left, who has become toothless, there is nothing to use to crush the bean cake. The effort at eating the bean cake then becomes a herculean task. This implies that what a translator who is well equipped (with sharp teeth) could eYasily translate because of training and proper education, the same will be difficuRlt for an individual who is ill equipped, without the facility for translation (toothRlessA). Education equips and prepares a person from childhood. A notiIoBn of education was already present among the Yorùbá people prior to their makinLg contact with the West. They regard as education any process or occurrence that mNain tain an incorporating and influential impression on the mind. Such that can shAape personalities, skill, physical and spiritual capabilities of the person, to facDilitate his/her living efficiently and 81 dutifully, with a sense of responsibility withAin the society. In accordance with the Yorùbá conception, Babatunde Fafunw aI dBefines education as the combination of all the procedures by which a child or Fyoung adult acquires abilities, attitudes and other forms of human behaviour, wh iOch are of constructive value to the society in which he 82resides. Y Education, for the TS YIorùbá, was therefore a lifetime progression which involves interrelations aRmong diverse practices that had decisive and influential effect on the whole conduct of a human being in relation to his/her society. Akinpelu says of YorùbIáV ed Eucation that a man that is regarded as educated can be illustrated as soNmebody who blend proficiency in some particular economic abilities with reliability U 83of temperament and skills with insight in sound judgement. One of the fundamental philosophical ideologies that inspire the Yorùbá idea of education is that like the other African thought of an educated personality, as against the conception of the Western world, it is characterised by the policy of communal accountability, functionalism, political involvement and consciousness, occupation 84 orientation, spiritual and moral values. The importance of skill acquisition in order to 18 enable a person to be able to perform a task successfully cannot be over-emphasised. What comes easily to a skilled individual would be difficult for someone who lacks the necessary ability to perform the task. Owomoyela says „the bird of the forest does not 85 know how to fly in grassland‟ (in a strange environment becomes a dunce). From the Yorùbá proverbs, it could be deduced that the Yorùbá agree with the notion that there are some words that may be intractable and not easy to translate. The Yorùbá say, Òwe lẹsin r , Y r lẹsin òwe AR T‟ r bá s nù R Òwe la ó fi wa IB This could be translated thus: L Proverb is the horse or powering machine of speeNch Speech is the horse of proverbs A When any discussion is lost D 86 We use proverb to find it out I B A However, no matter how intractablFe a word or concept may be, it could be found through the use of proverbs. T hiOs means in Yorùbá parlance that there is always a way to circumnavigate the chaYllenges of words or concepts that seem inadmissible to translation. The YorùbáT have made efforts to „unwrap‟ meaning of alien words and concept through thSe usIe of pragmatic means. Yorùbá linEguisRts have proposed some devices for formulating Yorùbá terms. These include;V i. NCIomposition: This has to do with two or more items like morphemes, words U phrases and others, for the purpose of expressing foreign concepts or objects based on the qualities or features that such concepts manifest. For instance, English: Bill Yorùbá: Àbá - òfin (This means literally suggestions) ii. Explication: It involves making explicit information available about foreign objects or concepts in Yorùbá. For example, 19 English: Imprisonment Yorùbá Ìsẹ w n (The acts of being put in chains) iii. Semantic extension: This has to do with extending the meaning of a concept, term, or word in Yoruba language for the purpose of expressing or describing a foreign one that is not available in the language. For example; English: President Yorùbá: Ààrẹ (An official title of a war high Chief, who is first in rank). This is extended in translation to the President of aR FeYderal Republic. A iv. Idiomatisation: This involves the use of idioms as a means oRf expressing or describing foreign concepts or objects. IB English: Veto L Yorùbá: Ìgbẹsẹ -lé (Literally - the act Aof pNutting legs on something) v. Loanwords: It involves the adoption Aor bDorrowing of words from a foreign language (mainly English) for the puBrpose of expressing concepts or objects for which either there are no equivale ntIs Yorùbá terms or the available Yorùbá terms are inappropriate. For instanceF; English: Budge t O87 Yorùbá: B Y jẹ ẹ tì The need to communiIcTate Western scientific terms not available in Yorùbá language has led to scholarsS developing „metalanguage.‟ These are technical terms required for teaching and dRiscussing the different disciplines and subject matters of practical and intellectVualE interest. For instance, NIEnglish Yorùbá U Alkali alikalai Acid asiidi 88 Bacteria bakiteria. Odoje proposes that additional data, especially literary texts should be obtained to train 89 the translator for wide-ranging efficiency and fluency. Therefore consideration should be given to minute but sensitive variations at the sentence level to attain 90 superior translation qualities. 20 91 These pragmatic steps that need be taken include; „coining,‟ „borrowing‟; description of reference as it can be visualized or imagined by the speakers of these languages; and „adaptation‟ in such a way that the words will enjoy acceptability, harmonization, 92 uniformity and consistency in their orthography to take care of the different levels of equivalence that exists. Equivalence in translation should not be word-for word 93 translation. However as identified by Baker, different levels of equivalence should be considered. These include; lexical word, grammatical differences in language, difference in language information structure, textual cohesion, pragmatic isYsues; 94 original writer‟s intention or implied meaning. AR The criteria of equivalence in translating these words and concRepts should be determined by the nature of the words and concepts which mustI bBe preserved in any successful translation. Thus the type of equivalence soughtL between originals and translations is not the same in all cases. While in some Ncas es concepts are borrowed from the foreign culture, in some other cases coining oAf concepts are evolved. Words that are culture based tend to be iAnfluDential towards indeterminacy. This depends on the structure or arrangement inB the way the statement is obtainable, that is figurative or literally; the intricacFy ofI the assertion and the complexity of the propositional sentence. A text that has more possibilities of variations in translation in the manner language is beYing u Osed, with absurd of meaning, becomes indeterminate. Whereas when a statement is determinate, it does not warrant any further translations again. TranslationsS areI Tusually not similarly determinate or indeterminate in the same manner as much as language usage in different culture is not the same. Translators of the same teExt wRould have to translate the text differently according to their language compeIteVnce, individual experience, the standard of their educational standard and the baNckground of their culture. A source text would be very challenging to translate U(indeterminate) when it is removed from the usual cultural background. As Francis Offor observes Theoretical and metaphysical claims involve beliefs, worldviews, and social values, and there is the tendency for the meaning attached to such concept in the language of a group to be defined by the totality of the culture of that group in question. And just as the meaning of concepts in 21 the language of a group is defined by the totality of the culture of the group, so also is language the vehicle through which the cultural beliefs of 95 any group are transmitted. The translator would thus be pessimistic of whether the transformation that has occurred in the given text during translation is correct. Most especially when observed that the translation is not in tune with the convention of the culture and the language expression. A translator needs to exercise caution in a situation where we have the same concept in different cultures but different conceptions of the concept, wheYre a conception in one is seen as a misconception in the other. For instance, „CRow‟ is a concept familiar to both Yorùbá and Hindu cultures. A Yorùbá man seeAs a cow and says, „this is a cow‟. The Indian agrees and says, „this is a cow‟I. BLet Rus consider this dialogue between them: L Yorùbá: This is meat. N Hindu: This is a god. A Yorùbá: When it is slaughtered, iAt isD fun and entertainment. Hindu: When it is slaugh teIreBd, it is a sacrilege and abomination. Yorùbá It is for food, Fto be eaten. Hindu: It is a go dO, to be worshipped. Y Whereas the concepIt T„cow‟ is the same in both cultures, the conceptions (functionalities) arSe different. A Yorùbá author describing a ceremony where cows were slaughterRed to portray the wealth of a family in a Yorùbá cultural setting would „misfire‟ if Ehe should assume same conception of cow in Hindu culture and translate as such. ITVhere is then the need for fidelity to ensure that what X means is what Y unNderstands. As George Steiner points out, to dismiss with the wave of the hand the Uvalidity of translation, just because it seems not possible in some cases, is ridiculous. 96 What needs clarification is the degree of fidelity to be pursued in each case. If we are not to limit ourselves to translation in the narrow sense, but jump into greater adventure towards communication with all cultures, then we need to have “shifting of 97 meanings and dynamic hybridities as our object and state.” 22 Statement of the Research Problem Previous studies on translation have examined the problem of translation from the theories of conceptual relativism and universalism. However, the studies failed to provide enough bases for resolving the quandary of translation and cross-cultural understanding. This is due to the inconsistencies in the principles they enunciate and their relegation to the background the importance of the skill the translator needs to acquire, as a key agent of translation. This study has made a shift by looking at the indeterminacy thesis of Quine from the perspective of an African culture, in this Ycase, the Yorùbá culture of Nigeria. The study sought to analyse indetermiAnacRy within languages and the effect that plurality of possible interpretation has inR Yorùbá cultural translation, so as to determine how to reduce complexities whIerBe shared culture is sparse. L Relativism fails to account for the reality involvedA in Nthe ability of individuals to communicate with others across culture. UniverDsalism on the other hand, has some standards such as rationality, inter-cultural intAelligibility and objectivity that words or concepts need to possess before they canI Bbe recognised to apply across cultures. The gap in literature is the failure of these a ccounts to take into consideration that all these characteristics would depend on thFe individual translator‟s ability to have adequate conception and perception of th eOse concepts. This invariably would have effects on the product of the translation. ITY The central questioSn this study tried to answer is whether every manual generated by a translator coulRd be accepted as being adequate for translation as posited by Quine; whetherV incEompatibilities in the alternative manuals of translation could be attributed to the Iambiguity of the concept or the competence/ incompetence of the translators. ThNe study also sought the conditions that need be fulfilled before adequate translation Ucould be achieved, the importance of fidelity or faithfulness that should occur between texts in the search for adequate theoretical framework for cross-cultural understanding. The study has been approached from the identification of the general problems and challenges of textual translation, as a result, there is a need for an account of translation firmly grounded on a certain kind of close-circuit faithfulness to the spirit of the original between the source and target texts. The study placed Yorùbá language 23 in the linguistic perspective in relation to the nature of language and the features of „science‟ to determine how local factors could be deployed in the translation of scientific concepts across linguistic boarders. It examined how emerging trans-cultural network could be used for the development of new communities of knowledge. This would enhance an enlargement that breaks with old linguistic and literary custom and serve as major instruments in the on-going process of socio-political and technological transformation. Statement of Thesis RY Quine claims that no single scheme of translation between natural languAages can be accepted finally as the right or correct one and that there is no oIbBject Rive matter to be right or wrong about. The thesis of this study is that the emphLasis placed on adequate skill of the translator in the Yorùbá traditional culture coNuld be employed to promote translation and mitigate the challenges that indeterminacy poses as a threat to cross- cultural understanding. While agreeing with Quine thaAt there can be several alternative manuals of translation, it is argued in this theAsis Dthat a manual of translation could be better than another depending on the skIilBl of the translator who designed it and the purpose of carrying out the translation . The study moved the burden of justification from the instability of words Oor cFoncept to the ability or skill of the individual translator. We argued that, tho ugh indeterminacy is partly a feature of any language, the determinate aspect Tof Ylanguage could be sufficiently explored to make cross-cultural translationS poIssible and cross cultural understanding achievable. This work explored the YRorùbá intra-lingual approach to translation which entails a concentration on the featEures causing determinacy and indeterminacy contained by the language itself iInV its internal structure. ThNe implication of this is that attention must be paid to the immediate cultural Uframework of the circumstances of the Source Language for it to be matched with that in the Target Language text. The pragmatic consideration embraces variables such as 98 the intention of the writer, illocutionary force and truth value of the proposition and the communicative use of sentences to perform certain actions. There is the need for a suitable procedure for translation for there to be an effective cross-cultural communication. It should be noted that not all texts can be translated the same way. A 24 translation is usually written and intended for a Target Language reader, even if the Source Language Text was written for no specific reader at all, for nothing but its author‟s pleasure, the translator needs to have an understanding of the local situation context, when and why the text was written, who is to read it now and for what purpose. These questions are manifested in how the text is interpreted and translated to meet the requirement of the target-audience. When translating, the conceptions themselves are embedded in the larger cultural world. A translator is successful when he findYs the correct answers to those questions. A translator should not consciousAly Rstrive at preserving the foreign conceptions alone, but needs to strive at theR elimination of anything that could be a barrier between the translated text and tIheB reader. A text that is translated should be the site where varied cultures emerged Land merged, the point at which a reader „can gain access into the life experiencesN of others and in the process; discover the genuineness of their beliefs and the meanAings they attribute to their use of 99 words.‟ AD A text is not just the total addition of its IpaBrts, and when words and sentences are used for the purpose of communication, th ey are brought together to make meaning in different ways. It is, therefore, the Fwhole text that has to be translated, rather than separate sentences or words. AO text that would adequately communicate will take along its cultural charTacteYristics while going from one language to another. The individual translating nIeeds to be accustomed with both the Source Language (SL) and the Target LanguaSge (TL) cultures, know the intention of communication and the targeted audienRce for there to be a correct translation. It should be kept in mind that becausIeV of Ethe differences in culture, there is no total exact translation between any paNir of languages, we can only hope for approximations. The more similar the system Uand cultures of the two languages, the more efficient the translation in cross-cultural communication. One may make no mistakes in the translation and yet „completely 100 loses the force and spirit of the original‟ When translation makes us familiar with strange cultures it may do so by conveying it in our own cultural sense. Sometimes the translator may absorb the sense of the foreign work, but replace it with a construct taken from his own natural language and 25 cultural milieu, such that an indigenous array is superimposed on the foreign form. This can lead to „misfire‟, „cross cultural misjudgement‟ and „infelicities‟. While keeping his text in focus, the translator must also “allow himself considerable latitude 101 if he is to convey the many “intangibles” that make the style of the text. Quine states that words in our language get their meaning from their interaction with the other words taken together in the language. He states that there is a vast network of meaning; therefore one does not have a way of differentiating those sentences that are completely a matter of meanings from the ones that link up with experience.Y The Yoruba also believe that the meaning of a word could not be isolated fromA its Rrelations with the other words in the language. However, there is a group mind Rthat is expected to capture the essence of any concept or word, because it is a prIoBduct of the culture, tradition and way of life of a community, which is usuaLlly passed orally from generation to generation. It is not codified or documenNted anywhere except in the 102 minds of the community. A Pragmatic steps need to be taken towarAds Dadaptation. Adaptation stands for abridgement or simplification which takIeBs the idea of the source text and re-writes them in a completely new way. The so urce text may be altered somewhat to appeal more to a new audience or it maOy beF placed in a different setting. More fundamentally in literary, poetic form, one m ay choose to give up literal meaning in favour of the transmission of a partTicuYlar message or conveying emotion, if one or the other is considered more necIessary to that particular situation. In making a choice for adaptation, it isR expSedient that the translator needs to put into consideration the purpose 103or aim (skoEpos) of the text pertaining to its use and targeted audience. In adaptation, there iIs Vlocalisation, modification and moulding, making suitable to a new audience in a nNew language or cultural group in rendering information, or ideas, putting in mind Uthe spirit of the original text. Only well trained translators who have acquired basic tools for translation can achieve the desired purpose. From the perspective of the Yorùbá, we conclude that while total, exact translation may be difficult to reach, adequate cross cultural understanding is achievable. The implication of this is that consideration must be given to the immediate cultural context of the Source Language text for it to be matched with that in the Target 26 Language. In as much as word or concept is a product of culture, tradition and way of life of a community, which is usually passed through socialisation, enculturation and orally from generation to generation. This makes it possible to determine whether a translation is acceptable based on the group‟s cultural understanding, though not 104 codified or documented anywhere, but in the minds of the community. Therefore, if there exist mutually incompatible translation manuals, it will not be mainly due to the indeterminacy of translation, rather it would be due to the indeterminacy of the translators. For even when words and concepts are stable, there may be instabiliYty of the translators whose inadequacy could make a logical concept to have a prRe-logical meaning. RA Aim and Objectives of the Study IB This study aims at a critical analysis of the concept of indete rLminacy of translation as postulated by Quine using a Yorùbá cultural perspAectiNve to interrogate the debate between determinacy and indeterminacy and tDhereby reconcile the two extreme positions. A The specific objectives are: IB 1. To show the relationship betwFeen linguistic interpretation and the analysis of the culture to which the lang uaOge belongs. 2. To examine the conYcepts of „meaning‟ and „translation‟ from the traditional Yorùbá perspectIivTe in order to understand their implications for cross-cultural translation. S 3. To compRare Quine‟s indeterminacy of translation with the Yorùbá perspective on inVdeteErminacy. 4. TIo enquire into the exact nature of translation and its implication for the Ncommunication of the Western Scientific thought in the African language. U5. To evaluate other alternative theories to Quine‟s indeterminacy thesis so as to appropriate the strengths in them. 6. To make a case for basic training of translators, for pragmatic understanding, as necessities for adequate trans-cultural translation. 27 Methodology The methodological approach that is used in this study includes the critical and conceptual analysis that will be on hand to clarify words and concepts; hermeneutical approach to investigate what it means to „understand‟ a piece of oral or written speech, and to attempt to diagnose this process in terms of a general model of meaning, interpretation and translation from Source Language (SL) to Target Language (TL); and logical argument and reconstruction of ideas which is intended to bring abouYt the synthesis of idea of determinacy and indeterminacy. R Justification of Study RA That the world is fast becoming a global village is indisputable. IHBowever, despite the position of many scholars that elements useful in other cultur eLs should be appropriated for acceleration of development most especially in AfricNa; this could not however, be achieved without knowing how to adequately apApropriate these values through translation and cross cultural understanding. TDhere is a need for a measure of understanding of how to achieve cross culturAal translation. In the quest for scientific and technological development, many IscBholars have canvassed for the use of the indigenous language to teach SciFence and Mathematics to the pupils in Africa communities, but only few hOave made useful suggestions on how to achieve communication and transfeYrence of terms or concepts that are elusive and not readily available in other cultIurTes. The need for theoretical framework for translation to pave way for consistenScy makes this study necessary; this could be done through the effective approRpriation and enlargement of the tools the Yorùbá have used to cope with translatiVon Ein their socio-cultural environment. ChNaptIer Outline UThe thesis is divided into six chapters as follows: Chapter One: General Introduction This is the introductory part of the study. A general overview of the thesis was given. We gave background information into the study and made a review of the Literature scholars have written on interpretation (cultural hermeneutics), translation and 28 indeterminacy. The relationship between interpretation and translation was also analysed. Chapter Two: Language and Meaning This chapter analysed language as a tool of communication. The nature, characteristics and the contemporary theories of language, semantics, meaning and translation were examined. This is expected to provide a background on how individuals are able to understand one another within culture and across cultures. RY Chapter Three: Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis A This chapter sheds light on the perspective of W. V. O. Quine Bon Rtranslation. His theory of indeterminacy of translation was critically examinedL toI determine how far it can go in helping us to achieve cross-cultural understandin g. His attack on „the two dogmas of empiricism‟ was also reviewed. In like manneNr, we subjected Quine‟s idea of meaning and translation into a critical analysis.D A Chapter Four: Alternatives to Quine AIB This chapter is a critique of „indetermFin acy thesis‟. Alternative views on the possibility of translation across cultures w eOre considered. Among the works examined were those of Donald Davidson who cYonsidered the situation of „radical interpretation‟ as against Quine‟s „radical tranIslTation, ‟Thomas Kuhn‟s „incommensurability of paradigm‟, relative to Quine‟sS „indeterminacy of translation‟. Kwasi Wiredu who considerered the situation wherRe there is conceptual disparity as against „conceptual relativity‟ of Edward SaEpir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. Austin and Searle‟s speech acts. Some of these IscVholars focused on the problem of compatibility in the use of concepts among indNividuals and groups. In this chapter we argued that interpretations and translations Uas posited by each of these alternative views have their weaknesses. 29 Chapter Five: A Yorùbá Cultural Perspective on Translation and Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis This chapter examined the perspective of the Yorùbá on indeterminacy. The issue of the synergy between translation and interpretation within Yorùbá pragmatic cultural hermeneutics was discussed as a way of bridging the gap between determinacy and indetterminacy. This was used to interrogate Quine‟s indeterminacy of translation on how translation is achieved and the extent to which the systems of translation by the Yorùbá have been adequate. RY Chapter Six: Towards a Pragmatic Understanding of Meaning andR TrAanslation This chapter focused on pragmatism as a way out to achieveI aB better translation. Skopos theory of Hans Vermeer was discussed to refle ctL a general shift from predominantly linguistic and formal translation theoriesN to a more functionally and socio culturally oriented concept of translation. DA Conclusion IB A O F SI TY VE R UN I 30 End notes 1. Ayer, A. J. (1946). Language, truth and logic. London: Gollancz. 35. Quoted in Ayer, A. J. 1981. The central questions of philosophy England: Penguin Books. 24. 2. Hume, D. (1978). Enquiries concerning human understanding. London: Oxford University Press. 165. Y 3. Quine, W. V. O. (1961). Two dogmas of empiricism. From a logiAcalR point of view. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 20 – 46. R 4. Steiner, G. (I976). After babel, aspect of language anLd ItrBanslation. London: Oxford University Press. 57 5. Genesis chapter 11, verse 1 - 9. Holy Bible. AN 6. Quine, W. V. O. (1961). Two dogmas ofA emDpiricism 7. Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure o f IscBientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 202. F 8. Feyerabend, P. (1981). R eaOlism, rationalism and scientific method: philosophical papers 1. CambridTge:Y Cambridge University Press. 5. 9. Boston, N. (1S995I). Understanding Quine‟s thesis of indeterminacy. Nortre Dame PhilosopRhical Reviews: 1. 10. IrVele, ED. (2000). Philosophy of language: a contemporary approach. Issues and pIroblems in philosophy. K. A. Owolabi. Ed. Ibadan: Grovacs Network. 180 U11. NIrele, D. (2000). Quoting Milton K. Muniz. 1981 Contemporary analytic philosophy. N. Y. & London: Macmillan Publishing Co:375. 12. Lindal, J. C. (1999). Anthropological approaches to the philosophy of translation. London: Ontario. iii. 13. Derrida, J. (2004). Des tours de babel (English and French version). Difference in translation. J. F Graham Ed. Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press. 16. 31 14. de Saussure, F. (2012). Course in general linguistics New York: Macgraw. Hill Book Company. 3. 15. Quine, W. V. O. (1992). Pursuit of truth, revised edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 20. 16. Pym, A. (2008). On Indeterminacy in translation, a survey of western theories. Intercultural Studies Group . 17. Mohatlane, E. J. (2014). The dynamics of the principles of determinacyY and indeterminacy in Sesotho translation. Journal of the Social Sciences. A40.3R: 305 18. Barry, C. S. Meaning and rule following. Routledge encyclopBediRa of philosophy. C. Edward. Ed. 6. 215. I 19. L Yancey, P. (2000). 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Library Philosophy and practice e– journal@ http://digitalcommons.uni.edu/libphilprac paper 1243. Y 44. Na‟Allah, A. (2010). African discourse in Islam, oral traditions and pAerfoRrmance. 19. R 45. Na‟Allah, A. (2010). African discourse in Islam, oral tradLitioInBs and performance. 20. 46. Guy, P. (1940). The art of translation. Royal SAocieNty for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufacture and Commerce: 793. D 47. Fagunwa, D. O. (1949). Igbo OlódùmIaBrè, A Ibadan: Nelson publishers Limited. 48. Fagunwa, D. O. (1995). The FFor est of God. Ajadi, G. Trans. Ilorin: Bamiex Printing and Publishing c oO. 49. Fagunwa, D. O. (2010Y). In the forest of Olódùmarè. Soyinka, W. Trans. 50. T Gbadegesin. O. IA. (2017). Between style and sense: a critical appraisal of Soyinka‟Rs anSd Ajadi‟s English translations of D. O Fagunwa‟s Igbo Olodumare. InternEational Journal of Language and Linguistics 4. 2: 41- 47. 51. GIbVadegesin, O. A. (2017). Between style and sense. 42. U52. NAdebawo, M. (2016). 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The Holy Bible (New Living Translation. 73. English Version of Luke 23:48. The gospel according to St Luke, Chapter 23 verse 48. The Holy Bible (King James Version) 74. Bibeli Mimo (King James Version). Luke, Chapter 23 verse 48. Y 75. Bibeli Mimo (Irohin Ayo) Luke, Chapter 23 verse 48. R 76. Bolaji Idowu. (1973). African traditional religion: a definitionR. LoAndon SCM Press. IB 77. Bolaji Idowu. (1973). African traditional religion. Londo nL SCM Press. 28. 78. Igboin Benson O. (2014). Is Olodumare God inA thNe Yoruba belief, God? Kanz philosophia 4: 189. D 79. B. Hallen and J. O. Sodipo. (1986). AI KBnowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, London, Ethnographica, 15-39. 80. Babade, T. (2008). Akojopo ijinFle owe Yoruba pelu itumo ati iloo won ni ede geesi (Akojo kin-inni). IbaYdan : OAboss Press. 42. 81. Fayemi, A. K. & MITacaulay-Adeyelure, O. C. (2009). 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MRanagement of Indigenous Knowledge (Ifa and Egungun) in Osun State,L NiIgeBria. 7. 103. Renuga, D. et al. (2015). The skopos theory: aN he terogeneous approach to translation. American International Journal of RAesearch in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, 9 (3). 281. D 104. Yusuf T. I. & Olusegun K. J. (2015 AI).B Management of indigenous knowledge (Ifa and Egungun) in Osun State, Nigeria. 7 OF ITY RS IV E UN 38 CHAPTER TWO LANGUAGE AND MEANING Introduction The concept of language, as well as meaning, is complex and has been a subject mYatter for significant attention to philosophers, linguists and anthropologists alikeA. AmRong the earliest known views on language expressed in the West are the ones foRund in the work th of Plato and Aristotle in the 4 Century BC. While Plato considers Bthe physical objects as passing representations of eternal ideas, Aristotle viewLs Ithat the relationship between words and objects consist of resemblance and coNnve ntion. Aristotle states that words represent objects and there is a convention aboAut which word represents which 1 object. AD th The views of other philosophers, on langIuBage and meaning, from Augustine in the 4 Century CE, to the mediaeval philosFoph ers such as Thomas Aquinas and Ockham and ththe 20 Century materialists, Orevolve round the rationalist view of Plato and the empirical view of AristotleY. C ontemporary scholars have shown interests in language and the complexities of grammar in human communication. In order to elicit more understanding of lSangIua Tge and meaning, this chapter shall analyse language as a tool of communicaRtion. The nature, characteristics and the contemporary theories of language, mEeaning and translation shall be examined. This is expected to provide a backgrIoVund on how individuals are able to understand one another within a culture and acNross cultures. ULanguage as Communication One of the facts of existence is that, human beings are capable of interacting with each other and one another through communication. This gives them the privilege to exchange beliefs, opinions and knowledge. It also enables them to express wishes, appreciations and emotional feelings. These they are able to do through the use of 39 language. This composition of language involves the set of guidelines (grammar) that link symbols and meanings to enable us communicate with each other. We need to differentiate between „language‟ and „a language‟. The term „language‟ is used to designate the common faculty that makes it possible for human beings to participate in the vocal exchange of information to dicuss with each other or one 2 another. The sharing of information may be achieved through speech, writing or signing. The exchange may also take place in any of the globally identified languages. Verbal and writing are two ways of the expression side of a language. Speech or vYerbal 3 is the most important medium of expression. The capability to speak is acAquiRred first, before we are taught to write. All human languages are orally or verRbally expressed, 4 but it is not all spoken ones that have written form. IB Language makes it possible to share comprehensible mes sLages with other fellow human beings within the group through discourses and Ntexts. These discussions and texts are structured in such a way to follow the laiAd down princciples conventions peculiar to that language that we share withA othDer people. The use of language for 5 communication can be referred to as „lingIuBistic communication‟. There are other means of communFication such as laughing, smiling, frowning, and clenching of fist and so on, w hOich are non-linguistic activities. Language and other activities related to it mayY be the most important exclusive privilege setting humans apart from other creaItuTres. It is a major tool that conveys the values and tradition 6 peculiar to a groupS, which gives them a unique identity. However laEnguRage could be used other than for communication. It could also be used for intIerVnal monologue, soliloquy and so on. When a civilization is destroyed, so also is Nits language, this is the more reason why when a people are colonised; there is Uimposition of the colonialist‟s language. As new ideas or concepts are learnt, so also, are new words needed to describe them. It is possible to recall some occasions when one had had a thought or meaning in one‟s mind. This thought might have been as clear as crystal. Yet one might not have been able to formulate the linguistic expression (word or string of words) necessary to convey the idea or message in the mind to an interlocutor. 40 The difficulty of generating the linguistic expression may be temporary. It may be as a result of what is referred to as, „tie-of-the tongue‟ phenomenon. This is a situation in which one knows what one wants to say, but the word to express it is elusive, exhibiting a kind of barrier in the connection between thought (word meaning) and language (word form). This occurrence can also be permanent. This is evident when one has never learnt the expression for a specific idea or concept. It even possible that the language itself does not make available the necessary materials for discussing the idea one wishes to express. More often than not, it is the language itself thYat is 7 restricted, rather than the knowledge of vocabulary of an individual speRaker. A language technically consists of several parts of speech. These include; nAouns, verbs, adverbs, prepositions, articles, tenses, adjectives, and so on. A lexicaRl term could be associated with a concept. Some scholars of language have distingIuBished the difference between three parts of language or the manner in which it is Lused. These are: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. DA N Syntax A Syntax studies the way in which words aInBd other elements are weaved collectively to make grammatical unit, withoutF p utting the meaning of the sentence into 8consideration. Syntax is a creatOive invention that made it possible for human beings to 9 be able to talk about everyYthin g imaginable to them. Since the languages of human beings are made up of aTn infinite number of sentences, new sentences are constructed out of simpler onesS indIefinitely. For example; Look atR the garage that John constructed. LooEk at the car that is parked in the garage that John constructed. VLook at the book that is put in the car that is parked in the garage that John Iconstructed. N Look at the boy that tore the book that is put in the car that is parked in the U garage that John constructed. 10 There is always the possibility of making any simple sentence in a language longer. This is made possible through syntax. It is quite difficult, if not impossible, for a speaker to have merely engaged in memorising all the existing phrases, expressions 11 and sentences available in a given language. Therefore, it is impossible, in principle, to memorise in its entirety the list of all the sentences of one‟s native language. 41 Though any specific sentence is limited in length, yet sentences that are present in any language is infinite. As an indigenous speaker of a language, even if one has never come across a sentence in the preceding linguistic experience, one, however, is able to comprehend it in as much as one recognised common units (words that one knows), brought together in a novel but suitable way. A native language‟s speaker is competent to generate and understand an infinite number of statements, together with many others that are new 12 and unfamiliar. In a similar manner, the people are able to recognise somRe ceYrtain expressions as not being acceptable and that they simply do not feel rAight in their 13 language. This knowledge is regularly called „linguistic competence‟.RSpeakers of a language are over and over again substantially innovative in theIirB invention of novel 14 sentences, they do not just utter the same sentences repeatedLly all the time. Syntax therefore, enables a person to speak and comprehend Ninfi nite number of sentences made from a finite number of small units, whicAh serves as the foundation for understanding language. AD Semantics IB This is an aspect of language that mFakes an inquiry about the meaning of words and sentences. Meaning is believed tOo be the relationship that exists between the words and the world. Two principal cYoncepts used in semantics are „reference‟ and „truth‟. What connects a word and Ia Tthing cannot be a thing in itself, because if it is, it will need 15 another thing to coSnnect itself. This will eventually lead to a vicious circle. While language repreRsents the world; Semantics represents the relation between language and the worVld. EThe determination of what this relationship is has been a subject of debate amongI scholars. UNPragmatics This studies how language is used. It encompasses social language skill that is used in daily interaction with others. This includes what we say, the way we say it, our body language and its appropriateness to the specific situation. This is crucial to communicating personal thoughts, ideas and emotions. It studies how context contributes to meaning. The absence of pragmatic skill in an individual could lead to 42 misinterpretation of the communicative intent of others and difficulty in giving appropriate response either in oral communication or written. The study of pragmatics became important in the early 1950‟s and became prominent till the early 1980s. An individual can use language to make statements, to express belief, opinion, promises, command and so on. The interaction between the speaker and the hearer is a focus of pragmatics. These three aspects of language are believed to enhance communication. Communication can be defined as the transmission of information, from one creYature to the other, through the use of signals. It requires at least four elements:A traRnsmitter, signal, channel/ medium, and receiver. Verbal communication involveRs the utilisation of sounds and language to send a message. It functions as a mIBeans of articulating needs, ideas and desires. It is very paramount to the pro gLression of learning and teaching. N Non-verbal communication has to do with transmissAion of information through other means apart from spoken, written or other coded Dform of language. Communication is not only verbal exchange, it also takes IpBlace A in writing. Writing, even though, is a relatively more recent developmenFt t han oral communication, yet it has a vital significance for a language. LanOguage is triggered by the need to communicate among people within a social commun ity. Y Language and commuInTication are two aspects of a culture. One aspect cannot be separated from theS other. Language is, without doubt, the most essential device for communicationR that an individual has at his disposal. The purpose of acquiring 16 language, aEs established by Chomskey, is mainly to communicate. The other systems of comImVunication have numerous weakness, hence, the language of the human being is Nthe best means of communication. A distinct language, which is understood only by Usome people, is often the determining factor in casting these people into distinct groups as a people, state or nation. Communication is „transactional‟ in the sense that the source and the receiver are both always having an influence on each other, through symbolic behaviour. Communication then becomes „instrumental‟ when we use it as we often do, as a device to modify our environment and to have effect or impact on 17 other people. 43 18 Berth Bradley points out six characteristics of communication. These are: i. Communication is dynamic: Communication is not static, but dynamic. It has to do with change adjustment and effects, as the elements intermingle. ii. Communication is continuous: There is no beginning and it does not end in a person‟s life. iii. Communication is complex: It takes place at many stages and manifests mYany influences. AR iv. Communication is not reversible: The communication procRess cannot be reversed. For example, what has been said, cannot be “unsaiIdB” (withdrawn). v. Communication does not follow a fixed sequence :L The elements in the communication process are arranged in a fexible mNanner. Which element comes on at which time and place in the process deDpendAs on situation. vi. Communication is unrepeatable: A gBivenA communication act cannot be recreated. There are other categorisation of deFfini tiIon which include those that stress sharing of ideas (or „transactional‟ nature of communication; those that stress intentional 19 influence or „instrumental‟ natu rOe of communication); and those that are all inclusive. It is logical to consider lTangYuage as majorly a system of communication, but we should not push the compariIson with the other system too far. It is not all the time that language usualRly hSas a „message‟ in any real sense of being a piece of information. Some of itEs functions are concerned with social relationship, although this is also correcIt Vof the animals communicating system too. Also, in language, the signs and the meNssages are themselves greatly complex and the affinity between them is even of Uhigher complexity. Due to this fact, it has been argued that human language differs in 20kind, rather than degree, from other languages. Moreover, in language, it is very challenging if not sometimes unattainable, to state categorically what the message is. Other communication systems do not have such challenges, because the message can be autonomously verified in relations to a specific language. For language in general, we do not have such an easy way out, for meaning 44 (the message) cannot be defined independently of the language. One can only state a set of meanings in terms of another set, which only explain language in terms of 21 language. Language and Culture William Raymond describes „culture‟ as one of the most complex words in the English 22 Language. There is still; nonetheless, no single broadly agreed definition of it today. The term is not only difficult to pin down, but downrightly controversial. Three Ymain perspectives of culture have been identified by scholars, these are: Received Rviews of culture, Post modern view and Cultural studies views of culture. RA Received View of Culture IB This is described as a common-sense idea which perceiveNs the Lworld as partitioned into 23 a variety of distinct organisations, with each society hAaving its peculiar culture. This view conflates large political groupings such as nDation, states and ethnic communities and with their shared belief, point of view andA behavior, overlooking the disintegrating 24 effect of immigration, social class and c uIltuBral diffusion. Post Modern View OF This emphasises change, Ydisr uption, discontinuity, inequality, movement, hybridity 25 and difference. This IdTirectly addresses the unanticipated interesting and disorganized integration, combining and cultural synergies that international movement of humans and ideas haveR broSught about in the last half century. CulturaVl SEtudies View of Culture NICultural studies view approaches contemporary culture from an ideological point of Uview. Even though there has been no view of culture which is universally accepted, a version which seems to have the most influence in the language studies regards „culture‟ as a historically transmitted and systematic network of meanings which enable us to understand, develop and communicate our knowledge and beliefs about 26 the world. This shows that cultural factors help mould our background understandings or schemas of knowledge. These are likely to have a serious impact on 45 what we write and how what we write are organised. It also influences our response to different communication contexts. Culture is seen as being so interwoven with language in such a way that one cannot be isolated from the other. Factors that are pertained to culture have the prospect of influencing perception, language learning and communication. Perhaps one of the most scrutinised influences of culture in language is the conflicting expectations that people have about the logical organisation of written texts and the effect this may have in trans-cultural translation. What is seen and counted as logYical, engaging, relevant, accurate, concise, coherent and well organised texts arAe aRll said to 27 differ across cultures. Two individuals cannot speak and write a langRuage in exactly the same way. Everyone is an individual when it comes to languaBge. An individual‟s language is called his/her „idiolect‟. „Idio‟ is derived from the GLreIek word for „private‟ 28 and „lect‟ is derived from the Greek word for „language‟. There are several factors that have impact on the manner an individual uses AlanNguage. These include; social factors, that is, the social group in which a perDson is brought up; the geographical factors, where a person comes from or has livAed during the childhood, adolescence or adulthood; and the psychological factor sI, Bwhich have to do with individual history as language users. There are also exFtraneous factors relating to the purpose of the 29 discourse or texts. O Language and culture cTannYot be disentangled, they are both tied to each other. Both impact immeasuraSbly Ion each other. Individuals with a common culture, but who speak differingR languages will view the world differently. At the same time culture is 30also reflectEed and transmitted through language from one generation to the other. It thus iImVplies that when an individual decides to aquire a new language, it will invNariably involve the learning of a new culture. Some scholars have stated that a new Uchild is just like any other infant until it is exposed to its surroundings where he/she is exposed to culture and language. The exposure makes him/her becomes an individual within his/her own cultural group. It is the cultural group that shapes the life and opinions of the individual. The group‟s approval or disapproval influenced the behavior and make acceptable language vary from location to location. 46 Language goes beyond just being a medium of communication, it has influence on both the culture and thought processes. A person visiting another society would come along with his/her individual culture‟s categories and construe events and occurrences in those conditions. However, there will not be adequate comprehension of the thoughts and utterances of the people in the society being visited. The person could, however, put aside his/her own culture‟s viewpoint and study the categories of reality in the other society. Through this, a much deeper insightful understanding of the other culture is gained. Y Byriam M. defined culture as „shared beliefs, values and behaviours Aof Ra social 31 group‟. Kramsch defines language as both an instrument for sharing Rinformation and also a symbolic system with the ability to produce and modify symBbolic realities, such 32 as values, perception and identities, through discourse. LaLnguIage usually forms a foundation for ethnic, national, regional or international identity. Contacts of an indigenous culture with a foreign culture, such as relAigioNus and political culture often create new concepts, terms or word in a languagDe. For instance in Yoruba language terms like, „Satani‟ (Satan) “Asitani” Angeli, AMalaika (Angel) and many others came into being due to the contact made with IthBe new religious concepts of the West. Also, in politics, concepts like democFrac y, capitalism and government, have been accommodated by the indigeno uOs language. The development in teTchnYology has resulted in the need to create new words to describe computers, laIptops, anti-virus, Central Processing Unit (C P U), Monitor, and some other chRaraScteristically similar words. Language also helps in formulating cultural valEues, norms and taboos. It expresses the approval and prohibitions of the society.V The destruction of a culture, would therefore lead to the destruction of a lanNguaIge and vice versa. Individuals in a culture are members of a society, which Umeans that their cognitive functions and structures mirror those of their social knowledge system within the social community. Individuals continue to extend the range of meaning and knowledge available to them. This is done through the participation in social interactions and by assimilating new information in problem solving and decision-making. In doing this, they develop understanding of acquisition of learning styles and strategies of communication within the social group. This leads the individuals within the community to use socially 47 acceptable standards for the categorisation of circumstances, people, emotions, knowledge and entities. Individuals‟ understanding of culture is influenced by the social identity. This is the sum of the numerous social sub-groups, which include; sex, age, profession, religion and other factors, to which an individual belongs and of which he or she is a recognised and competent member. Individuals acquire world-views, that is, sets of ideas, beliefs, representation, values and attitude which then form the interpretative repertoire they rely on to organise and make sense of their experience. The inRdivYidual acquires the linguistic, communication and cultural competence, includingA both forms and norms. The parameters, skills and practices acquired duRring childhood interpersonal communication, provide the resources for the inIteBrpersonal dialogue which is the primary identity formation process. L Despite the opportunity available to acquire knowledAge aNnd communication skill, yet, not all individuals within a culture in a given soDciety have the same culture. That is, they may not know all and the same things, bAecause their involvement in the society varies. Individuals construct their worldvieBws and languages on the basis of materials available to them. Culture is therefFore hIas to do with all the necessary habits that a person need to acquire to operatOe in a way that is acceptable to the general members of 33the society. It is what a person has to learn, different from the biological inheritance. The linguistic system ofT a Ysociety has to be learnt and transmitted to others within the culture. A theory of cuIlture is therefore, of necessity, a theory of communication. According to RRileSy, there are three broad categories of cultural knowledge: „know- that‟, „knowE-of‟ and „know how‟. „Know-that‟ consists of what individuals believe to be trueI,V their political and religious „philosophy‟ and values, their „theories‟ of disease, phNysics, child-rearing, hunting, history and geography. This is said to form what might Ube called „relatively permanent background knowledge‟. This is the version of each individual of „how the world works”. „Know-of‟ consists of present issues and preoccupations. This has to do with the day-to-day information about events and people. „Know-how‟ comprises of the personal skill, capacities and competencies of the individuals, their efficient acquisition of reasoning, behaving and speaking in acceptable ways. That is, understanding how to go about and speak in the way things 34 should be said and done. 48 Culture, language and individual identity are interwoven. It may then be claimed that since a language itself is a system of culture, all words are culturally inclined, however, some words could be more cultural than others. Individuals within a culture are expected to attain a level of linguistic competence, socio- cultural competence and 35 communication competence. Linguistic competence is the term used by Chomsky for the capability of an indigenous speaker to construct or recognise correct sentences in a language. Communicative proficiency could be described as the capacity to adapt one‟s expressions to the circumstances. Communicative competence needs knowlYedge of the socio-linguistic standards governing variations and makes it possibleR for the speakers to speak in situations appropriately. The learner is consideAred in this perspective as a language user. BRI The Socio-cultural competence then pulls together the in dLividual‟s knowledge of language with his/her understanding of the world, the socNiety, situations and culture of which he/she is a member. The socio-cultural compeAtence could also be described as learning competence. Each society has its visionD and standard of a competent adult, concept of personhood, and aims to prodBuceA individuals who will fit into the social frame. Linguistic competence deno tIes being a grammarian, communicative competence means being an adequatFe speaker and socio-cultural competence stand for 36 being an acceptable member of tOhe society. Any competent member of a society must therefore understand the mYeaning of words, concepts and expressions being used across the socio-linguiIstTic community for effective integration into the society. Meaning in CoRmmSunication What ImVos Et obviously distinguishes those sound and scratches which belong to lanNguage from the innumerable ones that do not, is that, the former have meaning. 37UThen the question is, what gives this type of force to a noise or scratch? Sometimes when people are confronted with the implication of what they have said, they usually say, „that is not what I mean‟. It shows that the words may not actually mean what we thought it to mean. Obviously there seems to be the other meaning apart from the 38 literal meaning of those words. The lexicon will recommend a number of alternative meanings of „meaning‟ or more correctly of the verb „mean‟. Ogden and Richards, in their research work, listed not less than sixteen different meanings that have been 49 accepted by various reputable scholars. However, we shall consider only the relevant 39 ones to this study. Questions usually asked by scholars about meaning include; Are meanings of expressions, words or sentences abstract entities of some sorts? What conditions must an expression meet to be meaningful? And what does it mean for two expressions to 40 mean the same? There are different conceptions of meaning that have been postulated by scholars in answer to the query, „what is meaning?‟ The question has also generated different types of semantic theories. RY Semantics is the study of linguistic meaning. The two uses of „mean‟ iAn semantics illustrate two major kinds of meaning, namely, „linguistic meaninBg‟ aRnd the „speaker meaning‟. The difference can be demonstrated with an illustratLionI. Assuming you have been having an argument with an individual, who suddenly exclaimed, “the door is right at your back”. Your assumption quite rightly in this Ncontext would be that you are being told to take your leave. Even though, theD speAaker‟s real words did not show 41 anything more than where the door is locatedA. This exemplifies how individuals can use words to mean something rather dif feIrBent from what their words mean. Generally, the linguistic meaning of an utterancFe or statement is purely the meaning of that word, phrase or sentence, in that p aOrticular language. When compared to the linguistic meaning, the speaker meaning may differ from the linguistic meaning. This will depend on whether theI sTpeYaker is speaking plainly (literally) or figuratively. However, when we make a statement literally, we mean exactly what our words mean, without 42 any major dispRarityS with what our words mean. Instances oEf non-literal uses of language are sarcasm and irony. Metaphorical use of 43 lanNguaIg Ve is also a type of non-literal language use. Perhaps the central semantic Uproperties of words are the property of being meaningful or being meaningless. For instance, father means male parent; bachelor means unmarried adult male; spinster means unmarried adult female. „Ambiguity‟ is another essential semantic property of words, most especially the one referred to as „lexical ambiguity‟. This could be shown with this example; 50 i. He found a „file‟ (File: Iron sharpener; office paper for keeping record) ii. She could not „bear‟ boys. (Bear: give birth to; put up with /tolerate) The words in inverted comma are ambiguous in each case as they have more than one meaning. Y The capacity to identify ambiguity is vital to communication. SuRccessful communication often depends on not only the speaker but also the hearerA recognising the same meaning for a potentially ambiguous word. An expressioRn is said to be anomalous, if the meaning of its each separate words are incLomIpaBtible. For instance, „Colorless yellow idea‟, „Speak diagonally caring.‟ In t he same way, we have „polysemy‟. It is usually defined as the quality of possessNing more than one associated 44 meaning. Eye can mean both a „sense organ‟ and „DsighAt‟. Theories of Meaning A IB Attempts at resolving what meaningF is , have led to postulations of some theories of meaning by scholars. These inc lOude; Denotational Theory oTf MYeaning I The relation betwSeen a linguistic statement and what it refers to, is often called „denotation‟, lRinguistic reference, and semantic reference. The conception may be formulaVted Ethat the meaning of each expression is the real object it denotes, that is, its denotaItion. A debate of meaning often starts by making a line of demarcation between theN „reference‟ and the „sense‟ of a word. Reference has to do with the external Umeaning relation; it is the affiliation connecting a word and the object that it indicates 45 in the material world, in the world of ideas or in the world of our experience. This is a common sense theory that words or sentences have meaning because they refer or stand for what they stand for. Even though denotation reflects the understanding that language is used to talk about the world, there are critical challenges with the classification of meaning as denotation. 51 For example, to suppose that the meaning of an expression is its denotation, one is then ready to accept additional claims that; (i.) if an expression has a meaning then it must have a denotation (meaningfulness). (ii) If two expressions have the same denotation, then they have the same meaning (synonymy). These two assumptions of denotation theory come out to be false. For example, the first assumption is that if an expression has a meaning, then it implies that it must have a denotation (meaningfulness). This necessitates that for any expression that has meaning, there must be a real object that it denotes. However, this is false. A word like „empty‟, „nothing‟, „so‟, „very‟, „PegaYsus‟ (the flying horse) and such others, could not be said to denote any object. AR If we also consider the second assumption, that if two expressionsR have the same denotation, then they have the same meaning (synonymy). It wouIldB then be discovered that there are numerous expressions that may be used to co rLrectly denote a specific object, but which do not signify the same thing. For exaNmple, „the morning star‟, „the evening star‟ and „Venus‟, all denote the same planeAt. However, these words are not synonymous. This can be verified in the fact thatD the morning star is the last star that 46 is seen in the morning and the evening BstarA is the first star that is seen at night. Neither is the expression, „the first ci viIlian president of Nigeria‟ synonymous with „Alhaji Sheu Shagari‟, but they denoFte the same thing. One of the problems withY den o Otational theory of meaning is, not all words refer to concrete or actual thingT. Some words do not even refer to anything that exists at all. A sentence like “I saw Inothing.” What can „nothing‟ stand for? Secondly, „water is colourless‟. „CRolouSrless‟ cannot be a reference for „water‟. We have some nouns that do not namEe particular individual things, or which may not even have to refer to anythinVg abstract. Similarly, some words that are not nouns may not refer to anything. FoNr inIstance, „a‟, „the‟ „no‟ „absurd‟ do not name any particular thing, yet they are Umeaningful. Thirdly, some words can refer to the same meaning. Muhammed Buhari is the Nigerian President. „Muhammad Buhari‟ refers to Nigerian President, but does not mean Nigerian President. In defining „meaning‟, then we are expected to generate a term that is more common than the one whose meaning is being interrogated. Translations are made from terms that are difficult to understand, those that are 52 technical or foreign language into words that can be easily understood. It is apparent, 47 however, that this method will not get us very far in our attempt to study meaning. The Mentalist Theory of Meaning 48 This theory has many versions. It states that an expression is meaningful if and only 49 if it is associated in some way, with a particular mental image, item, thought or idea. The major features that are associated in such relationship have to recur consistently 50 before it can be regarded as its meaning. The theory can be formulated thusY; the meaning of an expression is the idea (or ideas) connected with that expressioRn in the 51 minds of the speakers. For instance, it may be held that „piglet‟ isA meaningful because it is synonymously associated with a certain mental BimRage. „Piglet‟ is synonymous with „a young pig‟, because they both correlate wLithI the same image. To analyse meaning, therefore, is to scrutinise people‟s mental states or processes. Two words are different in meaning if there are dissimilaritiesN in the psychological contexts that are involved in the two cases. If meanings aDre nAot real objects, then it has been suggested that they are mental objects. If no flAying-horse actually exists that „pegasus‟ could denote, then there actually exists aI Bmental image or idea of Pegasus - a flying-52horse. F However, there are deficiencie s Oin this theory. If one is to adopt this theory, it would be difficult for two expressTionYs to be synonymous, that is, have the same meaning. Also, there are many meaniIngful words which do not correspond with any relevant images that we could Rcall Sup. If we concentrate on words like „dog‟ or „yellow‟ we may be tempted toE suppose that all words have corresponding images or mental items. HowevIeVr, we cannot say the same of words like, „so‟, „for‟, „or‟, „definitely‟ and so on. EvNen if some images are associated with each of the words, it is most unlikely that one Ucould explicate the meaning of the words in terms of the nature of the images. Words like chair, desk, and so on could be said to be meaningful as they refer to images which correspond to „chair‟ or „desk‟. It may not actually be possible to give similar account of theoretical terms. As Cooper observes, it is well known that some people are much better at imaging than others. If to know the meaning of a word was a matter of having the right images, it would then 53 seem to follow that a person who is not good at imaging is correspondingly poor in his 53 understanding of meanings. This is however, an absurd conclusion. If concrete objects have meaning in terms of their corresponding with images or mental items, how do we determine the meaning of a mental image? What image would correspond to another mental image before we could know the meaning? In mental representation, a noun is believed to have its capacity to denote, as it is connected with an impression in the speaker / hearer‟s mind. This takes one out of the dilemma of maintaining that all we talk about exists in reality. The theory, hRowYever, encounters serious problem when it comes to common nouns. This isA due to the variations in mental images that individual speakers might have, when Ra common noun like „cup‟, or „plate‟ is mentioned, based on their experiences. IABn illustration often referred to in the literature is of the word „triangle‟. A pe rsLon may have a mental representation of an equilateral triangle; another person mNay have a mental image of an isosceles triangle or scalene triangle. It would be hardA to visualise an image that would merge the characteristics common to each of theseD triangles. In the same way, it is hard to find an image that is compatible to all cBars Aand all dogs. In like manners, the mental representation one would possess for w oIrds like animal, food; or concepts like love, justice or democracy would be blurrFed. So if images are linked to words or concepts, 54 they cannot tell everything abo uOt such words or concepts. Similarly, images are IiTdenYtified separately from the words that are used to describe them, but we can have an image without applying words to it at all. The problem then is that images, RconSceptions or ideas, seem to have no way of recognising or identifying them excepEt through the use of words to express them. They could be identified only througIhV verbal interpretations or descriptions, that is, through the use of language. ThNere will then be no way of explaining meaning by referring to these mental images, Usince we need to understand already, the meaning of words in order to identify what the mental items are and what makes a particular thought or idea the one it is. Thinking or conceiving, are regarded as inner, non-verbal procedures which may or may not receive clothing in the forms of words, but if these were to be so, it should be quite possible to go about thinking and meaning things in total isolation from any 55 verbalisation, tacit or aloud. However, this isolation seems impossible. While 54 meaning could be associated with mental activity, any attempt to use words to explain meaning as a mental activity would be circular. The Behaviouristic Theory It states that an expression is meaningful if and only if utterances of it generate certain behavioural responses in people and/or are produced in response to some specific stimuli. If one is to examine meaning, then one needs to examine the behavior connected with utterance of expressions. An utterance may, however, have diffYerent responses at different time. For instance, „pig‟ may elicit different reaction at Rdifferent occasions. This does not mean it has changed meaning on those differRent oAccasions. It may even, sometimes, not produce any response at all. Not prodBucing any response does not make it meaningless either. Also, the responses t o LwoIrds or sentences are sometimes irrelevant to their meanings. It will thereforNe be absurd to say that each word or sentence changes meaning when differentA responses are elicited at their utterance. As Cooper points out: D Now by „behaviourB‟ pAI resumably, we mean not just movement of muscles, contractions of ligaments etcF. but human actions, like kicking, praying oOr building. However, once we include actions under the heading of „behaviour‟, it is difficYult to see that we are always in a position to idTentify what the behaviour is, without already Iknowing the meaning of the words we are S 56supposed to explain by reference to behaviour. He further staRtes that if a certain anthropologist visits a certain strange tribe and observeVs soEme of their actions when certain words are uttered, he may observe that they bIow, kneel, raise and wave their hands. He may not be able to determine whether theN 57 behaviour is praying or giving thanks, or rather frightening away some spirits. UThis is to say that the same set of physical movement may be involved in performing uniquely different set of bodily actions. It would then be difficult to state which of the actions are being performed without first knowing the meaning of the words. An appeal could only be made to non-behaviourist criterion. These show the inadequacy of the behaviouristic theory at explaining meaning. 55 The Use Theory of Meaning This theory also has many versions. It states that an expression is meaningful if and only if people can make use of it for a particular purpose and in a certain way. Two expressions will be synonymous, correspondingly, if and only if people can use them in the same ways for the same purposes. Scrutinizing meaning is mainly examining the function the expression plays in the actions of human persons. To provide the meaYning of an expression is to present universal guidelines for the way it is used toR refer or mention specific objects. To give the meaning of a sentence is to provideA the general 58 information on how to use it to make true or false statements. TBhe Rmajor challenge with the Use Theory of Meaning is that the appropriate co nLcepItion of use must be made accurate and the theory must say how, specifically, Nmeaning is connected to use. The Naming Theory of Meaning DA Two major reasons why philosophers analyse Alanguage are to grasp the characteristics of truth and to comprehend the structu reI Bof reality. The way languages attach to the world is called „reference‟. This is Fgenerally considered to be an attribute of proper names or subjects of expres siOons that denote individual objects, in as much as individual objects existing Yin space and time are seemingly the essential components of 59 the world. Ludwig WIiTttgenstein says that a name means an object and the object is its 60meaning. S Bertrand REusseRll, while presenting a variation of Naming theory, states that two types 61 of namIVes can be identified, these are; proper names and common names. Proper naNmes directly refer to particular objects that are usually sense data or sensations, Udifferent from separately accessible concrete objects such as chairs, tables, goat and rabbit. Common names refer to concepts, properties and universals. Examples can be used to illustrate the differences between individuals and concepts. The sensation of „Red‟ has something in common. They are occasions of a definite general thing. That something that is general is the concept, property, or universal. 56 The Verification Theory of Meaning The logical positivists believe that meaningful sentences could be categorised into two groups; the first group being those that were cognitively meaningful and the second, those that were emotively meaningful. Sentences that belong to religion, ethics, aesthetics and politics, which are value laden, were considered to have „emoYtive‟ meaning. Such sentences, as the logical positivists posited, were not aimed at describing the state of the world, but to convey or stimulate some attiRtudes or emotions. Therefore, to affirm that, „the teacher is good‟, „the lady is beauAtiful‟, „God is the designer and creator of the universe‟ is either to communicaBte pRositive emotion or intend to induce positive emotion in the listeners. While suLch Isentences as, stealing is wrong,‟ „lying is evil‟, either convey or intend to stimulate some negative feelings or emotions by the speaker. AN According to the logical positivists, to say that soDmething was good is to commend or recommend it. For the logical positivists, BcognAitively meaningful language consists of two categories of sentences: sentenFces oIf logic and those of empirical sentences. A sentence is meaningful when it is verifiable. That is, when there is a way of confirming whether it is true or false. The crOiterion of meaning of a sentence is, therefore, its mode 62 of verification. The vTerifYiability principle was modified to state that, a sentence is meaningful when theIre is a process of finding out the condition of its truth. Affirmative unRiverSsal sentences are meaningful on this basis. HoweveVr, nEegative sentences such as „there are no flying horse‟ are not meaningful based Ion the verification principles, for they do not have any evidence that could coNnclusively falsify the sentence. Although, there is no positive evidence that unicorns Uexist. Verifiability principle is also self-refuting. Going by its own condition, none of the verifiability statement would be meaningful, since it can neither be a proposition of logic nor an empirical position that describes the world. 57 Theories of Translation Using language to communicate in a meaningful way not only involves making one‟s thought clearly known to others, but also communicating with people of diverse cultures. In order to make others understand us, there is a need for translation of words, 63 concepts and sentences from one language to another. As Paul Ricoeur enumerated, translation may be either in a particular or in a broad sense. When in the particular sense, it begins the act of translating the meanings of a specific language into another one. In the more general sense, it points to ontological act of talking as both thRe wYay of translating oneself (inner to outer, private to public, unconscious to conscAious) on the one hand, and translating oneself to others on the other hand. Domino RJervolino puts it thus, the act of speaking itself is a translation (both when a personI Bis speaking a native 64 language or when one is speaking within oneself.) L The plurality of languages, which require a more accurateN interaction with the different cultures, which cannot be avoided, makes translaDtionA necessary and unavoidable. The question however arises, how do we make Athe thought of a culture intelligible in another that is alien to it? In answerin gI tBhis question, scholars have posited various F 65theories of translation. As outlined by Roman Jakobson, some of the contemporary theories of translation include: O The Socio-linguistic Approach ITY This approach statSes that the social context determines what can be translatable and what is not traRnslatable. It also defines those things that are or are not acceptable, throughV seElection, filtering and even censorship. According to this perspective, a translaItion is unavoidably the product of each society. Each person‟s own socio- cuNltural background is inherent in everything that is translated. U The Communicative Approach This is interpretive. It is developed based on the understanding of conference interpreting. According to this point of view, what needs to be translated is „meaning‟, not language. Language is not anything more than a means of transportation, for if the message is not carefully handled it can constitute an impediment to understanding. 58 This is the reason it is more advisable to „deverbalise‟ (rather than transcoding) whenever we carry out the act of translation. The Hermeneutic Approach The hermeneutic approach is largely grounded on the work of George Steiner, who states that any act of human communication can be regarded as translation. In his 66 book, After Babel, he states that translation is not a science but an “exact art”. A genuine translator needs to be competent by developing a writing proficiency, toY get hold of the message the author of the source text intends to convey. AR The Linguistic Approach IB R According to this viewpoint, any translation (whether it iLs a legal translation, a marketing translation, a medical translation, or any otNher type of text) should be evaluated from the perspective of its basic units; thatA is, the word, the syntax and the sentence. AD The Literary Approach IB According to this approach, a trOanslFation should not be seen as a linguistic enterprise, but a literary one. Language has a force that is revealed through words when an individual experiences a cYulture. This change is the thing that gives it power and eventually meaning. TIhiTs is what the translation-writer should translate. S The Semiotic ARpproach E SemioItiVc is the discipline that studies signs and signification. Consequently, for meNaning to exist, there must be relationship between a sign, an object and an Uinterpreter. Thus, translation is thought of as a system of interpreting texts in which there are variations in socio-cultural content and context. Conclusion This chapter has tried to make a review of the nature of language as a tool of human communication. It stated that language is a reflection of human cultural system. It 59 emphasised the complexities in human grammar and its meaning. The chapter considered language in the traditional model which consists of semantics, that is, the meaning behind an utterance. It also examined syntax, how words combined into utterances, and the pragmatics, the way language is put into use. It concluded that the utterance in a language needs to mean something before it can be an effective means of communication within culture and across cultures. Theories of meaning were examined to determine the necessary properties needed for words, concepts or sentences uttered to be meaningful. Contemporary theories of translation wereY also reviewed. The next chapter shall pay attention to the difficulties invoRlved in translation. W. V. O. Quine‟s indeterminacy thesis shall be critically exRamiAned. LIB AN BA D OF I ITY ER S IV UN 60 Endnotes 1. Douglas, P. (2010). Language and truth, a study of the Sanskrit language and its relationship with principles of truth. London: Shepherd Walwyn Publishers Ltd. 2. Das, L. (2006). Lectures notes on language and communication. Guwahati: Indian Institute of Technology. 1. 3. Shanna, M. O. Montales. (2011). Language and communication, A. B. EnYglish language 3: Linkedln Coorporation. 2. R 4. Howard, J. & Stockwell, P. (2011). An introduction to the natuRre aAnd functions of language, 2nd edition. London: Continuum International IPBublishing Group. 4 5. Howard, J. & Stockwell, P. (2011). An introduction to th eL nature and functions of language. 4. AN 6. Sirbu, A. (2015). The significance of languagDe as a tool of communication. Naval Academy Scientific Bulletin xviii. 2: B405A - 406. 7. Hall, C. J. (2005). An introduFcti oIn to language and linguistics, breaking the language spell. London: BOiddles Ltd. 64. 8. Martinich A. P. (199Y7). Language and its uses. Routledge history of philosophy th vol. x. philosophIy Tof meaning, knowledge and value in the 20 century. 11. 9. Peterson, RPS. L. (1984). Semantic indeterminacy and scientific underEdetermination. Philosophy of Science 51. 3: 471. 10. N MI Vartinich, A. P. (1997). Language and its uses. Routledge history of philosophy U vol. x: 1. 11. Akmajian, A. (2012). et al. Linguistics, an introduction to language and communication. New Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited. 150. 12. Carnie, A. (2007). Syntax, a generative introduction, second edition. Malden, M. A: Blackwell. 16. 61 13. Grady, W. O. et al. (2011). Contemporary linguistics, an introduction. London: Pearson Education Limited. 5. 14. Akmajian, A. et. al. (2012) Linguistics, an introduction to language and communication. New Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited. 149. 15. Martinich A. P. (1997). Phlosophy of language. 12. 16. Andrew C. (2007). Syntax, a generative introduction, second edition. 15. Y 17. Folarin B. (1998). Theories of mass communication, an introductory AtextR. Ibadan: Stirling- Horden Publishers (Nig) Ltd. 12. R 18. Bradley, B. 1984. Speech communication, the credibility Lof iIdBeas. Dubuque Iowa: Wm Brown Publishers. 7 - 8. 19. Bradley, B. 1984. Speech communication, the crAedibNility of ideas. 7 - 8. 20. Palmer, F. R. (1996). Semantics, 2nd eAditDion. London: Cambridge University Press. 6. 21. IB Palmer, F. R. (1996). SemanticFs, second edition. 6. 22. Williams, R. (1983). YKey w Oords, a vocabulary of culture and society. New York: Oxford UniversityT Press. 87. 23. I Gupta, A. andS Ferguson J. (1997). Culture, power, place, ethnography at the end of an eraR. Culture, power, exploitations in critical anthropology. A. Gupta and J. FeVrguEson. Eds. Durham, N. C: Duke University Press. 1. 24.N HIyland, K. (2005). Metadiscourse. Bodmin Conrwall: MPC Books Ltd. 113. U25. Appedura, A. (1996). Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 26. Hyland, K: (2005). Metadiscourse. Bodin Cornwall: M. P. C. Books Ltd. 114 making reference to Lantolf, J. P. 1999. Second culture in second language teaching and learning. Cambridge: C. U.P. 28 - 46. 62 27. Hyland, K. (2005). Metadiscourse. 115. 28. Howard. J. and Etienne Z. (2007). Words, meaning and vocabulary, an introduction to modern English lexicology. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. 5. 29. Howard, J. & Stockwell, P. (2011). An introduction to the nature and functions of language. 5 30. Emmett, M. & Pollock J. (1997). Language and learning: an introduRctionY for teaching, second edition. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. A 31. Byram, M. (2008). From foreign language education Bto Reducation for intercultural citizenship. Clevedon: Mutilingual Matter. 4L. I 32. Riley, P. (2008). Language, culture and identity, an Nethno - linguistic perspective. London: Athenaeum press Ltd. 22 DA 33. Cerri-Long. E. L. Ed. (1999). AnthropologAical theory in North America. Westport: C. T. Bergin and Carvey. 88. IB 34. Riley P. (2008). LanguageO, culFture and identity, an ethno - linguistic perspective. 41. 35. Y Mehrpour, S & AITli F. (2015). Theories of first language acquisition. Journal of language, linSguistic and literature 1. 2: 32. 36. CoopeEr, RD. E. (1975). Philosophy and the Nature of Language. London: LIoVngman, 37. UN Cooper, D. E. (1975). Philosophy and the Nature of Language. 7. 38. nd Palmer F. R. (1995). Semantics, 2 Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 41. 39. Ogden C. K. & Richards I. A. (1989). The meaning of meaning. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Word Inc. 186. 63 40. Cooper, D. E. 1975. Philosophy and the Nature of Language. 12-13. 41. Akmajian, A. et al. (2012). Linguistics, an introduction to language and communication. 226. 42. Akmajian. A. et al (2012). Linguistics, an introduction to language and communication. 227. 43. Akmajian. A. et al. (2012). Linguistics, an introduction to language and communication. 229. RY 44. Danks J. (1975). Experimental psycholinguistics. Hilldale: HR. .JA. Lawrence Eribaum Associations. 234. IB 45. Howard J. & Etienne Z. (2007). Words, meaning and vo cLabulary, an introduction to modern English lexicology. London: ContinuNum International Publishing Group. 106. DA 46. Akmajian, A. et. al. (2012). LinguisAtics, an introduction to language and communication. 234. IB 47. Palmer, F. R. (1981). OSemFantics second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. 48. Y Danks J. (1975). IETxperimental psycholinguistics. 50. 49. Cooper DR. (19S75). Philosophy and the nature of language. 14. 50. OgVdenE. R. (1989). The meaning of meaning. 57. 51.N AIkmajian, A. et al. (2012). Linguistics, an introduction to language and U communication. 230. 52. Danks, J. (1975). Experimental psycholinguistics. 50. 53. Cooper, D. (1975). Philosophy and the nature of language. 22. 54. nd Saeed, J. I. (2007). Semantics, 2 edition. India: Blackwell Publishing. 32 64 55. Cooper, D. (1975). Philosophy and the nature of language. 26. 56. Cooper, D. (1975). Philosophy and the nature of language. 26. 57. Cooper, D. (1975). Philosophy and the nature of language. 32. 58. Martinich, A. P. (1997). Philosophy of language. Routledge history of philosophy th vol. x. philosophy of meaning, knowledge and value in the 20 century. 17. 59. Martinich, A. P. (1997). Philosophy of language. 13. RY 60. Wittgenstein, L. (1965). The blue book. The blue and black books Apreliminary studies for the “philosophical investigations”. New York: HBarpRer Torchbooks. 17. LI 61. Martinich A .P. (1997). Philosophy of language. 14N. 62. Martinich A .P. (1997). Philosophy of languaDge. A 20. 63. Kearney, R. (2007). Paul Ricoeur and thAe hermeneutics of translation. Research in Phenomenology 37. 2: 150. IB 64. Domino J. (2004). The hermenFeutics of the self and the paradigm of translation. Presented at the RomYe In te Ornational conference on translation. 8. 65. Rangnnathan S. (I2T007). Philosophy of language, translation theory and third way in semantics.S Essays in Philosophy 8. 3. 66. SteineEr, SR. (1976). After babel, aspect of language and translation. London: OIVxford University Press. 296. U N 65 CHAPTER THREE INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION THESIS OF QUINE Introduction RY In the preceding chapter, an attempt was made to clarify the concept of laAnguage as it is understood by philosophers of language and the linguists. The role Rof language as a means of communication was examined. The aspect of lanLguIaBge such as syntax, semantics and pragmatics were also critically examined. Also, the relationships between language and culture were analysed. The conceNptual clarification of the idea of meaning was also attempted. This chapter shallD be Aconcerned with shedding light on the perspective of W. V. O. Quine on transAlation. His theory of indeterminacy of translation shall be critically examined toI dBetermine how long it can go in helping us to achieve cross-cultural understandingF. H is attack on „the two dogmas of empiricism‟ shall be reviewed. In like mannOer, we shall look into Quine‟s idea of meaning and translation. Y Indeterminacy of TraInTslation The quest for RcomSmunicating with others involves understanding people of other tongues. QuEine however sees the business of translating from one language to another as havIinVg a major obstacle of “indeterminacy”. In the second chapter of Quine‟s book, WoNrd and object, he formulates his „indeterminacy thesis‟. The thesis shows that Utranslation of language is largely indeterminate. Indeterminacy of translation thesis states that the totality of empirical evidence influencing the translation of one language into another fails to determine a unique 1 system of translation. It is the assertion that there is no particular system of translation among the natural languages which can be accepted finally as the right or correct one. If a person speaks of correctness in translation, it will be in relative to a specifically 66 accepted scheme, but to query the correctness of an entire scheme, relative to another, 2 is meaningless. No matter the number of data a person acquires, there will always be irreconcilable systems of translations that are also equally supported by data, there is 3 not even “an objective matter to be right or wrong about.” Quine believes that all types of empirical theories are underdetermined by observational evidence. The indeterminacy thesis maintains that theoretically any number of alternative schemes of translation may be set up, each of which is compatible with the data available and none 4 of which we have any basis for preferring to the other. Y The Indeterminacy of Translation thesis does not imply that it is difficultA to Rdiscover the meaning of foreign sentences. It is also not that the facts accessibRle to us as finite 5 beings is not always complete. What it is saying is that there is nIoB well-defined inter- linguistic meaning. There are usually many competing alternatLive manual available for translating the meaning of a foreign sentence. The meanNing of the translation cannot, therefore, be attributed to any of the competing maAnuals. There is no fact of which manual is the correct one. AD One of the reasons that led Quine inItoB this thesis is that he is a behaviourist philosopher who does not so believe in intentional properties such as beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes. FoFr this reason, Quine does not agree that meanings of words and the sentence OYs m ade are objective facts, as usually generally conceived. Thus, we can question Twhether one sentence mean the same as another. The view of meaning as an entSity Iis supported by Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wiggenstein. Frege considers the sRense of a declarative sentence to be the thought which it contains. He says it is hoEwever „„not the subjective performance of thinking but its objective content 6whichI isV capable of being the common property of several thinkers.‟‟ ThNe „sense‟ of a sentence is then taken by these philosophers as a kind of entity which Uis apprehensible by minds. The sense of a sentence or word (thought) is not expected to be confused with the reference (object) of that sentence or word itself. We realise from Frege‟s differentiation that „sense‟ (thought) is different from language and the user of language as a person. However, the problem with Frege‟s distinction is how to recognise and identify thought independently of its expression in language. Frege fails to intimate us with what kind of entity „sense‟ (or thought) is, but tells us what sense is 67 not. He says, thoughts are neither things of the outer world nor ideas but have their 7 own mode of being. Wittgenstein also claims that proposition has sense. The sense of proposition will then be the state of affairs that is revealed in that proposition. Wittgenstein and Frege, both show that meanings are objective facts. Therefore, it is on the basis of this conception that linguists are believed to be capable of translating sentences of one language into another. Thus, it is possible to translate successfully when meanings of statements are taken to be objective. This claims boil down to the belief that when two senteYnces share similar evidence they must be equivalent or have the same meaniAng. RIn other words, two sentences cannot be non-equivalent or differ in meaning Rif they have the same evidence. IB Quine, however, challenges these claims. He believes nNo r ea Lson can be adduced to such assumption. The idea of synonymy or sameness of meaning is not convincing. He states that it is possible to generate alternative DscheAme which would be completely different from the one we claim to have sAame meaning, and yet have the same evidence. Due to this, it is not proper to aIcBcept the former as equivalent to the word in translation. This would also apply toF se veral other schemes of translation that could be formed which would serve as Orival schemes of translation. Yet, the rival schemes would produce the sameY ev idence that the scheme has. This is the thesis of indeterminacy of translaTtion. It implies that the concept of meaning as an objective fact should be done awSay wIith. Thus, Quine rules out facts about desires, beliefs, intention and other propRositional attitudes. He does this by showing that translation relations are not mattersE of facts. His critical point is that it is possible to devise two or several schemIeVs of translation which are mutually incompatible but fit all the probable evNidence. UQuine supports his claim with the behaviourists‟ assertion that language is learnt through observation of the linguistic behaviours of others. What is pertinent in determining linguistic meaning is the overtly observable behavioural fact, most especially fact about stimulus meaning. However, he posits that there is the problem of under-determination of translation by data. This means that the available facts do not 8 establish what our words mean. 68 Ontological Relativity In his essay, „Ontological Relativity‟, Quine states that meaning is grounded on the behaviour of the speakers. He understood that there is the possibility for vagueness and obscurity in the process of learning a language or word. He therefore believes that all 9 that we need to work with is the observation of the behaviour of other speakers. Quine thus urges us to abandon the idea of “mental museum” which is already harboured in the mind of those with different culture and different cultural backgroYund. This is because, it is not possible to know if the translation is correct or wheRther it is inaccurate. He states that there is no accessibility into the “mental mRusAeum” of the people who are culturally different. One can only understand implicitly, the 10 dispositions of the speakers through their behaviours. LIB Radical Translation N Radical translation, according to W.V.O Quine, Dis aA translation of the language of a 11 “hitherto untouched people.” He gives theA example of radical translation in his 12 imaginary language, Junglese, translateId Binto English Language. Quine has been sharply criticised that radical translFatio n is not in practice. However he has already defended himself against this atOtack. He states that it is a fact that the task of radical translation does not exist in reality as there is most likely to be some interpreters available anywhere inI tThe Yglobe. However, even when languages are close and have some affinities, theSre are possibilities that the distinct features of each language may be 13poorly interpreRted. He therefore imagines a situation, hypothetically, where there is an encountEer with a language and there is no luxury of an interpreter. The imaginary situatiI onV is given thus UN A rabbit scurries by, the native says „Gavagai‟ and the linguist notes down the sentence „Rabbit‟ (or „Lo, a rabbit‟) as tentative translation, subject 14 to testing in further cases. A jungle linguist is expected to begin his search for translation through a trial and error means. He is supposed to observe the physical disposition of the native starting from a simple sentence such as „Gavagai‟. Through this, the empirical meaning of the word is determined. Meaning is then what that particular sentence share with its translation. 69 This is seen in the identification and matching of the word with the non-verbal stimulation. Quine tries to show the limitation in linguistic meaning. Linguistic meaning only could not go beyond what one could get from the overt behavior in observable circumstances. In the radical situation, the jungle language is inaccessible through any known languages. The only data one could use to make an in-road into the understanding of the language are the utterances of the natives and the present stimulation of the observable circumstances. Even though this basis is meager, Quine says, thRe nYative A 15speakers do not have any other way of showing the meaning of their utterances. The linguist would construct his manual of translation by the speculative gReneralisation of the data collected through observation. There would however bIe Blittle or no data to confirm the fact of his manual. This is because the curreLnt publicly observable circumstance would not be sufficient to make predictNion on what a speaker of a language, even our own language, would say. The reAason for this is that utterances do not usually bear much relevance to the situations Dthat is overtly observable at the same time. Quine sees language as consisting oBf paAst unshared experiences and concurrent situations. I Inscrutability of Reference F O Indeterminacy of referenceY has to do with single words. Quine challenges the idea of referential scrutabilityI oTr determinacy. Quine says that there is what could be called holophrasic indeteSrminacy. That is, there are always multiple translations of a single sentence. The vRarious translations of a sentence are not only different in the meaning of each VparEt of them, but also in the whole meaning. Both translations may even not be similaIr. Quine submits that there is no way to give an example for holophrasic insNcrutability because it affects the whole, and every language. If we try to determine Uwhat the referential object of a certain word is, the answer we would give would depend and be relative to our background language. Another important factor raised in Quine‟s argument for the inscrutability of reference is that, there is nothing in ostensive behaviour to solve the problem of ambiguity between two speakers from different cultural background. Quine demonstrated this in “Gavagai”. He states that if a speaker points to a rabbit and utter the word, “Gavagai” 70 there is no way the outward behaviour of the speaker could prove that he is referring to a rabbit, rabbit hood or rabbit stage. The difficulty is based on the difference in culture and language. It is not easy to know whether one‟s translation is correct or in error. Our judgement can only be based on the behaviour of the speaker to identify the correctness or otherwise of our translation. However, the scheme that we use, that is the behavioural disposition is vague and obscure, because the exact object being referred cannot be determined. Quine states that there are two types of translation. The first is „home translation‟Y, that is, translation within the cultural background and language of a speaker.A ThRe second type is „radical translation‟, that is, translation of a language thatR is distinct and different from the cultural background and language of the speaIkBer. Despite Quine‟s bifurcation between „home translation‟ and „radical translatioLn‟, he still believes that radical translation begins at home, This means that even iNn on e‟s local culture there are elements of radical translation. Thus, we cannot equaAte our neighbours‟ English word 16 with “the same strings of phonemes in our mouthD.” We therefore need to recognise that the way we use words such as „cool‟, B„squAare‟, „hopefully‟ and so on, are different from the ways our neighbours use them. I Theories of Reference O F Two opposing answers to Ythe reference question include the traditional Fregean view which claims that defiInTite descriptions play a crucial role in conferring reference on a name. This is in coSntrast with the Kripkean „causal theory of reference‟, which claims that descriptionRs are not so important in reference. This position states that the right answer Vto Ethe question of reference has to do with „initial dubbings‟ and „causal 17chainsI‟ of usage. UNThe traditional view on reference In the traditional view, definite description is very crucial for both meaning and reference for names. The basic claim of „reference descriptivism‟ is that what a name refers is already determined through the description of such names. Whatever is in conformity or satisfies the description counts as the referent of such name. Such description should not be that of a single instance, but a cluster of description within 71 the belief system that is associated with the name by speakers. This only is expected to do the reference determining job. This is the description accepted as the reference for 18 the name by the majority of speakers. However, this view is problematic in that, there may be error in majority association of a reference with a name. The causal theory 19 In Naming and necessity, Kripke comes against meaning descriptivism. He offers a new theory of meaning, known as causal theory. According to this theory, KYripke claims that a name first acquires its reference at an „initial dubbing‟ or „bapAtismR‟. Some speakers just determined that certain objects shall have certain namRes. The speaker needs to be in perpetual contact with the object. There has beenI aBn objection against this theory for it does not account for reference change. A namLe can definitely change its reference. N Quine, however, sees language as a social enterprise wAhich is learnt from other people through observing their actions, imitating wordsD of others in circumstances that are open to public examination. This enables inBdivAiduals in a linguistic community to form his/her concept and enables the individu aIl to participate in inter-subjective discussion. One of the basic facts of human Fexistence identifies by Quine is that despite the uniformity binding a people t ogOether in having a common language, there exists “a chaotic personal diversity” Yin the way we learn and understand a language. This is due to the fact that, no twIoT individuals learn a language in the same way; neither can an 20 individual finish leSarning a language in a lifetime. He believeEs thRat a child would begin to learn the language of his/her social group througIhV the identification of subjective sense data and reflecting those data in external obNjects. This will enable the person to be able to form a conceptual scheme relevant to Uhis/her society. He believes that it is not possible to have inter-subjective communication without having a conceptual scheme. For him, there is „no inquiry without a conceptual scheme. He also agrees that some objects will be learnt by a child contextually and some by description. He says that words like “centaur” though is not true of anything, will generally be learnt by description of its supposed object and that it also could be learnt contextually. However, word like „sake‟, he says, can be learnt 72 only contextually. Words that depict concrete objects like „tiles‟ may be learnt both when it is isolated as a one-word sentence, contextually or through description. 21 Quine‟s work, Two Dogmas of Empiricism is a response to the empiricists‟ claim of meaningfulness. The basic assumption of the Analytic and Synthetic statement is that, all knowledge can be put in the form of a statement. Analytic Statements Analytic truths, according to the empiricists are statements that their negation wRouYld be self-contradictory. Example of analytic statements is, “All bachelors are Aunmarried”. This statement is known a priori, that is, it is self-evident, self-explanaRtory. It does not need any reference to the world. Its background knowledge is aIlrBeady in one‟s head. The conclusion about truth or falsehood is reached by defi nLition and through logic. The degree of certainty of an analytic statement is total anNd absolute. Its truth or falsity is assured by the rules of language alone. The statemAent is true by the reason of its meaning. Instances of this include; propositions oDf logic, mathematics, and definitions 22 for translating empirical sentences into BsenAtences about sense data. In analytic statements, the rule of logic does not teIll us anyting about the nature of the world. They are relationships which we defiFne to be true in our minds. Ayer, concludes that, whenY we Oaffirm that analytic propositions are devoid of factual contents and accordingly that they do not say anything, we are not signifying that they 23 are senseless in theS waIy T that metaphysical expressions are senseless. For even though they provide us no information concerning any empirical situation, yet they do enlighten uEs, bRy demonstrating the way in which symbols are used. SyNnthIet Vic Statements U Example of a synthetic statement is, “All metals expand when heated.” The statements are known a posteriori, that is, by observation, through reference to the world. Its conclusion is reached based on what is observed. The degree of certainty of synthetic statement is only probable, as we are restricted in time and space. We could not absolutely trust our senses as they are imperfect. The knowledge of our existence and the universe outside our head or brain is in the form of Synthetic statement. Synthetic 73 statement passes the verifiability test. It is possible for experience to either confirm or disconfirm it. 24 Quine defines an analytic proposition as that which is “true by meaning” He states that the nature of meaning is obscure and that Rudolf Carnap made a mistake in semantics by equating „meaning‟ with „naming‟. He said, one should not confuse meaning, with naming. He gave an example of “The Morning star” which has a diverse meaning from “The Evening star”. However, both of them „name‟ the same object, that 25 is the planet „Venus‟. This makes the two to share the same reference. The BYritish empiricist, John Lock, also tries to investigate the origin, certainty and exteAnt oRf human knowledge, together with ground and degrees of belief, opinion and asRsent. He claims that all knowledge starts with sense experience. He states also ItBhat before we have 26 sense experience, our mind was a “tabula rasa” like a white pLaper, a blank slate on which nothing is written. What is written on the blankN slate is through experience. Lock claims that what we can know are only perceiveAd qualities, ideas and impressions sense experience imprint on our minds. AD George Berkeley on the other hand, claIimBs that ideas are things in themselves. For things to exist, they must be perceived by a mind. He states further that, affirming the meaning of a sentence sums up Oto dFeclaring the rules according to which the sentence is to be used and this is thYe sa me as giving the condition of how it can be verified or falsified. The meaning oTf a proposition is therefore its system of verification. If there is no way to verify Sa sIentence or no rule for its use is verifiable, such a sentence, 27statement or prRoposition is meaningless. In the VseaErch for criteria of meaning to distinguish meaningful statements from meaniIngless ones, many philosophers have posited various standards for the deNtermination of meaningfulness or meaninglessness of statements. Among these Ugroups are, David Hume, Immanuel Kant and the group known as the logical positivists. David Hume states that a statement must satisfy two different conditions for it to be meaningful. The first condition is that a statement must be about the “Relations of Ideas”. Relation of ideas is found in logical tautologies and mathematics. The second criteria is that the statement should be about “Matter of Facts”, such as we 28 have in subjects like Geography, Chemistry, History and Biology. 74 According to Hume, 2+ 2= 4 and “A triangle is a three-sided figure” are meaningful because they have to do with relations of ideas. Due to the ideas expressed by these statements, Hume takes them to be necessarily true. Matters of fact or existence are not involved in the case of logical tautologies. One only needs to have an idea of what the word like “triangle” mean and reason about the idea to determine its truth or falsity. The negation of statements which involves relation of ideas would lead to contradiction. The second type of statements is that which involves matters of fact and based on experiences. Example of this kind of statement is, “The man is tall,” “RaYin is falling” and so on. The denial of such statements does not lead to contradictioRn. Hume differentiated between simple ideas and complex ideas. He states that sAimple ideas correspond to simple impressions, whereas complex ideas correspoRnd to complex impressions. LIB This boils down to the understanding that at any point inN tim e, any existing idea must correspond to something. Hume then distinguished Abetween two kinds of relations, these are; natural relations and philosophical relatDions. Natural relations exist when the associated ideas are linked to one another Bby cAustoms and natural force of association. Philosophical relation has to do with ma ttIers of facts and relations of ideas. The logical 29positivists, led by Moritz SchlicFk, while deriving their principles from the empiricists, formulate the “prOinciple of verifiability” or a verification principle. According to the verificatYioni sts, there is no means of understanding any meaning without eventual refeIrTence to ostensive definition, and this means reference to experience or posSsibility of verification. According to A. J. Ayer, the truth of a sentence and thRe meaningfulness of a word are not about corresponding to things. They are about Everifiability. The principle which is used to confirm the genuiness of percepItiVble statement of fact is the criterion of verifiability. He says that the question thaNt needs to be raised concerning any supposed statement of fact is, whether any Uobservation would be pertinent to the determination of its truth or falsehood. It is only if the answer is negative that we come to the conclusion that the statement under 30 consideration is nonsensical. 75 Quine’s Attack on Two Dogmas of Empiricism Even though each empiricist‟s claim varies a little from one another, yet they are similar in the idea they posited. They posited analytic / synthetic distinction and principle of verification. They assert that a meaningful statement is either an analytical statement which expresses truth without reference to experience, or a synthetic truth which refers to immediate experience or matter of facts. Quine rejected the analytic / synthetic distinction as invalid. He states that the distinction does not makeY any important and clear difference between both analytic and synthetic statements. He claims that there is no clear cut between what is analytic and what is synthAeticR. He also 31 claims that what meaning is, is obscure and not clear and so, not settledR. Quine in reaction to Hume and Kant identifies two extant deLfinIitBions of the analytic statement and synthetic statement. The definition of anaNlyti c posited by Hume states that analytic statement is one whose negation or denAial is self-contradictory, whereas 32the negation of a synthetic statement is not self-contradictory. Quine urges us to reject this definition. According to him, thAougDh analyticity has presupposition of contradiction as the effect of its neIgaBtion, yet this contradiction is not self-contradiction. Quine asserts that wFe d o not even have a good definition of „self-contradictory‟. So, this definitioOn does not help. Thus, the notion of self-contradictions and analyticity is vague. Self -contradiction, therefore, does not clearly explain the distinction between analTyticY and synthetic statements. I Another definitionS of analytic statement that was given by Kant states that an analytic statement is onRe in which the concept of the subject term is contained or included in the conceptE of the predicate term. However, a synthetic statement does not have the concepItV of the subject term included in the concept of the predicate term. UQuNine identifies two important limitations to these definitions of analyticity. These are i. There is a restriction to only the statements with subject-predicate form, like “A tall man is tall,” “A square is a four-sided figure.” ii. It involves the metaphorical notion of „containment‟, whereas Kant does not state the way in which an idea or concept can be said to contain or be implicit in 76 another. Quine then concludes that the analytic/synthetic distinction is not clear enough. The second criticism of analytic/synthetic distinction by Quine is that except we have a clear understanding of the notion of “meanings”, it would not be proper to place the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic on the notion of meaning that is vague. We would need to know what meanings are in order to evaluate this statement. He points attention to Frege‟s definition of meaning, where meaning is said to be different from referent or what is referred to. Frege differentiates between sRenseY and reference. He regards „sense‟ as a matter of meanings. Meaning is whaAt makes the sentence true in some given context of utterance. Frege states that sRense determines 33 meaning because to know what an expression means is to know wIhBat its sense is. Quine argues that meaning cannot be the same as what it na mLes. This is because two expressions can name the same thing but have diffNerent meanings. Words like „Hesperus‟ and „phosphorous‟ named the same thingA, but each has different meaning. Quine argues further that the notions of synonAymDity and necessity on which one could base one‟s explanation of meaning are IthBemselves not clear and need clarification. Therefore, the distinction between the a nalytic and the synthetic is vague and arbitrary. It is circular and is therefore nOot teFnable. The classification of a statement as either analytic or synthetic would dep end on the conceptual framework in which one decides to operate. Analyticity TcanY be defined only in terms of meaning. Meaning, also, can only be defined in terIms of analyticity. This makes the definition of analyticity to be circular. He theRrefoSre urges us to discard the analytic and synthetic distinction, as well as, the notion of exact sameness of meaning. There is no clear, cut line of distinction betweenV anEI alytic and synthetic statements. QuNine postulates that words in our language are interconnected with one another. They Udo not get their “meanings” in isolation, but are connected with other words in a vast network. The meaning of a word would depend on its relation to all other words in the 34 language. In his later work, Quine says that a sentence is analytic for a given native speaker, „if he learned the truth of the sentence by learning to use one or more of its 35 words.‟ He also states that the analytic /synthetic distinction is related to the principle of verification. This is because the verification principle is derived from the 77 analytic/synthetic distinction. If the former had been rejected, so should be the latter, for they rest on the same foundation. According to Quine, no statement depends on a direct confrontation with experience for their truth and each observation involves value 36 judgement. Verification criterion of meaningfulness therefore lacks justification. He then concludes that we need to use pragmatic principle to determine whether to reject or accept any theoretical claims. There have been criticisms of Quine‟s skepticism on the idea of meaning. Firstly, when he claims that the notion of analyticity is not sufficiently clear, what standaYrd of clarity he is employing is also not clear. There has also been the criticismA thRat if our words do not have determinate meaning, it would be difficult to Runderstand one another, even in the same culture and language. IB Quine’s Notion on Analytic/Synthetic Distinction LN Quine argues that the analytic-synthetic distinction Amade by the empiricists is not tenable. He states that there are no “analytic” trutDhs but all truth involves aspects that 37 are empirical. According to him, the distBinctAion include; Analytic propositions, those propositions that are grounded on mea nIings, which do not base on experience and; Synthetic Propositions which are pFropositions grounded on facts. Quine however, disagrees with these distinctio nOs between analytic statements and synthetic ones. He shows that one must not coYnfuse the intension of a general term with its extension, that is, class of particular tIhiTngs to which we may apply the terms. He cited the example of “creature with a hSeart” and “creature with a kidney” both of which bear the same extension, sincRe all beings with hearts also possess kidneys and vice versa. However, the twoV staEtements do not actually mean the same. He then concludes that, there is a vivid Idifference between intensions and extensions, which give a vivid difference beN 38tween meanings and references. U Quine gave a brief explanation of what a word might mean as against the necessary qualities an object that is denoted by such word might possess. For example, the object „man‟, may be said to have the quality of rationality. Yet one might say „man‟ has the accidental properly of being “two-legged”. However, many human beings exist who have either only one leg or none at all. The word „Man‟ therefore could mean „rational being, but not necessarily mean, “two legged.” Hence, Quine comes into the 78 conclusion that, it seems that a sort of parallel exist between the necessary properties of an object and the meaning of the word that denotes such object. Quine therefore 39 concludes that meaning must not be confused with objects (reference). Quine seems to have intentional structure in mind rather than the truth conditions in consideration of meaning. He describes what type of evidence a radical translator needs to have to move on in decoding the jungle language. This evidence is the empirical observation of the stimulus reaction of the natives. However, he proclaims that this evidence is not enough to get an adequate correct manual. Quine‟s thesYis of indeterminacy consists of two parts. The first is the claim that all relevant eAvidRence has been described. The second is the claim that there are divergent mRanuals that are 40 compatible with the evidence described. IB Quine linguist notes the natives‟ utterance of „Gavagai‟ wh erLe he (the native) might have said “Rabbit”. The linguist, therefore tries saying,N „Gavagai‟ on occasions that would have prompted the native to say „RabbiDt‟ hAe then looks to the natives for approval. After doing this repeatedly and goAt the native‟s assent each time, he then records „Gavagai‟ as the translation for „raBbbit‟ tentatively. The linguist then continues to identify and translate observationF se nItences. Through assents and dissents by the natives, he is able to understandO the line of connective from them. In the successive utterance of the natives, sYom e will be expected to favour translations that ascribe beliefs to the native wThich stand to reason or which are in consonance with the observed way of Slife Iof the natives. Yet, he should not accept these values at the expense of makRing the structure that would be attributed to the grammar and semantics of the natiEve to be excessively difficult. Doing this, Quine says, would be bad psychoIlVogy. He states that the language must have been sufficiently straightforward for 41theN native to acquire. UThe translator needs to consider various evidences to determine the manual to be used. This is not because the meanings of sentences are elusive or inscrutable, but because there is nothing in them to show they are the correct or adequate meaning. Quine asserts that, there is nothing we can get in linguistic meaning, beyond what is to be 42 gathered from overt behavior in observable situations. 79 Quine on Translation and Meaning According to Quine, any theory of meaning that would be formed must have three 43 basic considerations. These are; evidence, simplicity and sufficient reason. Evidence is intentionally deployed when there is close balance between the sensory conditioning of „an affirmative response and the contrary conditioning‟ of what could be seen as being the action of an individual. There is also consideration for simplicity in determining the most causal physical dispositions of individuals during their observations. Sufficient reason is needed to justify the theory being considerRed bYased 44 on stimulus and response, which is determined through observation. A Quine therefore states an indeterminacy theory thus; R Manual for translating one language in tLI B o another can be set up in divergent ways, Nall compatible with the totality of speech Adispositions, yet incompatible with one aDnother. In countless places they will diverge in giving, as their respective translations Aof a sentence of the one language, sentences Bof the other language which stand to each o tIher in no plausible sort of equivalence hFowever loose. The firmer the direct links of a sentence with non-verbal stimulation, of course the less drastically its translations can diverYge f Orom one another from manual to 45 manual. He states that makSingI s Tentences such as, “That man shoots well” while indicating a man not armed, has the thought of the hunter‟s familiar face as its stimulation. What contributesE to Rthe past stimulation includes the individual‟s past observations of the shootiIngV activities of the man and other situations that have given the speaker the unNderstanding of the manner in which the word should be used. The stimulus Uobservation of the past is, therefore, taken to be both partly aspect of acquisition of 46 language and that of „acquisition of collateral information.‟ The task of a linguist, according to Quine includes the recovery of man„s current language from his currently observed responses. The linguist is expected to penetrate and translate a language that was hitherto unknown. He has to do the translation without the aid of an interpreter. While translation between languages with close 80 affinity is aided by the similarities in the forms of the words, translation between languages that are not related could be assisted by „traditional relationships that have 47 evolved in making them shared a culture. Stimulus Meaning The stimulus meaning for an individual, according to Quine, is the totality of his/her inclination to assent or dissent from the sentence based on the current stimulation. It is defined in terms of two notions: Affirmative stimulus meaning and negative stimYulus meaning. The affirmative stimulus meaning for a speaker is defined as claRss of all stimulations that would prompt the speaker to assent to the sentencRe. TAhe negative stimulus meaning, on the other hand, is the class of all stimulations that would prompt the speaker to assent to the sentence. It is peculiar to a particularI pBeriod of time. In as much as we need to allow a speaker to change his wa y Land manner. It is the stimulation that activates the disposition. Quine conceNives of this stimulation as a universal event, and not as a dated particular eDventA. Thus, stimulation is seen as a 48repeatable event form. A 49 In Word and object, there is a missing c oImBponent in Quine‟s “vindictive categories.” Apart from assenting and dissentinFg, a speaker may abstain or suspend judgement when asked concerning the trut hO of a sentence. Observation SentenceI TY According to QuinSe, some sentences are based purely on the current stimulation of observable EbehRavior. These are sentences like „it is raining”, “that is a rabbit”. Such sentencVes like these are called observation sentences. The linguist in trying to translate JuNngleI language needs to begin with observation sentence. He assumes that the Unative‟s utterance could be linked to a physical disposition that is concurrently observable. In order to check if his assumption is correct, he takes the initiative to volunteer the sentence himself and look out for the native‟s assent or dissent. However, for the linguist to be able to make correct assumption he should be able to recognise 50 the signs of assent and dissent of the natives of the Jungle, even if only speculatively. However, some sentences exist that are not observation sentences. That is, sentences that could not be correlated with the current physical behaviours of the speaker which 81 the linguist could share. In such situation, Quine suggests the linguist could note such words and try to compare them to some English words. Quine says: Our linguist keeps testing his system for its efficacy in dealing with natives and he goes on tinkering with it and guessing again. The routine of query and assent that had been his standby in constructing observation sentences continues to be invaluable at these higher and more 51 conjectural levels. Y The linguist does much guesswork before he could form his manual of translaRtion. He is expected to eventually accumulate the Jungle vocabulary through theA speculative interpretation of the non-observation sentences into English languageR. The meanings attributed to these sentences are regarded as tentative and areI Bsubject to repeated confirmations. L In translating the native‟s beliefs, Quine states thAat tNhe translator would rely on psychological speculation to determine what the nDative is likely to believe. He however observes that it is difficult to get words that woAuld match colours from one language to another. This is due to the differences inI tBhe customary groupings of shades. This is a limitation already on the mode of deFterm ination of the beliefs of the natives. Occasion Sentence OY An occasion sentenceI, Taccording to Quine, is, one in which a person gives assent or dissent and whichS is partly dependent on the speaker‟s present observation and the background inRformation. An observation sentence, on the other hand, is an occasion sentence ofE which assent or dissent depends on observation, with no, or only minimum backgrIoVund information needed. For instance, „she is a spinster‟ is an occasion seNntence because assent or dissent in a particular instance depends, partly, on the Uperson the subject is observing. It is not an observation sentence in the Quinian‟s sense because to assent or dissent in any specific case is dependent on the background knowledge regarding the person being observed. „Rain is falling‟, however, does not depend, in the same way, on possesing similar type of background information like „She is a spinster‟. „It is raining,‟ therefore qualifies as an observation sentence. 82 Occasion sentences may be called observation sentences when their stimulus meaning may be sufficient to give their meanings. Such sentences are said to “wear their 52 meanings on their sleeves.” An occasion sentence may be more accessible to observation when its stimulus meanings for diverse speakers tend to match with one another. That is, when there is high degree of agreement by well placed observers. Thus, we have an observation sentence that is firm and nearly infallible. However, infallibility is not total but could only be of degree. Quine‟s observation sentence is a bit different from philosophical tradition in thYat it allows the sentence to be about ordinary things rather than making them toA reRport data 53 got from the senses. Observational predictions made by translatiRon theories are dependent upon the stimulus meanings of observation and occIaBsion sentences that perform important roles. L Translation Theory AN A translation theory for two languages bears Aa reDciprocal or mutual relation between individual words, phrases or sentences ofB one language with words or sentences of another language. This connection is th eIn employed to relate the sentences of the two languages. The procedure of deterFmining such correlations can be regarded as a translation manual or a transla tiOon theory. According to Quine stimulus meanings are very essential in appraisinYg translations of “occasional sentences” and “observation sentences”. IT Three principleRs arSe identified by Quine for obtaining testable claims from theories of translation Efor these observational predictions. i. NTIh Ve first principle is that correct translation must maintain the stimulus meanings U of observation sentences in their individual linguistic societies. ii. The second principle states that accurate translation must conserve the stimulus synonymy of pairs of occasion sentences. iii. The third principle states how the translation of truth functional connectives 54 relates to their effects on stimulus meanings. 83 Related claims are made concerning other truth functional operations. Standing Sentence There is a probable limitation which is pertinent to the translation of what Quine calls „standing sentence‟. These are sentences assent to, or dissent from, which is free from current sensory stimulation. The possible limitation is that sentences assented to or dissented from, in every circumstance by the society of speaker L1, must be translated to those assented to or dissented from, in every circumstance, by the society of speYaker L2. This constraint itself is however, problematic, for it will need us to regaRrd some sentences that may be generally given assent by the speakers of a LanguagAe L1, which in L2 may be false, as being the same. For example, considering a sRentence like „O cupid, the god of Love‟, in Greeks. It is expected to mean the LsamIeB as some sentences of our language that we accept as apparent truth. HoweveNr, if the observational data for theories of translation are confined to behavioural evAidence, the type of which Quine suggested, then, extremely different theories of translation will be equally well supported by all observational data, known andA unDknown in several cases. Quine assumes that the truth function o fI lBogical connectives can be learnt inductively from observation of a speech commFunity‟s behaviourial verdicts. This may, however, not always be the case. O 55 He concludes that meaInTingY is holistic. It is not only about words or sentences, but has to do with the whoSle language. Possible situation does not exist that that can make us to choose a ruRle above another. Nothing prevents a linguist from reaching more than one incompEatible system. He cannot attain „one true grammar‟ of the language in considIeVration. It can therefore be concluded that there is no known rule that exists and usNed by the native speaker. Even when there is a fact about what an individual item in Uthe language means, there is much likely to be under-determination of such. That is, there would be no means finding out because of lack of adequate evidence. According to Quine therefore, there will always be indeterminacy in translation because there is no fact about what rules are guiding the natives, neither is there any definite rules guiding the translator in his / her translation. 84 Conclusion In this chapter, Quine‟s perspective on the indeterminacy of translation has been evaluated. Likewise, his view on meaning and translation has been critically considered. Quine‟s „Radical Translation‟ is a term coined to refer to a hypothetical situation in which a linguist approaches a completely isolated linguistic community. In such a situation, all the linguist has to go on in making an in - road into the foreigners‟ language is through the study of their behaviours. Thus, the translation manual that the linguist ends up constructing captures only such behavioural data. An important cYlaim of Quine is that the outcome of interaction in this kind of setting affecAts lRinguistic interaction in general. His view is that when understanding each othRer‟s speech we correlate linguistic behaviour with our experience of the worldI aBround us, and that there is nothing to linguistic meaning beyond such correlatio nL. This position points to Quine as both an empiricist and a behaviourist. The neNxt chapter shall consider the alternative view to Quine‟s as regards the possibility oAf translation. D IB A F Y O IT RS IV E UN 85 Endnotes 1. Soames, S. (1999). The Indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 29. 3. 322. 2. Jaggar. A. (1973). On one of the reasons for the indeterminacy of translation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 34. 2. 257. 3. Quine. W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge Mass.73. Y 4. Jaggar. A. (1973). On one of the reasons for the indeterminacy of translatRion. 258 5. Bostrom, B. (1995). Understanding Quine‟s theses of RindAeterminacy. nick@nickbostrom.com. 1 IB 6. Gottlob Frege. (1952). On sense and reference. Translati oLn from the philosophical writings of Glottlob Frege. M. Black and P. GreacNh. Ed. Oxford Blackwell. 56- 78. In Philosophy of Language: a contempoDraryA approach. K. Owolabi Ed. Issues and Problems in Contemporary philosopAhy. 63. 7. Geach, P. & Black M. Eds. (1952I).B Philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. CitedF by Dipo Irele. 103. 8. Soames, S. (1999). The inOdeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. 329 9. TY Quine, W. V.S O.I (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: ColumbiaR University Press. 8. 10. QuiVne,E (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. 30. 11.N QIuine, (1960). Word and object. 28. U12. Hellman, G. (1974). The new riddle of radical translation. Philosophy of Science 41. 3. 228 13. Quine. (1960). Word and object. 28. 14. Quine. (1960). Word and object. 29. 15. Quine W. V. O. (1987). Indeterminacy of translation again. 5. 86 16. Quine. Ontological relativity. (1969). 46 17. Goldstein, L. et al. (2010). Logic, key concepts in philosophy. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. 105. 18. Goldstein, L. (2010). Logic. 106. 19. Kripke S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge. M. A: Harvard University Press. Y 20. Quine, W. V .O. (1960). Word and object. 1. R 21. Quine. W. V. O. (1981). Two Dogmas of empiricism. 20. RA 22. Quine. W. V. O. (1980). Two Dogmas of empiricism. 21. LIB23. Ayer, A. J. (1981). The central question of philosopNhy England: Penguin Books. 128. A 24. Quine, W. V. O. (1981). Two dogmas of eAmpDiricism. 21 25. Copleston, F. (1964). History of ph iloIsBophy. 5. New York: Image Books. 55. 26. Locke J. (1894). An essay concFerning human understanding. London: St John J. A. 134. O 27. Russell, B. (1983I).T ThYe problem of philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. 20. S 28. Hume.(197R5). Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the prVincEiples of morals. L.A .Selby- Bigge. Ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, section IIV part 1: 2. U29.N Schlick, M. (1949). Meaning and verification. Philosophical review. 147. 30. Ayer, A. J. (1946). Language, truth and logic. London: Gollancz. 7. 31. Aigbodioh, J. A. (2000). Philosophy of language: problem and content. K. Owolabi. Ed. Issues and problem in philosophy. p. 171. 32. Aigbodioh, J. A. (2000). Philosophy of language: problem and content. 171 87 33. Gottlob Frege. (1952). On sense and reference. Cited by Dipo Irele. 2000. Philosophy of language: 177 34. Quine. W.V.O. From a logical point of view. 4. 35. Quine W. V. O. (1991). Two dogmas in retrospect. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 21: 270. 36. Aigbodioh. J. A. (2000). Philosophy of language: problem and content. 173. Y 37. Quine, W.V.O. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. Reprinted in From aR logical point of view. 1981. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 13. A 38. R Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. 64. IB 39. Quine, W. V. O. (1951).Two dogmas of empiricism. 64. L 40. Bostrom, N. (1995). Understanding QuinAe‟s Ntheses of indeterminacy. nick@nickbostrom.com: 3 D 41. Quine, W.V.O. (1981). Pursuit of Tr AIuBth. 46. 42. Quine, W. V. O. (1987). IndeFter minacy of translation again. The Journal of Philosophy 8 1: 5 O 43. Quine, W. V. O. (1960Y). Word & object. 44. Quine, W. V. OS. (I19 T60). Word and object. 17. 45. Quine, W.R V. O. (1960). Word and object. 27 46. E QIuiVne. W .V. O. 1960. Word and object. 27. 47.N Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. 28. U48. Berger, A. (1980). Quine on “Alternative logics” and verdict tables. The Journal of Philosophy 77. 5: 262. 49. Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and object. 34. 50. Berger. A. (1980). Quine on “Alternative logics” and verdict tables: 262. 88 51. Quine W .V. O. (1987). Indeterminacy of translation again. The Journal of Philosophy 84. 1: 6. 52. Quine W. V. O. (1987). Indeterminacy of translation again. 7 53. Quine. W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. 42. 54. Quine. W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. 44. 55. Soames, S. (1999). The Indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutaRbilitYy of reference: 325. BR A LI DA N IB A OF ITY S VE R I UN 89 CHAPTER FOUR ALTERNATIVES TO QUINE Y Introduction AR Having examined the indeterminacy thesis of Quine in the precediRng chapter, this chapter shall consider alternative views on the possibility of translIaBtion across cultures. Among the work that shall be considered is that of Donald D Lavidson who considered the situation of „radical interpretation‟ as against QuinAe‟sN „radical translation‟, Thomas Kuhn‟s „incommensurability of paradigm‟, relaDtive to Quine‟s „indeterminacy of translation‟. Kwasi Wiredu who considers the situation where there is conceptual disparity as against „conceptual relativityI‟ Bof E Adward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. J. L. Austin‟s speech acts. SomeF of these scholars focused on the problem of compatibility in the use of conceOpts among individuals and groups. In this chapter, we intend Yto a rgue that interpretations and translations as posited by each of these alternativIeT views are liable to be contested. Despite the best of intentions with which they mSay be carried out, they run the risk of being counterproductive. Some take theR „relativity approach‟ to show that words and concepts have peculiar meanings dEepending on the cultures and context in which they are used. Others take „univeIrsValists approach‟ to show that concepts are similar and their translations are poNssible across culture. We shall argue that each of these alternatives, however, has its Ulimitations. Donald Davidson Donald Davidson describes conceptual scheme as „ways of organising experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data sensation; they are the 1 perspectives from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. He 90 states that there may be difficulty in translating from one scheme to the other in the case in which the beliefs, desires, hopes and bits of knowledge that characterised one person have no corresponding item for the subscriber of another scheme. What a society counts as real in the culture may not, as such, count as real in another. Reality is then taken to be relative to a scheme. Davidson says that, sometimes when some sentences that have been held as true are revised in a discipline, the centrality of such concepts may give the impression that the 2 concepts have changed their meanings. He notes that languages that have evolvYed in places that are far in distance may vary considerably in the resources at thAeirR disposal to deal with one or some phenomena. What is easy to translate in a laRnguage may be difficult to translate in another. The difference in two different IlaBnguages may show difference not in style alone, but also significant variations Lin the value of the two cultures or societies. N Davidson notes that to hold a relativist position bDy saAying that points of view may be different seems to make sense. However, thAis could only be partially, because the reality of systems that are commomB opposes the declaration of striking 3 incomparability. He arrived at the coInclusion that having a language may be connected with having a concepOtualF scheme. Despite this, those who are speakers of dissimilar languages have the propensity to have a common conceptual scheme, if a method of translating aT laYnguage into another is available. If we want to study the criteria necessary Sfor Itranslation, we need to focus on the standard for identity in conceptual schRemes. DavidsoVn bEelieves that if conceptual scheme is not associated with language, then it will beI doubtful if we can have the initial problem of difference in conceptual scheme. ThNis is because, it will be difficult to imagine the mind grasping with language directly Uwithout functioning within a framework of conceptual scheme. Also, if the idea that any language distorts reality is sustained, as believed by some thinkers, it means that minds could only grasp reality as they are, without using language (that is 4 „wordlessly‟). Seeing language in this perspective would make language to be independent of the individual person that uses the language. Davidson, however, states that such claim cannot be sustained. Also, if it is possible for the mind to grasp with 91 things as they are without distortion, then the mind has to be without categories and concepts. This also could not conform to the understanding of the mind as having some traits that constitute it. Donald Davidson suggests that it is either we relate conceptual scheme with languages or make way for the possibility that two or more languages could share the same scheme and sets of inter translatable languages. Man cannot lose the traits of language speaking and still retain the power of thoughts. As such, it would not be possible fYor an individual to be in an advantage position of being able to compare two coRnceptual schemes by temporarily suspending his own scheme and taking on anotheAr. This leads to the question whether it is valid to affirm that two individuals posRsess conceptual schemes that are different from each other, if they speak different IlaBnguages that would not inter translate. L Davidson considers two types of cases that may ariAse. NThe first is the possibility of complete failure of translatability. This could occur if we cannot have fundamental scope of sentence in a language translated AintoD another language. Likewise, there 5would be partial failure if it is only someI fBorms of sentences that cannot be translated. He believes it is not intelligible to spe ak of total failure of translatability. If there is 6 anything that is not translatabOle, iFt is most likely such is not speech behaviour. 7 Translating a language into a c ommon tongue, for him, is a criterion of languagehood. Davidson sees it as bIeiTng Yvery unlikely that we attribute intelligently such complex attitudes as beliefSs and intention, to a speaker except we accept it is possible to translate his wRords into our own. This is because the relation between the ability to translate a Eperson‟s language and the ability to describe the person‟s attitude is very close. IV UIf Nwe juxtapose this with Quine‟s assertion that we may not be able to distinguish the meaning of the native‟s statement „gavagai‟, whether it means rabbithood, rabbit stage or rabbit‟s tail; it shows that inability to understand accurately what the native utters shows inadequacy in understanding rather than the native not having exact concept to describe rabbit. 92 Belief and the Basis of Meaning (Principle of Charity) Davidson analyses the evidential base needed for radical interpretation. Accordingly, ascribing meanings to utterances and intentions to speaker has to proceed simultaneously. This is because we do not have a prior grasp on either the meaning of those utterances or intention of the speaker. In the same way, for an interpreter to have headway into interpreting a radical language, he must begin by using an interpretative 8 „principle of charity‟ It states that, when interpreting another individual, you do not have any option than to attribute to him or her (1) overall logicality and rationalityY, and (2) beliefs and expression that are generally true. The justification of thisA priRnciple is directly obtained from the situations of radical interpretation. To facRilitate having a meaningful language (and thought), Davidson says, one has to IbBe interpretable, and being interpretable has to do with showing the above-menti oLned features (logicality, 9 rationality, and truthfulness). N Davidson says the translator needs to assume from theA beginning that the beliefs of the speaker are mostly true. Also, he has to presupAposDe that most of the utterances made by 10 the speaker are assertions of what he beliIeBves or considers to be true. The interpreter (translator) should hold the belief of the ability of the speaker to be concept specific. If a native says „gavagai‟ and poinOts toF a rabbit as Quine suggested, the onus rests on the translator to know the specific part or object being referred to. Therefore, interpreters need to shun attributinTg Yinexplicable error to the speaker. Instead, he needs to maximise agreemeSnt. I he point is that one should be careful when interpreting variations in liRnguistic expressions. One should not regard them as world-views that have differeEnces that are too wide apart and therefore unbridgeable. DavidIsoVn cautions that people should not hold the thought that ideas framed in lanNguages that are different, or even conflicting intellectual concepts, cannot be Uaccessible to translation. People from different cultural background may obviously possess ideas that are relatively dissimilar to our own and there may be few differences not easy to capture or that are even not possible to denote. Yet, it is not unlikely that there exists large section of indispensable misinterpretation, that are not possible to set straight. Therefore, one must not regard lexical disparities as signifying incommensurability. It may require an entire paragraph to elucidate the meaning of a 93 particular statement in another language, but the general interpretation and translation 11 must be achievable. This serves as a precondition for meaning. Therefore, for instance, one cannot make a decision to interprete a specific word in the other‟s language as one‟s English “for”, and go ahead to make the person‟s use of the word totally illogical. What should be majorly considered in the decision to interprete the other‟s word, as “for” is that; his / her utterance makes sense and turns out in a logical manner. One therefore does not have an option than to attribute one‟s own system of logic to the others also. In the same manner, whenever we aYttach interpretations to the expressions that are making references in the langAuagRe of the other, there is the need for us to make him/her truthful as much as possRible most of the time. For instance, if we decided that a specified word of a persIoBn means “chair” or “dog,” we did so by linking the word with whatever is availaLble in the surroundings that appears perceptible to him/her (and pertinent to hisN/her interests). Consequently, we do not have an alternative than to assign to the oAther person our perception of the world. For instance, that there is now a dog or Da chair next to us and in making a choice, we must make him/ her to be correBct tAhrough our own understanding. As such, there is the need to utter the word that a lIiens use for dog, when there is actually a dog around. F Communication and Conv OYen tion Davidson enumeratedI Thow the concept of convention could shed light on linguistic behaviour and otheSr concepts that are related to it. He denies that conventions govern the way assertRions are made and how assertions are linked to what is believed to be true. HeV claEims further that individual sentences with single uses offer at best a partial analysIis of the connection of speakers‟ intention to their utterances; and that coNnvention is not a condition for language, neither is language a condition for Uconvention. Davidson’s Account of Language and Belief Davidson states that, a speaker is a person who communicates thoughts, and to convey thoughts a person must mean something by his/her statement. The person interpreting must comprehend whatever the other person within the group utters. Both the speakers 94 and the interpreters must therefore, be capable of comprehending the meaning of 12 expressions, by alloting propositional content to those utterances. He states that an individual using language must be proficient enough to be specific, in such a way that depends efficiently and exclusively on formal considerations, what the meaning of 13 every sentence is. Davidson sees the theory of meaning as being capable of generating a sentence in the 14 meta-language for each sentence of the object language. Nevertheless, it is achievable to produce this sentence only if an interpreter understands the condYition under which an expression of a sentence is true and often knows that if some Rspecified 15 A sentences are true others also must be. This shows the commitmentR of Davidson to the holism of language. Therefore, one can ascribe beliefs to a spIeBaker if we have not less than two rational agents, with the external world. It i s Lthese three agents that constitute the triangle that is essential both for communiNcation and for the speaker to possess thought. The reason being that, if it is not posAsible for an observer to interprete an oral behaviour, then the oral behaviour wouldD contain no meaning and the speaker 16 would therefore possess no thoughts. ThBe „PArinciple of Charity‟ must be made used of by the two speakers in the triangle, bIoth must attribute rationality and meaningful thoughts to each other. F The aim of radical interpretati oOn has to do with taking the behavioural evidence of a community speaking aTn aYlien language and giving an account of meaning for the sentences of this cSomImunity. In order to accomplish this, the „principle of charity‟ must be used. RDavidson also refers to it as the Principle of coherence. One needs to presupposeE that the speakers of the language are, to a large extent, rational and will not maintaIiVn contradictory or conflicting beliefs. If a speaker‟s sentences cannot be coNnsistently interpreted, then the claim is that such a speaker is not communicating in U 17any language. Unlike Quine, Davidson asserts that one can explain language relative to thought, or thought explained in terms of language. He states that for a being to possess thoughts, 18 it must be an interpreter of the words of another. The implication of this is that it is not possible for a person to possess thoughts without being a member of a language community. This is because thoughts, whether expressed or not, are either true or false. 95 The thinker must also understand the meaning of those thoughts. Davidson therefore believes in objectivity of meaning of some concepts. A speaker must know the truth- conditions of a sentence before he/she can understand such a sentence. Davidson regards linguistic meaning as evolving from linguistic communication, which is not only expressed, but rather, is established in interaction. Davidson follows Quine in holding that, to enhance our understanding of what meaning sums up to, a person should reflect on a hypothetical state of affairs. This is a situation, where a person is faced with an alien language speaker with whom he Y/ she does not shares any linguistic or cultural background. In this approach, aAll cRonfusing conceptions that have to do with thoughts and ideas that were previousRly shared before interaction are put aside. One is then obliged to explain meaninIgB and understanding based on that which is obtainable within the framework oLf the interaction itself. Davidson refers to this kind of setting as "radical intNerpr etation". He follows the footsteps of Quine, who tagged his own thought experAiment “radical translation.” The interpreter in this Davidson „radical world‟ Dthen meets with a foreigner. He/she must allocate content to this foreigner'sI Bstate Aments or expressions based on his/her linguistic and non-linguistic obsFerv able behavior. Before the interpreter can comprehend the literal or centraOl meaning of the expression of the other, he / she must be capable of alloting truth-c onditions to the statements the other makes. He / she would have to use, foTr tYhis purpose, his / her local language. What also needs consideration, in a meIthodical manner, is the syntactic composition of the sentences in the language oRf thSe other with whom interaction is taking place. Davidson integrates truth-functiEonal semantics with communicative constructivism. He, therefore, arrived at a viewV that truth performs a crucial function in respect of how language is associated 19wiNth thIe world, through the procedure of interpretation. UDavidson shows that we recognise the meaning of our utterances and those of other people through the identification of the truth-conditions of the sentence. There cannot 20 be a truth ( T ) sentence without a community of language users. For if there were no beings that would communicate, there would be nothing such as truth. This is for the reason that truth belongs to sentences. It is a relation between the sentence, the 21 individual and the time. 96 The idea of error is very crucial to the formation of theory of meaning, according to Davidson. In our attempt to interprete others, we harbor the assumption not only that they are beings who are rational, but also that they possess a considerable number of beliefs that are true. Nevertheless, we should not presume that they possess true beliefs alone, but are also subject to errors in beliefs. He says “error is what gives believes 22 points.” The implication of the notion of error for indeterminacy of translation is that, some of the differences accounted for in manuals of translation may be due to error and inaccuracy in the attribution of meaning to the speaker by translators. For a peYrson to possess a belief, then, he/she must have an idea of belief, for one to have aRn idea of belief is to understand the possibility of such a belief to be mistaken. It is Ahowever not possible to have a notion of mistaken belief unless one has seen Rthe differences between his/her belief and those of others. LIB Davidson‟s point is that for another person to understanNd th e meaning of a speaker‟s word or expression, the person speaking must, firAst, personally have holistic and rational correlation between his/her own beliefs. HDis/her belief also has to be consistent with the external world. The triangulation Bon Awhich Davidson‟s theory rests says that, both thought and communication take pIlace at a point that a speaker is capable of attributing a belief to another personF, concerning some state of affairs. The point that every speaker a sOcribes beliefs and rationality to other individuals in a 23 linguistic community seTemYs not to be in dispute. In our interaction with others, it is usually assumed thSat wIe converse with speakers who also have beliefs in the existence of other mindsR. As such, each assumes that the other person with whom he / she converses is rational and sane. The people being interacted with may not even be of the same lIaVngu Eage, yet it is often assumed that there is a shared belief system common to boNth. This, he states, is because all interpreters ascribe beliefs, rationality and desires to Uthe ones they are interpreting. He claims that all speakers, who also are interpreters, must be capable of attributing beliefs to others. According to the claim of Davidson, interpreting has to do with attributing to the agents the belief they ought to have in relation to their environment. For instance, if an individual is holding an umbrella in the rain, an interpreter would assign the belief that it is raining to the individual. However, if an agent puts his cloth in a bag and departs 97 the room, if another person comes and removes the cloth from the bag into the store, the agent would most likely believe that his / her cloth is still in the bag and look for it there when he / she comes back. However if children are asked where the agent is likely to look for his cloth, he / she would likely say „inside the store‟. Some interpreters may not ascribe to the agents the belief that such agents should have, but attribute to the agents the belief that they, the interpreters, themselves have in this situation. This could only but show that such interpreters are incompetent in some circumstances. Thus, the skill to interprete and the competence to communicate RY with language, come in degrees. A Davidson asserts that an individual must hold the idea of belief and obRjective truth for him/her to be a speaker of a language. However, the question is „hIoBw do we predict the behaviour of a person with false belief? An interpreter, accor dLing to Davidson, should be competent to ascribe beliefs, desires and rationality to Nthe other person. He/she must have a notion of truth and recognise that it is possibleA for beliefs to be false. According to Davidson, it is possible for there to be a constDraint in possible interpretation of an 24 expression, most especially when the speakBer iAs seen as an proficient speaker. The implication of this is that languFag e Iand interpretative understanding appear in a continuum. The level of knowOledge in interpretation would then correspond to the 25 degrees of competence oYf th e interpreter in the language. The implication of Davidson‟s submission Tshows that every rational human being has the potentiality to develop progressiSvelyI from childhood, to fully participate in the triangle of communicationR. Language, thought and interpretive ability, all therefore develops in progressionE. DavidIsoVn rejects the idea of indeterminacy of translation. For a conceptual system to beN identified as indeterminate, it must be accepted as a conceptual system, that is, it Umust be recognised as interpretable. Nonetheless, interpretation entails a significant measure of concord and understanding. Hence, any suspicion of obstinate indeterminacy must be much more limited or shallow than it appears. It is either the disparity is clouded by areas of concord that are not properly observed, or the differences in some concepts, may not be as really difficult as it is emphasised. The grey areas may be overcome by a sufficiently thorough interpretive effort. Davidson 98 takes interpretation to be a process that is, not only local, but also inter-subjective. The essential problem with Davidson‟s approach is that he does not see the interwovenness between interpretation and translation. He rather sees interpretation as an alternative to translation. This bifurcation does not exist in the Yoruba pragmatic cultural hermeneutic approach that operates on the principle of complementarity. Sapir–Whorf: Linguistic Relativity In the Enlightenment period, thought and language were taken to be two disYtinct processes. Thought was seen as taking absolute control over language, whilRe „ideas‟ were taken to be conceived only through the inner logic of thoughAt, and thus, independent of language. The categories of thought were believed to beR universal to all rational beings. Language was then taken to be a means of commIBunication only. The apparent distinctions between languages were not really no tiLced or mentioned then. Whenever, differences were noticed in languages, thAey Nwere considered to be slight aberrations from a universal that is a common tDheme, most especially the European languages. A language may also be seen as being less developed in comparison to the European languages. The non-EuropeanB laAI nguages are in this category. In the Enlightenment period, language was see n as secondary to thought when it comes to the 26 formulation of a person‟s ideas.O F Linguistic relativism has toY do with the idea that the language that an individual speaks has an in impact on hiIsT cognition. This idea is typically associated with Edward Sapir and Benjamin LeeS Whorf. It is called „Sapir-Whorf hypotheses‟. Linguistic relativity dwells on the rRelationship between language and thoughts. The principle of linguistic relativitVy, aEccording to Sapir-Whorf, consists of two important characteristics, these are that; Ui. N I Different languages cut up and name the world differently. That is, fundamental differences between languages exist. ii. Different language constructions lead you to perceive and interprete the world in 27 different ways. Linguistic relativism asserts that the language spoken by an individual has an active 28 impact on that individual„s world view. Extreme form of Linguistic relativity is 99 „linguistic determinism”. This states that our language determines how we see the world. This implies that we cannot see things another way except through our language. However, there have been criticisms against this form of linguistic determinism in that it is not testable as it makes bilingualism and translation impossible. Linguistic relativism however, sees having a language as a form of disposition rather than constraint in seeing the world. Since technologically simple societies can have complete, elaborate grammars. Whorf therefore urges us to judge a given language or culture on its own terms and not with a standard of anoYther. 29 Language does not only shape thought, it is also shaped by how we use it. AR One of the major linguistic relativity debates is focused on the qRuestion whether language does affect thought or not. The traditional claim of SaIpBir-Whorf is that the languages we speak usually influence the way we thin k.L According to Whorf, 30 individuals divide nature along outlines arranged by theiNr indigenous languages. The hypothesis of linguistic relativity states that where lAanguages are different from one 31 another, it will lead to variations of thought. AD Language is seen as a code that all the mIeBmbers of certain group of people learn and 32 share. Through this language, a large portion of what the people know about the world is learnt. Language is thuOs soF important that it has great impact on the way a 33people perceive reality. Sapi r views that the habitual language of each community seriously impacts on theT obYservation of experience. It also affects the options that are 34 chosen on how thSe eIxperiences are interpreted. Whorf emphasises that the way language is strRuctured, has a tacit and great impact on the framework which the mind 35imposed upon reality. Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is an offshoot of the Structuralists 36 schoolI Vof Elinguistics. All languages are said to have specific universals which 37 prNimarily include space, time, quantity, action, state, and so forth. UIt is very important to note that though language has fundamental impact on behaviour and consequently on culture, yet we can only analyse it in relation to some other factors that are not verbal. Some of these factors are psychological. The factors come into play as they affect the ability to communicate, most especially when communicating with people of different cultural background, where „communication 38 accuracy‟ is expected to be established between two individuals or group. For a 100 person to comprehend the culture of a group of people is predicated on learning the language of that culture. The easier it is to have a grasp of a given language, the more profound the person is linked with that culture. A very important question that is necessary to ask is, what power does a language have to shape reality? This is because to have real agreement among people, there is required the use of language. Sapir and Whorf believe language and culture are two sides of the same coin. The idea is that language shapes thought, and each language 39 creates a distinct worldview. The thought that an individual may possess at aR poiYnt in time, naturally, is dependent on the nature of that person, his/her backgroAund, history and the specific circumstances or situation the individual finds himseRlf. Language as such may have a weak or a strong influence on an individual‟s wIBorldview. If we say that language influences thought, the scope of the influence Lis not well specified. It may be restricted to only some relatively isolated partsN of thought, and it may also extend towards the whole of the thought. However, wAhatever is taken to be the scope, whether covering minor area or major, we aAre sDtill involved with a certain form of linguistic relativity. Also, when we talk Babout „worldview‟ this may include both „perception‟ and „thinking‟. I Kwasi Wiredu OF Kwasi Wiredu delves inYto the foundation of human communication to discover 40 whether it is possible ItoT have universal canons of thought and action‟ In the debate on cultures and lanSguage, some scholars have argued for particularity or peculiarity in cultures leaEdinRg to relativism, while some have argued for universality in culture. There isV no doubt that any position on universality or particularity in a language also determIines that of languages in general. While cultural universals would eventually UleaNd to the possibility of easy cross-cultural communication, cultural particularity would lead to relativism and hence difficulty in cross-cultural communication. This however is not to say that there is no point of compatibility in the various points of view. Wiredu gives consideration and proffer argument in favour of the existence of cultural universals, without which there can be no cross-cultural communication. Wiredu says that there could be problem in communicating with people of other cultures if the 101 language of the other has been poorly or wrongly conceptualised. According to him, there are three things in this connection that might need a little more reflection. These are; i. Those categories of thought may be inconsistent with the ones resident in the framework of the given African system of thought, such that formulations that appear to make sense in the foreign language may be quite radically incoherent in the African language concerned. ii. The cause or causes of such situation may lie in defects in any one oYf the languages, foreign or indigenous. AR iii. It is possible, by a cross-cultural evaluation based oRn independent 41 considerations, to get to the root of the matter. IB According to Wiredu, there are some independent considerati oLns, that is, those that are not particular to the peculiar nature of any languagAe uNnder consideration. Such are general to and intelligible in any of the concerDned languages. Their possibility for 42 consideration is based on their in-built natureA of „self-reflexivity‟ which is universal to all natural languages. IB Wiredu defines communication asF „th e transference of thought content from one 43 individual or group of people toO another.” The thought content may be a statement, which may be true or falseY. It may be the expression of emotion, attitude or a wish. Language is consideredT to be the medium of transference of thoughts. This may take 44 place through the uSse oIf words, gestures, artifacts and so on. Indeterminacy may arise out of these sitRuations when the concept of a culture is not adequately conceptualized when it is Eformed for translation into a foreign culture. This could only make the concepItV to be intelligible in one culture and not in the other. Even when it is intNelligible in the other, it is inconsistent with the intended formulation, thus rendering Uit indeterminate. Indeterminacy could also arise when there is a defect in any one of the languages under consideration, whether the source language or the target language. The defect may also arise when concept is available in a culture (the source language) and not in the other being translated into (the target language), or vice versa. In the effort to find a formulation by different translators, each would conceptualise through personal effort 102 and understanding. The ability in most cases varies in degrees. Wiredu notes that there can be no human society without communication. He states that a community exists through individuals, who are intermingling persons based on the meanings they shared as a group. Certainly, without communication, Wiredu asserts, there is not even a human person. A human being who is denied the socialising impact of communication 45 will keep on being human only biologically, but mentally is bound to be sub-human. Among the factors that are fundamental to human communication, according to Wiredu, is “shared meanings”, However we need to know what meanings are, andY how they can be shared. Some philosophers conceive meaning to be subjectivAe iRn nature. However, this position has been argued against; if meanings were Rsubjective, they would not only depend on irregularity obtained in the distinctivIeBness of individuals, also there would be no conventions, no socially established ruLles, correlating symbols to meaning. This will consequently make it impossible toN co nverse with other people. 46 Worse still as Wiredu puts it “no one could converAse with himself / herself” The implication of this according to Wiredu is that thinDking is impossible. In Western philosophy, another school IoBf th Aought postulates „meanings‟ as abstract entities, that is, meaning exists inFdep endently of human minds. Understanding a meaning is therefore conceived Oon the model of perceiving an object. There have been arguments against this concept ion of meaning. Wiredu puts the objection thus: ITYIf meanings were entities, differences between S them could never, in principle be grasped, which R is absurd … If meanings were entities, it must be capable of being referred to. Referring involves E the use of symbol, a meaningful symbol, if the V meaning of the symbol is also an entity, it would I 47involve relating it to another ad infinitum. UWNiredu concludes that if meanings were entities, they would lose their generality. Conception of meaning as an entity will lead to infinite regress. Another tradition in Western philosophy also opposed the theory of meanings as entities. It is a form of realism. This doctrine is referred to as nominalism. It denies that meanings are entity of any sort. It also tries to eliminate the category of signification from the analysis of semantics. It therefore, recognises the symbol and the referent alone. However, when there is no referent such as the case of „non-existence.‟ There arises a problem in 103 nominalism account as a means of communication. Thus, “there remain only marks on some surface, written, or a series of sounds signifying nothing. Wiredu concludes that the aversion the nominalists have for the concepts is because concepts have been historically taken to be mental entities by some philosophers in Western philosophy. He asserts that it is, however, right to say that concepts are necessary in the theory of meaning. It is also correct to emphasise that concepts only exist in the mind. The objection to the conceptualist view, however, is that it cannot be sustained to conceive of mind as a kind of entity. Wiredu asserts that a meaning can apply to many objecYts or situations, which is called generality of meanings. However, an entity or objecRt cannot apply to anything. He states that RA ... an entity can signify something; but this mBeans that a rule can be established by which LtheI given entity puts us in mind, in a certain way, of the „something‟ in question ...WhNen an entity signifies something, the signification is neither identical with the entity itsDelf nAor with any other 48entity that may happen tAo be „signified‟. He states further that when a meaningful syBmbol is used, what is signified is a thought, and never an entity. It is correct toF sa yI that symbols sometimes refer to entities or object, but when they do, the obOject or entity cannot be said to be the signification of the symbol. The object is just the referent and not the signification. However, it is the signification that directTs uYs to a referent. Notwithstanding, the signification may not direct us to anything Ithrough the signification. Wiredu claims further that the same kind of elemenRt ofS communication can be a signification in one context and a referent in some othEer contexts. „Non-existence‟, for instance, though is an English word, what it exprIeVsses, that is , its signification or meaning could not be said to be English, but theN concept of „not-existing.‟ UAccording to Wiredu, one essential condition for communication is „objectivity „. For meaning to be objective is not the same as its being an abstract entity having an independent existence of its own outside the mind. Wiredu insists that if meanings are entities, it would be impossible to ever grasp with them. The difficulty of how meaning, if it is an entity, would be related to other physical entities to which they apply is problematic. In as much as human communication is described as the transference of thought content from a person or group to others, the process would not 104 be feasible if it is taken to mean sending out an abstract entity to one another. If on the other hand, communication is conceived as a person or group directing the attention of the other to an abstract entity that has independent existence, it would not be logically sensible. This is because this already presupposed communication. To direct the attention of another person is to communicate to such a person. This will mean communication being defined through itself. This is nothing but absurd, as it involves circularity or infinite regress. Also, for any two or more individuals to perceive, apprehend, grasp or comprehend the same entity, has already presuppYoses communication. R 49 A Wiredu while citing Okot P‟ Bitek shows the conceptual tranRslation problem involved in the translation of the Chapter 1 verse 1 of the St. JIoBhn‟s Gospel, in the Holy Bible; “In the beginning was the word, the word was wLith God, the word was God.” This when translated into Luo, means “from longN ago, there was News, News 50was with Hunchback Spirit. This religion-anthropolAogical works “interprete African D 51traditional world-views in essentially Anglo-Christian terms”. The concern to analyse those senses of meaning which are relevant to Aunderstanding language, communication and translation arises out of the barrier sIeBemingly created by the idea of „conceptual scheme,‟ conceptual category or framFework. While many have ventured into relativism and suggested the impossibilit yO of one culture penetrating the conceptual scheme of another, Kwasi Wiredu, seeYs „disparities‟ in conceptual scheme, rather than „relativity‟. He explores the possiIbTility of deriving equivalence through coining, and importing through borrowingS, where a concept is not available in a particular culture. There is thEe nReed to search for the root or fundamental basis of communication. WireduV says the answer needs to be looked for in the biological similarity of human 52 beNingsI. Further, in line with the argument of Len Doyal and Dogal Harris, Wiredu Usays the biological unity of man has made it possible for anyone to partake or imaginatively penetrate into any human life form, no matter how initially strange. This fact, he states, underlies the possibility of trans-cultural translation. Wiredu claims that a human person is born with certain innate conceptual abilities. This is due to the biological make-up of human beings. A person is born without having any concept. These innate abilities due to biological affinity of human beings, makes it possible for them to compare experiences and have inter-personal adjustment 105 of behaviour that makes social existence possible. For instance an African can accept Western idea after due reflection. According to Wiredu … The African concerned should satisfy herself that there are no better or equally good African alternatives to the proposed Western idea. More radically, she should consider whether the categories of thought in terms of which the propositions in question are framed are intelligible within the scheme of categories embedded in her own vernacular. Should this Y turn out not to be the case, she would then have to investigate whether the problem lies with her R vernacular or with the foreign medium. That A would be an exercise in cross - culBturaRl conceptual analysis – a difficult but not impossible project. So there is a conLditIion of intelligibility and also a condition, in a nutshell, 53 of truth. N In his efforts at solving translation problems, WirDeduA suggests two ways in which this can be done. If we have a situation where a coAncept exists in one language but does not in another, one of these could be done: (i) BCoining – devising new term which may be a word or phrase, by the specialisati oIn of old words in our languages, and (ii) Borrowing – the adoption of new wFords from other languages where the phenomenon to be named has no apparent lOinkages with previous experience. In support of this method, he reiterates its useYfulness in the science where equivalent words could not be found for such conceIptTs as „electron,‟ „atom,‟ „molecule‟ and so on. The adoption could be „electron,S‟ „atom,‟ „moleku‟. Introduction of new words has to be followed by pedagogic pEackRage,‟ a through teaching and enlightenment of what they stand for. This would Vguard against imposition of categories, in case the English philosophical discouIrse seems to lose meaning when processed in African language, because of the UinsNufficiency in the language due to specifics of culture, environment and even accidental idiosyncrasies of the people concerned. He acknowledges the fact that there are conceptual and methodological disparities in the thinking of different people. However, overriding this fact, he said, is the fact about 54 language, that we can comprehend even what we find difficult to translate. According to him, there is the necessity for cultural decolonization, that is, decolonization of the mind, through sustained and critical reflection of the foreign 106 55 categories of conceptualization which Africans inherited through colonisation. Wiredu gives three conditions which need be satisfied for the rational and effective pursuit of translation to take place. These include; i. The necessity and importance of the enterprise must be clear. ii. The ideas and techniques must have universal intelligibility and applicability, and iii. There must in any particular case be an adequate mastery of the given 56 Y African or foreign language and the body of knowledge. AR These three conditions given by Wiredu, though necessary, are noRt sufficient for adequate translation. At the back of the translator‟s mind shoulId Bbe the principle of charity as stated by Davidson, which requires that, L i. Any language makes sense in terms of takinAg anNy of them as making truth claim. D ii. Any language in making sense doeBs noAt differ radically from any other and I iii. The generalised principleOs wFhich are operative in our language will also work, at least up to a certain point, for the language we want to 57 translate. ITY S Thomas KEuhnR IncomImVensurability UIn Nhis book, The structure of scientific revolution, Thomas Kuhn emphasises a notion which he calls “incommensurability.” Incommensurability states that comparison between theories will not be as straightforward since the criteria for evaluating them are liable to change. This type of challenge in comparing theories is what Kuhn, as 58 well as Feyerabend called „incommensurability‟. Theories are said to be incommensurable when they do not have any common measure. So, if paradigms are the standard for measuring attempt at puzzle-solutions, it means that puzzle-solutions 107 which developed in different eras of normal science will be judged by comparison to differing paradigms, and therefore devoid of a common measure. Three types of incommensurability may be distinguished. These are; Methodological incommensurability, Perceptual Observational incommensurability, 59 and Semantic incommensurability. Methodological Incommensurability In methodological incommensurability, there is no common measure, sinceY the techniques of comparison and evaluation undergo changes. Puzzle-solutRions are evaluated through making of reference to different paradigms. In RmeAthodological incommensurability, advocates of rival paradigms may not be ofI tBhe same opinion on 60 which problems a competing paradigm should resolve. InL a nutshell, the factors which determine the choice of theory are not fixed and are n ot familiar as well. These factors vary and depend particularly on the frameworAk wNithin which the evaluation is taking place. As a result of this, there is no assurDance that individuals working within the same disciplinary culture would be iAn agreement on the theory for their 61 evaluation. IB Despite this, the room for diveOrgenFce will be lesser in the same disciplinary culture than when communication i s with individuals of different disciplinary cultural background. In spite ofT thiYs variation, there can still be widespread agreement on the 62attributes that are desIirable for a new puzzle-solution or theory. Kuhn enumerates five important featuSres that serve as foundation for a choice of theory. These are Ri. AccEuracy: empirically adequate, with experimentation. Nii. I VConsistency: both within and outside, with other pertinent currently U acknowledged theories. iii. Scope: its implications should go further than the data it is expected to explain. It must be broad. iv. Simplicity: phenomena must give the simplest explanation. v. Fruitfulness: (useful for further research) should disclose new 63 phenomena or new relationship. 108 However, there have been criticisms against these criteria for choice of a theory presented by Kuhn. The first criticism is that there may be dispute about which features of the theory satisfy these criteria. In addition, these measures are not precise and there is the possibility for disagreement on the extent to which these criteria hold. Another criticism is that, there can be differences in opinion on how they can be evaluated comparative to one another, most especially when these theories conflict. Semantic Incommensurability Y The fact that the languages of theories from different eras of normal scieAnce Rmay not be inter-translatable makes an impediment to comparing those theories. Kuhn expressed meaning holism, that the meaning of terms are intercBonnRected in such a system that if one changes the meaning of a term, it will conseqLueIntly result in changes 64 in the meaning of other terms that are related in the conceptu al web. The strands of this conceptual web are space, time, matter, force anAd soN on. Kuhn lays emphasis on Semantic incommensurability. He states that certain kinds of translation are impossible. AD Kuhn‟s incommensurability thesis is d ifIfeBrent from Quine‟s indeterminacy thesis in some ways. F i. Quine states that if we aOre translating a language into another, there are multiple ways inT wYhich we may give a translation that are compatible with the overt Idisposition of the speakers. However, one cannot take any of tRhe tSranslations as the most uniquely correct translation. Kuhn in conEtrast to this view of Quine claims, that incommensurability is, not IVhaving any fully adequate translation. Nii. Secondly, Kuhn believes that the expressions translated do have a U meaning contrary to Quine who rejects the idea that expressions are meaningful. iii. While Quine states that reference is inscrutable, Kuhn states that 65 reference is not inscrutable but is only not easy to recover. The nature of the problem of incommensurability of translation arises based on these assumptions that meaning is holistic locally; if there is a shift in the meaning of one 109 part of the lexis and structure, there will be a corresponding shift to all its parts. Hence, to understand one paradigm through the conceptual network and terminology of another rival paradigm is not possible. Kuhn applied this notion to quite a number of different areas all of which have a common pattern. This applied to translation in the following ways: i. There is no neutral language. Kuhn states that different paradigms, even if they use the same words or conceptY will use it in different ways. Individuals who are committed to different paradigmRs when they discuss will not do so based on the same platform. This is becauRse thAey will use, same or similar terms in different senses. The result will be that rIaBther than discussing on the same pedestal, they tend to „talk through‟ one another . LThe justification for this is that any part of a theory can affect the meaning of the terms used in that theory. Kuhn says that there is no difference between senteAnceNs that are analytic and those ones that are synthetic. Therefore, it would not bDe easy to give neutral definitions of concepts or vocabularies that are shared by dAifferent theories, which both epochs can accept. As a result, it will be extremely dIiBfficult for proponents of a paradigm to even understand what the other persoFn from another background is saying or the information he /she intended to pOass across. ii. There is no neuTtraYl observation Kuhn states that wShaItever a person observes rests to some extent on the person‟s theoretical leanRings. Observation is “theory - laden”. It is those theories that provide the framewEork in which observations are classified. The categories provided therefore affect IwVhat a person or group sees. The ideal choice of theory by the positivist is a sitNuation in which two competing theories which made opposing claims or Uobservational predictions, are subjected to crucial experiment. The one that comes out better would be chosen over the other. However, Kuhn believes that the matter is not as simple and straight forward as this. More often than not different theories will handle different sets of observations. Even when their observations seem to overlap, they may be interpreted differently according to the perspectives of the observers. Two individuals can look at the same letter or image 110 from different perspective and give different interpretation. Examples of this is looking at the number „6‟. This may be interpreted as‟ 9‟ by another depending on the angle from which it is observed. The same goes for the „duck-rabbit‟ drawing. For an individual, the diagram looks like a duck, and for another, it looks like a rabbit. This shows two individuals can see or observe the same thing and see totality different things. iii. There is no neutral choice for criteria Y Kuhn seems to suggest that each „paradigm‟ has a set of evaluative criteriRa that it carries with itself. It scores itself so well based on these standards. ASince each paradigm decides and evaluate itself based on its set of criteria, no neRutral criteria are available that will decide which theory is the best. LIB 66 In Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice, Thomas Kuhn states that there are general criteria for choosing theory which almost eAverNyone can agree upon. These criteria include; simplicity, scope, and coherenceDs with existing theory and so on .He however cautions that proponents of different Atheories may still interprete these criteria in different ways. IB iv. There is no neutral worOld F Kuhn makes a radical claYim that those scientists who are committed to different paradigm, in a particuTlar sense, “live in different world”. He does not deny the existence of a reaSl wIorld, but yet states that the one we experience and live in 67 undergoes chanRges when our theories change. The claim that there is no neutral world seems to inEvolve some kind of metaphysical claims of anti-realism pertaining to the empiriIcVal world. This is combined with the acknowledgement that a real world exists thaNt does not change with our theories that are changing.UThomas Kuhn‟s point of view in this wise is similar to that of Kant. The difference is that while Kuhn postulates different worlds for different paradigm, Kant states there is only one human paradigm and therefore only one empirical world. He agrees with Kant that the really real, independently existing world, which Kant calls “things - in itself” is totally unknowable. Not only this, but also that the empirical world which is knowable, is partly influenced by our categories or concepts. 111 One of the charges against Kuhn that is very common is that, he is a relativist, since he says that all evaluation is relative to a paradigm and since there is no paradigm independent means of evaluation. Paradigm itself has no means an individual can evaluate it. What counts as a puzzle and what count as a solution are dependent on the paradigm that is used at a particular period in time. However, a new paradigm must, at least, make an effort to retain most of the puzzle-solving ability of the preceding period and able to solve some of the challenges that were in the previous era. Incommensurability is therefore only partial. Most of the puzzles from the RprevYious period by recognition need to remain the same as that of the earlier ones oAr at least the ones that succeeds the earlier puzzles. R J. L. Austin LIB Speech-Act Theory N Speech acts theory is a pragmatic reflection whichA evolves from the pioneer and 68 revolutionary work of John Austin. In How to do Dthings with words, Austin considers that the truth-conditional account of theI Buse A of language as posited by the Logical 69 Positivists is faulty, due to the “descrip tive illusion” which leads to the supposition that the main objective of langOuagFe is that it is principally directed at saying true things. Rather, language tran smits specific piece of information about something, either about the world or tYhe thought of the speaker about the world. The pragmatic aspect of language wIasT emphasised by Austin that discourse may lead to action. A speech act as an uStterance performs a function in communication. A speech act is carried outE wRhen words of greetings, apology, complaint, request, compliment, invitatioVn, and so on, are uttered. It may contain a word like „No‟, to make a refusal or deNnialI, and „sorry‟ to make an apology. UDifferent types of “Speech acts” may be distinguished. These include promises, declarations, statements and so on. Any of these has peculiar conditions of felicity which are determined conventionally and contextually and which do not have anything to do with truth-conditions. Thus, the felicity of a statement would depend on certain 70 conventions. 112 J. L. Austin observes that certain sorts of sentences seem to be designed in order to „do‟ something. For instance, “I pronounce you husband and wife” which is to (wed) perform an act, rather than to merely say something. He therefore calls such sentences Performatives, as distinguished from another sort of sentences which he calls Constatives which is a merely descriptive sentence. Austin posits that every normal utterance has both a descriptive and an effective aspect of it. He regards saying 71 something as also doing something at the same time To replace the initial differences between performative sentences and constative sentences. Austin classified speechY acts into three basic categories which apply to all possible utterance. TheseR are; (i) Locutionary Act, (2) Illocutionary Act and (3) Perlocutionary Act RA i. Locutionary Acts: These are acts of speaking which eBxpresses sense or reference. It is involved when certain sounds are made LusiIng specific words in accord with „the grammatical rules of a certain languag e. For example, „A dog is an animal‟ or „a table is flat. This is the basic aAct oNf utterance which generates a meaningful linguistic expression. It is theD act of saying something through physical utterance of words. A ii. Illocutionary Acts: These expres s IthBe intention of the speaker through the use of a performative verb. It emphasFises the acts done in speaking which is apparently the purpose of using the sOentence. For instance, “I baptise this ship „the spirit of 72Galway”. These areY the actual actions that are performed through the utterance. An utterance is fIoTrmed with some sorts of functions in mind, that is, intention or desire of thSe speakers. The communicative force of an utterance is called illocutionRary force. iii. PerloEcutionary Act: This is the effect which is produced on the hearer or lIisVtener as they pay attention to a locutionary act, which elicit a response on the Nlistener. It may be intended or not. Perlocutionary act involves the production of U effects on the thoughts, feelings, or action of the audience or listener. For instance, this produces belief that makes the audience accept that Joseph and 73 Mary should be considered husband and wife. Austin makes a distinction between the locutionary „Meaning „and the illocutionary „force‟ of the utterance. For clear interpretation and translation, there must be independent knowledge of the use of the words in the context. 113 John Searle, however, believes that the taxonomy used by Austin is defective as it 74 lacks criteria for differentiating a variety of illocutionary force from another. Searle divides illocutionary acts into five basic types. These are; (i.) Directive (ii.) Commissive (iii.) Representative / Assertive (iv.) Declarative (v.) Expressive. He states that illocutionary act is a discussion between the first and the second person. By giving directive, the speaker tries to make the hearer do something. Words such as, ask, order, command, beg, plead, request, entreat, pray, demand and so on. Example of this is, „Go out now‟, „Bring that book‟. Y In commissive, the speaker commits himself / herself to future action. VAerbsR such as promise, swear, guarantee, threating, refuse and so on. R In representative or assertive, the speaker asserts that a statemIeBnt or proposition is true. By declaration the speaker alters the external status o rL condition of an object, situation or context, solely by making an utterance. FoNr example, „You are guilty‟, „Take him out‟. DA In expressive, the speaker expresses an attitudAe to a state of affairs or about a state of 75 affairs. Verbs such as congratulate, thankIsB, praise and apologise. Searle‟s analysis of speech act is different from AustinF‟s own in some respects. Searle makes a rigid distinction between the conten t Oand the force of the speech act. This is not present in the analysis made by AustYin. Another distinction is that Searle‟s analysis is based on the intentional view. TIhTe implication of this is that the intentions of the speaker and the recognition of theSse intentions are very important to realising speech act. Austin, however, statesR that a person cannot carry out an act by making reference to intention. In additVionE, Searle states further that a person may carry out a speech act only if he / shNe exIhibits the intention to do it, through the use of such a sentence and if one Uexhibits such intention to embark on all the obligation of the speech act one wants to perform. Therefore, Searle‟s scrutiny brings together conventional and intentional parts in order to put up a new semantic account of speech. This claims that what is needed to put up a speech act is not just certain process, but also a certain cognitive content (the intention). Thus, the speech act does not really modify the world any longer, but now has to do with the way the audience or listener perceives the speaker‟s intention. It 76 directs attention to a modification in concept “in the head” of the speaker. 114 Other conclusions may be drawn from this intentionalist perspective. If speaking is considered a way of making explicit a person‟s intentions to put together certain speech, then speaking can be perceived as a communication of intentions. Language .77 can therefore be grasped as a medium of communicating to others. Searle sees language as a non-natural method of meaning something. It is a way of communicating some intentions. He departs from Austin‟s philosophy of ordinary language. He decides not to put forward a theory of speech but that of communication. Grice makes a distinction between natural meaning and non-natural meaning. The natural meaYning is close to natural and regular relations between two elements in the woRrld. For example, clouds mean that it will rain. RA The non-natural meaning consists of all conventional meanings, paBrticularly linguistic meanings. As opposed to Austin‟s position, Grice tries to makeL a Iprofound explanation of non-natural meaning based on intentions and not largely on conventions. When a speaker uses something that has to do with intention tAo giNve information to the listener, he is using a non- natural means. For example,D when one says “it is raining,” the speaker intends to generate the belief that it Ais raining. This is done by making the hearer recognise his/her intention to influIeBnce him/her to believe that it is raining. This is to convey to the listener that theF utt erance the speaker has made connotes certain meaning. Through the conventiOon of intentional uses, language then develops into a 78 code that has a semantic coYnten t to decode. However, language onI Tits own can be used to pass message across, other than the coded content.R TheS message conveyed may not be incorporated in the meaning of the sentence inE its propositional content. By inference, the sentence, „it is raining” may intend tVo mean, “I am not ready to go out now.” This may be in answer to the question, “CNan Iwe go out to play?” The implication of “it is raining” to this kind of question Umay be, “the weather is bad and I cannot go out now.‟ The question one could ask is that, how does an individual determine the inference that can be made from the sentence? Also, what is the assurance that the hearer or listener would be able to grasp with such inference? The inference can be established because communication is a practice based on cooperation of social individuals. It is determined by many principles of conversation, which are universal in nature. These principles govern linguistic behaviours and inferences. Thus, the conventional 115 implication of “it is raining” may be “the weather is poor.” However, if the conclusions do not follow directly from the linguistic meaning, then we have 79 conversational implication that is made based on the „conversational principles.‟ Felicity Condition Thus, Austin‟s focus is the task accomplished by speech and not so much about what is said. What is said, then, depends on what is done. Austin‟s concern is majorly the use in which language is put into “utterance” which he says could be distinguished Yfrom “sentences”. When words are uttered, it does not only depend on truth-conditRions, but aims at specific “felicity conditions.” Felicity conditions are factors thaAt need to be 80 present for a speech act to be successful. Specific conditions of feliciRty are related to 81 every kind of utterance. LI B A felicity condition is fulfilled when the „circumstancNes „are adequate for using a 82 sentence and not just when the substance of a sentencAe is true. For example, if I say “I promise to visit an orphanage”. It is onlyA if Dthe listeners trust me that determine whether I have actually made a promise. BIf they do not, then a felicity condition has not been fulfilled. Therefore, the asserti oIn fails because there is no justification. In the same vein, a promise does not fail foFr the reason of the falsity of its content but due to its inability to perform it as an acOtion. When one makes a IsTtudYy of the different kinds of speech acts, it reveals that determining whethSer the act is successful or not depends on other extra-linguistic conditions. ForR example, for an act of baptism to be performed, it has to be done by a competent aEuthority. That is, someone who is entitled to do it. A person who is a priest can baIpVtise a child. So also can a judge discharge and acquit an individual accused of a criNme. The actions performed by these competent individuals usually have a ritual Ustructure. This requires special words or phrase which has to be spoken correctly, 83 failure of which the speech acts misfires. Despite the fact that Austin tries distinguishing between the three types of speech acts, it is usually very difficult to separate them in practice. To separate illocutions and locutions are not as such easy, the same with the separation of locutions and perlocutions. 116 The main suggestion that Austin made for distinguishing an illocution from a perlocution was that illocution is “conventional” as it could be made plain clear by the performative formula; but perlocution could not. This distinction however, is a mere possibility and not a practicable test. The test may give unequivocal evidence as regards what is not an illocutionary act, but cannot convincingly state what the illocution really is. If for instance somebody says “The building is about to collapse“. He may be taken to make a locution. His sentence may be translated as directing attention to the building , making reference to the condition of the building, thYat is about to collapse. However, another person may look at the illocutionary aRct of the statement and take it to be a warning statement. It may thus be taken to be,A “I warn you of the danger, that the building is about to collapse.” This may leadR to translational differences, if translated based on the understanding of diLfferIeBnt translators, thus leading to indeterminacy as pointed out by Quine. If such tran slation differences occur, Can we say it is because of ambiguity in the statemenAt oNr lack of understanding of the hearer? How do we determine the intention of the Dutterer of the speech? Austin sees the kind of imperfection thatB speAech acts are liable to. His interest was motivated by the way things can go wIrong in speech acts even when they appear normal at first sight. There are indFirec t speech acts where the literal meaning of a sentence is not what the speakerO wishes the hearer to use in his / her interpretation. For instance, „It is very cold Yin here‟ when it is not expected to be interpreted as a complaint, but as an indTirect request to switch off an air conditioner. This may be said as an act of politenSessI. Such request may allow the person being addressed to have the option of eitheRr to comply or refuse the implied request without picking offence. For two translaEtors therefore to translate this simple statement, “It is very cold in here.” A translaItoVr may translate on the face value, making the sentence a complaint, while anNother may understand the request being made and translate it as such. This will not Ube a case of indeterminacy but purely an incorrect translation on the part of one of the translators. This shows that many of the so called indeterminacy are determined by the level of understanding of the translators on the subject matter and knowledge of the concerned languages. Language may be used to send messages of which content is differently coded in the sentence written. For example, “It is too cold this morning,” may mean I will not take 117 my bath this morning or that if at all I will take my bath, it will be with warm water. However, what is communicated by “It is too cold this morning” is not integrated in the interpretation of the sentence uttered in its propositional content. Thus it cannot be reduced to what is uttered but can only be inferred or implied. Inference is made possible for the reason that communication is a cooperative practice. It is influenced by many principles of conversation which are universal. The „implications are conventional if the inferences are only made based on the conventional meaning of the words used in the sentence. However, “conversatYional 84 implicatures‟‟ are made if the inferences do not follow directly from tAhe lRinguistic meaning. These are based on the conversational principles. It is possibRle for a speaker to violate conversational principle in one way or another. Yet, theI lBisteners will be able to translate the linguistic act in a rational way due to the met a-Lprinciple of cooperation in a social environment. N According to Austin, perlocutionary acts are not convAentional. By insisting on the non- conventionality of percolutionary act, AustiAn‟s Dtheory undermines the potency of customs, norms, and traditions not IoBnly on the hearer‟s understanding and interpretation of illocutions, but also on their performance of perlocutionary acts. This shows that Austin‟s position did notF take cognisance of the importance of customs and traditions of societies whichY on m Oany occasions may be at variance with one another. The norms adhered toI bTy a people have social influence on the understanding of the audience and the Sinterpretation that will be given to any sort of illocution. Thus, Austin‟s view Rfails to take into consideration the “biases and prejudices of distinct 85 conceptual Eschemes in the performance of acts.” The implication of this is that an individIuVal would not be able to experience the „world‟ of the other, live their N experiences and discover how genuine their beliefs are. Secondly, if one is not privy to Uthe contextual use of words and sentences by the other there would be no intersection of beliefs and attitude. Then there is the need to consider how and why a sentence that is meaningful in a society would be apparently absurd in another. Speech acts are not so easy to perform in translation because to understand the idiomatic expressions or cultural standards in the second language may be difficult. The translators may hence, transfer, the rules and conventions of his / her first 118 language into the second language. He/she may presuppose that such rules and conventions are general. This is so as there is the natural predisposition of the translator to fall back on what they understand to be relevant and suitable in their first language. It is necessary that a translator knows exactly the nature and meaning of words being used in their first language before deciding what is transferable or amenable to translation. For instance, when an individual decides to appreciate a host, by saying, “Oh! I love ginger tea,” No English principle is tied to the statement that a person loving gingeYr tea constitutes appreciation and thus a way of thanking the person who has maAde tRhe offer. However, the „intention‟ of the speaker under the condition of utteRrance is a very important factor which plays a major role. It should, however, be InBoted that whichever is paramount between „convention‟ and „intention‟ does not guLarantee that the listener would understand and properly grasp the content of the Nutte rance. On the other hand, greeting someone through the utterance of the wordA, “Hi!” is a conventional way of greeting in English. However, if the person to whDom the conventional way of greeting, “Hi!” is directed does not understand English,A but speak another language in which the word means, “Go away”, the attempt a t IeBxtending greetings to the person is likely to fail. This failure is possible in spite Fof convention. There is therefore the need to strike a balance between convention aOnd intention. Speech acts require both the knowledge and the proper use of such lYang uage within a given culture. Conclusion T This chapter exRamS I ined the views of other philosophers on the possibility of translation from one cuElture to another. Among the views considered was Davidson‟s „principle of charityI‟V which has to do with the prospect of bridging the conceptual differences beNtween cultures. Kuhn‟s idea of extensive incommensurability between worldviews Uwas analysed. The idea he takes into account is that there really are (or the possibility of) definite conceptual systems that are not amenable to translation, one into the other. Many scholars have made broad use of this idea of Kuhn. As he argues that there are incommensurable scientific theories that represent the world differently. Sapir and Whorf also argue that the divergent linguistic systems of alien cultures lead to conceptual systems that cannot be harmonized with one another. 119 Wiredu however argues for conceptual disparity rather than indeterminacy or incommensurability. He pushes for the possibility of cross-cultural understanding through coining and borrowing where a concept does not exist in a culture. John Austin‟s speech acts was also considered. Each of these perspectives however has its strengths and weaknesses. The „universalist approach‟ did not actually explain what aspect the universality actually covers or to state how to take care of different concepts with their cultural peculiarities and conceptions. The Universalists have standards that words or concepts need to possess before they can be recognised to apply aYcross cultures. Some of these characteristics include logical coherence, rationalitRy, inter- cultural intelligibility, objectivity and open mindedness. However, no mattAer the list of characteristics arrived at, meaningful translation would depend on the iRndividual‟s own conception and perception of these concepts (what is to be traLnslaItBed). This invariably will have effect on the eventual translation. Having seen the l imitations of these views, the next chapter shall examine a perspective of the YoArubNa on translation. BA D OF I TY SI ER NI V U 120 Endnotes 1. Donald, D. (1985). Post analytic philosophy. Rajchman & Cornel W. Ed. NewYork: Columbia University. 129. 2. Donald, D. (1985). Post analytic philosophy.129. 3. Donald, D. (2001). On the very idea of conceptual scheme. Inquries into truth and interpretation. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 130. Y 4. Donald, D. (2001). On the very idea of conceptual scheme. 131. AR5. Donald, D. (2001). On the very idea of conceptual scheme. 131. R 6. Donald, D. (2001). On the very idea of conceptual schemLe. I13B2. 7. Donald, D. (2001). On the very idea of conceptual sNche me. 132 8. Donald, D. 2001 On the very idea of concepDtualA scheme. 197. 9. Davidson, D. (2001). Radical translaBtionA. Inquiries into truth and interpretation Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 1 25I – 139. 10. Donald, D. (1984). TOhouFght and talk. Inquiries concerning human understanding. 169 11. Dresner, E. (20I11T). YThe principle of charity and intercultural communication. InternationSal Journal of Communication 5. 976 12. DonaEld, RD. (1991). Three varieties of knowledge. A. J. Ayer memorial essays. VP. Griffiths. Ed. Cambridge University Press. 159. 13N. I Davidson, D. (1991). Three varieties of knowledge. 160 U14. Davidson, D. (1975). Thought and talk. Mind and language. S. Guttenplan. Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 9 15. Davidson, D. (1975). Thought and talk. 9. 16. Davidson, D. (1991).Three varieties of knowledge. 159 17. Davidson, D. (1991). Three varieties of knowledge. 160. 121 18. Davidson, D. (1975). Thoughts and talk. 9 19. Dresner, E. (2011). The principle of charity and intercultural communication. 970. 20. Davidson, D. (1996). The folly of trying to define truth. Journal of Philosophy 93. 275 21. Kristin, A. (2002). Philosophical psychology 15. 3: 3. Y 22. Donald, D. (1975). Thought and talk. 20 R 23. Kristin, A. (2002). Philosophical psychology. 3 RA 24. Davidson, D. (1999). Reply to Simon J. Evnine. The pIhiBlosophy of Donald Davidson. L. Hann,. Ed. Chicago: Open Court. 305. L 25. Davidson, D. (1999). Reply to Simeon J. EvnineA. 31N0 26. Wouter, B. (2016). Linguistic relaAtivisDm, variants and misconceptions. https.semanticscholar.org. 12. B 27. I Whorf, B. (1956). Language, tho ught and reality: selected writings of Benjamin Lee. J. B. Carroll. Ed. W Ohorf F, MIT Press. 28. Whorf, B. (1956).. LYanguage, thought and reality, selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. J. BI.T Carroll. Ed. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 29. Wouter, RB.S (2016). Linguistic relativism, variants and misconceptions. httpEs.semanticscholar.org. 12 30. IWVhorf, B. (2012). Language, thought and reality: selected writings of Benjamin UN Lee Whorf. 2nd. Carroll, J. et. Al. Ed. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 265- 280. 31. Brown, R. (1958). Words and Hings. Glencoe 111: The Free Press. 260 32. Gene, V. (1994). Linguistic determinism and mutability: The Sapir–Whorf “Hypothesis” and intercultural communication. JALT Journal 16.2: 164. 122 33. Sapir, E. (1949), Selected writings of Edward Sapir. Language, culture and personality. Mendelbaum, D. G. Ed. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 209 34. Gene, V. (1994). Linguistic determinism and mutability. 165. 35. Hall, E. (1974). The organizing pattern. Language, culture and society, Blount, B.G Ed. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers. 143. 36. Pearson, B. L. (1977). 71. RY 37. Kay, P. (1984). What is the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis? American AntAhropologist: 67. BR 38. Kay, P. (1984). What is the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis? A LmeIrican Anthropologist. 67. N 39. Danny K. (1980). Part 1: Demise of the Whorf hAypothesis. Phoenix: new directions in the study of man. 4. 1: 2. AD 40. Kwasi, W. (1996). Cultural univ eIrsBals and particulars, an African Perspective. Indianapolis: Indiana UniversFity Press. 1. 41. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultu rOal universal and particulars. 3 42. Wiredu, K. (199I6T). CYultural universal and particulars. 3 43. Wiredu, K. (S1996). Cultural universal & particular. 13 44. WireEdu, RK. (1996). Cultural universal & particular. 13 45. IWViredu K. (1996). Cultural Universal and Particular. 13 U46N. Wiredu, K. (1980). A philosophical perspective on Human Communication International Social Science Journal 32. 2. 199. 47. Wiredu, K. (1980). A philosophical perspective on the concept of human communication. 199. 48. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural universal and particulars. 15 123 49. Wiredu, K. (1996). Formulating modern thought in African Language. Citing Okot p‟Bitek.1970. African religion in western scholarship. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau. St. John‟s Gospel chapter 1 verse 1. Holy Bible. 87 50. Wiredu K. (1996). Formulating. 82 – 83. 51. Doyal, L. & Dogal, H. (1985). The practical foundation of human understanding. New Left Review 139. 65. 52. Wiredu, K. (1993). Race, anthropology and philosophy. North AmericRan PYanel at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Boston.7A. 9. 53. Wiredu, K. (1996). Formulating Modern thought in AfricaBn laRnguages: Some theoretical considerations. 185 I 54. L Wiredu,.K. (1996). Formulating modern thought. 33N1 55. Wiredu, K. (1996). Formulating modern thouDghtA. 331 56. Donald, D. (1984). On the very idea ofA conceptual scheme. Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Clar enIdBon Press. 183 57. Kuhn, T. (1970). The structurFe of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edit ioOn with postscript. 58. Kuhn, T. (2011).I TStanYford encyclopedia of philosophy, 59. Kuhn, T. (19S70). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of ChiEcagoR Press, 2nd edition with postscript. 148. 60. KIuVhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago. 200. 61N.U Kuhn T. (1977). The essential tension, selected studies in scientific tradition and change. Chicago: University of Chicago press. 321 - 322. 62. Kuhn, T. (1993). After words “world” changes .Thomas Kuhn and the nature of science. Harwich P. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 338 63. Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolution. revised edition with postscript. Chicago: University of Chicago press. 150. 124 64. Kuhn, T. (1976). Theory - change as structure – change: comments on Sneed Formalism. Erkenntnis 10. 191. 65. Kuhn, T. (1976). The structure of scientific revolution. 109 – 110. 66. Kuhn, T. Some notes on Thomas Kuhn's structure of scientific revolutions http://www.trinity.edu/cbrown/science/kuhn.html. 67. Austin, J. (1962). How to do things with words. Oxford: Oxford University PYress 68. Bruno, A. (2010). From speech act theory to Pragmatics. 1 R 69. Jerrold, S. (2006). Speech acts. The handbook of pragmatics. R.R H. ALaurence. & W. Gregory. Ed. Blackwell Publishing. 54. IB 70. Jerrold, S. (2006). Speech acts. The handbook of pragm aLtics. 54 71. Hickey, R. Pragmatics. 3. AN 72. Austin, J. (1962). How to do things with AworDds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 101 B 73. Barry, S. (2014). John Searle:F Fro Im speech acts to social reality. Researchgate. Retrieved Nov. 10, 202 0O, from https.//www.researchgate.net/ publication. 12. 74. Barry, S. (2014). JohnY Searle: From speech acts to social reality. 12 75. Bruno, A. (S201I0) T. From speech act theory to pragmatics: the loss of the illocutioRnary point. https// halshs. Archives. Ouvertes.fr/halshs. 6. 76. BaVrryE, S. (2014). Making reference to Grice H. P. Meaning. The philosophical Ireview 64. 377. U77N. Bruno, A. (2010). From Speech act to theory to pragmatics. 6. 78. Bruno, A. (2010). From speech act theory to pragmatics. 7 79. Fadoro, J. (2011). Lin 371 Conversational discourse. Department of Linguistics and African Languages University of Ibadan. 28 -29 125 80. Fadoro, J. (2011). Lin 371 Conversational discourse. Ibadan: Departmentof Linguistics and African Languages University of Ibadan:28-29. Making reference to Crystal, D. 1987. The Cambridge encyclopedia of language. Cambridge University Press. 81. Fadoro, J. (2011). Lin 371 Conversational discourse. Department of Linguistics and African Languages University of Ibadan. 28 - 29. 82. Austin, J. (1962): How to do things with words. 103 Y 83. Offor, F. (2012). Speech act; conceptual incommensurability and cross-R cultural misjudgement. Ibadan Journal of Theatre Arts. 788. 240. RA 84. Offor, F. (2012). Speech act; conceptual incommensuraLbiliItyB and cross-cultural misjudgement. 240. 85. Jerrold, S. (2006). Speech acts. The handbook of ApraNgmatics. 2006. 53. AD F I B Y O T RS I VE I UN 126 CHAPTER FIVE A PERSPECTIVE OF THE YORÙBÁ ON INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION Y Introduction AR In the last chapter, the alternative views of various other philosopRhers to Quine‟s Indeterminacy thesis were considered, to see the extent to wLhicIh Bthey could achieve adequate translation. However, it is discovered that each of th ese other alternatives has its own limitations. In this chapter, the perspective of theN Yorùbá shall be examined to discover their views on indeterminacy of translatDion;A how translation is achieved and the extent to which their system of translation Ahas been adequate. The Yorùbá is one of the major tribe sI iBn Nigeria. The ethnic group stretches and occupies South-Western part of NiFgeria. The area which consists of the whole of Lagos, Ekiti, Oyo, Ogun, Ond oO, a major part of Kwara and Kogi States and a part of Edo State. The Yoruba areY not only found in Nigeria. They are also present in large numbers in some otherT parts of West Africa, such as; the South-eastern part of the Republic of BeninS; DIahomey and Togo. Apart from West Africa, Yoruba are also found in SoutRh Africa and in the West-Indies. Yorùbá culture is also present and 1flourishing Ein South America and the Caribbean, most especially Cuba and Brazil. The YIoVrùbá are dispersed throughout the globe. UThNe Meaning of ‘Meaning’ and ‘Translation’ in Yorùbá The word „Translation‟ in Yorùbá language is „ìtum ,‟ which morphologically derived from three words i. „ì‟ – the act of ii. „tú‟ - „unwrap‟ 2 iii. „ìm ‟ – knowledge. 127 Ìtum could refer to „translate‟, „interprete‟ and „meaning‟, However, the verb tú could mean to unveil, reveal, unearth, unwrap or unconceal. Like we have in tú àsírí (revealing a secret). In essence, tú can variously mean to translate, to interprete or to ascribe meaning to or give meaning to something; to uncover or open up something hidden. Further, if we remove the prefix „I‟ such that we have túm , a verb, which rendered fully would read: tú ko m (unwrap to know); this is instructive of the very act of translation, interpretation and ascribing meaning to. Ìtum r is a narrow, Ymore particular sense of ìtum . Ìtum r refers to the knowledge of interpAretaRtion and translation of words, both oral and written. R This suggests that the Yorùbá believe that knowledge is a difficuIltB task to accomplish and it is not accessible to everybody but „wrapped‟ and, for a cLcess to be gained into it, it has to be “unwrapped.” „„ìm ‟‟ could also mean „kNnow-how‟ in Yorùbá, which shows that„ìtum ‟ not only means unwrapping knoDwleAdge, but also expertise or skill in unwrapping knowledge. It shows that it is not everybody that could attain the feat of unwrapping knowledge, but the skillfulI oBnes A. By implication, translation, from the Yorùbá perspective, could be achiFeve d only by those who are adequately skilled. Translation as an act, within thOe purview of Yorùbá thought, has passed through an evolutionary trend. The Yorùbá believe tIhaTt trYanslation is both a linguistic and cultural act. The saying that, „Bí a bá sún m ni, là n m se ni‟ (It is only when we move close to a person that we have insighRt inSto his/her actions) shows the understanding that translation, for the Yorùbá, inEvolves both language and culture. Physical reaction to stimuli is not interprIeVted on the face value. Observation of stimulus constitutes appearance, but the reaNl meaning of linguistic objects can only be comprehended when examined together Uwithin the cultural context in which the linguistic items are used. Therefore, when one is observing the activities of individuals in the culture from a distance, what the observer perceives is most likely to be at variance with the actual occurrence taking place in the culture. Both language and culture are believed to have roles to play in shaping reality. Hence, it is important to make a clear demarcation between the linguistic meaning of a word, 128 term or statement and the conception attached to it. A culturally explicit term in a Source Language (SL) may not have the equivalent word in the Target Language (TL). Some words have immense suggestiveness in certain context, whereas some descriptions hardly have equivalence in other languages. The Yorùbá believe that meaning is not just the component of words, but it is that which permits the understanding of what each of the words stands for within the confines of the context. The Evolution of Translation in the Yorùbá Culture Y 3 The Yorùbá oral tradition of Ifá, as a methodology (i.e. the act of divination), Ris pure hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is simply interpretation or technical interpretAation, which involves the acts of analysis and synthesis. Ifá describes the mRanifestations of translation in the traditional worship of Egúngún (MasqueradeL). EIgBúngún is one of the 4Yorùbá pantheons of divinities. It is ancestor worship and is believed to come from „another world,‟ the ancestral world. Egúngún is cAalleNd „Ará- run‟ (one from the 5 ancestral world). This in itself is shrouded in the act of unveiling or opening up secrets (that is, as evident in reference to the EAgúDngún as ará- run), which further corroborates that itumo involves the heIrmBeneutics of interpretation, translation and meaning. F The language of Egúngún is noOt understood by all, and is therefore expected to be translated by a translator, wYho is an appointed member of the „At kùn‟ (messengers) family. The messenger/tTranslator is always readily available at the side of the Egúngún (Masquerade) to trSansIlate and pass on the meaning of the Egúngún‟s speech to the listeners. EgúnRgún understands what everybody says, because he is a supernatural being, but oEnly his translator(s) understand his language because it is a language from the spIirVitual or metaphysical world. Egúngún speaks a peculiar language (ancestral lanNguage) which is translated by his guide. This Egúngún translation tradition has Upassed from generation to generation to the present day by Egúngún worshippers in 6 Yorùbá land. Another tradition of translation found in Yorùbá culture is that of sanyìn speech. sanyìn is the deity of herbal medicine in Yorùbá land. sanyìn involves the ability, capacity, skill and depth of the secrets of plants which then translates as knowledge of 129 the herbs; meaning that the speech of sanyìn derives from the versatile and dense knowledge of the herbal world; making speech act in sanyìn a pure act of ìtum . The priest of the deity is the translator of the communication between sanyìn and the clients who consults the deity. This translator must translate in the way the client must understand. In these two instances of translation, that is, Egúngún and sanyìn , the Source Languages are not actual mother tongues (as the traditional Yorùbá believe) neither are they regarded as foreign or alien, but the „voice of the gods,‟ understood 7 only by their assigned translators among their worshippers. RY Another form of translation among the traditional Yorùbá is found in druAmming. The Yorùbá have the talking drum, dùndún. Its sound is expected to be undRerstood by those who are skilled in it. They also have the agidigbo drum. ThLis IeBlicits the proverbial saying in Yorùbá, “Bí òwe bí òwe là nlú ìlù àgìdìgbό, ol gb n lό ngb , m ràn ló n m ”. Translated, “The àgìdìgbό drum is beaten /drummeNd in proverbs, the clever ones hear it, and the intelligent ones understand it.” The YAorùbá expect every person in the community to demonstrate in-translation. As pAoinDted out by Na‟Allah Each person mus tI bBe capable of an explanation that his or Fher action makes sense to the community and not just expect the community to accept s uOch action. Explanation or „sense‟ here means translation; to make sense is to be able to Y 8 explain one‟s action meaningfully. IT Different people aSre entrusted with message and the onus is on them to bear this responsibiliEty Rand deliver the messages from person to person and community to commuVnity. Na‟Allah states further that NI …any mistake in translation (not just transmitting U speeches and conveying their proper meanings) may result in serious cultural consequences. The drum, the gong, and fire making in the bush or forest are all examples of traditional vehicles for 9 conveying messages. These must be correctly interpreted and translated for the understanding of others within the community. 130 The Yorùbá do not bifurcate between the word “meaning” and “translation”. “Ìtum ” is used for both meaning and translation, therefore, there is no real ontological problem of how to translate “meaning”, for once translation is done, “meaning” is automatically 10 transferred. In the word „Ìtum ,‟ („translation‟ or „meaning‟) the most important thing is that the translator is dedicated to the translation of the voices of the deities to the worshippers or clients. The translator does not choose his own way of translation, he does not convey implied, implicit, inadequate or inconclusive information. If he did any of this, there is the expectation of his being visited by the anger of the gods. RY The translator does not even consider the state of mind of the client. HAe must not hijack the message and turn it to his own. The translator holds hiRs office (as the translator) in trust for the community and the gods. The translatoIr Bcould therefore not “deconstruct” society simply to cause disarray or to challe ngLe the idea of society‟s truth. Neither the Egúngún translator nor the sanyìn traNnslator is permitted to speak in riddles during translation. When translating their dAeities‟ messages, however, their responsibility is to convey the meaning intendedD by their deities in the clearest way possible to the receiver. The duties of thesBe trAanslators involve decoding the messages correctly and ensuring the receivers or t arIgets understand and go away with the correct intended messages. F All these forms of translations OY enumerated above, however, are just the evolutionary trends of translation fIroTm the Yorùbá thought system. They are as such not on the same critical pedSestal with the kind of translation Quine is suggesting in his indeterminacy Rthesis. TranslaVtioEn and Indeterminacy from Yorùbá Perspective WNhenI considering the perspective of the Yorùbá on translation as we have it at the Ulevel of Quine‟s approach, there is a need to consider some of the earliest texts translated into Yorùba language, as well as other Yorùbá language texts translated into 11 English. These could be found in the early works of Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther who translated the English version of the Holy Bible into Yorùbá language. Translation in Yorùbá from one language to another takes its earliest root in this work of Crowther, and D. O. Fagunwa who wrote some Yorùbá novels and got it printed 131 through the assistance of the Church Missionary Society. Fagunwa wrote „Ògbójú d 12 Nínú Igbó Irúnmal ” in 1938. 13 Also other novels of Fagunwa, such as Igbó Olódùmarè, which have been translated into English Language, need to be considered. Translation in Yorùbá started as an offshoot of the activities of the missionaries who came to propagate religion. The missionaries translated the Bible into various indigenous languages of Nigeria among which is the Yorùbá language. Even though, the absence of established orthogrYaphy creates some problems for the missionaries, but they were able to translate Rthe bible 14 into various indigenous languages like Yorùbá, using the literal translation Amethod.R Yorùbá Functional Approach to Translation IB The approaches used in the Holy Bible translations show Lthat the scripture was translated into Yorùbá language to make it available Ato tNhe speakers in their common language, as such there was application of domDestication and borrowing of foreign terms. This emphasises the task of the translatAor as a moderator between two cultures. The critical analyses of the efforts made Bat the translations of the novel written by Fagunwa, titled, Igbó Olódùmarè, Fint o IEnglish by two different translators, Wole 15 16Soyinka and Gabriel Ajadi oOn one hand; and those of the translations of the English Bible into Yorùbá on the othe r hand, lend credence to the understanding that sense, takes precedence over stTyleY, in these translations. In the translation oSf TIhe Holy Bible into Yorùbá, functional approach was used. The original translaRtion of the Yorùbá Bible (Bíbélì Mim ) and the subsequent translations of other verEsions of Yorùbá Bible have variations in the way some concepts and words are traInVslated. For instance, the way „bread‟ is translated into the Yorùbá language in theNse various versions of the Yorùbá Bible are not the same. Bíbélì Yorùbá At ka U 17(BYA), Bíbélì Ìròyin Ày (BIA) and Bíbélì Mím (BM). In the biblical period, „bread‟ was a prominent nourishment which was generally identified with food, in the Bible. However, on some occasions, it indicates a specific kind of food (an admixture of flour and water, with or without yeast, which is baked). When yeast is added, it is called leavened bread, while it is called unleavened bread when yeast is not added. This is, however, not the stuation in the Yorùbá culture. In the 132 traditional Yorùbá culture, bread was not part of their delicacies. Hence the Yorùbá did not have a name for it. This makes it particularly intricate to translate the word „bread‟ into Yorùbá in the Bible. According to the research by scholars, it was found that the word „bread‟ was written about 330 occasions in the King James Version (KJV) of the English Bible. Yet it has very few appearances in the Yorùbá versions of the Holy Bible. In the first version, Bibeli Yoruba Atoka (BYA), published in the 1880s, bread is synonymous with food in general. It is mostly translated as oúnjẹ (food), signifYying that something is eaten but not showing the particular thing that it is. NAeveRrtheless, whenever the bread is mentioned as a specific kind of food, it is refereRd to as àkàrà, a particular food of the Yorùbá people prepared from beans flour.I IBn the latter version (BMY) published in the 1990s, bread as food, in general, is alLso majorly translated as oúnjẹ or the verb jẹ, but whenever it is a type of food, it iNs re ndered as àkàrà, with few occurrences of „búrẹ dì.‟ Luke 22: 19 A „Ó bá mú búr dì, ó dúpẹ l w l run, Ó bùú,A ó bDá fún w n Ó ní...‟ „Bakanna ni Ó gbé 18ife fún w n lẹ yìn oúnjẹ, Ó ní … (Bíbélì ÌròByin Ày ). Ó sì mú àkàrà, nígbàtí Ó sì ti dúp Ó bIùú, Ó si fi fun won, Ó wípé,…B g g lẹ yìn oúnjẹ al , Ó si mú ago Ó wipe...(BíbFélì Mím . KJV). In Bíbélì Ìròyin Ày (Good N ewOY s Bible), „bread‟ when it is generally used to signify food, is either written as oúnjẹ or translated literally as „búrẹ dì‟, an adaptation of the English version. HSowIev Ter, where it occurs as a variety of food in this version, it is generally transRlated as búrẹ dì. It is only on few occasions that „àkàrà,‟ is used. This shows the Eborrowing of the word „bread‟ as „búrẹ dì‟ into the Yoruba language and culture.V I UGoNing by Quine‟s Indeterminacy thesis, indeterminacy occurs in the translation of these different versions of the Bible. While back translation of bread (àkàrà) would give „bean cake‟ in the version of Bíbélì Ìròyin Ày , bread (búrẹ dì), would translate „bread‟ when back translated. The question of which would be a better translation would not occur as Quine posited, because there is „no fact of the matter‟. Similarly, „cup’ is rendered as ago in one version and ife in the other version. While „ago‟ in 133 Yorùbá traditionally referred to the „gourd‟ used to bottle drinks like palm wine, „ife‟ 19 usually referred to a clay cup used for drinking water and other drinks. The English version of Luke 23: 48 says that when the crowd that came to see the crucification saw all that occurred, they “went home in deep sorrow” (New Living 20 Translation). …“they smote their breast and returned” (King James Version). …W n lu ara w n lí oόkan àiyà, w n sì padà (they smote their breast and returned) 21 (Bíbélì Mím ). Y 22 …. W n padà, w n sì káw lé‟rí pẹ lú ìbànújẹ . (They returned and put their Rhands on 23 their head in deep sorrow) Bíbélì Ìròyin Ày . RA While „smiting of breast‟ is the Jewish manner of expressing sorrIoBw, a Yorùbá person would not smite his/her breast (chest) to express sorrow, r aLther he/she does this to express pride. Instead, to express sorrow he/she puts Nthe two hands on the head. Indeterminacy occurs in these translations accordingA to Quine. Putting hands on the head and beating of the chest cannot be said to beD expressing the same thing however. If the aim of the author is to enlighten thBe YAorùbá on how the Jews express sorrow, this fact would be enough to show thIat „smiting the breast‟ would be a better expression than putting hands on theF he ad. In like manner, if the intention is to express the depth of their sorrow, „ puOtting their hands on the head‟ would be a better expression. Y This shows that i TSn YIorùbá, such expressions as this could not just cave in into indeterminacy Rbut the degree of accuracy needs to be determined based on the available faEcts within the cultural milieu.Yet according to indeterminacy thesis of QuineI, oVne of these translations cannot be said to be better than the other. However for anNyone who is well entrenched in the language, one of the translations would surely Umake a better sense than the other does. Quine‟s field linguist came into the field with the determinate meaning of „rabbit‟ in his own culture. He did not assume that any English man could misunderstand it to mean rabbit tail or rabbit stage. This shows him coming from a determinate cultural background. If language cannot be used determinately, Quine‟s attempt at communicating Indeterminacy of Translation to others would have failed, in that it 134 would be too complex to understand the meaning of his thesis in view of the numerous incompatible alternative meanings that would have been available. A comparative analysis of two translations of a text by two authors would show differences in translation from the perspective of each of the translators. The second 24 Yoruba novel of the renowned author, D. O. Fagunwa titled, Igbό Olódùmarè, was translated by two different authors. The differences in translation by the two translators became evident right from the title of the book. While Ajadi Gabriel translated Igbό 25 Olódùmarè, as „The Forest of God‟, Wole Soyinka translates the title of the Ysame 26 book to be, „In the forest of Olódùmarè‟. As Gbadegesin notes, the differAencRes in the 27 translation reflect the goal each of the translators has in mind. The Raims of the two vary, such that their interests have effects on their approach and mBanner of translation 28 of the intention of the author. LI The title of the book, In the Forest of Olódùmarè by WNole Soyinka is a fractional translation of Fagunwa‟s Igbό Olόdúmarè. The Atranslator substitutes the word “Olόdúmarè”, which he, among others, belieAvesD to refer to the supreme God in the cosmology of the Yorùbá. He also addIsB the preposition “in” so as to expose the connection of the nouns “forest” and “Olόdúmarè”. If the original title is back- translated, Igbό Olόdùmarè would Fmean “The Forest of God”. Soyinka consciously targets a well enlightened audi enOce of his era. A critical evaluation of Fagunwa‟s Igbό Olόdùmarè, and the traTnslYation of the novel into „In the Forest of Olόdùmarè,‟ by Soyinka, clearly reveaIls the inclination of Soyinka‟s translation towards the target- 29 oriented approaRch.S From the tEranslation of Samuel Ajayi Crowther, „God‟ was translated as „ l run 30 OlόdùImVarè,‟ However, scholars have observed the disparity between the conception ofN the Biblical „God‟ and „Olόdùmarè,‟ in Yorùbá conception. The controversy on Uwhether „Olόdùmarè,‟ is „God‟ in the Yorùbá belief system has been seriously debated by scholars. The question of whether Olόdùmarè is the same as God has been answered in three different ways by scholars. Among these scholars are the Western anthropologists who deliberately or not deliberately (mis)-translated Olόdùmarè, as being lesser than God. The second group of scholars is majorly African Yorùbá theologians who have equated the status of Olόdùmarè, with that of the Western God. 31 Bolaji Idowu posits that Olόdùmarè, in Yorùbá belief, is not inferior in quality and 135 essence to the Western God that was brought to Africa. He claims that Olόdùmarè, in Yorùbá cosmology, is supreme and almighty. Idowu gives the attributes of Olόdùmarè, as being a creator, the owner of heaven and earth, omnipotent, omniscient and omni 32 benevolent. Despite the qualities attributed to Olόdùmarè, He, Olόdùmarè, also has some divinities that are given the responsibilities to carry out their individual assignments. The divinities were given almost absolute power to accomplish their tasks. Divinities such as bàtálá were assigned with moulding the human body, Èsù was tasked Ywith 33 inspection of worship and rúnmìlá was given the assignment of divinatiAon.R Idowu states that the functions that these divinities perfom conferred Rupon them the authorities to be „almighty‟ within their personal limits. BNevertheless their “almightiness” is limited and totally subordinated to the u nLresItricted power of the 34 maker Himself. N Idowu has however been accused of promoting DWesAtern orientation and abandoning the African tradition that he set out to defend. AHe was said to have used the theoretical and intellectual instruments of the detrIacBtors of African belief system to promote 35Western value over African. The thFird group is a decolonisation school, which has tried to divest Olόdùmarè, of theO foreign attributes imposed on his nature. The conceptions of „Olόdùma rè,‟ by these three groups are at variance with one another. In the QuineaInT vieYw however, the translations of „Olόdùmarè,‟ from each of these various perSspectives fits into the structure of each conception. It would, therefore, be inRdeterminate. This is because there is no fact of the matter from which we can accEept one or reject the other. Each will therefore be correct within its own considIeVrations. According to Yorùbá traditional belief, Olόdùmarè has the greatest knNowledge. Despite this, there are accounts that some events occured without his Uknowledge or exclusive of His direct perception. This is shown in the process of the practical phase of creation, the way it is sustained and the management of the universe, 36 including even the realm of Olόdùmarè himself, ( run or heaven). 136 The Nature of Olόdùmarè and God The connecting word between Olό and marè is odù; as we have in odù Ifá. In the Yorùbá mythology, Ifá is regarded as the r (word, speech) and asírí (secrets) with which Olόdùmarè created the universe. If Ifá is regarded as the r (word, speech) and asírí (secrets) with which Olόdùmarè created the universe; then, those very words and secrets constitute odù, properly so-called. It is instructive from the above that Ifá act of hermeneutics, translation and meaning is embedded in the hiddenness of odù. This immediately spells out how the act of translation is connected to the Yorùbá conceYpt of Olόdùmarè. AR Some scholars conceive Olόdùmarè, and God to have the same BnatuRre, while some believe the two are of different nature. While God is conceived asI eternal, omnipotent, omniscience and omnipresent, Olόdùmarè sometimes ha d Lthe need to seek the assistance of rúnmìlà, one of the divinities to consAult INfá, who is believed to be the wisest one among the divinities. Ifá oracle iDs the channel of finding out the circumstances of events that is past, present, and also future. This insinuation regarding the restriction in the knowledgBe oAI f Olόdùmarè, is apparently one of the issues regarding the Deity, which iFs th e subject of most disagreement among those who are used to the previous traOdition that took its source from Idowu and supported 37by the cross-fertilisation of reli gion. In the writings of IdIowTu,Y one discovers the account of how some divinities were deployed to embarSk on the creation of the solid earth. There was the account of initial inability of thRe individuals detailed to do the task. Others however, eventually successfullyE performed the creation of the solid earth. The information about this 38 breaktIhVrough was then taken to Olόdùmarè. He was said to have at a time consulted anN oracle to have knowledge on the possibility of his death. An Ifá passage says that U„Kòròfo,‟ the cult of the underground was the person who did the consultation of the oracle on behalf of Olόdùmarè and affirmed that, nobody would ever hear of 39 Olόdùmarè‟s death. A different tradition gave the account of the efforts Olόdùmarè made to achieve immortality. According to this tradition, Olόdùmarè massaged his head, using a substance called Ìyèrosùn (bar-wood dust). He did this so that he may never taste 137 40 death. Every part of his head then becomes extraordinarily gray. Bolaji Idowu 41 recorded these accounts in „Ogbè ( ) y kú‟. Bewaji notes that the English translations made available by Idowu seem less than being the most suitable, the most 42 precise or faithful. According to him, the second line cited in the Ifá verse, conversed like Olόdùmarè did not personally conferred with the Ifá Priest of the Underground. It looks as if the priest of Ifá had the consultation, devoid of any demand by Olόdùmarè. The second one also talks to show that the oracle supports the immortality of Olόdùmarè. However, if the passage is well analysed, it will be so clear Ythat Olόdùmarè himself consulted his wise men. Similarly, kànràn Òsà, a passaRge of Ifá 43 states that nobody will ever hear that Olodumare is dead. RA One of the important analyses that Idowu made that is of cruciIalB significance in the reflection on Olόdùmarè's qualities is that, Olόdùmarè himLself was the one who personally looked for the means of immortality. Due to the request, he was asked to perform certain rituals, to make for himself a bulkyA chuNnk of white cloth. After the essential sacrifice had been carried out, the whiteD fabric was stretched over him, thus, 44 he was totally sheltered from death. Since theAn, he has become immortal. Idowu did try to divest himself of the persuasiIoBn of Christian theological demands and ontological categories. Thus, IdowuF say s there is a legend that claims Olόdùmarè at a period in time was at a loss ov eOr a very crucial issue. Several attempts were made by other divinities but they failed to acquaint him with the cause of his bewilderment. Ọrúnmìlà alone had a breaYkthrough at discovering and showing on the cause of the 45 T problem. SI This indicEatesR that, even though, Olόdùmarè is embedded with the primacy of wisdoImV, still he has assigned to a divinity the duty of revealing the sources of prNoblems, administering therapies or prescriptions and counselling. To reduce the total Uimplication of this reality, Idowu observes that this account was made up to boost the esteem of rúnmìlá, not taking into consideration the implication that it might reduce 46 the attributes of Olόdùmarè's who is regarded as "all-wise”. Bewaji, however, observes a contrary view to Idowu. For him, the attribute of Olodumare is not reduced just because Olόdùmarè' endowed wisdom to a divinity. He states that empowering a divinity to take up a task does not have any negative impact 138 on the belief of the Yorùbá, neither does it portray any absurdity in their view of Olόdùmarè. Furthermore, it is in no way, however little, subtract, from the "all- wiseness" of Olόdùmarè. To say that because Olόdùmarè created rúnmìlá and his wisdom, therefore, using from the assets of a being that was created implies a 47 diminution in the characteristics of the creator, is an irrelevant inference. Olodumare can and does tap from the resources he created. Wande Abimbola also supports this point. He states that according to some Yorùbá myths, there were instances when Ythere was no physical obstacle between heaven and earth, rúnmìlá was called Rupon by Olόdùmarè to employ his immense wisdom to proffer solutions to some chAallenges for 48 Him. R Abimbola‟s faithfulness was as a result of the fact that he wasL onIlBy bordered with the corpus of Ifá as the personification of the wisdom Olόdùmar è bestowed on rúnmìlà. He was not bordered with a characterisation of the fAeatuNres of Olόdùmarè. Abimbola later narrates a story of a disagreement between Dan Ifá priest and rúnmìlá, and how 49 Olόdùmarè decided to inquire from both sidesA to the dispute. The implication of this claim is that if Olόdùmarè is omniscienceI,B there would be no need for Him to ask each party in a dispute to state his/her oFwn side of the story. All that would have been needed was judgement based o nO his observable evidence. This shows that OlόdùTmaYrè, in these regards, displays a different quality from the biblical „God‟. SimilaIrly, some of the characteristics of Olόdùmarè are completely in contrast to thoRse oSf the Christian God. As a result, some theoretical and doctrinal challengessE that crop up in Christianity do not come up for the Yorùbá traditional religionV. The God of the Christian is shows profound mercy. He is slow to anger, but eaNsily Ind quickly forgive those who did wrong, repent and ask for forgiveness. He is Unot interested in the death of the sinner but that he turns back from his wicked way and be saved. Whereas, Olόdùmarè, in the conception of the Yorùbá, is a morally upright God. He implements and dispenses justice here on earth and does not necessarily wait for the life after death. This is because, justice on earth serves the function of being a deterrent to others, but it is not certain anybody will observe and learn from after-life 50 punishments. 139 Contrary to Quine‟s indeterminacy thesis, therefore, the difference in the conception of Olόdùmarè and God by the adherence of Yorùbá traditional religion and the Western missionaries respectively shows that translating one to mean the other would be a category mistake. Èsù and the Devil (Satan): Conflicting Interpretations There is the controversy whether translating „Èsù‟ in Yorùbá to Satan or Devil is acceptable. While some scholars accept the resemblance between the two, somYe do not. There is the understanding that, in Christianity, there exist structural antRagonism between God and Satan (Devil). The evil hosts of darkness frequently oppoAse the work of God work to obliterate it. Some scholars have stated that there is nRo real structural 51 opposition in the Yorùbá religious conception. According to theImB, Èsù in the Yorùbá cosmology could not satisfactorily symbolise the Devil o r LSatan in the Christian 52 doctrine. „Èsù‟, in the context of Yorùbá belief, is not ArebNellious to the work of God. The usual understanding and interpretation of ÈsùD, among the traditional Yorùbá, is as one of the major divinities. As Idowu empAhasized, Èsù is principally a "special 53 relations officer" between heaven an d IeBarth. He is the superintendent general who frequently gives intelligence reportsF to Olόdùmarè on the activities of both the other divinities and men. He checksO and ensures he gives reports on their adequacy of worship in general. He monitor s whether others perform the sacrifices required of them in particular. This showITs evYidently that as a divinity, he has the ability to do his task as assigned by OlόdùSmarè. Èsù inhabits a very important and unique office among the divinities. He eRffectively carries out his obligations devoid of fear or favour. Therefore, Èsù is a „gEood‟ servant of Olόdùmarè. He is the law enforcement officer who makes sure thIaVt adequate recompense and retribution follow any deed. His favour is, thus, cuNrried and he is sometimes bribed by many. It is when such offer did not prevent or Ufail to lessen penalty for their misdeeds that Èsù is called a bad name. Especially by those who took offence at his not doing all that is necessary to assist them despite their readiness to play ball with him to curry his favour. Idowu states that this act of given a bad name to Èsù becomes more pronounced with the introduction of Western religions. These new religious beliefs sought for correspondence of the Devil or Satan and discovered some attributes associated with 140 Èsù which made it a convenient substitute. This is due to the fact that any individual 54 who compels others to do the right things, are not usually popular. Despite the claim above, Idowu was still inclined to maintain the ambivalent perception of Èsù, when he stated that there was an unambiguous feature of evil in Èsù, and on that ground, he has 55 been principally connected with evil things. Some scholars have supported the notion that the principal task of Èsù in this universe is to ruin things. However, despite this claim, some believe we cannot still equate him with the Devil. This is due to the understanding that whatever degree of „evil‟ is fYound 56 in Èsù can also be established to some extent in many of the other diviAnitieRs. The inability to take a definite stand which reverberates in the many passaRges in the work of Idowu, has made it an available composition for much „fancifuBl interpretation and 57 reductionism.‟ Dopamu also laboured extensively, despite thLe fIact that he displayed intellectual competence and erudition, to accomplish to a l arge extent the preferred 58 Christian and Muslim translations of making Èsù the AequNivalence of Satan. However, this is seen as a misinterpretation by some scholarDs. This inclination was also available to soImBe e Axtent in the previous work Dopamu and Awolalu co-authoured. Both of Fthe m lend credence to Idowu‟s ambivalence 59concerning Èsù in Yoruba religOion. The discontenment with the stand of Idowu and Awolalu on this inadequate am biguity of the concept of Satan and Èsù, makes Dopamu to give an absolute corrTespYondence of Èsù with Satan in his personal work. Therefore, he asserts that in YorIùbá belief, Èsù is often linked with the tendency and power of evil and it is inR thSis sense that he regards Èsù, his figure, nature and character as the 60Devil or SaEtan. It is oIbVserved that Dopamu's project to equate Èsù with Satan or the Devil is not acNcepted by some scholars. Bewaji reiterates that if Dopamu‟s project had Uaccomplished its purpose, it would have given a logical validation for an originally unwarranted and malevolent translation of „Èsù‟ as the Devil or Satan and the associated launching of the problem of evil into an unfamiliar cultural and religious background. Secondly, it would have offered the foremost precise management of a 61 subject of interest across inter-disciplinary inquiries. Dopamu‟s reasons for associating Satan with the Yorùbá divinity called Èsù, is his acceptance of the 141 authorities of the Christians and Muslims Holy Books. They both make reference to Èsù as Satan. Also, his allusion to the Yoruba cosmology that refers to Esu as having 62 some elements of craftiness or evil in his nature. The claims above are seen to be deficient. It does not seem to be a convincing ground for such a significant inference. The conclusion that Èsù is Satan has untoward influence on the metaphysical, religious, moral, cultural, and linguistic understanding of a people. It has displaced and misplaced the actual understanding of the Yorùbá concerning this deity called Èsù. To begin with, that the foreign religious books eqYuate Satan with Èsù and translate as such does not make the translation to be AjustRified. As the Western religionists look for a suitable equivalence of Satan, the dRivinity with the closest features was imposed upon, not considering the disparitIieBs, and without any previous notification that such a translation is completely sub jeLctive and one of simple convenience. N From the foregoing, it is clear that Èsù is best regarAded or comparable to the Greek hermes, because its basic role is to act as theA mDedium between the invisible and the visible worlds. It is in this sense that IÈBsù is regarded as the messenger of both Olόdùmarè and Ifá, being a messenger, it is the conveyor of messages from the visible realm to the invisible realm andO vicFe versa. What this means is that Èsù is the agent that catalyzes interpretation, tra nslation and meaning in Ifá divination. Instructive from the above are the actsT oYf duality and complementarity, which form the core of interpretation, tranSslatiIon and meaning in Yoruba worldview. There have beRen various other Yorùbá terms that have been translated in a similar mannerV, leaEding to further commission of the error of misconstruction, misconception, and mIisunderstanding. Scholars like Sodipo and Hallen have cautioned against such N63error. In line with Quine, they argued in opposition to careless word-for-word Utranslation of a linguistic expression into another due to the indeterminacy of meaning that may occur between the initial and the other language. Also, the acceptance of the translation made available by the adherents of the new religions by the Yorùbá does not mean that their translation is precise; when a lie recurs again and again, it effortlessly puts on an apparel of truth. This is usually the case since most different teachers of religions continue stressing it everyday into the 142 hearing of the Yorùbá, that they were erroneous in their conception of Èsù, while the 64 foreign holy books conceptions were right. In difference from the obstinate Satan of the religions holy books, both Olόdùmarè and rúnmìlá possess sufficient power to subdue Èsù and they have always put him to 65 check. From the Yorùbá tradition, Èsù is conceived as being a necessary friend of all the other divinities. He was regarded as an intermediary between heaven and earth. As a result, the equivalence between the Yorùbá Èsù and Satan could not be absolutely the same. However going by Quine‟s indeterminacy of translation, one cannoRt bYe an arbiter between those who translate Èsù as Satan or devil and those who dAo otherwise, because fact of the matter is not accessible. BR Indeterminacy in the Translation from Yorùbá to English LLanIguage Soyinka‟s intention is to translate Fagunwa‟s novels Nto make the latter‟s works accessible to the non-Yorùbá speakers. He states that AFagunwa„s style makes his work not so easy to translate. Therefore, to make it comDprehensible to his target audience, he decided to look for the English equivalenBce Aof the expressions used for the people living in Fagunwa‟s corporeal world. M aIjority of the characters in Fagunwa‟s novels 66 are strange to the English and otheFr languages. In order to make it easier for his targeted audience to understandO Fagunwa, Soyinka adopted a method he said to be a 67 tradition of inventive naminYg c eremonies and neologisms. There is the need Sto Ico Tnsider the translation of a text by three different translators. There is a clearR case of indeterminacy as posited by Quine in these three translations of the same soEurce manuscript, „Igbó Olόdùmarè‟. As Gbadegesin observes, the approach each iInVdividual takes in translating the title of the book, offers an indication on the suNbstance that is fascinating to the mind of the translators; whether it is the Ugrammatical constructions or the thematic outlook of the whole novel. Ajadi‟s adaptation of Igbó Olódùmarè‟ is „The Forest of God‟. He substitutes “God” (popularly used in foreign religions, especially among the Christian fold) for “Olódùmarè”. He takes this from the common understanding of Yorùbá name for the Supreme Being as “Olódùmarè.” The narratives in the book in no way discuss the forest as being the habitat of God or of his spiritual ministers. It is a place occupied by numerous incredible bizarre and strange spirits. The version of Soyinka‟s translation 143 is, In the forest of Olódùmarè. This permits the reader of this English translation to either accept “Olódùmarè” as the personification of all the elements in the fable or as 68 an extraordinary being who operates as an unseen figure in the forest. Let us have a comparative analysis of the extracts of Fagunwa‟s Igbó Olόdùmarè by 69 two English translators of this same text. Adebawo Modupe‟s translations compared with Soyinka‟s translations in the chapterisation of the novel, Igbó Olόdùmarè, i. Fagunwa: j kejì l d bàbá onírùngbòn yẹ úkẹ ẹnití ngbé ibi gegele Y òkúta. AR Adebawo: The second day with the bushy bearded man, who liveRs on the tip of a stone. IB Soyinka: The second day with the furry-bearded one wLho lived on the rock promontory. AN ii. Fagunwa: Ìpínyà pẹ lú bàbá onírùngbòn yAẹ úkDẹ ẹnití ngbé ibi gegele òkúta. Adebawo: Departing from the bushIy Bbearded man, who lives on the tip of the stone. F Soyinka: Leave-taking fr oOm the furry-bearded one whose dwelling is on 70the promontory of Yrocks. Let us have a comSparIis Ton of translations of Ajadi and Soyinka of Fagunwa‟s novel Igbó OlόRdùmarè. Fagunwa: E V NI L sàngángan Ìj sí, nígbàtí mo j un ẹ kejì tán, mo kúrò ní 71 U ilé mi, mo b sí ẹ hìn odi, mo jòkό mo lé gόngό… Ajadi: It was on a sweltering afternoon, after I had eaten the second meal of the day, that I left my house and strolled to the outside of the city wall… I sat down… hugging 72 my legs to my ches... 144 Soyinka: One bright afternoon a long while past, after I had lunched, I left my home, strolled outside the fence of my compound… I sat…perched like the lord of all he 73 surveyed... „L sàngángan‟ was translated by Ajadi as, „on a sweltering afternoon‟. This is to indicate the unfavourable weather condition that made the author to remove his cap, to allow fresh air blow on his head. This was, however, translated by Soyinka as „one bright afternoon‟. This translation would not justify the reason the author had tYo be „forced to toss the covering‟ of his skull. While Soyinka translated „j un ẹ kejìR‟ as „had lunched‟, Gbadegesin notes that j un ẹ kejì (ounjẹ ẹ kejì) means more RthanA the second meal as translated by Ajadi. The major meals taken by theYorIùBbá are divided into three per day. They divide the day into three parts of a contin uLum; morning, afternoon, and evening. Breakfast is the meal taken in the morNning; lunch is taken in the afternoon. Dinner is eaten in the evening. A The author‟s focus is not to discuss taking foAod Drepeatedly at a specific period of the day. The starting expression, L sàngángan (sun-drenched afternoon) removes the uncertainty doubt that may come with “ j IuBn ẹ kejì‟. The meal that the author refers to is the “lunch”. In another culture in whFich four mealtimes are observed daily, “the second 74 meal of the day” would be tran sOlated beyond the purposeful meaning of the authour. This would not be due toY the problem of language, but that of the inability of the translator to key into thIeT correct understanding of the author‟s cultural reference. Also, SoyinkaR‟s rSendering of „ẹ hìn odi‟ as „outside the fence of my compound‟ damages thEe spirit of the original. This has put aside the ancient traditions of constrIucVting very high walls for fencing round the town, in Yoruba culture, as a prNocess of securing the people against foreign attacks whenever there were wars. In Uaddition, the traditional Yoruba cohabit together in the community. „ hìn odi‟ therefore 75goes beyond a common fence of a compound. It is therefore the “city wall”. Gbadegesin observes that “Jóko lé góngó” is a self-exalted proud sitting position. The manner in which the man sat shows how important he felt or considered himself. Ajadi translates this as, “hugging legs to the chest”. This may be understood as a form of punishment or sitting in an uncultured way. Soyinka on the other hand in his version 145 translates the same as “perched like the lord of all the surveyed”. This is closer to the 76 original sense of the expression. Consider these translations from the same source text, 77 Fagunwa: “Mo nmí hẹlẹhẹlẹ, bí ẹnití nsáré ìje, tí kàn mí nlù kìkì bí k òfurufú” Ajadi: “I was panting like one who was running race and my heart was beating very 78 loudly like an aero plane” Soyinka: “I was panting heavily as if I was on a sprint field, my heart pounRdingY like 79 the engine of an airplane” A The translation by Ajadi, literally considered, seems closer to RI Bwhat Fagunwa has written. This however, is not likely to make much sense to the foreign reader. Soyinka on his part shows vividly that it is the engine of an aeroplane oLr airplane that makes the kind of „beating‟ or „pounding‟, like the heart that thNe author talks about. Unlike Quine, any reader of the two could make a choicDe ofA which is better between the two alternative translations. A Fagunwa: ...inú bí mi gidigidi, mo fa o júI Bro bí ẹniti ebi npa, mo npòsé bí enití 80 ìyà njẹ... F Ajadi: …I was angry at hiYm, a n Od I frowned like a hungry person: I was sighing like a 81 man under stressT… I Soyinka: …I was Sfurious, my face was concerted by a frown like the face of a starving 82 man, RI sucked in breath as one in pain, tighten… E These ItwVo translations above have watered down the spirit of the original in the use of theN adverb, “gidigidi” which is for emphasis. The adjective (gidigidi), portrays moral U 83depiction of the high level of displeasure prompted by an unwanted disruption. This shows that contrary to Quine‟s indeterminacy, translations may be judged as good or bad and one form may be seen as better than the other. In the translation of another novel of Fagunwa, Àdììtú-Olόdùmarè, (The Mysteries of God) the translator, Olu Obafemi writes in the preface his intention for translating the 84 novel. He informs the recipients the rationale behind the translation, the method of 146 the translation, the type of recipients the translator focuses on at the assumption of this translation enterprise and the difficulties he came across in the process of his 85 translation. As Obafemi stated, he had developed interest in the literary work of Fagunwa and was fascination with his fictional novel right from his formative years. He stated further that he had wished during those years of innocence to find a way of given people with different background, who are alien to Fagunwa‟s world, in reality and in fantasy, opportunity to have access into his imagination. However, he never expected that the journey of translation he embarked upon would lead to a translYation 86 for native speakers who have turned out to be the targeted audience. AR He acknowledges the impute of Soyinka‟s translation of the first noRvel of Fagunwa titled, Ògbόjú dẹ nínú Igbό Irúnm lẹ , which, he said, increaIseBd his yearnings to follow his footsteps in the translation of Fagunwa‟s liLterary work. Like his predecessors who had earlier translated Fagunwa‟s novel Nfrom Yorùbá into English, he also emphasised the challenges he faced in the proceAss of translating Yorùbá into the English Language. These challenges came up mosDtly because of the style in Fagunwa‟s work. Some of the challenges Obafemi encBounAtered were due to the reason that he did not have the privilege to study Yorùbá lIanguage in a formal school setting inspite of 87 being a Yorùbá child. This is becaFuse he was brought up and studied in the Northern Nigeria which is not a Yorùbá coOmmunity. He also acknowledgeIdT thYe fact that he was not formally trained in the act of translation. He staSted that he did not have any educational instruction or practice in the art of translatRion. He claimed to be practically inexperienced in translation as a discipline. HEe sees the process of translation as intricate, due to its nuances, contextual matterIs Vand the behaviours of grammar of two different languages. He also sees 88himNself as not possessing the capability to avoid inter-linguistic spillage. UKnowing the importance of adequate skill in the art of translation, Obafemi therefore, prepares the minds of his audience that his translation could not be perfect. It could at best be an intermediate point between a result of an inexact science and the outcome of an individual who has imbibed two cultures. He is, thus, a bi-cultural individual, under pressure to have an equilibrium between fidelity to the source text in Yorùbá and 89 plausible translation for English as the target language. 147 The inter-linguistic spillage which may be avoidable if adequate skill is acquired, is not acknowledged by Quine as one of the major factors that may make different translations of the same text to have wide variations rather than being indeterminate. The fact of the matter would then be that some translations would be far from the centre of the continuum whether on the positive side or of the negative. Fagunwa says …ètè mí gbẹ, it ẹnu mí yi, ikùn mi ri pẹlẹbẹ, ojú 90 mí rí kán-ndό, mo lé góngó lórí igi…. RY Soyinka translates as: A …my lips parched, my mouth desiccated, mRy stomach flattened, my eyes bulging like egBgs. I 91 was suspended from the tree… LI Ajadi’s version N …my lips dried, the saliva in mAy mouth became sticky, and my stomachA waDs flat; my eyes saw a 92lot of trouble. I sat roundly on the tree… There is the clear evidence of transla tIioBn differences and contrariness in the two translations of the above text. QuiFne would want us to see this as an evidence of indeterminacy, whereas there isO a vivid error of misjudgement of the meaning of the source text and malapropisYm o n the part of one of the translators. It is observed that Ojú kán-dó (hollowinIg Teyes) in Yoruba language is not one and the same with ojú kàndò (big/protrudSing eyes), the meaning of “eyes bulging like egg” that has been translated by SRoyinka. This is a mistaken interpretation of the author‟s sense of using the expressEion. The word “kán-dó” is an adjective. It describes what those eyes have becomIeV after battling with long hours of exposure to starvation and distress during the 93 peNriod the narrator was on the top of a tall tree. Ajadi‟s translation “my eyes saw a lot Uof trouble” is closer to the author‟s use of the words. In this case, Ajadi‟s translation can be adjudged better. However, this would be against the spirit of indeterminacy thesis of Quine, where facts of the matter cannot exist. Of course where there are competent individuals, facts of the matter will be available. 148 There are words or concepts in Yorùbá language that are not readily available in other languages. For instance in Igbó Olódùmarè, Fagunwa writes ... Bí ό ti nb ni ẹsẹ rẹ ndún jìnwìnjìnwìn nítorí p lop ìkaraun ìgbín ni w n gé wẹ lẹ wẹ lẹ tí etí 94 k kan w n sì rí kiribiti bí etí owό sílè This was translated by two scholars, Adebawo: As he was coming his legs were tinkling because they are made Yfrom 95broken snail shells ... R Soyinka: As he approached, his legs kept up a tintinnabulation frRom Asnail shells 96which had been broken into little pieces … IB In the above text extracted, from Igbό Olódùmarè, the w oLrd “jinwinjinwin” is an idiophone in Yorùbá Language. “Jinwinjinwin” is a sounNd made when objects such as broken shells of snail are tied together with strings tAo produce a tinkling sound. This sound is a description of the outcome of theA cyDmbal sound made when a mythical being in the novel was moving. The objecBts tied to the legs of the creature are made from shattered snail shells. Soyinka u sIed a loan-word from Latin “tintinnabulum” (wind-chime) to get the word “tintinFnabulation” in an effort to derive a translation of this extract in his target text. O By translating “jinwinjinwiYn” as “tintinnabulation,” Soyinka has been able to rigmarole a way out of the unItTS ranslatable feature of the sound that does not have direct 97replacement inR English language. However, the reductive tendency which manifested in this tranEslation can be considered as qualitative impoverishment, as this extraction “tintinInVabulation” seems to lack the sonority or “iconic richness” and the cultural coNnnotation intrinsically embedded in the primary expression “jinwinjinwin” as U 98apparent in the original text. In like manner Adebawo‟s description of „legs were tinkling‟ has watered down the meaning of the sentence. In as much as it is not actually the legs making the sound, but the snail shells attached to the legs. Despite the inherent reduction in the two translations, Soyinka‟s translation may be considered better for formulating the sound made by the snail shell while Adebawo did not. 149 Alternative Perceptions of the Yorùbá to Indeterminacy Thesis Apart from the fact that indeterminacy features in the perception of the Yoruba in the consideration of translation, there are other perspectives from which the Yoruba look at this issue. These include; incommensurability, empirical observation and the contextualist approach. Incommensurability In the proverbs and words of wisdom of the Yorùbá, there are many sayings RpoiYnting to incommensurability of paradigms. For instance there is a saying that, A Ajá ‟wòyí ló mo ehoro ‟wòyí lé (It is the dog of nowadays that knBowRI s how to pursue 99the rabbit of nowaday‟). L The literal meaning of the above proverb indicates that a Ndog that had the skill to purse and catch hares in the previous years (eras) would faiAl to perform, if it is to be brought into the present period to pursue the modern hDare of this era. This is because the modern hare is more likely to have develoBpedA new strategies of escape different from the ones the dog from the previous era isI aware of and could cope wth. It is therefore necessary to train a new dog, in the Fnew techniques, to cope with pursuing the modern hare. O This indicates that moTdeYrn strategies are needed to solve modern problems. In language, thereforeS, mIodern usage of a word or concept may be different from the use in the earlier tiRme. There is the possibility for there to have been a paradigm shift. The Yorùbá somEehow partially agree with incommensurability of paradigm. They agree that thIeVre is most likely to be a difference in attitude and understanding between lanNguage and experiences that have been divided by time and space. The tools used to Usolve problems in the earlier period may be outdated and no longer useful in dealing with the present challenges. As such, the meaning of words in the previous period may no longer be acceptable as the meaning of such words in a new era. 150 Empirical Observation An individual can gain knowledge from empirical observation, according to the Yorùbá. Keen observation of events and actions could be a basis for evaluation. The Yorùbá say Proverb: Ọ r j gàté kò j gàté, w n ní ranko l s kan sá w „gbó, ènìyàn l s kan jáde níbe. Translation (literal): (Word resembles unreliable talk, it does Y not resemble unreliable talk, they said R one-legged animal ran into the bush and A one-legged person came out of the 100 bush). BR The proverb implies that if people are talking about a parti cLulaIr event, one needs to confirm the empirical observation of the event. This is toN emphasise that when there is an argument over a matter, words can then be corroboArated with action (observation) of the event. The Yorùbá believe in the empirical obDservation as a means of verification. This could be deduced from this Yorùbá provAerb that, if one observed that one-legged animal ran into the bush and a one-leIgBged human being comes out of the same direction where the one-legged aniFma l entered the bush. Then we should begin to suspect that the animal that ra nO into the bush is the same person that comes out as a human being. This emphasises that physical observation as a means of verification can be used to justify a sItaTtemYent. This in a way agrees with Quine. However, physical observation as mucSh as it is necessary in some cases, is not considered by the Yorùbá to be a sufficieRnt condition for sound judgement. YorùbIáV Co Entextualist’s Approach YoNrùbá say U Gángan l‟ r ayé, ó k jú kan s‟ẹ nìkan, t ló k sí ẹlòmíràn Translation (literal): The world issue is like two-faceted tom-tom native drum, it faces 101 one on a side, and faces another person at the other side. This Yorùbá proverb gives the indication that perceptions of worldly phenomena sometimes are relative. The way individuals perceive the world are different from one 151 another. This also affects translation, as the way a translator would translate a given text depends on what he perceives and considers to be its meaning, based on his personal perception and judgement. The environment, personal experiences, economic and socio-political status, all contribute to the way an individual would interprete an occurrence. For instance, in the Yoruba culture if an individual is struck by thunder and eventually died, the interpretation of the occurrence would vary. While traditional religious worshippers would interprete that Sàngó, the god of thunder is angry, others with scientific inclination would see it as a natural occurrence. This will lead eaYch to record and translate the event based on the context of their circumstances. AR This informs the Yorùbá saying that, R Gbogbo wa ò lè sùn ká k orí sí ibì kan. (We cannot all sleepL anIdB place our heads in 102one direction). This shows that we cannot all think alike. Therefore,A theNre cannot but be variations in the translations that we give to experience aDnd our perceptions of objects and experience. Yorùbá expressions are full of Aidioms and proverbs. Idioms are not a separate part of a language which on eI cBan chose either to use or omit, but they constitute an indispensable part of tFhe general expressions. These idioms have many sources, which include commo nO sayings, proverbs, and jargon phrases, all of which are interwoven with the people‟s national cultural background. The national cultural background of each naItTionY consists of its history, culture, religion, customs, literature 103 and even such peculiarities as climatic condition, weather and nourishments. An idiom is a sequRencSe of lexis that when brought together means something not directly associated wEith the specific words of the idioms when they are isolated. The words are usuallIy Vput together, often in odd, illogical, or even grammatically incorrect way. This is Nthe reason one must adopt idioms and proverbs as a whole. One cannot change any U 104 part of them and they cannot be translated word-for-word. If any part of the idiom is changed, the meaning would change accordingly. Similarly, if the words are isolated, it would give a totally different meaning hence, a different translation. 152 Problem of Translation To translate a text is considered by the Yorùbá to have its associated challenges. These include translation in excess of what the author has in mind or subtraction from the intending meaning of the source text. To acknowledge this challenge, there is a saying in Yorùbá, Ọ r òkèrè, bí kò lé„kan, á dín„kan (Distant conversation, if one word is not added, one 105 word will be subtracted from it). Y This shows that there cannot but be differences in re-told stories or speeches.R When a text is interpreted or translated, there is the more likelihood that RtherAe would be excesses or remainder in the meaning attributed to the source teBxt. Similarly, if an author is different from the translator of the text, the tendencyL foIr the translator not to understand the motive behind the text is high. Also, if Nther e was a gap between the source culture and the target culture, a distance iAn time and space, there is the likelihood that the translation would have addedD inputs from the translator that were not in the initial text. Furthermore, there is tAhe possibility of a subtraction from the source text, in what is being translate d IiBnto the target language. This is one of the challenges that require special skill iFn translation to overcome Yorùbá on Education and Sk ilOl Acquisition Yorùbá people had theirT owYn indigenous notion of education before they made contact with the Western SworIld. Even though the conception of education of the traditional Yorùbá is not Rthe same with the Western understanding of it. Education is a life-long process forE the traditional Yorùbá. It is regarded as any act or experience that has a mouldIinVg and influential outcome on the mind, physical and spiritual abilities, chNaracter and skills of a person, to allow him/her cope efficiently and reliably in the U 106society. In agreement with the perception of the Yorùbá, Babatunde Fafunwa gives the definition of education as, the totality of all the progressions by which a child or young adult build up abilities, attitudes and other forms of behaviour, which are of 107 constructive value to the society in which he lives. The word “education” means ẹ k in Yorùbá language. The word ẹ k is broader in meaning than ìm (knowledge), ìwé (literacy), ilé-ìwé (schooling), gb n 153 (understanding), and òye (wisdom). Though these words are related. The word ẹ k refers to the real exhibition and constant manifestation of the epistemic characteristics of knowledge, wisdom, understanding and other moral ideals of excellence. These ideals include; temperament, integrity, modesty in mind-set and self-discipline, in words and deeds. The word ẹ k can be divided into two morphemes ẹ and k . The first morpheme ẹ is a plural pronoun in Yoruba language which refers to many people. It connotes that a substantial number of people are involved in the training of an individual in the society. The morpheme k means „to learn‟. k (education) Ythen implies that an individual must learn from so many people with diverse knowlRedge and experiences before he/she can attain the level of education needed toR be Aa functional member of the society. IB The parents are the first set of teachers in the traditional YLorùbá society. It is the responsibility of the parents, the relatives and the commuNnity at large to be involved in the training of an individual. However, if a person reAfused to be educated, the blame for not being educated belongs more to the indivDidual rather than the parents and the society at large. Therefore, education was aB lifAetime process for the Yorùbá. It involves inter-relationships among diverse occur reInces that had shaping and determining impact on the whole character of a person inF relation to his/her society. The Yorùbá cultural understa ndOing of education can be properly evaluated only in relations to being a goTod Ypersonality of integrated character. An educated person is expected to displaSy reIasonably well the constructive use of the physical, mental and psychological nRature of the human being, and the ethical decency in his/her life in the 108society. IEn as much as education is important, a person who is well trained is the one that otIhVer individuals want to follow his/her footsteps as a role model. Such individual 109haNs dignity, integrity and commands respect. It is believed by the traditional Yorùbá Uthat a person needs to be adequately trained to understand the cultural standard and values of the society and be prepared to always learn from the wisdom of both the old and the young in the community. This shows that acquisition of skill is a means to an end and not just an end in itself. As a result, nothing could necessitate calling-off the pursuit of learning from other people‟s experiences. J. A. Akinpelu says of Yorùbá education that, the man who is 154 educated can be illustrated as a person who has acquired skills in some particular economic areas, combined with reliability of character and with prudence in judgement. He is the one who is well prepared to cope effectively with the challenges associated with living in the nuclear and extended family. He is well-informed in the myths, legends and genealogies of his ancestors. He also has expertise in handling health challenges that are minor and could give direction on the place to access counsel and assistance in major ones. He is an individual who is conversant with the ancestral spirits of the family. He is familiar with how to worship them. He has the capaciYty to carry out his communal and political duties. He is prudent and clever in judRgement, speaks not in many words but instead communicate in proverbs and analogAies, placing his audience in the position to find an answer to the puzzle of his Rthoughts. He is temperate and calm when others annoyed him. He is distinguIisBhed in sorrow and reserved in success. Finally and most significantly, he is gLenerally of outstanding 110 character. AN The Philosophical Foundation of Traditional YDorùbá Notion of Education Among the major philosophical ideoloIgBy t Ahat lie beneath the Yorùbá notion of education is that the African notionF of an educated personality, when compared with the Western idea, is characOterised by the ideology of functionalism, social accountability, skill acquisitio n, political contribution and understanding, moral and 111 spiritual values. EducTatioYn was not a formal structure in traditional Yorùbá culture, in disparity with whatI obtains in the Western education of the modern world. Instead, the process wRas Sinformal and functional. It aimed at producing straightforward, upright, skiElled and communally accountable manpower that would do the accepted things Vto maintain the societal stablility and enhance the development of the coNmmIunity. UThe people were given orientation to acquire skills of different kinds, based on the particular areas of social and physical needs of the community and natural world in which they inhabit. For example in the coastal and riverine areas, skills acquired included swimming, construction of canoe, navigation, fishing and netting of fish, among others. In areas within the rain forest, with vast expanse of agrarian land, the skills acquisition trainings were essentially based on farming, food preservation, weaving, building, hunting, blacksmithing and communication among others. The 155 natural environmental factors in each Yorùbá community influenced the type of educational instructions given to its associates. Thus, the traditional Yorùbá people did not have a universal operational curriculum. The traditional Yorùbá notion of education is also different from the Western education in that it has a social side. It is different from the individualistic orientation of Western education. In the Yorùbá understanding, education does not exist alone detached from the society. Since the entire community serves as the school, education derives motivation and sustenance from the social principles of the communitRy; anYd in a cyclic manner, the educated person is required to use the skill and knowAledge he has 112 acquired for the expansion, advancement and improvement of the comRmunity. This aspect of social accountability is very obvious, based on the coBmmunal life of the traditional Yorùbá society. LI The individuals, who were educated, were required to aNdd value to the general well- being of the society. This is the progressive aDttituAde of the Yorùbá principle of education. This concept of education involvesA a procedure of resolute and constructive revolution in a specified direction, whichI Bis directed by common and united spirits. It is a show of a powerful interconneFcted ness between the nature of man, the good of man and the physical and socialO environment. The principle implies that human beings are inclined towards making t hemselves perfect, to develop and progress in definite bearings that are more TsupYerior presently than they had been in the past; and for a better future. The priInciple of progressivism is a support pillar of the traditional Yorùbá idea ofR eduScation. It specifies that skill and knowledge need be appropriated to 113generate feaEsible communal structures for systematic social transformation. AnNothIer V essential principle that is fundamental to the Yorùbá indigenous system of Ueducation is moral conduct. Instruction on positive character development is pivotal to the Yorùbá practice of education. In contrast with the Western concept of education in which prominence is most often given to the cognitive feature of human being and the inherent importance of knowledge, to the detriment of the ethical and other potentiality of man; the Yorùbá view of education is shaped by the interest in morality and the tacitly accepted standard and values of the society. Ethical principles are taught, learnt and lived. Consequently, courage as a norm, is not just taught, it is exhibited. 156 Likewise, resilience and dedication to duty are not merely taught, but are also demonstrated. A person is taught morals by exemplars from childhood to adulthood, through direct instructions, songs, moon light folktales, proverbs, myths and other related means. Hence, on the whole, the principles that guided traditional Yorùbá 114 education were; functionalism, progressivism and moralism. As Obanya, has appropriately elucidated the Yorùbá education has a purpose directed 115 at two related important goals, which are; conservation and transformation. ForY him, conservation involves acculturation - the alertness at transfering a community‟Rs values, skills, attitudes and knowledge from one generation to the other. ConseArvation also entails utilisation of indigenous educational principles of the AfricaRns, to meet the contemporary requirements for the development of the continenLt. I B The importance of skill acquisition to enable a personN perform a task successfully cannot be over-emphasised. What comes easily toA a skilled individual would be difficult for someone who lacks the necessaryD ability to perform the task. The perspectives of the Yorùbá on a wide ranIgeB of A issues are most often found expressed in proverbs. These also include their thou ghts on language and translation. The saying goes that; F Àkàrà d‟ nu akáyín ό de‟egun O(„Bean cake gets to the mouth of the toothless and 116 becomes bone‟). TY The Yorùbá believSe thIat the task that is easy for an individual with an adequate skill may be a diffRicult task for another individual without a well-equipped skill. An important vEalue in the traditional Yorùbá society, that influences their thoughts and behaviIoVural pattern, is education. It may look odd initially to assert the interest of the YoNrùbá society in education, due to the ethnocentric belief of some early modern Uanthropologists that Africans were primitve, “uneducated” and unenlightened. Education equips and prepares a person from childhood. A Yorùbá adage says Bí m ẹni kò bá gb ẹnà, a kì í f ẹnà sí i (If one‟s child does not understand signs or 117 coded language, one does not communicate it to him). 157 There are signs and coded language that a smartly educated individual is expected to understand. This indicates that sometimes words and concepts may be loaded with more than the surface meaning. The meaning attached to concepts may go beyond what a third party can easily decipher. It may be loaded with stories and histories behind them. The saying goes that A wítẹ l r ló njẹ m mí gb ẹ nà (Previous discussion on a matter brings about „my 118 child understand signs, codes or concealed sentence‟). Y This is to express that parties in conversation understand the details of the caRse under discussion due to profound previous learning. The details may howeAver not be available to the third party who may be lost in the discussion. BR Competent Authority LI A person who has acquired a skill is seen as an authoritNy in that wise. His words are taken to carry much weight. This informs the sayinDg thAat, r tí Akúwárápá bá s , ará run lo s B (TAhe word mentioned by the epileptic is 119delivered by a heavenly personality). I An epileptic individual is regardOed aFs someone who shuttles between heaven and earth. Any claim made by such i ndividual about what he/she saw in heaven when unconscious, cannot be TfauYlted by those who have never made such journey. He /she is therefore seen as an auIthority on the after-life experience. This Yorùbá proverb directs attention to thRe imSportance and the need to accept as correct something said, or a speech deliEvered only by someone who is expected to be knowledgeable in the field. This aIsVcribes importance to a thing or a speech delivered by one expected to be knNowledgeable in the field. Such a person must have been seen to make conscious Ueffort to acquire knowledge and must have demonstrated the impact of the knowledge attained in the recent past. It is believed that the speeches or utterances of some people cannot be taken serious. However, some people who are knowledgeable are regarded as authorities and their description cannot be faulted. A translator as well who have necessary training would become an authority in translation. His translation would therefore be far better than the ones who are not well trained. 158 In the education of individuals, such a person who has been educated is expected to be innovative. m lúàbí in Yoruba cultural understanding is a person who has passed through the basic training of the community and has been found to be responsible and exhibit high moral virtues. He / she should be able to develop the potentials in him / her to improve on the skill acquired. This reflects in the proverb that, r diẹ là á s fún m lúàbí, bi o ba de inú rẹ a di odindi (Few words are said to the 120 wise or nice fellow, when they get into his mind, they shall be whole). Y In translation this implies that the translator is responsible to add or subtrRact, in a responsible way. In as much as it is recognised that few words canR be Aspoken that would go beyond the mere expression, partial understanding of an expression is also regarded as a source of confusion. It is part of the responsibLilitIyB of the translator to clear any confusing text and divest it of whatever is causing a mbiguity or vagueness. A translator should be able to develop the text into what wNill meaningfully fit into the recipients‟ culture. AD A Being Concise The Yoruba recognise that anyone who isI tBo take up the task of translation should have a firm grasp of the languages invOolveFd. The Yoruba say, „Àgb ìgb tán èdè, tí díjYà s ìlẹ ‟ (Half understanding of a language that causes confusion). IT If a translator didS not understand the text to be translated, the outcome of the translation EwouRld not achieve its purpose. The translator should understand the cultural backgroVund of both the source and the target languages before proceeding on the miNssioIn. This will enable him / her to know how and when the text should be literally Utranslated and when it is to be adapted. What creates a positive emotion in a culture, if so translated into another culture might cause a negative one. Clarity Another important factor that the Yoruba believe is necessary for translation is clarity. Both the speech and its translation must be unambiguous. This is established in the Yoruba saying that, 159 121 Às r àìlà á l‟ό pa Elémpe ìsáájú t‟ó ní igbá wúwo ju àwo l . (Making a statement without explanation killed former Elempe who said that a calabash was heavier than a ceramic plate. (He meant a complete calabash before it was cut and its seeds removed). Elémpe, in Yoruba mythology was regarded by the people in his community as an embodiment of wisdom. He, however, made an unclarified statement that a calabash was heavier than a ceramic plate. While the king of the community corrected him that it was not the case, Elémpe decided to prove it, putting his life at stake. He was invited yo come and proof his statement before the members of his community. The Yking brought out a ceramic plate and a complete calabash fruit, with seeds in it.A EléRmpe was asked to lift the two objects to show how calabash was heavier than Rceramic. It was then it dawned on him that he did not specify that he meant dryI Bprocessed calabash. This led to the order for Elémpe to be executed, for trying to Lmislead the community through his wrong teaching. This would also prevent h im from corrupting the communal wisdom of his society. It was expected tAo sNerve as a lesson to others to propagate correct and adequate teaching for propeDr functioning of the society. The implication of this for translation is thBat, aA translator should always divest his / her work of any equivocation. It is oFnly wIhen the message in a piece of writing is succinctly put that it can generate the expected effect on the recipient. The same factor of clarity is emphasized in a sim Oilar saying that; Àìlè s r jálẹ Y lo pa baáTlẹ Ajẹ kókóró ó ní déédé ibi tí mo bá ju isu sí ni kí ẹ wó l‟ódó (Failure to expressS hiImself clearly lead to the death of the Chief who ate a slice of 122 yam, he said, pRound with pestle the exact spot where I throw the yam). Chief IAVjẹ kó Ekóró, in Yoruba mythology, wanted to prepare pounded yam. He instructed hisN children to use pestles to pound the precise spot wherever he put any piece of the Uyam. Unfortunately for him, at a point, he felt like eating a piece and throw it in his mouth. The children obediently pounded the mouth of their father, being the exact spot where the yam was thrown. This led to the death of the Chief. This is used as a warning for the danger of not expressing one‟s intention clearly without ambiguity. Translators are required to convey their messages in such a manner that the recipient would find it easy to absorb the intending message without error. 160 Skilled translator An important quality that the translator must possess is the capability to understand the message from the source, correctly interpreting the message and translating it accurately to the target audience. Thus, the Yoruba say, pẹ lẹ kò sèké, Oníkin ni kò gb ‟fá, ohun tí a bá da ifá sí ni ifá ns . (The god of divination does not lie, it is the reciter who does not understand the god‟s messageY, it is 123what one consults the god of divination for that the god speaks on). R Whenever ( pẹ lẹ ) the god of divination was consulted, the deity would alwAays give an accurate prophecy. The deity usually relayed the prophecy throIuBgh Ran intermediary (Oníkin), who had been trained and was expected to understand the language of the deity. Oníkin, therefore, served as the interpreter of the Ndeit y‟ Ls message. However, it was discovered that some of the prophecies given bAy the deity were not correct or sometimes turned out to be outrightly false. TheD deity was, thus, accused of being a peddler of false prophesy. Other older and wiAser priests of the oracle, however spoke in defense of the deity. Their discovery waBs that the oracle‟s prophecies were not false, but it was the interpreter that did noFt a ctIually understand the message of the god and relayed contrary messages. O The above Yorùbá proverbY em phasises that even when the message from the source is clear and unambiguous,T the translator who is ill equipped to give adequate translation is most likely to dSistoIrt the intended message to the target audience. Therefore, the possibility of aR translator giving a wrong, confusing and ambiguous translation cannot be overV-emEphasised. As such any would be interpreter is expected convey the message in a siImple language that would be easily understood by the recipient. Thus the Yoruba saNying that, U là l‟ r , ibẹ p ko sé j lódidi (Speech must be split; the pawpaw cannot be eaten as a 124 whole without being split). This indicates that speeches should be well explained for unambiguous understanding. The competence of the speaker or translator in „splitting‟ explaining the meaning of the speech would determine whether the intended message would reach the target 161 audience. This emphasises that the Yoruba consider congruency as an important factor in communication. It is expected that tone of the words of the speaker and his/her body language need to convey the message that is the same. Indeterminacy states that one cannot be certain of communicating any expression, at least, not in a precise sense. As Anthony Pym points out, one cannot take for granted that there is a meaning that is encoded on a side and then decoded on the other. The contrary to indeterminacy would be a view that assumes “codes transmission” or 125 “meaning transfer”, somehow able to guarantee equivalence. The specific feaYtures and peculiarities of Yorùbá idiom make it either untranslatable or make itAs trRanslation indeterminate, especially when its meaning has no association wRith the original meaning of the separate words when they are isolated. IB The manner in which the Yorùbá translate is principally gr oLunded on convention or tradition, and not only on observable facts. As such, Nthe indeterminacy of radical translation extends into non-radical translation, Din Aaddition to translation within a 126 single language. For instance, consideringA the literal translation of these Yorùbá idioms: IB bá ti w‟àjà – The king has entered Fthe roof. bá ti papòdà - The king has c hOanged position. bá ti re ibi àgbà írè – TTheY king has gone to the place the elderly go. bá ti re ‟wàlẹ àsàS - TIhe king has gone into the cultural place for men. Àkùk ti k E lẹ hRìn bá - The cock has crowed behind the king. bá tiI fVilẹ bora bí as –The king has covered himself with the ground like cloth. UAlNl these mean the same in Yorùbá, that is, „The king is dead‟. These idioms cannot be literally translated into English meaningfully, as the meaning cannot be associated with any of the unique meaning of each specific word. Yorùbá idioms and proverbs cannot be translated into English, but can be pragmatically translated through mutual replacement by equivalent ones in the Target Language (TL). Thus, bá ti w‟àjà (the king is dead) or any of its equivalence in Yorùbá can be translated as, „the king has kicked the bucket.‟ The English version when translated into Yorùbá language would 162 be „ bá ti ta kolobá ní ìpa‟, which could not make much sense but could only be understood literally in Yoruba language. Hence, in such translation, a language would lose its national character, as the Yorùbá historical and cultural environment is 127 automatically replaced by English history and culture. However, where there are no similar or equivalent translations of an idiom, it can be paraphrased in plain language, even though this may not be satisfactory. So the task of a translator to preserve the spirit of the original and produce something which functions in the same way as the original is not fulfilled. The mono-linguisticR YoYrùbá translator is also in a way deficient in many autonomous controls in whicAh the jungle linguist was lacking. Some scholars have also argued that even a sRingle individual lacks the ability to neutrally decide between probable interpretationBs of utterance made in his /her own idiolect at different point in time. LI From the Yorùbá proverbs, it could be deduced that Athe NYorùbá agree with the notion that there are some words that may be intractable Dand not easy to translate. The Yorùbá say, A Òwe lẹsin r , B r lẹsin òwe I T‟ r bá s nù F Òwe la ó fi wa O This could be translated thuYs: Proverb is the horse or powering machine of speech Speech is the horse of IpTroverbs When any discussiSon is lost 128 We use proverbR to find it out. HowevIeVr, n Eo matter how intractable a word or concept may be, it could be found thrNough the use of proverbs. This means there exists in Yorùbá parlance that there is Ualways a way to circumnavigate the challenges of words or concepts that seem inadmissible to translation. The Yorùbá have made efforts to „unwrap‟ meaning of alien words and concept such as; artificial- àt w dá (Created with hands); police - l pàá (One with rod /staff); bargain- Idunadura (Haggling before purchase); 163 basic - Ibẹ rẹ -pẹ pẹ (From the scratch/ beginning); barrack – bárékè; battery- bàtìrì; bequeath - Fi síl bí ogún (Left behind like an inheritance); blackboard- Pátáko ìk wé (Plank for writing books); Agnostic - a siyè–méjì-nipa-ohun-merìírí (One who doubt what he has not seen before); Economics- Ìm ìsúná –owó (Knowledge of trading with money); Y Algebra - àjìbìrà; R Allegiance - Ìwà ìfòtìt -inú –sìn (Acts of rendering service with inner truthA); aluminium – alumínìo; R allegory - Ìtàn-olówe (story with proverbs); IB alumnus - kùnrin akàwé jáde (A male who has graduated fr omL an institution); ambassardor - asojú ìjoba nìl òkèèrè (RepresentatAive Nof government in a foreign land); ammunition - Ohun ìjà olóró (Poisonous fightiAng wDeapons); application - Ìwé ìwá nkan (Letter for searcBhing something); 129 appeal - P‟ẹj k òtẹ mi-l rùn (Make aF ca seI for expression of dissatisfaction). The criteria that determine equ ivOalence in translating these words and concepts are the nature of the words and coYncepts which need to be preserved in any translation that is successful. Thus, the ItyTpe of equivalence required, between the source text and the target translation, Sis not the same in all cases. While in some cases concepts are borrowed fromR the foreign culture, in some other cases coining of concepts are evolvedV. E ThNe wIords that are culture based are more influential towards indeterminacy. This Udepends on whether the structure or format in which the statement is presented is figurative or literal. The more the complication and complexity of the statement, the more it is inclined towards indeterminacy. A text that has more likelihood of ambiguities and absurd of meaning, in the use of language, becomes indeterminate. However, determinacy does not warrant any further translations. Translations are usually not uniformly determinate or indeterminate in as much as language usage in different culture is not the same. Translators of the same text are mostly inclined to 164 translate the passage differently in terms of their personal experience, educational standard, language competence, and cultural background. A source text would be very demanding to translate (indeterminate), when it is out of the conventional cultural context. As Francis Offor observes Theoretical and metaphysical claims involve beliefs, worldviews, and social values, and there is the tendency for the meaning attached to such concept in the language of a group to be defined by the totality of the culture of that group in Y question. And just as the meaning of concepts in the language of a group is defined by the totality R of the culture of the group, so also is language A the vehicle through which the cultural belieBfs oRf 130any group are transmitted. LI The translator would, for this reason, be pessimistic of whether the translation provided is accurate, considering that it is not in confAormNity with the cultural practices and language expression of the targeted recipientsD. A translator needs to exercise caution in a situAation where we have the same concept in different cultures but different conceptio nIsB of the concept, where a conception in one is seen as a misconception in the otherF. For instance, „Cow‟ is a concept familiar to both Yorùbá and Hindu cultures. A YOorùbá man sees a cow and says, „this is a cow‟. The Indian agrees and says, T„thiYs is a cow‟. Let us consider this dialogue between them: Yorùbá: This is meSat. I Hindu: This isR a god. YorùbáV: WEhen it is slaughtered, it is fun and entertainment. HinduI: When it is slaughtered, it is a sacrilege and abomination. UYoNrùbá: It is for food, to be eaten. Hindu: It is a god, to be worshipped. Whereas the concept „cow‟ is the same in both cultures, the conceptions (functionalities) are different. A Yorùbá author describing a ceremony where cows were slaughtered to portray the wealth of a family in a Yorùbá cultural setting would „misfire‟ if he should assume same conception of cow in Hindu culture and translate as 165 such. There is then the need for fidelity to ensure that what X means is what Y understands. As George Steiner points out, to deny the validity of translation because it seems impossible in some cases, is ridiculous. What one needs to clarify is the level of 131 fidelity to look for in each case. If we are not to confine ourselves to translation in the narrow sense (by restricting ourselves to pairs of texts in separate language, connected in some way), but leap into greater adventure towards communication with all cultures, then we need to have “shifting of meanings and dynamic hybridities as our 132 object and state.” Y From the understanding of the Yorùbá, some sorts of error may occur inA traRnslation. These include not understanding the meaning of a term in the languageR from which the translation is made. There is the saying that: W n l‟ m dé kò m‟ẹ làB, o s wìpé òun m là fála fàla, ní àìm wípé là fála fàla ba ìjà ni. [A child waLs toIld he does not know là (Chief of peace), he brags that he knows „ là fála fàla‟ (so many „ là‟)], he does not understand that „ là fála fàla‟ is the chief of crises. (A làN in Yorùbá mythology stands for peace, but its multiple, là fála fàla, meansD crises.). While the child boasts he knows a lot of peace, what he said actuallyB conAnotes knowing a lot of crises. Another error that may occur is the iInability of the translator to understand the meaning of concepts in the languaFge into which the translation is being made (the same name may mean diffe rOent things). Also, the interpretation of a specific 133 expression using a geneTralY equivalent and misleading literal translation. A text that contains proper nameI may be very difficult to translate. In Yorùbá culture, proper names are fullR of Smeanings. The Yorùbá say/s Ilé ni à n‟wò kí á to s‟ m l‟όrúk . 134„Ayandele‟E, used in Tal‟ό pa m ba, is a person who takes drumming as a 135 profesIsiVon and the name is used to denote drummers in Yorubaland. How can one traNnslate a proper name? With what does a person replace it or what sort of Uequivalence can one find for it in any language, most especially when such is loaded 136 with meaning and visibly reaches beyond its individual bearer? This in a way could not but affect the smooth flow of translation. The Yorùbá language is sometimes very esoteric to nature and interprets natural phenomenon spiritually. While Yorùbá language is very versatile in given name to elements close to natural environment, it does not have some of the words to translate scientific and technological concepts of the Western world. Words such as „atoms‟, 166 „molecules,‟ „neutrons‟ are alien to Yorùbá language and culture. Therefore, there is the need for a pragmatic way of understanding that will take care of the factors limiting the adequate process of cross-cultural translation and understanding. Yorùbá Pragmatic Way of Translation Interpretations and translations are interrelated. All interpretations are translations in the broad sense. We translate one phenomenon into another, one interpretation into another, one translation into another and one text into another. There is a synYergy between translation and interpretation within Yorùbá pragmatic cultural hermReneutics, which bridges the gap between translation and interpretation. This Asynergy is achievable within the Yorùbá perspective because Yorùbá culturaRl hermeneutics operates on the principle of complementary dualism or duality forI Bshort, as opposed to 137 the antagonistic dualism of Quine and others. This compl emLentary duality between interpretation and translation promotes pragmatic interdeNpendence of language genres, making it a mean between determinacy and indetDermAinacy. As noted by Oluwole, the Yoruba nation has made one of the greatest coAntributions to world intellectual heritage, being one of the first people in the woIrBld to articulate, develop and adopt Binary Complementarity as a strong intellectu al structure within which science, philosophy, and the social sciences, severally anFd mutually locate an existence that is both rational 138 and scientific. . O Yorùbá linguists haveI TproYposed some devices for formulating Yorùbá terms. These include; S i. CompoRsition: This has to do with two or more items like morphemes, words VphrEases and others, for the purpose of expressing foreign concepts or objects I based on the qualities or features that such concepts manifests. For instance, U N English: Bill Yorùbá: Àbá - òfin (This means literally suggestions) ii. Explication: It involves making explicit information available about foreign objects or concepts in Yorùbá English: Imprisonment Yorùbá: Ìsẹ w n (The acts of being put in chains) 167 iii. Semantic extension: This has to do with extending the meaning of a concept, term, or word in Yoruba language for the purpose of expressing or describing a foreign one nthat is not available in the language. For example; English: President Yorùbá: Ààrẹ (An official title of a war high Chief, who is first in rank). This is extended in translation to the President of a Federal Republic. iv. Idiomatisation: This involves the use of idioms as a means of expressinYg or describing foreign concepts or objects. R English: Veto RA Yorùbá: Ìgbẹsẹ -lé (Literally – the act of putting legs on soImBething). v. Loanwords: It involves the adoption or borrowing oLf words from a foreign language (mainly English) for the purpose of exprNessing concepts or objects for which either there are no equivalent YorùbáA terms or the available Yorùbá terms are inappropriate. For instance; D English: Budget Yorùbá: B jBẹẹtìAI English: Bail YorùbFá B éèlì 139 English: Committee YOorùbá: K mití 140 These pragmatic steps iTncluYde; „coining,‟ „borrowing,‟ description of reference as it can be visualized or imIagined by the speakers of these languages; and „adaptation‟ in such a way that tShe words will enjoy acceptability, harmonization, uniformity and 141 consistencyE in Rtheir orthography, to take care of the different levels of equivalence that exVist. Equivalence in translation should not be word-for-word translation. 142 HoNwevIer as identified by G. P. Baker, different levels of equivalence should be Uconsidered. These include (i) Lexical word (ii.) Grammatical differences in Language (iii.) Difference in language information structure (iv.) Textual cohesion (v) Pragmatic issues; original writer‟s intention or implied meaning. However from the perspective of Yorùbá, we would like to conclude that while total, exact translation may be difficult to reach, adequate cross cultural understanding is achievable. The implication of this is that consideration must be given to the 168 immediate cultural context of the situation of the Source Language for it to be matched with that in the Target Language text. Conclusion Quine states that words in our language get their meaning from their relationships with every other word in the language, there is a vast network of meaning, therefore there is no way of identifying the sentences that are solely a matter of meanings from the ones that attach to experience. The Yorùbá also believe that the meaning of a word cYould not be isolated from its relations with the other words in the language. HowevRer, there is a group mind that is expected to capture the essence of any concept orA word, in as much as it is an outcome of the culture, custom, tradition andB wRay of life of a community, which is most often passed from generation LtoI generation through socialisation and enculturation. There is nowhere this is codif ied or documented, but is 143 engraved in the minds of the community. This could bNe accessed through education and acquisition of skills. Thus an individual coDuld Anot be competent in translation without adequately passing through the socialisation and enculturation of the community. It is discovered that the Yorùbá Aapproach is pragmatic and functional in nature. The next chapter shall therefore foIcBus on pragmatism as a way out to achieve a better translation. O F SI TY R IV E UN 169 End Notes 1. Adegbindin, O. (2014). Ifá in Yorùbá thought system. Carolina Academic Press Durham, North Carolina: p.xviii. 2. Na‟Allah, A. (2010). African discourse in Islam, oral traditions and performance. New York: Routledge: 18. 3. Ogunshina, B. AyeAkamara society for Ifa. Aug. 31, 2011: 1. Y 4. Yusuf, T. I. & Olusegun K. (2015). Management of indigenous knowledgeR (Ifa and Egungun) in Osun State, Nigeria. Library Philosophy and practicAe. Retrieved Oct. 12 2020, from http://digitalcommons.uni.edu/libphilpracB papRer 1243 : 1. 5. Yusuf Tunde I. & Olusegun Kayode Joseph. (2015). Ma nLagIement of Indigenous Knowledge (Ifa and Egungun) in Osun State, NigerNia, p. 1. 6. Na‟Allah, A. (2010). African discourse in IslaDm, oAral traditions and performance. New York: 19. A 7. Na‟Allah, A. (2010). African discours eI inB Islam: 19. 8. Na‟Allah, A. ( 2010). African discoFurse in Islam: 19. 9. Na‟Allah A. (2010). AfricYan d Oiscourse in Islam: 20. 10. Guy, P. (1940). ThIeT art of translation. Royal society for the encouragement of arts, manufacture Sand commerce: 793. 11. Bishop ESamRuel Ajayi Crowther translated the English Bible into Yoruba language. 12. FaIgVunwa, D. O. (1938). Ogboju Ode ninu igbo irunmale. Ibadan, Nelson UNpublishers Limited. 13. Fagunwa, D. O. (1949): Igbo Olodumare, Ibadan, Nelson publishers Limited. 14. Edebiri, I. 1982. Aspects of language and translation, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 20. 15. Fagunwa, D. O. (2010). In the forest of Olodumare. Soyinka, W. Trans. Ibadan: Nelson publishers Limited. 170 16. Fagunwa, D. O. (1995). The forest of God. Ajadi, G. Trans. Ilorin: Bamiex Printing and Publishing co. 17. Bibeli Yoruba Atoka. (BYA), Bibeli Iroyin Ayo (BIA). and Bibeli Mimo (BM)- these are different translations of the Holy Bible in Yoruba language. 18. The gospel according to St. Luke 22: 19. Holy Bible. 19. The gospel according to St Luke, Chapter 23 verse 48. Holy Bible. 20. Y The gospel according to St Luke, Chapter 23 verse 48. The Holy Bible, KinRg James Version. A 21. Ihinrere ti Luku, Chapter 23 verse 48. Bibeli Mimo King JameIsB Ve Rrsion. 22. Bibeli Iroyin Ayo. L 23. Kolawole S. (2013). Functionalist theories and AtheiNr relevance to Yoruba Bible translation. Time Journals of Arts and EducaDtional Research. 1. 3:15. 24. Fagunwa, D. O. (1949). Igbo OlódùmaBrè, IAbadan: Nelson publishers Limited. 25. Fagunwa, D.O (1995). The ForeFst o f IGod. Ajadi, G. Trans. Ilorin: Bamiex Printing and Publishing co. O 26. Fagunwa, D. O. (2010).Y In the forest of Olódùmarè. Soyinka, W. Trans. 27. Gbadegesin. O TS. AI. (2017). Between Style and Sense: a Critical Appraisal of Soyinka‟Rs and Ajadi‟s English Translations of D. O. Fagunwa‟s Igbo OloduEmare. International Journal of Language and Linguistics. 4, 2: 41- 47. 28. GIbaVdegesin. O. A. (2017). Between style and sense: 42. U29.N Gbadegesin, O. A. (2017). Between style and sense. 44. 30. This is a translation of the Book of Common Prayer (B.C.P.) used for worship by the Anglican Communion. (1980). Iwe adura Yoruba ati ilana awon sakramenti ati awon isin miran pelu awon psalmu Dafidi. C S S Bookshop. 31. Idowu, E. B. (1973). African traditional religion: a definition. London: SCM Press 171 32. Idowu. E. B. (1973). African traditional religion. 28. 33. Igboin. B. O. (2014). Is Olodumare God in the Yoruba belief, God? Kanz philosophia. 4: 192. 34. Idowu, E. B. (1996). God in Yoruba belief. Revised and enlarged edition. Ikeja: Nigeria. 45. 35. Igboin, E. B. (2014). Is Olodumare God in the Yoruba belief: 189. Y 36. Bewaji, J A. I. (1998). 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A philosophical examRination. 46. A 109. R Gbadegesin O. A. In search of agbasanko. The Nation NewspaBper, Friday Sept 28, 2007:87. LI 110. Akinpelu, J. A. (1987). An introduction to philosNophy of education. London: Macmillan Publishers:178-179. DA111. Balogun, O. A. (2008). The idea of an „edAucated person‟ in contemporary African thought. Journal of Pan African S tuIdBies 2. 3: 123. 112. Fayemi, A. K. & Macaulay-AdeyFelure, O. C. (2009). A philosophical examination. 50. O 113. Fayemi, A. K. & MIaTcauYlay-Adeyelure, O. C. (2009). A philosophical examination. 50. S 114. AwoniyEi, TR. A. (1975). Omoluwabi: the fundamental basis of Yoruba traditional edVucation. Yoruba oral tradition. W. Abimbola. Ed. Ibadan: Ibadan University PIress. 376. U115N. Obanya, P. (2004). The dilemma of education in Africa. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books. Cited in Fayemi, A. K. & Macaulay-Adeyelure, O. C. 2009. A philosophical examination: 58. 116. Babade, T. 2008, Akojopo ijinle Owe Yoruba pelu itumo. 42. 117. Babade, T. 2008, Akojopo ijinle Owe Yoruba pelu itumo. 152. 176 118. Babade, T. 2008, Akojopo ijinle Owe Yoruba pelu itumo. 97. 119. Babade, T.(2008), Akojopo ijinle Owe Yoruba pelu itumo. 412. 120. Babade, T. .(2008), Akojopo ijinle Owe Yoruba pelu itumo. 409. 121. Elempe is the name of a proverbial Chief in Yoruba mythology. 122. Ajẹ kókóró refers to a person who threw a slice of cooked yam in his mouth. 123. Babade, T. (2008), Akojopo ijinle Owe Yoruba pelu itumo. 405. RY 124. Babade, T. (2008). Akojopo ijinle Owe Yoruba pelu itumo. 182. A 125. Pym, A. (2008). On indeterminacy in translation. a survey oBf wRestern theories. Intercultural studies group. 40. LI 126. Yancey Patrick. (2000). Indeterminacy and tranNslatability. Universiteit Van Amsterdam: ILLC. 48 A 127. D Horodecka, E. and Osadnick W. M. (A1990). The problem of translation of idiomatic expressions from Englis hI toB polish: 167. 128. Tope Babade. (2008). Akojopo ijFinle owe Yoruba pelu itumo. viii 129. Ayo Banjo et al Ed. (1 9O91). Quadrilinqual Glossary of Legislative terms (English, HausIaT, IgYbo, Yoruba) Ikeja: Nigeria Educational Research and DevelopmenSt Council NERDC. 1. 130. Offor, F. R(2007). The analytic-synthetic distinction in indigenous African laVnguEage. Philosophy, culture, & traditions 4: 191 131N. SteIiner G. (I976). After babel, aspect of language and translation. London: Oxford U University Press. 251. 132. Pym, A. (2008). On Indeterminacy in translation. a survey of western theories. 40. 133. Nicholas D. G. (1951). Problems of translation. Science New series. 113. 2932: 278. 177 134. Akinlade K. (1994). Tal‟opa omo oba. Macmillan Nigerian Publishers Limited Atlas of World Languages. 4. 135. Salawu, A. (2006). Narrowing the gap between theory and practice of translation. Translation journal 10. 2: 44. 136. Derrida, J. & Prenowitz E. (2008). Who or what is compared? The concept of comparative literature and the theoretical problems of translator. Discourse. 30. 2. 38. Y 137. Oluwole, S, B. ((2017). Socrates and Orunmila, two patron saints of Rclassical philosophy 3. Ark Publishers, Lagos, Nigeria. 181. RA 138. Oluwole, S, B. ((2017). Socrates and Orunmila. 181 IB 139. L Fadoro J. O. (2011). LIN 372: Multilingualism & lan guage planning. Ibadan: University of Ibadan. 36- 37. AN 140. Wiredu, K. (1996). Formulating modernA thDought in African languages: some theoretical considerations. CulturIalB universals and particulars: an African perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 331. 141. Banjo et al. Ed. (1991). QOuad Frilinqual glossary of legislative terms (English, Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba.Y v. 142. Alo, M. A. (2010)I. TA pragmatic appraisal of the translation of Yoruba discourse markers into SEnglish. African journal of history and culture 2.4. 57. 143. Yusuf TE. I.R & Olusegun K. J. (2015). Management of indigenous knowledge (Ifa aInVd Egungun) in Osun State, Nigeria. 7. UN 178 CHAPTER SIX TOWARDS A PRAGMATIC UNDERSTANDING OF MEANING AND TRANSLATION Y Introduction AR In the preceding chapter, we examined the perspective of tRhe Yoruba on indeterminacy. This was used to interrogate Quine‟s indeterminIacBy of translation on how translation is achieved and the extent to which the syst eLms of translation by the Yoruba have been adequate. The focus on instability ofN concepts was shifted to the efficiency of skill acquisition of the translator in DdeaAling with the subject matter. The translator as an agent of translation is expected to decide which of the diverse alternative translations is suitable for thIeB pr Aesent source text. It is expected of the translator to take into consideration the cultural differences or disparities of the target culture. This chapter shall focus oFn pragmatism as a way out to achieve a better translation. Skopos theory of HOans Vermeer shall be discussed to reflect a general movement from princiTpalYly linguistic and formal translation theories to a more functionally and socioI-culturally inclined concept of translation. S Pragmatism aRnd the Difficulties Involved in Translation E PragmIaVtism is a theory held by philosophers such as C. S. Pierce, F. C. S. Schiller, JoNhn Dewey and William James. Schiller says an assertion is true if and in so far as it U 1 satisfies or forwards the purpose of the enquiry to which it owes its being. The word pragmatism originated from „pragmaticus‟ - a word from Latin language, and „pragmatikos‟, a Greek word, which means „deed.‟ It evaluates assertions based on the practical consequences on situations of human interests. Pragmatics is the branch of 2 linguistics which has to do with language in use. Pragmatism states that inquiry is social, as well as knowledge. As such, preserving, sustaining and renewing knowledge 179 is a collective task. Pragmatism has been considered by various researchers as a useful theory of translation. 3 Translation is described as “an inescapable necessity.” There are multifarious and multi-dimensional difficulties in translation, most especially from one language to another. The problems in translation include the challenges faced in isolating the intervention of the unconscious into the act of translation. That is, a mistranslation “out 4 of subconscious motives.” Translation is expected to change language and at the same time remain intelligible. Most translations have been discovered to be in exceYss of human intentions. What is expressed in translation often times is more thAan Rwhat the translator intends to express or sometimes less than the intended meaniRng. Translation is not expected to be just an act of interpretatioLn IthBat only repeats the original in the new language, but is at the same time e xpected to communicate meaningfully to others. Translation challenges mAay Noccur due to the error in understanding the meaning of a concept in the Dlanguage from the source language. Each language has a degree of combination of words that made it possible and easy to achieve accuracy, precision and vividnIesBs i An expressing certain ideas. Such word combinations sometimes have meanFing s that are inseparably bound together and are 5used figuratively, these are calleOd idioms. An idiom is a sequence of words which are often combined in illogical, odd and sometimes not even grammatically correct manner. There are sevTeraYl idiomatic sentences that the reason for their being put together could not be eIxplained, but have been accepted over a long usage. There is difficRultyS in the translation of such idioms, most especially when their backgroundE knowledge is necessarily needed to determine their meaning. This backgrIoVund knowledge may not adequately fit into a target culture. This makes traNnslation from any culture to another to be a complex task. In translation, there is the Unecessity to seek ways of understanding the experiences of others without falling into 6 the conceptual snare of absorbing it dogmatically. The differences in individual experiences which enabled each individual to have unequal background knowledge of concepts also make translation to be difficult. As such, Ofelia Schuttle has argued for a principle recognising remainder of meaning that will not be transfered in cross-cultural 7 enterprise. 180 Plurality and diversity of culture account for different perspectives of individuals 8 across culture. However, there are still available points of intersection. That is, there are points in which a culture may intersect with some other cultures. This intersection allows an individual to negotiate between different culture and this enables the fostering of new ways of thoughts concerning the world. Another difficult task of translation is seen in the relationship between language and the world, which are fused 9 together and mutually dependent. Many theorists have argued in favor of 10 „foreignisation‟ in translation, in which all the normal beauties a reader was expeYcted to discover in a translation is necessarily given up for the accurate rendRering of contextual meaning. A translator may have the focus of bringing thRe thAought of an 11 author closer to the standards of the target culture, while othBer translation may proclaim the need to get closer to the unadulterated original. SomIe translations may of necessity be a way that might shock the reader of the targ eLt language through the exposure to the roughness of the original. AN Translation throws up both ethical and epistemDological dilemmas. Communication with a dissimilar language and context may iAmpress other conceptual schemes on the 12 thought of the targeted audience. ThIe Bepistemological problem of translation is grounded on the fact that if an indivFidu al accepted that words and conceptual schemes are placed in their cultural cOontext; and that every language possesses its own conceptual scheme, then loYgically, the individual may hold the idea that translation is 13 not possible. The fact Tthat language can grow or develop shows that translation is not an impossible task oIf comparing two separate inaccessible schemas. Language continues to evRolveS according to the need for its use. TranslaVtionE is a way of building „bridge‟ across various cultures of the world. This allNowsI mutual interactions and beneficial relationship between people of different Ucultural milieu. The diversities in the language of the world make it necessary to find a way of not only interpreting one tongue into another, but also one written text of a language to the other. This can be achieved through pragmatic consideration of the needs of the targeted readers. While interpretation deals with oral form of communication, translation deals majorly with the written texts. Since the autonomous languages of the world are more than 4,200, if the different cultures of the world would interact, understand one another and cooperate to 181 exchange ideas that are beneficial to humanity, then there would of necessity be a need to translate language from one culture to another. This will not only narrow the wedge between different cultures of the world, but also erase the misconceptions about the other people and their ways of life. There are various perspectives to translations. Among these are the scholars who believe translation is not possible. The scholars of this inclusion as enumerated by 14 Abioye, include George Borrow who states that translation is, at best, an echo. Dante, an Italian scholar, says, RY Hardly can any of those things harmoniously A strung through poetical arrangement be expressed in any other tongue without wreaking somRe 15 havoc on its original beauty and sensitivLity I…B This is to say that in translation, the work cannot be undeNrtaken without either the loss of the original ideal or misconception on the pDart Aof the translator or a deliberate betrayal of the intention of the original author through a mistaken belief or distortion of the intention of the author. However,B theAI question of faithfulness or fidelity in translation is of serious importance in tr anslation. F Categories of Translation O Some categories of traInsTlatYion can be identified. These are; General TranslatioSn - This could be on any subject or topic. Literary TrEansRlation - This has to do majorly with subjects that are technical in nature. IVThese include texts in Science and Technology, and other arts and social N sciences. UPoetic Translation: This has to do with poem or metrical verses. Free Translation: This is a paraphrase which recreates the matter without the method, or the content without the form of the original. The translation is most usually 16 far longer than the original. 182 The technique of translation for these categories of translation could not but vary. This is because the goal meant to be achieved is not the same in each case. Methods of Translation Some of the methods of translation that can be identified include: word-for-word; semantic; literal; adaptive; faithful; communicative; and idiomatic translation. Word-for-word translation: In this form of translation, the structure of the Source Language is maintained and the translations of words are done by using the meanYings universal to them most. Words that are culturally inclined are literally transAlateRd. Semantic translation: It puts into consideration the aesthetic valueR of the Source Language text, in addition to faithfulness in translation. It compIrBomises on meaning where necessary such that no word play or repetition comes i n Lconflict with the refined version. It does not rest on cultural equivalence and maNkes very little compromise to the recipients. Semantic translation is however muDch Amore flexible relative to `faithful' translation which is dogmatic. A Literal translation: The grammatical coInBstructions of the Source Language (SL) are altered to their nearest equivalents iFn the Target Language (TL) but the lexical items are somehow translated out of coOntext. It sometimes serves as a pre-translation process that directs attention to proYblems to be solved. When translation is done literally, effort is made for a direct IcTorrespondence of words between the source and the target languages. S Faithful trEansRlation: It makes efforts to replicate the accurate contextual meaning of the orIigVinal text within the confines of the Target Language (TL) grammatical strNuctures. It conveys cultural words and conserves the degree of grammatical and Ulexical deviation from (SL) norms. It tries to be totally faithful to the purpose and the text-realisation of the author of the Source Language (SL) text. When we translate things culturally, we try to recreate the same effect that the expression produced in the Source Language text readers in the target people, through their culture. Communicative translation: It makes effort to supply the precise contextual meaning of the original such that both language and content are easily intelligible and agreeable to the targeted reader. 183 Idiomatic translation: It recreates the message of the original text through the use of 17 idioms and colloquial words. Adaptation: This is the freest form of translation in which the Source Language (SL) culture is transformed to Target Language (TL) culture and the text is rewritten. Translation could be seen as an „instrument „for „propagation‟ of knowledge from culture to culture. For instance, some aspects of Yoruba culture would not easily be understood by a foreign reader of Fagunwa‟s translation if the work is liteYrally translated. The Yoruba traditional society uses of the „cock-crow‟ and theR „second cock-crow,‟ will be meaningful when being read in Yoruba cultural contexAt, but not by a foreigner. As each „crow‟ indicates a particular time of the day. BR This study, therefore, was structured to discover genera l LproIcedure to arrive at pragmatic modifications which would make the target text acceptable and comprehensible as much as possible. When a text is wArittNen and translated by the same individual for two different targeted audiences, theD type of pragmatic adjustment which will take place in the text that is translatedA may be different from when the it is translated by a another translator differeInBt from the author, the adaption may likely diverge from the author‟s intention. F Equivalence Paradigm O Equivalence paradigmI TexaYmines the probable foundation of equivalence within the source language cSontext. It wholly rests on the source text. Many theorists have 18 worked on thisR paradigm. Equivalence paradigm in most cases look for equal value between thEe segment of a source text and that of a target text. The suggestion being made IbyV equivalence paradigm is that a source language does has no precedence above theN target language. Equivalence paradigm is a group that is in opposition to Ustructuralism. This is because it studies the relations among variables. Those who subscribe to Equivalence paradigm believe that each language convey its unique views of the world. If a general inference is drawn from these descriptions, one could not but conclude that the procedure of translation by nature is not a feasible undertaking to accomplish. The translator then needs to „trans-create‟ instead of translate. The reason being that equivalence is a static part in their minds. Equivalence is usually a serious mission of the translator. 184 It should, however, be noted that a translator is like an intermediary whose mission is 19 to unite the language of the original text to the targeted one through some procedures. Reconciling the source to the target is the major responsibility of the person who has taken up the translation of the text. As a result, she/he needs to understand, as much as possible, items in the two divide. That is, he/she should be accustomed with both the 20 source and the target languages in translation. Generally therefore, before embarking on the task of translation, the goal of the source and the target texts should be understood, in order to communicate the message in such away that it captureYs the essence of the source text. A Translator can perform the act of restructuring, aRmending and improving a piece of writing. He/she may either merge or dissolveA the source language into the target one. Thus, seeking for accurate equivalence is Rvery essential in translation. LIB Equivalence paradigm can be sub-divided into two subcateg ories. These are: Natural equivalence and Directional equivalence. For NaturalA equNivalence, the translator takes the challenge and brainstorm on the probable coDrrespondence in the source language 21 and discovers the possibilities of connecting thAem. On the other hand, in equivalence paradigm, languages that are more promIinBent are given much more attention, in that, most of the advanced countries havFe th e benefit of equivalence theorizing. Such that, they can add more value to theO target language in any manner they deem it fit. The „principle of charity‟ of DYavi dson will however not agree with this. Thus, charity demands that the less Tprominent language should be given the benefit of initial consideration. SI Catford givEes Rthe definition of Directional equivalence as a “replacement of textual 22material in one language (SL) by equivalent material in another language (TL).” The deNfinitIio Vn indicates that textual substances present in the source language do not 23 Ucoincide totally with those of the target language. As Chesterman points out, directional equivalence takes a divergent position in translation in that an element in the source may have two or more elements in the target language to illustrate or explain a term in language contexts. Thus, it may have one to two or more correspondences. It is in a situation like this that Quine‟s indeterminacy seems to occur. There is the need to state that directional equivalence may be carried-out at some points in the real process of translating. Therefore, the translator has to convey 185 and portray the genuine intention based on the understanding of the target culture. This can clear some of the obstacles to translation. It is, in particular, has to do with the translator‟s ethics, that is, manner an individual translator goes about his task. Skopos Theory as a Veritable Tool of Translation Skopos theory is a form of pragmatism. It emerged in the late 1970s through Hans J. 24 25 Vermeer. It is seen as a “framework for a general theory of translation." Vermeer was motivated by the need to discover a general approach to translation which iYs not 26 depending on only linguistics level. Vermeer states that, translating is nRot just a linguistic procedure and that linguistics is yet to formulate the right quesAtions to deal with translation challenges. Therefore there is a need to look at somRewhere else for 27 solution. This can be found in Skopos theory. According to VLermIeBer, …what the Skopos states is thNat one must translate, consciously and consistently, in accordance with some prinDcipAles respecting the target text. The theory does not state what the principle is; this must beA determined separately in 28each specific case.IB Skopos theory, is another dimensionF to the functionalists approach to translation which 29 is developed to be more target-reader oriented. The theory is inclined towards a paradigm shift, from linguYisti c Os to functionalism. Its focus on translation, has its position between extraI-lTinguistic factors (client and culture) and the textual factors (the 30purpose or intentioSn of a text). Vermeer borrowed the word „Skopos‟, from a Greek language. „SkoRpos‟ literally means „a purpose‟. It is a technical expression which emphasisesE that any translation is an action that is intentionally directed towards achievIinV 31 g a goal. As a result any act of translation must have a purpose or skopos,whN 32ich performs a function as the major principle guiding any translation process. UThe need to possess a purpose has led to a major contemplation in the Skopos theory, which is a dire need for a translator to possess practical experiences necessary for the 33 perception of what the translator intend to achieve in the target text. The theory is one of the famous theories which have emphasised the communicative principle in translation. The theory asserts that there is no more limitation of translation by the conventional views which are source-text oriented. It provides 186 explanation for diverse strategies in peculiar contexts. It is not only the source text that is a factor to be involved in the consideration. What determines the strategies to be 34 used for translation is rather, the purpose of a text. This is the reason pragmatic adaptation is necessary in translation. Skopos theory is a functionalist approach to translation which aims is to unseat the 35 source text (ST). This action is performed by stressing the part played by the translator as a moulder of the target text (TT). In doing this, precedence is given to the purpose (skopos) of bringing the target text (TT) into existence. Functionalism Yis an 36 important movement from a linguistic equivalence to functional adequaAcy.R When culture is mentioned in the context of translation, it is to be considRered as a wide conception which includes customs, history, ideology, politics, IaBnd tradition. It also consists of political tradition, social values and mentality pLertaining to a specific 37people. N Different Skopoi, (purposes) are allowed in transDlatioAn. The purpose of a text may be expressed on one hand, according to the imprAession it is expected to make, that is, the significance, uniqueness, and intelligibilitBy. On the other hand, the purpose may be described in terms of the attractionF, th atI is, the harmony, wholeness, suitability, and circumstances of the communication. The decision taken rests upon the purpose for which the translation is mean t.O The mission of the translation may need a 'free' or 'faithful' translation. TY Bernardoe elucidaStes Ithat there exists new concerns about target recipient, the prejudice of thRe translator which may be inevitable, as well as, the purpose and use of 38 39 the translatEions. For example, as Xiaoshu and Dongming stated, literary translation is expIecVted to replicate the spirit and characteristics of the original. As a result, the recNipient is the major consideration in determining the Skopos of the target–text. USkopos Theory and the Translation Brief The cultural features of both the source and the target language are put into consideration within the structure of Skopos theory, despite the theory focusing more on the target culture. Vermeer explains that a „translation brief‟ is an instruction, given by oneself, by another person or by a translation commission, to perform a given 187 40 action, in this wise, to translate. It is however, possible for a translation brief, to be 41 42 explicitly stated or not so explicitly stated and may be in written or spoken form. In a nutshell, a translation brief is considered to be a necessity in the Skopos theory. It 43 stands as a manual for translators. A translator can establish the skopos (purpose) 44 only through a translation brief. It is then s/he may come to a decision on what technique or approach s/he should adopt in the translation process of a text in 45 consonance with the projected skopos. When translating scientific terms, information for educational use, guides for toYurist, contracts and other similar items, the contextual factors surrounding theA trRanslation cannot be overlooked. These are factors that have to do with theR culture of the anticipated recipients of the target text and also the client who haIs Bcommissioned it. It also includes, specifically, the task which is set for the text toL achieve, in that culture and for those readers. Skopos theory is entirely directed Nwith regards to this function. When considering translation, it is not as a procedureA of trans-coding, but as a definite system of human action. In the manner of evDery other human action, translation contains a purpose. Skopos has to be madBe clAear prior to undertaking translation. The 46 product of an action of a translation is a Itranslatum, which is a particular variety of target text. In skopos theory, VermeFer posits that there is a universal rule that, it must be the anticipated purpose of thOe target text that influences the translation techniques 47 and strategies. It is from tYhis postulate that he derives the skopos rule: Human action (and its subcategory: traTnslation) is determined by its purpose (skopos), and therefore 48 it is a function of itSs puIrpose. Two other EgenReral rules are those of fidelity and the coherence. The fidelity rule has to do witIhV inter-textual coherence between translatum (the product of translation) and the soNurce text. It requires that some connection must be present between the two in as Umuch as the prevailing skopos principle and the rule of (intra-textual) coherence have been complied with. The coherence rule states that the target text must be sufficiently coherent to enable the anticipated end users have a grasp of it. The background knowledge of the recipient which is different from the source text must be taken into consideration. 188 Translation is, by definition, inter-lingual and inter-cultural. It entails both linguistic 49 and cultural transfer. In other words, it is a culture-transcending process. While skopos differs with text recipients, the purpose of the target text and that of the source 50 text may vary. In situations where the purpose is similar for both texts, Reiss and Vermeer speak of functional constancy. In situations where the purpose varies between both texts, there is, however, a modification of function. In situation of the latter type, the criterion for translation will not be inter-textual coherence with the source text, but suitability or appropriateness to the skopos (purpose). This also leads to the decYision on the choice and arrangement of the subject matter. Even though a translatuRm is not directly, by that very fact, a faithful replication of the source tRext,A fidelity or faithfulness to the source text may not be totally possible for justBifiable skopos. One should not, therefore, consider Skopos theory as encouLragIing extremely free translation in all, or even in most of the cases. It gives jus tification for a variety of techniques in disparate contexts, where factor involAvedN is not only the source text. Instead, the aim of a text influences the techniquesD used for the translation. Status of Source Text and Target Text A The purpose of a translation may be to aIdBapt the text to the target culture. It may also be to let the reader in the target lanFguage be familiar with the culture of the people from where the source text orig iOnated. However, it should also be emphasised that any goal that is stated is not thYe only possible goal available, but one among many other possible goals. The eIsTsential point is that no source text has only one correct or 51adequate translatioSn and that, consequently, every translation commission should explicitly or imRplicitly contain a statement of skopos. The purpose of a translation would therEefore determine the choice of a translation which best fit into the target cultureI Vout of the various alternatives. The skopos for the target text need not be the saNme with that ascribed to the source text. Until the skopos for the target text is Uidentified, translation cannot, properly speaking, be achieved at all. Pragmatic Adaptation is an important strategy employed to ensure that the intention of the text is communicated to the target language in the most suitable natural manner. Adaptation can be descibed as translative commitments which produce in a text what is not usually seen or acknowledged as a translation, but nonetheless accepted as 52 representing a source text. The term „Pragmatic adaptation‟ is a concept used for 189 describing how to accomplish the communicative objective of translation. Various definitions have been given to this term. It thus refers to those elements in the source text which when translated literally, would not work well to reproduce what it signifies in the target language. They are instead adapted, recreated or modified to enable them 53 satisfy the requirements of the new linguistic and cultural environment. Klaudy in his own definition describes pragmatic adaptation according to the desires of the target 54 language audience, while Zauberga sees pragmatic adaptation as the adjustment of the content or structure of the source text so as to bring into being a target text thYat is suitable to the experiences of the new audience. R 55 A Chesterman‟s model recognised some pragmatic strategies. The moRdel enumerates nine approaches. These include: visibility change, informatioBn change, cultural filtering, explicitness change, coherence change, interpersonLal Ichange, illocutionary change and partial translation. These changes in the pr ocess of translation are acceptable on the ground of the Skopos theory. VermAeerN argues for this theory that as 56 stated by the action theory, every action has a Dpurpose in view. The purpose of translation is to communicate an exact meAssage. This includes, along with other factors, the relationship with the extra-l inIgBuistic world which makes a translation to be well delivered. F Delivering a message from p eOrson to person goes beyond merely exchanging the language of a text to thTe oYther. Also, there is a need to re-emphasise that translation does not occur in a vaIcuum; rather it is also influenced by a variety of extra-linguistic factors, most eRspecSially the agents involved in translation. Therefore, in a translation, the translatEor sometimes needs to modify information, omit some information and redistribVute information through a number of pragmatic techniques to facilitate the 57fuNlfillmIent of the mission for translating to the target language (TL) readers. UVinay and Darbelnet point out that if a translator methodically declined to adapt, it will 58 ultimately lead to a deterioration of the target text. Adaptation then aims to bridge the temporal distance between the source and the target texts. This clearly shows the communicative quality of adaptation exposing the impetus that set translators in motion to apply it. In spite of the prominence given to the impact of the target 190 circumstances and the expectations of the target language readers in modern approaches to translation, the pragmatic feature of the procedure is often ignored. Criticism of Skopos as a Pragmatic Theory Despite the advantages apparent in Skopos theory, the theory has various criticisms against it. The theory has been subjected to rigorous criticism by the advocates of linguistic and equivalence rooted theories. However, there have been responses to these criticisms. Some of the points raised include obscurity in this concepYt of translation. The criticisms focus majorly on how translation is being defiAnedR and the perspective of the Skopos theory towards the source text, its taking ovRer of the source 59text or the „dethronement‟ of the source text. The issue includes too much simplification and inability to attain equivalence text that are LliteIrBary and religious in 60natture. It is also disputed that there is no precise proceduNre to accomplish the theory. The Skopos translation theory, however, gives good rAeason for the modification made to the way and manner information from the sAourDce language is presented in the target language (TL). The translator understandBs his personal intentions which necessitate him to initiate the translation process aInd the requirements of the target text (TT) readers also. Therefore, he makes alFterations that are necessary in communicating the information in the target tex t Oto fit into the situations and circumstances of the recipients, through pragmatYic adaptation. Another criticism TSleveIled against Skopos theory is that it is a bulky standard. The translator needRs to comprehend a lot of principles and vigorously consider their suitability fEor the situation or context. Nord addresses some of the arguments that have 61 been IpuVt forward against the theory. Among the most fundamental points raised agNainst the theory is that, it is not all actions that have intentions. This critique is Udirected against all action-based theories of translation. Vermeer defended the action 66 theory through his definition. According to Him, action is always intentional. He also states that to be interpreted as purposeful, a particular action (or inaction) must be triggered by a decision that is free. Every translation is therefore a purposeful action. Despite this, it is also the case that a writer may manage to write something without a definite intention or with no purpose in mind. However, the translator, before deciding 191 to engage himself in the translation, would have an intention directing or motivating him towards the translation. Another criticism is that Skopos theory is not being original. Nord acknowledges that a translator may have thought that is in agreement with the Skopos theory already for some time earlier, but points out that this does not 62 indicate that a formal theory which is explicit, is irrelevant. Despite a number of objections, Skopos theory could be considered to be a rather useful approach to be used in the translation exercise. The Skopos theory presents a new perspective on the way a translator should carry out a set task. It brings toR beaYr the Yoruba pragmatic approach of dual complimentarity. It emphasizes the Arelationship between the purpose the translator has in mind and the skill possessed Rby the agents of translation to achieve the specified goal. The fact that a translatorB is presented with a translation brief is a suitable answer for every criticism lev eLlledI against this theory. Nord has made a clearly stated motion to tackle these issues that any “form of equivalence required for an adequate translation” can Abe gNot through “the skopos of the 63 translation.” D It is natural that before one can have thBe sAkopos, one needs to have obtained the translation brief. It is only after the tFran slIation brief is available and adequately stated, that it can then facilitate the Otranslation guidelines and scheme when translating. However, it should noted that the strength of will for the translation choices rests with each translator. Further,T VeYrmeer also emphasises that the Skopos theory does not put any constraint on the cIhoice of strategies for translation. In other words, it permits the 64 freedom in traRnslaStor‟s actions and that also comes with a definite responsibility. Going by EVermeer‟s and Nord‟s elucidation of the theory, it is apparent that this translatiVon brief is a fundamental factor in the translation activities. NISkopos theory‟s appeal to common sense can rather be seen as a merit, not a weakness. USome critics of the functional approach have also argued that within this approach, translators exercise the liberty to treat the source text in any manner that they are 65 commissioned to do by the client. This has to do with the concept of loyalty. In response to the critics, Nord points out that the translator must be loyal, towards the client on one hand and towards the source text author(s), and the target audience on the 66 other hand. This implied that in the first instance, the purpose (skopos) of the target text should be in agreement with the intention of the author of the source text. 192 Secondly, the translator should take into consideration the nature of the translation 67 being expected by the target audience. It should be found out if the function of the product of a translation contradicted the intentions of the source text author. It sould also be determined if the translator produced a text which deviates from the expectation of the target audience without duly notifying them about it. If the latter was the case, the translator has in a way deceives one of the two agents of translation. There is a need to emphasize that the idea of loyalty usually has to do with people, that is, the translation agents, unlike the concept of fidelity which has to do with texts. Y Conclusion AR The Skopos Theory is a functional communicative theory. It is notR an equivalence theory. Scholars in the field of translation have understood thaIt Bcultural differences exist and there is the necessity for pragmatic changes in t raLnslation. As a result if equivalence is to be the goal of translation, direct or fAormNal equivalence cannot always achieve the purpose of translation. There are Dmajor changes that are sometimes necessary for there to be adequate transfer of iAnformation from the source to the target language. In the process of moving fromI Bthe source to the target language, there are different types of adaptations that caFn b e made on the basis of source texts which may not be considered to be translations because they are seen as being less valuable than actual translations. Some sch oOlars, however, have considered that these abridged versions or adaptations neeYd to be included in a theoretical framework of translation and this is the essenceI oTS f Skopos‟ theory. The skopos (the function or the purpose of the translationR) is the main factor in translation. This purpose may, however, be different froEm the function of the source text. That is, the target of the translation may be for IaV radically different purpose than the source text. Likewise, it may be for people of a radically different culture. The essence of translation, therefore, is for it to achieve UitsN purpose, whatever this may be. This pupose can only be realised by the translator who is well equipped, with adequate skill for the task required. 193 End notes 1. Cooper, D. E. (1973). Philosophy and the nature of language. London: Longman Group Ltd. 121. 2. Ormerod, R. (2006). The history and ideas of pragmatism. Journal of the Operational Research Society: 894. 3. Vesgo, R. (2012). The parapraxis of translation. The New Centennial Review: 12. 2: 47. RY 4. Vesgo, R. (2012). The parapraxis of translation. 49. RA5. Horodecka, W. and Osadnik W. (1990). The problem of tranBslation of idiomatic expressions from English to Polish. New Zealand Sla vLoniIc Journal: 166. 6. Celtia T. (2008). Border communities and Royce: TNhe problem of translation and re-interpreting feminist empiricism. The JouArnal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series 22. 1: 12. AD 7. Schuttle, O. (2001). Cultural alter itIy:B cross-cultural communication and feminist theory in North–South contFexts. Women of Color and Philosophy: a Critical Reader. Zack, N. Ed. C aOmbridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 49. 8. Celtia, T. p. 13. 9. TY Celtia T. 15. I 10. FrancEe, PR S . (2005). The rhetoric of translation. The Modern Language Review. V100: 261. N11. FIrance, P. (2005). The rhetoric of translation: 264. U 12. Maclean, K. (2007). Translation in cross–cultural research: an example of Bolivia. Development and Practice 17. 6: 784. 13. Maclean, K. (2007). Translation in cross – cultural research: 785. 14. Abioye, J. O. (1999). Bridge across cultures Lagos: University of Lagos Press. Inaugural Lecture Series. 8. 194 15. Abioye, J. O. (1999). Bridge across cultures. Lagos: University of Lagos Press. Inaugural Lecture Series. 11. 16. Abioye, J. O. (1999). Bridge across cultures. Lagos: University of Lagos Press. Inaugural Lecture series. 12. 17. Newmark, P. (2001). A text book of translation [M], Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Language Education Press. 18. See Vinay & Darbelnet, (1958); Nida and Taber 1969. RY 19. Nida, E. and Taber, C. (1969). The Theory and practice of translatAion, Leiden: E.J. Brill. 12. BR 20. Nida, E. and Taber, C. (1969). The Theory and practice oLf trIanslation. 12. 21. Chesterman, A. (2005). Where is Similarity? SNimilarity and difference in translation. S. Arduini & R. Hodgson. EdDs. RAimini: Guaraldi. 63-75. 22. Catford, J. C. (1965). A linguistic theoAry of translation: An essay in applied linguistics. London: Oxford Un ivIeBrsity Press. 20. 23. Chesterman, A. (2005). WhereF is Similarity? 63 - 75. 24. Nord, C. (2012). QuoY vad is O, functional translatology? Target, 24. 1: 26. 25. Nord, C. (2012).I QTuo vadis, functional translatology? Target, 24. 1: 27. 26. Nord, C. R(19S97). Translating as a purposeful activity, functionalist approaches expElained. Manchester: St. Jerome.1997, as cited in Stajszczak, T. 2011. IVSkopos theory as an aid in resolving culture-related difficulties in the N translation of functional texts. Master‟s thesis, University of Warsaw, U Warsaw, Poland. 11. 27. de Leon, C. M. (2008). Skopos and beyond: A critical study of functionalism, Target 20. 1. 1: 235. 28. Stajszczak, T. (2011). Skopos Theory as an aid in resolving culture-related difficulties in the translation of functional texts. Master‟s thesis, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland. 12. 195 29. Nord, C. (2012). Quo vadis, functional translatology?, Target, 24. 1. 34. 30. de Leon, C. M. (2008). Skopos and beyond: A critical study of functionalism, Target 20. 1. 1” 235. 31. Nord, C. (1997). In Masduki, 2011. Skopos theory and its functional aspect in translation. Bahasa dan Seni, 39. 2. 167. 32. Green, B. S. (2012). A skopos - based analysis of Breytenbach‟s Titus Andronicus. Doctoral dissertation. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch UnRiveYrsity. 109. A 33. Taki, B. N. (2017). Pragmatic adaptation as a requirement inB traRnslation: a case of Persian and English versions of the shah. InternatiLonaIl Journal of English Language & Translation Studies. 5. 1. 14. N 34. Newmark, P. (1991). About translation. ClevDedoAn: Multilingual Matters Ltd. 35. Vozna, M. (2016). Pragmatic adaptatioAn in translation of ideologically-loaded lexicalized concepts, science a nId Beducation: a new dimension. Philology, 4. 18: 111. F 36. Bernardoe, A. M. (2010 ).O Translation as text transfer: Pragmatic implications. Linguistic StudiTes 5Y: 107. 37. Klaudy, K. (2S007I). Sociolinguistics of translation. Studia Slavica, 52. 1 – 2: 229 – 234.R 38. CIhVest Eerman‟s model. cited in Chesterman & Wagner, (2002). N39.U Cited in Munday, (2001). 40. Munday, J. (2008). Introducing translation studies: theories and applications. New York: Routledge. 2. 41. Vinay, J. P. & Darbelnet, J. (1995). Comparative stylistics of French and English: a methodology for translation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 41. 196 42. Vermeer, H. J. (2004). Skopos and commission in translational action, in. The Translation Studies Reader. 2nd Edition. Venuti, L. Ed. London New York: Routledge: 234. 43. Green, B. S. (2012). A skopos - based analysis of Breytenbach‟s Titus Andronicus. Doctoral dissertation, Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University. 109. 44. Vermeer, H. J. (2000) in Jensen, 2009. 11. Y 45. R Nord, C. (2006). Translating as a purposeful activity: a prospectivAe approach. TEFLIN Journal 17. 2. 142. R 46. B Green, B. S. 2012. 109. LI 47. Nord C. (2006). Translating as a purposeful activityN: a prospective approach. 17. 2: 142. DA 48. Nord, C. (2006). 142. Chesterman, 2007 Ain Jensen, 2009. 5. 49. B Vermeer, H. (1979). 174. TranFslat ioIn. In Reiss & Vermeer. 1991: 2. 50. Vermeer, H. (1978). 100 . O 51. Reiss and VermeeTr, (1Y984/1991). 76. 52. I Vermeer, H. S(1992). Is translation a linguistic act? University of Heidelberg. 40. 53. Reiss EandR Vermeer, (1984/1991). 45. 54. N RIe Viss and Vermeer (1984/1991). 196. 55. U Vermeer, H. (1989a). 187. 56. Vermeer, H. (1989a). 182. 57. Baker, M. & Saldanha, G. (2011). Routledge encyclopedia of translation studies. New York: Routledge. 41. 58. Schaffner, (1998). 237. 197 59. Trisnawati, I. (2014). Skopos theory: a practical approach in translation in the translation process. Englisia 1. 2: 245. 60. Nord, C. (1997). Translating as a purposeful activity: functionalist approaches explained. Manchester: St Jerome. 109. 61. Nord, C. (1997). 110. 62. Nord, C. (1997). 114. Y 63. Green, B. S. (2012). 112. R 64. Vermeer, H. J. 1998. Starting to unask what translatology is aboRut, TAarget 10. 1. 45 - 54. IB 65. Nord, C. (1997) : 117 – 119. L 66. Nord, C.(1997) : 123 – 128. AN 67. Nord, C. (1997): 125. AD B F I Y O IT RS IV E UN 198 CONCLUSION The basic aim of this dissertation is to postulates a re-alignment of worldviews that will be efficient for cross cultural translation. We emphasised the need to recognise the skill of the translator and the purpose of the translation as key elements of paramount importance to a workable theory of meaning and translation. This will show that the meaning of a word must always be considered not from a passive contemplation of the word, but from the analysis of its functions, with reference to the given culture. The fundamental aim of the study is achieved through Yorùbá complementary pragmYatic approach to translation, which is interpretative, dualistic, symbiotic and comAprRehensive in nature. R Chapter One is a general introduction. An overview of the thesisI wBas given. We gave background information into the study and made a review ofL the Literature scholars have written on interpretation, translation and indetermAinaNcy. In the Second Chapter, we analysed the concepDt of language and meaning. Three aspects of language were examined. These Aare: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Syntax Studies the way in which word a nIdB other elements are brought together to form grammatical units without taking Finto consideration the meaning of the sentence. Semantics studies the meaning Oof words and sentences. It represents the relationship between language and the Yworld. The determination of what this relationship is has been a subject of debaIteT among scholars. Pragmatics studies how language is used. It encompasses sociaSl language skill that is used in daily interaction with others. These three aspects oRf language were shown to enhance communication. LanguaVge aEnd communication were emphasised as two aspects of a culture which caNnnotI be separated. Communication is identified as being dynamic and complex. UBased on this premise, we argued that human language differs in kind, rather than degree, from other languages. It is also sometimes very difficult, if not impossible, to specify exactly the message that is being conveyed to others. Contemporary theories of translation were reviewed. We espouse the understanding of the function of language as the human facility that makes it possible for us to exchange meaningful messages with other people within and across cultures. This is done through the process of 199 discourses and texts, which are ordered according to the rules and conventions of the specific language that we share with other human beings. Chapter Three critically examined the perspective of W. V. O. Quine on meaning and translation. His theory of indeterminacy of translation was analysed to determine the extent to which it can be useful to achieve cross-cultural understanding. His attack on „the two dogmas of empiricism‟ was reviewed. Quine‟s „Radical Translation‟ is a term coined to refer to a hypothetical situation in which a linguist dwells into a completely isolated linguistic community. In such kind of situation, all within the possessioYn of the linguist to make incursion into the understanding of their language is thAe bRehaviour of the people. Thus the translation manual that the linguist ends Rup constructing captures only such behavioural data. An important claim of QuineB is that the outcome of interaction in this kind of setting impacts on linguistic in tLeraIction in general. His view is that when understanding each other‟s speech we Ncorrelate linguistic behaviour with our experience of the world around us, and thAat there is nothing to linguistic meaning beyond such correlation. D Quine claimed that there is no one schemBe oAI f translation between natural languages which can be accepted as the right or correct one. He stated that one may speak of correctness in translation relativOe toF a particular accepted scheme, but to question the correctness of a whole schem e relative to another is meaningless. He stressed that meaning is grounded onT thYe behaviour of the speakers. However, there is nothing in ostensive behaviour toI solve the problem of ambiguity between two speakers from different culturRal bSackground. There are usually many competing alternative manuals available foEr translating the meaning of a foreign sentence. Thus, the meaning of the translatiVon cannot be attributed to any of the competing manuals. There is no fact of whNichI manual is the correct one. There have been criticisms of Quine‟s skepticism on Uthe idea of meaning. He says the notion of analyticity is not sufficiently clear, however, the standard of clarity he is employing is also not clear. Also, if our words do not have determinate meaning, it would be difficult to understand one another, even in the same culture and language. In Chapter Four, we analysed the work of scholars such as Donald Davidson who considered the situation of „radical interpretation‟ instead of Quine‟s „radical translation‟. Thomas Kuhn‟ posited „incommensurability of paradigm‟, relative to 200 Quine‟s „indeterminacy of translation‟. Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf postulate relativity of concepts, while Kwasi Wiredu suggested that what is called conceptual relativity may actually be taken to be conceptual disparity. Austin and Searle posited „Speech acts theory. Some of these scholars focused on the problem of compatibility in the use of concepts among individuals and groups. In this chapter we argued that interpretations and translations as posited by each of these alternative views are liable to be contested. Some take the „relativity approach‟ to show that words and concepts have peculiar meanings depending on the cultures and context in wYhich they are used. Others take „universalists approach‟ to show that concepts arRe similar and their translations are possible across culture. We argued that eaAch of these alternatives‟ however, has its limitations. BR In Chapter Five, which is taken to be the thesis chapter, we diLscuIssed a perspective of the Yorùbá on indeterminacy of translation. The Yorùbá w ord „Ìtum ‟ suggests that the Yorùbá believe that knowledge is a difficult taAsk Nto accomplish and it is not accessible to everybody but „wrapped‟. To have aDccess to it, it has to be “unwrapped.” „„ìm ‟‟ is also regarded as „know-how‟ in YoArùbá, which shows that „ìtum ‟ not only means unwrapping knowledge, but also eIxBpertise or skill in unwrapping knowledge. It implies that it is not everybody that cFould attain the feat of unwrapping knowledge, but the skillful ones. By implicati oOn, translation, from the Yorùbá perspective, could be achieved only by those whoY are adequately skilled. We also made a compIaTrative analysis of different translations of texts, which showed differences in RtranSslation from the perspective of each of the translators. Similarly, concepts suEch as Olόdùmarè, which were translated by three different groups of scholarsV, each with different signification, were examined. Among these scholars are theN WIestern anthropologists who conceive Olόdùmarè as a lesser being than God, the Usecond group of scholars are mainly African Yorùbá theologians who have imposed the Western conception of God on Olόdùmarè, and the third group is a decolonisation school which have tried to divest Olόdùmarè of the foreign attributes imposed on His nature. According to Quine, the translation of „Olόdùmarè‟ from each of these groups would be correct because they fit into the structure of each conception. He therefore regarded such translation as indeterminate. This is because there is no fact of the matter from which we can accept one or reject the other. Thus each conception will be 201 correct within its own framework. We however argued that there are vivid category mistakes in some of these translations rather than being indeterminate. Only translators who are firmly grounded in the Yorùbá culture and who have acquired sufficient skill for translation could, in actual fact, detect the error. Alternative views of the Yorùbá to indeterminacy were considered. We concluded that a translator who has necessary required training would therefore produce a far better translation, through the Yoruba complementary pragmatic approach, than the ones who are not (well) trained. Chapter Six, which is the last chapter, focused on pragmatism as a way of achievYing a better translation. Skopos theory of Hans Vermeer was discussed to refleAct aR general shift from principally linguistic and formal translation theories to a mRore functionally and socio-culturally oriented concept of translation. Translation geBnerates both ethical and epistemological dilemmas. Communication with a langu agLe, Iother than one‟s own and in different context, may impress other conceptual schemes on the thought of the targeted audience. The epistemological problem of trAanslNation is grounded on the fact that if an individual accepts that words and conceDptual schemes are placed in cultural context, and that each language possesses its Aown conceptual scheme, then logically, the individual may be committed to the bIeBlief that translation is not possible. The fact that language can grow or develop sFhow s that translation is a possible task. Language continues to evolve according t oO the need for its use. Many theorists have woTrkeYd on the paradigm of Equivalence paradigm. In most cases, they look for equal valIue between the segment of a source text and that of a target text. The suggestionR beiSng made by equivalent paradigm is that a source language does not have the prEiority over the target language. The conclusion that could be deduced from equivaleVnce paradigm is that, since different languages present varied perspectives of theN woIrld; and since the concepts in a culture are not equivalent to those of the other Ucultures, therefore translation across culture is impossible. We however argued against this position. We considered „functionalism‟ as a necessary movement from a linguistic equivalence to functional suitability. Therefore, translation is considered, first and foremost, as a progression of intercultural message transfer, the final result of which is a text that has the capacity to function fittingly in particular situations and framework of use. Pragmatic adaptation that is employed to attain the communicative purpose of translation is regarded as the adjustment of the substance or form of the 202 source text so as to produce a target text that is in accord with the desires for the new audience. Skopos theory makes effort to keep the equivalence between the source and the target text. However, it only regards a source text as an „offer of information‟ to which it will then be adopted wholly or partially, into a target text by specially taking into consideration the target language and culture. Some scholars, however, have considered that these abridged versions or adaptations need to be included in a theoretical framework of translation and this is the essence of Skopos‟ theory. We concluded that the skopos (the function or the purpose oYf the translation) is the main factor in translation. This purpose may, however,A be Rdifferent from the function of the source text. That is, the target of the translatiRon may be for a radically different purpose than the source text. Likewise, it maIyB be for people of a radically different culture. The essence of translation, thereforLe, is for it to achieve its purpose which, in the final analysis, is determined by the Ncom petence of the translator. Contributions to knowledge DA A lot of researches have been carried out in tAhe area of translation and cross cultural understanding; however this research a iImBs at providing a theoretical framework for translation across culture through a Fcritical look at an African language as a model, to have a general overview of h oOw limitations in a culture could pose a challenge to language and translation oYn one hand, and how acquisition of necessary skill by the agents of translation caInT aid in surmounting the challenges on the other hand. The study is a qRuesSt for solution to the limitation placed on translation on one hand and cross cultuEral understanding on the other. It argues for the possibility of total understaVnding of materials across cultures when texts are adequately translated. It maNkesI a case for transference and localizing of scientific terms, concepts and Uknowledge from one culture to another. The engagement of the Yorùbá pragmatic (functional) approach is based on the dual complementarity between hermeneutics (interpretation) and translation. The fundamental aim of the study is achieved through this Yorùbá complementary pragmatic approach to translation, which is fluid, dynamic, flexible, interpretative, dualistic, symbiotic and comprehensive, putting into consideration the ability, capacity, skill and character of the translator. The use of explication, coining, borrowing, semantic extension and adaptation, broadens our 203 knowledge in the field of philosophy and gives room for further research into the intellectual foundations for the introduction of new ideas for not only the development of our language and culture, but also to bring scientific and technological development closer to all cultures. 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