UTILITARIANISM AND THE AIMS AND 
OBJECTIVES OF ADULT EDUCATION
By
LAOLAT ABEKE ADESANYA (MRS.) 
Adv. Dip. Ed., M.A. (Ed.) (Hull)
A THESIS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
ADULT EDUCATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF EDUCATION
IN PARTI .1 FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOFc THE DEGREE OF
OCTOR o r  PHILOSOPHY 
OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN
Departms ent o f Adult Education, 
University of Ibadan,
Ibadan.
1991
(i)
ABSTRACT
Much of what has been said and written  on educational 
aims has been prescrip tive ; i t  has asserted not what they 
are , but what they should be. That happiness has been 
prescribed indicates that i t  is  an id e a l ,  which finds  
expression in a natural phenomenon. Because o f  i t s  natural 
and comforting i l lu s io n s ,  aims such as this carry a 
persuasive force of positive  connotations which encourages 
va r ie t ie s  o f hyperbo lica lly  optim istic assumptions about 
i t s  e f fe c ts ,  in order to avoid these assumptions becoming 
unchallenged fashionable ideas in educational arena, 
p ar t ic u la r ly  in the realm of adult education, the need for  
a care fu l scrutiny a r ise s .  Thus in prescrib ing  U tilita r ian ism  
as an aim fo r  adult education.; this study has examined the 
fo llow ing  issues:
(1) The meaninOg o- fr aims and the ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  the 
formulation of aims in adult education;
(2) Some philosophical theories that form the basis of  
the aims and objectives o f adult education;
(3) u t i lita r ian ism  and education;
(4) u t i lita r ian ism  as an aim o f adult education; and
(5) Problems associated with the achievement of  
U tilita r ian ism  in adult education.
(ii)
The above examination was carried  out using the 
instrument of philosophical analysis in the follow ing manner: 
F irs t ,  major concepts were picked out for analysis  
in order to understand the princip les  by which their us<e s 
are determined. Thereafter, some crucial themes5  were
subjected to c r i t ic a l  analysis so as to eliminate psuedo- 
problems that are l ik e ly  to a r ise  at the practice and 
implementation stages. This led to the c la r i f ic a t io n  of the 
underlying basic assumptions a r is in g  ~ therefrom, so as to 
put the real issue in c lear  perspective. Later, a synthesis 
of a l l  the positive  ideas highlighted in the process o f  our 
c r i t ic a l  analysis of concepts and issues on the topic was 
drawn together. The re su lt  o f  th is exercise was the 
restatement o f the theory o f happiness in the context of  
adu11 edu ca tion•
F in a l ly ,  counter-objections to the new statement was raised  
in the form o f  unbiased critic ism  and answers were provided 
fo r  such objections. The reason fo r  this task is  to d ig  
up any ambiguity that may be hidden in the new formulation.
I t  was found out that U tilita r ian ism  is  made up o f  
very many component parts o f  eth ica l theories that renders 
i t  almost an impossible target to be aimed at. The problem 
with u t i l i t a r ia n  doctrine is  that i t  obscures the
(iii)
id en tifica t ion  o f appropriate goals and standards o f  
achievement in the education of adults. However, the 
u t i l i t a r ia n  doctrine sees man as primarily concerned with 
the pursuit o f happiness and as such regards the maximisation 
of happiness and the minimisation o f su ffer ing  as the supreme 
o f social action. Thus, the promise o f a psychological 
w ell-be ing  as is  contained in the u t i l i t a r ia nm doctrine is
enough a factor that can a ttract p o l it ic a l  as well as
economic and academic attention.
Our conceptual ana lysis  reveals i t  as a system o f  socia l
and p o l it ic a l  decis ion , as o ffe r in g  a c r ite r ion  and basis  
o f judgement fo r  administrators as well as a system o f  
personal morality. I t  is  claimed that freedom o f thought, 
autonomous decision making and truth are important elements 
fo r  human happiness. Without freedom, there can be no
genuine interaction with environment-, no w i l l in g  involvement 
in the l i f e  o f  society ; and partic ipation w i l l  become an 
irksome imposition, pedagogica lly , this points to an 
education oN, involvement, o f partic ipation , o f  a c t iv ity  and 
an education that involves discovery. Epistemologically, 
what is  to be known and learnt is  to be derived from the data 
of the product of the le a rn e r 's  experience. As such, i t  i s  
argued that education should not be seen as the p r iv i le ge  o f  
a few, but as the r igh t  and the ob ligation  of a l l .
(iv)
I f  this is  to be achieved, tb**- government has to 
restructure i t s  present ro le  concerning adu lt education.
I t  is  therefore recommended that adequate financia l  
provision should be made ava ilab le  fo r  the establishment 
o f adu lt  centres fo r  learning. Adult learning c a l ls  fo r  
d is t in c t  methods; as such, e f fo rts  should be made to train  
adu lt teachers, and access to the adult centres should be 
based on in d iv idu a l’ s in terest and not on government 
selection  and f in a l ly ,  the curriculum o f  the centres should 
be structured in such a manner as to focus on the w e ll-be in g
of the learners.
( V )
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I give glory to God Almighty, who has made i t  possib le  
fo r  me to reach this academic height* I  am very g rate fu l  
to my parents, who in it ia ted  me into this fasc inating , i f  
sometimes mysterious world; to my beloved, brothers and
s is te rs  fo r  their encouragement, prayers, me
continuous in terest in the progress o f  this work from 
conception to execution* I  would l ik e  to say a word ot thanks
and apology to my children -  the l0 l 10 have contentendly
and cheerfu lly  put up with my long absence from home.
My husband, who also is  my p i l l a r  o f support stands in a 
special category. To his mature, kind and soothing encourage­
ment through a l l  the w ritings and re -w rit ings  of this work,
I owe almost everything.
To my Supervisor, professor J. A, Akinpelu, I  owe an 
inexpressib le  debt. His busy schedule of duty as the 
pioneer provost of the College o f  Education, University of  
Ibadan, has in no way affected his ever listen ing  and 
understanding re lationsh ip  with which we started th is work.
As a Philosopher and Adult Educator, he w i l l  never impose 
any or his own ideas upon his learners but rather help the 
learner to discover and organise his own ideas lo g ic a l ly .
(vi)
This has been the situation  throughout this study, and 
I  see myself as being fortunate to have had this type of 
tra in ing. I am also gratefu l to him fo r  the use o f  his 
personal l ib ra ry  and h is untiring helpfu lness in making 
his books ava ilab le  to ipe. At this juncture, I w i l l  also  
l ik e  to show my gratitude to Dr. F. W. Garforth fo r  the 
enthusiasm he showed when I wrote him about ray plans and 
the subsequent generous g i f t s  o f  books. May God b less  you 
two and a lso  your family.
My thanks go to my other lecturers in the University  
who, on their own may have contr to the success of
this work.
This acknowledgement would be incomplete without 
showing my gratitude to my Parents-in-Law fo r  their good 
sense o f  judgement and to my friends and acquaintances, 
with whom I always share my anxiety and Mrs. Shaw o f  
Nottingham University , who was never tired o f  my requests 
fo r  photocopies and other useful Journals.
I a lso wish to thank the Governing Council of 
Ogun State University , Ago-Iwoye fo r  not only granting me
study leave but a lso sponsoring the Course o f  this study. 
Again, the assistance given to me by Mr. e . 0. Olugboja, 
F irs t  Principal of Akoko Anglican Grammar school, A r ig id i  
in Ondo State is  acknowledged.
(vii)
For the cooperation given to me by Mr. 'Jimi ogundare
(viii)
CERTIFICATION
I  c e r t i fy  that this work was carried  out: by
MRS. LAOLAT ABEKE ADESANYA in the Department o f  Adult 
Education, University of Ibadan.
professor J. A. Akinpelu 
M.A. (London) Ph.D (Columbia, N.Y.) 
Professor o f Philosophy of Education, 
Provost o f the College of Education 
University o f Ibadan,
Ibadan, N igeria .
Date: J . . . 1 9 & L
(ix)
DEDICATION
I dedicate this work f i r s t  to the blessed  
memory of my father, g lh a j i  Sunmola (1912 -  1987) who
taught me never to re lax  un til  I have sa t is f ied  my
h ea rt ’ s desire
and
Secondly, my Mother-in-Law, a mother o f  mothers 
la te  Chief Ruth Odubowale Adesanya (1896 -  1986) who 
sacrif iced  her old age re s t  to me what she was
never opportuned to be.
< r
(X)
TABLE OF CONTENT
P A G E
Abstract ........................**.............................................. i  -  iv
Acknowledgement .......................................... . . .  v -  v i i
C e rt i f ic a t io n  ............................................ . . .  . . .  v i i i
Dedication ..................... . . .  ..............  . . .  ix
Table of Contents .....................................................  x -  x i i i
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the problem 1 - 1 0
1.2 Statement of the problem 11 — 13
1.3 The Role o f Philosophy in tackling the Problem. 13 -  14
1.4 Purpose and Significance o f the S tud^/  15 -  17
1.5 What are Aims ? - IS -  22
1.6 Must an Educator have Aims ? 2 3 - 2 6
1.7 The ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  the formulation of
Aims in Adult Education. 26 -  31
<8 ?
CHAPTER TWO: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF
ADULT EDUCATION AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
2.1 Aims o f Adult Education 32 -  47
2.2 Humanistic Adult Education 47 -  51
2.2.1 Adult Education and ‘Romant-c* Humanism 5i -  65
2.3 Adult Education and the L iberal Philosophy
of Education. 65 -  73
2.3.1 The Critique o f L iberal Adult Education. 73 -  77
2.4 Radical Adult Education 78 -  85
2.5 Pragmatic Adult Education 85 -  96
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction 97 -  98
3.1 The Rise of Analytical Philosophy 98 -  103
3.2 What is  Conceptual Analysis 104 -  105
(xi)
Table of Contents (contd.)
P A G E
Chapter Three (contd .)
3.2.1 Techniques o f Analysis 105 - 10 7
3.3 The Datum o f Ordinary Language 108 - 111
3.4 A Concept of Adult Education 111 - 114
3.4.1 Education fo r  individuation 114 117
3.4.2 A Normative Aspect of Adult Education 117 T 120
3.4.3 A Concept o f Adult Education in the
Nigerian Context 120 - 123
CHAFTSR FOUR: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: A IS OFt
CONCEPTS OF UTILITARIANISMV
4.0 introduction  124 131
4.1 What is  Happiness ? 124 - 131
4.2 What is  meant by 'U t i l i t y '  c  132 - 136
4.2.1 What is  U tilita r ian ism  ? 136 - 138
4.3 Negative U tilita r ian ism  fp 138 - 139
4.4 U til ita r ian ism , Motivation and Moral worth. 139 - 143
4.5 Utilitarian ism  as a Defin ition  of  
Ethical Terms. * V / 143 — 149
4.6 U tilitarian ism  and Moral Reasoning 149 - 153
4.7 Measurement^f U t i l i t y 153 156
4.8 Rule and Act U tilita r ian ism  _ 156 - 161
4.9 Freedom and Happiness 161 - 164
4.10 What Autonomy is 164 - 165
4.10.1 Some Objections 165 - 168
4.11 The Concept o f  Autonomy 163 - 171
4.12 Maturity and Adulthood 171 - 173
4.13 Education fo r  Maturation 173 - 174
4.13.1 Equality 174 - 175
4.14 Freedom/Liberty 175 - 186
4.15 U tilita r ian ism  and Education 186 _ 192
(xii)
Table of Contents (contd.)
P A G E
CHAPTER FIVE; CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF TYPES OF
UTILITARIANISM IN CURRENT
ADULT EDUCATION FORMS. 
5.0 Introduction 193 -  194 
5.1 General Objections to U tilitarian ism  -  199 
5.2 The Case o f  p o l i t ic a l  Education ^  199 -  204 
5.3 Is P o l i t ic a l  Adult Education possib le  ? 204 -  206
5.4 Feminism and Adult Education: The Nigerian
Situation 207 -  210 
5.5 Adults and the Need for school 211 -  212 
5.6 Liberal Adult Education 213 -  219
5.7 Education fo r  Freedom — \  ' 219 -  220
5.8 The Content o f Education: Vocational or 
Theoretica l. 220 -  223 
5.9 The Concept o f  Value 223 -  229 
5.9.1 Intuitionism  229 -  230
5.9.2 Naturalism 231
5.9.3 Emotivism 232 -  234 
5.10 Values in Adult Education 234 -  237
CHAPTER SIX: U tilita r ian ism  as an Aim of  
Adult Education.
6.0 Introduction  238
6.1 A Theory of Happiness 239 -  241
6.2 Happiness Defined 241 -  242
6.2.1 Eeing Satis fied  with Something 242 -  248
6.3 Methods of Teaching 248 -  249
6.3.1 Didactic Methods 249 -  251 
6.3.2 Socratic Approaches 251 -  253 
6.3.3 F ac i l i ta t iv e  Methods 253 -  255
(x i i i )
Table of Contents (contd.)
P A G E
Chapter Six (contd.)
6.4 The Se lf 255 -  261
6.5 The Teaching Strategy of Paulo Freire 261 -  265
6.6 Andragogical Approach 265 - 268
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
Summary o f Research 269 -  271
The Role o f Government Agencies 272 - 274
The Role o f Un ivers ities part icu la r ly  
Department o f Education. _ - 274 -  275
Role o f philanthropists 275
The Adult Learners 275 - 277
Implications for Curriculum Planners 277 - 278
Adult F a c i l i t a to r s '  Role 278 -  279 
Adult Education in S o c ie ty ^ 280 - 283
REFERENCES 284 - 294
• 7 ' ° ' ............
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background to the problem
Underlying adult education aims and objectives are 
assumptions concerning the characteristics  of the adult.  
An adult is  assumed to be a mature, responsib le , free and
autonomous ind iv idual. I t  is  believed that an ediucaatt.ional 
goal geared towards the perpetuation these characteristics  
is  the ideal type o f education fo r  the adu lt , because such 
an education which is  based on voluntary partic ipation  is  
naturally  a llu r in g  fo r  the fac t  that i t  involves the choice 
of one 's own destiny. And also in view of the fact that 
i t  consists in an advance towarwra chosen goa l, i t  a ffords  
a sense o f continuing progress in maturity which, according 
to Bromley, "precludes the fee ling  of inner deadness and decline  
that can ligh t  old age". Furthermore, Bradley adds that 
a person's happiness consists in "the finding o f  himself . . .  
the rea lisat ion  of his concrete ideal of l i f e . " ^  Bentham 
adds that the ideal is  to promote the preference of human 
beings and no doubt these characteristics  constitute the
adult preferences.
1. Bromley, D .B ., (1974): The Psychology o f Human Ageing.
(second e d it io n );  Harmondsworth, penguin Books, p.265.
2. Bradley, F.H. (1962): Ethical Studies (second ed it ion ).
London, Oxford University press. p.96
3. Sen, A. & Williams, B. (e d s . )(1988 ): U tilita r ian ism  and
Beyond. New York, Cambridge University press, p.266.
2
The proponents o f this aim claim that this type of education
is  worthwhile fo r  i t s  own sake. This type o f aim is  
associated with those v/ho already have had an in i t i a l  
education and who are w i l l in g  to continue to experience the
joy o f what had e a r l ie r  begun. I t  is  therefore often
c r it ic iz e d  as being e l i t i s t  and se lec t ive , whereas somek 
proponents o f adult education believe that i t  i s  a grassroot  
movement aimed at e ^ a l i t y  o f  e d u c a t io n  o p p ^ n i t y  at a i l  
le v e ls ,  and they hold the view that education is  a r igh t
and not a p r iv i le ge  of only a few.
Adult education has always been concerned with a c t iv i t ie s
that are, usefu l or instrumental, and this has always been the 
fundamental basis  in any formulation of i t s  aims and objectives  
Useful education aims to serve as the means to an end.
In more concrete terms, what this amounts to is  that i t  tr ies  
to be u se fu l ,  teaching information and s k i l l s  which have a 
d irec t ,  p ractica l value. A great deal of adu lt education has 
this kind o f purpose. I t  tends to address sp ec if ic  issues
and solve immediate problems. Forms of adu lt education that 
re la te  to spec if ic  outcomes are vocational education, community 
education, education fo r  social change, extension education, 
p o l i t ic a l  education and so on and so forth ; a l l  come under the 
umbrella of functional or pragmatic education. An excellent  
example of this type of instrumental education is  the 
on-going mass (non-formal) education in this country
3
by MAMSER. The Social M obilisation Crusade fo r
Economic Recovery, S e lf  Reliance and Social ju st ice  (MAMSER) was 
launched on 25th July, 1987 in Lagos. One o f the aims of 
MAMSER is  "the inculcation in a l l  o f our c it izens the 
values, the habits o f and the orientation which w i l l  lead, 
without coercion to the emergence, . . .  o f  a grea 
s e l f - r e l i a n t ,  c iv ic  society in which ju s t ic e ,  duty,
re sp on s ib il ity ,  tolerance and commitment to ition shall
1
hold sway". This type o f instrumental aim is  not new.
For some time now, espec ia lly  the period a fte r
independence, there has been much talLkk about the need to
build  a united N igeria  by the various p o l i t ic a l  and m ilitary  
ru le rs .  The need arose as a re su lt  o f  the N ige r ia 's  
d iv e rs i f ie d  cultural and re lig iou s  sett ing . Such a setting^  
i t  i s  opined, w i l l  not augur well fo r  the accelerated social 
and economic progress that is  needed for the successful 
take -o ff  and maintenance o f  her autonomous existence  
a fte r  independence.
This need becomes more v is ib le  p a rt icu la r ly  during -the period  
a fte r  the c iv i l  war. This time, in addition to social and
economic s t a b i l i t y ,  the need for peaceful co-existence
^ (XmC-
becomes paramount. The ravages o f war have done a lo t  to 
d isin tegrate  the people of N igeria  to the extent that 
nobody is  ready to help, trust or care fo r  the other person.1 
1. Ogun State Information Service, 1978: MAMSER in a
Nutshell. Abeokuta, Ogun State printing Corporation.
4
The resu lt  is  that instead o f becoming one N igeria , we are 
becoming many and alienated Nigerians.
This situation is  not peculiar to N iger ia ; i t  has 
happened, for example, in the western world. The end o f the 
Second World War brought into lim elight the need fo r  education 
and adult education in particu lar , on the one hand, the need., 
fo r  new knowledge in orddr' to be ab le  to cope with industria l
| ^ i , ^  *
t a k e -o f f , en w  instigated organizations and communities into 
commitment to adult education^ on the other hand, is  the 
adoption of workers' Educational Movement founded by A lbert  
Mansbridge designed to provide learning fo r  l iv in g  and not 
fo r  earning § live lihood .
Something, however, which ique about adult education,
is  that i t s  nature and purpose, as i t  is  p ractised , reveals  
that i t s  aims and ob jectives are f a i r ly  sp e c i f ic ,  a r is ing  
out o f  need. For example, in I t a ly ,  a low leve l of general 
education among workers, a p o l i t i c a l ly  divided society and 
government in action, a l l  played a major part in the creation  
of the '150 hours/15Scheme. This is  a kind o f co llec t ive  
arrangement reached between Unions and employers; employees were 
allowed some^jours o f paid leave depending on their status and 
number o f  employers in that establishment, to undergo some 
academic pursuit. The in i t ia l  condition fhowever, is  that
employees on their own must put in as many hour^^pf paid leave 
granted them out of their le isu re  time. In the / German-'Federal 
Republic, c itizenship  education has been given so much attention  
because o f the perceived need to create an informed, 
responsible c it izen ry  capable of exercis ing re sp on s ib il it ie s  1
1. Titmus, C. (1981): Strategies fo r  Adult Education: practices  
in western Euro~pe! Milton Keynes. The Open university  
Press.
5.
which previous generations had neither understood nor 
appreciated. France has provided • : vocational
adult education . to a l l  and sundry^ part ly  because
of the free market philosophy of the Government, partly
because of employers' d is t ru st  of the formal education system
a fte r  1968,and partly  because i t  seemed to be the only way to 
achieve the scale  o f provision desired , since there was no 
ex isting  nationwide machinery of adult vocational training.
In l ik e  manner, adu lt education is  needed in iria now
1 N i g e r i
part ly  because of her depressed economy and partly  as a 
preparation fo r  the take -o ff  o f the Third Republic.
The current s ituation , as i t  is  put by Iso la  Folorunso, 
is  as fo llow s: "When we r e f le c t  on some o f the disturbing and 
agonising aspects o f our soc ia l behaviours of the past, and 
re ca l l  the s e l f  in f l ic te d  problems that arose from our 
d if fe re n t  prevailing  circumstances o f those moments -  dishonesty, 
disharmony, d is t ru s t ,  lack of patriotism , in d isc ip line ,  
problems that have continued to appear in tractab le , . . . "
He went on, "the anguished cries o f a l l  concerned Nigerians 
fo r  a change have long f i l l e d  the a i r  and can no longer be
ignored".
In lik e r ,  Kola, Omotosho2 lamented on the s e l f i sh ,  
care less attitude o f the Nigerian e l i t e s ,  He made reference  
to the physi cal environment, mountains o f re fuse , mileages
1. Folorunso, I .  (1987): An Address delivered by
Mr. Iso la  Folorunso, Ogun estate D irector fo r  Social 
M obilisation ; in MAMSER in a Nutshell. Abeokuta. 
Ogun State printing Corporation; p.8.
2. Omotosho, K. (1981): 'who Can be Happy in Nigeria ?' 
in west A fr ic a ,  No. 3437, 27th June.
6
of stinks, and yet a ff lu en t  Nigerians are doing nothing to 
improve this situation . Because they can afford  generating 
plants that w i l l  supply them with e le c t r ic i t y ,  they are doing 
nothing about the darkness into which their neighbours are 
plunged by NEPA (National E lectr ic  Power Authority ). For 
as long as they can a fford  tb l iv e  in affluence and comfort, 
what matters to them is  how to keep the status quo. They thus 
become sources o f envy fo r  their less able neighbours, and 
the resu lt  is  that some less  successful elements attempt a sort  
o f crude red istribution  o f wealth by robbing with violence  
and terrorism a l l  over the place. Sd, the a ff luent is  not 
happy, neither is  his less successful neighbour.
To this end, Oluwole advocated " the ra ising  of people’ s
consciousness towards positive a c t iv i t ie s  that w i l l  involve
a ttitud ina l changes in us . .1 as a basis before embarking
on any programme of a l le v ia t in g  the present i l l s .  Tugbiyele,
favouring the idea o f a tt itud ina l change, wrote:
'•the tragedy o f th^*N^gerian situation  is  that many so -ca lled  
highly educated Nigerians including many with doctorate 
degrees are, in fact, functional i l l i t e r a t e s .  . . . "
He continued, "unless our functional i l l i t e r a t e s  are made 
l i t e r a t e ,  a l l  e f fo r t s  towards economic rejuvenation, social
t \ "  _____ .__  __ ____ __ 2_
m obilisation and p o lit ic a l  s t a b i l i t y  are doomed to f a i l " .  1
1. Oluwole, S. B. (1989): "Welfarism: what is  i t  a l l  about?"
in Sunday Times, January 22, page 10.
2. Tugbiyele, E. A. (1989): ’Tackling the Problems of
i l l i t e r a c y ' ;  in Sunday Times, p.15.
As the saying goes that nothing is  new in the universe, 
so i t  is  found a fte r  a l l  that this situation  and the 
attendant recommendations to ameliorate i t  are not new. The 
situation  bears s im ila r ity  to the period in England when 
James M ill  gathered round himself a group o f  men who called  
themselves 'philosophical r a d ic a ls '  who doyotod th«m*«lreg  
to the reform o f English Society -  in law, education, 
m orality , parliament, the nation 's  economic l iLftee,, in ever;y thing
that embodied in justice  in humanity, p r iv i le  ̂ and denial
o f  reason. Their aims were to be achieved not only by 
p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv ity ,  including the nomination o f parliamentary 
candidates but also by powerful use of the printed and spoken 
word. There is  a fa ith  that human society is  capable of  
improvement and i t  is  the duty o f  responsible men and women
to promote i t .
This w riter  shares the view that change o f  attitude in 
Nigerians is  long overdue. Assuming that i t  is  possible to 
e f fe c t  a change, what- type o f change are we to envisage? 6r 
put i t  in another way, what e f fe c t  do we want education to 
have on the learner ?
In view of the nature of the type o f  problems on hand,
we would want a change from a s e l f ish  behaviour to an 
a l t r u i s t ic  type. Also, the need fo r  ju s t ic e ,  coooeration 1
1. Garforth, F.W. (1980): Educatipe Democracy: John Stuart 
M ill on Education and soc ie ty ; England,
Oxford University Press, pp. 12 ff.
8
and enlightenment which have been Identified  as a panacea 
to v ir tu a l ly  a l l  our problems can only be achieved, according  
to John Stuart M ill ;  by "unchecked l ib e r ty  o f thought, 
unbounded freedom o f individual action in a l l  modes not 
hurtful to others, but a lso  by convictions as to what is  
r igh t  and wrong, usefu l and pernicious, deeply engraven 
on the fee lings by education and general unanimity o f  
sentiment".^-
The claim made by Godwin that "true ob&jective o f  
education . . .  is  the generation o f  happiness" and the 
assertion by Lawson that education has a claim to public  
support, not only because i t  makes people happier . . . "  
confirms that education in general, and adult education 
in particular, is  grounded in the search fo r  happiness.
Those who come into adu lt education do so because they have, 
on their own vo lit ion , discovered something missing in their 
l i f e  s ty le , the addition c f  which w i l l  make them happy, and 
those who educate adults think that at the end o f a programme, 
they have at least  succeeded in promoting the happiness of  
the partic ipants. 1
1. M i l l ,  J .S. (1824) Autobiography: Oxford University  Press,
p.41
2. Godwin, w. (1797): The Enquirer (London) quoted in
G arforth , F.W. ( 1 ^ 3 5 ) : Aims, Values and Education. 
Hull, Christygate press. Page 31.
3. Lawson, K.H. (1979): philosophical Concepts and Values
in Adult Education (second ed it io n ).  England,
The Open University  Press. Page 10.
9
Unfortunately, c lea r  understanding o f what happiness 
means i s  lacking in the teachers and the taught*; Irfc tftses,
the instrumental aim of adu lt education alone is  seen to be 
the only aspect o f adult education that is  capable o f  providing  
happiness. This is  due to the practica l exposure o f  the 
learner and the attendant monetary reward. Any adu lt  
education therefore that has no immediate a p p l ic a b i l i t y  may
not have the support and attraction o f the partic ipan ts .
1 O c )
To this end, Lawson warned that i t  is  dangerous to re ly  on
instrumental aims in adult education fo r  there is  the
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f not atta in ing  the anticipated ends.
This study therefore seeks not only to c la r i f y  the
concept o f  happiness, but a lso  to recommend structures and
procedures fo r  promoting i t  in adult education; in addition ,
i t  examines some o f  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  l ik e ly  to be encountered
when these methods are employed in practice, and discusses
how they can be overcome.
U tilita r ian ism  means "happiness and the absence o f  
2_
pain". The creed which accepts u t i l i t y  as the foundation 
of morals, oK  the greatest happiness principles, holds that 
actions are  r ig h t  in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse o f  
happiness, in this instance, i t  is  not the action that re a l ly  
counts but i t s  e f fe c t .  In any action therefore, i t  i s  the 1
1. Lawson, K.H. (1979) o£. c i t . , p.10
2. M ill, J.S. (1859): Utilitarianism . On Liberty and Considerations,
On Representative Government edited by Acton, H.B. (1987)
Everyman C lassics, p.7
motive and the resu ltant e f fe c t  that counts in so fa r  as 
i t  resu lts  into happiness.
U tilitarian ism  can a lso  be c la s s i f ie d  as an a l t r u is t ic
philosophy in that the u •t i l i t a r ia n  morality recog’ nises in
human beings the power o f  sa c r i f ic in g  their own greatest  
good fo r  the good o f  others. M ill  argues that the 
u t i l i t a r ia n  doctrine maintains not only that v irtue  is  to 
be desired, but that i t  is  to be desired d is in te rested ly  
fo r  i t s e l f .  In other words, i f  by s a c r i f ic in g  your
individual happiness of
the society, then you are conforming with the doctrine , 
though one might as w e ll  be serving a double purpose, that 
i s ,  sa tis fy ing  ones happiness and that o f  the society .
The idea o f unrestricted  l ib e r ty  is  very prominent in 
M i l l ' s  w rit ings ; he believed that this w i l l  lead to 
happiness, we would therefore try tc examine what happiness 
i s ;  the way in which l ib e r ty  can promote happiness. But 
very importantly is  how l ib e r ty  can be achieved through 
adult education. We would therefore examine some methods 
o f teaching espec ia lly  the method o f teaching adults* through 
which happiness can be achieved.
11.
1.2 Statement o f  the problem;
Much has been written in recent years on those aspects 
o f M i l l ’ s thought fo r  which he is  best known -  soc ia l and
p o l i t ic a l  theory, ethics and philosophy o f  science. Yet 
none o f these w rite rs  has attempted • a p ractica l •p p liL .ce a tion
o f his views to education in general, l e t  alont ; adult  
education in p a rt icu la r ;  despite the fa c t  that he was, as 
could be s ifted  from his various w r it in gs , convinced o f the
importance o f education. His father, James M ill, had written  
that "the end o f  Education is  to render the indiv idual as 
much as possib le  an instrument o f happiness, f i r s t  to 
himself, and next to other beings". To these two foci j  
of educational purpose, the individual and mankind, John
Stuart was a lso committed. For him, the ultimate goal 
is  happiness, and th is ,  he explains in h is U til ita r ian ism
as meaning the presence o f "pleasure and the absence of pain.^  
Happiness, in the ordinary sense, is  an emotional 
state that a l l  sentiant beings desired, v/hat^hov/ever^ 
constitutes happiness fo r  each individual is  a t variance
from person to person and from culture to cu lture.
The purpose of this research therefore is  not to make a 
case fo r  the d e s i r a b i l i t y  of ’Happiness'. What i t  sets out
1. Burston, W.H. (e d . )  1969: James M ill  on Education. 
London, un iversity  Press, p.52
2 M i l l ,  J. S. (1859) op. c i t . . P.7
12
to do is  to develop a pragmatic de fin it ion  o f happiness, such 
as can be achieved when set as aims and objectives o f  adult
education. Neither is  the researcher interested in formulating  
additional aims and objectives fo r  adult education programme;
these have been variously  defined and amongst them i s :  "to help 
the individual find meaning and happiness in life."(emphasis mine) 
The problem with aims such as these is  that they appear 
to be insp iring  and worth pursuing, but is  i t  capable of  
being achieved? Is  i t  possib le , for example, to break down 
happiness into units of learning objectives that w i l l  be 
evaluated at the end of a learning period? Is  u t i l i t y  an 
inherent and inev itab le  characteristic  o f adult education 
aims and objectives? I f  so, there degrees to
utilitar ian ism ? 'Jhat leve l of i t  w i l l  be adequate in an ideal  
adult education aims and objectives?
Another problem confronting the issue of aims p a rt icu la r ly  
in re lation  to adu lt education is  at lea s t  twe general 
objections raised against any attempt at de fin it ion  o f aims.
On the one hand, i t  is  maintained that a de fin it ion  must 
inev itab ly  have a cramping e ffec t  on the educator.
I t  is  suggested that adult education is  carried on in an 
environment o f personal re lationships which any defined  
and defin ing formula may f a i l  to take account o f ,  to the 
detriment o f the educational process. The second 
type o f objection seems to be the generalisation  1
1. Akinpelu, J .a . (1981): 'philosophy and Adult Education' 
in Sown, L. & Okedara, J.T. (ed s . ) An introduction  
to the study of Adult Education: A NuTti-D iscip linary  
and Cross-Cultural Approach {'or developing Countries. 
Ibadan, un iversity  c. Ibadan press; p .83
13
o f the f i r s t  in the socia l context. The opinion is  
expressed that i t  should not be the special task of an 
ind iv idua l, or even o f a restricted  group of ind iv iduals ,  
to formulate what is  in e f fe c t  the jo in t concern of a wide 
varie ty  o f persons. The formulation o f a social aim -  which 
means a common purpose i s  beyond the power o f anyone in the 
context of the twentieth century divided society. I t  is  
suggested that those cleavages which ex ist  in contemporary 
Society, cleavages rooted u ltim ately  in d i f fe re n t  socio­
p o l i t ic a l  and metaphysical commitments, cannot be resolved
but can only be recognised. Thus the questions a r ise :  
'Should an educator have an aim? and Vin particu lar , should
adult educators have aims? I f  soo ,. or n what foundation should
such aims be based? These are^tery important questions 
which w i l l  be discussed in this work.
The Role of philosophy in tackling the Problem:
Among the various asoects o f  adult education which 
f igu re  in training courses are i t s  h is to r ic a l ,  psychological, 
sociological L, o anisational and economic aspects, and these 
form c lea r  f ie ld s  fo r  research. Workers in these f ie ld s  
operate within re la t iv e ly  c lea r  terms of reference, d e f in ite  
resu lts  are expected of them. Now^what part can 
philosophical inquiry play in the systematic study of adult
14
education ? Roberts, suggests that I t  is  needed because
adult education is  too often concerned with ,rwhat to do
without examining s u f f ic ie n t ly  why we should do i t . "
2
An expansion o f this concern can be found in Apps' work.
A philosophy is  e ssen t ia l,  he fe e ls ,  fo r  answering 
programming questions, fo r  seeing adult education a c t iv i t ie s  
in their re lationsh ip  to other a c t iv it ie s  ety, fo r
answering what he c a l ls  "long standing and basic  questions" and 
fo r  providing "deeper meaning to adult educators l i f e . "  
Bergevin,while recognising that adu lt education philosophers 
w i l l  vary, fee ls  that there is  value in having some philosophy 
to "estab lish  a common point o f reference, an integrated  
viewpoint, toward certain  b e l i e f s ,  ideas, a tt itudes , and 
p rac t ice s ."
I t  w i l l  be illum inating to know that a philosophy Is  
more than a description of what is  going on in adult education, 
more than a de fin it ion  o f  the adult learner and the learning  
process, more than any one aspect o f the f ie ld  o f  adult  
education. A philosophy provides a framework, a structure  
or set o f basic assumptions and princip les from which one can 
view the entire f ie ld  of adu lt education. 1
1. Roberts, H.W. 1976: "Goals, Objectives, and Functions
in Adult Education". Adult Education. Winter, p.127
2. Apps, J.W. (1973): Toward a Working philosophy o f  
Adult Education. Syracuse, Syracuse un iversity  
publications in Continuing Education, pp.3-5
3 Bergevin, P. (1967): A Philosophy fo r  Adult Education 
New York, seabury press, p.3
15
1.3 purpose o f  Study;
I t  is  now commonplace that in the V/estern world 
there has been a ’ revo lu tion ' in philosophy which has brought 
with i t  sim ilar revolution in educational philosophy.
Educational philosophy was transferred from an examination
*
o f the theories and doctrines o f the great educators in to
a c r i t ic a l  analysis o f  the language and concepts education,
o f  i t s  methods, of i t s  aims and their ju s t i f ic a t io n .
C la r i f ic a t io n  o f  ideas and the neutral d isp lay  of lo g ic a l
taken
relationsh ips have/the place of prescription and exhortation. 
One re su lt  o f such enquiries, i t  was hoped, would be greater  
c la r i t y  in educational thinking, which in turn would 
contribute to more enlightened and purposeful planning, and 
thus to a greater change o f success in achieving educational
ob jectives .
That in i t i a l  impe5 tu  sS o f the revolution has faded and
a fresh approach to problems in educational philosophy is
1
being put forward -  recontextualising of philosophy.
For a recontextualized philosophy, the context is  pertinent. 
%
Garforth suggests that philosophical issues in education
should be seen f i r s t  in a personal and h is to r ic a l  context -  
that i s ,  in actual educational w riters  -  and thereafter  
abstracted, generalized and subjected to scrutiny. 1
1. Raywid, M.A. (1980): 'More Criticism  o f Analytic philosophy
of Education'. _in Philosophy o f  Education. vol.7 ,No.2
2, Garforth, F.W. (19T9)s John Stuart M ill 's  Theory of Education;
England; Martins Robertson. Preface v i i i .
16
The present research is  an attempt to examine the 
concept of aims in adult education, and the issues associated  
with i t .  The issue o f aims in adult education as formulated 
by adult education thinkers has been based on prescription ,  
imposing on the concept a value-content of their own or some 
ideology or re l ig iou s  doctrine to which t' ’ ’ ’ ed.
The intention here is  modified. Rather,
made at an elucidation of aims in adult e is
descr ip t ive  and, as fa r  as possib le , make i t  typical and
p o l i t i c a l  or re l ig iou s  commitmen t the same time, i t  is
intimately related that i t  is  possib le  to view them as two 
aspects and that values should be centra l, decisive  and 
d irec t ive  in the theory and practice of adult education.
Sign ificance o f  5tufty:
For sometime now, adult education has been dealing  
with programme. The present research, however, is  concerned 
with process in adult education, though i t  has not neglected 
the issue of programme in adult education. While this can 
be seen as a novelty, i t  is  also very s ign if ican t in that 
i t  provides a conceptual basis for adult education 
practit ioners  and planners.
17
The f i r s t  chapter reviewed the Nigerian situation  and 
discovered that the u t i l i t y  of adult learning and education 
is  taken only in the context of instrumental aims. The need 
fo r  a c la r i f ic a t io n  o f the other side of u t i l i t y  thus becomes 
paramount. And this brings about the need for a ju s t i f ic a t io n  
o f  aims in adult education. In chapter two, a review of some 
philosophical theories o f adult education is undertaken.
This involves an examination of relevant theories which form 
the basis for the various adult education forms.
In chapter three, an attempt is  made to discuss the method 
o f  philosophical ana lysis  being employed in this study.
Chapter four attempts a conceptual c la r i f ic a t io n  o f  the 
concept of u t i l i ta r ian ism , through analysis and deduction 
from the theoretical explanations as they re la te  to adult  
education is  done. While chapter f ive  looks at the various  
forms of adult education with a view to examining the types 
of u tilitar ian ism  contained tnerein. In chapter s ix ,  
happiness is^redefined in such a manner as to make i t  
achievable when set as an aim; and this has implication fo r  
the process o f adu lt education. The Summary of the research 
and i t s  attendant recommendation is  undertaken in
Chapter Seven..
1.5 What are Aims ?
Much o f what has been said and written on educational 
aims has been p rescr ip t ive ; i t  has asserted not what they 
are , but what they should be. Frequently, th is prescription  
is  disguised by using the language of fa c t  instead o f  the 
language of command or ob liga t ion . Examples of such 
prescription abound in the w ritings o f  many educational­
i s t s .  Richard Steelj fo r  example, wrote that " i t  is  . . .
the great end of education to ra ise  ourselves above the 
1
vu lgar" , and William Godwin in his case declared: "The true
ob ject o f education . . .  is  the generation o f  happiness". 2
Here, Godwin’ s assertion is  no doubt a p rescrip tive  
recommendation -  happiness should be the ’ true ob ject* .
Sim ilar assertion can be found in abundance in recent 
times, such as Percy Nunn*s: 'The primary aim o f  a l l  
educational e f fo r t  should be to help boys and g i r l s  to 
achieve the highest degree o f individual development o f  which 
they are capable* ; in the same vein, White stated that: 1
1. S tee le , quoted in Garforth, F.W. (1985): Aims, Values
and Education. Hull, Christygate Press, p.31
2. Godwin, quoted in Garforth, F.W. (1985): Ib id .  p.31
3. Nunn, P. (1945): Education: I t s  Data and F ir s t  Princip les  
Arnold, p.15
•the central aim of  education . . .  ought to be that the
1
pupil becomes a morally autonomous person '.  others conceal
the prescription by stating i t  as a fac t ;  the Norwood Report,
fo r  instance, declares that the purpose of  education is
to provide the nurture and the environment which w i l l
3
enable the child to grow a r i g h t ' ;  and Rusk : ' i t  i s  the
(S  3
function of education to turn capacity into a b i l i t y ' .
I t  is not the intention of the present chapter to 
prescribe what the aims of education in general and adult  
education in part icu lar  should be (th is  w i l l  be tackled la t e r
in the course o f  this research) nor
the h istorian, the soc io log is t  and so on; instead, what
the philosopher seeks is  c la r i f i c a t io n ,  the elucidation o f
necessarily
meanings, the exposure o f  problems but without/adopting 
a positive  stance except where fac t  or log ic  requires i t .
The f i r s t  task as such w i l l  be to take a l in gu is t ic  
analysis of  the concept o f  aim in educational discourse.21 
1. White, j .  (I9S2.): The Aims of  Education Restated. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.140
2. Norwood Report (1943): Curriculum and Examination in 
Secondary Schools. London, H.M.S.O.
3. Rusk, R. R. (1928): The philosophical Bases o f  Education 
University of  London press, p.63
20
The var iety  of words used in discussing educational aims
can be a source o f  uncertainty and confusion. For example,
we f ind :  end, ob ject ,  aim, purpose, function, -  a l l  o f  them 
purportedly
^expressing the same meaning; also to be found are:  ob ject ive ,
goal,  point, use, intention; while p r inc ip le 1̂ and idleall*5are 
a l l  used in educational discussion.
Some writers  have sought in this d ive rs i ty  a means o f  
i l luminating the concept o f  education and i t s  family in 
drawing d ist inctions between for  example, purpose and function,  
purpose and aim. Gribble  accuses educational socio log ists  
o f  confusing analysis o f  the function o f  education with 
analysis  of aims, though he too i s  gu i l ty  of  the same offence  
fo r  he fa i led  to elaborate on the d ist inct ion .  However, 
i t  may be said that function includes the way in which a 
process works, the design o f  i t s  operation, i t s  ro le ,  and 
also the way i t  contributes to a la rge r  context of  purposes 
( e .g .  the function o f  schools within the total system of  
education) -  a l l  this in addition to the analysis of  
purpose i t s e l f .  But, in practica l  usage, the notions of  
function and purpose are commonly ident i f ied ,  and i f  someone 
asks: 'V/hat i s  the function of  X ?' he usually  means ’what 
i s  i t  f o r ,  what purpose does it. serve ? This i s  well  
i l lu s t ra ted  by a sentence o f  Peters: "The function of the
1. Gribb le ,  J. (1969): Introduction to philosophy of Education. 
England, Allyn and Bacon, p. 14
21
formulation o f  aims is  to specify more precise ly  what one
1  ,
i s  trying to achieve . . . "  Here, function is  indistinguish­
ab le  from purpose and this la t te r  word, and many of  the 
others l is ted  above, could be substituted fo r  i t .
This may not be unconnected with the reason why 
Langford suggested that in educational discussions, aims 
should not be used. He pointed out that aim in educational 
discourse is  a metaphor and that metaphors, though they may 
a s s i s t  understanding^ can also be misleading because the 
analogy is  never exact or complete. He concludes that
" i t  might be better to abandon the misleading
terminology o f  aims, and use inssttead t1 erms l ik e  "purposes",  
intentions, and idea ls  which are tailor-made to talk about
A 2
the intentional aspect of a c t i v i t i e s . "  Purpose, he argues,
d i f f e r s  from aim in having no metaphorical content, in 
suggesting a wider and more distant perspective, and in 
implying an in te rna l i ty  o f  viewpoint -  the a c t iv i ty  as seen 
by those engaged in i t  rather than from outside, as compared 
with idea Dose has a practical ring while " idea ls  are
•y
the product o f  re f lect ion  and may be unattainable" .  J
------------ :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Peters, R.S. (e d ) ( l9 7 3 ) :  The Philosophy o f  Education. 
England, O .U.P.,  p.14 . '
2. Langford, G. (1968): philosophy and Education: An
Introduction. England, Macmillan Press. p.483 
3. Ib id .  p .54
c. t-%
r,Ideal and pr incip le  look farther than purpose” , he 
contended, "they r e f l e c t  a vie1/; o f  what l i f e  and education 
ought to be" and concluded that "they have an ethical  content 
which both guides a c t iv i ty  and assesses i t s  worth".
In spite o f  a l l  these d ist inct ions ,  one i s  s t i l l  not 
very c lea r  whether the substitution o f  purposes, intentions,  
id ea ls ,  fo r  the terminology o f  aims is  l ik e ly  to achieve 
greater c la r i t y  in our understanding o f  educa tion and what 
exactly i t  is  fo r .
For Peters, the situation is this. He acknowledges 
the metaphor in aim and draws implications o f  meaning from i t .  
"The concept o f  aim'^ he writes ,  "always carr ies  with i t  
some o f  the nuances associated with i t s  natural home in
context of shooting and throwSintg" . 2 Inclus ive  are 
concentration o f  attention, specif ication  o f  a precise object,  
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  attainment and p o s s ib i l i t y  of  f a i lu r e .  He 
explained that aims is  l ik e  trying and so to ask a question 
of what one is  aiming at is  just l ik e  asking what one is  
trying to do. He argues that aims are an attempt to persuade 
people to specify more c lea r ly  what they are trying to do 
and to concentrate their  e f fo r t s  accordingly; they serve,  
therefore, more as exhortation than as requests fo r  explanation.21 
1. Langford, G. (1968): op. c i t . . p.55 .
2. Peters, R.S. ( e d . ) ( l 9 7 3 ) :  op. c i t . . pp.12, 13.
1.6 Must An Educator have Aims ?
Garforth argued that 'education is  e ssen t ia l ly  an
act iv i ty  intentional ly  directed towards purposes more or less
c lea r ly  envisaged and must therefore exclude the unplanned
1
and involuntary". in the same vein, J.s. M i l l f in his  
inaugural address chose to confine education to the "narrow 
sense -  the culture which each generation purposely gives to 
those who are to be i t s  successors . . . " ^  Education, 
therefore, according to these two thinkers^ as a process,  
i s  both intentional and instrumental and these features  
no doubt imply that there i s  a purpose fo r  undertaking the 
act iv i ty  (education). A fter  having identi f ied  such purpose, 
the educator, i f  he i s  to achieve this purpose, has to 
determine the method by which to attain i t .
To aim at something i s ,  in other words, to concentrate 
attention on an ob ject  which must be h i t ,  or  pierced, an 
act iv i ty  which iS) s imilar to the dart board game. I t s  
internal accusative target covers anything conforming to 
this specif ication . I t  suggests concentration o f  attention  
on something which i s  the focus of an ac t iv ity .
Hence i t  i s  no surprise  that Peters raised an objection  
to the use o f  purpose or motive l ike  aim. Questions as to21 
1. Garforth, F.W. (1985): op. c i t . , p.46.
2. _________  (ed . ) (1971 ) :  'inaugural Address' in John Stuart
Mill  on Education. New York, Teachers College  
Press, p .154
24
the purpose of a person's a c t iv i ty ,  say building a house, 
or one's motive in v is i t in g  a sick friend are usually  
attempts to e l i c i t  information as to what one views these 
a c t iv i t i e s  as leading up to; but i t  would be odd to ask
fo r  the aim of these a c t i v i t i e s ,  i f  we wanted to remove our
«
puzzlement about their explanation. "To ask for  an m"
he w r ites ,  " i s  to ask for  a more precise specification of
1
what an action or ac t iv ity  i s " .  Questions such as what people 
are aiming at would seem to a r ise  only in situa tions when
, V “
they appear rather confused about their purposes or when
they are drawing up a plan of campaign arid have to formulate
what they intend to do in a coherent way. Among these, he
continued, are specification o f  precise ob ject ,  «nd measures
to betatoen towards i t s  attainment. The function of aims
he concluded^ are attempts to persuade people to specify more
c lea r ly  what they are trying to do and concentrate their e f fo r t s
accordingly; they serve therefore, more as exhortation than
2
as requests fo r  exploration. Merger adds, that aims are 
l ik e  route maps in a sense that they guide trave lle rs  to 
reach their destination.
Despite a l l  these assurances about the a b i l i t y  of aims 
in aiding the achievement of educational a c t iv i t i e s ,  adult1 
1. H irs t ,  P.H. & Peters, R.S. (1970): The Logic o f  Education; 
Routledce & Kegan Paul, London. p.26
2. Merger quoted in Garforth, F.W. (1985) Aims. Values and 
Education. Hull ,  Christygate press, p . 35 .
25
educators are s t i l l  opposed to the idea o f  formulating aims
in adult education. There are two sorts o f  object ions,  at
least ,  which are raised -  the attempt to define the aim or
aims of adult education. On the one hand, i t  is  maintained
that such a de f in it ion  would impose a l im it  o f  ju r isd ict ion
and this w i l l  in turn have a cramping e f fe c t  on the educator.
I t  is  suggested that adult education is  carried on in an
environment o f  personal re lationships,  which any defined and
defining formula must f a i l  to take account o f ,  to the detriment 
the
of/educational process. These re lationships,  that i s ,  
teacher/learner rapport constitute the essence of the educational 
process and can develop only in an atmosphere of spontaneity, 
whereas c lea r ly  defined aims, which bring in their  train sharp, 
formulated methods o f  instruction and evaluation w i l l  no doubt 
destroy the good teacher/learner re lationships.
The second type o f  objection seems to be the generalisation  
o f  the f i r s t  in the social  context. The opinion is
should not be the special task o f  an
_ _________  en o f  a restricted group of  ind iv iduals ,
to formulate what i s  in e f fe c t  the jo int concern of a wide
variety  o f  persons. The formulation of an aim -  which means 
a common purpose -  is  beyond the power o f  anyone in the 
context of the twentieth century divided society. I t  is  
suggested further that those cleavages which ex is t  in 
contemporary society , cleavages rooted ultimately in d i f fe ren t
ZG,
soc io -po l i t ica l  and metaphysical commitments, cannot be 
resolved but can only be recognised.
The objections may however be met by considering in 
d e t a i l ,  the reasons fo r  e laborating the aim of adult  
education. Probably the most compelling reason for  c la r i t y  
derives from the necessity of defining the nature o f  the 
dependence of adult education on the broad purpose o f  the 
community providing both the context and the material  
resources for i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  and i t s  re lat ive  autonomy 
within this context. This necessity in turn stems from the
fact  that education in a l l  i t s  stages and manifestations,  
i s  a planned act iv ity .
1.7 The Just if ication  f or 
Formulation of Aims ini Aduu lt Education:
A feature o f  adulI t  educatiion is  the comparative freedom
of programme planners, tutors, and students to make their  
own decisions about what shall  be taught. They are not
on the whole bound by prescribed syllabuses or by externally
dictated objectives. Nevertheless, such freedom carr ies  with
i t 3on the one hand, the respons ib i l i ty  for  ju st i fy ing  what
is  taught andj on the other, "modes of  conduct and thought
which have standards written into them by reference to which
i t  is  possible to act . . . " .  Furthermore, there has to be
ju s t i f ica t ion  for the spending o f  public money, there has1 
1. Lawson, K.H. (1973): 'The ju s t i f i c a t io n  of Objectives in 
Adult Education', in Studies in Adult Education, 
Vol.5 , No•1 .
27.
to be ju st i f ica t ion  in terms of the tradition and aims of  
the providing inst i tu t ions ,  and there has to be ju s t i f i c a t io n  
on educational grounds, that i s ,  in terms of basic  conceptions 
of what education i s ,  and what i t  is  fo r .  we sha ll  in the 
course of this research examine the various aims ascribed 
to adult education with a view to ju st i fy ing  thes^ aims as
means of promotina the hapoiness o f  the adult. But fo r  the 
present, we shall be concerned with ju s t i f i c a t io n  o f  aims 
in educational a c t iv i t i e s .
The more widespread questioning of educational aims and 
objectives and curriculum content and methods which has 
developed in school education has focused attention upon the 
question of ju s t i f ica t ion  and the value basis  on which 
ju s t i f ica t ion  rests .  I t  has attracted the interest  o f  many 
educational philosophers and there have been a number of  
attempts to prov W a n underlying rational fo r  the educational
curnriccullum., pe tersj fo r  example, has argued that the
co mmm: itment to _truth underlies education, while H irst  starts
from the nature and forms o f  knowledge; phenix in his case
is  concerned with the realms of meaning and Belth contents 
himself with man as a bu ilder  and manipulator o f  symbols.
A l l  these, including the wide range o f  soc ia l ,  moral 
and po l i t ic a l  ideologies found among educators pose 
d i f f i c u l t y  and con f l ic t  fo r  anyone who attempts to 
formulate a common experience.
”  Peters, R.S. (1966): Ethics and Education; Hirst, P.H. ’ Liberal Education 
and the Nature of /ir.ovledge' ; in Arcnaacault, E.I». (ea .)(l965 ) 
Philosophical Analysis and Education; Belth, M. (19«5)
Education and Discipline.
28.
A resolution might be found in Pe te r ’s Ethics and Education 
where he argues in favour o f  what amounts to
transcedental imperative, which helps the teacher to decide 
on what he ought to do in respect o f  his curriculum. He 
claims that "in more settled times, only the re f le c t iv e  
teacher was led to probe behind tradition for a rationale
of  what he ought to do; nowadays, i t  is  only the lazy or
1
dogmatic who can avoid such probing'1. peters, while  clain 
that the standards o f  education are in t r in s ic ,  argues that
what is  worthwhile in education derives i t s  worthwhileness
"from the characters o f  the a c t iv i t ie s  themselves and from
the form of l i f e  in which pract ica l  discourse has emerged
as a type o f  public discourse which is  widespread in our 
soc.i ety".  2 Thus, commitment to truth becomes the touch stone 
which is  used as the ju s t i f i c a t io n  o f  a l l  curriculum 
a c t iv i t ie s .
As fo r  H irst ,  his ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  build ing curriculum 
is  in terms of the categories o f  knowledge which he id en t i f ie s  
as being fundamental cu ltu ra l ly .  These categories or 'forms'  
are identified  as having their  own central concepts: fo r  
example, those of gravity  acceleration, hydrogen and photo­
synthesis character ist ic  o f  the sciences; number, integral
and matrix in mathematics; God, sin and predestination in
3
re l ig ion ;  ought, good and wrong in moral knowledge.
1. Peters, R.S. (1966): op. c i t . ,  p.93
2. _________  (1967): ' in  Defence o f  Bingo: A Rejo inder ' ;  in
" British Journal o f  Educational Studies, Vol.XV, 
p7T9I------------------------------------------------------------
3. H irst ,  P.H. (I9GS): 'L ibera l  Education and the Nature
of Knowledge'; in Archambault, R.D. (ed . )  
op. c i£ . , pp .128-129.
The forms have their own logical structure, techniques and 
sk ills ,  criteria and tests, by means of which we can explore 
our experience and conceptualise knowledge of our world.
in as much as we are inheritors of public forms of knowledge 
in terms of which we operate and develop, then the educator’ s 
task is to encourage and assist individuals to operate more 
effectively within those forms or structures. ' He sta tes 
their importance as:
(a) representing the whole cognitive fraramm«e work
of concepts and public criteria by which 
"the l i f e  of man in every particular is 
patterned and ordered. Without its structure, 
a ll  other forms of consciousness, including, 
for example, emotional experiences or mental 
attitudes and belie fs, would seem to be 
un in te l1ig ib le " .
(b) representing the ways through which mind 
i t s e lf  is developed.
"To be without any knowledge at a l l  is to be
without mind in any significant sense .........
The acquisition of knowledge is it se lf  
a development of mind and new knowledge 
means a new development of mind in some sense . . .  
to fa i l  to acquire knowledge of a certain 
fundamental 'kind, is to fa i l  to achieve 
rationa l m ind.........
This has at least provided a sufficient justification for 
curriculum activities.
Relating this justification to adult education, i t  could
be argued that at. least a partial solution to the problem
of authority is offered. The question of who decides on1 
1. H irst ,  P.H. ’ L ibera l  Education and the Nature of  Knowledge’ 
in Archambault, R.D. op., c i t . , p.124.
2 . (1969): ’The Logic of the Curriculum’ . Journal of
Curriculum Studies, Vo l.l,  p.150.
30..
what to teach is an important one; as the reliance on the 
concept of meeting needs shows, some adult educators are wary 
of determining objectives for others. But the arguments made 
so far provide a basis of authority for doing so, which is 
beyond both tutor and student. Education is in a sense made 
neutral to specific personal and social demands because of 
the attempt to root educational values in the most general
characteristics of society, knowledge, and man as they are 
understood. The general objectives of education are deduced 
internally from the concept of education itse lf .  To be 
engaged in an educational activity is  to be logically concerned 
with those things that are built into the definition.
The most important reasons for having a declared aim 
have s t i l l ,  however to be stated. I t  is the aim, whether 
declared or implicit, which conditions, sometimes determines 
the method of education. As there are only a limited number of 
aimc nncciMp fr»r» thi= pfinrsHnnaUst, corresponding to the
poten tial s of th e human species in the available environments 
so the methods of instruction are even more limited. I f  we
define our aim in terms of the individuality we wish to
foster, this automatically precludes certain
procedures, and indicates equally automatically certain other 
procedures. I t  is not surprising that discussion of aim is
31
often deprecated and that the disputants thereupon dangle 
on the field of method; the overlapping of aim and method 
is  so close that when the method is decided, this decides 
the aim which may then be le f t  undiscussed and undeclared, 
in other words, unthinking routine can then be substituted
for critical awareness -  a' consumetion often devout:llyy  wi shed
by the educator. But a declared aim has these advantage s
over a routine application of a stereotyped me 
(a) i t  can lead to a nice discrimination between methods 
based on a reasoned appreciation of their uses and 
their limits;
(b) i t  allows a modification of particulars of the method 
on the basis of principles Biflce i t  offers a criterion 
by which the success or otherwise of the process as a 
whole and its several parts may be evaluated.
This is the ultimate justification of a discussion of
educational aims, that such discussion, unless i t  degenerates
into frivolous academic debate, tends to the betterment of
the instruction and this in rurn reacts beneficially on those
oersonal relaittiioonnss!hips iinvolved which many believe to be
at the hear t of the educational process.
CHAPTER TOO
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF ADULT 
EDUCATION AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
2.1 The Aims of Adult Education:
The philosophy of  adult education can be traced to
those writers who see the aim of adult education as delated
f i r s t l y  to society, secondly, to those who see the aim of
adult education as an individual growth and development
irrespective  of societal concerns and, th ird ly ,  to those who
are concerned with the extent to which adult education should
la s t
work towards social change: the / has been interpreted by some 
people to mean revolution.
Merriam made an il luminating explanation concerning
these three aims. For those who see the aim of adult
education as related to society, reference was made to
-  2
Bergevin and Lindeman. Bergevin recognized the va l id i ty  of  
presenting the adult an opportunity to advance as a maturing 
individual.  However, this maturity should be tailored toward 
helping him toN/earn how to contribute his share to the 
c iv i l i z in g  process. This aim may not be as easy to achieve
as the prescription goes. For an individual to be able to1 
1. Merriam, S. (1977 ) : 'Philosophical perspectives on Adult
Education: A C r i t ic a l  Review of  the L i te ra tu re ' ,
Adu11 Education, Vol. XXVII, No.4 .
2. Bergevin, Paul (1967): A Philosophy fo r  Adult Education.
New York; Seabury press, pp. 3 & 4.
33.
realise that there is something good he has to contribute 
to complement a society, such an individual must have been 
a typical individual whose l i fe  orientation is higher than 
the Society in which he is living. I f  that be so, whatever 
contribution (no doubt better) he is making would be a kind 
of imposition. But there is nothing wrong in this, provided 
that the contribution can be justified as making ihe Society 
a more conducive place to live than hitherto. Though Mill 
would not allow an individual's freedom to be to^ed with, 
suggested that those who have been judged as better knowledged 
should be allowed to take lead in decision matters. So, 
adult education which is aimed at nurturing the individual 
to become a better member of the society should be undertaken 
by those who are knowledgeable.
As for Lindeman, his views about the nature of man is 
that he is a social being. He thus emphasized individual 
growth and a situation-approach to learning. Man is to learn 
what his situation indicates. This bears a semblance to 
Champion's artic le : 'Towards an Ontology of Adult Education' 
who claims that attempts to declare and justify  our objectives 
is in the state of a ffa irs . The goals of adult education 
according to Lindeman are derived from the surrounding 
culture. He however emphasised on the democratic ideals
Champion, A. (1975): 'Towards an Ontology o f  Adult Education' 
Studies in Adult Education, Vol.7 ,  No.l  .
34
as an aim. These two thinkers would want to see adult 
education in relation to societal improvement.
Knowles presents a contrast to Bergevin and Lindeman 
with his emphasis on individual development apart from external 
concerns. The aim of adult education is to help adults 
become liberated. He speaks of a model of a 'free man' 
but this is not a stereotyped model, since each individual 
himself defines what he w ill be when free. 1 All Adult 
educators can ra lly  round this common aim, he fee ls, because 
i t  allows for any type of adult education as/long as the 
individual sees i t  as liberating. Society does not enter 
into the process except as a vehicle for providing a fu ll  
range of choices to a potential participant in adult education. 
What Knowles perhaps overlooks here is that some selectivity  
must of necessity operate in providing opportunities and 
information to a learner. And what is selected to help an 
individual become liberated w ill depend, to some extent, on 
the existing social .dorms and values, together with the 
philosophy o£ the chooser.
An individualistic view would be consistent with the 
claim of Wiltshire 2 that individualism is a significant and
1. Knowles, M. (1957) "Philosophical Issues that Confront 
Adult Educators"; Adult Education, v o l . v i l ,  No . l ,
U.S.A.
2. 'Wiltshire, H. (1976): ’ The Nature and Uses o f  Adult 
Education' in The Sp ir i t  and the Forum.
(ed . )  Rogers, A. Nottingham; Department o f  Adult 
Education, University of Nottingham. pp. 136-144.
35
dominant aim in adult education. Individuation he defines 
as self-discovery, and self-development voluntarily undertaken 
and this determines curriculum, organisation and method.
Hence the ideology of adult education, according to Griffin^" 
is  identified as the needs, access and provision.
John Hostler in a recent monograph on 'The aims of 
Adult Education' concludes by identifying three most 
fundamental aims of adult education.
The most fundamental of them a ll  is  autonomy, 
which prescribes the students right to choose the 
classes he w ill attend and to evaluate their 
success. Autonomy in turn implies individuality, 
which enjoins that he should develop in a unique 
way and that he should be able to select from a 
very broad curriculum. 2
The aims of adult education may well be as Hostler claims, 
those of autonomy, individuality and equality.
No doubt, Paulo Freire is of revolutionary.
For him the world, the third world at least, consist of the 
oppressed and the oppressors. In his opinion, the aim of 
adult education is to liberate the oppressed and in so doing, 
also free the oppressor. This is done through a process 
he calls conscientisation. The revolutionary aspect enters 
into the process when human beings, having been aware of their 
plight, no longer tolerate their oppressed condition.
A struggle to change the basic structure of society comes as 
a necessary part of such rejection, While Pedagogy of the 
oppressed can be criticized because its philosophical 
terminology is often d i f f ic u lt  to grasp, Freire 's position 1
1. G r i f f in ,  C. (1983): Curriculum Theory in Adult and Lifelong
Education. London, Croom Helm. Chp.3
2. Hostler,  J. (1981): The Aims of Adult Education,
Monograph 17, May; Manchester University.
3. F re ire ,  P. (1972): Pedagogy o f  the Oppressed. England;
Penguin Books Ltd.
3 &>
and i t s  d irect  implications for adult education emerge 
c le a r ly  from the text.
Broudy reacts to what he c a l l s  the unqualif ied autonomy 
o f  the adult learner. I f  the emphasis i s  so le ly  upon the 
ind iv idual,  then "the problem of  aims in adult education 
becomes, so fa r  as the educator is  concerned, a problem of
means; in short, the problem disappears ."
Neither does Broudy fee l  that adult education should only 
adults
prepare/to e f fec t ive ly  play their ro les in society.
This social roles approach, he argues, produces a dangerous 
conformity to inst itut iona l  patterns. Rather, Broudy sees 
man as being in an ex istent ia l  j jT  cu ltura l  predicament caught 
between the demands of a modern system o f  mass production and 
the democratic commitment to individual freedom and develop­
ment. "The aim of adult education", he recommends, " i s  to 
make every adult av/are of  their predicament and his ro le  in i t .  
Adults v/ho are sensitized to their predicament w i l l  then commit 
themselves to/a s e l f - cu l t iv a t io n " . *  I t  might be argued that 
Broudy over-estimates the motivation and/or a b i l i t y  to deal 
with one's predicament even though i t  has been acknowledged.
The issue of whether adult educators should focus on developing 21
1. Broudy, H.S. (1960) Aims in Adult Education: A R ea l i s t 's
View. Chicago; Centre for  the study of Liberal  
Education for Adults, page 7.
2. Broudy, H.S. (1960) Ib id .  p . H
37
s e l f -d i r e c t in g  individual learners or promote a posit ive  
social order is  s t i l l  very much a l ive  today.
But do we need a purpose in adult education 7 asks 
Lawson. 1 By purpose, he means an object ive  -  an aim or a task 
that i s  external to the idea of adult education. Le ft  to him, 
he does not think that adult education needs a purpose beyond 
that o f  teaching adults about certain areas o f  human 
experience and helping then to develop in certain ways which 
are thought to be important. He affirmed that education is  
of  value as an end in i t s e l f ;  yet there is  in adult education 
an apparent desire  for external ob ject ives ,  and there are
claims that this i s  i t s  prime purpo se. There i s  no doubt,
however, that adult education is  ju s t i f i ed  because i t  f u l f i l s  
part icu lar  external purposes or aims, a situation o f  f a i l in g  
to achieve these spec i f ic  purposes could a r ise .  I f  i t  be so, 
v/ould i t  not be rigft^ to say that adult education is  not 
ju s t i f i e d  because i t  has not been successful or that the 
part icu lar  purpose indicated were, a fte r  a l l ,  only a r b i t r a r i l y  
selected, and that adult education is worthwhile on i t s  own 
without the external aims? He went on to say that the 
concept o f  an educational situation contains at lea s t  the 
idea of an ordered log ica l  study; o f  problems approached 
in a rational way; o f  analysis and categorisation, and of  
evaluation and judgement. "We pre-supposeM, he said ,  "the 
build ing  o f  structures of knowledge with public ly .  shared
1» Lawson, k .H. (1968): 'The Concept of ’ Purpose';
Adult Education, Vol.41, No.4, November, p.165
38
concepts tested against publicly accredited criteria.
We expect that certain sk ills  w il l  be developed and that there
may also be a development of aesthetic appreciation and of
1
moral judgement." He is opposed to imposition of aims and 
objectives and advocates for purposes internal to the concept 
of education. He Concludes that some of these characteristics 
are what we regard as essential ingredient in our conception 
of a developed individual. Since a society is made up of 
individuals, i t  means that a civilised society w ill be that 
which is made up of such developed individuals we have been 
talking about. He therefore urged adult educators to have
a concern for their subject and for their students' responses 
to it .  They are not concerned as tutors with the many 
possible uses to which the results of their educational 
encounters might be put, for i t  would be impossible to 
foresee, yet alone teach, with specific end products in mind. 
So, they might well say that their teaching had no purpose 
other than those contained in their conception of education. 
'What this implied is that adult education is not the same
thing as adult training.
Paterson on his own, based his rejection of imposed 
aims on the basis that the adult is an autonomous person.
He rejected the aim of adult education as an agent of social 
change. He argued that i f  adult education were to become 
harnessed to the cromotion of a set of social causes, then
1. Lawson, K.'ri. (1968); oo. ci t . p.169
39*
i t  would become se rv i le  to those causes. Education is  the 
fea r le ss  transmission of truth and this knowledge i s  morally, 
so c ia l ly  and p o l i t i c a l ly  neutral.  An educative society  
therefore is such a society that welcomes exposure to the 
truth about i t s e l f ,  l is tens  to continuous cr it ic ism , rational  
and objective for the purpose o f  checks and balances.
"Social  Change", he concluded^however des irab le  in i t s e l f ,  
is  fo r  the educator, not an aim, but simply another subject  
fo r  unbiased investigat ion , fo r  the development of free  and 
c r i t i c a l  inquiry, and for  that undeviating and fear less  
transmission of truth which edu catio  n e ssen t ia l ly  i s . " ^
The aim of education, accordi ing to him, i s  to transmit 
knowledge which is  educationally worthwhile. He argues 
consistently that just, as he would not have adult education
promote social change, neither would he have i t  defend the
s ta tus cue.
There s be very l i t t l e  consensus as to the aims
and objectives of  adult education. The spectrum ranges from 
F re i r e ' s  advocacy o f  radica l  social  change to Lawson's and
Paterson's rejection of any goal save that o f  education for  
i t s  own sake.1 
1. Paterson, R.W.K. (1973): 'Socia l  Change as an Educational 
Aim’ ; Adult Education, Vol.45, No.6 , March, 
p.359.
40
In the absence of any agreed definition of 'adult
education', one of the major problems which faces any writer
in this controversial field is the d ifficu lty  of looking •
beyond the arguments about goals, objectives and purposes.^-
In common with other forms of education, adult education is
presumed to have a specific effect on its learners.
Consequently, there is ,  in the literature on the subject,
a continuing debate about what that effect should be.
not
Debate, in other words, is / only about the goals or tasks
of this particular form of education, but also about the
more fundamental question of the relationship between adult
education and the society in which its activities are carried
out. The relationship between adult education and the
society within which its  activities are carried out is  a
crucial one; i t  consists of defined goals, purposes and
interests which combine to form, in Merton's words: 'a frame
> 2
of aspirational reference*. Some of these interests are 
those of society, others are more individualistic in their21 
1. Thomas, J.E. (1982): Radical Adult Education: Theory and
Practice. Nottingham, Dept, of Adult Education.
2. Merton, R.K. (1938): 'Social Structure and Anomie'.
American Sociological Review, Vol.3 ,  p.673 •
sub jec t iv ity ,  but in e ither  case, d i f fe ren t  interpretations
have been put upon them by a number o f  international w r i te rs .  
1
Thomas writes that the interaction between interests
and ac t iv i t ie s  provides fo r  adequate theoretical framework 
from which an examination of the re lationship between adult  
education and society can be based. Although a great part  
o f  the l i te rature  of adult education is  concern®^ with practice  
rather than theory, i t  is  poss ib le  to see W 1 terpretations  
o f  societal interests which approximate to con f l ic t  and 
consensus view, respectively, o f  Society. Confl ic t  theorists
approach the question of interests  frroom t1 he standpoint of the
various individuals and groups within society. The needs and
desires  of these factions,  rather than the needs of society
as a whole, motivate their  attitudes towards the divis ion
of  power and p r iv i lege .  Their att itude was summed up by
Parsons who commented that : -
The essential point is  that, to M i l l s ,  
power is  not a f a c i l i t y  fo r  the performance 
of function in and on behalf  o f  the Society
as a system, but i s  interpreted exclusively  
as ^aA ffa^ccii l i t y  fo r  getting what one group, the 
holders of  power, wants by preventing another 
group, the "outs" from getting what i t  wants •
1. Thomas, J.E. (1982); Radical Adult Education: Theory 
and pract ice . Dept, o f  Adult Education, 
University of  Nottingham.
2 Parsons, T. (1957): 'The Distr ibution  of Power in
American Soc ie ty ' .  World P o l i t i c s . Vol.10,  
October, p.139.
42
Consensus, or funct iona l is t ,  theorists ,  in contrast,  
approach the problem of societa l  interests from the viewpoint 
of  society as a whole. The interests o f  society are then seen 
to be compatible with the interests o f  the ind iv idua l,  fo r  i t  
is  the interests o f  the l a t t e r ,  as part o f  the whole which 
govern the needs and requirements of the total socia l  system. 
The cohesion, s t a b i l i t y  and persistence of this consensus 
model therefore emphasise, not interests and power, but the 
signif icance of norms and values which are seen to be the 
basic elements of  socia l  l i f e .  To these theorists ,  adult  
education is  not a f a c i l i t y  for  promoting the social  po l ic ies  
of a part icu lar  group, but itC is  a means of transmitting the 
inherited knowledge and culture of  the whole society.
Value-judgements are then concerned with cognitive rather than 
social or p o l i t i c a l  values.
Despite a widespread criticism of  these consensus/conflict  
models of society, a critic ism which has become one of the 
principal issues in the recent l i te ra tu re  of  social  theory,
both theories have a part icu lar  relevance in the analysis o f  
the relationship between adult education and society . The 
nature of  individual in terests ,  as they are interpreted by 
supporters of the con f l ic t  model of society, suggests that 
to the mature adult, education is  seen as a means whereby 
the pov/er, prestige  and pr iv i lege  of the individual can be
42 
Increased. More Importantly, the ident i f icat ion  o f  the con f l ic t  
tend to change, encourage the b e l i e f  that adult education is  
primarily a vehicle o f  change. This concept of  adult education 
as a radical force,  seeking to make a major impact on society,  
means that an education programme is  only va lid  or v iab le  i f  
i t  seems to challenge basic  assumptions about socio-economic 
structures, value systems, and cultural and aesthetic  norms.
There is a total rejection of any interpretation of goals of 
adult education which identifies these coals v/ith the 
maintenance of the existing social system.
Supporters of the consensus model, be lieve  that adult  
education has no role  as an inst igator  or  supporter o f  change. 
Society, that is  i t s  structures, value systems and norms, is  
therefore accepted as a s ta t ic  framework which provides the 
boundaries within which the a c t iv i t ie s  o f  adult education should 
be carried out. From this point of  view, i t  is not the primary 
task of adult education to challenge the v a l id i ty  of this  
framework, although such a challenge may a r ise  as a resu lt  
of the e f f e c t  o f  education on societal in terests .
The distinction between these two interpretations of the 
relationship between adult education and society is , however, 
rarely expressed in terms of polar extremes. The concepts of 
adult education as a radical force, primarily seeking to make 
a major impact on society, or as a conservative man are graduated.
44
They are, therefore, best seen as parts of a continuum.
At one extreme is the view that any system of adult education 
which is to be effective, must challenge established economic 
and social assumptions. At the other, is the view that adult 
education contributes to the preservation of the existing 
system. *
Much as there appears to be distinction between these 
two models theoretically, i t  w ill  not be surprising to 
discover that in practice, however, ib^may be d if f icu lt  to 
identify the particular characteristics which are usually 
attributed to the two models in question. But in an attempt 
at a reconciliation, i t  is important to remember that the 
creation of the models owes a great deal to ideology.
For the adult educators, therefore, their importance is not 
derived from their methodological correctness, but from the 
reasoned ideological arguments which underlie the defence of 
either or both of the two models. One effect of this, is that 
the concept of maintenance, as i t  is interpreted by the 
supporters of this idea of the relationship between adult 
education and society, is associated with a wish to maintain 
the existence of those norms which are considered to be the 
basis of social l i f e .  They are particularly involved in the 
maintenance of the underlying system or values which influence 
the norms to be found throughout the society. There is
45
this ample evidence of a developed interest, not only in 
ensuring a sense of commitment to those norms, but also in 
creating consensus on the values which produce them. The most 
suitable situation for ensuring the development of adult 
education programmes oriented to these ends is found, i t  is 
believed, in a stable social system which encourages the 
maintenance of the status quo. Here, the formulation of 
societal goals, in terms of the accepted norms and the creation 
of a harmonious sense of values, encourages\|ihe creation of
teaching programmes which are specifically desianed to
encourage social integration.' xy
The possibility of change • s r  excluded from consideration.
To be accepted as valid, however, tnis must be a planned
change which arises as society, as a whole, adapts to 
universally accepted amendments to existing norms and values, 
changes which are reflections of sectional interests are 
disregarded on the grounds that these do not contribute 
towards the maintenance of the whole. A resulting pre­
occupation with the believed needs of society can be discerned 
in most discussions about the role of adult education in 
relation to socio-cul tural factors. Among these, for example, 
a frequent cause of controversy arises from the postulated 
need to produce a large number of educated specialists who can
|. Cohen, P. (1968) Modern Social Theory. Heineman,
46
f i l l  appointments as administrators, professionals, and 
managers. I t  is here that the liberal versus vocational 
argument is most frequently waged, although the force of 
arguments used is weakened by the general agreement that
there is  a need to achieve a synthesis between the two 
conception of a literary or technical culture.
Another social need which, i t  is argued, fi lled
through the medium of adult education programmes, is the 
requirement of Society for "productive workers who enjoy 
their lives. This means the most economical and effective 
use of manpower, and i t  also means that happiness is a factor 
in efficiency." The implications of this as an educational
goal are far-reaching. For many employers of labour, i t  
endows their be lie f in a custodial model of organizational 
behaviour, in which the natural measure of morale is employee 
satisfaction. Consequently, they approve or support adult
education activitie:ss wthich contribute to the development of 
employee maintenance needs and increase the la tte r 's  
organizational dependency. After a l l ,  there is no dividing 
line, the importance of adult education is  that i t  should be 
useful1̂ ^  the individual, the society, to the sponsors 
whether government or philanthropi*t*.
1. Ottaway, A. K. (1953) Education and Society. Routledge 
and Kegan PauTJ p.92
47,
In other words, whether we agree with the consensus 
or con f l ic t  ideo log ies ,  adult education is  concerned with 
the performance of a lternate  actions which are l ik e ly  to 
maximize the probable happiness of humanity as a whole.
The problem that is  l i k e ly  to ar ise  from this u t i l i t a r i a n  
position o f  adult education in the Society is  that o f  making 
moral decisions, that i s ,  the problem of  deciding what the 
morally r ight action is  in a given situation or in a given 
class  o f  s ituations, we shall  defer discus on this  
question, unti l  such a time when we s h a l l ^ ^ e  analysed the 
concept of  u t i l i t y  in Chapter Four. A l l  that need to be 
said here is  that this issue f a l l s  within the realm of  rule  
and act u t i l i ta r ian ism ,  and that i t  w i l l  be argued la t e r  
that while u t i l i ta r ian ism  i »  concerned with general practices,  
moral rules are empirical generalization to a l l  practices.
2.2 Humanistic Adult Education:
Humanism is  &  stem of views based on respect fo r  the 
dignity  and ri< :s o f  man, his value as a personality, concern
fo r  his we lfa re ,  his a ll -round development, and the creation  
of favourable conditions o f  social l i f e .  I t  grew into a
d is t in c t  ideological movement at the time of the Renaissance 
when i t  figured prominently as an element o f  bourgeois ideology 
opposed to feudalism and medieval theology. I t  proclaimed 
freedom of  the ind iv idua l,  opposed re l ig ious  asceticism,  
vindicated men's r ight  to pleasure and the sat is fact ion  of
48
earthly requirements.
Humanism reached its zenith in the works of the 18th century 
enlightenment, who put forward the slogans of liberty, 
equality and fraternity and proclaimed men's right freely 
to develop their natural essense.
Humanistic education therefore is  based on forms of  
education in various subjects aiming towards a greater  
individual self-awareness as well as a mutual understanding 
among people and cultures. Consequently, the humanist as a 
scholar ,  we are told, was one dedicated to "learning for  
lea rn ing 's  sake, otium, remaining within the limits o f  human 
knowledge, aimed at neither transcendence nor practica l  
purpose".* The 15th century 'humanista' in the I ta l ian  
Univers it ies  studied and taught humanae l i t t e r a e .(humane le t te r s )  
The curriculum contents are precise ly  stated as l i te ra tu re ,  
history ,  philosophy, languages and such social science 
subjects. But contrary to the above observation is  the 
fo l lowing comment:
Humanistic education is more a diffuse and 
multiplex phenomenon than one that may be 
sharply caujht and defined. Although in its  
own apologies i t  distinguishes it s e lf  quite
Giust in ian i,  V.R. (1985): 'Homo, Humanus and the Meanings 
of Humanism'; in Journal of the History of  Ideas,  
Vol.XLIV, No.2, April-June. p.l71
49
dramatically from other educational systems 
i t s  rationale is  e lusive  and the educationist  
must find his way through a series  of  exhortations,  
general statements on education . . .  and recipes  
fo r  particu lar  methods. 1
One ra re ly  finds extended statements of educational theory 
that give enough deta i l  and elaborated ju s t i f ica t ion  with 
which to concur or not. While one is  worried as to the 
ca jse  o f  the controversy, i t  was not d i f f i c u l t  to detect 
the genesis of  Williams and Foster 's  contrasting ideas
to the tradition of humanism that we used to know. The 
1971-72 Education Index which they cited as their point of  
reference contained an entry where mention was made of a 
'new' humanism in current educational thought. The entry,
according to the authors, defines the new humanism in the
fo l low ing  way.
While tradit ional humanism views mankind in
need of shaping from without because of an
innate flaw, the ne.v humanism sees the individual
person containing within himself the power and
2
pattern o f  his ov/n development.
1. Williams, A.J. and Foster, L.E. (1979): 'The Rhetoric 
of Humanistic Education'; in the Journal of  
Educational Thought. Vo 1.13 , No. l”  p. 37.
2 Ib id .  p .38
Not only does this new humanism show no continuity with this 
tradition, i t  also shows no continuity whatsoever with that 
faith in the power of human institutions to contribute 
towards betterment of l i f e  which Baier* identified as part of 
the modern conception of humanism inherited from the Renaissance. 
Cn the contrary, i t  is extremely sceptical towards a ll forms 
of institutionalized learning, most especially schooling, and 
emphasises the value of personal autonomy in its  most radical 
form. In fact, roots of the kind of theoretical individualism 
suggested by the 'new' humanism can be traced '"back to the anti" 
Enlightenment naturalistic philosophy of Rousseau's Emile, 
which in like manner aligns it se lf  'in favour of the individual
as an educational good in itse lfU.  and 5as prior to the
. i
consideration of the individual’ s contribution to society'.
Power, independently of williams and Foster, writes about 
'romantic' humanism as constituting a distinctive i f  ill-defined  
trend in contemporary educational theory. He also attributes 
tc this trend the same characteristic attributed to the 'new' 
humanism by the latter, distinguishing v/ithin i t  the same kind
of radical s' *ubjectivism and eventually describing i t  as follows:
wha^we shall call romantic humanism exudes 
an abundance of self-sufficiency and se lf ­
confidence. Tilting on the verge of arrogance 
i t  turns its back on the past, finds nothing21 
1. Baier, K.E. (1980): 'Freedom, Obligation and Responsibility'
quoted in Wain, K. (1987): Philosophy of Lifelong 
Education. Croom Helm. p.ldb
2. Williams, A.J. and Foster, L.E. (1979): .QH* i P«40
of  much worth in trad it ion, and ju s t i f i e s  the
motives of  each person to find his own sat is fact ion
1
xn a face - to - face  confrontation with re a l i t y  •
2.2.1 Adult Education and Romantic' Humanism:
A comparison between the characterist ics  o f  the
educational theory o f  'romantic 1 humanism, as ident i f ied  by
Williams and Foster, and Power, and certain prominent aspects
of  the l i fe long  education l i te ra tu re  reveals some very close
s im i la r i t ie s  o f  viewpoint between them, '^ith reference to the
former, both sets o f  authors agree on i t s  main theoretic
framework such as ex is ts ;  that the major influences on i t
come from the humanistic psychology movement o f  the 1960s,
more part icu lar ly  from the work o f  Rogers 2 and Maslow 3 whose 
psycho therapies are based on fu l f i lm ent theories o f  the 
personality. \je find a variety  of  learning theories within  
educational psychology, from 3. F. Skinner's work on operant
conditioning to C a r l  Rogers' person centred approach. I t  i s
f s
the work of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow -  both of whom 
representative o f  humanistic psychology -  which has had32* 
1 .  P O W < (1932): philosophy of Education: Studies in 
l i losophies, schooling and Educational Po l ic ie s ! -  
New jersey ,  Prentice Hall ,  p.159
2. Rogers, C.R. (1968): Freedom to Learn. u .S .A . ,
Charles E. M err i l l  publishing Company.
3. Maslow, A.H. (1968): Towards a Psychology o f  Being.
New York, D. Van i.'ostrand Company, 2nd ed.
52
profound e ffects  upon recent developments in adult education.
Thus many of the techniques fo r  teaching adults to be found
in the l i te ra tu re  of the 60s and 70s have their roots in the
b e l i e f  that learning involves self-awareness, " s e l f ­
actualization" in Maslov's terminology, and student's
participation in, and respons ib i l i ty  for, his own learning.
At the same time, williams and Foster identify  v/ii: hin i t  a
rationale couched in a socio log ica l  context characterized by
t ’c main factors :  a s t ress  on the rapidity change in the
environment ca l l ing  fo r  a new type of educated person able  to
cope with such change, and, an attempt to mitigate the e f fec ts
of alienation on human beings l iv ing  ir technological
environments. The thrust o f  huma&nisit<ic psychology in response 
to these twin factors i s  toward theory o f  motivation with 
ar. emphasis on the growth of  ̂ pfelf-awareness as an ultimate  
good.
Williams and FosteS further ooint out that, eventually,  
this emphasis, to be expected, is  directed towards
objectives that focus upon the s e l f - r e a l i zation pr inc ip le  
in l i f e ,  a ^principle which implies that 'the thrust o f  human 
a c t iv i t ie s  in healthy persons i s  towards growth, fu l f i lment  
and c r e a t iv i ty ' .  The p r inc ip le ,  they say, i s  given i t s
theoretical shape by Rogers, who 'c ry s ta l l iz e s  his philosophy 
of the person as he works through therapy'. In accordance 
with the aims of this therapy:
52,
The c l ient  w i l l  move away from facades; he w i l l  
move away from ’oughts*; he w i l l  move away from 
pleasing ’o the rs ' ;  he w i l l  move toward s e l f ­
d irect ion , toward being process, toward openness
to experience, toward acceptance o f  others and
toward trust o f  s e l f . 1
And Maslow s im ilar ly  emphasises this 'auto-centred ' 
approach, his theoretic approach being, l ike  that of Rogers, 
rad ica l ly  sub jec t iv is t .  For both, the focus is  o<C>the
individual who, for good measure arid consistently wi th
v s ' "
n atu ra l is t ic  philosophies, i s  a lso regarded a p r io r i  as being 
essen t ia l ly  good and per fec t ib le .
As in therapy, the central aim e educational outlook
o f  ’ romantic’ humanism, the authors continue, i s  to make the 
learner progressively more se lf -aware,  more in touch with 
himself,  his own uniqueness, how he d i f f e r s  from others.
There is  therefore a centering of authority within the learner  
himself which, taken together with the therapeutic pedagogy 
implied by humanistic psychology, evidently transforms the 
typical role o f  the educator away from i t s  traditional form.
So that i t  actually comes to resemble that of the therapist,  
i t s  cantrai task being to develop within the learner an attitude  
o f  respons ib i l i ty  towards his own learning.
The l i f e lo n g  education l ite ra ture  shares a l l  these 
tendencies, beginning with the sociological context. L ifelong1 
1. Williams, A. J. and Foster, L.E. (1S79): ’ The Rhetoric 
of Humanistic Education’ , in The Journal of  
Educational Thoucht, Vol.13, No.1, p.4J .
education theory s im ilar ly  locates i t s  own rationale  and 
ju s t i f i c a t io n  within societ ies  that are undergoing change at 
an accelerated rate pressed on d i re c t ly  or ind irect ly  by the 
e f fec ts  of  a sc ie n t i f i c  and technological revolution which has 
assumed the proportions o f  a ve r itab le  ’knowledge explosion* 
in our times. This 'knowledge exp los ion ' ,  in turn, renders 
the traditional view of education as the transmission of a 
stock of  knowledge from one generation to the next and as the 
forming of a stereotyped personality,  irre levant.  Thus the 
Faure report speaks about the need for  a r»ew education fo r  a 
'new* individual,  one who both understands in i t s  d i f fe ren t  
e f fec ts  and dimensions, and is  able  to cope v/ith i t  and turn 
i t s  potential to positive outcome
From a narrower angle than^cne above, pov/er states that 
the common theme of 'romantic? humanism is  exhibited most c lea r ly  
in i t s  criticism of trad it ional  schooling. And this again is  
another c lear point o f  s im i la r ity  i t  shares with the l i fe long  
education programme. One reca l ls  among Dave's^'concept  
characte r is t ic s '  one that re fers  to the l i fe lon g  education 
programme as providing 'an antidote to the shortcomings of the ' 
ex is t ing  formal education system'. And the criticism goes fa r
beyond that of  h is to r ica l  irrelevance just  referred to. In his  
brok on Gelpi, Ireland provides a synthesized l i s t  o f  the1 
1. Faure, E. e£ a l . .  (1972): Learning to Be. London, Harrap.
2. Dave, R.H. (e d ) ( l9 7 6 ) :  Foundations o f  L ifelong Education.
Oxford, Pergamon Press.
55
objections against existent schooling recurrent in the l i fe long
education l i te ra tu re  and these are, in essence, very close to
the one attributed to ’ romantic’ humanists by Williams and
1
Foster, and Power.
2
Thus Power, for  instance, says that the main charge 
’ romantic’ humanists leve l  against schools is  that they are 
' l i t t l e  more than assembly l ines perpetuating a conspiracy 
against indiv idua lity  by accepting a commiss^^to  produce 
a standard product’ , this neglect of indivic
3
typ ica l ly  described as 'dehumanizing' for  the learner.
And the same accusation is made on the width of l i f e lon g
4
education by Lengrand who s im ilar ly  complains that no 
consideration is allowed in schools fo r  individual d if ferences
o f  character. On the contrarrvyr , pupils who do not conform to 
pattern become marginal,^as do those whose rate of development 
i s  slower than the 'average ' .
Moreover, he argues, the need for selection prevails
over pedagogical considerations and fa i lu re  is  thus 
inst i tu t iona l ised  at the cost of senseless wastage of  
in te l lec tua l  and monetary investment. Education should, 
Lengrand says, allow every individual to develop in 
accordance with his own nature and as a function of learning  
capacit ies that are his own, not in terms of ready-made models
1. Ire land, T.D. (1978): G e lp i 's  View of L ife long Education.
Manchester Monographs 14, University of Manchester,
pp. 8 -  1 0 .
2. power, E. J. (1982): _££. c i t . , p.160
3 . Faure , E. _e_t jal_. , (1972) : _op. c i t . , p. 95
4. Lengrand, P. (1975): An introduction to Lifelong  
Education. London, Croom Helm.
models suited fo r  one kind of personality, that o f  the 'g i f t e d '  
pupil who learns eas i ly  and does not question the school order.  
Fina l ly ,  and from a s l igh t ly  d i f fe ren t  point o f  view, he
charges schools, as presently organized, of resting on a
truncated conception of the human personality in that the
capacity to acquire knowledge is  given precedence over a l l
other forms of expression; emotional, soc ia l ,  aesthe t ic  or
physical. They therefore adopt a learning programme which
not only has the pract ica l  e f fec t  of  fragmenting the personality
1
but also of separating the individual from l i f e .
A l l  these tendencies are appee at a time when, l i f e lo n g
education theorists argue, the hmi man personality i s  already
constantly menaced v/ith 'abs tract ion ' ,  threatened with f a l l i n g  
victims to elements within our contemporary c iv i l i z a t io n  that 
conspire to divide i t ,4 to break up i t s  unity. Lengrand is  not 
the only one who emphasises these 'a l ienat ing '  e f fec ts  o f  the 
modern situationXC^Vjersons, Suchodolski and others do so also.^-
In addition, however, Lengrand, l ike  the Faure report,  
repeatedly accuses the school of contributing g reat ly  to the 
'd issociation of the parts of the personality '  which is  the 
main symptom of this a lienation. This is  because, corresponding 
with the p r io r ity  given to knowledge acquisit ion, the school 
a r b i t r a r i l y  iso lates  one aspect of the personality, the1 
1. Lengrand, P. (1975): o£. ci_t • ,  pp. 78-79
2. Ibid, p.95
57.
in te l lec tua l  aspect in i t s  cognitive form, as being alone 
educationally relevant while the other aspects are forgotten or 
neglected and e ither 'shrink to an embryonic s ta te '  or 
develop in a disordered fashion, threatening the very balance 
of the personality. In this s ituation, Lengrand argues, 
some essentia l  elements o f  the human person are actually  
e ither  atrophied by schooling or e lse  are temppoo rraanr.ily,  
and even, sometimes, permanently paralised
,/hile the Faure Report says:
The neglect and disdain from whic:hk  ’t5e0o]me elements
of  educational programmes continue to su f fe r ,  the
def ic ienc ies  and imbalance o f  curr icu lar  appear
to us to be among the most serious symptoms of  the
disease o f  which education is  both the symptoms
and the cause. The separation o f  i t s  in te l le c tua l ,
physical,  aesthetic ,  moral and social components is
. an indication o f  a lienation, un1dervaluation and
mutilation o f  the human person, 
that
And again we find^this tendency to separate education from 
l i f e  s im ilar ly  constitutes the grounds fo r  serious complaints 
leve l led  against schooling by romantic humanists. Couching 
their objections s im ilar ly  in the language of 're levance '  
they ask how schooling can be educationally relevant when 
in schools 'thought' i s  f a l s e ly  divorced from ' l i f e '  which, 
they argue, is  the crucib le  o f  real not f ic t ion a l  problems.1 
1. Faure, E. et  a l . . (1972): .ee . c i t . t p.69
58
And, in any case, they in s is t ,  the question o f  relevance is  
not one that can be decided by the school since, in fact,  
i t  i s  r e a l ly  a personal one and as such requires a private  
verd ict  not a statement of  policy. For these reasons, there 
i s  a tendency among ’ romantic’ humanists to conclude that 
trad it ional schooling is la rge ly  a waste of  time while,  at 
the same time and for  the most part, drav/ing back, l ike  the 
l i f e lo n g  education movement, from the inference that the v/hole 
concept of school be abolished.
The Faure report, in e f fec t ,  regards the deschooling
thesis as an'extreme' one based on the er;roneous postulate
that 'education constitutes an independent va r iab le  in each
society. 1  v/hat is  in question /fo\r.\ l i fe lon g  education
theorists is  not whether school in i t s e l f  i s  important or
necessary, but whether i t  i s a good thing in i t s  current form.
From this point o f  view, the problem is not only that current 
schooling preserves the outworn formulae o f  the past but also  
that i t  continues to pro ject  the same dichotomies of  the past,  
and there can be- no remedy for  this s ituat ion .  L ife long educa­
tion theorists hold that before schools recognize th is ,  at a
time when abstract knowledge is  coming to be viewed more and 
more as part o f  a continual process, acting on and reacting to 
da i ly  l i f e ,  new solutions are required. For on such 
recognition depends the further recognition that the common 
stream of education in schools should combine theory, techniques
Faure, E.L. a l . , (1972): o£. c i t . , pp.20-21
59
and practice ,  in te l lec tua l  and manual labour.
The dislocation of these d i f fe ren t  combinations
constitutes in concrete form the much c r i t ic ized  separation
o f  education from l i f e ;  i t s  consequence in psychological
terms, is  that the c h i ld 's  personality is  s p l i t  between two
worlds each discordant with the other; one in which i t  learns
l ik e  a 'disembodied c reatu re ' ,  some 'an t i -educat idns l '
a c t i v i t y ,  a conclusive comment on this issue is  that:
most education systems do not help their c l ien ts  -
whether they be youngsters or adults -  to discover
themselves, to understand the components o f  their
conscious and unconscious persona lit ies ,  the
mechanisms of the brain, the operation of the
in te l l igence ,  the laws governing their physical
development, the meaninc o^  their re lations with
‘ 1
one another and with the community at large .
Yet another point of agreement between the two sides re lates  
to their criticism monopoly the school has always
exercised on educat _ . That monopoly, both argue, helps 
to conceal the insuff ic iency o f  what is  on o f f e r  as against  
the real educational needs of contemporary indiv iduals .
Both, therefore, emphasise the educational importance of  
the wider society. 'Romantic' humanists, rather surprisingly1 
1. Faure, E.L. _et a_l. , (1972) : od. c i t . , p .6 6
D O
in s i s t  that ’ social in teract ion '  is  the great educator; but
the explanation could be that they view such interaction as a
1
way to ’ curb the school 's  pretensions '.  S im ilar ly ,  the
Faure report argues that the school must be transcended by
'broadening the educational function to the dimensions of
society as a whole. I t  quotes Plutarch, in this connection, 
who said that 'the c ity  is  the best teachei r»' ,, ap^pcrho(vTinncgly,
and, of course, devotes much space to the elaboration of the
princip les  and practices o f  the ' learn ing soc iety ' . 2
Williams and Foster re fe r  to the seven goals which Roberts 
T“he se■ 'c*o“nce rn“:  “  ~ ‘ n ~  *
personal development, creative behaviour,
inter-personal awareness, subject or ientation,
spec i f ic  context, method of teaching, and
3
teachers and administrators.1 
1. Power, E. J. (1982) £p. c i t . , p.161
2. Faure, E. et a l . ,  (1972) _op. c i t . , p.62
3. The authors have taken this quotation from Roberts,
T.B. ’Seven major Foci on Affective  Experiences:
A Typology for  Education Design, Planning, Analysis and 
Research’ Jin Roberts, T. (ed . )  (1975) Four 
Psychologies Applied to Education; New York,
Jfonn’ Wiley.
J&l
./hat is  especia l ly  interesting  about these ’ goals '  and
'imperatives ' ,  because they are so close in essence (and
sometimes even in description) to those distinguished in 
various places by l i f e lo n g  education theorists,  is their
provenience. They are, V/illiams and Foster say, inspired:
(1) by the Social Education movement, which sought to 
foster  cooperative individualism through education;
(2) by progressive Education, whose common principles v/ere 
seen by Dewey as the expression and cultivation of  
ind iv idua lity ,  free ac t iv i ty ,  learning through 
experience, acquiring new s k i l l s  as< a means to attaining  
ends, concentration on the 'here £nd now', and 
acquaintance with a changing world; and
(3) by the Open Education movement which encourages an 
equally active ro le  fo r  teacher and learner in order
to develop greater classroom democracy with an emphasis 
on a cooperative sharing environment.
I f  the ordinary person is  to l iv e  a l i f e  that shows
the fu l l e s t  rea l izat ion  o f  his potential as a human being,
that prepares hiri fo r  immersion into the mainstream o f  his
cultural heritage, that equips him for  genuine decision­
making on fundamental socia l  and moral questions, then that 
person must receive a humanistic education is the suggestion  
put forward by Gregor.^ Noreason is given for the advocation1 
1. Roberts, T. ( e d ) ( l9 7 5 ) :  op. c i t . ,  p.40
2. Gregor, A. (19S1) : 'Humanism: A Definition of L i te racy ' .
in The Journal of Educational Thought, Vol.15,
No.1, December, p.203
62.
of  this nodel of  education. However, Kraut contends that 
’’happiness requires a f i t  between a thing's  nature and i t s  
surroundings." Humanistic education along the l ine  written  
above no doubt is l ik e ly  to re su lt  into what Kraut regards 
as happiness. such a curriculum could not be easy though. 
To suggest that i t  could be is to ignore the complexity o f  
our c i v i l i z a t io n ' s  h istory and present state.
No one would doubt the advantages to be ived from
this type o f  a programme; but at times i t ^ ^ n o t  always easy, 
sometimes not possib le  to p ract ica l ise  some lo f ty  programmes. 
Some would re late such impediments to lack of fund, the r ight  
ca l ib re  of personnel and so on aBd so forth. Mostly, 
however, such impediments are <#u£ to the fact  that there is  
no basis for  the programme and at times the impossibi l ity  
of  being able to re la te  such programmes to actual l i f e  
practices, in order? overcome this type o f  p l igh t ,  we shall  
take a brier  loo lr^V  the way an adult educator has analysed 
humanistic adult education.
R. H. Tawney succeeded in inscrib ing four p i l l a r s  of
thought onto the heart o f  British adult education. Cne of
them may be termed the fellowship of  learning, re f le c t ing  the 
humanitarian s p i r i t  of adult education.1 
1. Kraut, R. (1579): 'Two Conceptions of  Happiness'.
The philosophical Review, Vol.38, p.lS7.
2. Elsey, 3. (1937) : »R.H. Tawney -  'Patron Saint o f  Adult
Education' in Jervis ,  P. (ed . )  (1987)
IWentieth Century Thinkers in Adult Education; 
England, Croom Helm, p . 73 f f .
63
Tawney regarded adult education as a means to working 
class  p o l i t i c a l  power. In that sense, education was not just  
for personal cultivation but for p o l i t i c a l  emancipation. 
Liberal adult education was for him the pursuit of knowledge 
fo r  social  purposes and personal development based on an ideal  
of in te l lectua l  excellence and the inquiring jnind.
However, Tawney's socialism was based on two ideas which
one would agree are mainly humane in nature. F icst ,  he was 
a man o f  deep re l ig ious  conviction and Christ ian ity  was, in his  
view, founded on a b e l i e f  in common hurl anity. This common 
humanity derived from a recognition of God as the Father of Man.
I t  does not matter v/hether Tawney •s C-c d was 'out there' or an 
internal Sp ir itua l  force which and women discover for
themselves in the l igh t  o,f l i f e experiences. The means of
establish ing  a social orderr properly recognising the moral basis
of our common humanity i s  the idea o f  equality o f  worth.
Man, according tc him, has qua l it ies  which go beyond 
individual d if fe rences .  These qua l it ies  o f  humanity express 
the potential fo r  individual contributions fo r  the common good. 
This idea is  underpinned by a b e l i e f  in the ultimate moral
goodnes^sjyT mankind and, in more concrete terms, the capacity
of  people to f ree ly  recognise their ob ligation  towards others.  
The route to this essen t ia l ly  moral view of mankind is through 
a proper recognition of the equal worth of people and the need
64-.
fo r  equal treatment. By such means, social re lations and
A
socia l  order rest on a commonly accepted consensus o f  values.
Tawney in his ro le  as an adult educator, wrote T e r r i l l ,  
cave expression to the idea o f  treating people equally ,  as 
he did in his personal l i f e  too. He crossed the boundaries 
of  a class ridden Society, with i t s  deep in -b u i l t  inequa lit ies  
o f  material and cultural kind, through the simple act of  
treating ethers as equals and ra is ing  their self-esteem.
He enabled teaching adults with the moral principle  of
regarding students as worthy people wild^sskills to unfold and
valuable contributions to make to a more just society. %
Equality is more than the d i s tribution of  power and wealth 
in this approach, fo r  i t  demonstrates the humane quality of  
egalitarianism through social  re lationships. This i s  socialism  
as fe l lowsh ip , and these constitute the bedrock of our common 
humanity.
The second dimension c f  Tawney's socialism, c lose ly  
linked to the f i r s t ,  is  the idea o f  equality as a means of  
personal freedom and development. This is  not the same thing 
as g resdy^^e l f -seek ing  individualism fo r  i t  involves a sense 
of obiigabion and the urge to do one's duty for the common 
good. Again, this i s  an e ssen t ia l ly  humane aspect to s o c ia l i s t  
b e l i e f s ,  v/ith its  concern for  d ist r ibut iona l  equality.1 
1. Slsey, B. (19S7): o£. c i t .
2. T e r r i l l ,  R. (1974): R.H. Tawney and his Times: A Socialism
of Fellowship. London, Deutsch. p .63
65
Freedom arises  from within people who are given the 
opportunity to explore their  capab i l i t ie s  and develop themselves. 
In this regard, adult education enables talents to develop 
and become ava i lab le  fo r  the common cood of  society. This view 
rests on a b e l i e f  in the desire  of  those who have benefited  
from access to educational opportunities to service the
community through their  a b i l i t i e s .  S e l f - f u l f i ln  ent, there fore , 
is  linked to the ideal of service which in the long run reduces 
inequa lit ies  in society. This view bears resemblance to the 
meaning of u t i l i ta r ian ism  -  happiness and the absence of pain. 
Tawney has thus highlighted an important methodological 
“ •
2.3 Adult Education end the Liberal  
philosophy of education:
The fu l ly  developed Greek notion of l ib e ra l  education was 
rcoted in a number <yf related philosophical doctrines anc* there 
appears to be t h r i ^ ^ is t in c t  interpretations to the ohrase.
Education was reived of as a process in which the mind's
developnen^^^wlards knowledge and understanding was not to be 
inhibited by being harnessed to vocational ends. Knowledge
must be pursued for i t s  own sake, not viewed as instrumental 
to some other end. This is  the f i r s t  interpretation o f  l i b e ra l  
education. I t  was strongly supported by nineteenth century
thinkers such as Mathew Arnold and Cardinal L'ewman in a context 
of the rapid development o f  technical training and technology.
66.
I t  is  s t i l l  very in f lu en t ia l  as a characterization o f  
University education.
The second interpretation of l i b e ra l  education is  a plea  
against the mind being confined to one d isc ip l ine  or form of  
understanding. Newman's conception of a ll-round development 
v/as, to a large extent, a reaction against the growing 
specia l isation  and compartmentalization o f  knowledge in the 
nineteenth century. Nowadays, l i b e ra l  education ils more or  
less  identi f ied  with this demand for a general education as 
d is t inc t  from a specialized training. Thigpen and is  well  
exemplified in Paul H i r s t ' s  conception o f  a l ib e ra l  education,  
which involves in it ia t ion  into a l l  d is t inc t  forms of  
knowledge.
A third interpretation o f  l i b e ra l  education re lates  to
constriction on the mind imposed by dogmatic methods of  
teaching. An obvious example o f  this is  indoctrination, in 
which a fixed body of  b e l i e f s  is  implanted in a manner which 
discourages criticism or an exploration o f  the grounds on 
which be l ie fs  are*based. These three interpretations w i l l  
each now be discussed separately in order to c la r i f y  the
issues
1
Hirst notes that the C-reeks regarded l ib e ra l  education 
as that form of  'education in the seven l ib e ra l  a r ts ,  as1 
1. Hirst ,  F.H. (1965): 'L ibera l  Education and the Nature of
Knowledge' in peters ,  R.S. (ed . )  (1973) The philosophy 
c f  Education; Oxford University Press. p . l lS
introduction to and a pursuit of the forms of knowledge as
they may be conceived'.  He goes on to argue that these forms 
o f  knowledge may now be considered to be: mathematics, physical  
sciences, human sciences, h istory, re l ig ion ,  l i te ra tu re  and 
the f ine  arts and philosophy. He claims that since l ib e ra l
education, in this sense, is  about the comprehensive development 
o f  the mind, i t  is necessary to study some aspects hese 
d isc ip l in e s .
Without discussing the va l id i ty  of HirstX^Torms of 
knowledge, i t  may thus be seen that in this sense of the 
concept, l ib e ra l  education is s imilar to general education and 
the debate about whether the ecucatei^p^Vscr. is  ere whe has 
breadth or depth of knowledge fceQsmes more s ign i f ican t ,  in 
addit ion ,  i t  must be recognised that the structure of 
knowledge i t s e l f  may be related to the structures of  society  
which may, in turn, re la te  to other social factors, including  
the level  of technology in a society and the ideology of the 
e l i  te.
Nevertheless, discussion w i l l  be deferred on the social  
nature of knowledge, but i t  w i l l  be seen that one other issue
is  s ign i f ican t  here. The knowledge to be learned is not 
prescribed necessarily,  so that the selection may be made by 
the learners in order for  them to pursue their own interests  
o r  i t  may be prescribed by the teacher, the sy llabus, etc.
Hence, l ib e ra l  education may be 'education of equals' or 'from 
above' and in this sense, i t  may be regarded as a r e la t iv e ly  
va lue - f ree  concept, but one that is s im ilar  to general education.
68
Liberal education may also re fe r  to education of  the free
man rather than education of  the slave. in the sense, the
meaninc of the work ' l i b e r a l '  is  c lea r ly  made by Faterson 1
when he claims the postulate of l i b e ra l  education is  that nan 
is  ' f r e e  to become everything that i t  i s  in t r in s ic a l ly  good
for  man to b e ' .  This claim re f lec ts  the ideology o f  l iberalism
referred to in the opening chapter, that the individual is  free
and able  to act.. ..r.a..t.i.o..n..a l ly  in order to pou- rsue- jhFis "l i f e  interests .
Two issues require discussion here: the extent to 
v/hich people are free and whether ra t iona l i ty  is  i t s e l f  a non- 
ideo locica l  concept. The fact that the concept of l ib e ra l
/ M
education, as a concept, emerged in ^  society in which there were 
free  men and slaves and that i  the education of  the free  which
indicates that i t  i s  a concept that has certain biases within 
i t .  But i t  might be argu^^jthat there are now no s laves, so 
that this argument has no va l id i ty .  However, no complex 
industr ia l  society.,Gar. ex ist  without a ru l ing  e l i t e  who have 
considerably more freedom v/ithin the socia l  structure than 
those who do neb-nave their weal th or power. Yet freedom is  
no t only t he prerogative o f  the e l i t e ,  the middle class
certa in ly  have more control over their l iv e s  than did the 
slaves o f  Greece. Indeed, i t  might be claimed with j u s t i f i ­
cation that a l l  people in a ' f r e e '  society have more freedom 
than that and while this would not be disputed, i t  would be 
true that those at the upper end o f  the social  hierarchy
j . Paterson, R. (1979): Values, education and the *du lt .
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, n.37
69.
probably have more control over their l ive s  than do those at
the lov/er end. Hence, the phenomenon of l ib e ra l  adult  
education may have a conceptual bias towards those who are 
more free ,  in addition, the idea that people are rational and 
free  to pursue their own interests raises a number o f  problems. 
The log ic  of this position can be embraced by a l l ,  then a l l  
people can be free to pursue their own interests and that i t  
is  rational fo r  them to embark on such a course. However, 
in common with a position argued by Narcuse , i t  w i l l  be 
suggested here that the ra t iona l i ty  o f  this £ e ment is its?:e l f
ideo log ica l .  I f  everybody were free  to follow their own 
interests  and that i t  appeared ra t iond^^b  do so, then the 
social  resu lt  would be chaos, as Hobbes recognised many
centuries ago. Hence, i t  i s  rj il to impose a ra le  of
order which seeks to ensure^^at  chaos does not reign but that 
soc iety 's  scarce resources are d istributed amongst the populace. 
I t  thus appears rational to have a rule of order and indeed
claims that ' i t  is  l o g ic a l ly  impossible to ha^c any 
kind of s o c i e t y £ n  does not depend fo r  most o f  the time
cn rational principles because they underlie any form of  
organisat ion ' .  Yet i f  i t  is  rational for  free men to pursue21 
1. Marcues, H. (1971): ' Industr ia l isa t ion  and Capitalism'
In Stammer, 0. (ed . ) ( l9 7 1 )  nax jeber and Sociology 
Today. Oxford Basil Blackwell.
2. Lawson, K. H. (1932): Analysis and Ideology: Conceptual
Essays on the Education fo r  ’d u l uni versi ty of  
Nottingham, Dept, of Adult Education, p.16.
. 7 0  -
their  own interests and rational to impose a ru le  of  order that 
prevents free  men pursuing their own in terests ,  then the 
' r a t i o n a l i t y 1 that preva i ls  must i t s e l f  be ideology or else  
one of  the preceding claims i s  i r r a t ion a l .  Before the 
argument is pursued any further, i t  is  important to note what 
actually happens in society when this apparent c on f l ic t  occurs. 
Harris (1953:136)27 indicates this c lea r ly  when h^S/rites  
about the evolution o f  l iberalism in I t a ly :
More s ign i f ican t  perhaps than the Right proper was 
the evolution of Liberalism i t s e l f  in tfte la te  
nineteenth and early  twentieth centuries. For both 
in te l lectua ls  and businessmen '.i£.ngr^ioving away from
the conception o f  freedom in rspciety that had been 
the essence of L iberal  ism .O p a re  to , economist and 
social theorist,  is  a representative f igure  in that 
he was both a LiberaL-^&d an anti-democrat, someone 
who more v iv id ly  f e l t  the threat to his own freedom 
than the oppression of others his freedom might 
en ta i l ,  and who saw in Mussolini a saviour o f  his  
freedom. “
Ultimately, t or some people to have freedom, others must 
have their m curta i led .  For some people to be free to
pursue their own interests ,  others must be prevented from
pursuing theirs.  Hence, i f  l ib e ra l  education i s  an essential
element in the good l i f e  then i t  is for the good l i f e  o f  the
2
few rather than for the many. Hence, i f  l i b e ra l  education21 
1. Harris ,  N. (1968): Be l ie fs  in society . London, C.P. Watt
and Co. Ltd. p . 136 .
2. H irst ,  P.H. (1965) : 'L ibera l  Education and the Nature of
Knowledge in Archanbaull, K. ( e d . ) ( l9 3 5 )  ~hilo?o- -̂>* ' - - i  
-inalvsis and Education. London, "loutledge and ” 2 nan
u
71,
implies that man is free and rational i . e .  able to pursue
his own interests then the concept is  more applicable  to
those who have more than i t  is  to those who have less freedom.
The third approach to l ib e ra l  education is  that i t
' f r e e s  the mind to function according to i t s  true nature,
free ing  reason from error and i l l u s i o n . . . '  in the sense
education is  designed to produce in learners * c r i t  ica l
awareness is  a claim that few people would, dispute. As such
X
Paterson's claim that in "characterizing certain a c t iv i t ie s
as ' l i b e r a l '  we are proclaiming that re a l ly  are educational
a c t i v i t i e s ” i s  almost indisputable. Indeed, i f  education is  
any planned series of  incidents that are directed towards 
learning and understanding anfc\bnderstending includes c r i t ic a l  
awareness, then the p r e f i x  ' l i b e r a l '  becomes superfluous 
since a learnina episode is  not educational unless i t  results  
in ' f ree ing  reason^PQn error , ' One of the results in
l ibe ra t ing  the mind in this way is  that the individual nay 
develoo a profound d issat is fac t ion  with the society in which 
he l ives  «hd^wish to reform i t  e ither gradually or dramatically  
in a r^V^tLitionarv form, in this instance, the resu lt  of an 
educational act iv ity  that may have been regarded as l i b e r a l ,  
may only be interpreted as rad ica l .  Hence, the debate between321 
1. H irst ,  P.H. (1965): op. c i t . . p.115
2. Paterson, S.h'.K. (1979): oo. c i t .  p .33
3. Jarvis ,  P. (19S5) : The Sociology o f  Adult Education.
London, Croom Helm, p.5
l i b e r a l  adult education and radical education as viewed by 
1
Lawson is un rea l i s t ic  since they are not always opposing 
concepts.
Thus i t  may be seen from the above discussion that the
confusion with the concept of ' l i b e r a l '  had to be c la r i f i e d .  
Where ' l i b e r a l '  re fe rs  to free  and rational ind iv idua ls ,  then 
there are implications of power whereas l ib e ra l  adult education 
may be seen to be embracing ind iv idua l is t ic  and e l i t i s t  
ideo log ies .  The s ign i f ican t  point is  that the phenomenon 
o f  adult education is  being interpreted from a soec i f ic  
ideo log ica l  perspective: that man is  free  and able to pursue 
his own interests in a rational manner.
This approach a lso seems to favour a form of 'education 
from above' since Lawson2 appears to imply that 'an imperative 
ex is ts  which says that members of the working c lass  ought . . .  
to be encouraged to accept thd trad it ional  forms of education',  
even though he does pose this as a question in the context o f  
the quotation. Paterson also seems to suggest that this form 
o f  education must be 'education frcn above' since he claims 
f o r  the educator the duty to teach what is  objective  re a l i t y ,  
while  omitting^bonsideration of some of the broader curriculum 
is sues .
Whil these are implications of this position, i t 1 
1. Lawson, K.H. (1982): od. c i t . , p.16
2. I b id . p .16
3. Paterson, R.W.K. (1984): 'Objectiv ity  as an Educational
Imperative' in International Journal o f  L ifelong  
Education. Vo l .3 ,  N o . l .
■73
would be wrong to claim that either o f  these w r iters  would 
claim that i t  is  imperative that education is always from 
above. However, not a l l  versions o f  l i b e ra l  adult education 
were interpretations of  the educational phenomenon from a 
l i b e ra l  ideological perspective. The other two interpretations  
of the term re fe r  to education per se or to general, non-
vocational education. since, in neither instance- ddo  they 
incorporate the ideology o f  l ib e ra l i sm , the ] ibe ra l  adult
education w i l l  be restr icted  to that f o r m ^ ^ a d u l t  education 
that incorporates within i t  the liberaXN^deology.
2.3.1 The Critique o f  L iberal  Education: 
I t  is  necessary at  this j re to examine the ideas o f
some radical adult educators who seek to re jec t  the old l i b e r a l
aporoach to adult education.
Hell Keddie r e g r e t s  that adult education upholds an
a
ideology of in d iv id '^ l i s n ,  and argues that provision fo r
d- e_tp__r_i_v_e_d_a da*u: l t3^^%c6urara„_c_es the indiv idualisation  of f a i lu r e .
Yet educatio^^p'r disadvar. taged adults is  p o l i t i c a l l y  clamorous
as i t  can>^ipeal across a wide ideological  spectrum. Fletcher 2
arojeis tnat l ib e ra ls  regard i t  as 'compensatory education' or  
positive  discrimination' and conservatives welcome i t  as cheap 
education to transform ' feck less  and d isruptive '  adults into21 
1. Keddie, N. (1979) ' Adul.t Education -  \r, ideology of In d iv id u a l i s m '^
Thompson, J. (1979)(ed . )  Adult Education for a Change. 
London, Hutchinson, p.39
2. Fletcher, C. (1979): 'The Theory of Community Education and 
I t s  Relation to Adult Education'; in
Thompson, j .  (1979): Ib id .
74.
responsible c it izens.  Such provision is  a hybrid between 
adult education and socia l  work.
Yet the pedagogic re lationship between adult educators 
and under-privileged adults is  d i f f i c u l t .  Fletcher proposes 
to solve i t  by dialogue, in which students teach teachers; 
the type of F re i re 's  conscientisation , in which workers are
led zo discover their unarticulated grievances .and demands.
Colin G r i f f in  argues the case fo r  a new adult curriculum 
and asserts that " the conceptual framework of  adult education 
has been constructed in terms of need! lccess and provisions,
rather than knowledge, culture and power.".1x G r i f f in  is  wary 
of educational radicalism in tfre context o f  social conservatism, 
in part icu lar ,  so called radical pedagogy may not be radica l  
in e f fec t  since i t  leav<=^iinchanged adult education's hidden
curriculum oy* pol ̂ c's ntrol. S imilar ly ,  G r i f f in  
c r i t ic i s e s  the ided^gg;y o f  needs meeting which e f fec t iv e ly
depo l i t ic ises  adGl^ "education by avoiding the issue o f  aims,
on grounds -losophical scepticism or professional
neutrality ,  aftd reduces decision making to a straightforward  
techn exercise in which market forces constitute the 
the log ica l  stop. He a lso suggests that such conceptions 
as l i fe long  learning and recurrent education are consistent  
v;ith established social  constructions of  knowledge.1 
1. G r i f f in ,  C. (1933); Adult education: Theory and
Curriculum. 3eckenham, Croom Helm p738
75
He supports G e lp i 's  view that "there exists  a p o s s ib i l i t y
of transformation through education", however, since education
is  r e la t iv e ly  autonomous o f  prevail ing social forces. This
means that adult education should not "induce adults to adapt
themselves to the needs o f  production, or to engage in
cultura l and educative le isu re  a c t iv i t ie s  as a response to the
alienation resultina from their  work." He argues with Gelpi
that adults should be motivated by "a wish to transform their
working l iv e s ,  improve their  l iv in g  conditions, and take part
in their Society 's  management." 1 But this could be regarded 
as imputed needs meeting fo r  the co l lect ive  individual of  
adulthood. G r i f f in  advocates a new curriculum for  the social  
reconstruction of  knowledge, and undermines the claims o f  some 
experimental pedagogy.
To Lindeanan, education was, f i r s t  and foremost, conceived 
as a l i fe lon g  process^ and to regard i t  as preparation for  
an unknown future was £o condemn teachers and students to
in te l lectua l  s tas is .  Secondly, adult education was held to 
be unreservedly of  a non-vocational character. He wrote that 
"adult  education more accurately defined begins where
p
vocational education leaves o f f "  and condemned the fac t  
that "the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  o f  enriching the a c t iv i t ie s  o f  labour
1. G r i f f in ,  C. (1983) op. c i t .  p.192
2. Lindeman, E.C. (1926): The Meaning of Adult Education.
New York, New Republic, p.b ’
76
i t s e l f  grow less fo r  a l l  workers who manipulate automatic 
1
machines" . In his view, for workers to experience "the good 
l i f e ,  the l i f e  interfused with meaning and with joy, 
opportunities for expressing more of the total personality  
than is  called forth by machines w i l l  be needed.
I t  is  the task of adult education to a ss is t  these workers 
to find meaning and creative fu lf i lment in the areas of their  
l i v e s  separate from the factory and to counter the development 
o f  fractional persona lit ies  seen as the inevitable  consequence 
o f  a highly specialized d iv is ion  of labour. This defiant  
re jection  of adult education having any involvement with 
vocational training was character ist ic  of  most of his writ ings .
The third pr incip le  of adul ilt  education is  that we 
emphasize situations, not subjects, in our teaching. Lindeman 
wrote that adult education be t the point at which adults
found themselves needing to adjust to new situations,  and in 
this stress on the educational potential inherent in adults '  
attempting to make sense o f ,  and come to terms with, changed
r e a l i t i e s  at work, the family or in society at large.  
F ina l ly ,  adult education was held to place primary emphasis 
on learners '  experiences.
The importance of grounding curricula and methods
in  the experiences of  adults is now something of a
se l f -ev iden t  truism in adult education, enshrined as 
i t  is  in the concept of andragogy and in
1 Lindeman, E. C. (1926): o£. c i t . , p. 5
7 1
experientia l  theory o f  adult development. What remains 
d ist inct ive  about th is ,  however, is  Lindeman's constant 
attention to the connection between individual rea l isat ion
through experience, and the need fo r  adults to be involved
in social change movements. To him, a major learning need in
adulthood was "to change the social order so that v i t a l  
personalit ies  w i l l  be creating a new environment in which
their aspirations may be properly expressed." '
The medium through which this can be achieved as put
forward by Lindeman is  the discussion method. The d is t inc t ive
purpose o f  adult educational method, according to Lindeman
was the inculcation in learners of a set o f  analytica l  s k i l l s
which could be applied to understanding a range o f  d i f fe ren t
situations. He wrote that "education is  a method for  giving
situations a sett ing ,  fo r  analyzing complex wholes into
2
manageable, understanding parts. This idea of adu lts '
developing a set of  analy t i c a l  procedures applicable  to a
variety  of  setting i s ,  perhaps, a conceptual precursor o f  the
notion of mathetica* of learning how to learn, as developed
in adult education by Smith. To Smith, the chief purpose of
adult education is  to help learners to understand their
id iosyncrat ic  learning sty les  and to develop s k i l l s  o f  inquiry,
analysis and synthesis which can be adapted to d i f f e re n t
3
in te l le c tua l  pursuits. This idea of  emancipation is  the message 
of the l ib e ra l  adult education theory.1 
1. Lindeman, E.C. (1926): qgj, c i t . page 9
2. Ib id ,  p .115
3. Smith, R.M. (1982): Learning How to Learn: Applied Learning
Theory for  Adults . New York, Cambridge Books.
7 8 .
2.4 Radical Adult Education:
Radical education was essent ia l ly  an oppositional  
movement, gaining energies from contesting orthodoxies, in 
theory and practice. The f i r s t  criticism of  the sorts  of  
schooling which were provided were formed in the period 
to 1820, under the shadow of a counter-revolution. The 
ear ly  schooling enterprises -  Sunday Schools o f  the more 
Conservative-Evangelical kind, the monitorial day schools 
were seen as coercive and knowledge-denying. When more 
l ib e ra l  schemes were put forward in the 1820s and 1830s -
Mechanics' In s t i tu te s ,  the useful knowledge Societies  infant
j o y
schools plans for  State education -  they were opposed too, 
though more conditionally* Before the 1860s, there was not
enough working class support fo r  the state  education to
/  1  
overcome the opposition of i t s  Tory-Anglican opponents.
Criticism was not limited to opposition. Alternatives
were proposed.^NEducation was d i f fe ren t ly  defined. I t  was
partly  a matter of  re l ig io n .  Radical Education tended to be
secular and r a t io n a l i s t }  i t  drew on Enlightenment ideas
of  an expanding human nature. But there was a po larisation
within Christ ian ity  too. The philanthropic educators
inherited a puritan-Evangelical view of human nature as f i n i t e ,1 
1. Johnson, R. (1977) "Educating the Educators"; "Experts"
and the s ta te ,  1833-39". In Donajgrodiski, A. (ed . )  
Social Control in Victorian England. Croom Helm.
•79
limited and flamed. They associate social evils like crime, 
rio t, pauperism, vice and sometimes epidemic as immoral
phenomenon and this holds the view that moral and religious 
education was the answer. Radicals by contrast, developed
the legacy of natural theology (God known only through Nature) , 
and of Christianity as a morality of cooperation among equals. 
There was also the appearance of secular knowledge, especially 
as solvents of dogmatic religion and as keys to Understanding 
Society and human nature.
Yet another feature of
with education and politics, knowledge and power. Educating 
yourself and others, especially in a knowledge of your 
circumstances, was a step in changing the world. Knowledge 
was a natural right, and unconditional good. The typical 
middle-class argument -  that only the 'educated1 should be 
able to vote -  was dismissed in anger. Yet, there were 
differences around education and politics within radical 
movements too. Some groups, the Cwenites for instance, were 
more likely  to adopt 'Schoolmastery' attitudes than others;
the others always insisted on some moral or physical force. 
I t  was fa ir ly  d if f icu lt  to know which educational practices 
were for the here and now, as strategies for change, and 
which could only be enjoyed once the change had come.
A prominent feature of radicalism is its  approach of
questioning the assumptions on v/hich organisations,
80
institutions and Society rest. Radicalism in other
words, is the "expressed intention to attack the foundations 
of a system, complemented by a v is ib le , manifest effort to do 
so, whether or not that effort is successful".* The radicals
wishes to question social limits -  po lit ica l, social, and 
cultural, and usually, to destroy them.
The origins of radical criticism in adult education lie  
in two events which were roughly contemporary. There are the 
rise and growth of adult education, and the writings of Marx and 
the Marxists. The 'extension' development in the nineteenth 
century universities, the establishment of the Worker's 
Educational Association, and similar ventures were paralleled 
by the most fevered debates about society and its institutions, 
inspired by the Marxists. I t  wa s not long before the growth
of adult education, thati s; ocial discontent, unrest, and Marxism,
became connected. To the debate about the desirability or 
otherwise of 'u tility* In education, there was now added 
a new and more ̂ significant discussion. What was the broad 
aim of education in relation to society and its values ?
And what was, or should be, the commitment of adult education
to that aim ? This was the question v/hich interested le ft ­
wing radical educators, especially in the early years of this
century and which Expressed it s e lf  in the conflict at 
Ruskin College..I 
I. Livingstone, R.W. (1941): Future in Education; C.U .P . ,  p.44
8 1
In conventional education circles, the names of I l l i c h , and 
Freire excite very strong feelings. These radical educators 
both embody and create its meaning.
Freire 's concept of radical adult education has its
origins in liberal humanism, theology and Brazilian nationalism.
I t  is given its revolutionary edge through the adoption of
Marx's ideas on class struggle and its cultural-dimension
from dependency theory and the writings of Fromm, Memmi and
Fanon. Freire is further indebted to Marx for the view that
in changing his circumstances, man changes himself, thus
emphasising the dynamic unity between man, his activity and
his environment, i t  was the dialectical interaction of man
reflecting upon his action, on his social and material
environment and in turn being acted upon which forms the
essence of revolutionary praxis. I t  is found that Freire
agrees with Marx that the dominant ideas of a particular
historical period are those of the governing class, thus,
i t  requires a revolutionary instrument in the form of a
politicized language to inculcate a revolutionary conscious-
1
ness in the oppressed.
Freire's central theme is the revolutionary transformation 
of men's consciousness through which society can be 
fundamentally changed for the better .  In essence, Freire1 
1. Carnoy, M. (1974): Education as Cultural imperialism, 
New York, McKay Company.
82
wishes to effect a capacity for cultural change through
releasing the potential of action which he assumes resides
in a ll  oppressed peoples. The great dilemma confronting
mankind lies in choosing between the humanization or
1
dehumanization of man.
The restoration of the oppressed's humanity can only
come through the oppressed who best understand the 'te rr ib le
significance' of oppression and the 'necessity for liberation '.
The poor, however, are so conditioned by the harsh existence
of their poverty and oppression that they identify themselves
with their oppressors whom they see as "their model of 
humanity". 2 In this condition, their consciousness is 
dichotomized between their desire for 'authentic existence' 
and their fear of i t .
Herein lies the central problem of Freire's pedagogy.
How can the oppressed overcome the dual oppression of their 
concrete existence and divided unauthentic se lf and 
participate in their own liberation? According to Freire, 
the answer lies in the oppressed f i r s t  discovery tr.at their 
consciousness is false. The second step lies in developing 
an independent authentic consciousness so that the oppressed 
come to recognise their own oppression. This w ill  have the
3
effect of "making real oppression more oppressive".1 
1. F re ire ,  P. (1972): pedagogy of the Oppressed. Middlesex,
penguin Books, p .2(3 .
2. I b id . pp. 22, 24.
3. Freire, P. (1972) op. c i t . , p.28 .
83
The resu lt ing  interaction between the ’o b je c t iv e ’ conditions  
of poverty and oppression and the ’ sub ject ive ’ awareness o f  
these conditions w i l l  be to compel men to act on their own 
situation and change i t .
The key to the development of an authentic consciousness 
is  the conscientization process. I t  is  the process whereby 
man is  transferred from an ’o b je c t ’ , who merely responds 
unthinkingly to circumstances around him, to a 'sub jec t '  
who, in seeing the so c ia l ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  
behind poverty and oppression, acts on this r e a l i t y  to 
change i t .  Conscientization involves traversing "through1 
the spontaneous stage o f  apprehension o f  r e a l i t y  into a
1
c r i t i c a l  stage".  I t  is  the product of the creative
d ia le c t ic a l  interaction between man and his environment,
a process o f  praxis which results in the "h is to r ica l
commitment" of men to "take the role o f  agents" to make and
2
remake the world* .✓ Conscientization, then, is  the " c r i t i c a l  
insertion into history to create h istory" .  i t  becomes 
a moral imperative to act in and on the real world. I f  such 
'engagement' is  absent, conscien tiza tion has not taken place.
1. F re ire ,  P. (1976): ’a Few Notions about the word
’Conscientization"; in schooling and Cap ita l ism,. 
Dale, R. England, K. and MacDonald, M. ( e d s . ) 
(1976); London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.224
2. I b i d , p.224
3. F re ire ,  p. (1976) op. c i t . . p.225
84.,
in the f in a l  ana lys is ,  "conscientization is  a permanent
c r i t i c a l  approach to r e a l i t y  in order to discover i t  and
discover the myths that deceive us and help to maintain the
1
oppressing dehumanizing structures" .
Myths and dehumanized structures are, in F re i r e ' s  view,
perpetuated by formal education systems. Formal education 
i s  'domesticating' in that i t  induces a confoirmity Ooif mind
which ultimately colonizes men's consciousness and ensures
the continuity of  the status quo, thus cripp ling  men's
confidence in their own capacity to change r e a l i t y .  'Narrative
education',  as Freire  c a l l s  i t ,  is  based upon the concept of
banking. The teacher's task is/ fo^ iepos it  facts and
information into the students. Education becomes an "act o f
depos it ing ' .  Banking education is  e ssen t ia l ly  'manipulative'
and encourages the individual to be passive in re lat ion  to
the world and r.ct active in transforming i t .  The educator's
ro le  is to "regulate the way the world enters into the 
2
student". In human terms, banking education turns men into
being
uncr it ica l  'autonomous '^which in turn denies their  humanity.
I t  ultimately reduces men to objects and encourages the 
development of what Fromm c a l l s  "the necrophilous person . . . 21 
1. Freire ,  P. (1976): op, c i t . . p.225
2. F re ire ,  P. (1972): op. c i t . . p.45, 46
I b id . p.49
85.
who loves control, and in the act of control l ing  k i l l s  l i f e . " 1
Education for l iberat ion  c a l ls  for a more dynamic,
d ia le c t ic a l  approach associated with ’problem-posing*
education, problem-posing education is  'd ia lo g ic a l*  in that
i t  tolerates an equal and interchangeable partnership
between the student and the teacher, thus resolving the
contradiction between them. Liberating education is  the
process whereby education becomes the c r i tica^fc^link between
2
'uncompleted beings ' and an unfinished r e a l i t y . '  I t  
therefore plays a creative ro le  in the on-going transformation 
of human consciousness and external re a l i t y .
2-5 pragmatic Adult Education:
Pragmatism is, as i t  has often been described,
a d is t inc t ive ly  American contribution to philosophy, in i t s  
e f f o r t  to c la r i f y  and extend the methods o f  science, and to 
strengthen the prospects o f  freedom and in te l l igence  in the 
contemporary world, i t  represents also a philosophical  
or ientat ion  o f  Sirgent general interest.  I t  bears the 
imprin1 ̂t oirvtradi tional modes of argumentation, and a lso  of
advanced log ica l  and methodological ideas; i t  addresses 
i t s e l f  not only to problems of philosophers but also to 
problems of men. in i t s  search for an integrated interpretation21 
1. Fromm, quoted in Pedagogy of the Oppressed. p .5 l
2. F re ire ,  P. (1972): op. c l t . , p.53
I b id , p.57
of human l i f e ,  i t  s t r ives  to re late  mind and nature, 
language and thought, action and meaning, knowledge and value, 
emphasizing always the primary s ign if icance of c r i t i c a l  
thought, log ica l  method, and the test o f  experience in a l l
realms of endeavour.
A major e f fo r t  of  pragmatism has been to assimilate  
modern science within philosophy, and to c r i t i c i z e  traditional  
philosophical outlooks in the l igh t  of  new s c ie n t i f i c  
developments. F i r s t ly ,  i t  is  the theory o f  evolution and 
the new s ta t i s t ic a l  modes of  reasoning that have exercised the
greatest  impact upon pragmatism, and yttlat have led i t  to 
c r i t i c i z e  inherited conceptions o f  science i t s e l f ,  secondly, 
pragmatism takes quite seriously the legitimate demands of  
other modes of  human experience -  morality and social  practice  
a r t ,  poetry, h istory, re l ig ion  and philosophical speculation.  
I t  does not use de facto science as a device fo r  excluding 
or downgrading these other modes. Rather, i t  takes science 
as a suggestive o f  more general concepts o f  c r i t i c a l  thought, 
in terms of  which' the continuities among a l l  modes may be 
revealed, and in l igh t  of which they may a l l  be refined and 
advanced*^/
Thus, Peirce^ develops the notion o f  log ica l  method 
as an underlying conception capable o f  unifying the various1 
1. Echeff le r ,  I .  (1986): Four Pragmatists: A C r i t ic a l
introduction to T e i r c e ,  James, r-lead, andTpewey. 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. *
2. Ib id .
87
oppositions that has been mentioned above. James stresses
the appeal to experience as a common test to which a l l
constructions are to be brought.1' "The various speculative
philosophies" he wrote, " fo r  example, are l ike  so many
separate hotel rooms, a l l  d i f fe ren t ly  furnished, to be sure,
but connected by a common corridor o f  experience, through
which they may be put into communication".* Mead lays primary
stress upon symbolism as the indispensable basis  For human
selfhood as well  as for  more d if fe rent iated  an<Sr sophisticated
2
forms of  human consciousness. And Dewey elaborates a theory
of  in t e l l  igence in offering a unified conception of thinking as
an active interchange between organism and environment -  an
interchange which reveals the continuity between the humblest
b i t  of  learning by a 'ch i ld  exploring i t s  room and the most
refined piece o f  theorizing by an experimental sc ien t is t
3
investigating the natural wor ld ' .
Education provides an important application for  Dewey 
The aim of  education, according to Dewey, is  f i r s t  and 
foremost, to develop c r i t i c a l  methods of thought. I t s  task 
is  not to indoctrinate a part icu lar  point o f  view, but rather
to help generate those powers o f  assessment and crit ic ism  by 
which diverse points o f  view may themselves be responsibly
judged. In pursuit o f  this task, the school ought to exemplify321 
1. James, W. (1910): pragmatism. New York, Longmans; p.54
2. sch e f f le r ,  L. (1986): op. c i t . , p.2
3. Ib id .  p.2 .
< 88*
the application o f c r it ic a l  method to a ll the domains o f 
human l i f e .  This implies the need to present these domains 
with an emphasis upon their meaning, that is ,  in their 
relatedness to one another but, most particu larly , in their 
bearing upon the realm o f purposive a c t iv ity . For the more 
meaning we grasp, the greater the context we can take into 
account and the more we are able to evaluate c r i t ic a l ly .
This is  the central idea o f Dewey’ s theory o f education, 
which he develops into a notion o f proper method and 
curriculum.
Study is  e ffec tu a l in the degree in which the
pupil rea lizes the place o f the . . .  truth he is
dealing v/ith in carrying to fru ition  a c t iv it ie s
in which he is  concerned. This connection o f an
object and topic with the promotion o f an a c t iv ity
having a purpose is  the f i r s t  and the la s t word
1
o f a genuine theory o f in terest in education, 
proper method requires that the subject be placed in a broad, 
and growing context -  a context that embraces the students 
own purposes and potential a c t iv it ie s  as well as the urgent 
problems confronting the human community o f which he is  a 
part. In the matter o f curriculum,- Dewey’ s emphasis is  on 
continuity and meaning. "The criterion  o f the value o f 
School education is  the extent to which i t  creates a desire
1 Dewey, J. (1963) :  Democracy and Education. New York,
Macmillan, p. l'$5 (o r ig in a l date o f pub lication  ,1916)
89.
fo r  continued growth and supplies means for  making the desire
1
e f fec t ive  in f a c t . ” His de f in it ion  of growth was "a general 
and persistent balance of organic a c t iv i t ie s  with the 
surroundings, and of active capacities to readjust act iv ity  
to meet new conditions. The former furnishes the background 
c-f growth; the la t ter  constitute growing."^
Dewey's notions o f  growth have been cr it ic ized  because 
some would argue that whereas growth is taken as the basic  
value and resu lt  of education, Dewey did noHfef specify the 
direction or ultimate goal of  growth -  save i t s e l f .  But 
as Scheff ler  has pointed out,
the ideals  of  in te l l igence ,  growth, and freedom 
open-ended as they are, a r ^ h o t  amorphous or 
d irect ion less ;  . . .  they make the most stringent  
of demands upon those who would embody them in 
human institutions and s t r ive  to rear their young 
by their l ich t .  ^
I t  is  clear that Dewey would judge any institution  or process 
according to how fa r  i t  had succeeded in enabling individuals
\ Y /
to develop their innate powers o f  awareness and analysis.
These powers might well  d i f f e r ,  depending on each ind iv idua l 's
capacity, but the disposition to continue their exercise  
inde f in ite ly ,  in order to bring past experience to bear upon1 
1. Dewey, J. (1S63) op. c i t . , p.53
Ib id .  p . 52
Sche f f le r ,  I .  (1986) op. c i t . . p.247
90
new experience, conditions or problems was never to be 
abbreviated.
According to Dewey, therefore, armed with the capab i l i t ie s  
fo r  in te l l ig en t  enquiry and solution, (which are the properties  
o f  e f fec t ive  growth) no one would be debarred from being 
in te l le c tu a l ly  and personally developed to act confidently,
discriminating and acting from a position o f  wisdom, at every
yi i
phase o f  adulthood, and learn "from l i f e  i t s e l f " .  This was 
necessary in order to negotiate l i f e ' s  contingencies, and 
on a grander scale, so that man would be able to se lect  that 
which contributes to the quality o f  a l l .  E l i t i s t  education 
fo r  the few was, therefore, dismissed by Dewey. To him, the
'educated person' was one whose*SvnLnate analytica l  powers were
developed su f f ic ien t ly  to enable him or her to be e f fec t ive  
in a l l  aspects of l i f e  and work. Thus, 'ways o f  knowing', 
rather than 'States o^Knowledge ' were o f  primary imoortance
to Dewey.
These vi< similar to those expressed by advocates
o f  l i f e lo n g  education. For example, Cropley says: "What is  
needed is  a system in v/hich adult and school learning are 
seen as part of a continuous f a b r i c " . 3 And "L ife long
education squarely recognizes that learning occurs throughout 
l i f e . " 31 
1. Dewey, J. (1963): op. c i t . . p .5 l
2. Cropley, A.J. (1976): 'Some Psychological Reflections '
in Dave, R.H. (1976): Foundations o f  L ifelong  
Education. London, pergamon press, p . 209~~
Ibid p. 196
91
Sim ilar ly ,  janne w r ites :  "In Lifelong education, learning . .
1
becomes a normal, constant dimension o f  man's entire  l i f e , "  
Not only are these w r iters  describing l i f e lo n g  learning,  
they are arguably describing Dewey's view of growth.
In a l l  these theoretical explanation, there appears 
to be a common sense or common assertion and that i s  the 
value of  freedom of  thought. The need for the promotion,
development of i t  in any situation where learning is  to take 
place cannot be over-emphasized.
On the face value, u t i l i tar ian ism  buttressed the theory 
of l iberalism. The underlying log ic  of u t i l i t a r ia n  
l iberalism is  simple: man must be allowed to pursue f ree ly  
the pleasure he des ire s ,  because the pleasure i t s e l f  is good n 
and i t  is  only the individual who can know which pleasure  
is  good for  him. Yet such a c lass ica l  u t i l i t a r i a n  log ic  
coll ided with M i l l ' s  'q u a l i t a t iv e '  theory o f  pleasure.
In the theory, although pleasure was generally accepted as 
good, seme pleasures are qua l i ta t ive ly  better than some others,  
and i t  was simply incorrect to say that each individual  
always knows which pleasure is  better than another, as f a r
as high quality pleasures are concerned, an individual cannot 
always be regarded as the best judge o f  his own w e l l -be ing .1 
1. Janne, H. (1576): 'Theoretical Foundations c f  L ife long  
Education'; in Dave, R.H. op . c i t . , p.129
9 2 . ,
Liberty  thus lost  an important ground fo r  i t s  general 
ju s t i f i c a t io n .
In order to ensure the development o f  a nation’ s moral
character, Mil l  developed a normative theory o f  l ibe rty  on
the basis o f  the Humboldtian ideal o f  total man, "a complete
and consistent whole" whose essence was to be ” a *
ind iv idua lity  of power and development." Only when the
freedom of ind iv idua lity  is  established, according to M i l l ,
could man choose his plan for himself, employ a l l  his
2
f a cu l t ie s ,  and quit the apelike imitation o f  custom.
Such a romantic claim for l ib e r ty  c lea r ly  contradicted the 
descriptive  l ibe rty  claim of tarianism which grounded
i t s e l f  on an ind iv idua l 's  pursuit of pleasure. What is to 
be noted, (and this is  of  great relevance in an attempt to 
the process o f  l ib e ra l  adult education)is not the contradict­
ion i t s e l f  but t h e ^ i f f e r e n t  objectives which caused Mil l
on one occasion tco- pnegate and on another to affirm the 
u t i l i t y  of l ib e r ty .  Mere w i l l  be said about this confl ict ing  
values when we come to discuss the process of adult  
educa tion. ’What has been done in this chapter is  an
exposition of the philosophical basis o f  the aims and
objectives o f  adult education, we have tried to bring out 
the contemporary signif icance o f  the concept of each theory 
from some selected adult educat6 rs who both embody and 
create their meaning.
1. Warnock, M. (1979)( e d . ) :  John Stuart M i l l ,  U t i l i ta r ian ism .
Glasscow; william Co l l ins .  p.lo6
2. Ibid.
93
We may now want to ju s t i fy  the need for  examining a l l  
these models in a u t i l i t a r i a n  aim of adult education.
Do the models help in promoting happiness, or are they 
conditions necessary for the achievement of  happiness ? 
perhaps we may want to say that their def in it ions  give some 
clues to what i s  meant by happiness when we come to apply 
i t  as a programme. We may add too that they give a direction  
espec ia l ly  when we come to measure the extent to which adult  
education helps in promoting happiness. But importantly, 
these models are based on established philosophies which 
he*ct been in practice for  ages and as - 5 T  give, a prop to
our aim.
Humanist adult education, as we read on page 47 of this 
research, is  concerned with the dignity and rights of men.
The value of  the human personality is  important. This bears 
s im i la r i ly  with M i l l ' s  assertion about human beings. M il l  
believes that human beings are possessed o f  certain potential  
fo r  development; they are born into the world with facu lt ies  
and powers which grow and mature according to the opportunities  
afforded them. Human nature, he affirms,
. . x ^ s  not a machine to be b u i l t  a fte r  a model 
and set to do exactly the work prescribed for i t ,  
but a free  which requires to grow and develop 
i t s e l f  on a l l  sides according to the tendency 
of the inward forces which make i t  a l iv ing  thing.
M i l l ,  J. S. (1910): 0£. c i t .  p.127
94
M i l l ' s  aff irmation, which is  implied in humanistic adult  
education finds expression in one of the aims of adult  
education -  the purpose of  adult education is to help the
individual find meaning in l i f e  that i s ,  help him/her discover  
his/her potentials.  Desires and fee l ings  are part of  the 
raw material of human nature every person has possession o f  
and as much as possib le ,  they must be encouraged to unfold 
themselves. Thus we find in the theory of adult education 
great emphasis being put on the lea rner 's  experience- As a 
matter o f  fact ,  one great adult education thinker, Lindeman
precise ly  upholds the view that experi.eennce is the adult  
l e a rn e r ' 3  textbook. In teaching them, no particu lar  
information is imposed upon themf <rout equipping them with 
capab i l i ty  of modifying their  own experience.
In l ike manner, l i b e ra l  adult education is conceived 
ofj  as a process in which the mind has to develop towards 
knowledge and understanding -  the search for truth. 
Relating this l itar ian ism , is  the goal of education,
The purpose^f- l ib e ra l  education as stated by M il l  in his 
Inaugural lecture for the individual student, is  'the
strengthening and enlarging of his own in te l l e c t  and character '  
and the creation of 'capable and cultivated human beings ' who 
can bring l igh t  of general culture to il luminate the
Garforth, F. W. (ed . )  1971; op. c i t . p.92
95
techn ica l it ies  of a special pursuit. I f  this be so, l i b e ra l  
education is  needed by everyone at least  in a bid to help 
individuals  find meaning in his l i f e  act iv ity .  This finds 
expression in some of the aims of adult education part icu lar ly  
when we say that adult education is  aimed at helping the 
individual learners to become conscious of  the various types 
o f  knowledge that are present in their own indigenous culture  
and traditions. So, when we say that in adulC education, we
should teach the students how to learn but not particu lar  
learning facts ,  we find M i l l  advising that che aim of  l ib e ra l  
education should be to give the student such information and 
training as w i l l  enable him to seek truth for himself and form 
his own conclusions.
To attain this condition of existence requires the 
development of  rational s k i l l s  and enthusiasm for enquiry. 
Hence we find Lindeman stating that one of the goals of adult  
education is  the cu lt ivation  of rational in te l l igence ;  he 
went on to say that the development of inte l l igence is  the 
supreme reajsan for adult education. According to him, 
in te l l igence  i s  needed not for  personal l iv ing  only, i t  is  an
indispensable tool fo r  social l iv in g  and social interaction.
The value of social interaction according to the u t i l i t a r ia n s
i s  that i t  promotes improvement and increases the sum of  
happiness.
J a rv is ,  P. (ed . )  (1987) ; Twentieth Century Thinkers in 
Adult Education. London, Crcom Helm.
I t  may now be said that the aims of  adult education are
not formulated out of mere assumed idea ls .  The aims are 
based on existing philosophies which have been accepted as 
idea ls .  The present exercise has been done f i r s t  to establish  
such a foundation, and two, to be assured that there exists  
a paradigmn against which our proaramme can be compared.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction;
The meanings o f  l i f e  and the word which is  called
*
•philosophica l ' are a product of  two fac tors :  one, inherited  
re l ig ious  and ethical meanings, the other, the sort  of  
investigation which may be called ' s c i e n t i f i c * ,  usino this
word in i t s  broadest sense. Though indlividual philosophers
hold d i f fe ren t  views in re lation to the ex tent to which these
two factors entered into their systems, i t  i s  however the 
presence of both, in some degree, that characterizes Dhilosophy, 
This notwithstanding, i t  is  common to distinguish
between the b.vo factors ;  the former factor belongs to the 
trad it ional approach. This type of approach which is  
predominantly normative and speculative in nature tr ies  to 
achieve some k indw f  total view o f  r e a l i t y ,  to attain seme 
sort  of  intimate contact with the essence o f  things and 
persons. The la t t e r  factor which is e ssen t ia l ly  ana ly t ica l ,  
aims at taking a survey o f  our own understandings, examining
our own powers and seeing to what things they were adapted. 
In wittaenste in 's  exoression as found in the Tractatus
'ana ly t ic  philosophy aims at making thoughts c le a re r '1 
1. Wittgenstein, L. (1922): Tractatus: Logico-Philosophicus; 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hence we find analytica l  philosophers concerning themselves 
more with the meaning o f  statements instead o f  trying to find  
the truth or falsehood of  such statements.
Sometimes, there can be no dividing l ine between 
speculative and analytic philosophy, for  one and the same 
philosopher may practise philosophical analysis as well  as 
philosophical speculation. Depending on the proportion 
between the roles which the two play in their thinking, 
philosophers may be arranged along a scaleV
This chapter w i l l  be structured along this vein. In a 
sense that while attention w i l l  be paid to the methods of  
analytic  philosophy, an attempt w i l l  be made to locate the 
extent of  traditional philosophy in such a method. Since 
this study is concerned with educational setting,  another 
task that w i l l  be ventured w i l l  be to locate the place of  
Analytic philosophy of  Education within the realm of analytic
philosophy and re la•teX this to conceptual and l in gu is t ic  
philosophical analysis .
3.1 The Rise of  Analytical philosophy:
Generation a fte r  generation o f  modern analytic  
philosophers have regarded themselves as philosophical
revolutionaries wiping the s late  clean of e a r l i e r  philosophies 
and laying the foundation for  something entire ly  new: a s e l f ­
c r i t i c a l ,  s t r ic t ly  s c ie n t i f i c  philosophy. This b e l i e f  could 
however be seen to be a f la t te r in g  i l lu s ion  because
philosophical analysis is  nothing new, i t  can be traced 
back to Socrates, P lato ,  and A r is to t le ,  and re f lect ions  of  
an analytica l  character can be found in the work o f  nearly  
a l l  the great philosophers. What has happened in modern 
philosophy is  not the advent of  something new, but the 
development and intens if icat ion  o f  something which was always 
there. TJew realms of thought have been subjected to analysis ,  
and new methods of analysis have been created. This new 
method is what analysts tagged as ’ s c i e n t i f i c ' .  The 
philosophies that have been inspired by s c ie n t i f i c  technique 
are power philosophies, and tend to regard everything 
non-human as mere raw materials. Ends are no longer considered^ 
only the sk i l l fu ln es s  o f  £ e p r  ocess is  valued.
Hegelian philosophy belongs to the new analytica l  
approach but one finds that there is  no clean break from the 
tradit ional approach.
Hegel i s  a theologian: his speculations were predominantly 
guided by practica l  instincts o f  the higher l i f e  o f  man, by 
the desire' to restore the moral and re l ig ious  bas is  o f  human 
existence, v/hich a revolutionary scepticism had destroyed.
His philosophical method, the d ia le c t ic ,  is  a method of  
reconc i l ia t ion .  For him, there are no antagonisms which 
cannot be reconciled -  there must always be a higher unity 
within which antagonistic tendencies w i l l  each find a place.
Thus, i f  realism and Science appear to be irreconciliably
opposed, this can only be an appearance fo r ,  in r e a l i t y ,  they
. 1
must form part of a higher unity.
Thus i t  is stated that:
The universe reveals  the workings, the development, 
the rea l isa t ion ,  the unfolding o f  a world s p i r i t  or 
Absolute idea . . .  the universe is  not unlike an 
animate being that has a soul, des ires ,  aims, intentions  
and goals. The universe i s  sp i r i tu a l ;  i t  has 
directions; and the explanation o f  ordinary fac ts ,  
human actions, h is to r ica l  changes and inst itut ions  
may be grasped once we recognise how they are embedded 
in this cosmic organism, how they are directed by the 
cunning of the Absolute, how they play their part in 
the Universe 's progressive rea l isat ion  of the world
sn i r i t  . 2
Hecel 's loc ic  and his h is to r ica l  d ia lec t ic  presupposes an 
underlying metaphysic. Fojc Hecel, the whole is  more real than 
i t s  parts, and among wholes the more d i f fe rent iated  are more 
real than the less d i f fe ren t ia ted .  The state is  not only a 
rational whole, but a lso d ist inguishable from other wholes 
composed of non-rational and inanimate parts within the 
rational ord$rY>f the whole by the fact  that i t s  parts are  
rational and animate. The State is  therefore the highest  
r e a l ' at exists and so is  divine. As the d ia le c t ic a l
process of  history continues, therefore, the syntheses that 
fe l low these, and antitheses become more and more complex and1 
1. Passmore, J. (1957): A Hundred Years o f  Philosophy. 
London, penguin Bocks.
2 Morton white (1955) : The Age of Analysis. Houghton M i f f l in
Company, pp. 13-14.
accordingly come into greater and greater approximation with 
re a l i t y .  F ina l ly ,  absolute r e a l i t y  in the form of a synthesis 
that encapsulates the whole in a l l  i t s  complexity w i l l  emerge, 
which alone we shall  be able  to know without contradiction.
In contrast to A r is to te l ian  log ic ,  which holds that
matter has either an a ttr ibu te  or i t s  opposite,^ given time, 
Hecel 's  "d ia lec t ica l  idealism" be lieves thair there are 
in-becween moments when i t  can be neithe This Hegelian
metaphysics enjoyed the support o f  the to _ious, philosophical  
and evolutionist theories of his days.
whereas, G. E. Moore, one o f  the founders of the so-cal led
Cambridge school, represents a style  of  thought that is
essent ia l ly  d i f fe ren t  from Hece l 's .  in his analysis,  Moore 
wanted to find de f in it ions  of  the form. Where the r ight side  
(the analysans) is  to be synonymous with the l e f t  side (the 
analysandum), tjfcVinSuld at  the same time possess a more
refined gramatico-semantic structure. According to Moore's 
methodical theory, analysis  consists in distinguishing the 
constituent parts of  a complex content o f  thought, for example, 
a concept or proposition, on his view, successful analysis  
demands rigorously concentrated attention on the content, 
carefu l  inspection o f  i t .
Moore was primarily interested in analysing certain  
propositions which he took to be truths o f  'common sense ',
truths that are indubitable and known by every man, along with
analysis of concepts involved in such propositions. To give 
an analysis of a concept, Moore suggests, is to discover 
some concept which is the same as the concept being analysed, 
but wtilcb can be expressed in a different way, "by referring  
to the concepts which were not explicitly mentioned in the 
expressions used to refer to the original concept. An 
example may make this explanation clearer.J Vtal e Sibling is
vO y
a correct analysis of brother; the two concepts mentioned 
in the expression 'male sib ling ' are not mentioned in 'brother' 
As far as Moore is concerned, conceptual analysis should 
always be done in relation to other concepts in order to
clarifBYe trand tRaru9sestell's phiillosscophy, on the other hand, moves 
in scientific atmosphere, philosophy for him is continuous 
with social, psychological, physical and mathematical 
investigation. His views about philosophy should begin with 
an analysis propositions. Russell contends that a ll  
propositions can be reduced to the subject-predicate form, 
that is , their relations are reducible to properties of the 
terni£\between which they held. He defines a proposition 
as an indicative sentence that asserts or denies something, 
in other words, a proposition is a symbol not a fact, there
can be true or false propositions. According to him, 
propositions fa l l  into two classes -  atomic and molecular.
1 0 * .
An atomic proposition asserts that a certain thing 
has a certain quality or that certain things have a certain  
re la t ion ;  i t  can be further said of atomic propositions that, 
they mirror re a l i t y .  For example, this book is  red, this 
is  a cow with a pair  of horns or that 2 + 5 is  the same thing 
as 7. A l l  molecular propositions on the other hand can be 
expressed as truth functions o f  atomic propositions that i s ,  
their truth or f a l s i t y  is  wholly determined by the truth or 
f a l s i t y  of the atomic propositions which make them up; 
fo r  example, ' i f  i t  is  Deoti ' s » .s the red book ' .  The 
atomic propositions that make up this molecular proposition  
are:  'The name written on the book is  Deoti and the colour 
of her book is  r ed ' .
An;alys is ,so  f a r ,  can be said to imply a re-description
in other terms; the re lation of one concept to another or  
simply the use 3  p ropcsit ions.  Hence c r i t ic s  of the method 
suggest that what is  achieved might be no more than a set
of ideo log ica l ly  based prescriptions fo r  the use of
educational terms . However, a general claim made by those 
who apply l in gu is t ic  and conceptual analysis to education 
is  that they are trying to c l a r i f y  and understand what is1 
1. Kirkwood, C. (1973): 'The Concept of  Community'; in 
Adult Education, Vol.51, No.3, p.147.
104
meant in educational d iscurse, by examining the ways in which
words are used, and by charting what is  often referred to as 
a
their • l o g ic ’ . This leads us to an explanation of conceptual 
and l in gu is t ic  analysis.
3.2 What is  Conceptual Analysis ?
Although a number of approaches are covered by this t i t l e ,  
conceptual analysis is  usually  described as a 'second order'  
ac t iv i ty  because i t  i s  concerned with langua^e^ the medium 
through which f i r s t  order statements and questions about
practice and policy are expressed, rattier than f i r s t  order 
statements and questions themselves. Jnstead of considering
what should be taucht, how we should t each or how adult education
should be organised and similar questions, conceptual analysts are 
interested in the meaning and log ica l  force o f  v/ords such as 
' teach ' or what is  entailed when the term 'adult  education' 
i s  used, i t  is  the idea o f  'teaching' and the idea of 'adult  
education' which is the area of concern and a legitimate f ie ld
of  study. But such second order issues are not wholly d ist inct  
from f i r s t  order problems, because i f  we believe as a resu lt  
of analysis that 'teaching ' is  a set of a c t iv i t i e s  o f  a certain  
kind carried out with certain intentions in mind, then what i s  
dene by teachers when they believe themselves to be 'teaching'1 
1. Lawson, K. H. (1982): Analysis and Ideology: Conceptual 
Essays on the Education of Adults . Dept, of
Education, University of Nottingham, p.3 .
105
must be influenced by what that term is taken to mean. 
Sim ilar ly ,  i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to see how we can tackle f i r s t  
order questions about how adult education should be organised,  
except by drawing upon our understanding of what is  meant by 
the term 'adu lt  education'.  Values b u i l t  into that concept 
and revealed by analysis are l ik e ly  to influence and underpin 
judgements about the manner in which adult education should 
be conducted.
In l in gu is t ic  analysis which by de f in it ion  is  concerned 
with words, empirical factors are excluded. At best ,  i t  is  
possib le  to co l lec t  examples in s peed, and writ ing  o f  the ways 
in which words are used. >/e can^^^flect upon usage and chart 
what we think are central and those that are peripheral.
.;e can categorise strong senses and weak senses o f  terms as 
when say, that i t  is  a weak sense of  'education' to claim 
that 'gett ing  drunk was an education', compared with, say,
'attending courses' is  nearer to the central meaning of  
educa tion.
As e a r l i e r  remarked, there are lots  of  approaches to 
concep, r  analysis and the following are a selected few
of  such approaches.
3.2.1 Techniques o f  Ana lys is :
The methods o f  conceptual analysis va r ie s ;  i t  a l l  depends 
on the nature of the question on hand. Some o f  these methods 
are: iso lat ion  of conceptual questions; i t  is  not only
important to iso la te  the questions of  concept from other 
considerations, but to deal with them f i r s t :  because 
considerations of fac t  and morality cannot be re levantly  
applied at a l l  unti l  one has worked out just  what they are 
supposed to be applied to.
Usually philosophical questions do not have any sing le ,  
c lear -cut  solutions part icu la r ly  when i t  comes to questions 
pertaining to moral philosophy. Conditional answers are 
normally given in order to i l lu s t ra t e  the a p p l ic ab i l i ty  of a 
part icu lar  concept to various possible instances.
There are times when philosophical questions are d i f f i c u l t
to explain l in g u i s t i c a l ly ,  one o f  the best ways a philosopher 
can employ to tackle the question is to pick a model case. 
Take for instance, a child who stole  meat from his mother's 
pot o f  soup, was caught and beaten, while this i s  an
i l lu s t ra t ion  of the concept of  punishment, in a contrary 
manner, the concept o f  just ice  can be explained. I f ,  for  
example, twa  ̂Children (two s ib l ings )  sto le  from their mother's 
pot o f  soup, and only one of them is beaten, i t  can be said 
that the one beaten has been unjustly treated. There are
however the borderline cases. Suppose two children had two 
pieces of meat kept somewhere, one c f  them had stolen his 
piece and the other has not, i t  was his legitimate share.
A ra t  comes along and ate up both pieces of  meat. I t  would 
not be r ight  to say that both boys deserve the punishment
1 0 7 .
of being denied their pieces o f  meat, i t  is  only the former 
that deserves such a remark. The point of a l l  these cases 
is  to elucidate the nature of  the concept by continually  
facing ourselves with d i f f e re n t  cases which l i e  on the 
border line of the concept.
But when situations within the immediate environment are 
not su ff ic ient  to draw out our point in analys , imaginary
inventions can be embarked upon. Ordinar'$^Jn<f ecgs are qui 
distinguishable from f ru i t s  l ike  mangoes, apples, oranges 
and so on. However, we want to f in# out the essential  
c r i te r ia  for the concept so we tried to imagine f ru i t s  that 
are plucked from trees round^T)\hape and has yellow yoke 
inside instead of ju ice .  Though we nay not be able to name 
this imagined f r u i t ,  we are contented to know that eggs are 
oval in shape and they contain yellow yoke.
A
Sinnccec- language is not used in a vacuum, care must be
taken when dealing with l in gu is t ic  analysis.  General concepts 
are usually asked in everyday l i f e ,  under the pressure of  
particu circumstances. Hence we need to imagine, in the 
cas !n °5 s t ny statement, who would l ik e ly  make such a statement, 
why he would most natura l ly  make i t  and so forth.
Not a l l  these approaches are equally useful in a l l  cases. 
The nature of the concept to be analysed as well as the 
possib le  consequences of  our analysis w i l l  decide what 
part icu lar  approach or combinations o f  approaches we w i l l  use.
108
3.3 The Datum of ordinary Language:
This brings us to the tradition o f  using ordinary  
language as the datum from which to judge the meaning of  
terms. Following Wittgenstein, i t  has become fashionable  
to claim that the meaning o f  a word is  i t s  use. But words 
are l ike  tools in that they are selected fo r  a part icu lar  
job, and in deciding on the use of a word, we J r t o be 
careful about whether we are begging the >r. by claiming
that i t s  use is  'such and such' and t h a t ^ ^ s h o u ld , therefore,
be taken to mean.......... .. or whether we are looking at the
ways i t  is  actually  used. This is bo d istinguish as Ryle'3' 
did, between 'use ' and 'usage ' ,  but such a d ist inct ion  does 
not help us to decide between ‘correct '  and ' in co rrect '  or 
between 'cen tra l '  and 'peripheral '  usage. A screwdriver has 
a use but i t  can be misused as a ch ise l .  This type of  
situation and some other defects are what the analytic  
c r i t i c s  have against analytic philosophy.
Popper in his cr it ique  of the analytic  methodology 
expressed that the business of both science and philosophy 
i s  the search for truth, not the search fo r  meanings.
Meanings are interesting when they are embedded in correct  
accounts of the world. In replacing the analytic  method 
with his philosophic method, he says:1 
1. Ryle, G. (1953): 'Ordinary Language' in The philosophical  
Review, vol.  LXII; pp.167- 8 6 .
109
One should never quarrel about words, and never 
get involved in questions o f  terminology. One 
should always keep away from discussing concepts, 
v/hat we are re a l ly  interested in , our real problems, 
or in other words, problems of theories, and their  
tru th. 1
Analytic philosophers themselves are conscious of  the 
deficiences in i t s  process and so, when analytic philosophy
of education was to be launched, care was taken to o\v ercome
these deficiences. In education, thus the analytic  method
went through some revolution. Scheff le r  outlined the new
analytic programmes in terms o f :
(a) a greater sophistication a: 'egards language, and
the interpenetration of language and inquiry;
(b) an attempt to follow the modern example of the 
sciences in empirical s p i r i t ,  in r igour,  in attention  
to d e ta i l ,  in respect for a lternatives,  and in 
ob ject iv ity  o f  method; and
(c) the use o f  the^techniques o f  symbolic log ic  
brought to f u l l  development in the previous 
f i f t y  years-.1 2
in sum, tention was to bring to the study of education
a "unic$1̂ o f  s c ie n t i f i c  s p i r i t  and log ica l  method applied
3
towards c la r i f ic a t ion  o f  basic  ideas ."
1. Popper, K. (1972): ob ject ive  Knowledge. Oxford,
Clarendon p re ss ; p.3l6.
2. sche f f le r ,  I .  (1954) : 'Toward an Analytic philosophy o f
Education'; in Sche f f le r ,  I .  (1973) Reason and 
Teaching. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
3 Ib id ,  p.10
*10.
The horizons of analytic  philosophy had been set  by the 
ear ly  Wittgenstein; Philosophy was to leave everything as 
i t  i s ;  i t  was to explain the world rather than to try to 
change i t .  i t  would therefore, have no truck with ideology.
I t s  interest  would be in second order questions; i^. 
concerned with re f le c t iv e  questions about s c ie n t i f i c ,  
re l ig iou s ,  moral and other f i r s t  order a c t iv i t ie s .
This type of programme, according to Raywid's amounts 
to the decontextualising o f  philosophy. v V  thus distinguishes
two problems related to this strategjf» j^cne, in Dewey's 
words is  that:
./hen the context is  sup;
elements become absolute, for  they have no 
l imiting conditions. “Results of inquiry  
valid within spec i f iab le  limits of context are 
ipso facto converted into sv/eeping metaphysical 
doctrine. ^
The other, in Raywid expression is  that 'conceptual analysis
serves up a ind cof atomism . . .  by denying empirical
connection in 'the establishment of a concept."'2
With the recontextualizing of philosophical debate, the
c cn te^ y is  what is  pertinent. For a recontextualised philosophy 
i t  is  within a part icu lar  spatio-temporal, cr h is to r ica l1 
1. DGWSy, J. 'Content and Thought' 3ernstein, R.J. (ed . )  
( I960):  on Experience, nature and Freedom;
New York, L ibera l  Arts Press. p". 56
2 . Raywid, A. 'More Criticism of Analytic philosophy of  
Education' in sernstein, R.J. (I960):  Ib id ,  p.26
situation that we define our concepts and choose the issues
we want to discuss; i t  is  by re fe rr ing  to and being related  
continuously to the context of  their employment that concepts 
avoid atomism or taking on a cruasi-metaphysical status.
in the course o f  this research therefore, we shall  
employ both the tradit ional and the contemporary analytic
methods of research. The reason for this choice i.s that an
exclusive concern v/ith tasks of analysis ttended by
serious dangers, unless we make an investigation of those 
metaphysical, re l ig ious ,  ethical presuppositions which 
underlie the value-judaements that are made in education 
part icu la r ly  adult education N V
'
3.4 A Concept of AduIlt  SEddqu<cation:
The concept o f  adult education is  not separate from the 
concept of education in general. To understand the nature 
and purpose of adult education, i t  is necessary and a 
su f f ic ien t  condition to understand the nature and purpose 
o f  education in general. ,;hat appears to be a t  variance is  
concerned with the normative issues which a r ise  in adult
education.*
The concept o f  'education* is  broad and inclusive as 
v/ell as complex; i t  embraces a large number o f  other concepts
1 Adult education has i t s  own peculiar normative issues 
which d i f fe r s  from those o f  general education, 
please see pp.117 -  120 below.
such as teaching, schooling, instructing, aims and values.  
Especia lly  s ign i f ican t  in such concepts as education is their  
value content -  the values which, whether their presence is  
c lea r ly  acknowledged, tac i t ly  assumed or simply not noticed, 
powerfully influence our outlook and our actions. Education 
is  concerned with the 'worthwhile ',  therefore v/e might look 
at what is identif ied  as worthwhile. in the Cc adul t
education, i t s  worthwhileness revolves round: peculiar
value and purpose. To this end, an attempt w i l l  be made to ■ 
analyse what education means in the context o f  an adult  
sett ing .
In much of American writing ,^S^dul t education' is  used
as to include a l l  education (planned learning) done by adults.
Thus the great survey carried out by the National Opinion
Research Centre in 1963 lumped together in one enormous
*
miscellany such disparate things as l i te racy  c lasses,  
postgraduate courses, driv ing instruction, Bib le  study,1 
technical training, dancing, tuition and University extension 
courses. connotation given to 'adu lt '  here is a purely
chronol 1 one; i t  describes a l l  the education which done
at a part icu lar  time of l i f e .  This presents us with so large  
and various a collection of a c t iv i t ie s  that, there is  not 
much that the educationist can say ibout the whole though 
he may have much to say about any one o f  i t s  parts.
But ’ adult '  has a qual ita t ive  as well  as a quantitative  
adult educatior.
meaning and/can be used in a narrower sense to describe a 
part icu la r  kind of education, not just  education which is  
done at a particu lar  time of l i f e ,  in this sense, to be an 
adult is  to have reached, a certain stage o f  development and 
to have attained social status. The sa l ien t  characterist ics
of  this stage of  development and this social  si are very
simple and very obvious. A
An adult , as well  as being over twenty, i s :
(a) a free  man, no longer under tutelage, able (within 
the law) to do what he l ikes to make his own
judgements and choices;
(b) a mature man with some e.xOperrience o f  l i f e ,  whose 
personality, attitudes and social ro les are becoming 
f ixed ,  though they may not be irrevocably f ixed ;
(c) a f u l l  c it izen (and in many cases, a parent and the 
head of a houssho>] ld) with a l l  the rights and duties
o f  a ci tizen ( and perhaps those o f  a parent and
1
householder).
So, by 'adult  education' as i t  shall  be conceptualized 
in this research is  meant education -  planned processes of  
learning which is  not only undertaken by people over twenty
Wittshire, R. (1966): 'The Nature and Uses of Adult 
Education' in The S p i r i t  and the Form. 
Dept, o f  Adult Education, University of  
Nottingham; p.137 .
114.
determined
is  cu ltu ra l ly  / but which, in i t s  content, organisation and 
conduct is relevant to and to some extent, determine- by 
these characteristics o f  adulthood. Excluded are, casual 
learning that is  incidental to other a c t iv i t ie s ,  recreational  
ac t iv i t ie s  in which there is  no commitment to learn even 
though these may take place in an educational inst itut ion ,  
education done under comoulsion and education that belongs 
to the period of tutelage and preparation for  occupation.
3.4.1 Education for  Individuation:
Ear l ie r  staoes of education are mostly concerned to a 
considerable extent, with two tasjk^^ F i r s t  socia l isation  
and second, preparation for  occupation. ‘.;e a l l  have to learn 
the language, habits,  attitudes and s k i l l s  that w i l l  
enable us to l ive  as an accepted and normal member of  the
society into which we happen to be born; we have to learn to 
be English or YonioV or Igbo, ar.d this task of socia l isation  
takes up a greater part o f  the e a r l i e s t  stages o f  our 
educa tion *  • 1 1  have to learn too, how to earn our l iv ing  
in that society; we have to acquire the knowledge and s k i l l s  
that w i l l  enable us to fearn a l iv in g  by producing goods and 
services that society wants and w i l l  pay for ,  and this 
preparation for work takes up a great part of the la te r  
that i s ,  secondary and te rt ia ry  stages o f  our education.
But adult education comes at a stage of l i f e  v/hen these 
tasks of socia l isat ion  and o f  preparation for occupation are
115
more or less completed; the adult i s ,  as e a r l i e r  sa id ,  a 
mature, responsible and free c it izen .  I f  in this phase
of l i f e  education starts  up again, i t s  tasks w i l l  be a d i f fe ren t
1
one. Accordint to W iltsh ire ,  educational tasks w i l l  not be 
that o f  soc ia l isa t ion ,  nor w i l l  i t  be vocational training  
but rather something which may perhaps be described as 
individuation, which he defines as " s e l f  discovery and se l f
development vo luntar i ly  undertaken". He cl aj that
'indiv iduation '  is  a s ign i f ican t  and dominant aim in adult  
education and i t  determines curriculum^ ^ j a n  is  a tion and
method.
3y choosing to learn something vo luntar i ly ,  the learner  
is demonstrating that for him i t  is worthwhile, and decisions  
are intentional.  There are personal c r i t e r ia  o f  some kind 
relevant to the decisiLoons,.  Each individual is  in e f fec t
wo rk in g ou t his own ^ s ^ t  O f  educational c r i t e r ia  and his own 
concept of  educati©ft$ and we have what might be cal led  an 
ind iv idualis  .ew of education. I t  i s  a view that would
f i t  in with the s p i r i t  o f  adult education, and there is  a 
real sense in which adult education is p lu r a l i s t i c .  The 
values ar.d objectives subscribed to by individuals are more 
l?.kely to be shared with other members o f  a sub-group than 
ind iv idua lly  conceived, because none of us is isolated  
completely from soc ia l ly  constructed value systems but I t
1 .  W i l t s h i r e ,  A. in Rogers, A .  (1976) op, c i t . . p.139
would be lo g ic a l ly  possible for  some unique personal 
col lect ion  o f  values and ideas to be regarded as a 
personalised concept o f  education.
Like education, the word individual also requires  
analysis because our understanding and interpretation o f  
concepts do influence our thinking, our planning and our 
experience of the world around us; i t  is  important therefore  
to attemot some c la r i f ic a t io n  o f  i t s  content.
To be individual f o r  example, someb' whose wavs o f
l i f e  are quite different from others, the way he reasons, or 
would
dresses/distinguish him from the rest of his associates;
or for somebody to be an individual (houn) , is to be separate,
apart from others, in this s€»rt$e, the word can be used of
both animate and inanimate ects -  books, bricks, and
beetles,  as well  as human beings. Each of  these is d is t inct
from every other, physically discrete; i t  occupies an
*
environment which- because spatially unique, is at least
to that extent minimally d i f fe ren t  from the environment
of every object. As applied to human beings, 'individual' 
signifies ^ s^paratedness which is more than merely spatial;  
i t  carries also a sense of psychological separatedness,
of  being a d is t inct  centre of consciousness which includes 
awareness of one's s e l f  and of one 's otherness, a d ist inct  
personality as construed by psychologists is  not possessed 
by objects.
To be an individual is  to be separate, unique and to
possess a potential for response and development; in addition 
is the capacity for choice and self-determination.
117.
A l l  organisms respond to appropriate stimuli;  but only in 
human beings is response a de l iberate  choosing. Not that 
i t  is  always so, for in many situations we respond automatically 
through habit or inst inct ;  but i t  can be, and often i s ,  a 
considered weighing up o f  pros and cons in an attempt to 
sort  out problems and make a choice independently o f  what 
others advise or do. Such choosinc is characterist ic  of
human ind iv idua lity ,  so that the greater 'tihe# tendency to 
think of the person choosing as an in d iv id u a l . - The 
foregoing analysis is  a descr ipt ive  account of the concept, 
i t  is  only p a r t ia l ly  informative and as such not a complete 
practica l  guide. I t  leaves unanswered such questions -  what 
degree of self-determinatiorN*o permit ? Choice o f  what ?
No doubt, these are value questions which lead us from the 
factual to the normative.
3.4.2 A Normative Aspect of Adult Education
Adult education, according to the above proposed 
ra t i o n a l e , ^ ^  the t a c t iv ity  concerned to a ss is t  adults in 
their quest for a sense of control in their own l i v e s ,  
within’ .their interpersonal re lat ionships ,  and with regard to 
the social forms and structures within which they l iv e .  
Assist ing adults to develop a sense o f  autonomous control 
in their l ives  is  not to be equated with an atomistic  
iso la t ion ;  rather, such a sense of control is  realized
1 . Garforth , (1985): Aims, Values and Education.
Hull,  Christygate press.
118.
in the creation and re-negotiation o f  personal re lationships  
and in the sphere of s o c io -p o l i t ic a l  behaviour, as well as 
in the realm of in te l lectua l  exploration, judgement and
discrimina tion. . . .  ..................... \
In adult education, i t  is  proposed that a l l  involved 
a ss is t  each other to identi fy  the external sources and 
internalized assumptions framing their conduct, and to be
ready to assess. Such c r i t i c a l  awarene^^to^ll involve a 
rea l isat ion  o f  the contextual, provisional and re la t ive
nature of supposed "t ru th " ,  public  knowledge and personal 
b e l i e f .  When there is  a sepa between adul ts '
aspirations and the so c ia l ly  transmitted codes, values 
frameworks and b e l i e f  systems which are instrumental to their
behaviours, then, with the aid o f  autonomous re f lect ion ,
received assumptions, that i s ,  assumptions which, a fte r  
careful consideration, are seen to be irre levant  are jettisoned.
Indemic to - ndcnii.eii L of assur i l ions perceived as
irre levant and inauthentic w i l l  be the transformation of  
individual and co l lec t ive  circumstances. Such a transformation 
w itl * i  manifest in the re-negotiation o f  personal re lationships,  
in the attempt to re -c reate  the conditions of work so as to
imbue these with some sense o f  personal s ign if icance, and 
in an engagement in the a lterat ion  of social forms.
Adult educaticn, then, is  concerned with f a c i l i t a t in g  
adult learning of a part icu lar  kind. I t  is  distinguished
119
from adult training, in which a set o f  previously defined 
s k i l l s ,  knowledge and behaviours are transmitted to trainees  
in a manner previously defined by the trainer, in training,
the emphasis is on acquiring and demonstrating the previously  
defined s k i l l s ,  knowledge and behaviours in as correct a
manner as possib le .  For a training course to be rega,arded 
as an example of  adult education, i t  would have to have at  
i ts  curricu lar  and pedagogic heart a w il l ingness to consider
al ternatives,
In adult education, however, the internal change in
consciousness which results  fro^^^frt ic ipat ion  in teaching­
learning transactions has at i t s  heart the fact o f  c r i t i c a l
r e f l e c t iv i t y .  A cent r a l^ ^saatfue  rj e  o f  adult learning explained
by Brookfield is  that the adults concerned come to appreciate
the contextual and contingent nature o f  public and private
knowledge. it e^Ni^alize that the belief systems, value
frameworks aqrfT behavioural prescriptions informing their
conduct are cu ltu ra l ly  constructed, not d iv inely  ordained.
Endemic to this cognitive and a f fect ive  change is the
awareness that the world is not composed of fixed and
unchallengeable givens of  b e l ie f s  and conduct, but that
1
i t  is  malleable and open to continuous re -creation.
Following from this awareness is  the rea l izat ion  that 
individual circumstances can consciously be altered and that 
adults can, in concert v/ith others, engage in a co l lec t ive
1. Brookfield, £• (1SS5) : ’A C r i t ic a l  Definition o f  Adult 
Education', in Adult Education cuarter lv ,
Vcl. 36̂  KQ , 1 ----------------- *■
120
chancinc o f  cultural norms. Developing in adults a sense 
of their personal power and self-worth is  thus seen as a 
fundamental underpinning to this concept of adult education. .
So fa r ,  we have been concerned with the in d iv id u a l i s t ic  
aspects o f  adult education, but i t  should be noted that the 
normal individual i s  not an iso late  and what he does is  in 
most cases influenced by, and influences in turn, his re lations  
witn others. Thus i t  can be said of adult education that i t  
has absolute as well  as instrumental value, that i t  is  good 
in i t s e l f  as well as a means o f  griaaiining other goods.
3.4.3 A Concept o f  Adult Edu on
in the Kiaerian Centm
From the background of a recontextualized view of  
education emerges an important consequence for the way in 
which we come to define the concept i t s e l f .  Thus, within 
this paradigm, fcb^^ippropriate question to ask is  not the 
generic one, is  adult education?', but the contextual­
ised one; ' S ^ t  ought adult education to mean given 
c o n d i t i ^ ^ x  in ether words, given the Nigerian condition 
whatN^cht adult education to mean ?
To give an answer to this type o f  question would involve  
taking a cursory look at the state of a f f a i r s  o f  N igeria  from
her p o l i t i c a l ,  re l ig ious  and h isto r ica l  perspective. The 
type o f  answer would thus be either descriptive or p rescr ipt ive  
in nature, depending on who is  answering the question.
121.
The po l it ic ian  is l ik e ly  to give a prescriptive  meaning of 
adult education i f  he is  trying to include the programme of  
adult education in his campaign manifesto. While an educator
is  l ik e ly  to give the descr iptive  meaning of adult education 
in i t s  truth perspective i f  his ambition is  to modify the 
programme.
The Nigerian National policy on Education states that 
adult and non-formai education consists ^/ func t iona l  
l i te racy ,  remedial, continuing, voca t io r^^^ fe s the t ic ,  
cultural and c iv ic  education for youths and adults outside 
the formal School system.^
The Policy immediately go to state the objectives
of adult education some of  which are:
( i )  "to provide fu n c t io n ^  and remedial education for  
those young people* who prematurely dropped out of  
formal School system;
( i i )  to provide further education for  d i f fe ren t  
c a te co r ie ^ ^ f  -Completers of  the formal education 
system in -o'rder to improve their basic knowledge 
and s k i l l s ;
( i i i )  to give the adult c it izens of the country necessary 
aesthetic,  cultural and c iv ic  education for  public  
enlightenment."
The f i r s t  aim might be interpreted as an ambition to provide 
equality of educational opportunity for every Nigerian, while
1 Federal Republic o f  Nigeria  (1981): National policy on 
Education (Revised). Federal Government Press
122.
that i t  is
i t  could be said o f  the second / an aspiration of providing
what M il l  in his Inaugural lecture named „ an instrument
fo r  d irecting the use of  professional knowledge and for
bringing the l ight  of general culture to illuminate the
technicalit ies of a special pursuit; 1 and the thirda aim 
str ives  at the attainment of a knowledge of public
participation, an ideal knowledge needed in a democratic 
setting. Though these are aims, they could also be 
interpreted as what adult education means i^^fche Nigerian 
context.
But are they really the meaning ofC^dult education 
in the Nigerian context? Is i t  possible to achieve equal 
share of educational opportunity in a country where some 
areas are marked as educationally disadvantaged, and
such areas are given priority over and above the so-called 
’privileged' areas? Is equal educational opportunity 
compatible with this type of reverse discrimination ?
Ideally, adult education should involve no selection, 
no entrance examination and no termination of education at 
any point, ^Sve when the educand wants to take a rest or 
wants no jnore. The participation of a l l  citizens in 
democratic decision making transcends the dictation of 
content of education from above, i t  requires a type of 
free and unhindered ordering of knowledge. I t  is the 1
1. Garforth, F.W. (1971): John Stuart M i l l  on Education.
Columbia, Teachers College press.
123
dictates o f  society that should form the basis o f  the type 
of knowledge needed in an adult educational sett ing .
Whereas the meaning of adult education in Nigeria  now 
is  s t i l l  loose and vague, for the aims as stated are not 
directed to the d ictates of our Society as at present, 
transitional preparation preoccupies the minds of  th^ETled  
and the ruling c lasses ,  the rural and the urban c it izens .
The ambition is  now to move from this poverty obsession
situation to a situation o f  positive value. '^Jfeoccu pat ion 
to ‘build a nation where peace and justice, snail re ign* ,  
in the words of  the Nigerian Nation< 7 * : hem.
The foregoing is  an expositi  what philosophical
method is  a l l  about. In the course of this research, we 
shall  make use of  this method by f i r s t  of a l l  picking out 
major concepts, and then analysing them in order to understand 
the principles by w h i^ ^ th e i r  uses are determined.
Thereafter, some crucial themes w i l l  be subjected to c r i t i c a l  
analysis so as to Eliminate psuedo-problems that are l ik e ly  
to ar ise  a.t the practice and implementation stages.
F ina l ly■,, we wii]l l  take a synthesis of  a l l  the posit ive  ideas
v T
highlighted in the process of  our c r i t i c a l  analysis of concepts
and issues of the topic and draw them together.
CHAPTER
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION; ANALYSIS OF 
CONCEPTS OF UTILITARIANISM
In troduction:
In this chapter, we shall concentrate on the analysis  
of  the concepts of u t i l i tar ian ism . This w i l l  be done 
in re lation to other key concepts with a view to 
establishing conditions for i t s  rea l izat ion ,  standards 
to be used in i t s  evaluation and i t s  re la t ive  value. V/e 
shall  then examine these in re la t  ideal characterist ics
o f  the adult -  the springboard from which adult educations 
aims a r ise .  This exploretiorfc^ill a s s i s t  us in our 
evolving a reconstructed^J^^ory of happiness in Chapter Five.
4.1 What is  JHappiness?----The word JhFâapJspir̂ni ess is  basic to ut i l i tar ian ism  hence i t  is necessary to review the various claims ascribed to 
statements5 about what happiness i s .  I t  is  doubtful whether 
we can su f f ic ien t ly  put into words the fee l ings  that we 
experience when we feel happy, and, by the same token, 
i t  is  unlikely that we shall  ever know whether the 
experiences of  two people who are happy are similar or  
id en t ica l ,  and i f  so, in what respect? For example, one 
man may find happiness in so l i ta ry  pursuits and private
125
pleasures, while fo r  another, a l l  cannot be well  i f  he is  
f a r  from noisy company -  'the madding crowd*, or confined 
to his cwn resources. Again, some see happiness to l i e  in 
material success of a very obvious kind , while for others,  
i t  l i e s  rather in contentment with the bare necessit ies of
l i f e  or even in ascetic  withdrawal from the world.
According to Erich Fromm, a very common view of  
haopiness nowadays is that i t  consists in 'the pleasure of
i
unrestricted consumption, push-button power and laz iness '  
V/hile Grice holds that for  a large number of  people the
recipe is  "marry a Dretty g i r l  who can cook; have some
children, hold a job -  i t  is  ./tot c r i t i c a l l y  important what
job -  as we ll  as the next man; earn as much as I can;
own my own house and car; encage in recreations and
entertainments to taste; love my neighbour with some
fraction  of my ernthusiasm for myself." 2
1. Fromm, E. (1956): The Sane Society. Routledge & Kegan
P au l , p .201 .
2. Grice, G. R. (1967): The Grounds of Moral Judgement.
C .U .P . ,  p.165. ‘
126
Whereas, Greenberg proposes that happiness is  an on-going  
se r ie s  of instantaneous fee lings which exist only in the 
present and ident i f ie s  the source of the fee lings involved 
with "a reaction of physical stimulus (which) creates a 
force which joins other forces impinging on a person”.
But Smart and williams wrote that ”Happy is a word which is  
mainly descriptive (t ied  to the concepts of cc ntentmen t and 
enjoyment) but which is  a lso  partly e v a lu a t iv e ^  I t  is  
because M il l  approves of the "higher” pleasures . . .  then he 
aoproves of the more simple and brutish pleasures, that apart  
from consequences and side e f fec ts ,  he can pronounce the man 
who enjoys the pleasures of philosophical discourse as 'more 
happy' than the man who gets pleasure from push pin or
beer drinking". '
Happiness, however, i s  s£omething more than contentment.
M i l l  recocnised this*^i^ien he wanted to c a l l  less worthy form 
o f  happiness mere abb tentment. He wrote: "By happiness is  
intended plea: and the absence of pain; by unhappiness,
pain and deprivation of pleasure". 3
Greenberg, A. (1965): "Communication on the Concept of 
ippiness". Philosophical and phenomenological 
(esearch, v o l . l b , p . 1 ^6 .
Smart and Williams (1973): "Uti l itarian ism -  For and
Against". in J.J.C. Smart, An outline of a System 
of U t i l i t a r ia n  Ethics. Cambridge, p .22
M i l l ,  J.S. (1957): ut i l i tar ian ism  ( f i r s t  published in 
1S61) U .S .A . ,  The Liberal Arts Press, p.10 .
127.
There i s  an assertion that no concept has been discussed 
more frequently in connection with e f fo r t s  to understand 
human happiness than the concept of pleasure. Along with 
enjoyment and sa t is fac t ion ,  pleasure has often been either  
identi f ied  with or made to serve as a crucial ingredient  
of happiness in most u t i l i t a r i a n  and empiricist oriented 
accounts of the nature o f  happiness.
I t  w i l l  also be noted that there is  a strong association  
o f  pleasure and happiness which ranges across the spectrum 
of philosophical treatment o f  happiness. Does happiness 
then consist of pleasure ?
But the happy l i f e  is  said to be the completely 
sat is fy ing  l i f e .  And this again suggests that happiness 
is  more nearly to be ident i f ied  with sat is fact ion  than with 
pleasure. The d if fe rence  then between pleasure on the one 
hand, and satis faction  and happiness on the other, may be 
explained by the fo l lowing example.
A man may enjoy his work but yet not be happy in his 
work or ,  find sat is fact ion  in i t .  The man may be a
professional fisherman; he may enjoy catching f ishes ,  take 
de l igh t  in the var iety  o f  species, shape and sizes and make 
good sa le ,  but he may fee l  that a fte r  a l l ,  catching fishes is
not a sa t is fy ing  way to spend one's l i f e ;  fo r ,  a f te r  a l l ,
though
i t  i s  only a menial/skilled job. Anybody could be a
128
fisherman; he would have preferred to be doing something e lse  !
Now to say that f ishing is  only a menial job is  to assign
i t  a certain place among human a c t iv i t i e s ,  to show what
kind of  value i t  has fo r  him as a human act iv ity .  That i s ,
i t  is  to pass a value judgement. Thus, while i t  is  true
that a man w i l l  not find an ac t iv i ty  satis fy ing  unless he
can, in general, take pleasure in the ac t iv i ty ,  sat is fact ion
requires, in addition to pleasure, that a man should believe
the act iv ity  to be in some way valuable o^worth his while.
The right aptitude for a job is  another condition necessary
i f  a man is to find an ac t iv ity  sa t is fy ing .  Thus, the above
given conditions explain why men d i f  fe r  in the a c t iv i t ie s
which they find sa t is fy ing ,  aNa why satis faction  is  d i f fe ren t
from pleasure. * ■ O '  *
There is  no consensus as to what pleasure i s .  To some,
i t  is  some kind of sensation and fee l ing  while others object
to this view. Ryle 's  view is  that pleasure is a part icu lar
form of  hee^^iO' or attending to the ac t iv ity  enjoyed.
Perry 's  defin ition of enjoyment tends to support this view;
fo r  "enjoyment is a non-evaluative, non-conative pre-att itude
towarfcKsone actual object fo r  what i t  i s  in i t s e l f ,  which
object is  a present doing, undergoing, or experiencing on
o
the part of  the subject".1 
1. Ryle, G. . (1967): 'The Concept o f  P leasure '.
The Hacue quoted in D.W. Erook (1973): 'Recent Work in 
Uti l ita r ian ism ".  American Philosophical Quarterly, 
ycl.10, .\'o.4, October, o.241.
Pcrr , .... -j' in j. ;. Brock (1973) Ibid.
129
A r i s to t le 's  proposition is  that:
Pleasure is  an experience o f  the soul 
(conscious s e l f )  and each individual finds  
pleasure in that o f  which he is  said to be 
fond; e .g .  a horse gives pleasure to one 
who is fond o f  horses
Pleasure from these points of  view has some value implications
and i t  is  a cognitive based ac t iv i ty .
However. R.P. Sylvester takes pleasures t»o be a kind o f
and
sensation and fe e l in g ,/  he argues that i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to
see how any judgement over f e l t  pleasures can be made.
Feelings, according to him, are whatever they are. They are
f e l t ,  he renarked. They come upon us and vanish. The
ephemeral and perishing nature of  a pleasant sensation is
perhaps i t s  most prominent feature. Pleasures, as they
occur, have no content. They have no additional meaning.
and
Content and meaning come abouty(are recognised when the 
fe e l in g s ,  whatever they are,  are spoken about; that i s  to 
say, when they are categorised. One may experience a surge 
o f  pleasure upon hearing the voice of  one 's favourite musician 
t there i s  no assurance that the ne::t time
one hears the piece, one w i l l  be fee l ing  the same again.
There is  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  boredom, of wrong environment or
lack o f  attention. Also, one may have a shock of  pleasure  
upon seeing a longed fo r  son, walk into the room.21 
1. J.A.K. Thomson (1983 ) (t ran s l . )  The Ethics o f  A r is to t le :
The Nlcomachnean Ethics. England, penguin Books.
2. R.P. Sylvester (1958) "Pleasure: Higher and Lower".
Ethics. Vol. LXVII, Mo.4, July. pp.129-137
130
But another time, one may fee l  the pain o f  anxiety. Pleasure  
viewed this way can be given to people. Clark, fo r  example, 
says that pleasure can be given in various ways; by sending 
flowers or sweats, sa t is fy in g  whims and fancies , paying 
compliments, and arranging treats .  She denied,however, that 
such things give automatic pleasure. A bunch of^jred hoses
< f
may revive b i t t e r  memories and a v i s i t  to the theatr e may be
spoiled by a bad play but then, these are the ways in which
attempts to give pleasure are made and which are more often
1
than not successful.
There are,however, objections to UOttiilliit a r ian ism ,  and a 
common one is  that o f  maximising the total or the average 
net happiness while f a i l i n g  to take enough account of  the
separateness of persons . 2 A similar objection is  that of
John Rawls 3 who claims that the u t i l i t a r i.a n  approach extends
to society as a whole the princip le  of rational prudence for
one person. This approach can be described to be that of  an
impartial sympathetic spectator who imaginatively id en t i f ie s
with each and every member of Society, thus con fl ic t ing  a l l
their desires with one experience, which in turn makes i t
possib le  to treat the internal ordering o f  the community as
though i t  were much the same problem as that of maximising1 
1. Clark, P.M. (1954): 'Some D i f f i c u l t i e s  in U t i l i ta r ian ism '
Philosophy; Vol.29
2. Hart, H.L.A. (1938): 'Between U t i l i t y  and R ights ' ,  in
Essays in jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford, 
Oxford univers ity  Fress, pp. l9'8-22^.
3. Rawls, J. (1971); ,\ Theory of j u st ice .  Cambridge; Mass.,
•arvard un ivers ity  press.
131
an ind iv idua l ’ s desired sat is fact ion .  Thus, i t  allows  
a society to balance the satis faction  and d is sa t is fac t ions ,  
the gains and losses o f  d i f fe ren t  individuals as i f  they 
together formed one individual seeking the greatest
balance o f  sa t is fac t ion .
The problem is  that a society i s  not l ik e  a person. 
Adopting this approach amounts to treating the d i f fe re n t
ident it ies  o f  persons as i f  they were o f  no more importance, 
fo r  the ordering o f  Society, than the d i f fe ren t  stages of  
an ind iv idua l 's  l i f e  are fo r  i t s  prudent ordering. But 
a Society i s  composed of  d is t inc t  persons, each with a l i f e  
to lead, a point o f  view, and $ 6  on. As d is t inc t  systems 
of ends, persons cannot simply be cashed out as ju st  so 
many containers fo r  valuable experiences, since the 
boundaries between individuals are o f  more than merely 
derivat ive  importance and indeed define the very object o f  
moral concern.
The purpose o f  this simple analysis is  to explain what
or psychological
is  meant by happiness in the emotional^sense. This type of  
happiness needs no evaluation, for  Mil l  himself
regards emotion or sensation as lower happiness. The higher  
•happiness' has to do with cognition and as such is  to be
preferred ,
132.
4.2 What Is meant by u t i l i t y 1 ?
The view underlying traditional Uti l itar ian ism  was that
the only things good in themselves, in t r in s ic a l ly  good, good
per s e , are certain experienced goods, a certain state of
consciousness. These were frequently summed up as pleasure
or happiness, by which was usually  a lso  intended the absence
of i t s  contrary state o f  consciousness, usually referred to
as pain. The concept o f  experienced good might be extended
beyond pleasure to include such things as knowledge.
Bentham, fo r  example, says that the word ' u t i l i t y '  means
"that property in an object where i t  tends to produce bene f it ,
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness." And, l e s t  i t  seems
that he has more than one standard afoot,  he immediately
reduces a l l  the others to pleasure by saying that a l l  of them
1
"come to the same thing". In another place, he a lso mentions 
' secur ity '  in a content which seems to say that happiness 
equals pleasure plus security. And, on the negative side,  
he adds that i t  includes whatever tends to avert or diminish 
m isch i^^^pain , e v i l ,  or unhappiness.
1. Bentham, J. The principles  o f  Morals and Leg is la t ion ; 
Chapter 1, i i i .
2 Ibid. Chapter I I I ,  i .
133
Likewise, M i l l ,  objecting to c r i t i c s  who opposed u t i l i t y  
to pleasure, says that fa r  from being opposed, they are the 
same. He then goes on to subsume beauty, amusement, the
agreeable and the ornamental under pleasure as species of i t . 1
To tolerate the odour or sight o f  the droppings from 
l ivestocks for example, because of their u t i l i t y  as cheap
f e r t i l i z e r s  would be mistaken i f  applied to the word as i t  
occurs in the ethical doctrine o f  U t i l i ta r ian ism , for  this is  
neither beautiful nor is  i t  amusing, on this theory, whatever 
(as ide  from pleasure i t s e l f )  is  good is  so either because 
i t  is  d irec t ly  pleasurable or because u t  is  a means to 
something e lse  which i s .  Consequently, whatever is ind irect ly  
good is  not something which can be properly contrasted with 
u t i l i t y ,  for that concep r r  intended to be taken broadly 
enough to include them a l l .  Whatever is  good instrumentally, 
be i t  object,  action, in st i tu t ion ,  custom, or law, is  so because 
o f  i t s  tendency to increase pleasure (experienced goodness) 
and/or decrease pain -  and this is  exactly what is meant by 
c a l l in g  i t  u t i l i t a r i a n  and saying that i t  promotes u t i l i t y .
4.2 Wh^yis Uti l i ta r ian ism  ?
The preceding discussion on the meaning of the word 
• u t i l i t y '  no doubt provides a basis for  the task ahead.
1 . p iest ,  0. (ed . )  (1957): u t i l i ta r ian ism :  John Stuart M i l l ;
U .S .A . ,  The Liberal  Arts Press Inc . ,  p.3
134
Bentham explains:
By the pr incip le  of u t i l i t y  is meant that 
princip le  which approves or disapproves o f  every 
action whatever, according to the tendency which 
i t  appears to have to augment or diminish the
1
happiness o f  the party whose in terest  is  in question".  
M il l  c a l l s  ut i l i tar ian ism  by the name 'the greatest happiness 
p r in c ip le '  and says i t  is  the creed "that a c t i o n s ^ ^ ^  right  
in proportion as they tend to promote happine^T^ Wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness
is  intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness,
pain and the privation o f  pleasure. 2
in a more modern version, Pickard-Cambridge states:
The r ight  act is  that ac tv^ ich  on the most 
careful possib le  review c f  a l l  relevant factors  
may most reasonably be expected to bring the 
greatest good about.
The doctrine can thus be summed ur> very simply: Maximise
haociness.
A few points need to be made in the c la r i f i c a t io n  o f  this  
concept. ^ i r s t  is  that the doctrine intended is  d e f in i te ly
not a ssee lf ish  one. Happiness is  happiness, and since i t  is  a
good per s e , i t  is  just  as good in one place as in another.1 
1. 3entham, J. o£. c i t . , Chapter I ,  i i .
2. P iest ,  C. (ed . )  (1957) oo. c i t . page 10
3. Fickard-Cambridge, .-/.A. (1932) 'Two problems about Duty'
in MIND Vol. 41, p .340 .
135.
So, as the u t i l i t a r ian s  e x p l ic i t ly  in s is t ,  the happiness to 
be maximised is  that o f  the human community taken as a whole -  
sometimes even a l l  ’Sentient creat ion ’ . U t i l itar ian ism  
j u s t i f i e s  and praises s e l f - s a c r i f i c e  but only on the condition 
that i t  is  for the sake o f  someone e l s e ’ s greater hap> pp iinneess.
So happiness -  unhappiness (or as is  usually  put, 
pleasure-pain) is  viewed as a continuum, usually  l in ea r ,  
centering around some neutral point. Here, then, a r ises  the 
hedonic calculus. The doctrine when elucidated is  not merely 
the injunction to produce as much happiness as possible  but 
ratnet to produce the greatest balance of happiness over 
unhappiness -  that i s ,  pleasure over pain. Just as a state of
more happiness (pleasure) i s prefersable to one o f  le s s ,  so is
a state of less unhappiness (pain) preferable  to one c f  more, 
and so also is  the neutral state better  than e ither o f  the 
l a t t e r  two and worse than e ither o f  the former a lternatives.  
Further, since i t  total o f  various quantities which one
is  to consider, ^ ig iv en  quantity o f  unhappiness (pain) may be 
morally neutra l ; 'or overcome by an equal or greater quantity 
of happin esO  pleasure).  So, to determine the re la t ive  
d e s i r a b i l i t y  of any given state o f  a f f a i r s ,  add up the various 
quantities of unhappiness (Pain) present throughout the 
community, and subtract this total from the corresponding total1 
1. P iest ,  0. (ed . )  (1957); oo. ci t . , p.21
o f  happiness (p leasure ) ;  the higher the net re su lt  l i e s  on the 
happiness -  unhappiness continuum the better .  Having thus 
c la r i f i e d  the concept further,  we can now elaborate the 
doctr ine ’s statement as maximising the balance o f  happiness 
over unhappiness.
4.3 Negative u t i l i t a r ian ism :
Negative U t i l i ta r ian ism ,  which may never heave actual ly
been defended by anyone, is the doctrine tnab^lane's duty is  
to minimize unhappiness on the whole. The s ign i f ican t  
dif ference between this doctrine and the theory as i t  has been 
stated above is  that there is  no reference here to increasing  
happiness. Increasing happiness may well be recognised as good 
but i t  is  not a duty. Happiness, as a posit ive  quantity, does
not enter into one's calculations;  there is  no balancing of
happiness with unhappiness, no concern with the net resu lt .
This theory hinvnbwever. one cor.seruence which alone is
* a
su f f ic ien t  immediately to render i t  untenable. since any 
conceivable animal l i f e  w i l l  include some su f fe r ing ,  and since 
this theory holds that the so le  aim of morals is  to r id  the 
world of su f fe r in g ,  i t  would follow that one should, i f  he 
could d o ^ o  instantly and pain less ly ,  destroy a l l  sentient  
creation. V/ith the extirpation of beings which can su f fe r ,  
su ffer ina  i t s e l f  would also vanish. Sven i f  i t  could not be1 
1. Smart, R.N. (1958): "Negative U t i l i ta r ian ism " ,  Hind, 
Vol.67, p.542.
137
done quite pa in less ly ,  i t  is  at leas t  quite p laus ib le  that
the cumulative total o f  the minor pains and unhappiness of  a
l i f e  time would probably be greater than that o f  a quick
though violent death, so, on this view, murder, mass murder -
a l l  would be a moral duty and a benefit  to the 'v ic t im s ’ .
as
But surely no moral theory i s  v iab le  which has^a consequence
the elimination of the moral community.
In an attempt to m o l l i fy  this consequence^A^C:  tto,n has 
argued that eliminating su ffer ing  is  not J^eNsame as reducing 
i t  or as arriv ing at the least  amount o f  avoidable suffer ing  
f c r  a l l .  His version is  however misleading because i t  
lacks qua l i f icat ion .  The least  amount of su f fe r ing  is
zero, and to reduce su f fe r ing  s leas t  amount is to
eliminate i t .  Cbvicuslv, what he seems to have in mind thouch 
not articulated, is  some  ̂qua l i f icat ion  o f  some form such as
'the least  amount consistent with ........ ' But what might
this^with* . b& Could i t  be 'Human l i f e ? '  or 'human 
l i f e  of some part icu lar  sort ?' The f i r s t  is  c lea r ly  
inadequate. s doubtfu l . that the second could be stated
in a way avoids a reference to happiness as a positive
quan ti d is  at the same time both c lear and p laus ib le ,  
nor does any other p laus ib le  a lternative  suggest i t s e l f .
1. Acton, H.B. (1963) : 'Negative Util itarianism . ' ,
Proceedings, The Ar istote lian  Society, SuoDlementary
s o l . 37, p -------  ------------------------------
128
4.4 Uti l i ta r ian ism , Motivation and Moral ;;orth:
1
Brandt points out that U t i l i ta r ian ism  is  indefensible  
as a theory o f  moral blameworthiness, fo r  this depends not 
merely upon consequences produced but rather upon other 
factors such as whether the agent sincerely believed he was 
doing his duty, the degree c f  temptation, whether his act was 
impulsive, compulsive, provoked, or not. I t  certa in ly
is  true that producing consequences is  not the whoi!le o f  ethics.
Consider, fo r  example, these a lternative  actions: On the one 
hand, a man does something to help his fr iend; on the other,  
the friends acts on his own beha lf ,  .producing the sane 
consequences. The former, an a l t r u i s t i c  act, would seem to 
have a moral v/orth which the la t te r  lacks. 3 rov/n considers
this to be a fata l  objection to U t i l i ta r ian ism , arcruing that 
on this theory i t  would
make no dif ference to our judgement o f  the moral 
value of an acfcv.. . whether the agent acted 
ra t iona l ly  or i r r a t io n a l ly ,  with good intentions  
or bad ones, while he was we ll  and conscious
2
or i l l  and unaware of what he was doing.
Now, Uti l itarian ism  may perhaps be intended as (as 
including) a theory o f  moral value. I t  may be intended to
imply the claim that the moral worth is  the act ion 's  instrumental
1. Brandt, R.3. (1963): "Toward a Credible Form of U t i l i t a r i a n i s "
in Morality and the Lancuace o f  Conduct; ed. 
Casteneda and Nak'nnilcan, ;iayne State University Press;
p. 109
2. Brown, 3.M. Jr. (1952): "Duty and the production of Good".
Philosophical Review, Vol.61, p.299
1 3 9
value. I f  so, then Brown's critic isms would be fata l  to i t .
However, Uti l itar ian ism  need not be intended as a complete 
moral theory. In part icu lar ,  i t  need not be intended to imply
a theory of moral worth. Remember M i l l ' s  comment in this
context, "the motive has nothing to do with the morality o f
„ i
the action, though much with the worth o f  the agent."
In such hands as M i l l ' s ,  the theory is  intended only as a 
theory o f  rightness and duty and as such i^V^bt concerned with 
the in t r in s ic  value o f  actions. Hence,^for such theories,  
Brown's criticism f a i l s .  The moral value of an act may well
depend upon something other than consequences while yet its  
being a duty or not depends u that alone. So, Uti l itar ian ism  
i s  not necessarily committed to denying the d ist inction  
frequently made betv/een a r igh t  and a good act. Uor is  i t  
committed to denying/that a good act has a moral worth as 
something d is t inct  from the consequences o f  the particu lar  act.
There are at lea s t  two possib le  explanations of  in t r in s ic  
moral value which are consistent with a U t i l i t a r ia n  theory of  
du ty. r s t  is that an action has in t r in s ic  value by
v irtue  o f  i t s  being a kind o f  action which usually  produces 
good resu lts .  In this case, the value o f  the action is  not 
completely independent o f  re su lts ,  but i t  is  independent of  
the results  o f  the part icu lar  action which i s  enough.1 
1. M i l l ,  o p . c it .  T ch. i i ,  p.24 footnote.
140
The second would say that a good action shines in the re f lec ted  
g lo ry  o f  a morally good motive and de r ives  i t s  non-instrumental 
worth therefrom.
The f a i l u r e  to d is t ingu ish  these two d i f f e r e n t  i ssues ,  
duty and moral worth, mars many c r i t iq u e s  of  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,  
as can be seen in the fo l low ing  two examples. Consider f i r s t
th is  exchange between Kaplan and Smart. Kaplan i ob jects  to 
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m ;  that, i t  i s  a tool b e t t e r  suited to
ph i lo soph ica l  or p o l i t i c a l  speculation than to indliivvii<d ual  
p ra c t ic a l  l i f e  on the ground that even i f  ca lculattiioonn:s would
show that one should fo l low  ce ru les  (keep one 's  promises,
t e l l  the truth , even then i t  seems that i t  would be morally
p r e f e r a b le  f o r  the a c t i o q ^ o  be done with spontaneity, morally  
p re f e r a b le  that the action flow from some A r i s t o t e l i a n  ' f i rm  
charac te r '  rather than out of  any so r t  of  ca lcu la t ions  about 
t o ta l  happiness r S '
Smart 's  rep ly  to Kaplan i s  concerned s o le ly  by showing
that spontaneity has a p lace a lso  in the U t i l i t a r i a n ' s  
2
l i f e .  The reasons which Smart c i te s  in support o f  his  
contention that the U t i l i t a r i a n s  need not c a lcu la te  every 
time are ,  f i r s t ,  that there i s  no need to do so s ince moral 
r u le s  serve as empirical genera l iza t ions  t e l l i n g  us what i t  i s  1
1. Kaplan, M.A. (1959-60): "Some Problems of the Extreme
Position".  Ethics, Vol.70, p.228.
2. Smart, J.J.C. (1960-61): "Extreme U t i l i ta r ian ism :  A Reply
to M. A. Kaplan". Ethics, Vol.71, p.133
141
usual ly  r ight  to do, and, secondly, that i t  would be inut i le
to do so since the advantages of calculation would frequently  
the
ou tweigh disadvantages. But Smart's reply seems to be the 
worst possib le .  He has saved a place fo r  spontaneity a l l  
r ight ,  but in doing so, he has missed the point o f  Ka■ plan' s 
objection and has stated Uti l itarianism  in precise ly  that form 
:c which this objection is  most applicable . Ka Sff has insisted
(correct ly )  that spontaneity in certain acts a moral beauty
which is  independent o f  the results of  tha*. p a r t icu la r  act, and 
Smart's reoly leaves him stuck with the contention that even 
this spontaneity is o f  value only in so f a r  i t  increases the 
total happiness produced. However, both Kaplan's objection and
Smart's reply appear to overlap dist inction  unde, discussion
here. Even though Smart's reply amounts to l i t t l e  more than a 
misunderstanding, Kaplan's objection could be turned by pointing 
cut that although nuitch can be said about the motivation of the 
act and the character o f  the agent, this is  not the province o f  
U t i l i t a r ian iscC /  ,It i s  quite consistent with U t i l i ta r ian ism  as 
a theory o^^TSthtness and duty that spontaneity in the 
performance of duty has an additional moral worthr
1
As a second instance, consider an example o f  Ewing's.
A ship sinks, and the l i f e  saving f a c i l i t i e s  remaining v/ill 
carry to safety either A or 3 tut not both. Further, i t  is c lear1 
1. Ewing, A.C. (1962): Ethics. London: The English 
Univers it ies  Press L td . , p.45 .
142
that 3 ' s survival rather than A 's  w i l l  be most conducive to 
the future production of human happiness, due, perhaps, to 
some special talent or a b i l i t y  o f  B 's .  (This qua l i f icat ion  needs 
to be introduced e x p l ic i t ly ,  for without i t  a U t i l i t a r ia n  
doctrine would not a r ise  at a l l .  There would be merely an 
instance of s e l f  s ac r i f ice  opposed to an instance o f  sel fishness  
v/hich the U t i l i t a r ia n  is quite as free as anyon >raise and
blame accordingly.) Now the a lternative  acti^Q^considered  
are f i r s t ,  A 's  s a c r i f ic in g  his l i f e  for 3, second, S's
shoving A out of  the l i f e  boat. E w in g c o n t e n t io n  is that 
a U t i l i t a r ia n  has no reason to t re f  < T  to the other since 
the consequence are the same in both cases, whereas in fact,  
the f i r s t  is  noble and the secorb^ base. 3ut l e t  us not be 
swayed by the moral horror >©^^;h is  te r r ib ly  cruel situation.
A choice must be made. rt’ner, i t  is  given that, c le a r ly .
S 's  survival w i l l  yield the most human happiness. On what
other basis  coul■dd JaU ^dfef cciissiion be made ? Simply as humans, they
have equally thej ^jyyL ght to l iv e . Can i t  not be p laus ib ly
arcued that^^l^s trhe one who should survive ?
Now certain ly  the f i r s t  a lternative gives the U t i l i t a r ian  
no d i f f i c u l t y .  In addition to being in accord with duty, A's  
action is  noble and he deserves praise for  his s a c r i f i c e .  Eut 
neither does the second alternative  bring U t i l i ta r ian sn  to 
g r i e f .  B has brought about the situation v/hich should ex ist ,  
and in doing so, has done what he should. The question v/hich
143
remains concerns 3 's  notive in this case. I f  he has saved his  
own l i f e  cut o f  recognition o f  his cfuty to the community (there  
i s  no argument here that this is l ik e ly )  then he is  rather  
to be pitied  fo r  the choice he has had to make and the memory 
he w i l l  doubtless carry with him than be blamed fo r  making i t .  
I f ,  on the other hand, his action was merely s e l f i s h ,  then i t  
is  quite as open to a u t i l i t a r i a n  as to anyone e lse  to ca l l  i t  
what i t  .-/as and tc censure i t  accordingly. Ewing argues:
The very most the U t i l i t a r ian  could .maintain 
with the least  show of p lau s ib i l i t y  would be 
that the action o f  3 was excusable a K n o t  
blameworthy, he could not possibly maintain that 
i t  was pos it ive ly  admirable, yet we should a l l  
admit that the action of A which- had p rac t ica l ly  
the same e f fects  was net just  excusable but 
pos it ive ly  admirable. Uti l itar ian ism  cannot account 
fo r  this d if fe rence.
Indeed i t  cannot, but then li  tl  rn leecd never have been conceived 
as an account o f  moral worth.
in discussing ftt^sNsxample, I  have assumed that B, in 
pushing A out o f  the 'boat, was employing the only method 
ava i lab le  to sav^yhis l i f e .  The moral value question has 
thereby beejNparrowed to that of his motive. The moral value 
of means employed and the p o s s ib i l i t y  of something o f  moral 
value besides happiness in the results  produced are d i f fe ren t  
issues and w i l l  be discussed la te r .
4.5 U ti l i tar ian ism  as a Definition of Ethical Terms:
I t  is  not c lear that any U t i l i t a r ian s  has proposed his 
doctrine as an explanation of the meaning o f  ethical terms.
144.
Perhaps the c learest  case could be made against Bentham, who, 
in a section entitled "Ought, ought not, r ight or wrong,
how to be understood", says:
When thus interpreted, the words ourht, and 
right and wrong, and others o f  that stamp,  ̂
have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none.
Obviously, the pr incip le  o f  u t i l i t y  is  proposed as thAe
standard of r ight  and wrong, in sentham's words, ^ is
that principle  which states the greatesirt S 
happiness of a l l  those whose in terest  i^  in 
question as being the r ight  and proper, and2 
universa l ly  des irab le  end of human action.
However, i t  night be argued that, i f  ' r ight*  means something
l ik e  'conducive to the general happiness',  then the central
p r inc ip le  of Bentham's ethics, that an action is r ight  i f  and
only i f  i t  is conducive to the general happiness, actually
says nothing more than thafjk action is conducive to the
general happiness, which, though doubtless true, is  not very
il luminating, as Sidwlfek so succintly sums i t  up, under a
s l ig h t ly  differecrt interpretation,
the proposition that i t  is  conducive to general 
happins^sji to take general happiness as an end of  
action,, though not exactly a tautology, can hardly g 
serve as the fundamental pr inc ip le  o f  a moral system.
Moore does, in principia  Bthica, define 'r ight*  as
'productive of the greatest good'. However, since he adamantly1 
1. Bentham, oo. c i t .  . Chp. 1, x.
2. I b i d . , chap. 1, n.2 .
3. Sidwick, H. (1962): The Methods of  Ethics. London,
Macmillan & Co-! Ltd. , p.26a .
145
denies that 'good' can be defined in any way at a l l ,  what this  
de f in it ion  amounts to is  but the explication of the (claimed) 
re la t ion  between these two ethical terms. Further, in his 
second book on the subject,  Ethics, he seems to give up
a ltoaether the e a r l i e r  opinion that he could define even
, ........
• r igh t '  and now argues only that the c r ite r ion ,  the treason,
fo r  an ac t 's  being r ight  is  i t s  u t i l i t y ,  and since the cr iter ion
o f  rightness is  a d i f fe re n t  thine from rightness i t s e l f ,
th is  is  a d i f fe ren t  issue.^
Ross argues that most attempted defin it ions of ' r i g h t ' ,
including the U t i l i t a r i a n  one, f a i l  simply because i t  is  plain
on re f lect ion  that " th is  is  not what we mean by r igh t ,  even
i f  i t  be a true statement about what is r i g h t . B r o w n  also,
in a similar vein, agrees tha'k Uti l itarian ism  cannot define  
•good',  because these terms have their d is t inc t  meanings.
He points out that other philosophers deny the synonyms of  
' g ood ' ,  and •'prroductive ■o f  the greatest happiness',  and 
in s i s t s  that for the,  U tii l i t a r ia n s  to assert their synonym is
a rb it ra ry  and doamatic. He argues that i f  the statement
' whatever maximises happiness is  good' were rea l ly  analytic ,
then there w< Id be no disagreement -  just as there is  no
argument about the synonym of 'married' and 'wed'.1 3
1. For a quite complete discussion of Moore's sh i f t  in 
position on this topic see v.D. Ross, The Richt and the 
Good, (Oxford: un iversity  press, 1961)“  ppl 5-11.
2. Ross, I b id . , p .9 .
3. Brown, op. c i t . , p.305 .
146
These considerations would seem fa ta l  to any claim that
U t i l i ta r ian ism  is  a correct account of the meaning of these
eth ica l  terms as they are comrronly employed. I t  does seem
true that this simply is  not what most people mean when they
use these words. However, another p o s s ib i l i t y  remains.
Perhaps Uti l i ta r ian ism  could be interpreted as bein^f >(as 
including) a l in gu is t ic  recommendation to the e f f e c t  that 
• r i g h t ' ,  _be defined in these terms. This proposal would 
seem to come to g r i e f ,  however, over the appropriate version
o f  Moore's open question argument. As Brown argues, continuing
in the above context, assuming this synonym, the U t i l i t a r ia n
can neither explain the questions in which we ask fo r  reasons,
nor can he give us any such reasorfer^
Granted that X is  happiness maximising, the question
'Why is  X r igh t? 'w ou ld  n o l^ ^  a legitimate request for
information but only a display of l in gu is t ic  inadequacy on
the part of the auestionner. And beyond this impossibi lity
o f  i n t e l l i g i b l e  phrasing of such a request l i e s  the further
im possib i l i ty  ô , answering i t .  How could one who adopted
such a def in it ion  then argue in support of his pr incip le  that
a r ight  act is  one which maximises happiness ? What reason
could he give to support this central claim that one shouId
(an ethical term) so act? He could not turn rould again and
c i t e  happiness maximization as support fo r  this principle
fo r  in Brown's words:
147
the reason why anything is  what i t  is  cannot be 
provided in any phrase that i s  precisely synonymous 
with some other word for the thing. I f  'good 
maximizing* means 'd u t i f u l '  then 'good maximizing! 
cannot be the reason why a given act is  d u t i f u l . " 1
To pursue this question much further would open up the 
whole topic of the Natura l is t ic  Fallacy and lead us too far  
a f i e l d .  However, before leaving i t ,  perhaps i t  would be 
worthwhile to mention the replies that have been made by two 
U t i l i t a r i a n s .  M i l l ,  without exp l ic i t ly  ra is  ing t he question 
o f  the meanings of ethical terms, states that the principle  
o f  u t i l i t y  is the ' f i r s t  p r inc ip le '  of morals, and l ike  a l l  
f i r s t  pr incip les ,  a l l  those principles upon which proof is  
ultimately based, i t  is  not susceptible to proof. He went on 
to explain that one cannot s t r ic t ly  prove that the end of 
r i g h t  action, or of commended act iv ity  in general, is  happiness. 
One cannot prove any ultimate end.
An ultimate end^^^ that by reference to which we prove 
the propriety of adopting subordinate ends or part icu lar  rules.
The same k:;ind Of thling is  true in matters of theory. proof
o f  the truth of statements depends upon reference to certain
u 1 timate_ cri t e r i a , which are not themselves capable o f  proof
but are "accented through some other procedure than proof.
M i l l  believes that the ultimate c r i t e r i a ,  in the case of 
theoretical  proof, are truths received from the 
experience of the senses and of fee l ing .  He holds
1. Brown, S.M. Jr. (1952): _op. c i t . , p.301
148.
that the acceptance o f  ultimate c r i t e r ia  for  practical act iv ity  
i s  l ikewise a matter o f  experience, in this case, the 
experience of des ire .
we can prove that hard drinking is  bad, that is ,  
i t  must be avoided, by showing that i t  i s  harmful to health;  
and that exercise is good, by showing that i t  is  conducive to 
health. But we cannot prove that health is  goock W  1 we can 
say is  that human beings desire  to be healthy#’!  The ultimate  
end of  cr iterion  of human action is  what human beings desire ,  
or 'happiness '.  This cannot be proved, but i t  can be explained;  
and the explanation may be ca l led ,  in a wid e sense of the word , 
a 'p roo f '  in that i t  helps us to accept the view proposed. 
M i l l ' s  'p roof '  consists:
(a) in explaining his vie//; and
(b) in trying to mee^objections to i t .
And this is exactly what he has done in chapter iv of
U ti l i ta r ian ism .  He presented considerations which he believe?
are su f f ic ien t  to lead his readers to accept the principle
as the f i r s t  orincii d e  of ethics. 1
Withou t belabouring this point further here, I re fe r  
the reader to the very cogent arguments to be found in 
E.W. Hall ,  "The proof of U t i l i t y  in Bentham and M i l l "  
Ethics, Vol.60 (1949-50), p . l .  See a lso :  R.H. Popkin,
"A note on the Proof" in M i l l ,  Ethics, vol.61 (1950-51), 
p.66 and S. Moser, "Comments on M i l l ' s  Arguments for  
Util itarian ism" Inqu iry , vol.6 (1963) p.308 .
149
A similar move is without question made by Harrod.
HQ would meet the Natu ra l is t ic  Fallacy head on. To the 
objection that i f  'good' is defined as 'happiness maximising' 
then one can give no reason why one should maximise happiness, 
that the statement 'whatever maximises happiness i s  good' 
becomes a tautology, Harrod agrees as true. Indeed, he 
continues, one can give no reason why one should maximise 
happiness. But this is not peculiar,  f o>rr i'tfc ^ifs b. eyond the powe 
of reason to orescribe ends. Reason caniN ^gd ~c‘ -tem*ine means to
ends and the consistency of  d i f fe ren t  ends, but when i t  comes
to choosing ends, this l i e s  altogether beyond the scope and 
capacity of reason. Ultimata ends are a matter of  pure choice; 
there is  no ultimate reason for  doino or praising anything.
To the opposing vie./ he \oyld attach the la be l ,  'The 
Rationa l is t ic  F a l l a c y ' •
Ut i l l tarianijffl\ and Moral Reasoning:
On® objection which has frequently been raised against
U t i l i t a r i a q ^ n r  is  that i t  does not conform with ordinary  
moral reaissoorning. Brown in highlighting this objection
considers a situation in which i t  is  necessary to l i e  to 
save a friend from death comments:
Harrod: "U ti l i tar ian ism  Revised"; Mind, Vcl.45
(193S) , p . 137.
150
We do not calculate consequences . . .
And i f  a man, under such circumstances, 
were to make these calculations, v/e should 
judge him to be immoral. ^
To this objection, Smart remarked that one has only 
to read the newspaper correspondence about capital punishment 
to realize that the ordinary moral reasoning is in part made
up of supersititicus elements, of morally bad elements, and 
of logically confused elements. He v/srned^^^hsl philosophers 
not to yield to the untutored and undisciplined opinion of 
the man in the Street. ’'Surely, i t  is more likely that
ordinary men are confused here . sorphers should be able 
to examine the question more r^agt ionally . ’ 1 2 Herrod, in like  
manner arcued that the nor il. opinions of the ordinary man
contains "many elements^Pf dogmatism, survivals of the
3
past, and! prejudices due to trhie accidents of history", and 
further t:hat most men ’are neiftnh er aware of ncr greatly
concerned over the lack of clarity in their thought on 
such matter k
Alsp, tc the objection that one does not calculate, 
one j V ‘obeys, Kabbot replies that i t  is true that most
people obey rules without ever considering their justification 1
1. Brown, S. M. (1952): op. c i t . , p.3C4
2. Smart, J.J.C. (1955); "Extreme and Restricted
Utilitarianism", philosophical Quarterly , Vol.6 
p.34G '
3. Harrod, R.F. (1936): "U t i l i t a r ian  Revised", hind, Vol.45,
p.137 .
151.
but points out that, s im i la r ly ,  most factual b e l i e f s  are held
1
on no better basis than authority. This certain ly  does not 
mean that authority i s  their  sole ju s t i f i c a t io n .  L i fe  is too 
short to go around ju s t i fy in g  in f u l l  every factual b e l i e f ,  
and the same is  true o f  actions. What is  needed is some 
method of ju s t i f ica t ion  to re ly  on in those situations where 
ju s t i f ica t ion  is needed, as, fo r  example, v/hen ef or
the moralityy o f  an action is  seriously challenged.
I t  is  not that U t i l i ta r ian ism  has be^^^ resen ted by 
i t s  proponents as an account o f  the moi^^Veasoning process 
of  the ordinary man. I t  is  rather those ■who ra ise  this
objection appear to be using 'ordinary moral reasoning' as a
uoon
sort o f  moral tempi a te/which theories must f i t  or f a l l .
::cw, i f  a theory, moral or otherwise, be completely out of
touch with what men be l ie,v .o that i t  never succeeds in 
attract ing adherents, then one would have to admit this as an 
--rcument a rains t i t ,  *ho doubt, but i t  is  a very d i f fe ren t  
thing fron this N^adduce  ordinary moral reasoning as though 
i t  we re a CQUtt of l a s t  resort  from which there is  no appeal,
as thoug divergence o f  a moral theory from ordinary
moral reasoning is eo ioso conclusively fata l  to the theory,
Mabbott, J. D. (1953): 'lioral Rules ' ;  Proceedings o f  the 
Srit ish  Acadeny, Vol.39, p.97. ~
152
I f  ordinary noral reasoning, £a species, one supposes,^
of common sense, were that authoritative,  there would be very
l i t t l e  of  e ither need or place fo r  noral theory.
And in any case, i t  nay not be an objection to
Uti l i ta r ian ism  to point out that people do not ord inari ly  stop
to calculate consequences. This fact  o f  human behaviour
night be explained in a number c f  ways. Hume, for  instance,
1
would explain i t  as habit .  That we act way shows
the influence cf education; v/e have be^n trained not to 
r e f l e c t .  (Hume adds that is prcbat^PWto an advantage.)
But the truth of this or any other psychological theory
claimed as an account o f  thi ement of human behaviour 
is  in any case net gemarl^^ Reg ird less o f  hov/ i t  is  that1 
v/e have come to act in this way, the moral philosopher can
s t i l l  ra ise  some qa’estions such as: I s  actinc this way
'
very iusrriried ? And i f  so, then by what ? i s  i t  morally 
correct to do at a l l  this thing which we do habitually  ?
And i f  i t  I s ,  then by what ? './hat makes i t  so ? Thus, 
mere divergence from ordinary moral reasoning does not flaw  
a theory, and, in part icu lar ,  U t i l i ta r ian ism , v/ith i t s  claim
1. Hume, D. (1777); Encuiries Conc.er.iinc Human Understanding 
and Concerning Tha principles of Morals; Int. by " 
L. A. Selby-3igoe, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Sec. I l l , ‘ pt. ' f i .
153
that consequences are what ju s t i f i e s  an action, is  not 
detected by the fac t  that we do not ord inar i ly  stop to 
calculate them. I t  is  no news to say that the reason why 
one does a given act may be d i f fe ren t  from the reason ’which 
j u s t i f i e s  i t s  being done.-
4.7 Measurement o f  U t i l i t y ;
Whatever content u t i l i t a r ia n s  givea th?e measurement of  u t i l i t y ,  they almost without exception agree that moralityrequires i t s  maximisation. Since v i r tu a l ly  a l l our actions
a f fec t  the u t i l i t y  o f  more than one person, i t  must be 
possib le  to calculate the total net u t i l i t y  to a l l  affected  
that is  produced by each a lternative  action open to us in seme 
situation (or at le a s t  possible  to order the a lternative  actions 
in terms of total net u t i l i t y )  in order to se lect  that action 
that w i l l  maximise u t i l i t y .  There w i l l ,  of course, be 
practica l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in r.ahing such calculations. These,wculd 
generally centexj' arCUr.d the d i f f i c u l ty in  gathering and the 
uncertainty ie necessary information regarding consequences.
Such d i f f i c u l t i e s  a f f e c t  any interesting moral theory, though 
they a re -pa rt icu la r ly  acute for/te leologica l  maximising theory. 
More important and perplexing, however, is  how the necessary 
calculations can, even in pr incip le ,  be made and whether the 
log ica l  foundations necessary to the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  o f  these 
calculations ex ist .
154.
Unfortunately, very l i t t le  attention has been paid to 
these problems by moral philosophers. Most discussions of 
utilitarianism in books and journals of late simply assume 
that i t  is possible to determine in any situation what is 
required by ut i l ity  -  maximisation, and then go on to consider 
whether this always coincides with v/hat is required by 
morality. Precisely, v/hat u t i l ity  measures, turn how
it  can be measured, depends on which notior\^ £he sort 
discussed in Chapter One, the theory is formulated with, as 
well as how that notion is construct
For example, i f  the theory is-:^^ terms of happiness in 
its long term sense, then some measuremancf level of 
happiness and correlation of properties of particular actions 
with their effects on long term happiness w il l  be required.
Cr, i f  the theory is in te rms cf satisfaction of wants,
desires, or preferences, then there must be some means of 
determining and^aggregating such satisfactions.
Furthermore, there is the problem of the possibility  
of actually applying any sort of calculus to such a thing as 
happiness. Utilitarianism requires the balancing, in
calcul afcion, of a greater quantity cf happiness against a
155
lesse r ,  or o f  a quantity of happiness against a quantity of
unhappiness. But is  happiness a sort of  thing capable of
being weighed or measured, or  is  the quantitative idom but 
1
a pretence ? I t  seems doubtful that happiness is  susceptible  
to being checked by weight.
Pickard-Cambridce in his defence counters, that 
Util itar ian ism  is  at le a s t  no worse o f f  in this respect than
a theory which involves choice from amonas^competing
. 2
Prina fac ie  duties.
I t  surely is  no more d i f f i c u l t ,  h"& argues, to compare 
a small happiness widely distributed with a la rger  one more 
narrowly distributed than i t  i ^ i o  weigh the stringency of  
such tota l ly  disparate prime fac ie  obligations as, for  
example, the keeping ofyg^pronise and the reparation o f  an 
injury, This aipppee, ars tco be a part ia l  solution.1 
There i s ,  l e a s t  one point on which Uti l itar ian ism  
must agree; senthan certa in ly ,  and almost as c lea r ly  M il l  
and Moore, conceived happiness as occurring in d iscrete  units  
which could be bunched together and counted. Just as said
1. As is  argued by Duncan-Jones, A. (1957): "Ut i l i tar ian ism  
and Rules". Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.7; p.364
2. Pickard-Csmbridge (1932): on. ci t . , pp. 333-334.
156
Our account o f  this Science w i l l  be adequate 
i f  i t  achieves such c la r i t y  as the subject-matter  
allows; for the sane degree of precision is  not 
to be expected in a l l  discussions . . .  je  must be 
sa t is f ied  with a broad outline o f  the truth . . .  for  
i t  is  a mark o f  the trained mind never to expect 
more precision in the treatment o f  any subject than
the nature of  that subject permits.
I t  should also be added that Uti l itarian ism  does not require  
that every moral question have a single  deternl inafe answer.
As regards the other issue re lat ing  to Quantitative  
judgements, certain ly we can make measurable arb itration  o f  
some kind about happiness. I t  is c lea r ly  more productive 
o f  happiness to feed a man than to^^a^. him. prosperity as 
opposed to depression unquestionably a time of greater  
happiness on the whole.
Attempts have been made so fa r  to find a oroof of 
u t i l i t y ,  for we cannot know the v a l id i ty  of a thing unti l  
i t  has been proved; l ikewise  we have tried to find a means 
o f  measuring u tiiV^arianism as i t  is  believed that w i l l  
provide a Kind o f  _a p r io r i  knowledge. Attempt w i l l  now be 
made to locate such rules that have to be kept in order not to 
v io la te  the u t i l i t a r i a n  doctrine.
4.8 Rule ar.d Act U t i l i t a r ia n ism :
Ut i l i ta r ian ism , as we have i t  so fa r ,  says that what 
one should do in any given case is  that act which w i l l1 
1. Thompson, J.A.K. ( t r a n s l . )  (1975): The Ethics of  
A r is to t le :  The Miconachean Ethics. 
penguin Books; pp. ol-SS.
157
maximise the net balance o f  happiness over unhappiness.
Be that as i t  i s ,  ethics is  an eminently practical d isc ip l ine .  
While engaged in the study of morals, one should note the 
fact  thait i t s  theories must be su itab le  for  practical use 
in real l i f e .  I t  is  on- their  a b i l i t y  to function adequately 
and prop>eerlly in this ro le  that they are f in a l ly  to be jiudgoed,. 
How then, is  a U t i l i t a r ia n  goina to solve a oractical  oroblem ? 
Apparently when faced with a moral choice, he w i l l  be required
to perform calculations to see i f  anly,, amnd.  i f  so, which of  the
alternatives open to him w i l l  produce the most happiness.
Unfortunately, i t  is  not al W l ations that allow for  
calculations to be made. Take an example; When a child
toddles out into the s t ree t  mOor wh en a non-swimmer f a l l s  
overboard something nusJeS|^ done at once. I t  might be replied  
that there is  no need! fo r  calculation in cases l ike  these, 
fo r  the consequences o f  one of the a lternatives i s  manifest,  
and teat one is  a d isa s te r .  But the prevention of this 
d isaster  would not l ik e ly  be the only consequences o f  the act,  
nor woul4. the d isaster  i t s e l f  be the only consequence of
doing s;omee1thing e lse ,  so, a calculation would seem to be 
required, for our theory states that the best consequences 
are what is  required, and how can one be sure without 
calculating that this course of action would be the best  
in the long run, a l l  things considered. A successful moral
158
agent must have some way of carrying with him general 
princip les  to govern his action in such emergency situation.  
Without some provision o f  this sort, Ut i l i ta r ian ism  becomes 
impractical.
Calculations may be uncalled f o r  espec ia l ly  in a 
situation v/here i t  is impossible fo r  one to foresee a l l  
the consecruences o f  one's action. Even in the absence o f  an
< x r
emergency, the actual application of the ita r ian  calculus  
would seem to be impossible, for  how can one total up the 
quantity o f  happiness produced when the consequences of 
one's act stretch possibly into ture, f a r  beyond one's
capacity to determine now what^^ty w i l l  be. I t  would seem 
that even in the more usual ^ijfcuations there would be no
theoretical end to possib le  calculations. So, i t  appears
that Uti l i ta r ian ism  must yield to the exigencies o f  actual
moral l i f e ,  that i t  rifust find a way to make i t s  claim that
consequences ajre^hat ju s t i fy  an action compatible with the
manifest need fo r  the functioning of general principles in
the control o f  conduct, s o e c i f i c a l l y , that i t  must avoid the
necessity fo r  calculations to be made at every step.
Hbwever, i t  se ms that there are situations in which
individual calculations,  even i f  done correctly ,  would yield
non-optimistic i f  not disastrous resu lts .  This is  brought
1
out in an exchange between Kaplan and Smart.
1 . Kaplan, M. A. (1959-60) : "some Problems o f  the Extreme 
U t i l i t a r ian  Position";  Ethics, Vol.70, d.228
1 5 9
Kaplan distinguishes two different kinds of relationships. 
Specific instrumental relationships are those in which the 
people have only one thing in common -  their goal. Direct 
calculation is admitted to be possibly advantageous in such 
cases. As an example, -he suggests sailors and their usually 
correct almanac. I t  is perfeactly a l l  right to recalculate 
at any timejfor here there is a strict achievement criterion, 
reaching port. The other kinid of relationship, a diffuse 
relationship, exists where there is no single common purpose 
or achievement criterion. I t  is sucr^ Cases as these in which 
calculations in individual cases^VA wel 1 be harmful.
Marriage is offered as an example of a relationship. One 
important to humans, which requires diffuse, non-instrumental 
attitudes i f  i t  is to achieve its purpose. The point is not 
that it  v/ould be useless to act contrary to a general rule in 
a particular cas e ^ h  is would s t i l l  be consistent with Act 
Utilitarianism. The point is rather that the calculation 
i t s e l f  would be useless, for i t  would be adverse to the 
narriag tionship which is  much mere important than the
advantages of individual exceptions to the associated rules.
mart, J.J.C. (1960-61): "Extreme U t i l i ta r ian ism :  A Reply 
to M.A. Kaplan", Ethics. V o l .7 l ,  p.133
Kaplan, M.A. (1960-61): "Restricted U t i l i ta r ian ism ".
Ethics, V o l .7 l ,  p.301 (A Rejoinder to Smart's 
r e p ly ) .
1 6 0
So the rules should be followed, at least, Kaplan adds, until 
i t  becomes clear that continuing the marriage is undesirable. 
Likewise, the rules of society often perform the function of 
stabilizing certain relationships and are validated by their
consequences. I f  such rules did not exist, the s ic
instrumental attitude toward individual actions might become 
optimal, but this would be a generally less desirable situation.
As an example of a case where calculations does not 
produce desirable results, he offers bfre case of lawn watering 
in a time of water scarcity. Suppose that during hot weather, 
there is an edict that no water must be used for watering 
gardens, I have a garden and I reason that most people are 
sure to obey the edict, and that as the amount of water that I 
use will be by i t se l f  negligible, no harm will  be done i f  I use 
the water secretly . So , I do use the water, thus producing 
some lovely flowers which give happiness to various Deople.
But by the san ;asonina, so should everyone. Thus the result
of everyone’^Nreasoning correctly on Act Utilitarian grounds is 
the worse possible. Even i f  one unselfishly desires to maximise 
happiness, he should act selfishly in such situations, for the 
private would outweigh the negligible loss to the community.
The consequences of everyone's applying -  correctly -
the Act Utilitarian principle in such situations is no doubt 
undesirable i f  not disastrous. Kaplan concludes that in such
161
cases the rules must be followed and breaches punished, but 
that even then, society w i l l  not be secured unt i l  the rules  
become internalized and individuals no longer des ire  to 
break them even to secure a part icu lar  advantage. To avoid the 
disadvantage of generally lawless behaviour, he concludes, 
i t  i s  des irab le  that some rules must be followed automatically
a l l  'without calculating.
4.9 Freedom and Haopiness:
Happiness, as stated in chapteirt iyv  of-  U t i l i tarianism,
i s  a co l lect ion  of in t r in s ic a l ly  des irab le  goods,
a col lection that could eas i ly  include l ib e r ty  along with a l l  
the other things i t  includes. Thus, some elements of happiness
are ' 'associated with being hum&h"; they are "the permanent
> 1
aspects" or "essentia l  elements of human happiness".
Secondly, there are those elements which are acquired
requis ites  for  on©r3x>wn happiness , such as Virtue, fame,
2
or power, and- the d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  these acquired elements 
i s  controlled by those goods "requ is ite  fo r  the happiness of  
man as a creature of elevated f a c u l t ie s ” . And f in a l ly ,  
happii involves choosing one's plan to achieve "a harmonious
orderj^hg and arrangement of the elements of a personality
f u l l y  developed in i t s  capab i l it ies  and powers". 4
1. Berger, F.R. (1934): Happiness, Justice  and Freedom: The 
!!oral and p o l i t i c a l  philosoo’nv of Joihn Stuart M i l l .
Berkeley, University of Ca l i fo rn ia  Press; pp. 33-40.
2. P iest ,  0. (ed . )  (1957) on. c i t -, , p.6
3. Berger, F.R. (1984) oo.~~cit. , p.41
4 Ib id . p.42
162.-
Therefore, H i l l ’ s conception of happiness i s  part ly  
determinate and p a r t i a l l y  open, and the doctrine of  higher 
pleasures is  fundamental to the account M il l  advances.
3ercer argues that M i l l ' s  theory of value includes 
freedom and security among the essential elements of  fouman 
happiness. F i r s t ,  3erger arcues that M i l l ' s  account of  the 
higher pleasure establishes the paramount value o f  l i b e r ty .  
According to Berger, M il l  argues "that some pleasures are more 
crucial to happiness, and thus more va luab le ."^  M i l l  claims 
that a "love o f  l i b e r ty  and personal independence" is  tied to 
"a sense of  d ignity"^  that explains competent judges'  
preferences; and M il l  a lso claims this sense o f  d ianitv  
is  possessed by a l l  humans. On this bas is ,  then, Berger 
concludes that among the"essent ia ls  of human happiness, are 
the constituents and requirements for  an in d iv idu a l 's  sense 
of being his or her own person, of developing one's l i f e  as 
one chooses -  a ;e o f  freedom, rower, excitement, and so on."'
Secondly, because M il l  says "security is  the most indispen­
sab le  of a l l  necessaries, a fter  physical nutrient"4 , Berger 
concludes that "security (and perhaps the sense of  i t ) " ^ 1 
1. 3 9 rger,  Ib id .  p.38
2. P iest ,  0. (1937) on. c i t . , p.6
3. 3ercer, F.R. (1984) on. c i t . , pp.40-41, 231.
4. P iest ,  0. (1957) op. c i t . , ch.v, p.25
5. Berger, ?.3. (1984) oo. c i t . , p.41.
163
is  also an essential o f  human happiness. This suggestion 
Berger is  making is  that freedom and security , l ike  
physical nutrient are to be understood as essential to 
happiness in that they a reba s ica l ly  necessary conditions 
fo r  experiencing the higher pleasures and human happiness.
In l ike  manner, Gray’ s treatment o f  M il l  considers the 
relationships between happiness and freeWdom. SU'op ti tu ting ' autonomy* for M i l l ' s  term, ' in d iv id u a l i t y ' ,  Gray claimsthat for  Tiil 1, an autonomous agent engag es  " i  n rational" l n
deliberation  on the a lternatives open to him", exercises
unimpaired a l l  the normal capacit ies and pov/ers of  a rational  
chooser," i and "his actions express princip les  and po l ic ies
which he has himself r a t i f i e d  by a process of c r i t i c a l  
re f le c t ion " .  2 Since "auto<nomy could be abridged both by
3
the interference of others" and by intrapersonal f a i l i n g s " , ’' 
freedom is c lose ly  t.ieir to M i l l ' s  conception of autonomy.
I f  higher pleasures are treated not as states of mind, but 
as kinds o f  a c t iv ity  of  forms of  l i f e ,  then they are c losely  
tied to autonomy because mankind's d is t inc t ive ,  elevated 
facu lt ie s  are exercised only in making an autonomous choice.
3u t th e mental pleasures are supremely valuable because
they are conceptually necessary ingredients of  human happiness.1 
1. Gray, J. (1983): M il l  on L iberty :  A Defence. London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul. p. 72
2. Ib id ,  p.5 5
3. Ibid. d .72
164.
Therefore, Liberty is of paramount value because i t  is 
closely tied to autonomy, which it se l f  is valuable because 
of its  close connection with the higher pleasures essential 
to human happiness.
M i l l ’s analysis e r f happiness establishes that the 
mental pleasures are markedly superior to other pleasures.
But feheir pursuit requires certain social conditions: 
liberty and security. Liberty is valuable because i t  is 
necessary for autonomy, and latter is valuable because i t  is  
connected with the higher pleasure^. Understood in terms 
of the re liab i l ity  of established expectations, security too, 
is valuable: i t  is an importar^^Urerequisite for autonomous 
choice, especially choosing one's plan of l i fe .
The above explanation of the connection between
happiness, freedom. liberty and autonomy are fundamental
concepts on which this research work rotates.
The three values among other values in adult education, 
that is ,  freedom, liberty and autonomy deserve special 
emphasis V>d as such, the rest of this Chapter wil l  be 
devo o their concepts and analysis.
4.10 wha Âutonomy I s :
'Autonomy' was o r i g i n a l l y  from a compound Greek work 
(autos-nomos). I t  meant making one 's  own laws and
was used chiefly in a political context to 
describe cities or States which governed themselves,
U b O ,
in contrast to colonies or dependencies governed from 
elsewhere. 3ut the word is  a lso used nowadays in a more 
personal sense to describe people governing themselves' 
as individual human being; holding their own opinions,  
making their own decisions and generally managing their own 
a f f a i r s .  In this sense, being an autonomous person means 
being independent and self-determining, master of one 's fate  
and Captain o f  one's soul. I t s  opposite is being dependent
and passive, a mere puppet controlled by somneone e lse.
This broad, and general meaning encompasses a number 
o f  ambiguities. Personal autonomy may be thought of e ither  
as a right -  in this sense, we speak of being 'granted' i t  
or 'deprived' of i t  by others -  or as an a b i l i t y  to exercise  
that r ight and to manage dne's own a f f a i r s  as when a child  
i s  said to be 'not autonomous. Moreover, that a b i l i t y
may be conceivg^ as an actual competence in s e l f ­
management to Nexercised or enjoyed or as one that is
merely potential or latent  to be enhanced or developed.
The las these senses is  espec ia l ly  common in talk about
education, thouch the others are reoularly employed a lso .
4.10.1 Sdm&yCbjections:
But are any of  these senses rea l ly  meaningful ?
Objections are often leve l led  against the whole idea of  
personal autonomy, suggesting in e f fec t  that i t  i s  an
empty f ic t ion ,  a fanc i fu l  notion which has no application  
in the real world.
These objections can be grouped roughly into three main 
kinds. The f i r s t  derives from the fac t  that every .individual 
depends on society. Socio log ists  and psychologists a like  
have shown that each of us necessari ly  r e l ie s  on our 
association with other people fo r  both our mental and our
physical we ll -be ing.  Prom our relationships with others and
from our rr.enbershio o f  social crouoDiirrH^s,^we derive a v i t a l  
sense of personality and ind iv idu^^ iden t ity ,  as well  as
our language and our fundamental b e l i e f s ,  values and world view, 
Conseouently, the notion that any one of us could 
make a truly independent decision is  an absurdity; in order
to conceive ourselves and our situation we use ideas which 
are generated and defined by others, and in order to act  
e f fec t ive ly  we re ly  on conventions and institutions which
o f  argument derives from psychoanalytic theory. Freud and 
his followers have made us recognise that much o f  our 
conscious behaviour is stamped by dnconscious forces, many 
of  which resu lt  from our very early  experience. Therefore,  
we can never be sure that we are re a l ly  in command of
1. Freud, S. (1914): The Psychopathology of Everyday L i f e ; 
London, Penguin Books.
/
167
ourselves in the way that the idea of  autonomy seems to 
imply.
The third kind of reason fo r  doubting whether we can
ever be truly autonomous derives from philosophical theories
of determinism. These usually  start  from the premise that
*
every event must have a cause. An uncaused event-would 
simply be u n in te l l i g ib le ,  i t  is  thought, fo r  usual ly  we come 
to understand an otherwise mysterious occurr^Nte by finding  
out why i t  haooened. since human actions events, thev
must have causes too; and so in fact we commonly express our 
sense o f  understandinq someone's behaviour; that i s ,
discerning the causes of their f^CndVuct. That is  why when 
we fee l  that we r e a l ly  under someone's behaviour, i t
often seems predictable ,  inevitab le ,  ' ju s t  what we expected'.  
3ut i f  their .icMons can be predicted, they appear not to be 
autonomous, for a person who rea l ly  could not have done 
otherwise cannot ,properly be said to nave chosen f ree ly  
to act in the way he/she did.
A l l  the objections reviewed above imply that no one 
can truly be said to be autonomous (in an absolute sense).
A contrary argument i s  offered by Rare who contends that 
everyone is  autonomous. He draws a d ist inct ion  between 
'a c t ing '  and merely 'behaving ',  bet/een doing things consciously
1 Ragg, N.M. (1977): People not Cases. London, 
Routledge and Kecan Faul , p .56.
168
and de l ibe ra te ly ,  on the one hand, and on the other, not 
re a l ly  'doing' then at a l l  but just moving unthinkingly;  
for example, through inst inct  or automatism. He then points  
out that a l l  action (in his sense) involves conscious decision  
and is  to that extent self-determined, and that therefore  
everyone who is not a mindless automaton is autonomous. 
Clear ly ,  this argument too threatens to deprive the idea of  
autonomy of a l l  p ract ica l  relevance, but once again, the
threat is more apparent than rea l .  For Rate also admits the
everyday practical d if fe rence  between acting on one 's own 
obeying
in i t ia t iv e  and / someone e l s e ’ s commands -  he just  prefers  
to describe i t  as a d if fe rence  in degree o f  " r a t ion a l i ty "
o f t  i
rather than "se lf -determination".  From Rage's argument, 
one can conclude that th<^^aesninc cf autonomy is  vague and 
ambiguous and that many arguments about i t  come close to
being purely verbal disputes.
irrespective  o f  a l l  theoretical objections, autonomy 
remains a r e a l ,  fam il ia r  and important notion. Though simply 
described, i t  is  not always so eas i ly  understood; hence 
there is  need to make i t s  meaning c lear .
Th,ee .Coo rncent o f  Autonomy:
Autonomy has much to do with the exercise o f  choice. 
Cne demonstrates one 's essence as a se l f -d i re c t in g  being by1 
1. Ragg, N. M. (1977): Ib id .
choosing -  not just selecting, (for selection can be done
mindlessly), whereas choice is done deliberately and with
1
due thought. Thus as Dearden observes, personal autonomy is 
manifest and experienced daily in a wide range of mental
activities like "choosing", deciding, deliberating, reflecting,
*
planning and judging".
Secondly, when one chooses deliberately one Is conscious 
that it  is really one who is choosing. One acknowledges one's 
choice as being in character or what some writers call 
•authentic'. It  reveals what Kaufman calls 'core' self,  
that is , "that constellation of relatively deeply rooted, 
important disposition, knowled' which helps us to anticipate
explains (a person's) actions over a relatively extended
stretch of his total behaviour". The autonomous man is the 
one who, in Rouseau's phrase: " is  obedient to a law that he
prescribes to himself", whose l i f e  has a consistency that
derives from a coherent set of beliefs,  values, and principles, 
by which his actions are governed. Moreover, these are not 
supplied to him ready made as are those of the heteronomous 
man: thê X are his, because the outcome of a
still-continuing process of criticism 1
1. Dearden, R.F. (1975): ' Autonomy and Education' :  in R.F. 
Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters (ed s . )
Education and Reason. London, Routledoe & Keoan Paul; 
"pTTf".--------------------------
2. Kaufman, A.S. (1973): 'Comments on Frankena's "The Concept
of Education Today", in Doyle, J.F. (ed.)
Educational Judgement. -  papers in the philosophy of  
Education; London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.48.
3. Benn, S . I .  (1976-7): Quoting Rousseau in 'Freedom,
Autonomy and the Concept of a person'; proceedings 
cf  the \ristotelian society, p.124 .
170
and re-evaluation. The autonomous man is not merely capable 
of considering reasons, he does consider them; and he acts 
on then, './hat is meant here is that to be autonomous, one 
must have reasons for acting, and be capable of second thoughts 
in the light of ne'v reasons; I t  is not tc have a capacity for 
conjuring criteria out of nowhere.
To say that choice and rational criticism are necessary
for autonomy is not to suggest that ws choose or  woul.d choose,
our principles as we choose our bags and sho. /ea  cs. I t  is rather 
that we discover our principles changing as we discover 
reasons for setting old ones aside as effipty that once we 
thought serious and weighty. The critical junctures in our 
lives occur when we discover that;^ principle or attitude 
that we had taken to be coait^btive of our characters, as 
making certain kinds of action unthinkable has been eroded 
by our acceptance alongside i t  of others that now seem basic, 
'e discover experientially what considerations really mattar 
to us, or, whc nts to the same thing, who we really are.
Such discova^e^ are possible only to the extent that we are 
su tonomous.
1
irth rightly points out that this very strong link
between the concept of autonomy and the ideal of rational and
ieliberate behaviour is one reason /by ' autonomous' is
Gewirth, A. ( 1S75) : 'Morality and Autonomy in Education', 
in Doyle, o p . c it .
171
generally used as a term o f  approbation.
One might be surprised that the idea o f  autonomy should 
attract  attention from theorists of adult education; a f te r  a l l ,  
autonomy is a simple and fam il ia r  notion, why should i t  be 
deemed so important ? The. answer is  to be found not so much 
in the idea of autonomy i t s e l f  as in i t s  close log ica l  
relationships v/ith other important concepts. Attempt w i l l  now 
be made tc consider some of  these b r i e f ly  in order to show 
how thev a f fec t  our understanding of what autonomy implies.
Maturity and Adulthood:
Since the caoacitv for  autonomous behaviour develoos 
durino childhood and adolescence and is de l iberate ly  fostered  
in the course c f  one 's schookin^* i t  naturally  has close  
conceptual links also v/ith notion of :,being grown up" and
matjre. some theorists indeed treat i t  as the very essence 
of maturity. Knowles, fo r  example, declares that "the point 
at which he psychologically becomes adult” . “ But this is  to
overstate the case. '.7e a l l  accept, surely, that people can 
and should ^ ^ f a d u l t ' in other ways besides se l f -d i rec t io n ;  
in sens it iv ity  and tact fo r  instance, in wisdom and insight,  
in .emotional depth, moral judgement and personal commitment.
Yet even i f  autonomy is only one element in being adult  
i t  is  undeniably a very important one for several reasons.1 
1. Knowles, M.S. (1973): The Adult Learner -  A Neglected 
Species. Huston, Gulf publishing Co., p.45.
172
The terms ’adult* and 'mature' (which are being treated as 
more or less synonymous), have a complex set of meanings. 
In the f i r s t  place, they are evaluative. No single set of
personal characteristics qualifies as the universal and
objective pattern of adulthood. Hostler argued thatA each 
culture has its own beliefs about what mature people should 
be like, and those beliefs chance continually. To desicnate 
particular attributes or behaviours as 'adult' is therefore 
to commend them, to say that these rather than some others 
should be aimed at in personal development. Presently, 
personal autonomy is widely accepted as one of the most s ign if i ­
cant characteristics cf maturity; but i t  has not always been so, 
and, of course there are many other cultures today in which 
attributes like obedience and conformity are valued much more
than self-direction and independence.
In the s e c o n d , 'adult' or 'mature' can be used
either to attribute**certain characteristics to a oerscn or
to accord a particular status to him. The status of being 
an adult carries with i t  a wide range of legal and moral rights 
and duties, chief among which are a fundamental obligation to 
share in the tasks and responsibilities of .Society, together 
with a right to share in its decisions, a right to consult with 1
1. Hostler,  J. (1986): Student Autonomy in Adult C lasses.
Manchester Monographs. The Centre for Adult and 
Higher Education, p . l l  .
173
others, a r ight to ignore advice, and so on. The characterist ics  
o f  adulthood are supposed somehow to correspond to these.
The legal r ight  to vote, for  instance, is  granted by any
democratic society to those presumed (by virtue of their age)
*
to be able to exercise i t  sensibly. 3ut this is  not true of  
a l l  cases. Many who are adult in years and in law sometimes
think and behave in ways v/hic'n are f a r  frcmm being adult iin 
character. Thus the term 'adu lt '  is  ambicuoiu : s in exactly the 
same wav as 'autonomy' i t s e l f ,  which was sheown e a r l i e r  to
denote either r ight  or an a b i l i t y .  The r ight of se l f -d i rec t ion
is  one of the most fundamental o f  those accorded by many 
:so cieties  in granting someone the status of adulthood, but the a b i l i t y  to exercise that jright sensibly may be lacking or l imited. ^
Education for  Ma
The idea -of autonomy is  linked a lso  with that of
ne as a person. This notion has come to be 
very w/idseslyr* accented as a cuiding princio le  in a l l  the
helping^professions. I t  is  somewhat vague, admittedly, and 
d i f fe ren t  theorists interprete i t  in rather d i f fe ren t  v/ays, 
but the majority would probably agree with the analysis of 
Downie and Telfer  that: "to respect a person . . .  is  to respect  
him for  those features which make him v/hat he is  as a person
1 7 4
and which, when developed constitute his f lou r ish ing " .
In other words, i t  i s  not to respect him for  his peculiar
achievements or a b i l i t i e s  -  for being him, so to speak -  but
simply for being a human person.
The princip le  o f  'respect for persons' means that one
must be concerned above a l l ,  to oreserve and enhance Deoole's
autonomy, a lb e i t  although with many other attr ibutes of
2
human personality. Hostler explains that, in practice this  
means allowing and encouraging people to run their own l ives  
as fa r  as possible instead of making a l l  the key decisions
for  them.
4.13.1 Enuality:
The principle  o f  respect fo r  persons, i t s e l f  re lying on 
the notion of  autonomy, supports in turn the even more 
fundamental pr inc ip le  of  the equality of  a l l  human beings.
As a p o l i t i c a l  and ethical slogan, this sometimes encounters 
the objectloT^^hat oeoDle are manifestly not eoua l , that some 
are cleveH or more talented or stronger than others -  and 
of course, we do d i f f e r  very much in these respects. 3ut 
being equal dees not necessarily mean being a l ike ;  rather,1 
1. Downie, R.S. & Telfer, E. (1969): Respect for persons.
London, George Allen & Unwin; p.15 .
2. Hostler, J. (1986): Student Autonomy in Adult C la s se s ;
Manchester Monographs, The Centre fo r  Adult 
Education; p . l l .
175
i t  means having the same and degree of importance despite  
the d if ferences between us. Because of this,  our b e l i e f  in 
equality depends very much on the idea of autonomy. Since
essentia l ly  i t  amounts to the conviction tha t " a l l  . . .  h ave
the same status as choosers and creators of value'’ , as W/iilson
puts i t .  A l l  are presumed capable of sel irection towards
their chosen goals ,  and therefore a l l  are to be accorded equa] 
(negative) l i b e r ty  for  s e l f  exprei equal access to the
means o f  self-development and so on.
Thus one can see that th e id ea of  autonomy, though 
re la t iv e ly  simple in i t s e l f ,  i s  at the very centre o f  a large  
family of important ccoceS^s. I t  is  linked with equality and 
so informs p o l i t i c a l  and social  thought; with respect fo r  
persons through w^icn i t  influences moral and ethical thinking; 
and with adulthood toe, hence i t  has come to dominate the 
theory of education in general and of  adult education in 
particu y & r
14.4 Freedom/L J-ber ty :
Evidently, personal autonomy presupposes freedom in some 
sense, for  one cannot be directing oneself i f  one is  obliged  
to do whatever other people want. But l ike  autonomy i t s e l f ,  
freedom is  a vague and ambiguous notion which, according to
1. •./i lson ,  J. (1975): ’Self-determination and human equa l ity ’
in IlcDermott, F.E. (ed.)  Self-determination in 
Social .:o rk ; P.outledge Prgon Paul, p . lu -
176
B er l in /  has "more than two hundred senses", concentration
however, w i l l  be on two part icu lar  senses which have become
prominent in social philosophy, and which part icu lar ly  finds
expression within the context of educational thought.
There occurs repeatedly in educational writ ing and
statement, or at least  the implication, that there i s  something
essen t ia l ly  paradoxical in the concept of freedom. This
apparent paradox takes two forms; in one, i t  consists in the
contrast between ’ negative' and 'p o s i t iv e '  freedom; in the
other, in the opposition between freedom and l im itation.
The following quotations i l lu s t r a t e  t h i s j -
(a )  . . .  the idea of freedom I s  susceptible of a
number of interpretations.  A preliminary approach 
would include the d ist inction between negative and 
posit ive  freedom; freedom from and freedom fo r  . . .
Negative freedom i s  an indispensable condition for
posit ive  freedom".
. . .  there are two d ist inct  elements in freedom:
(a )  freedom from frustrat ion  or inhib it ion; and
(b )  freedom fo r  achievement or fu l f i lm ent .
3
And freedom-from is  a precondition of freedom-for. 1
1. Berlin, I .  (1969): ' two Concepts of L ib e r ty ' ;  in
Berlin: Four Essays on L ibe rty . Oxford;
Oxford University press. p . l * l
2. Curtis,  S.J. (1958): introduction to the philosophy of
Education, university Tutorial press, d . 12*
3. Jef freys ,  M.V.C. (1955): Beyond Neutra l i ty , pitman;
p. 24.
177-
(b) Freedom means d isc ip l in e ,  because we must order  
our own selves so that our forces work together  
and not in con f l ic t  . . .  And freedom means dedication,  
because, i f  our personal resources are to be 
released with their f u l l  e f fec t ive  power, we must 
be l iv ing  fo r  something beyond ourselves . . .  we must 
in fact  lead committed l ive s .  There is  no escape
from this paradox."
"A l l  the higher freedoms of  the human being imply 
the in i t i a l  restr ict ion  and d isc ip l ine  essentia l  
to the process o f  becoming ' f r e e '  to exerc the
required s k i l l .  2
S r
In i ts  f i r s t  form, freedom contains within i t s e l f  both
negative and positive  elements, in i t s  second form from the
conjunction of  prima fac ie  incompatib le s ,  ifreedom and restra in t ,
freedom and necessity. Thus Garforth provided a set of s ix
interpretative  schemes fo r  hijjk to be able to show how the
conceot of freedom is  used a=rhd ait polled to education.
According to him, the basic  element in the scheme is  the urge  
of the individual human being, an organic creature, to growth, 
expansion of  ac t iv ity ,  the actualisation of his potentia ls .  
' S e l f - e x p re s s id O ^  ' s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n ' ,  'conative impulse',
' l i f e - fo r c e d  are other names fo r  this urge he remarked.
1. Jeffreys ,  M.V.C. (1955): cp. c i t . , p.31
2. G. H (1952) : Freedom and Authority in Education. 
Faber p.67.
3 , F.W (1962): 'The "Paradox o f  Freedom"; 
Studies in Education. Hull ,  university  of  
TIuTTl July.
178
For the purpose of his analysis, however, he called the urge 
horme, hormic impulse or hormic energy following Percy Nunn. 
He went on to explain that this hormic energy requires for 
its activity two sets of conditions: one is negative -  the 
absence of restraint; the other is positive -  the presence 
of factors without which its activity is either impossible
or stunted. For example, a child may have strong musical 
ability  to develop and actualise which he needs both the 
absence of restraint, for instance in the fofm of parental 
authority, i l l-health or his own disinclination and also 
positive conditions in the form of cOJiano, spare time, 
instruction and so on.
Given these conditions, the hormic impulse is able to
develop and express i t s e l f .  Then the hormic impulse is freed 
from restraint and also given the positive conditions needed
for its activity, choice determines the direction or area of 
that activity. A note of clarification is needed here: 
i t  is not simply the case that choice begins to operate only 
when the conditions for activity are provided, in fact,  
choice helps to decide those conditions; for what restraints  
must be removed and what positive factors provided depends 
on the purposes envisaged, on the direction already selected 
for activity. Moreover, choice is itse l f  partly determined 
by the need to accommodate itse l f  in particular cases to
179
l imitations which cannot be removed and to the inevitab le  
absence o f  opportunity. There is  thus no straight-forward  
log ica l  or chronological order o f  dependence -  negative
conditions, posit ive  conditions, choice -  so much as complex 
of mutual re lations to the total character o f  which i s  given 
by choice.
The f i f t h  item in the scheme is  the fi^^Ttnent of the 
hormic impulse in e f fec t ive  act iv ity  within the area chosen, 
the actualisation o f  potent ia l i ty .  At ^ f is  stage, the 
musically g ifted child has found expression for  his talent,  
./hen this happens, there is  a fee l ing  o f  l i b e r a t io n , of  power 
released, of  soontaniety and we ll -be ing  and this is  the sixth  
and f ina l  item in the Scheme.
Conjoined with the idea o f  freedom and l ib e r ty  is  the 
thought of power, opportunity or  advantage, that any one has, 
to do as he pleasefN Cr in other words, his being free from 
hinderance qr^impediment in the way c f  doing, or conducting 
in any respects, as he w i l l s .  There are however, two things 
which are paradoxical and con f l ic t ing  in the interpretations  
of the concepts o f  l i b e r ty .  These are sometimes cal led  the 
'negative ' and the pos it ive  notions o f  l ibe rty .
The notion of  negative l ib e r ty  is  explained as consisting  
in being le t  alone, not being interfered with, and posit ive  
l ib e r ty  consists in being self-determining, master of  one 's
180-
destiny, determining what happens to one, ./ith negative 
l ib e r ty  the key contrast is  interference, the central p o l i t i c a l  
notion related to i t ,  that of protecting negative l ibe rty  
against interferences, V/ith pos it ive  l ibe rty  the contrasts  
re la te  not only to interferences against which we are to be 
protected, but also to lacks, obstacles ,  f rustrat ions,  
impediments to our choices and actions, and which need to be 
removed and aids and f a c i l i t i e s  provided in order to enlarge  
the ind iv idua l 's  l i b e r ty .  /ith negative l ibe rty ,  a l l  coercion 
of the individual involves a total loss of l ibe r ty  in the lcng
as well  as in the short run, 7i'itthh p»ositi-ve  l ibe r ty ,  coercion,  
as in compulsory education, compulsory medical treatment of  
certain kinds, temporarily lessens freedom but i t  may enlarge  
i t ,  so that the coerced person in the long run enjoys greater  
freedom than he would ,i v/ithout the coercion.
Most of the tirtie, negative l ib e r ty  is  explained in a 
negative way as consisting in being free from interferences,
in being le t  alone. There is  something paradoxical and 
unsatis fsctorv  about any attempt to exolain a p o l i t i c a l  value  
or any—£Qal (educational fo r  example) as an absence or some 
kind. An absence can be a good, fo r  instance, an absence o f
i l l -h e a l th  is  a good, namely, the good of health. However, 
i t  seems not to be possib le  to explain negative l ib e r ty  along  
such lines without either rendering i t  as not a concept o f  
l i b e r ty  or identifying i t  with posit ive  l ib e r ty ,  the l ib e r ty  to
181
make and act on the basis of one’ s decisions; to be s e l f ­
determining, and master of one's destiny although i t  is  true 
that weaker or stronger accounts of self-determination can be 
o f fe red .
The negative characterization of negative l ib e r ty ,  to 
avoid identify ing negative with positive l ib e r ty  one must 
explain i t  in terms of being l e t  alone, where an individual  
who i s  l e t  alcr.e, whether he be in a coma, para jy led , or 
completely impotent because of natural or economic factors ,  
i s  said to be f u l ly  f ree .  The victim of ^  stroke or an 
accident who is  paralysed so that he can neither speak nor 
move but who is  conscious, and who with treatment and care 
could regain some of his powers, i f  l e t  alone to d ie  enjoys 
complete negative l ib e r ty .
positive  l ib e r ty ,  with i ts  stress on the removal of 
obstacles ,  hindrances, impediments, and the provision of aids,  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  i s  claimed'1 to involve the absurdity that our lack 
o f  wings and such l ik e ,  constitutes a lack or want of freedom, 
as the possession of  wings and other attributes would enlarge  
our range of action. This has led some exponents of positive  
l i b e r ty  N^^stress the removal only of human caused and/or
humanly planned impediments and obstacles. Another sense of
the notion in which positive l ibe rty  is  used is  that the word 
l i b e r ty  consists in the attainment of self-mastery, or,  
in other words, the re lease from the domination of adverse 
influences. This ’ s lavery ’ from which men l ib e ra te  themselves
182
i s  variously described to include slavery to nature, to
'unbriddled passions ' ,  to ' i r r a t io n a l  impulses ',  or simply
1
to one's ' lower nature '.  Positive l ib e r ty  is  then identi f ied  
with ' s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n ' ,  ' s e l f - f u l f i lm e n t ' ,  or an awakening 
into a conscious state of ra t iona l i ty .  The fact  that i t  is  
contended that such a state can often be attained only by the 
interference of other 'ra t iona l*  persons who l ibe ra te  their  
fe l low  beings from their ' i r r a t i o n a l i t y '  brinqs this 
interpretation  of l ibe rty  into open and str ik ina  con f l ic t  with
l ib e r ty  in the 'negative ' sense.
2.
For Garforth, there is  no con f l ic t  between negative 
and posit ive  l ibe rty .  What appears to be paradoxical 
he said ,  arose partly from l in gu is t ic  confusion, partly  
from misunderstanding. The l in gu is t ic  confusion, he 
explained, consists in the extension of the meaning of  
'freedom' from i t s  primary sense of 'freedom from' to 
meanings which do not properly belong to i t  -  in part icu lar ,  
'freedom f o r '  which is not freedom at a l l  but an expression of 
purpose-cum-value, and fu l f i lment .  The misunderstanding 
consist^ in our fa i lu re  to recognise f i r s t ,  that we are
seriously  misled by l in gu is t ic  unclarity  into the formation of21 
1. West, E. G. (1565): 'L iberty and Education: John Stuart
M i l l ' s  Dilemma'. in philosophy, vol .  XL, No. 40,
p .129 .
2. Garforth, F.W. (1962) ££. c i t .  , p.299 .
183.
pseudo-problems, second, that l imitation, commitment, restra in t  
and d isc ip l ine  are not negations of freedom but e ither  
synonymous with i t  ( r e s t ra in t  = 'freedom from') or co-conditions  
with i t  for the achievement of fu lf i lment.
He concluded that three principal conditions must be 
observed whenever freedom i s  to be examined for practica l  
purposes. F irs t ,  there must be acceptance of the limitations  
imposed by environment and by the ind iv idua l 's  innate caDacity; 
second, some p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of hormic act iv it^m ust  be rejected  
in favour of others and kept in restraint;, third, there must 
be training and exercise of  the facu lt ies  in the d irection of  
the chosen act iv ity .  He b r i e f ly■ summm; arised these as:
" ( i )  obedience to necessi< >v
( i i )  commitment and restra ints ,
( i i i )  training and s e l f - d i s c ip l in e . "
Thus i t  can be said o¥-^freedom that one becomes free
not simply by aiming at I t ,  and throwing o f f  restr ict ion  but
by being educated into some other goals within a s ituation of
1
minimum interference. Furthermore, both positive and
negative interpretations find the ground in M i l l ' s  works.
What is  neglected in both interpretations, however, is  the
theoretical relationship between the descriptive  concepts of  
l i b e r ty  and u t i l i t y ,  on the one hand, and their normative1 
1. Garforth, F.W. (1962): _op. c i t . , p. 299.
2. John Stuart M i l l :  Uti l itar ian ism  ed. Mary Warnock (1979)
Glasgow; William & Col l ins ,  p. 195.
184
concepts, on the other. Normatively, individual l ib e r ty  was 
j u s t i f i a b l e  only when i t  promoted individual development, 
while in the concept o f  u t i l i t y  was contained an imperative 
that the individual must be led to noble and high-quality  
pleasures. Referred to these normative concepts the importance 
of individual l ib e r ty  shrinks, because i t  is  only to the extent 
that i t  promised individual development that i t  c ould be 
j u s t i f i e d .
I f  l ib e r ty  was to be viewed simply as part o f  the 
doctrine o f  l a i s s e c - f a i r e  and did not, in fac t ,  promise
development, " i l l  could not accept i t .  There fo re ,  when he
declared the pr incip le  o f  l ib e r ty  tc be. a sanctuary of  s e l f -  
regarding a c t iv i t i e s  which shoul exempted from any kind
of public  intervention, he di d nc t mean that the individual  
should be free to make a ch which might harm his own 
character. H i l l ’ s intent: Was, rather, to protect the indi*ddual
from cne sway of maLi?c3 ’̂Js custom and vulgar opinions o f  the 
majority, par t icu lar ly  what concerned him was the protection  
of minority opinions, the excellence of which could be eas i ly  
ignored by the ignorant mass. "Genius" he wrote, "can only
breathe f ree ly  in an atmosphere of freedom (emphasis o r ig in a l ) .  
He went on to add: "Persons of  genius are, and are always
l ik e ly  to be, a small minority". In a condition o f  l ib e r ty  
the otherwise f r a g i l e  seeds of wisdom would break their  
nutshells in the minds o f  the enlightened minority, to grow and
1. Mil l ,  J .  s. (1910) :_op. c i t . , p.133
185
ultimate ly  to spread and take root among the masses.
The two imperatives -  that i s ,  the imperative for the 
indiv idual to have l ib e r ty  and the imperative that he develops 
h is  own character -  re f lect ing  respectively the l ibe rty  
concept and the u t i l i t y  concept, were essentia l ly  ir reco . ic i l iab le .  
An indiv idual,  though he was theoret ica l ly  free as fa r  as 
his action was se l f - regard ing ,  was not free to downgrade his 
character because, i f  he did so, i t  would bp^dontrary to the 
pr inc ip le  of u t i l i t y .  For the majority pf the population, 
therefore, individual l ibe rty  was permissible only with a 
proviso that they should either improve their own character 
(thus increasing the general u t i l i t y  of Society) or l isten to 
the wise opinions of the instructed minority.
Without the commitment of a free s p i r i t  to improve the 
character of  a nation, l ibe rty  would be rather destructive  
than constructive. This, in fac t ,  was M i l l ' s  ju st i f ica t ion  for  
reserving come exdepnonal cases from which l iberty  could be 
withdrawn. For example, children, who were not yet mature 
enough to judge aptly their own business, should not have the 
same lihd'cty as their parents. The same logic  was also applied
to someSof the adult population. Being an adult was not
su f f ic ien t  reason fo r  an individual to assume a f u l l  right to
his l ib e r ty .  Before assuming the r igh t ,  he/she had to prove 
the maturity of  his/her mental fa cu l t ie s ;  otherwise, his/her 
l i b e r t y  would only harm the general u t i l i t y  of  Society.
186
V/i th this explanations, i t  is  not d i f f i c u l t  any longer to 
press fo r  adult education along the l ines of negative and 
pos it ive  l ibe r ty .
1 .1 5 Uti l itar ian ism  and Education;
We now turn to a more, d irect  consideration c f  the
preceding theory in re lation to education as a whola^^fcn
attempt w i l l  be made to work out and integrate this into
the aims of education in General and adult education in
p a r t icu la r .
Barrow in his book, Plato, U t i l  itarianis:m and Education
argues that happiness i s  supreme. This5 fceatn be inferred from 
the following quoted passages:
(a) the notion of just ice  pei^^pposes the
pr inc ip le  of happiness.
(b) the principle  o f  happiness is  the only
princip le  that commands universal assent and 
therefore does not need proof. . . .  I t  must 
be accepted as the supreme principle  because 
enmeshment, ancNhence happiness, is  the only 
thing that ,a l l  men necessarily des ire ,  and 
hence is  the only thing that a l l  men can 
accept as morally des irab le ;  and in l ieu of 
any formal proof to establish the va l id i ty  
of any p r inc ip le ,  we must accept the 
universal agreement of mankind.
He went further to subsume other qua l i t ie s  under happiness
thus declaring
that equality should be interpreted as a 
d ist r ibu t ive  pr incip le ,  a formal princip le  
that takes i t s  substance from the princip le  of1 
1. Barrow, R. (1975): P lato, U ti l itar ian ism  and Education. 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. pi 93.
happiness and that the principle  of  freedom 
i s  merely another formal procedural princip le  
that has to be interpreted in the l i gh t  of  
happiness.
Thereafter he went on to c la r i fy  his concept of happiness. 
His analysis concludes that "happiness involves a re lation  
between two var iab les ,  the person and his circumstances."^
For an individual to be happy, he has to be enmeshed in his 
circumstances. This is  not, of course, to say that there can 
be a spec i f ic  l i s t  of  circumstances necessary fo r  happiness 
to obtain nor can a spec i f ic  type of character be delineated  
as a necessary condition of happiness. Notice that there is
nothing lo g ic a l ly  odd in saying "X is  poor and happy" nor in
saying "X is  unkind, a hypocrite, and is  happy".
Some people who are rich are happy; some unhappy. Some 
other people in circumstance A are happy and some are not; 
they prefer circumstance B, while those in B prefer A and D. 
This shows that there are no necessary or su f f ic ien t  
conditions about t rson or his circumstances. To say 
"X is  happy" te l ls  us something about "X", but i t  does not 
automatically t e l l  us anything about "X 's "  character unless 
we know something about the circumstances he is  in.
Is  'X' c lever?  Stupid? We do not know. 'X is  happy* only 
t e l l s  us that there is  relationship between 'X' and his 
circumstances, whatever they are, in which he finds himself1 
1. Barrow, R. (1975) : o d . c i t . , p.14
Ib id .  p.53 .
1 U O  •
o f  such a sort  that he is  sa t is f ied .  Notice that to say
'X' is happy and he is dissatisfied with his lot* involves
one in a semantic contradiction. A person attempting to
get out of a situation is not happy in that situation.
There is something in i t ,  that does not satisfy him and being
in i t  makes him unhappy. If he stays and claims that he is
happy, then i t  could be either that he has altered his
desires or the circumstances have altered for hi
There are . . .  some necessary conditions 
for attributing happiness and they are 
the absence of certain conflicting attitudes 
to one's situation such as frustration, 
loneliness, agitation, depression, annoyance 
. . .  or, more generally, misery.-
To be happy is to be devoid of such feelings which are
indicative of situation that ought not to be for a person.
Such feelings diminish one's relationship with his situation,
which is also to say that one's happiness is thereby
diminished. When one's relationship with one’ s situation
is increased such that one is almost 'at one' with i t ,  then
i t  may be said >tiat he is happy. In Barrow's expression,
"The individual is happy when he feels that he enmeshes with
his surrounding or situation". Hence "happiness is the
2
feeling that arises out of and is dependent upon enmeshment"• 
More ct^arly, "A person is enmeshed with his surroundings" 
means " . . .  that he is in such a relation to his situation 
that the demands of that situation are willingly met, and 1
1. Barrow, R. (1975): o p .  c i t . , p. 54,
2. Ib id .  p.62
3. I b id . p.62
189
the restrictions of that situation are not irksome".
A man is enmeshed with his job " i f  a l l  aspects of his person 
that relate to the job that is ,  his ab i l ity ,  interest,
enthusiasm, are suited to the job, and given the opportunity
to find fulfi.l ment". 2 .To promote happiness, we " . . .  4correlate
the aspiration, attitudes, attitudes, be lie fs,  desires . . .  of
the individual with the demands and the ethos of the
circumstances in which he finds himself". More pointedly,
Barrow describes the manner thus:
The obvious way to aim at the creation of a 
happy state, is to bring children up so that 
there is this correlation between individual 
and situation. . . .  in particular, given that 
there are different kinds of functions to be 
performed in Society i t  would be important 
that the individual's character should be 
adapted to meet th^specific role or situation 
which, for whatever reason, he is in fact 
going to face; . . .
So far as happiness is the aim, the development of the
individual should >^cl low a course that relates the man to 
the way of l i f e ^ p w i l l  1.<e ad the individual should
have attitudes, tastes and characteristics that suit the
overall manner of the l i f e  he is expected to lead. . . .
I f  theXpdividual is destined to live a l i f e  in which 
there will  be very l i t t le  formal guidance or structuring
1. Barrow, R. (1975) op. c i t . ,  p.63
2. Ib id .  p. 63.
190
from external pressures, he w i l l  need to have the kind of 
character that welcomes making decisions, taking responsi­
b i l i t i e s  and acting on his own in i t i a t iv e .  I f  he is
destined to l iv e  for the most part circumscribed by A' lou<
pressures,  then he needs, i f  he is  to be happy, to f ind
such direction acceotable.
Since i t  is  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not impossible, to be a- aams t
t o b e
•happiness',  the question to ask, then, i s ^ h e t h e r  or not 
there is  good reason to promote happiness. Barrow attempts 
to establish  that there are ccod reasons by showing that 
a l l  men necessarily pursue enm< ft, hence, happiness.
But this is not to say that, A *  erefore ,  the principles of
happiness should override any other proposed moral princip le ,
o r  e lse  one f a l l s  into, the natu ra l is t ic  fa l la cy .  He then 
suggests that the State can maximise happiness by exercising
control over the vidual and the situation he is  in .  
In Barrow's mind, educators are l e f t  with three basic
tasks :
3arrow, R. (1975) od. c i t . , p. 64. 
Ib id .  p.65 .
191
(a ) to produce sociable and happy c it izens;
(b) to train a l l  children from an early age to adopt 
the norms of society ;
(c) to determine the exact nature of education for  the 
child based upon the c h i ld ' s  aptitud 
demands of Soc ie ty , ‘
Though Barrow is concerned with child edu 
well  relate to adult education.
We have no doubt been engaged in a thorough philosophical
discuss of happiness and this may appear to be too theoretical
and perhaps not actually called for in a thesis that is
looking at aims and objectives of adult education. The
purpose for such an exercise are two fo ld ;  f i r s t l y ,  adult
education is  a new d isc ip l in e  of academic study and, according 
1
to Akinpelu, i t  is justMeveloping i t s  own crops of concepts 
which are needed in any f i e ld  of study so as to ease i t s
research and develop into a fu l l - f l ed ged  academic d isc ip l in e .
This is  what attempted in this chapter, a concept of  
happiness ^S^yne context of adult education. Secondly, we are  
making use of the instrument of philosophy to establish a 
propei^jnderstanding o f  our main concern -  that i s ,  Uti l itarianism
Akinpelu, J. A. (1968): Introduction to philosophy of
Adult Education. Ibadan External Studies Programme, 
Department of Adult Education, University of Ibadan.
192
After a thorough examination, we can now claim to have
established a solid foundation upon which to build the 
applied study of philosophy of adult education.
The next chapter i s  a c r i t i c a l  examination of the
CHAPTER F IVE
CRITICAL EXAMINATION CF TYPES OF 
UTILITARIAN I Sr". IN CURRENT 
ADULT cDUCATICN FORMS
5.0 Introduction:
he fathers of u t i l i tar ian ism  thought of i t  A c ip a l ly
as a system of soc ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s ionn, ,^a^s o fife r ing  a
cr iterion  and basis of judgement of leg is la to rs  and 
administrators. This is  recognizably a d i f fe rent  matter from 
uti l i tar ian ism  as a system of personal morality, but i t  is  
hard for a number of  important reasons to keep the two things 
ultimately apart, anc to stop the s o i r i t  of  ut i l i tar ian ism ,  
firmly established in one, frwv moving into the other. I f  
individual decisions or. personal matters ere made on a 
u t i l i t a r ian  basis ,  thenviMose c it izens wi.l11 both direct the s
same outlook on to ^ t h ^  r views about whet should be done in
the ,-utlic sphe^^^andd also expect the leg is la ture  and the 
executive t< i t s  decisions in the s p i r i t .
IndeeVj, a u t i l i t a r ia n  is  l ik e ly  to think that the case for  
public u iS litarianism is  even stronger than that for  p r ivate .  
For one thing, the decisions of government a f fect  more persons, 
in the main, than private decisions. But, more than that, 
he is  l ike ly  to fee l  that there is  something in the nature of  
modern government which requires the u t i l i t a r ian  s p i r i t .
194
P r iv a te  c it iz e n s  might le g it im a te ly ,  i f  r e g re t ta b ly ,  have 
r e l ig io u s  b e l i e f s  o r  c o u n te r -u t i l i t a r ia n  id e a ls ,  but  
government in a secu la r  s ta te  must be se c u la r ,  and must use  
a system o f  decision  which is  minimally committed beyond i t s  
in t r in s i c  commitment to the w e lfa re  o f  its  citizens. Thus
u t i l i t a r ia n is m  can be seen almost as b u i l t  into  a contract
o f  government.
Thus Brenda Evan's message to a d u lt  educators is  that
they should try  to understand the p o lic y  process be tte r
in o rder  to p a r t ic ip a te  more f u l l y  in i t  on beh a lf  o f  adult
le a rn in g .  She went on to exp la in  that the incremental nature
o f  p o lic y  making in modem s o c ie t ie s  means that adu lt
educators must act p o l i t i c a l l y  in o rder  to be e f fe c t iv e .
Acting p o l i t i c a l l y  however,she expands, purports acting  with
a sense o f  s e l f - i d e n t i t y  as a po licy  community and as a
pressure  group in pu rsu it  o f  aims which a re  recogn isab le  as
aims in the current c lim ate o f  p o l i t i c s .  In th is  chapter, 
we s h a l l  not only be concerned with the c r i t iq u e  o f  the forms 
o f  a d u lt  education a lone, we sh a l l  a lso  be concerned with  
that o f  u t i l i t a r i a n  doctr in e . •
5.1 General Objections to U t i l i t a r ia n is m :
I t  has been objected that u t i l i t a r ia n is m  i s  excess ive ly
puritan ica l .  For example, Brown^ argues that since every 
act is  productive o f  good or e v i l ,  every act becomes a moral1 
1. Evans, B. (1987): Radical Adult Education: A P o l i t i c a l  
C r it iq u e . London, Croom Helm s e r ie s ,  Consu ltant 's  
In troduction .
195
Issue . S inger phrases th is ob ject ion  in some s im ila r  words 
when he says:
One major ob ject ion  to th is  p r in c ip le  
(o f  u t i l i t y )  i s  that, i f  con s is ten t ly  adhered to , 
i t  would lead to moral fanatic ism ; to the idea  
that no action i s  in d i f f e r e n t  or t r i v i a l ,  
that every occasion i s  momentous •
I f  th is  ob ject ion  i s  to be held on to , the s itu a t ion  would
probably  be a serious one, because, not every occasion is
momentous. Moral reasons do not seem pertinent to such
questions as whether to have fried o r  b o i led  yam fo r  b reak fas t .
To what extent, then, does U t i l i t a r ia n ism  have moral fanaticism
as a consequence ? We sh a l l  try  to d iscuss  the top ic  by
considering  whqt i s  meant by saying that a question i s  not a
moral question , or  a given issue  i s  not a moral is su e .
F i r s t ,  one po in t must be c l a r i f i e d ,  a po int which i t  may
be h e lp fu l  to express in these terms: While many p a r t ic u la r
actions  (and some kinds o f  ac t ion , in genera l)  are  m ora lly
in d i f f e r e n t ,  no action  o f  any kind is  m orally  i r r e le v a n t .
The l a t t e r  i s  intended to mean that no human action  l i e s
beyond ■’ S r i nds w ithin  which m ora lity  is  a p p l ic a b le ,
that there is  no kind o f  act which whatever the circumstances
- -
1. Brown, s.M. Jr. (1952): 'Duty and the production of  Good';
Philosophical Review, V o l .6 l ,  p.299 •
2. Singer, M.C. (1961): Generalization in Ethics; New York,
Alfred A. KnopTI p.184
196
would im possib le  as the sub ject  o f  a moral Judgement,
There i s  nothing that a human being can do but that i t  i s  
conceivab le  that an act o f  this kind might be p re fe rred  under 
conditions which would make i t  su scept ib le  to moral evaluation  
Let us consider th is  example, 'Sex is  not a moral m a tte r '.
The truth o r  f a l s i t y  o f  th is we w i l l  not try  to decide here, 
but take i t  that i f  i t  is  to have even a chance o f  being true  
i t  cannot be in terp reted  as saying that i t  i s  im possib le  fo r  
any act invo lv ing  sexual indulgence to be wrong. So to say 
that an issue  i s  not a moral issue  cannot mean, a t  l e a s t ,  
that the act o r  kind o f  act re fe rred  to i s  m orally  i r r e le v a n t
in the sense ju s t  exp la ined . To say that an issu e  i s  not a
moral issue  i s  to say rather that i t  i s  m orally  in d i f f e r e n t ,  
that m ora lity  makes no demand fo r  e ith e r  i t s  performance o r  
i t s  ommission, o r  that there i s  no moral preference fo r  any 
one o f  the (re le v a n t )  a lte rn a t iv e s  over any o f  the o th ers .
I t  is  in th is sense that eating  bo iled  yam fo r  b reak fa s t  
(under most circumstances) is  co rrec t ly  sa id  to be 'n o t  a 
moral m a tte r '.
Coming back to the ob jection  to U t i l i t a r ia n is m  under 
consideration  here , i f  i t  i s  that on th is  theory no action  
i s  m orally  i r r e le v a n t ,  then the ob ject ion  can be overlooked, 
f o r  th is i s  true and hence no ob jec t ion . Consequently, the 
ob jec t ion  must be that on a U t i l i t a r i a n  theory no action  can
197.
be m orally  In d i f fe r e n t .  Thus, i f  t rue , would mean that the 
app lica t io n  o f  the p r in c ip le  o f  u t i l i t y  would y ie ld  an 
unequivocal and determinate preference in every case . But 
th is  could be true only i f  i t  i s  a lso  true that every p o ss ib le  
s itu a t io n  must contain p re c is e ly  one a lt e rn a t iv e  which 
produces more happiness than any other. U n t i l  per im poss ib le , 
th is l a s t  be adequately demonstrated, th is form o f  the 
ob jec t ion  may be dismissed as w e l l .  U t i l i t a r ia n is m  does not 
try  to t e l l  me what to take fo r  b r e a k f a s t /
The second l in e  o f  ob jection  centres around the in a b i l i t y  
o f  U t i l i t a r ia n ism  to account fo r  ju s t ic e .  A U t i l i t a r i a n  has 
no reason to recognize any moral d i f fe re n ce  between any two 
a lte rnative - d is t r ib u t io n  which y ie ld  the same to ta l quantity  
o f  happiness; Consequently, he i s  unable to provide an account 
o f  moral d e se r t ,  which is  considered to be *a f a t a l  d e fec t  
by many moral ph ilosophers. To adapt an example from the 
case o f  Moremi in I l e - I f e  ( I  suppose th is i s  a mere f a b l e ) ; 
but we wer that a wicked god demanded from I l e - I f e
people a young boy f o r  sac r if ice^  f a i l i n g  which the whole 
boys in the community would pe r ish . One needs to imagine the 
number o f  young boys that would be lo s t  i f  no vo lun teer  
emerged. Moremi, probably  weighed the net balance o f  boys 
that would be saved i f  only one i s  given up, decided to give  
her on ly son to appease th is angry god. U t i l i t a r ia n is m ,  as a
198
consequentialist theory of ethics id en t i f ie s  certain states  
of a f f a i r s  as good states of a f f a i r s  espec ia l ly  i f  the 
rightness or goodness of actions (or of other subjects of  
moral judgement) consists in their positive productive 
relationship to these state of a f f a i r s .
Rawls, in his objection to issues such con tends
that "each person possess an in v io la b i l i t y  just ice
that even the welfare of Society as a whole r r i d e " .
Justice, according to him, does not allow that the sac r i f ic e s  
imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger  sum of advantages 
enjoyed by many. But Util itarianism would not raise eyebrows
i f  punishment of a scape-goat or the persecution of the 
dis l iked  people would in fact serve to maximise happiness, 
then such actions would ^>e enjoined by the principle  of u t i l i t y .
Thus justice  and fairness become rules of thumb, along 
with other moral ru les ,  to be given up whenever happiness 
can be maximized by breaking them. Both Util itarianism and 
just ice  as fairness are concerned with consequences, i . e .  ends; 
what is  at variance i s  their methods of calculation.  
Util itarianism is consistent with the aggregate number of  
happy ends while just ice  as fairness would not care what the 
ends become but that the rules must be s t r i c t ly  adhered to.
1 Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice U.S.A
Harvard University Press, p.3 .
In education and p a r t ic u la r ly  adu lt  education, the r o le  
experience plays when i t  comes to decision  making cannot be  
over-emphasized. The s t r i c t  re l ia n c e  on ru le  would there fo re
not be compatible with the nature o f  adu lt  education* 
D ecis ion -tak ing  a t  a l l  le v e ls  tends to be p o l i t i c a l  in nature  
and there is  always that tendency to want to r e fe r  to the 
consequences o f  s im ila r  dec is ion  taken in times past in o rde r  
to be ab le  to assess the l i k e ly  r e s u lt .  When thus he talks  
o f  p o l i t i c a l  adu lt  education , there is  cause to determine 
the lim its  o f  ru les  when i t  comes to taking d ec is io n .
5.2 The Case o f  p o l i t i c a l  Education:
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ic ip a t io n  i s  a  c h a ra c te r is t ic  r ig h t  and 
duty o f  adulthood, and teaching people how to make the most 
o f  i t  i s  no d i f f e r e n t  in p r in c ip le  from teaching them 
parenthood o r  home management: one is  s t i l l  he lp ing  them to 
meet the demands o f  a d u lt  l i f e .  O ften , indeed, p o l i t i c a l  
education has the same p ra c t ic a l  b ias  as other forms o f  
instrumental work, and aims to enable people to perform  
s p e c i f ic  p o l i t i c a l  tasks . The idea o f  teaching the masses 
to be ab le  to vote w is e ly  i s  one o f  the aims o f  p o l i t i c a l  
education. This o r ig in a ted  in the mid-nineteenth century, 
when the B r it ish  Constitu tion  was s t i l l  f a r  from being even 
outwardly democratic.
The ra d ic a ls  and reformers o f the day wanted 
p o l i t i c a l  power to be d is t r ibu ted  more w idely , and
2 0 0 .
pressed f o r  u n ive rsa l su f fr a g e ;  they r e a l i s e d ,  however, that  
the vote i s  an instrument which can be used f o r  good or i l l ;  
and so they a lso  wanted to prevent people from misusing any 
power they might get. Education appeared to many o f  them 
to be the most e f fe c t iv e  sa feguard . M i l l * ,  f o r  example, 
maintained that 'u n ive rsa l  teaching must precede un iversa l  
enfranchisement' because he thought that i f  on ly  people
understood f u l l y  the issues  they were c a l le d to decide ,
they would not vote fo r  rash or harmful p o l i c i e s .
He was a c tu a l ly  advocating the extension o f  elementary 
schoo ling , but i t  was not long be fo re  h is  argument was adopted 
by adu lt  educators to press fo r  xpansion o f  th e ir  own
work. At the turn o f  the century } f o r  instance, Mansbridge 
rested h is  case f o r  the f le d g in g  W orker 's  Education Association  
on the id en t ic a l  claim that education f o r  the voters  'w i l l  
in e v ita b ly  b r in g  about r ig h t  and sound action on m unicipal, 
nationa l a f f a i r s '  . MO re recen tly , when the referendum on 
B r i t a in 's  entry to the European Community was imminent, the 
same hope led many adu lt  educators to arrange courses in order
1. M i l l ,  J.S. (1910): U t i l i t a r ia n is m , L ib e r ty ,  Representative
Government (ed ited  by H. B. Acton) Dent.,
Everyman's Library;  p.280
2 . Mansbridge, A. (1944): 'Cooperation, Trade Unionism and 
University extension' in Clark, L. (ed . )
The Kingdom o f  the Mind -  Essays and Addresses  
o f A lb e rt  Mansbridge. London, Dent & Sons, p.2 •
2 0 1 .
to explain  the issues involved in that dec is ion . The idea  
behind the launching o f  MAMSER in N ig e r ia  i s  c lo s e ly  re la ted  
to the above. N ig e r ia  i s  preparing f o r  i t s  Third Republic  
and everything i s  being done by the government to make sure  
that the masses are  ca rr ied  along with the p o l ic ie s  o f  the 
government. Hence, there are mass m obilization  r a l l i e s  here  
and there, a form o f  mass teaching f o r  the dissemination o f  
inform ation.
The WEA has recen tly  o f fe re d  a u se fu l  summary o f  o b je c t iv e s  
fo r  p o l i t i c a l  education. These are  "the  encouragement o f  
ac t iv e  p a rt ic ip a t ion  in so c ie ty ,  the r a is in g  o f  p o l i t i c a l
consciousness and the development o f  the s k i l l s  necessary to
1
take in the determination o f  p u b lic  p o l i c y . "  While Hoggart  
evaluates p o l i t i c a l  education as "an e s sen t ia l  p a rt  o f  the
curriculum o f  adu lt  education, and considers i t  l i k e l y  to
n
lead to activism  ra th e r  than qu iescence".
This kind o f  aim however r e s t r i c t s  the curriculum o f  
adu lt  education. I t  only j u s t i f i e s  knowledge which is  u se fu l  
f o r  making p o l i t i c a l  d e c is io n s ,  the re fo re , i t  p resc ribes  on ly  
the Study o f  Economics, Law, Socio logy  and the l i k e .  This 
l im ita t ion  o f  knowledge has been deplored by many other1 
1. WEA National Meeting, 15 December 1984. WEA News;
Spring 1985).
2. - ACACE, (1973): p o l i t i c a l  Education fo r  Adults.
In trodu ction.
2 0 2 .
adult educators, and have made various e f fo rts  to overcome 
i t .  For example, Ridley suggests that groups such as the 
unemployed could gain s k i l l s ,  could learn about their welfare  
r ights  from adult p o l i t i c a l  education. This instrumental 
approach he argues, is more l ik e ly  to gain public funding 
because of i t s  t an g ib i l i t y ,  and i t s  avoidance of mass education 
based on vague appeals to educating fo r  democracy.
He re jects  the claim that knowledge is  power, since power 
flows from socio-economic status. R id ley 's  conclusion is  
that in an administered society ,  i t  is  best to a ss i s t  such 
groups as tenants, res idents '  associations, and social
“ ° “ " y  "  “ “  ■“  
exist ing arrangement.
There are probl ems, however, with the group oriented  
approach to political ition. Are a l l  groups to receive
p o l i t i c a l  advice? A *  eiy are not to be offered advice, then, 
on what ideological basis  is  the selection of groups to occur ? 
Further group pluralism is  bare ly  the radical approach that 
some advocates of p o l i t i c a l  education imagine. The group 
approach can be parochial unless the educator moves out from 
where members find themselves to o f f e r  a wider and more 
thl1 eoreti ca l  po l i t ic a l  education,
1. Morris, C. (1963): The idea of Adult Education.
(1st Mansbridge Memorial Lecture).  Leeds university  
Press.
Arguments in contribution to political Education by 
Ridley, F. quoted by Evan Brenda (1987) ££. c i t . , p.29.
203.
Finally, groups in the community can best be served by the 
decentralisation of bureautic power rather than by a token 
strengthening of their sk i l ls .
A reasonable way to extend the cur 
education is  that done by Crick and por
a broader aim. They developed their notion of 
literacy. They mean this to cover not only ex
vote but also understanding the nature r
and o f  the p o l i t i c a l  process. And they broaden the idea s t i l l  
fu r th e r  by de fin in g  the sub ject-m atter  o f  p o l i t i c s  as not 
merely the acqu is it ion  and use o f  power in government but,  
as the c rea t ive  c o n c i l i a t i o n  o f  d i f f e r i n g  in t e re s t s ,  whether
interpretation means that almost any situation in which we
try to resolve a dispute can be extended to embrace any
subject which might cast some l i g h t  on how we do i t .
Up to now, this aim of teaching p o l i t i c a l  l i te racy  has
been advocated mainly fo r  schools, but there is  no inherent
reason to prevent i t  from being pursued in adult c lasses too.
2
W righO  in fac t  maintains that i t  is  more suited to adult  
since they have practica l  experience o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t iv ity1 
1. Crick, B. and Porter,  A. (e d s . ) (1978): p o l i t i c a l  education
and p o l i t i c a l  l i t e racy  -  the report of  the Hansard 
Society. London, Longnan; p.4 •
2 . Wright, A. (1980)s 'A P o l i t ic a l  Literacy Campaign ? 
Adult Education. Vol. 53, N o . l ,  (May).
204
*
and there fo re  are more l i k e ly  to perce ive  p o l i t i c a l  relevance
in sub jects  which t r a d i t io n a l ly  have not been thought to 
possess i t .  I t  could be added that, u n lik e  ch ild ren , they
are  a ls o  in a posit ion  to put th e ir  lea rn in g  to use.
For Crick and porter 1 dec la re  that p o l i t i c a l  educatio4n should
not merely aim at b e t te r  understanding but should a lso  exc ite  
a p roduct iv ity  to ac t ion , and a d u lt s ,  as enfranchised c it iz e n s ,  
have one obvious means o f  action a lready  to hand.
I s  p o l i t i c a l  Kdult Education P o ss ib le  ?
Pate rson 's  argument seems to suggest some doubt as to 
even the f e a s i b i l i t y  in theory o f  the aim o f  promoting p o l i t i c a l  
c r i t ic is m . As fo r  i t s  p r a c t i c a b i l i t y ,  adu lt  educators themselves 
have created some confusion and impediment simply because  
they f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to agree as to the purpose o f  p o l i t i c a l  
c r i t ic is m . For instance, Mansbridge stressed that i t
would generate p o l i t i c a l  wisdom, so that ‘ support fo r  the 
Workers ' Educational Association  was seen as a sound p o l i t i c a l
_ 2 3
investmenit aqgairn st  extremism' whereas, Fowler in arguing
that people should be taught to adapt to changes in Soc iety ,1 
1. Crick, B. and Porter, A. (eds . )  op. c i t . . p.41
2. Fieldhouse, R. (1977): The Workers' Enucatlonal Association -
Aims and Achievements 1903-1977. Syracuse 
University (publication in Continuing education) .
3. Fowler, G. T. (1979): 'The Functions and impact o f  the ACACE
and of administrative and organisational change';
Elsdon, K.T. ( e d ) (1979) New Direction -  Adult”
Education in the context o f  continuing education; 
being the proceedings o f  a Conference . . .  D^pt. o f  
Education and Science, London.
205
protests  that i t  i s  not a question o f  whether these changes
are d e s i r a b le  o r  otherw ise , ra th e r , i t  i s  that they are
apparently  in e v i t a b le .  In other words, Fowler t a c i t l y  assumes
that i t  is  always b e t te r  to accept so c ia l  change than to
1
r e s i s t  i t .  Thus, Paterson argues that adu lt  education can 
on ly  c r i t i c i s e  soc ie ty  e f fe c t iv e ly  i f  i t  i s  compl< e ly  im part ia l ,
and there fo re  he maintains that i t  should have itment
to any p o l i t i c a l  o r  so c ia l  values a t  a l l  and should be 
concerned with 'the  development o f  persons ' a lone . But such 
n e u t ra l i t y  i s  qu ite  im possible  to achieve. Even Paterson
2
him self does not achieve i t  fo r  he endorses S c h e f le r 's  view  
that 'the  notion that education i s  an instrument f o r  the 
r e a l is a t io n  o f  so c ia l  goa ls  . . .  harbours the g re a te s t  
conceivable  danger to the idea l o f  a f r e e  and ra t io n a l  goal
3
which adu lt  education should help us to a t t a in .  As Lawson
points ou t, id e a ls  about how people should develop as
in d iv id u a ls  n ece ssa r i ly  imply other id e a ls  about how they
should l i v e  in company with each other. In e v it a b ly ,  there fo re ,
to encourage personal development i s  a lso  to help to create  
a p a r t ic u la r  kind o f  soc ie ty .
1 . Paterson, R.W.K. (1979): Values, Education and the Adult.  . London, Routledge and Kegan Pau l. p.2552 I b id .  p .255
3. Lawson, K. H. (1970): op. c l t . . p.169
206
This i s  one reason why Dewey declared that "what a
society is ,  i t  i s ,  by and large, as a product of 
(quoted by Ski lbeck ).  One needs to add, howe 
education is ,  is  equally a product of Socie &
Society thus fashion education just  as much as education 
shapes society. The two ex ist  in symbiosis, mutually 
reinforcing and moulding each other. The peculiar intimacy
of their re lationship  limits the extent to which people can
be taught to be c r i t i c a l .  0 , Sull ivan,^  therefore o f fe rs  an
assessment of the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of p o l i t i c a l  adult education
the most I fee l  that can be hoped for is  that 
students w i l l  come to appreciate the social  
location of their b e l ie fs  and values, and come 
to some rea l isat ion  of how their consciousness 
has been formed.
I t  may seem a modest aim, but i t  is quite d i f f i c u l t  enough 
to achieve, and at least  i t  su ff ices  to escape the charge 
of indoctrination. So, while some adult educators profess  
to teach social c r it ic ism  and p o l i t i c a l  involvement, many 
others are helping to promote moderation and conformity.21 
1. Skilbeck, M. ( e d . )  (1970): John Dewey (Education Thinkers)
London, C o l l i e r ,  Macmillan; p.163
2. O 'Sull ivan, D. (1980): 'Soc ia l isa t ion ,  Social Change and
Ideology in Adult Education'. in Adult Education. 
Vol.52, No.5 (January).
207
Feminism and Adult Education: The Nigerian S ituation .
In recent years, the ro le  of women has surpassed the 
traditional p ro f i le s  of motherhood, wife and caretaker of 
the home. Their ro le  has penetrated d i f fe ren t  facets of the 
national economy. In times past, women were more or less 
discriminated against as regards participation in economic 
ac t iv i t ie s ,  such as fu l l - t im e  agr icu ltu ra l  act iv ity ,  
commercial and industr ia l  ventures etc. There were slim 
opportunities for women education. They were treated as
1 /N
minors or, according to Akinpelu, belongs, to the 'disadvantaged1 
group; and are regarded as in fe r io r  or helpers to men. The 
women in the past therefore had no confidence in themselves.
Right now, things are changing and the ro le  of women
in the Nigerian Society is no exception. Many of them
according to Mrs. Rasaki, 2 are findring themselves in the 
position of bread-winners in addition to their other family 
and societal problems. There is  need therefore for women 
to form themselves into educational groups where they w i l l  
be opportuned to exchange useful ideas that w i l l  create
pelu , J. A. (1988): 'Mobilizing the Grassroots and 
the Unserved'; Paper presented at the N.N.C.A.E/ 
A.A.L.A.E. West African Sub-Regional Management 
Development Training Workshop, held at the 
University of Ibadan, February 14 - ,24 .2 
2. Report of the Launching of "Better L i fe  for Rural Women" 
in Ogun State at Asero Stadium, Abeokuta on Thursday 
25th February, 1988.
Mrs. Rasaki is  the Chairperson of the Lagos State 
Better L i fe  for Rural Women programme. This programme i s  
a kind of Women's Liberation Movement aimed at the 
improvement of the lo t  of Nigerian women.
208
Earlier, a three—day workshop was organised in Abuja 
in September 1987 aiming among other things, at mobilising 
the rural women to participate more effectively and efficiently  
in the nation’s drive to ensure a qualitative and more 
meaningful l i f e  fo r  them. Generally, some of the aims of the 
Better Life for Rural Women are:
(a) "To promote the interest of women in soc economic 
and industrial development and to ens ure t hat they are 
not relegated to the background in these areas;
(b) to improve the home l i f e  and the general status of 
women in the State."
in order to achieve these and other aims, provision for loan 
to start small scale business has been made through the 
establishment of the 'Peoples Bank' in the States and Loan 
through Cooperative Societies are made so as to encourage 
small scale industries.
There is also the Nigerian Association of women in 
Business and some of its aims are:-
(a) ’To stimulate and encourage women to take an interest, 
and actively participate in the various development 
activities within and outside their environment;
(b) to instil into Society, through Women folk, a high
standard of ethics and economic discipline conducive 
to the realisation of a more productive and 
self-suffic ient economy.
209
There are other women programmes such as National Council for
Women Development. They a l l  tend to emphasize the changing
ro le  of the Nigerian women both as a home manager and as a
soc ia l ,  economical and p o l i t i c a l  developer. Unfortunately,
these programmes are not achieving the desired results because 
i t  has been found out in various States that there are s t i l l
high i l l i t e r a c y  rate among women; in su f f ic ien t  enlightenment 
programmes.
The need for adult l i teracy  programme, therefore cannot 
be over—emphasized. These women need to be able to read and 
write in order to be able to understand the plans of government
Since however, from the point off v:L ew of a woman writer,  this 
idea of emancipation and participation of women in the a f f a i r s  
of the State has emanated from the men fo lk ,  they may not 
expect a huge success. Perhaps i f  more women are involved in 
the programme, some o f  these impediments might be removed.
The suggestion is  that women should be given more freedom to 
shape their  own l iv e s .
The African man sees himself as a God-made lord over the
woman and programmes such as this may l ik e ly  change the
so -ca l led  God-raade status of the woman. Though no one is  
doubting the good gesture of the male fo lk ,  i t  w i l l  perhaps 
be more advantageous for women to be more independent to 
organise and set their own object ives .  By so doing, they 
w i l l  be able to a llocate  values to their success.
2 1 0 .
5.3 Adults and the Need for School:
U t i l i ta r ians  pay a high price for assuming that happiness 
must be sub jective ly  defined by each individual,  an assumption 
that frees them of the need to defend an objective conception 
of the good. How i s  society to prepare children and adults
for the pursuit of their own se l f -de f ined  happinless ? In the 
case of children, they cannot themselves determiSne the 
particu lar  ends of education, nor in maximising ■'their present 
happiness a reasonable u t i l i t a r ian  stand or education i f
only because the re s t  of their l i f e  i ^ l i k e l y  to be much longer 
than their childhood. While for adults, education is to help 
them in their attainment of personal fu l f i lment .
We l ive  in a world o f  change; so what w i l l  make people
happy in future is  la rge ly  indeterminate. To make matters more
complicated s t i l l ,  education i t s e l f  s ign i f ic an t ly  shapes how
individuals w i l l  define happiness. In order to provide a
guidance, u t i l i t a r ia n s  need to find a standard that is  not tied
to a part icu lar  conception of the good l i f e  and that is  not
derived from the c i rcu la r  argument that i n i t i a l  education goes 
a long way to determine the happiness of subsequent ones.
Thus, the major problems that u t i l i t a r ia n s  face in determining 
the purpose of education generally stems from Benthamite 
ut i l i tar ian ism  and his spec i f ic  recommendation for educating 
ind iv iduals .
2 1 1 .
Benthamite u t i l i t a r ia n is m  takes the preference o f  
in d iv idu a ls  as given and regards attempts to maximise 
sa t is fa c t io n  o f  those preferences as 'good1. 'Push pin i s  
as good as peotry; so long as the s a t is fa c t io n  a person 
der ives  from each i s  equal and each contributes equ a lly  to the 
happiness o f  o thers , as J .J .C .  Smart points ou t , the l a t t e r  
condition w i l l  almost c e r ta in ly  mean in p rac t ice  that poetry
w i l l  be a b e t te r  a c t i v i t y  than
add to the happiness o f  others i . - . _ _ ;n
c r i t i c s  o f  u t i l i t a r ia n is m  recognise that happiness, broad ly  
in te rp re ted , i s  a m inimally con trovers ia l good in that i t  
accommodates almost a l l  conceptions o f  the good l i f e .  Very 
few people want to lead an unhappy o r  u n sa t is fy in g  l i f e  •
Utilitarian ism  maintains a neutral position among conceptions 
o f  the good l i f e ,  ask ing people only to recognise the equal 
claims o f  a l l  others to lead a happy l i f e  as they de fin e  i t .  
Bentham therefore  l i s t e d  secondary ends, which he assumed 
were const itu t ive  o f  every i n d i v i d u a l s  happiness. Education 
ought to supply le a rn e rs  with the means to:
" ( a )  avoiding ino rd inate  sen sua lity  (and i t s  
^  mischevious consequences);
b) securing p r o f i t - y i e ld in g  employment;
(c )  securing admission in to  ’ good company' from 
which the previous advantage could a lso  be 
obta ined ;
1. Smart, J. J. C. (1973) in Smart and w illiam s, op. c i t . , p.24
212
(d ) avoiding annui and the ‘pain o f  mental vacuity*;
(e ) gaining a proportionable share o f general respect” .
Surveying Bentham's l i s t ,  we discover that each
secondary end is  problematic. Either i t  is  not c lea r ly  
derivable  from happiness as an ultimate end, nor su f f ic ie n t ly  
neutral among conceptions of the good l i f e ,  or as indeterminate 
an educational goal as happiness i t s e l f .
Even i f  s e l f  defined haoDiness may not a fte r  a l l  end 
up in absolute happiness, what about the other ideals which 
people be lieve constitute happiness. These idea ls  are 
argued, to be means that can lead to human happiness and as 
such have been aimed at in education in various ways.
Eminent educational thinkers viewed these idea ls
the r igh t o f everyone and as such should not be denied anyone. 
For instance, l ib e r ty  in form of speech, re l ig io n ,
marriage, o f the individual as a whole should be the 
prerogative o f a normal,just society . But does l ib e rty  
at the end o f i t  a l l  give a l l  that i t  promised in form of 
happiness ?
Before we can attempt to answer this question, we 
sha ke a look at some forms of adult education and
determine the extent to which i t  tr ies  to ju s t i fy  happiness 
as an adult educational goal on the one hand, and how best 
i t  is  atta inab le  on the other.
213
5.4 L iberal Adult Education:
The essence o f l ib e ra l  education is  learning which 
i s  valued for it s  own sake. Consequently, i t  tends to 
aim exclusively  at promoting personal development, for* 
philosophers have always argued that most things are  valued
only because they contribute in one way or another towards
the l iv in g  of a fu l ly  human l i f e ,  which alone is  claimed 
to have in tr in s ic  worth. Thus Lawson asserts that education 
should be undertaken 'because man is judged to be important 
and a more developed man is thought rbost important o f a l l ’ .
Although essen tia lly  qui4te simple, the notion of  
l ib e r a l  education has generated over the years a multitude 
of theoretical confusion and obscen ities. The main reason 
fo r  this is  probably that the idea of personal develop­
ment is  i t s e l f  sfurttiamentally unclear.
4 °
1. Bent_h am, J. (1843): Chrestomathia v o l . 8 , p. 8  quoted 
in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds .) (1988): 
V ^ i l i t a r ia n is m  and Beyond. New York, Cambridge 
n iversity  press; p.264.
2 Lawson, K.H. (1970): The Concept o f 'purpose ';
Adult Education, Vol.43, No.3, Sept., p.169,
V
214.
Kohlberg and Meyer- show that educators actually  
employ several d i f fe re n t  models to explain i t ,  and th ese 
are neither lo g ic a l ly  consistent with each other nor
always appropriate fo r  the task. Most of derive
ultim ately from the philosophy o f  A r is to t le ,^  who was 
the f i r s t  thinker to conceive the process of growth as 
involving the progressive rea lisa t ion  o f potentia l.
He postulated that every l iv in g  organism is  "potentia lly  
a l l  those things which i t  w i l l  be o f i t s e l f  i f  nothing 
external hinders i t " ,  and thus he was enabled to understand 
the cause of i t s  development as a general emergence of  
qu a lit ie s  which, so to speak, had been hidden in i t  a l l  
the time. His idea has ever since dominated a universal 
thoughi-t. I t  survi 1ves v i r tu a l ly  unchanged in modern
psycholoay for instance. 
1. ^ Kohlberg.,. ...L.... ..a.nd Meyer, R. (1972): Development as the
aim of education; in Hazard Educational Review, 
Vol.42, No.4, November.
2. A r is to t le ,  (1941) : Metaphysics transl. by V/.D. Ross
oo. c i t .  , 104"^a 1 $.
215
Maslow a sse rts  that each o f  us i s  bom  with an "e s se n t ia l
inner nature" o f  inherited  in s t in c t s ,  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  and 
a b i l i t i e s .  Like A r i s t o t le ,  he thinks that they e x is t  
p o te n t ia l ly  w ithin  u s ,  and so he goes on to explain  the 
course o f  healthy psychologica l development as consist ing  
in th e ir  p rogress ive  'a c t u a l i s a t io n ».
This kind o f  theory is  obv ious ly  the source o f  the 
contemporary gospel o f  ’ s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n *  which a s se rts  that 
psychic health requ ires  the complete fu l f i lm e n t  o f  a l l  one 's  
p o te n t ia ls .  I t  maintains that one should l i v e  so as "to  be
2
that s e l f  which one tru ly  i s " ,  to borrow Soren Kierkegaard's words 
I t  has become a popular doctrine in recent years and is  new 
widely  held by educators as w e ll as by psychotherapists.
But i t  in v ite s  serious in t e l l e c t u a l  ob ject ion  unless i t  i s  
formulated with care .
3
One fundamental weakness which i s  pointed out by Peters  
i s  the t a c i t  assumption that o n e 's  s e l f  always deserves to be 
r e a l i s e d ,  and is  never b e t te r  suppressed in stead . In another 
g u ise ,  this i s  ju s t  the ancient b e l i e f  that ' a l l  po ten tia l  
i s  f o r  good '. Thus Maslow*s theory assumes that there i s  an1 
1. Maslow, A.H. (1968): Toward a Psychology o f  Being.
(2nd ed it ion );  New York, van Nostrand, p.l90
2. quoted by Rogers, C.R. (1961): On Becoming a person -  
A Therapist's View of Psychotheraphy; London, 
Constable, p.166
3. peters, R. S. (1966): op. c i t . , p.56
216
■ v
innate urge to develop. Echoing A r i s t o t l e ' s  words, he says 
that on e ’ s po ten tia l s e l f  has a dynamic fo rce  o f  i t s  own, 
press ing  always fo r  open uninhib ited  expression . In 
educational theory, th is  truth has generated a popular  
analogy with h o r t ic u ltu re .  The teacher i s  new commonly 
likened to a gardener because, i t  i s  thought, h is  task is  
to fo s t e r  growth in human beings which, l i k e  that in p lan ts ,  
i s  n a tu ra l ly  disposed to occur. Up to a po in t , th is metaphor 
is  h e lp fu l and i l lu m in a t in g , but i t  has unfortunate  
im p lications  i f  i t  i s  exaggerated, as D«arden exp la in s .
The more the natural ’dynamic’ o f  the p u p i l ’ s growth i s  
emphasised, the le s s  c a l l  there i s  fo r  the teacher to
encourage i t ,  and thus he i s  reduced to a ’ ga rdener ’ o f  the 
most minimal so rt  -  in f a c t ,  to l i t t l e  more than a sympathetic 
bystander and observer o f  h is  students ’ development.
C r it ic ism s  such as these have led many psycho log ists  
and educators to propound a modified and more soph isticated  
vers ion  o f  the theory, in e f f e c t ,  they have re jec ted  the 
im p lication  o f  K ierkegaard ’ s words, that each o f  us has ju s t  
one ’ true s e l f  which we e ith e r  r e a l i s e  o r  not. in stead , they 
maintain that we in h e r it  so many ta lents  and ch a ra c te r is t ic s  
that each o f  us is  p o te n t ia l ly  many se lv e s ,  as i t  were.
Dearden, R.F. (1975); ’Autonomy and Education’ , in Dearden et a l . ,  (eds) 
Education and the Development of Reason. London,
Routledge and Kegan Faul; p.65 •
In the course o f  our development, we therefo re  have to decide  
which a tt r ib u te s  are to be encouraged and allowed to f lo u r is h  
and which are  to be ignored or suppressed, thereby fash ion ing  
ourse lves  into one kind o f  person o r  another. Growth invo lves  
not only the r e a l is a t io n  but a lso  the choice o f  our p o te n t ia l .
Frank 1 accord ing ly  s t re sses  that i t  pres>ents u s with
the ’ challenge to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' .  I t  i s  not a purely  
automatic process, evo lv ing  in a pre-determined d ire c t io n ;  
i t  has to be guided and shaped by u s ,  and therefore  we
n ece ssa r i ly  become respon s ib le  fo r  the course i t  takes. Many 
people do in fa c t  bear in mind an idea l o f  the so r t  o f  person 
they are try ing  to become, which they use both to guide and 
to judge th e ir  d a i ly  l i v in g .  Those who do not are nevertheless  
l i k e ly  to be working towards such a goal unconsciously. For, 
as A r i s t o t le  exp la in s , we only conceive a process as growth, 
rather  than as mere purposeless change, when we see i t  to be 
aiming a t  a ta rge t .
In re la t io n  to human development, such a goal u su a l ly  
takes the form o f  an image o f the id e a l ly  mature person, a 
pattern o f the p e r fe c t  human being . In the past, such a 
paradigm was handed down in a r t ,  o r  in r e l ig io n ;  today,1 
1. F rank l, U. E. (1978 ): 'Beyond S e l f -A c tu a l is a t io n  and 
s e l f -e x p r e s s io n ' in Frankl: Psychotheraphy and 
E xisten tia lism  -  se lec ted  Papers in Logotheraphy; 
penguin Books, Harmondsworth. p.53
2 ( 8
suggests G lasser, i t  is  more l ik e ly  to be promulgated by 
the media and by advertis ing. However purveyed, i t  is
fundamentally important fo r  understanding the function o f
education. As Kallen 2 says "adulthood, even i f  determinate 
b io lo g ic a l ly ,  is  c u ltu ra l ly  a va r iab le  . . .  Images o f i t  are  
co llec t ive  ideals which the soc ieties  committed to those
idea ls  str ive  to have their young embody.
A crucial point to note however, in th is , is  that 
there are many images o f adulthood. The cu ltural h istory  
o f mankind records a host o f them, and even in the western 
world today there are several competing patterns o f maturity. 
The fac t  that we have to make \  choice between them means that
l ib e r a l  education, l ik e  instrumental education, can never be 
wholly neutral. Every attempt to fo s te r  someone's development 
presumes that one ideal or another has been judged worth 
developing towards. This is  yet another reason why the 
teacher cannot r igh t ly  be portrayed as a gardener who merely 
cooperates with an automatic process o f  growth. Either he 
approves the paradigm o f adulthood which his pupil wants to 
emulate, in which case he shares the re spon s ib il ity  o f  
choosing i t ,  or he tr ie s  to supplement i t  with another ideal 1
1. G la s se r ,  R. (1973 ): 'L e isu re  and the Search f o r  a S a t is fy in g  
Id e n t ity ;  in smith, M. e t  a l . ,  (eds) (1973): Leisure  
and Society  in B r i t a in . London, A llen  Lane, p.60
2 . K a llen , H.M. (1962 ): ph ilo soph ica l Issues in Adult
Education. S p r in g f ie la ,  Charles Thomas; p738
of maturity, and then his own commitment to a particular
set o f  values is  even more m anifest,
5,5 Education fo r  Freedom:
The u t i l i t a r i a n s  uphold that l i b e r t y  i s  a necessary  
condition fo r  the in d iv id u a l ’ s pu rsu it  o f  happiness. However,
sphere in which the advocate o f ronted with  
c a t io n ” . 1'
The question that r e a d i ly  comes to mind i s  whether freedom 
provides a b e tte r  standard than happiness by which to determine 
what and how to teach in d iv id u a ls .
I t  could be seen that some o f  Bentham's secondary goa ls  
f o r  education are more compatible with an education designed  
to prepare ch ildren  f o r  freedom than with one designed fo r  
happiness. By preparing everyone through education fo r
p r o f i t - y i e ld in g  employment, we are providing in d iv idu a ls  with  
the background conditions f o r  f r e e  choice in a soc ie ty  that  
attaches a p r ice  to most valued goods. And i f  admission to 
good company f a c i l i t a t e s  access to many valued goods, then 
education d irected  a t  securing such access w i l l  a lso  increase  
a c h i l d ’ s fu tu re  freedom, in fa c t ,  these secondary goals
seem more reasonably connected to the end o f  future  freedom 
than to that o f  fu tu re  happiness.1 
1. R u sse ll ,  B. (1955): John S tuart  M i l l : Oxford; 
Oxford U n iv e rs ity  P ress , p.5’6.
2 2 0 .  '
Securing p r o f i t - y i e ld in g  employment and admission into  
good company i s  no more consisten t with the g re a tes t  happiness 
p r in c ip le .  Sure ly , many types o f  employment that a re  not 
often  p r o f i t - y i e ld in g ,  a r t i s t i c  vocations , f o r  example -  can 
be p leasure  y ie ld in g ,  perhaps even moreso than jobs in 
bus in ess . But i f  an ind iv idu a l has no independent source 
o f  income, then income-producing employment i s  l i k e ly  to be
e s se n t ia l  to l i v in g  a minimally happy l i f e . e one accepts
the p re v a i l in g  economic r e a l i t y  -  that on ly independently  
wealthy ind iv idua ls  can a f fo rd  to be educated to pursue 
non-income producing vocations then Bentham's educational goal 
seems to fo l lo w . S im i la r ly ,  i f  admission into good company 
provides a t icket  to g a in fu l  employment, then from a 
u t i l i t a r i a n  perspective , an education that enables in d iv idu a ls  
to enter into good company may be s u f f i c ie n t ly  neutra l among 
concepts o f  l i f e .
5.6 The Content o f  Education; Vocational o r
Theoretica l ?
U t i l ita r ia n ism  i s  u su a l ly  commended on the grounds that 
i t  supp lies  one standard, the common currency o f  happiness 
by w a l l  goods can be ranked. Educating children  to be 
capable  o f  f ind ing  p r o f i t - y i e ld in g  employment in th e ir  soc ie ty  
p laces very d i f f e r e n t  demands upon schooling than does the 
goal o f  educating ch ildren  to think beyond the estab lished  
forms o f  l i f e  and thereby f re e in g  them from the tyranny o f
2 i l .
the present. The advocate o f l ib e r ty  can embrace both goals 
in his theory. But, without some p r io r ity  ru le , the theory 
w i l l  be inadequate to determine educational practice in a 
non-ideal Society. The imperfections in our economic and 
p o l i t ic a l  institutions as w ell as scarcity  o f time and 
resources demand that we choose between an education instrumental 
to finding employment and what is  commonly called a l ib e ra l  
education.
The job o f equipping learners fo r  p ro f it -y ie ld in g  
employment seem to place very sp ec if ic  demands upon schools; 
that they teach technical s k i l l s  to future technicians,
sec re ta r ia l  s k i l ls teaching s k i l l s
to future teachers, and so on and so forth . But even Bentham 
did not give p r io r ity  to teaching more practica l subjects  
because they prepared people for sp e c i f ic  occupations, but 
because he believed that applied Sciences ( fo r  example) were 
eas ie r  to learn than pure science. One can see that Bentham 
upholds his in terest  fo r  the higher knowledge in a l l  i t s  
ram ifications. Only i f  one believed that learners pa rt icu la r ly  
children were destined fo r  p art icu la r  vocations and that 
educators could discern their predestinations would the goal 
o f vocational training be this simple to implement educationally. 
Otherwise, elementary, secondary and perhaps even higher 
education must be broad enough to allow children themselves 
to determine their future vocational plans.
212
As regards adults, due to the fact  
that vocations keep changing as a resu lt  of  
economic upheavals, such spec ific  vocational train ing might 
not produce the desired re su lts .  I f  equality  of opportunity 
includes the r igh t to choose and not only the r igh t to be 
selected on grounds o f merit, then even the demands on
education su f f ic ie n t ly  extensive to expose chi] to many
types of in te lle c tu a l s k i l l s ,  or s k i l l s  and knowledge general
enough to be useful in many professions.
The resolution o f  this dilemma, i f  there is  one, does not 
depend upon a determination o f which function is  more important 
expanding the minds or the job opportunities o f  indiv iduals .
Perhaps more vocational education fo r  the less-advantaged  
would provide them with me >re jc> b opportunities than they now 
have. For when we argue fo r  equalising economic opportunity,
we are not arguing simply that a l l  learners should be prepared 
fo r  some job, but that a l l  should be given an education that 
prepares them for choosing a sa t is fy in g  job that i s  not 
wasteful o f their ta lents. This is  one reason why even i f  
a h igh ly -spec ia lised  education is  a pre-condition fo r  certain  
occupations, i t  should be chosen by, rather than imposed upon, 
learners.
So much fo r  the learners. The educators too have a ro le  
to play in whatever form o f educational setting  they might 
find themselves. The nature, purpose and status o f adult
education are  a l l  causes o f  concern; as they are determinant 
fa c to rs  in judging the success or f a i lu r e  o f  both students*
and p r a c t i t io n e r s ' o b jec t iv e s  very o ften , in talcing dec is ions
as to how to go about th e ir  work, they often  ask themselves
questions o f  va lu es .
The issue o f value decision is  very
course o f  th is  work fo r  the fo llow in g  re;
As w i l l  be noted in the in troduction , i t  was stated that
attempt w i l l  be made to formulate aims which w i l l  be
su ita b le  to adu lt  education programmes ir r e sp e c t iv e  o f  race
1
or r e l i g io n ,  though Paterson thinks th is may be an 
im possible task because according to him, educational va lues  
are re f le c t io n s  o f  m oral, r e l ig io u s  and p o l i t i c a l  stance.
The concept o f  va lue  there fo re  needs to be c l a r i f i e d  fo r  
not u n t i l  we know the meaning o f  va lu e , i t  may not be w ise  
to make value d ec is io n s .
5.7 The Concept o f  V a lue :
The importance in human experience o f  va lues and value  
judgements has long been recognised. The Greek p re -S o c ra t ic  
philosophers were w e l l  aware o f  i t ;  so too were th e ir  
contemporaries in other c iv i l i z a t i o n s .  In the fourth  
century B .C . , P la t o 's  Republic presented a choice between1 
1. Paterson, R.W.K. (1964 -5 ): 'Values in Adult Education '.
Rewley House Papers, V o l . iv ,  No.3 .
214.
a society based on what he regarded as permanent and 
unchanging values -  the forms o f  Goodness, Truth, Justice,  
and the rest -  and a Society dedicated to the passing whims 
o f  s e l f -g r a t i f ic a t io n .  The same awareness o f the importance 
of values in ordinary l i f e  pers is ts  even up to the twentieth
a  A  i
century; by the very lo g ic  o f his position , writes Bentodc, 
" . . .  the educator is  inev itab ly  involved in the world of
va lues” ; and peters : "Education necessarilLy involIves the
in it ia t io n  of children into what is  thought to be va luab le " . 1 2
Whether e x p l ic it ly  recognised or not, values have always 
been powerfully and dec is ive ly  operative both in societies  
and in the l ives  of ind iv idua ls . The word value is  used to 
indicate that something i s  regarded as having worth, as 
attracting  choice or preference. To value something is  to 
ref^rd i t  as choiceworthy, and i t  is  fundamental to the whole 
concept of value that human beings choose, p re fe r , commit 
themselves to what they judge des irab le , valuable , worth 
having or experiencing; fundamental indeed, so i t  would seem, 
to l i f e  i t s e l f  and i t s  higher le v e ls ,  and a d istinguishing  
fea tu re -o f  the human species. Choice, however, implies
f r e e  w i l l  and a re je c t io n  o f  the view that a l l  dec is ion  is
1. Bantock, G. H. (1965 ): Education and va lu es . Faber, p.12
2. pe te rs , R.S. (1966 ): Ethics and Education. George, A llen
and Unwin, p . 75 "
2 2 5 .
determined by environmental conditioning or by a person's  
psycho-physiological make-up. The cen tra lity  of free  choice 
in the concept of the value emphasises human re spon s ib il ity  
fo r  the choice i t s e l f  and fo r  the consequences that follow  
from i t .  Values do not simply have to be accepted or  
perpetuated in unbroken succession from generation to
generation.
An important characteristic  of values is. t_ hat they
carry with them an implication o f consequences; and this is  
done by a deductive implication by normal ru les of inference. 
Commitment to a p art icu la r  value, such as a ffluence or personal 
worth, carr ies  by implication to further values and these 
again to others, so that a whole pattern o f commitment is  
b u i l t  up from the o r ig in a l  value. For instance, i f  affluence  
is  taken to mean a state o f copious material goods, i t  seems 
to imply that material goods are des irab le ; that enjoyment 
o f them is  su p e r io r  to other kinds o f enjoyment; that the 
acquisition  o f  them should be a primary human purpose; and 
that the possession of material goods is  a principal criterion  
fo r  assessing the worth o f ind iv iduals . A ll  these are
further value decisions which can reasonably be in ferred  
from the o r ig in a l  commitment to a ffluence.
yet another characterist ic  o f value is  the ir  r e la t iv i t y .  
This does not mean, as is  often supposed, that there are not 
firm princ ip les  of r igh t  and wrong or that moral decision
226
depends wholly on circumstances, or that i t  can be purely  
egocentric and without reference to other individuals or to 
Society, What i t  does mean is  that value commitment is  not 
immutable but is  related to individual and socia l needs and 
circumstances; new values can be introduced into a pattern of  
commitment or the emphasis in an ex ist ing  pattern changed.
In this circumstance, one might want to know i f  there 
are no absolute values, that i s ,  values that are choiceworthy 
and independent o f time, place and circumstance. The Norwood 
Report o f  1943 has this to say:
Education cannot stop short o f  recognising  
the ideals  of truth and beauty and goodness as 
f in a l  and binding fo r  a l l  times and in a l l  p laces, 
as ultimate values . . .  Education from it s  own nature 
must be ultimately concerned with values which are  ̂
independent of time of part icu lar  environment,
and in the same vein, Jeffreys claims that
the hist-ory o f human thought suggests that 
man w i l l  always recognise the need fo r  ultimate  
values which are timeless in the sense that 
they provide standards by which changes o f manners, 
customs, b e l ie fs  can be judged, and in the l ig h t  of
which the future can be planned. 2
3
Peters a lso writes o f  "ultimate values” which i t  is  a 
f u n c t i o n e d u c a t i o n  to transmit: truth, ra t io n a lity  and
concern for others, he would include among them. In a world 
o f rapid change and moral uncertainty i t  is  comforting, 1
1. Norwood Report o f  1943 on Curriculum and Examinations in 
Secondary Schools; London, HMSO, p . v i i i
2. Garforth, F.W. (1985): Aims, Values and Education. H u ll,  
Christy gate press, p.61
3. peters, R.S. (1966): Ethics and Education. London,
22-7
no doubt, to be lieve in ’absolute* values l ike  truth,
Beauty and Goodness; they give a sense of s t a b i l i t y  and 
of d irect ion .
I t  is  true that there are certain eth ical and aesthetic  
concepts l ik e  ju s t ice ,  r igh t , goodness, beauty, which are 
common to v ir tu a l ly  a l l  soc ie t ies ; but the content o f  each 
of these concepts may vary so widely as to produce quite
and have regu lar ly  sa t is f ied  such c r i t e r ia  as human need and 
socia l cohesion, have now acquired an apparent permanence.
They have become widely accepted as providing rules fo r  the 
conduct of l i f e  and are vested with an authority, almost 
a sanctity , which gives them a powerful normative and 
emotional force; among* these are happiness, freedom and equality .
Agreement on such basic values is  so widespread 
that i t  has sometimes been assumed that mankind is  moving 
slow ly , although with many digressions and much co n fl ic t ,
i  <4
towards universal ethical agreement. Wilson, fo r  instance, 
argues that knowledge and experience have already brought a 
la rge  measure o f agreement on ethical p r in c ip le s , and that 
in the end we can hope fo r  universal consent about a t le a s t  
the most fundamental va lues. " I t  seems . . .  that the 1
1. Wilson, J. (1961): Reason and Morals. O .U .P ., p.152
228
evidence fo r  the likelihood o f eventual unanimity is  
overwhelming: and what is  espec ia lly  s ign if ic a n t ,  i t  a l l  
points the same way. We have not yet met a case where we have 
had proper experience and yet fa i le d  to agree” . The 
implications of this view irrespective o f  the fac t  that one 
accepts i t  or not, is  that values are experimen t a ^ ~  
tentative groupings, guides to further exploration o f  
experience rather than fixed goals . In the same vein, Dewey 
w rite s :  "Honesty, industry, temperance, ju s t ice ,  l ik e  health, 
wealth, and learn ing, are not goods to be possessed, as they 
would be i f  expressed fixed ends X  be attained. They are 
d irections o f change in the quality  of experience. Growth 
i t s e l f  is  the only moral 'e n d ' .1'
To this objection could be raised that i f  growth is  the 
•only moral end*, there arises  the problem of what kind or 
quality  of growth is  des irab le  or choiceworthy. Furthermore, 
the danger o f a b e l ie f  in 'absolute* values is  that i t  is  
l i a b le  to fo s s i l i s e  our thinking about values, makes us less  
open-minded, more res istan t to change and less  inclined to 
attempt to e f fe c t  i t .  Whereas, the present world situation  
requires that we should be prepared for change in values, 
that we should seek and encourage d i f fe re n t  expressions of  
trad it iona l values, that we should str ike  a balance between 1
1. Dewey, J. (1948): Reconstruction in philosophy.
Beacon Press^ p.177 .
229
conservatism and experiment. I f  we are committed to 
absolute values, we may l ik e ly  find this task very d i f f i c u l t .
We have seen from the above ana lys is , suggestion that 
value choices are not wholly dependent on circumstances or 
the whim of the person making them, then one might want to
ask the question as to how value choices are ju s t i f ie dA.
Take fo r  instance, suppose I  commit myself to b e l ie f  in the 
worth o f persons or to happiness, tolerance or any other 
value, how do I  ju s t i fy  th is commitment. In other words, 
what is  the ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  the choice o f happiness as the 
goal o f adult education as i s  the case ^Lth this researcher ? 
There are three main c lasses o f answer to this question.
5.7.1 in tu i tionism:
F ir s t ,  some philosophers have argued that values are 
perceived in tu it ive ly ; that happiness is  choiceworthy is  
not something that can be ju s t i f ie d  by s t r ic t  log ica l  
argument; we see i t  to be so, we know i t  by a kind of d irec t  
mental perception; that human beings are valuable  in themselves 
i s  something which is  obvious to any normal person who takes 
the trouble to look around him and re f le c t  honestly to what
he observes -  and i f  he does not see i t ,  i f  i t  is  not obvious, 
then we must encourage him to look more c a re fu l ly ,  more 
extensively and more re f le c t iv e ly ,  intuitionism holds very 
strongly that terms l ik e  'good* and ’ought* do not stand fo r
230
observable qu a lit ie s  o r  re lat ions and that moral judgements 
are  not inferences from any form o f  empirical generalization#  
This process o f seeing has been interpreted in terms 
of two d is t in c t  sorts o f models, both o f which attempt to 
ground moral knowledge on some kind o f indubitable and
se lf -ev id en t  propositions. The f i r s t  type o f theoryf assunmes 
that terms like  ‘ good* designate some sort of property that 
i s  grasped by a re f le c t iv e  mind. Moore, fo r  example, held 
that good re fe rs  to a simple non-natural unanalysable  
property. That i t  is  not subject to discovery by the use 
o f the senses or by the ordinary process o f introspection  
makes i t  to be non-natural. Yet, i t  is  only when observable  
q u a lit ie s  are present can i t  be discerned. There is  something 
pecu liar with seeing of this type; i t  ^oes beyond ordinary  
gazing; i t  involves some sort  o f in te lle c tu a l process.
A second type o f theory is  that which is  held by Ross that 
moral ..du ties are founded upon a limited number o f  basic  
prima fac ie  ob ligations such as that promises ought to be 
kept, which are known in tu it iv e ly .  1
1. Moore, G. E. (1903): P rlncip ia  Ethica. Cambridge University
Press.
2. Ross, D. (1930): The Right and the Good. Oxford,
The Clarendon press.
231.
5.7 .2  Naturalism;
A second c lass with a number of important variants  
comes under the general heading of 'naturalism *; that is  
to say, ju s t i f ic a t io n  of value judgements is  sought by 
reference to facts about the natural world or about human 
nature. For instance, u t i l i t a r ia n s  have argued that 
"happiness is  un iversa lly  desired and is  therefore d es irab le " ;  
conversely, pain is  un iversa lly  shunned and is  therefore e v i l ;  
these are facts of human nature which they claim, have value 
im plications. Others have appealed to man's d ist inctive
ra t io n a lity  and argued that those a c t iv it ie s  are most 
worthwhile which give mos' " ’ * * " reason;
peters is  one of those. man' s
s o c ia l i t y ;  the fact that he (man) requires society, community, 
in order to be human, whatever promotes community and 
harmonious interpersonal re lationsh ips is  deemed to be valuable .
Dewey, a pragmatist held that the test of values
i s  in their consequences -  facts  or events in the natural 
world ; if^these la t te r  are 'good' (however this is  
in terpreted, but espec ia lly  in the sense of promoting human 
development and the enrichment of experience) then values 
which produce them are choiceworthy.
1 M ill ,  J. S. (1910); o£_. c l t
232
5.7.3 Emotivism:
The third c la ss ,  one variant o f which has had much 
support in the present time, is  that value-choices are not 
so much rational judgements as expressions o f  fe e l in g  or 
attitude sometimes we use language to express or evince 
our fee lings and attitudes and we sometimes do so in order 
to influence the fe e l in g s  and attitudes of others. Thus
persuasive uses of words are intimately bound up together. 
The approach as is argued by Stevenson and Ayer is  in terms 
l ik e  'good* have meaning by expressing how people fee l  and 
by getting others to fe e l  in the same way.
analysis o f
Stevenson's / "This is  good" as " I  approve th is" ; do so as 
well i s  an i l lu s t r a t iv e  example. The argument is  that not
a l l  words have meaning to moral terms in ways which brought 
out what was d is t in c t iv e  o f  them. Thus, tc commit oneself  
to happiness or freedom is  not to re la te  oneself in some way 
to something ob jec t ive ly  existing  -  a value embodied either  
in a culture or in ’ r e a l i t y '  -  but to say something in d irec t ly  
about one 's own emotional condition, namely: ' I  l ik e ,  approve 1
1. Ayer, A. J. (1936): Language, Truth and Logic . London,
Gollancz.
2. Stevenson, C.L. (1944): Ethics and Language. Newhaven,
Yale Un ivers ity  Press.
233
o f ,  commend, esteem happiness or freedom*. And this i s  a l l  
the ju s t i f ic a t io n  i t  i s  possib le  to give -  my approval o f i t .
There are objections to a l l  three of these attempts 
at ju s t i f ic a t io n ,  intuitionism re l ie s  too much on personal 
vision  and has about i t ,  therefore, a certain  a i r  o A  
a rb itra r in ess ; when two such visions disagree as they do,
how does one decide between them ? What evide;nncce ,can one
adduce, what tests apply to show that one is  better than the
other ? There seems no sa tis fac tory  answer to th is . I t  is
much the same with emotivism: i f  value judgements are merely
expressions o f  fee lings  or attitude , then I  have as much
r igh t  to mine as the next man to h is ;  the question 'which is
be tte r '?  does not a r is e ,  fo r  they are both o f equal status.
The objection to naturalism is  no less cogent.
facts about
To argue from /human nature or the world around us to values, 
from what is  or is  valued, is  lo g ic a l ly  in va lid ; to have an 
'ought' in the conclusion there must be an 'ought' in the 
premises. For example, M i l l ' s  argument quoted above, from 
the fac t  that happiness îs desired to the conclusion that 
i t  ought to be desired would be more va lid  i f  i t  runs thus: 
a l l  men desire  happiness; what a l l  men desire  is  something 
that ought to be pursued. But the second stage in the argument 
is  not fact  at a l l ;  i t  is  i t s e l f  a value judgement requiring  
ju s t i f ic a t io n .
234
I t  seems that there is  no lo g ic a l ly  compelling argument 
by which values and value choices can be ju s t i f ie d .  About 
some, i t  is  certa in ly  possib le  to achieve a f a i r  measure of  
agreement. Most normal human beings pre fer happiness to 
misery, though there could be disagreement about what 
constitutes happiness; within a p art icu la r  culture (say in a 
democratic setting) there is  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f agreement 
about the value of freedom though there w i l l  be d ifferences  
o f view about their meaning and practica l app lication .
Religion too, is  a means to conformity in value judgements 
most Christians agree that ' lo v e ' < D  joined upon them by 
the teaching of Jesus though once again, the interpretation  
o f 'Love' into practica l terms constitutes a source of  
endless argument. Human nature, human experience, cultural  
trad ition  and re lig iou s  doctrine are important guides but 
not f in a l  authorities in value judgements; there remains 
(concluded G arfo rth ), always an element o f fa ith ,  o f personal 
commitment, and the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  experiment and change.
5.8 Values in Adult Education:
Paterson suggested that there are no special 'adu lt  
educational va lues ' but that given someone's b e l ie fs  about 1
1. Garforth, F. W. (1985): op. c i t . , p . 6 6
2. Paterson, R.W.K. (1964-5): "Values in Adult Education".
Rewley House Papers, V o l . iv ,  No.3 .
235
man's cosmic s ituation , and given his b e l ie f s  about the 
nature of knowledge, of Society and o f the place o f education
in i t -  we have already been given his adult educational 
values. He went on to explain that in order to understand
the nature and purpose of adult education, i t  is  a necessary 
and su f f ic ie n t  condition to understand the nature and purpose 
o f education in general. The fa c t  that the aims of adult 
education are simply the aims of a l l  education however, does 
not mean that teaching methods, administrative arrangements 
should be the same; i f  the aims are to be re a liz ed , in special 
circumstances o f adult education, they need to be modified 
accordingly. Like Garforth, he too opined that adult  
education values are nothing but our re l ig io u s ,  moral, social 
and other general values restated within the adult educational 
sett ing . He then went ahead to show how his notion is  l ik e ly  
to work out in a part icu la r  case by presenting in outline  
fashion, the 'adu lt  educational' va lue-position  that might be 
associated wi^h a part icu la r  world view.
A metaphysical frame of reference would see human 
beings as inhabitants of a trackless world without signs,
which to the inhabitants respond to their c a l l  fo r  in tr in s ic  
meaning. I f  re a l i ty  is  s ign if ican t ,  i t  is  the inhabitants 
who must 'invent ' i t s  s ign ificance . While epistemological 
frame of reference stresses the s ign if ic an t  r e a l i t y  as being 
inverted by human beings, i t  fo llows that the ir  knowledge o f
236..
the world cannot be d issociated from what they are in 
themselves and what they make o f themselves. Knowledge is  a 
total response of the person who knows; i t  i s  personally  
involved experience; i t  is  knowledge as l ived . Yet, fo r  moral 
frame o f  reference, human beings are absolutely incommensurable 
with one another, fo r  no two human beings inhabit the same 
'w orld*. There can therefore be no 'commun' n beings.
But there can be communication between them that
one can witness the free  se lf-expression  o f the r e a l i t y  which 
i s  'another ',  and one can exhibit his own re a l i t y  in return. 
This is  the only way in which one man can help another to 
attain  'au thentic ity ' as a person, that i s ,  to accept absolute
re spon s ib il ity  fo r  everyth' has made of onese lf .
From these, he gave e o f derivative  value-systems
These are: . . G .........................................................
(a ) Social Resistance must be offered to a l l  the socia l  
forces which threaten to engulf personal identity  or to 
reduce individual respon s ib il ity . The mass man lo s t  in 
the anonymity o f  the crowd, has fo r fe ited  his spontaneity 
and thereby his humanity.
(b ) Aesthetic. Since not only one 's own identity , but 
s ign if ic an t  r e a l i t y  i t s e l f ,  is  an 'in ven t io n ',  an 
a rte fa c t ,  a r t i s t i c  c rea t iv ity  is  the archetype o f free  
human ac t iv ity .  The crucial function o f  a r t  i s  to 
construct a personality  meaningful re a l i ty  and to 
communicate this r e a l i t y ,  despite i t s  essentia l  
'inwardness, to others who are engaged in the same 
pro ject.
2 3 7 .
(c ) Educational. Education is  a process o f  s e l f -
re f ineraent by means o f interpersonal communication.
The individual is  educated by witnessing the free  
self-m anifestation  o f  his fe llow s pa rt icu la r ly  his  
mature fe llow s. The ch ie f aim of education is  to 
develop 'au then tic ity1, to lead individuals to 
acknowledge their so le  re spon s ib ility  fo r  th e ir  personal 
character and id en t ity ,  and in this the educator must 
respect the in v io lab le  sanctity of the p u p i l 's  nature.
He must stimulate and d isc lo se ,  not inculcate or d irect .
To this end, impersonal, factual studies are e ssen t ia lly  
irre levan t. The v i t a l  ro le  in education belongs to 
the c r i t ic a l  and r e f le c t iv e  studies, which fo ste r  an 
urgent and committed se lf-quesi ng - 1
This simple p ro f i le ,  he believes,may serve to i l lu s t r a t e  
some of the ways in which the judgements o f an adult
educationist are derived from his basic  world views.
Now back to questions o f  the value and purpose o f  the 
education of adults. We should try to see such questions as 
•open questions' of adu lt  education, in the sense that they 
needed and deserve continual restatement, and any answers 
we give to them must be tentative and open to constant review. 
We say this because o f the controversy between those who 
regard adult education as an essen tia lly  educational pro ject  
and those who regard i t  as an exercise in community development 
or as a form o f  Social Service.
1. Paterson, R.W.K. (1964-5) op. c i t . . pp.49-50.
CHAPTER SIX
UTILITARIANISM AS AN AIM OF 
ADULT EDUCATION
6.1 Introduction:
We have so fa r  in the course of this research 
attempted a conceptual analysis o f the term U tilita r ian ism ,  
and have found that U tilita r ian ism  means "happiness and the
absence o f pain". We have further discove red that  happiness 
is  so involving that i t  does not constitute i t s e l f  as a 
stra igh t  goal to be aimed at. Though i t  could be claimed 
to be a dominant end, i t  i s ,  however, an end which includes 
the attainment of other ends. I t  is  these other ends that
we shall concern ourselves wvith iin this chapter. The 
rationale  for this .adventure is  the fa ith  that these other 
ends are capable of serving as focus for the purposes of 
evaluation at the end of any particu lar  adult education 
programme. We hope that this w i l l  provide an answer to our 
question of the p o s s ib i l i t y  of breaking down happiness into  
units o fr learning.
We shall therefore take a theory of happiness which is
believed to be sp e c i f ic ,  a tta inab le  and measurable
239.
6.2 A Theory o f Happiness:
What are the ideals  of happiness ? what is  the 
defin it ion  of happiness? what is  the foundation of happiness? 
Answers to these questions constitute a theory of happiness.
Idea ls  of Happiness:
There are at le a s t  three well-known philosophical 
accounts of happiness or idea ls  o f the happ These
are set out by Von Wright. He c a l l s  the f i r s t  o f these 
’Epicurean id e a l s ' ,  according to which happiness consists 
in having (as opposed to doing) certain things that give 
one pleasure. For example, one might have pleasure from 
having certain possessions, or from being well thought o f ,  
or from globe trotting. Happiness fo r  such an individual 
consists , then in getting su f f ic ie n t  pleasure by having 
enough of these pleasure-producing things; on this view, 
the objects to berim ed at would be pleasure-producing thir.cs. 
we do no t however see this as a perfect ideal o f happiness 
because there 11 be some people who would not be happy 
receiving this type o f passive p leasures. We may only look 
upon A  ju st  one way of atta in ing happiness, which w i l l
work; fo r some people but not fo r  a l l  people.
1 Wright, Von (1963): The Varieties  o f Goodness. 
Routledge and Kegan P au l, London, p.41
240.
The second kind of ideal of the happy l i f e  is  one that
is  found in the w rit ings o f u t i l i t a r ia n s ,  in which happiness
depends upon the satis faction  of des ires . "Happiness, on
such a view, is  e ssen tia lly  contentedness -  an equilibrium
between needs and wants on the one hand and sa tis fac tion  
on the other". 1  On thi.s view happiness is  having one's
wants, e ither most o f  them, or perhaps one 's importa nt wants 
f u l f i l l e d .  There is  however, a sub-class o f this kind of  
happiness known as the ascetic  id ea l.  According to the 
ascetic  id e a l ,  one should minimize one's wants so as to 
maximize the chance o f sa tis faction  and thus happiness.
The aim on this u t i l i t a r ia n  view would be the fu lfilm ent  
of as many as possib le  of oneSg; needs and wants. That one 
has suppressed some desi n order to avoid frustration  -
a situation  which we know leads to unhappiness does not 
guarantee absolute happiness. To avoid unhappiness is  not 
the same as to b^Tftappy.
The third type of ideal of happiness given by '//right 
is  that found in A r is to t le  in which happiness is  thought
to com m the pleasure that one takes in certain things
or a c t iv i t ie s  -  espec ia lly  those that involve capacities  
that one has made an e f fo r t  to develop. For example, one 
may enjoy playing 'ayo ' game or w rest ling ; and the better  
one is  at these a c t iv i t ie s ,  the more one enjoys doing them;
1 Wright, Von (1963): £D. c i t . , p. 93
and the happier one i s .  The ambition on this view would be 
opportunity to develop and exercise these capacities as much 
as one desired.
These three id e a ls ,  that i s ,  having what gives pleasure, 
having a favourable balance between needs and wants and their  
fu lfi lm ent and engaging in enjoyed a c t iv i t ie s ,  do not, i f  
taken as separate ideals give an adequate accountyjf 
happiness. Rather, the three Dut together would constitute
a complete ideal of happiness. 
Happiness Defined;
Happiness w i l l  thus be defined in terms of wants and 
sa t is fac t ion . A man w i l l  be ui ■mappy i f  he cannot get what 
he wants, as such, ’happiness "Nj^s the name we give to what a 
man wants when we consider the objects o f  his desire  not 
seve ra l ly ,  but c o l le c t iv e ly .  Getting what one wants is  not 
only a necessary condition of happiness but also a su f f ic ie n t  
condition. Happiness is  thus conceived o f as the sa tis fac tion  
of des ire  or pleasure. But what do we mean by sa t is fac t ion ,  
and what are those things i f  there are, that can arouse our 
des ire  fo r  wanting something? There appears to be some
confusion in this question. Are we suggesting what we want 
or that when we have decided on what we want, then go ahead 
to find a means of sa t is fy in g  them? Or are they both the same 
thing? We would perhaps say that they are two d i f fe re n t  
issues. Though in treating them as separate issues, we may
242
not be able  to avoid ideas running into each other. We shall  
take them as s p l i t  issues , though not considering the issue  
of sequence.
Thus we sha ll attempt to answer the question of what we 
mean by 'Sa tis faction  ' .  V/e. shall elucidate this meaning by 
breaking down into three component parts, what a sa t is fy in g  
ac t iv ity  is .
Beinq Satis fied  v/ith Something:
'Being s a t is f ie d '  has an ob ject, although a very general
one which is  person re la t iv e .  The central idea is  'being  
sa t is f ied  w ith ' something, and we shall try to explain this 
notion. The idea of being sa t is f ied  v/ith something implies 
that one's hopes, expectation^, requirements, demands, etc. 
are involved. I f  a man says that he is  sa t is f ied  v/ith his  
accomplishments, he implies that what he has accomplished 
does not f a l l  short o f his hopes and expectations, with the 
aoals which he has, e x p l ic i t ly  or im Dlicitly  set himself. 
Thus, one^be sa t is f ied  or d is sa t is f ie d  with one's job, one's  
marriage, one's lots in l i f e .  I t  would seem in addition that 
one could even be sa t is f ied  or d is sa t is f ied  with such things 
as the national or world s ituation , so long as one sees 
oneself bound up with these. I t  is  d i f f i c u l t ,  however, to 
see how one could be s a t is f ie d  or d is sa t is f ied  with some 
state of a f fa i r s  which does not d irectly  a ffec t  one
243.
When c le is  s a t is f i ed  with something, one need not 
be sa t is f ied  with every aspect of  i t .  One need only be 
sa t is f ied  with most o f  i t ,  or with the important aspects 
of i t ,  so that on the whole, one’ s satis faction  with 
something su f f ic ien t ly  outweighs the d issat is fac t ion  with 
i t .  Whether one is  sa t is f ied  with something can be 
determined by seeing whether cne fee ls  sa t is ffie  d ’ with i t .
The fee l ing  of sa t is fact ion  needs some c la r i f ic a t ion  here. 
To say that one fee ls  sa t is f ied  with one's job means that
one fee ls  sa t is f ied  because one judges that the object of 
some expectation connected with one’s job is  rea l ized ,  and 
that one gets or expects to get is  or w i l l  be worthwhile. 
One thus fee ls  sa t is f ied  with something only i f  one gets
a fee l ing  of enjoyment 4 cau, sed by his judging that the 
object of some expec:tatiion has been realized, we may
conclude that happiness i s  a matter of getting whatever 
i t  is  that one wants and finding i t  worthwhile when one 
gets i t .
Now le t  us see how happiness can be defined in terms
To want something is  to desire i t .  We may want
to know as to how we come about our various desires .  These 
can be aroused psychologically ,  in te l le c tu a l ly ,  and so c ia l ly .  
Thirst or hunger, fo r  example, may lead to our des ire  for  
water or food. Thus our des ire  for water or food w i l l  be
244.
sa t is f ied  as soon as we get what we want. However, a bott le  
of Pepsi-Cola, which is  equally l iqu id  in nature may meet 
our desire, but i t  w i l l  not sa t is fy  i t  in the way water w i l l .  
So, for a desire to be sa t is f ied ,  that which is desired must 
be compatible with the nature of need. Food, for example,
is  desired by a hungry person and not a th irsty one.
We may however have 3 desire, but not a w i l l  to sa t is fy  
i t .  I f  one has a desire for in te l lectua l  pursuit, but 
because one is  a j o l l y  fe l low, and the meriments of the 
society keeps inviting one to parties ,  to such an extent that
one finds i t  d i f f i c u l t  to s i t  in one's l ib ra ry  to do some
academic work, such invitations may obstruct one's w i l l  to 
sa t is fy  one's in te l lec tua l  des ire .  That one has not enough 
strong w i l l  to detach oneself from one’ s friends is a great  
impediment to one's desire ;  that one has not been able to do 
what one wants in l i f e  therefore makes one fee l  unhappy.
So, i t  is  not only enough to have a desire , but there must be 
a w i l l  strong enough to enable one to be able to sa t is fy  
such a desire.
There is need however, to make a c la r i f i c a t io n  between 
these three words: that i s ,  want, desire and need. When we 
say that we want something, the reason may be because such a 
thing appeals to us. Such an appeal is  always very fr ivo lous ,  
arising out of ah state of  luxury. For example, one may want 
a pair of blue shoes. But i f  one says that one desires a pair  
of blue shoes, i t  means that a pair  which is  perhaps not as 
expensive as the blue pair has been given to such a person.
Desire is  a kind of reward for stewardship. I desire a 
better treatment means that the treatment given to me f a l l s  
short of my expectation. Again, these are not as weighty as 
need. I need blue shoes w i l l  perhaps mean that no other 
colour of shoes w i l l  meet the condition for which that
245.
part icu lar  pair of shoes is  cal led  for
Need is  a kind of compulsion and always objective in 
nature. W« may want to interprete need as fr ivo lous,  luxury, 
appeal; desire as reward, expectation and treatment that is  
related to one’ s status; and need as compulsory, necessary, 
rational demand which is  ob ject ive ly  demanded.
But i t  may not be enough to only have a desire and w i l l  
to be acle to sat is fy  one's wants. Other conditions such as 
aptitude, opportunity, p r iv i lege ,  need to be met. Though 
these other conditions may be situations beyond the control 
of an individual,  yet because they could cause some
obstruction to the satis faction  
important they be removed.
So, the saying that a happy n who
gets what he wants in l i f e  is  true to the extent that the 
three conditions we have just enumerated are met.
We find a practica l  expression of method of attaining  
sat is fact ion  in M i l l ' s  account of happiness in his proof of 
ut i l i ta r ian ism .  Mill understood happiness or well-being  
in terras of  harmonious satis faction  of the desires of the 
ind iv idua l.  His conception of well -being i s  his conviction 
that man is a social, as well as an in te l le c tua l  animal, and 
that a large part of his happiness depends upon the s a t i s ­
faction of his social impulses and other regarding sentiments. 
To know this, he suggested, involves enlightenment, i f  men 
su f f ic ien t ly  understand themselves, and are not distracted  
by fa lse  conceptions of the human s ituation .  Mill  thus 
opined that enlightenment wculd necessitate the provision of 
l i b e r ty .  He went on to give his reason for th is .
According to him, the primary social factor in modern l i f e  
which blocks the way of individual and co l lec t ive  well -being  
is  the widespread interference of inst i tu t ions ,  formal and
246
informal, with individual self-development. For him, l ibe r ty  
i s  both a means and an end, a condition of the general welfare  
and an in tr in s ic  component of personal happiness. He is  
very spec i f ic  about his type of l ib e r ty  and these are, freedom 
of thought, freedom to choose one's vocation and freedom of 
association and speech.
What then are we to understand by the claim that adult 
education is aimed at the promotion of the * ’'S happiness ?
I f  educators are co aim at promoting the go ;heir learners,
their work is two-fold; partly a matter of enlarging  
understanding and partly to do with shaping disposition to 
behave in certain ways. The learner has to understand in 
general terms, what his well -be ing  consists in. He has to see 
himself as an animal with su d such an array of natural
desires and to appreciate the way in which these desires may 
take d i f fe rent  forms owing to cultura l  influences and new 
desires of a l l  kinds be b u i l t  up out of them.
I t  w i l l  be reca l led  that Hostler emphasised three 
fundamental aim»H.n adult education. These are: 'autonomy' 
which, according to him, prescribes the student's r ight to 
choose the classes he w i l l  attend. Autonomy in turn implies 
ind iv idua l i ty , which enjoins that he should develop in a 
unique way.
Hostler, (1981): op. c i t . , p.56
247
And i t  also enta i ls  equality in his relationship with 
the tutor, whereby both o f  then develop through the process 
of learning together. This type of equality no doubt, f a l l s  
within the ideology of radica l  humanism. And such humanism 
is  e xp l ic i t  in many adult educators' w rit ings ,  sugfj!| as Rogers, 
Knowles and Jarvis.  One o f  the most s ign i f ican t  of a l l  
adult educators to adopt this position and to pursue i t  to 
i t s  log ica l  conclusion is  Paulo Freire and his work w i l l  be 
discussed in this chapter.
One of the main aims of adult educators v/ho have adopted 
a humanistic position is  the development of the s e l f  of the 
learner and at the heart o f  Knowles' theory of  andragogy l i e s
the idea of the s e l f  of g a r n e r .  ,Vne'e shall  therefore take
an analysis o f  the s e l f  and this w i l l  lead to a discussion of  
the learning cycle in which learning is  viewed as a process of
re f lect ion  upon^fjHperiences rather than memorisation o f  data.
bo far we'have been concerned with the u t i l i t a r i a n  aims 
of adult education. We have tried to bring out the elements 
of happiness that can be incorporated in an adult education 
programme. These elements can further be developed in the 
curriculum process. Thus, happiness can become a part of  the 
curricula ac t iv ity  of the adult education programme. The 
* formulation o f  aims are fo r  the achievement o f  part icu lar
target.  I f  care i s  not taken, the target which is  aimed at  
may not be attained. That 'ca re '  is the means, the process
248
or method by which the target is  attained. A good aim can 
therefore be spo i lt  or prolonged by bad means.
Therefore, when we say that we are aiming at something, 
i t  might be r ight to ask why, the answer to such a question 
may further lead to a further question how. To aim at 
something is to have a good reason, whether psychological or 
soc io log ica l .  The success of  a good reason depends heavily  
on a good approach (method). I t  follows therefore that a
good aim plus a good method leads to a good end. I t  does not 
fo l lo w  however that a good aim tantamoun^^/a good method.
The two ac t iv i t ie s  though related are <iot the same. 
C la r i f ic a t ion  o f  aim i s  a necessary though not su f f ic ien t  
condition for the establishment c f  methodology. I t  is  l ike  
policy and implementation . X  such, our next task v/ill be 
the c la r i f i c a t io n  of adult education methods.
6 . 3  Methods o f  Teaching:
Education j.^N^iten regarded, in some way, as the 
transmission cfTy knowledge. But im plic it  in this type of 
def in it ion  is  an extremely limited teaching methodology.
This methodology is  reflected in the idea that teaching is  
a one-way communication process and that education is merely
t
249.
the communication of knowledge that should be acquired and
reproduced. However, there are a variety of other approaches 
. , i
to teaching which Jarvis outlined. These methods are 
c la ss i f ied  within a framework of three broad types: 
didactic ,  Socratic and f a c i l i t a t i v e .  Below is  a b r ie f  
discussion of each type.
Didactic Methods: Didactic aDDroaches to tbeachin g generally
assume a one-way communication approach and that a selection  
of culture should, fo r  a variety of reasons, be transmitted 
to the students to learn. This knowledge is  usually taught 
by the lecture, or some other s imilar mode of  instruction.  
Indeed, there is  a sense in which the education versus training  
debate can be placed within this context. Training, i t  is  
assumed, emphasizes the lea rner 's  dependence and education 
i s  viewed as creating a much more autonomous individual.
Didacticism s i g n i f ie s  a form of  education from above 
in which the learner i s  regarded as an empty receptacle that 
needs to be f i l l e d  with the knowledge and wisdom that emanate 
from thi icher. This approach does imply a concept o f  man
tha t be moulded by external forces, so that i t  is  not
surprising that Bourdieu and Passeron claim that 'a l l  1
1. Jarv is ,  P. (1983): Adult and Continuing Education: Theory
and Pract ice . London, Croom Helm, pp. 120 -  9.
2. Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J.C. (1977): Reproduction in
Education, society  and Culture. London,
Sage publications.
250
pedagogic action is objectively symbolic violence insofar 
as i t  is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary 
power*. Hence, in the process of teaching, the social 
relationships of the wider society are reproduced and the
knowledge to be learned is presented to the learner.
Bourdieu and Passeron are also as clearly concerned about 
the curriculum content as about the method whereby the content 
is presented but they are mentioned here simply because their 
approach emphasizes the method. However, they proceed to 
point out that such pedagogic action presupposes an authority 
to impose such symbolic violence u pon individuals, authority
which reinforces the arbitrary power which establishes i t  
and which it  conceals.
It  might be claimed that this form of analysis is valid 
for in it ia l  education but it  is not true for the education of 
adults because tne learners are voluntarily present and that 
ou aside o f  the sc(l^xfc of the classroom, some of the learners 
may be in higher positions in the social hierarchy than the 
teacher s t education is not reproducing the social
s r
situati However, this argument"does not hold good, since
in the context of the teaching and learning, didacticism does
reproduce a hierarchial relationship and the fact that some 
of the learners may forego their status within such a 
relationship merely serves to reinforce the validity of
2 5 1 .
such a hierarchical structure. That the learner is not 
always compelled to attend adult and continuing education 
classes hardly alters the fact that the learner may be 
prepared to have his self moulded by agencies other than 
himself in a manner that some might view as symbolic violence.
Didacticism is ,  therefore, a technique of control 
insofar as the method by which the content presented is 
authoritative and often authoritarian. Frequently, the 
learner is expected to reproduce i t  but rarely is he given 
the opportunity to debate i t .  in some liberal adult education 
classes, debate often follows a didactic presentation, and 
in these instances, i t  is clear that Bourdieu's and Passeron's 
claim would be less valid, but then it  might also be that 
ultimately this teaching metnod may not be totally didactic. 
Overall, didacticism that allows for no debate and expects 
the memorization and reproduction of knowledge presented in 
a form of educa from above is nothing but a means to 
mould t:he indiviidual to f i t  into the structure of the wider 
society.
Socratic Approaches: Unlike the previous techniaue in which 
learners are required only to memorize what is presented to 
them from above, this approach encourages the human process 
of learning. Socratic teaching methods are sometimes employed 
in adult and continuing education. In this approach, the
252
teacher either takes the students through a prepared, logical 
sequence of questions or the teacher responds to the students' 
response with further questions, so that the onus is always 
on the learners to formulate their reply to the teacher.
One outcome of this process may be that the students reach a new
. had reached
position in logical knowledge from that which they / previously.
Alternatively, the teacher may have so
controlled the process that the outcome of the teaching and
learning process is that the students are le f t  with the 
culturally accepted knowledge and that since i t  appeared to
be arrived at in a democratic manner may be accepted and
acted upon more readily by the group as a whole; Since 
Lewin and his associates discovered that where the participants 
had helped to set group goalk, they would more likely be 
committed to the outcome. In this instance, therefore, while 
an impression of democracy is given, the outcome may merely 
be a more effectiveS^etnod of control than didactic teaching 
and, as such,, vi tf ‘ retmains a form of education from above.
Howeve:c ' t  fact that in this instance, students are
given the opportunity to reach their own conclusions actually
does create a situation in which a more explicitly reflective 
learning process is encouraged, in this instance, the agent 
is less constrained by social pressures than he is when he
Lewin and his Associates cited in Jarvis, P. (1985):
The Sociology of Adult and Continuing Education; London, 
Froom Helm.
is  merely required to memorise and to reproduce that which 
he has been presented. Hence the p o s s ib i l i t y  of the learners  
reaching conclusions other than those held by the teacher must 
ex ist  and, provided that there are no other methods of control  
such as examinations, therefore, the teacher may be seen to 
be embarking upon an educational process of equal:
Fac i l i ta t ive  Methods: In this approach, the educat or of  
adults creates a situation in which learniqtf may occur.
He may, for instance, seek to create an awareness of a special  
learning need in the student; endeavour to confront a student 
or students, with a problem requ ir ing  a solution; provide
the student(s) with an experience and encourage re f lect ion  
upon i t .  In a l l  of these instances, an outcome of the act iv ity  
should be that learning has occurred, but the teacher's ro le  
has not been to control the learning outcome but to f a c i l i t a t e  
the learning process.
Hence, the potent ia l i ty  exists  in such a situation
for the learning outcomes to be tota l ly  d i f fe rent  from those
which th^ teacher had perhaps anticipated. This re f lects
the e a r l i e r  discussion on behavioural and expressive
objectives;  for in f a c i l i t a t i v e  teaching, the only possible
form of objectives that the teacher may legitimately have
is  expressive, for the learning outcome should in no way be 
controlled by the teacher. Thus, the education of equals 
appears when this teaching method is  employed. Even so,
254
i t  might be objected that the teacher i s  in a position to 
manipulate the environment, so that the learning outcomes 
are s t i l l  under the teacher's control.  Such a poss ib i l i ty  
must always exist  though i t  might be claimed that this is
an abuse of the teacher's o f f i c e .  As Dewey, writing about
education of children claims:
I t  is  possible,  of course, to abuse the o f f ice ,  
and to force the act iv ity  of the young into channels 
which express the teacher's purpose rather than 
that of the pupils .  But the way to avoid this 
danger is  not for  the adult to withdraw entire ly .
The way is ,  f i r s t ,  for the teacher to be in te l l ig en t ly  aware
of the capacities,  needs, and past experience of those under
instruction made to develop into a plan and project by means
of the further suggestions contri butea and organized into a
whole by the members of the group. The plan, in other words,
is  a cooperative enterprise, not a d ictat ion .
While Dewey's terminology may not be that which an educator
of adults might use, the sentiments are those of  which he
might approv^*"} We shall  now take an analysis of the word
' s e l f ' . S - *
— (1938): Experience and Education. London,
— >Collier-Macmillan Publishers, pp. 71 -  72,
255
The Self:
The strategy-based radicals are in various ways concerned
T
with the humanity of the learner. Rogers, for instance, 
focusses upon both the se lf  of the learner and the achievement 
of freedom, yet Rogers, like others of this school, spends 
l i t t le  time on the constraints of the social structure on the 
self ;  this is a point to which further references wil l  be made 
below. Knowles, locates his f i r s t  major difference between 
andragogy and pedagogy in the concept off th^learnert 
claiminc that:
. . .  something dramatic hapjpens to tnheiir self  
concepts when people define themselves as adults. 
They begin to see their normal role in l i f e  
no longer as being full-time learners. They see 
themselves increasingly as producers or doers. 
Their chief sources of self-fulfilment are now 
their performer. ces as workers, spouses, parents, 
and citizens -
The developmentaolf. . th<e person is clearly central to this 
perspective but the above quotation raises a number of 
auestionsNthat reauire further examination.
*1 —• Rogers, C.R. (1969): Freedom to Learn. Columbus, 
Charles E. Ohio M err i l l  publis'nina Co.
2. Knowles, M.S. (1980) The Modern Practice of Adult
Education. Chicago Association press, (Revised ed.)
p.45 .
256
Knowles focuses upon the self concept of the learner 
but produces no evidence to substantiate his claim that 
adults see themselves as self-directed, even though he 
acknowledges that children may also be self-directed and 
he accuses Society of preventing this occurring.
Nevertheless, he makes no reference to the thorough discussion
of the self that various social interactionists and
phenomenoiog. ists have undertaken. For instance, Mead 1 argues
that the Self is the product of interaction between the 
individual and, in it ia l ly ,  significant others. In this 
early socialization process, a body of knowledge, meaning 
and experience acquired by individuals becomes detached from 
the immediate experience of the individual and assumes an 
independence. This detachrae^^ leads to an individuation of 
consciousness which permits the construction of schemes of 
meaning which allow for the individual to interact with 
himself as an objective reality in a 'I -  ME' dialogue. 
Hence, he argues that both reason and the self-consciousness 
emerge in a o  individual as a result of interaction with 
others ■Sr , ,
iwo questions immediately demand discussion here:
is not the conception that the self is a creation of social 
interaction a confirmation that man is created by Society,
* 1 Mead, G.H. (1938): Mind, Self and Society 
University of Chicago press.
and, therefore, evidence that there is  only one sociology? 
And, secondly, i s  Knowles correct when he claims that 
something dramatic happens to the s e l f  concept when people 
define themselves as adults?
Mead was aware of the issue of the Social Se lf  and he 
discussed, but r ight ly  re jected, the p o s s ib i l i t y  that the 
Se l f  is an independent entity.  However, is  the assertion  
that the se l f  is  a social evidence that man is  merely the 
product or the social group into which he i*s bcrn? This is
a view that was prevalent in Sociology during a stage in i ts
now finds
development but i t  is  not one that / favour with Socio log ists ,  
i  
Wrong, 1 drawing on t
"he work of Freud, sought
to show that this resulted in an iS^er-socialized conception 
of man and one that is  f a l s e  to experience. Hence, the 
problem is to explain ho>fa independent Se l f  can emerge in 
an individual since i t  is 'the product of Society. In a 
p lu ra l i s t  s o c i e t y , i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l  be exposed to several  
d i f fe ren t  inter tions of  any r e a l i t y ,  especia l ly  ever a
period of time, so that in order to understand that re a l i ty  
the individual has to decide upon which of  the interpretations,  
i f  any, to accept and espouse. The more that the individual  
i s  able to re f le c t  and decide from a lternat ives ,  the more 
l ik e ly  he is  able to emerge as a se l f -d i rec ted  person.1 
1. v/rong, D.H. (1961): 'The oversocialized Conception of  
Man in Modern Socio logy ' ;  American Sociological  
Review, Vol. 26.
258
Not a l l  people achieve the same degree of independence and 
se l f -d i rec t ion  and in i t i a l  education, with i t s  tradit ional  
didactic  methods, with the exception of primary education,
X
may not encourage the process. Reisman snowed that while  
some adults are 'inner d irec ted ' ,  others are ' t rad it ion  
directed '  and even 'other d irected ' .  Hence, i t  i s  suggested 
that since the s e l f  i s  a social  construct, some individuals  
do not acquire as high a degree of s e l f -d i r e c t i '  as others
durina their socia l izat ion  and in i t i a l  educa Su ch
se l f -d i rec t ion  does not, therefore, emerge with adulthood: 
for  some, i t  occurs ear ly  in their l ives and for  others,  
i t  may not appear unt i l  much later  at a l l . Indeed,
other directed individuals may have what is  known as 'Protean
S e l f '  described by Sennett.
As a b e l i e f  that one‘' s < p< eN rsonality is  always 
undergoing fundamental changes, or is capable 
of doing so. There is  no core o f  ' innate ' human 
nature or fixed social  condition that defines i t .
I t  is a Self 'SO immanent in tne world that i t  is  
a creature of immediate appearance and sensations.
This selfhood puts an immense premium on 'd i r e c t '  
experiences with other people; i t  detests reserves  
or masks behind which other people are f e l t  to lurk,1 
1. Reisman, D. (1950): 'The Lonely crowd: A Study of  
Changing American Character '.  quoted in 
Jarv is ,  P. (1985): £p. ci t .
259.
because in being d istant,  they seem to be 
inauthentic, not taking the immediate moment 
of human contact as an absolute .
Ther° is a sense in which some forms of adult education,
espec ia l ly  in i ts  a f fec t ive  form, seek to remove the barr ie rs
that prevent se l f -d isc lo su re  and endeavour to f a c i l i t a t e  a
community fee l ing  in which the participants reveal themselves
to each other. Sennett regards s e l f  'd isc losure of one',
fee l ings  to others ' in an attempt to create Gomeinschaft
as something destructive to the participa n -t s / ince advanced
industr ia l  societies  demand individuals who do not necessari ly
seek to share their fee l ings  and certa in ly  do not need to do
so. This inner-direction or se l f -d i rec t io n  may be a condition
of social maturity in such a society, but this is  not
necessari ly  to be equated witi -hU   a-N dulthood in the manner that 
Knowles implies.
Whenever se l f -d i rec t ion  begins i t  does not, however,
imcly the stratecy-based humanistic aim of seekina to ensure
the development O.f the s e l f  in the teaching and learning
transactio merely points to the fac t  that adults are
at d i f fe ren t  leve ls  of self-development and independence
when they embark upon a learning project and that adult
educators may need to diagnose the degree of  individual  
development i f  they are to employ f a c i l i t a t i v e  methods of  
teaching and learning.1 
1. sennett, R. (1980): 'Destructive Gemeinschaft' quoted 
in Jarv is ,  P. (1985): op. c i t . , p.101
Ib id .  p .102
260
The third point in the quotation from Knowles that 
requires examination is his assumption that the chief source 
of adu lts '  fu lf i lment is  their performance as workers, 
spouses, etc. The assumption here is that adulthood w i l l  
resu lt  in a socia l  conformity and that in performing soc ia l ly  
prescribed ro les ,  the individual discovers s e l f - fu l f i lm en t .
The implications of this position are im p lic it ly  conservative 
and that the social structures exercise no constraint upon 
the indiv idual.  No consideration is given to the fact that 
for many able persons, the constraints of the social  structure
^ t h o s e  lower in the socia l  
hierarchy to be so c ia l ly  mobile upwards and to obtain the type 
of employment that is  in t r in s ic a l ly  sa t is fy ing ,  so that 
individuals are not a l l  to ta l ly  free agents in the way that 
l ib e ra l  adult education assumes. While a person may be free  
to think, he may be constrained from acting by the structures  
of Society.. This is  where one finds i t  d i f f i c u l t  to see the 
re a l i t y  Paulo F re i re 's  method of l iberat ion .  He espoused 
that the oppressed should free themselves from the shackles 
of the oppressors. There is need therefore to examine his 
teaching strategy with a view to assessing i t s  po s s ib i l i ty  
of achieving a true l iberat ion  of thought and action.
The Teaching Strategy of Paulo Freire;
Any examination o f  the works of  Freire would reveal  
that at the heart o f  his approach is  a strategy-based  
radicalism, based upon a humanism that stems from his concern
for  human beings, indeed, i t  is  his ideological  background 
in a radical Christian-Marxism that makes his theory and 
practice so uniaue and important to any understanding of the 
education of adults.
From the outset o f  his l i te racy  programme, F re i r e ’ s 
aims were c lea r :  they were to help people learn rather than 
memorize, using the medium of l iteracy  to create a c r i t ic a l  
consciousness. He explains i t  thus:
I f  learning bo read and write is  to constitute  
an act o f  knowing, the learners must assume 
from the beginning, the role of creative subjects.
I t  is  not a matter of memorizing and repeating  
given s y l la b le s ,  words and phrases, but rather,  
of re f lec t ing  c r i t i c a l l y  cn the project of  
reading and writ ing  i t s e l f ,  and on the profound 
signif icance of language.
in hig, W r it ings , he describes fu l ly  the types of
learning strateg ies  to which the stud nts were exposed,
including:working from their own level o f  experience, active
projects and group discussion. The educator is  a member of
the group rather than i t s  leader and his task may be that of
1 Freire ,  P. (1972): Cultural Action fo r  Freedom; 
Harmondsworth. penguin, p .29 .
262
problem poser rather than problem so lver .  Hence, the 
learners are encouraged to generate their  own meanings and 
to re a l i s e  that there is  a d if ference Between appearance 
and meaning so that they are encouraged to analyse the 
influence of the dominant culture upon the social rea l i ty  
that they experience. Liberation begins when they rea l iz e  
that apparently objective  knowledge is i d e o lo g ic a l^  The 
process o f  re f lect ion  i s ,  according to Freire,, one of the
character ist ics  of man himself and problem solvi,ng is an
element in the development of the humanity of  the learner.
Problem-posing education affirms man as being
in the process o f  becoming -  as unfinished,
uncompleted beings in and with a likewise
unfinished rea l i ty .  Indeed, in contrast to other
animals who are unfinished but not h is to r ic a l ,
men know themselves /C3* be unfinished; they are
aware of their incompleteness. In this incompleteness
and this awareness l i e  the very roots o f  education
as an exclusively human manifestation. The
unfinished character  of re a l i t y  necessitate that
* 1
education be an on-coing re a l i ty .
I t  is^through problem solving that individuals become 
conscious o f  the v/orld in which they l iv e  and by which they 
can b ^ ^ e e d  from the process of conditioning, in the act 
of learning, individuals become potential agents, freed to1 
1. F re ire ,  P. (1972): pedagogy of  the Oppressed; 
Harmondsworth, penguin . pp. 5b-S7.
263
act upon the world. Through the process o f  learning, man 
becomes conscious of  r e a l i t y  and the process of conscienti-  
zation is  at the heart of F re i re 's  thinking. I t  is  defined 
as "the process in which men, not as recip ients ,  but as 
knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the 
socio -cu ltura l  rea l i ty  which shapes their l ives  and of their
capacity to transform that r e a l i t y " . '1' The procs; ss of
transforming the world is fo r  him a process or numanizing 
i t ,  so that the end product of  the Drocessvof re f lect ion  and 
action is  one in helping to create a world where individuals  
may be more truly human. I t  is a Utopian ideal but he 
himself claims that unless education is utopian, either the 
future has lost  i t s  meaning fo r  men or men are a fra id  to 
r isk  l iv ing  in the future as creative  human beings. Hence, 
man is involved in a struggle  against the oppressive and 
dehumanizing structures of  the world in a "precarious  
adventure of transforming and recreating the world ."
Among the v£\reng ths of F re i r e ’ s position are that: 
i t  combines theory with practice; i t  locates education within 
the v/ide o -p o l i t ic a l  process; i t  places the individual
within the context of a socio log ica l  framework within which 
contemporary sociological theorizing is  seen to be relevant;1 
1. Freire ,  P. (1972): op. c i t . , p.51
Ib id .  p .72 .
264
i t  combines Christ ian ity ,  humanism and Marxism in a radical  
humanist, ideological position that is  quite unique v/ithin 
educational theory and i t  can be r igh t  to say, i t  is  utopian.
The aim of F re i re 's  pedagogy is to a s s i s t  the oppressed 
unveil this world of oppression and to commit themselves to 
i t s  transformation. When this ideal society has bsfeJl achieved, 
i t s  techniques should belong to a l l  people ensuring the
oermanent process of  l iberation, Here l ie s  a major weakness
tha t
in F re i re 's  thinking since i t  assumes^an!  eg-a3l i t1ar ian  society
w i l l  be achieved -  an assumption that, thereafter,  w i l l
require permanent l ibe rat ing  forces to prevent the structures
of  society being reformed with another dominating e l i t e .
In addition, he appears to assume that those of the masses
who have been educated w i l l  become revolutionary and this
could open him to the critic ism that he i s  actually  using
education to producerrevolutionaries. This, however, depends
on the motive o f  ^teh^.educa tor and the educand.
necessarily
Oppression, does not /relate to slavery; the aim of education 
in a u t i l i t a r i a n  sense has to do with co l lec t ive  act iv ity  
that w i l l  produce more happiness. The l iberat ion  of the 
mind, the freedom of thought advocated fo r ,  by the u t i l i t a r ia n  
is  fo r  the purpose of attaining cross f e r t i l i z a t io n  of  
opinion towards the solution of a problem. While the aim 
may be d i f fe ren t ,  the pedagogy of  Freire no doubt, is good 
enough for  the process o f  adult education.
265
Andraqoglcal Approach:
So f a r ,  we have been examining the various methods that 
can be applied in the education of adults without making 
reference to a particu lar  approach. I t  w i l l  be interesting  
to know that a l l  the above methods can be applied to children/  
conventional education as w e l l .  That i s ,  to say, th^Vthe  
aooroach to any method determines the extent to which such a 
method is  workable, in order to e f fe c t iv e ly  achieve our 
object ives when we use any of the methods, s T * i dragogical 
approach w i l l  be more su itab le  to adult learners. Andragogy 
is  an approach to education fo r  adults which constitutes an 
a lternat ive  to the pedagogic appro; Andragogy can be
defined as an approach i . e .  the total embodiment and expression 
of a philosophy of education^^r adults.  This approach is  
aimed at ,  enabling people to become aware that they should
•i
be the or iginators of their own thinking and f e e l in g . "
The theory of ,syv4ragogy stems from a d ist inct ive  set of 
assumptions about the nature of adults ,  adult development, 
learning, knowledge, teaching and education.
M. Knowles, a renowned adult educator whom many
people acknowledge as the or ig inator  of the andragogical 
approach, based his idea on at least  four crucial assumptions1 
1. Allman, p. and F.ackie, K.J. (1S81) : Towards a Developmental 
Theory of Andragogy; Monograph 9. University o£ 
i Nottingham, Department of  Adult Education, p.2 .
266
about the characterist ics  o f  adult learners. He believed
that these assumptions are quite d i f fe ren t  from those of  
child learners on which traditional pedagogy is  based. 
These assumptions are:
(1) that the adult lea rner 's  self-concept moves* 
from one of  being a dependent personality  
toward one of being a se l f -d i rec t in g  human 
being;
(2) that he accumulates a growing reservoir  of
experience that becomes an increasing resource
for  learning;
(3) that his readiness to learn becomes oriented  
increasingly to the developmental tasks of  his  
social ro les ;  and
(4) that his time perspective changes from one of  
postponed application of knowledge to immediacy 
of applicat ion , and accordingly his orientation  
towards learning sh i f ts  from one of subject-  
centeredness to one of problem-centeredness.
Knowles' basic assumption have further been expatiated
/vy i
by Allman and Mackie. According to these w r iters ,  andragogy 
i s  a theoretical approach to the education of adultSjWhich
is  underpinned by the following set of assumptions : -
1. \luman beings are Social beings, which means that 
their nature derives from their interactions or 
transactions within their social and h isto r ica l  
contexts; therefore, wh i lst  contributing towards 
the creation of s e l f ,  society and history,  they are,
1. Knowles, M. 'An Emerging Technology fo r  Adult Learning' 
in Tight, M. (1983): Adult Learning and Education. 
England, Croom Helm. ~ ' ........
2m Ib id .
267
in turn, influenced by what they and others have 
created, i .e .  the entire context.
2 . An adult person who is thinking, learning and 
crit ica l ly  reflecting is a more adequate social being.
3. The potential for continuing development of thought, 
feeling and self  during adulthood entails qualitative 
change in thinking and thought structures which 
distinguishes the adult's development of various 
forms of competent thinking from that of the child 
or adolescent.
4. Creative and critical thinking rather than the 
uncritical reception of other's thinking is 
preferable because these modes q^^Jiinking foster
the full  development of the adult
Creative and c r i t i c a l  thinking are most appropriately  
fostered by a combination o f  group and individual  
se l f -d i rec ted  learning.
6 . A continuing re -integr&tion of the cognitive and 
the affective domains is an essential ingredient 
for effective adult learning.
7. Knowledge âri be seen as both an open system and 
closed system. When i t  is seen as an open system, 
i t  is something to which the learner can add or which 
can be altered by critical thought. Even when perceived 
as a Closed system i t  is something which can be used
by the learner to solve problems or to create new systems.
> S
8 . Learning involves thinking, discovery, enquiry .. 
critical reflection and creative response.
9. Education is not about transmission, but rather, 
i t  is about selection, synthesis, discovery and 
dialogue.
Allman, p. and Jackie, J. (198 ) :  on. c i t .  pp. 36-37
268
This broadening of the approach arose as a resu lt  of 
some c r i t i c a l  statements about andragogy. To those c r i t ic s ,  
Knowles' formulation of the approach is  nothing but an 
extension of the progressive pedagogy. The reason why 
andragogy goes beyond and even contradicts pedagogy,^  that 
an appropriate theory of andragogy derives from a l l  the above
d ist inct  set of  assumptions about the nature of a<d ults,
adult development, learning, knowledge, teaching and education. 
To apply the pedagogical approach to the education cf  adults 
is  to ignore the dif ference between cognitive development 
during youth and that which is possible during adulthood.
We have argued that happiness means the satis faction  
of des ires .  The choice of desire, thus becomes a determinant 
factor to sa t is fac t ion .  Therefore, i f  an adult is taught to 
choose achievable desires, he has somehow been taught to be 
happy. Achievable desires consists in one 's capabil ity ,
aptitude and o unity, a spec i f ic  aim of adult education 
should theref be to teach the adult to discover his
capab i l ity ,  aptitude and where to get  these developed.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
In this concluding chapter, we shall  address ourselves  
to two main assignments. The f i r s t  one w i l l  be to b r ie f ly  
give a resume of the contents of the previous chapters so as 
to highlight the cogent areas of profound concern in this work.
The second one w i l l  be the consideration of
of the findings of this research for the var
the Society that have a stake in adult education. These 
include teacher training institutions adults of a l l
categories, and a l l  our well placed p inthropists.
I t  also has great implications for policy makers and a l l
employment agencies. We cannot continue to pay l ip  services  
to the need for adult education; the situation has arisen 
that demands very urgent action and this should be done in 
earnest by a l l  concerned.
Summary of Research:
The question of aims and objectives is  very crucial  
in any act iv ity  -  be i t  long or short term, in the sense 
that they serve as focal point and at the same time, as 
measurer of our endeavours. I t  is  for this reason that
careful consideration has to be made when aims are accut
be formulated. At both the planning and implementation stages,  
aims must be c lea r ly  stated so that everyone involved in its  
course is  able to contribute meaningfully to i t s  success.
I t  is  perceived that aims in adult education are prescriptive ly  
stated, and this contradicts one of the c r i t e r i a  of adult 
education that, adult education should be s i tuat iona l ly  
relevant and related to the learner.
Since happiness is  an emotional
aspire to be with nature; we made e f fo r t  to examine the concept
philosophically  in the early chapters of this work. Such an
examination has included the various uses of the concept as well
as the possible  interpretations of such uses. Our analysis
reveals that freedom of thought, autonomous decision making
and s e l f  e f f o r t  are important elements for human happiness.
These elements are la ter  founa to be the accepted 
character ist ics  of\a normal adult. As such, the development 
of these characterist ics  in a manner accepted by the 
u t i l i t a r ia n  doctrine tantamounts to developing in the adult 
through education, the happy state .
Furthermore, we developed a theory of happiness which 
makes the chooser of his well-being and therefore the
promoter/developer of his ideal happy environment.
271
This is  a situation that can be reached not only a fte r  the 
individual has been able to re a l i s e  his potentia l,  but can 
as well take an autonomous decision to choose between 
a lternat ives .  This, however, requires an exposure to e f f i c ie n t  
teaching. The adult teaching is  a process which enables 
learners to be in control of their  thinking. I t  involves 
learning and thinking with others who are learning and thinking 
There i s  no doubt that the adult is  a socia l  being whose 
nature results from his interactions with his social context.
In addition, adults have important t ra i t  -  the
potentia l to undergo changes in thinking throughout
v
their entire l i f e  span. For this, they are able to develop
continuously, and take control over their thinking. To be 
able to attain this educational ideal  and remain in i t  for 
l i f e  c a l l s  for proper instruction and motivation.
Apart from th# adult making e f fo r t s  to attain his s e l f ­
f u l f i l l i n g  prophecies, other determinant agents contribute  
immensely in making them achievable. Such agents are employees 
of  a l l  types, higher institutions of learning, philanthropists,  
policy makers, government agencies who are in charge of  
financing and providing for  adult education. We shall  now 
examine the contribution of these bodies in making a success 
of adult education a c t iv i t i e s .
2 7 2 .
The Role of  Government Agencies:
The ideology of adult education is based upon needs,
1
access and provision. These three situations c a l l  for  
government assistance and d irect ion . When we talk in terms 
of needs in adult education, we are usually re ferr ing  to 
basic needs and community needs. Basic needs have been 
c lea r ly  enumerated by Maslow; these are food, * * * * *  , love 
and s e l f  esteem. Food is  obviously the strongest of the four,  
and w i l l  a f fec t  others i f  i t  is  lacking. Maslcw says that s e l f ­
esteem is more important than the esteem of others. But 
there is  a c r i t i c a l  r ide r  to his ident i f icat ion  of these four 
basic needs. I t  is  that the pre-condition for the sat is fact ion
of these basic needs is  the free  use of cognitive capacities
basic
as a set of adjustive tools which serve to sa t is fy  those/needs.
But, "the need for safety, belonging, love -re lat ions  
and respect can be i *H s f  ied only by other people i . e .  from 
outside the person." Now to Community needs. Community needs 
re fers  to the well -being of the general c it izens by government1 
1. G r i f f in ,  C. (1984): op. c i t .
2. Maslow, A. H. (1970): Motivation and Personality .
Harper Row. Page 54.
273
to ensure peace, better productivity, freedom to the extent 
that the structure of Society is preserved. Continuing
i
education is the only means through which adults can be 
helped to find more meaning in l i fe ,  gain some sense of 
security, self-respect and independent significance*
The government therefore has an obligation to make sure 
that education is a continuous process. The present situation 
which makes very meagre allowance for adu^vecjucation snould 
be reviewed. Employers should be mandated to set aside 
special budget for re-training of their sta f f .  At present, 
in this country, there is no particular place set aside for 
adult education classes and the National policy does not even 
make provision for adult educators. Rather, the policy 
says that philanthropists should come and to offer help 
in adult education classes free-of-charge. All these 
situation rrf.ka adult education to be a ..leaning less and 
not too serious/activity. Firstly, there should be strict  
regulations about where adult education classes should be held.
In view of our target clientele i . e .  farmers and 
markaJ2s,women in relation to literacy classes, government 
coul^Khire some stalls right in the market places, so that 
when these women come to sell their items, they do not have 
to walk too far to attend classes. Such classes should not
274
be handled just by anyone who can read and write, but by 
someone who had gone through a teacher training institution 
and he/she must be a full-time government employee.
The Role of the Universities 
Patrlcularly Department of Education;
Presently, only a handful of our Universities have 
departmentsof Adult Education and i t  is only students who 
belong to such departments that are exposed to courses in 
adult education. Again, this situation should be reviewed.
All our education students should be exposed to, at least 
the theory and practice of teaching adults and this course 
will  even make them better pedagogical teachers.
Universities have a great part to play in promoting 
the culture of continuing education in this country. More 
courses and professions than hitherto should be run on 
part-time basis for mature students who cannot afford to 
go on full-time studies. I t  should be realised that education 
means money, such mature students should be given some 
allowances to augment their expenses on books and travels.
Education as is known, is for the development of the
mind. There are some people whose interest in education
is not for employment but for self-actualization. As such,
Universities should review their entry qualifications as 
regards mature students. They should not be made to go
through the rigour of Joint Matriculation Examinations or
275 .
General C ert i f ica te  Examinations.
From time to time, Seminars and Conferences should be 
organized for serving teachers thus providing them the 
opportunity of up-dating their knowledge and of  learning new 
research outcomes.
Role o f  philanthropists:
The enthusiasm of well-meaning Nigerians sho&uld  no t be 
dampened by taking their a c t iv i t ie s  fo r  gran ted. One of the
c r i te r ia  of adult education is that i t s  ac&t iv i ty  must be 
educational in nature. As such, the policy makers should 
coordinate the e f fo rts  of these philanthropists so as to make 
i t  meaningful and purposeful and, as much as possib le ,  give 
them a guideline as to what should be done. This coordination 
would better be the burden OTy'the Department of Adult and 
Continuing Education of each State Ministry of Education.
This Department w i l l  also ensure that the aims and objectives
of adult educetion p<o l ic ie s  f a l l  in l ine  with the overa l l  aims
and objectives :he nation.
The Adul t learners:
Many of our adults C liente le  are not accorded the 
necessary recognition that w i l l  enable them perform their  
proper ro les in the Society. Many government po l ic ies  are
passed down to them without actually giving them the 
opportunity to discuss and have f u l l  understanding of such
276
p o l ic ie s .  This type o f  situation further aggravates their  
ignorance. More enlightening programmes should be embarked 
upon now especia l ly  at this transition periods. I t  is  a 
truism that the MAMSER, the DFFRI are some forms of 
enlightenment programmes by the government and they have been 
doing a lot .  There are s t i l l  more to be done. I t  is  not 
just  enough for  then to t e l l  the adults their  rights and the 
functions of government. The adults in oû e Society too needs 
to be able to partake in policy matters* N K  such, a form of  
l ib ra ry  should be b u i l t  in each LocalNcovernment, stuffed with 
books but Dart icu lar ly  newspapers both o f  this country and 
o f  other countries.
Also, seme form of educative proarammes l ike  the'head start* 
programme of the united <S>tates of America can be organised.
This programme is a sort of formal school learning organised 
so as to help parents understand what their  children are 
learning in school. p o l i t i c a l  education/awareness could be 
so taucht theoretical ly .  Thereafter MAMSER w i l l  organise  
discussion groups when they come to meet these people in their  
various communities.
Moreover, the type of f an fa i r  associated with Better L i fe
for**"*Rural Women Programme should be discarded. There is no
doubt that as an innovation, the programme needs to be 
public ised , but there is  a limit to which such public ity
277.
should be made. The programme appears to be superf ic ia l  
now; i t  becomes deep only at the level o f  educational 
involvement. Better L i fe  Centres should be b u i l t  a l l  over 
the place where these women w i l l  be exposed to both the 
pract ica l  and theoretical, aspects o f  their  trades. Specif ic  
knowledge should be highlighted; such as our indigenous 
vocations, mother-craft, and we must not lose sight o f  our 
simple l i te racy  programmes.
implications fo r  Curriculum Planners:
Here, we shall  examine the ro le  the Curriculum planners. 
Adult learners,  no doubt are l ik e ly  to have a strong sense 
o f  what they wish to learn; and learning contracts are an 
obvious way of  dealing with that requirement. The problem 
now i s ,  how does a single  teacher or curriculum planner 
manoeuvre a programme that w i l l  meet the needs of the many 
individuals in the c lass .  D i f f i c u l t  as the case appears 
to be, planning should be made in such a way as to meet 
individual learning programmes. This means that the content 
of  what be learnt should be person centered and not
inst itut iona l  centered. For the learner to choose his course 
o f  study, he should f i r s t  ask himself this question: 'what 
w i l l  I be able to do at  the end o f  this study which I could 
not do before ? f Whatever appeals to him are what he needs
278
to know as a person. As such, provision fo r  the curriculum 
should be as rich as the number o f  problems facing a 
part icu lar  society. These problems should be identi f ied  
and c la r i f i e d  and they w i l l  in turn be the bases of the 
curriculum planning. One important ob ject ive  to note in the 
content o f  the curriculum of the adult learner i£^bhat the 
learning programme focuses on c r i t i c a l  thinking, c r i t i c a l  
awareness, on problem-solving and the application o f  knowledge, 
This involves fam il ia r is ing  students with assimilation,  
analysis and synthesis of  materials -  fac ts ,  ideas,  
hypotheses -  in such a way that they are better able  to solve  
problems, ar is ing  in quite d i f fe ren t  circumstances.
This i s  in conformity with the ideology o f  adult education 
which st ipulates that the adult should develop towards an 
identity  of values and characterist ics  which he has chosen 
fo r  himself, not one which we have prescribed fo r  him.
He knows what his personal ideal i s ,  and he knows how he can 
best reach ^it, and therefore he is  best placed to judge 
hov/ fa r  his learning has helped or hindered his development.
In this way, the learner can develop a sense o f  autonomy.
Adult Fac i l i ta to rs  Role:
The role o f  the f a c i l i t a t o r  becomes imperative at  the 
point when the adult f inds himself in the learning environment,
279
We have found that amongst the characteristics of the adult  
is  his autonomy. I t  is  through autonomy that he can 
attain  his s e l f - r e a l i s a t io n ,  social progress, pleasure,  
some sense o f  morality and the human status. The f a c i l i t a t o r  
has to design some form of  teaching that w i l l  encourage 
and promote these t r a i t s .  F i r s t ,  he has to develop in his  
students a sense o f  independent learning. This can be done 
through group discussions, group projects^yogr even study 
c i r c le s .  In a l l  cases, the Fac i l i ta to r  should avoid the 
imposition o f  his own ideas. However, the need fo r  the 
t rad it iona l  type o f  learning cannot be ruled out in adult
c lasses .  This is  because
from some tradit ional forms and meaning o f  knowledge such as
those stated by H irst  and Phenix. Therefore whether the
F ac i l i t a to r  is  concerned with cultural or vocational  
education, the need for  an amalgamation of  the general 
knowledge cannot be over-emphasized i f  the learner is  to 
come ou t as a chooser. A l l  that is  important is  that the 
teacher should maintain a democratic control of the class  
act iv i ty  as well  as a c o l le g ia l  authority.
280.
Adult Education in Society:
The need to create an educative society cannot be over­
emphasized. This has to do with the power of l iteracy which 
Freire saw as a means of l iberat ing  the oppressed from the 
oppressors. K i l l  too, placed a great premium on education, 
though for him, he saw i t  as a means to attaining happiness.
He believed in the educability of a l l  human beings and this 
meant that men, women and children are susceptible to influences  
which ass is t  their growth towards goals which are deemed 
worthwhile, be i t  happiness, freedom or what have you.
Education should therefore not be seen as the p r iv i lege  of  
a few, but as the r ight  and the obligation  of a l l .  The value 
to be derived from a si tuatioiC such as this is  active  
partic ipation  in decision making by a l l  concerned.
There i s  no gainsaying the fact  that participation in
socia l  and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  is  necessary for a positive conception
of individual happiness and psychological well -be ing. In order  
to make partic ipation e f fec t ive ,  there is need to establish  
a c lear  channel of communication. Again, the importance of 
education/literacy is  here established. But the education 
that i s  jieeded has to be continuous. This i s  because of the 
technological changes taking place every day.
For Nigeria to attain a U t i l i t a r ian  Society, 
a Society that cares for the well -be ing  of her 
c it izens ,  that preserves the ’human r igh t '  of her 
c it izens ,  the creation of a learning Society becomes
281
paramount. By ' learning Society' is  meant a Society designed 
to be supportive of individual l i fe long  education. I f  the 
society is  to be a continuous learning one, i t  has to be 
conscious about education in i t s  total sense; that is ,  
conscious of the educational relevance and potential of its  
inst itut ions and a lso  of the general environment. By this
is  meant the way of l i f e  of i t s  c it izens and such a society
must make up ner mind to maximise her resources in these
respects to the utmost. I t  is a Society which follows Dewey's 
advise to look to a l l  i t s  institutions not merely for their 
e ff ic iency  and productivity but also, and more especia lly ,  
for  their educative potentia l.
The educative instrumentality of the society is  convenient 
f ic t ion  whose only r e a l i t y  l ie s  in the individual persons who 
are considered as constituting, as i t  were, i t s  members.
I t  fo l lows that the interest of the community is  the sum of 
the interests  of the several persons who compose i t .  I f  the 
Society is  so important in the promotion/attainment of the 
individual happiness, then i t  is  important that education 
should not be the confines of schools, Colleges, or 
Universit ies -  though these are important institutions where 
educative influence is concentrated and focused on c lear ly  
formulated goals .
Garforth, F.W. (1971): o£. c i t . p.10
282
The home, places of work, recreation centres, v i l la g e s ,
farms, are a l l  potent educators. I f  this be so, education
in the u t i l i t a r ia n  sense means a switch of focus from the
teacher in the classroom. I t  points to an education of
involvement, of participation, or experiment, of act iv ity
rather than passiv ity .  Such an education requires freedom
such that w i l l  allow the learner to choose the direction of
his interests  and energies, estab lish  his own interaction
with the environment. The idea of the learning Society sounds
good, such a community w i l l  ease the flow of  information, 
quick and c lear information gives direction to what i s  expected 
of the individual,  and an a b i l i t y  to be able to perform to 
the progress of one's community i s  an achievement that carr ies  
a moral and re l ig ious  sanction -  'to  make the world a better  
place than I met i t ' .  This S s  an achievement and achievements 
are immediate means to happiness.
The U t i l i t a r i  morality does recognize in a l l  human
beings the power of sac r i f ic ing  their own greatest good for  
the good of others -  i t  is an a l t r u i s t i c  theory -  and so 
recommends Education, which i t  claims to have power over human 
character as an instrument to estab l ish  in the mind of every
indi-vi^- 1 an association between his own happiness and the 
good of the whole.
I f  therefore this work generates the desired
att itudina l  change, i t  means that Nigerians generally and,
in part icu lar  the adult group who hold positions of power 
and, who are a ff luent would take i t  as both their c iv ic  and
283
and ethical duty to sacrifice their time, wealth, position, 
intellect to alleviate the sufferings of their fellow 
country men. Again, i f  this becomes the aim of everyone, 
corruption, selfishness vandalism, robbery of all  sorts 
wil l  soon become a phenomena of the past. This is  what 
utilitarianism is about -  the improvement Oy^aankind. Thus 
disciplines of Adult ar.d Philosophy of Education would have 
contributed a lot to learning in this country i f  the suggestions 
put forward in this research gets to the arm of government 
that deals with planning and impi r̂i ênting of educational 
policies.
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