Marginality and Crisis
Globalization and Identity in 
Contemporary Africa
Edited by Akanmu G. Adebayo, 
Olutayo C'. Adesina, and Rasheed O. Olaniy
Lexington Books 
A division of
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. 
Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK
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Dedication
, To Ireoluwa, Uthman, and Xander:
\he hopes for our more equitable and sustainable future
Published by Lexington Books 
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Marginality and crisis : globalization and identity in contemporary Africa / edited by 
Akanmu G. Adebayo, Olutayo C. Adesina, and Rasheed O. Olaniyi. 
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7391-4556-2 (alk. paper)
I. Africa—Foreign economic relations. 2. Globalization—Africa. 3. Economic 
development—Africa. 4. Africa—Economic conditions—1960- I. Adebayo, A. G. 
(Akanmu Gafari), 1956- II. Adesina, Olutayo C., 1964- III. Olaniyi, Rasheed O., 1971 
HF1611.M37 2010
337.6—dc22 2010006376
<
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American 
National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library 
Materials, ANSI/NISO 239.48-1992.
Printed in the United States of America
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Contents
Figures xi
Tables xiii
Preface xv
Acknowledgments xvii
Section 1: Discourse on Globalization
/. Introduction 3
Rasheed O. Olaniyi, Olutayo C. Adesina, and Akanmu G. Adebayo
2. Globalization: The Politics o f "We” and “Them” 13
Osita Agbu
3. Origin and Dynamics o f Globalization: A Historical Approach 3 1 
Samuel Oluwole Ogundele
4. Compatriotism vs. Cosmopolitanism: Exploring a New Cosmo- 43
Morality o f Human Relations from the Yoruba in the Age o f  Globa­
lization
Ronald Olufemi Badru
Section II: Globalization and Culture
*\ 5. Kiswahili Language and the Future o f East African Integration 6 i
in the Age o f  Globalization
Mwanakombo Mohammed Noordin
6. The Kabba Dress: Identity andM odernity inC ontemporary 71
Cameroon
Flavius Mayoa Mokake
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viii Contents Contents ix
7. Beyond Memoir: Echoes o f Globalization, Identity, and Gender 81 17. Petroleum, the Environment, and the Economics o f Nationalism 225 
Struggle in Soyinka's Ake: The Years of Childhood in the Niger Delta
Ayo Ogunsiji Sheriff Folarin and Henry Okodua
8. From the Global to the Local: The Media and Islam in Nigeria, 89 18. Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide 239
1979-2007 Andrew Oseloka Sawyer
H. 0 . Danmole
Section V: Conclusion
Section III: Marginality: Africa and the Political Economy of 
Globalization 19. Conclusion 259
Olutayo C. Adesina, Akanmu G. Adebayo, and Rasheed O. Olaniyi
9. Globalization and the Privatization o f State-Owned Enterprises: 103 
An Empirical Analysis o f the Impact o f Privatization on the Nige­ Index 265
rian Economy
David Omeiza Moveh About the Editors 271
/ 0. Contemporary Trade, Investment Practices, and the Challenges 117 About the Contributors 273
o f Regionalism and Poverty Alleviation in Africa 
Aloysius-Michaels Okolie
Vi
11. Community-Based Organizations: Household Food and Live- 133
lihood Security in Southern Nigeria
Stephen Onakuse and Eamon Lenihan
12. Trade Liberalization and Employment in Nigeria 149
Olayinka Idowu Kareem
13. Globalization, Poverty, and the Failure o f States in Africa: Is 167
There a Connection?
Olalekan Emmanuel Obademi
Section IV: Crisis: Hot Spots and Contestations
14. A Cross-Regional Analysis o f African Conflicts in the Age o f  181 
Globalization
Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson
15. Globalization, Identity Politics, and the Escalation o f lfe- 197
Modakeke Crisis
Olajide O. Akanji
16. The 2001 Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis: The "Indigene-Settler" Fac- 209 
tor Reconsidered
Moses T. Aluaigba
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Figures
Figure 12.1 Unemployment Rate in Nigeria 154
Figure 12.2 Total Foreign Private Capital in Nigeria 155
Figure 12.3 Total Unemployment Rate and Inflow of Foreign 155 
Capital
«\
ii
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Tables
Table 2.1 Faces of Globalization
Table 9.1 U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
Table 9.2 Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product and Growth Rate 
before and after Privatization, 1970-2004
Table 9.3 GDP Per Capita Growth Rate in Nigeria before and 
after Privatization
Table 9.4 Inflation Rate in Nigeria before and after Privatization
Table 9.5 Incidence of Poverty in Nigeria before and after Pri­
vatization
Table 10.1 Poverty in the Developing World, 1950-2000
Table 10.2 Selected Development Indicators for Major Develop­
ing Regions
Table 10.3 Tariff Walls in Selected African Countries, 1986-2000
Table 10.4 Pattern of Tariff Changes in Africa, 1980-2002
Table 12.1 Multiple Regression Result
Table 12.2 ADF Test
Table 12.3 Phillips-Peron Stationarity Test 
Table 12.4 Johansen’s Cointegration Test
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X IV Tables
Table 12.5 Parsimonious ECM 162
Table 12.6 Pairwise Granger Causality Test 162
Table 13.1 External Debt of Selected Countries 171
Table 13.2 External Debt as Percentage of GNP 172
Table 13.3 Regional Poverty Estimates 172
Preface
Table 13.4 People Living on Less Than $2 a Day 173
In an essay published in 2003, Zine Magubane and Paul Zeleza made the follow­
Table 16.1 Chronology of Events in the 2001 Tiv-Jukun Conflict 214 ing point: “Africa is claimed, with various degrees of glee and gloom, to be 
in Taraba State marginal and in crisis both in epistemological and economic terms. . . Over the 
past decade, there have been vigorous debates about the dimensions and dynam­
Table 17.1 Record of Oil Spill Incidents in Nigeria, 1976-2005 229 ics of Africa’s alleged marginality and crisis. However, what strikes us . . .  is 
how old these debates are” (Magubane & Zeleza, 2003, p. 165). Zeleza further 
elaborates on this theme of marginality and what he calls the “unhappy history” 
of Africa’s experience with globalization:
Africa’s purported marginalization from globalization hardly means that the 
continent is not integrated into the world as such, but that it is integrated in a 
subordinate position. The degree of this subordination may have changed in re­
cent decades, but its basic structure has not altered fundamentally since the 
emergence of the modem world system. In a large sense, then, for Africa globa­
lization represents an old problem in new contexts: the hegemony of Northern 
processes, practices, and perspectives. (Zeleza, 2003, p. 11)
What has changed in the African experience of globalization since these and 
similar studies? Offered to fill several gaps in the discourse, this book presents 
current studies on globalization in (and of) contemporary Africa from various 
disciplinary perspectives. It finds, to a large extent, that not much has changed in 
the African experience and scholarship vis-ft-vis globalization since the begin­
ning of the twenty-first century. This seems to lend credence to the popular 
expression: the more things change, the more they remain the same.
The chapters in this book were first presented in November 2007 at the 
international conference on “Globalization: Migration, Citizenship and Identi­
ty,” held at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, and organized jointly by 
the University of Ibadan and Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, Georgia, 
United States. Different themes had emanated from the papers presented at the 
conference. These formed the basis for three publications, two of which have 
already been published. The first is the special edition of the Journal o f Global 
Initiatives, Volume 3, Number 2, 2008 (Guest Editor: Olutayo C. Adesina) sub­
titled Globalization and the Unending Frontier. The second is Globalization and
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X V I Preface
Transnational Migrations (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009) edited by 
Akanmu G. Adebayo and Olutayo C. Adesina.
This book is divided into five sections. Section I is “Discourse on Globali­
zation ” With four chapters, this section presents several studies that evaluate 
globalization from different disciplinary perspectives. These discourses are 
followed in Section II by an important exploration in cultural globalization. The 
section covers everything from religion to mode of dressing. Section III dis­
cusses the theme of marginality by exploring the political economy of globaliza­
tion anchored by the disciplines of political science and economics. Studies in 
Section IV provide empirical and detailed analyses of Africa’s hot spots and ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
terrains of contestations, confirming Zeleza’s concept of “crisis.” Section V is 
the conclusion. Many people and organizations helped to make this book possible. We grateful­
In various ways, the studies in this book all affirm the position that globali­ ly acknowledge the assistance of the entire staff of the Department of History at 
zation has marginalized Africa—in the sense of ensconcing the continent in a the University of Ibadan (UI), and the Institute for Global Initiatives at Kenne- 
subordinate position—and has deepened its crises. The absence of any serious saw State University (KSU). We appreciate the support of Dr. Lendley Black, 
consideration for Africa in extremely popular studies, such as Friedman’s The Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs, KSU; Professor Olufemi 
World Is Flat (2006), his Hot. Flat, and Crowded (2008), or Stiglitz’s Making Bamiro, FNSE, Vice Chancellor, UI; Professor Adigun Agbaje, Deputy Vice 
Globalization Work (2007), have further demonstrated the extent of this “margi­ Chancellor (Academic), UI; Professor Labode Popoola, Dean of Postgraduate 
nalization and crisis.” This study is offered to complement others in the field, to School, UI; Professor A. L. Oyeleye, the immediate past Dean of the Faculty of 
fill the gaps in the literature; to further our understanding of the African expe­ Arts, UI; and Dr. C.B.N. Ogbogbo, the current Acting Head of the History De­
rience under globalization; and to present choices and opportunities available to partment, UI. We also thank Professor Bolanle Awe, Dr. Dan Paracka, Dr. Nu- 
African states, peoples, cultures, economies, and societies especially as the cur­ rudeen Akinyemi, Dr. Howard Shealy, Dr. Richard Vengroff, Ms. Vivian Bonil­
rent global economic and financial crises deepen. la, Dr. B. A. Mojuetan, Professor A. I. Olayinka, Professor Aduke Grace Ade­
bayo, Professor Dotun Ogundeji, Dr. Babatunde Sofela, Professor Olufemi 
Omo'sini, Dr. K. I. Princewill, Mr. Laolu Ogunniyi (Chairman and Managing 
References Director, LOTO Productions), Dr. V.O. Edo, and Mr. Paul Ugboajah.
Several people helped to make the conference and the subsequent editing 
Friedman, T. (2006). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. New process go smoothly. We are especially grateful to the following: Mr. Ademola 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Adebayo, Professor Lai Olurode, Mr. Muritala Monsur Olalekan, Justice Olade- 
. (2008). Hot, flat, and crowded: Why we need a green revolution—And how it can jo Akanbi, Mr. Nwachukwu Peace, Ms. Ime Enang, Alhaja Nike Ibraheem, Mr. 
renew America. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Magubane, Z., & Zeleza, P. (2003). Globalization and Africa’s intellectual engagements. Wale Adeleke, Mr. Okey and Dr. (Mrs.) Ngozi Anyikwa, Mr. Sola Abioye, Mr. 
In M.B. Steger. (Ed.), Rethinking globalism, pp. 165-177. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Rasheed Hassan, Dr. Jare Adejuwon, Mr. Folu Ogunbanwo, Engineer Segun and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Dr. Foluke Ogunleye, Dr. Sesan and Yinka Fadare, Dr. Bola Udegbe, and Mr. 
Stightz, J. (2007). Making globalization work. New York: W.W. Norton Co. Abimbola Olayemi Oladayo. We also thank the students of the Department of 
Zeleza, P. (2003). Rethinking Africa's globalization, volume I: The intellectual chal­ History, University of Ibadan, who acted as foot soldiers during the entire period 
lenges. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. of the conference.
We use this medium to thank Ms. Betsy Rhame-Minor for copyediting the 
various chapters. We are also grateful to the editorial staff of Lexington Press, 
especially Mr. Michael Sisskin, Ms. Lindsey Schauer, Ms. Gwen Kirby, and Ms. 
Victoria Koulakjian for their professionalism. They made the entire process 
painless.
Our families provided immense support. We thank Mrs. Tola Adebayo, 
Mrs. Kemi Adesina, and Mrs. Monsurat Olaniyi for their love and encourage­
ment. Above all, we thank God for His many blessings.
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Section I
Discourse on Globalization
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\
Chapter One 
Introduction
Rasheed O. Olaniyi, Olutayo C. Adesina, and 
Akanmu G. Adebayo
Contemporary challenges of development and interaction need to be conceptua­
lized in terms o f  global processes and interconnections. This is centrally because 
everyday life and livelihoods have been re-constituted, re-colonized, or re- 
westernized. Globalization process has contradictory dynamics and a hierarchi­
cal nature that have shaped and respaced modern nation-state, economy, images, 
cultural forms, commodity flows, and social interaction. It has also re-defined 
and reshaped people’s sense o f meaning. The phenomenon could, therefore, be 
considered the great transformation of our epoch.
The philosophy that undergirds this book is simple enough. Globalization 
has produced many results for Africa. Two of these are marginalization and 
crisis. Globalization has caused, promoted, and/or escalated the marginalization 
and crisis, especially as many Africans (countries, ethnic, religious, and other 
groupings) negotiate their particular identity vis-S-vis the global identity. The 
outcome o f Africa’s structural linkages to the global economy, the marginaliza­
tion and crises are not acceptable if globalization is expected to be good for all 
the world. But Africa must be liberated, must get out o f the marginality and 
crisis. The question is how.
Global restructuring of capitalism and turbulent socio-economic transforma­
tions are intrinsically interconnected. Globalization’s benefits have not reached 
everyone equally; it is thus highly turbulent, contested, and full of struggles, 
inequalities, and conflict. The chapters in this volume theoretically and empiri­
cally explain new thinking on the historical specificity and peculiarity o f  globa-
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4 Introduction Rasheed O. Olaniyi, Olutayo C. Adesina, and Akanmu G. Adebayo 5
lization, and its prevailing impact in several parts of the African continent, rang­ some clerics do criticize government officials and policies, religious institutions 
ing widely from Kenya to Cameroon, and from the Sudan to Nigeria. expect the peasants to be content with their leaders no matter the level o f corrup­
The authors examine a wide range o f  issues including the West and the rest tion. The masses are expected to address their socio-economic challenges 
of the world in matters relating to culture, ideology, identity, conflict, literature; through fasting, vigils, and prayers at domestic as well as workplaces. Struggles 
global governance, the state, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); against bad governance and corruption continue to be affected by religious doc­
people’s understanding and resilience. They pose a wide range o f questions: Do trines and dogma. Boko Haram, a recent Islamic movement in northern Nigeria, 
the masses o f people in the Global South understand the dynamics o f  globaliza­ preached against Western education and launched attacks on security officials 
tion? In what ways have they reacted against persistent poverty, food and health and outposts o f  the state. It took the combined security forces o f  Nigeria several 
crises, environmental degradation, unemployment, influx o f foreign cultural and weeks to crush the spontaneous uprisings of Boko Haram adherents in many 
social norms, and other vices? Where is Africa now, and what are the future parts o f northeast and northwest Nigeria. Challenges posed by globalization 
prospects? While Africa and other developing societies are vulnerable to globa­ were considered as repercussions o f sins or machinations o f the enemy. This 
lization, the phenomenon has also threatened European, American, and other notion has compounded domestic disputes, rivalries in the marketplace, conflicts 
developed societies, what with the serial collapse of banks, failure o f free market over water supply in the neighborhoods, and so on. These are issues that con­
ideology, loss o f  jobs, and homelessness. front not just the masses of the people but also today’s intellectuals and other 
With specific reference to the continent of Africa, the corpus o f  literature on members o f  the middle class.
globalization has not significantly taken into account the street situation and It is amazing that responses to neo-liberalism and globalization have enth­
struggles, or the citizenship and identity questions playing out in the global age. roned the capitalist idiom of individualism by eroding African communal ethos. 
From Cairo to Kano, Calabar to Casablanca, millions o f ordinary Africans have Individualist approaches are now adopted in order to survive the effects o f glo­
inadequate knowledge of globalization. Discourses on globalization remain balization. In Nigeria, it has become popular to see low- and middle-income 
formal, elitist, and academic to the exclusion o f the masses who bear the perni­ earners buying “generators” to provide power supply in the absence o f electrici­
cious effects. Before the international conference on globalization held at the ty from government sources, or sending their children to private schools due to 
University of Ibadan in November 2007, the impact o f globalization was articu­ the collapse o f public schools. In this equation, some gain but others (the majori­
lated at several fora and workshops. Such conferences and workshops are still ty) lose. Among those who profit from the chaos are importers o f generators 
being convened. How do ordinary people conceptualize globalization? How do and, by extension, makers of cheap generators in China, Taiwan, India, and 
they feel its effects? How do motion pictures, ATMs, money transfers, reality other (mostly Asian) countries. On the other hand, the declining capacity o f  the 
shows, billboards, mobile phones, cyber cafes and the Internet, rap music, wigs, state invariably triggers solidarity along ethnic and religious lines among people 
fast food joints, and other manifestations o f globalization influence their every­ whose security and livelihoods are threatened.
day life? In spite o f its overarching influences, globalization remains basically an 
Given that globalization involves invisible political calculations and expe­ intellectual concept and ideological commodity. Despite the presence o f anti­
diencies, it is difficult for the masses to react to unseen forces that affect their globalization movements, popular discourses about the phenomenon is almost 
everyday lives. In the industrial capitalist countries, American citizens may not lacking in Africa. Samuel Ogundele in chapter 4 of this book adopts a non­
think o f outsourcing in the context o f  globalization but would rage against Mex­ esoteric approach to analyze globalization. According to Ogundele, globaliza­
icans, Somalis, and other immigrants pushing them out o f the labor market. tion research should not be conceptualized as a mere academic engagement that 
Similarly, in other parts of the world, the ambiguities and uncertainties spurred makes scholars get lost in verbiage or verbosity to the detriment o f comprehen­
by globalization could be perceived as local, attributable to bad governance, sibility by a broad spectrum of people.
corruption, nepotism, and witchcraft. Most African leaders^and other parts o f the The disruption o f the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization 
Global South are historically disconnected from the nee'ds and aspirations o f  (WTO) in December 1999, that of mass rally in Quebec in Canada; demonstra­
their masses. This lack o f understanding o f the social struggles o f the masses tion in Gothenburg in Sweden and the mass rally against the World Bank Confe­
constitutes profound challenges to development. rence in Oslo, Norway, in 2000, had no parallel elsewhere in the Southern He­
Religion and spirituality have usually had a prominent role in African misphere. Anti-globalization sentiment as developed in the West has no equiva­
worldview, power o f  judgment, and cosmology. Since nation-states appear to be lent in the South. In Africa, popular musicians and the new Pentecostal elites 
an inadequate structure under globalization, faith-based organizations and in­ found globalization as an opportunity for growth and expansion o f their trades. 
formal associations have had overwhelming control over the masses. This in­ In these masses-oriented spaces, globalization is glorified and celebrated.
creases religious space and the process o f seeking spiritual remedies to the chal­ Since the early 1990s, left-wing student unionism and scholarship has vir-
lenges o f living. Religiosity also affects state-citizen relations. Even though tlia lR /  fir.ru * "  1 O fin -  "
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
u Introduction Rasheed O. Olaniyi, Olutayo C. Adesina, and Akanmu G. Adebayo
coupled with vibrant civil society, had fought military dictatorship, human rights State declined, and global governance emerged to deal with global prol 
violations, and abuse o f  power. Many activists were hounded into exile, incarce­ such as poverty, women’s rights, conflicts, and environmental issues. Glob 
rated, or silenced through state-sponsored assassination. This process had emas­ tion engenders unequal development and perpetuation o f poverty on an unf 
culated popular movements, and had denied the masses the opportunity o f radi­ dented world scale in the southern hemisphere.
cal mobilization against the forces o f globalization. Compared to the global In chapter 15 o f this book, Akanji suggests that globalization has 
South, anti-globalization in the North was mediated through the Internet. Local whelmingly contributed to the escalation of local conflicts. Akanji’s study < 
struggles in the South continue to deepen but are also disconnected from the hydra-headed Ife-Modakeke crisis in Nigeria shows that the volatility c 
global struggle due to ideological differences, identity politics, and most signifi­ recent phase o f the crisis (1997-2000) could be explained by the supply o f 
cantly, technological backwardness. Indeed, the victims of globalization have pons and resource mobilization by the diaspora hometown associations. A! 
been manipulated and remain too fragmented to unite against globalization. For ba in chapter 16 similarly makes allusion to this fact in the case of the Tiv-J 
example, the Ogoni struggle for self-determination in the oil-rich Niger Delta ethnic crisis. Even though the ethnic conflict was one of the most prolonge< 
developed no linkage with the religious protests in some parts o f northern Nige­ violent crises in Nigeria, the free flow of weapons into Nigeria from neighb* 
ria against American occupation o f Iraq and Afghanistan. countries aggravated the conflict. The unaccountable forces o f globalize 
In capitalist countries, the Internet and other means o f communication were especially the cross-border flow of arms, are largely beyond the control o f e 
used to organize mass resistance to the institutions of capitalist globalization. tive state regulation (Mittelman, 1994, p. 439). Sandbrook and Romano (2 
Oppositional politics used new technologies to intervene in the global restructur­ further contend that globalization has a general tendency that generates cc 
ing o f capitalism in order to promote democratic and anti-capitalist social tions which are conducive to the emergence of extremist movements, instab 
movements aiming at radical structural transformation. and conflict. According to Sandbrook and Romano, the ascendance in tens 
Africa and the larger parts o f the global South are firmly integrated into the and grievances, combined with an increasingly ineffective and unpopulai 
dominant global trends o f institutional change. According to Bangura, the conti­ gime, provide an opening for violent protest movements and conflicts. In 
nent o f Africa is tightly locked into the processes o f global economic policy context, Johnson in chapter 14 demonstrates that due to the marginalizatio 
making as directed by the Bretton Woods institutions. Institutional changes and Africa in the process o f  globalization, identity has become a tool for compel 
reforms in Africa involve technocratic capacities, economic policies, market in the desire to gain undue advantage by one group against another. This c 
reforms, and budgeting crafted and enforced in order to send credible signals to ter, focusing on the Mano River area, Darfur, and Rwanda, explores the idei 
investors and donors. In essence, institutional reforms in the public are investor context and marginality inherent in the conflicts.
driven with little regard for the struggling masses. Indeed, despite the democra­ The poor are notoriously non-ideological actors in the globalization de 
tization process, there has been reduction in social accountability. Governments and the concomitant inequitable workings of free market. The donor agencies 
are less able and unwilling to control their own economic destinies. It is no “secular missionaries,” are guided by preconceptions and notions that excl 
longer an assumption that the state power o f  economic policy making and bud­ the poor in the bargaining and income-distribution processes. In addition, m 
geting has been ceded to international financial institutions and multilateral donor agencies promote patronage, corruption, and clientelism by bending to 
agencies. interests o f the ruling elites. Invariably, donor regime sustains the inequalitie 
Following the withdrawal o f the state from social welfare, the international income and power and the processes that undermine the livelihoods of the pi 
NGOs have been providing social support to civil society organizations, wom­ In the developing world, only a small fraction of NGOs focus on global eco 
en s and farmers’ groups. These international agencies funded and organized my and global issues. Most NGOs focus on issues ranging from women’s rif 
workshops on human rights, gender equality, poverty alleviation programs, and democratization, to eliminating female circumcision as a barbaric relic 
HI V/AIDS campaigns, and peace-building and conflict resolution. Funding from the past (Bhagwati, 2007, p. 37).
donor agencies deepens the culture o f  dependency. Some communities consider Since the 1990s, the deepening process of globalization reconstitutes i 
NGO intervention as a form o f cultural imperialism, the “modem missionaries” redefines the development process in Africa. Under the aegis of globalizati 
on civilizing mission.” In northern Nigeria, the resistance against polio vac­ developing nations in Asia, Latin America, and Africa remain peripheral, ru 
cines was partly borne out o f cultural and religious sentiments, despite untold and non-industrial parts o f the global system. Some o f these issues have 
health consequences for children and women. ceived the attention o f scholars in this volume.
These soft anti-poverty packages take inequalities for granted and merely The globalization process has strongly affected the African economy, 
address the symptoms o f underdevelopment. Contemporaneously, African states also is the expansion o f global capital and Information and Communicati 
are under pressure for budget cuts in agriculture, education, and health, which Technologies (ICT). The penetration o f these forces has significantly influenc 
has a correlation with taxing the poor more. The redistributive capacity of the African culture and self-understanding. Acculturation processes and sociali;
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
tion have been spurred by foreign culture, social values, lifestyle, dressing, mu­ tions of marginalization and stagnation. For Thandika Mkandawire, The trage­
sic and dance, consumerist culture, and eating and drinking habits. In the after- dy o f  Africa’s policy-making and policy implementation in the last several years 
math o f these, Akin Fadahunsi suggests that, “the prospect for promoting au­ is the complete surrender of national policies to the ever-changing ideas o f in­
thentic and sustainable indigenous culture will remain dim as long as Africa ternational experts” (1999, p.l). In this scenario, dependency syndrome stifles 
cannot access ICT facilities for use in the learning of local African languages. imagination, local knowledge, and initiative. Thus, hegemonic forces, sabotag­
The slow death o f  the languages may emasculate the various African identities ing development in Africa, are not primarily external to the global south. The 
and loss of dignity by the African” (2002, p. 6). “comprador elite” reproduce and entrench the colonial exploitative structure. 
Most countries in the developing world are strong states that jealously guard African leaders exploited the liberalization process to commercialize their poli­
their strength and sovereignty and suppress threat to their powers. As the case o f tics. Moveh in chapter 9 builds on the suggestion that privatization o f  public 
the Niger Delta imbroglio shows, the state in the age o f globalization intervenes enterprises aggravates the disarticulation of the economy and inequalities.
to protect global capital. Globalization represents the triumph o f capital over all Kareem, in chapter 12, discusses the impact o f globalization by measuring 
social classes. The protracted conflicts in the Niger Delta, even though domestic, the effects o f trade liberalization on employment generation in Nigeria. He de­
have pandered to the global value o f oil, with all its devastating consequences monstrates that the openness of the economy and liberalization of custom and 
for the U.S. economy and elsewhere in the industrial world. Sawyer analyses the excise duties on the one hand seems to enhance job creation. On the other hand, 
oil conflict in the Niger Delta and the Odi genocide. He argues in chapter 18 that the liberalization of exchange rate and import duties enhance the level o f  unem­
official handling o f  conflicts in Nigeria has been characterized by inadequacies ployment through high cost of exports.
and questionable methods. The iron fist and militaristic approaches remain en­ Furthermore, it seems economic recovery can hardly occur without local 
demic in Nigeria’s conflict management. initiative and historical experiences that are required for development. In chapter 
The Nigerian state protected transnational oil companies in an attempt to 2, Osita Agbu traces the historical trajectory and philosophical moorings of 
expropriate the revenue from oil while the local communities remained impove­ globalization as well as its practical manifestations in relation to the inequalities 
rished. The soaring oil production intensified the centrality o f the state as the between the advanced industrialized nations and countries of the South. Every 
locus o f  the struggle for resources for personal aggrandizement and group secu­ nation and culture is a product of borrowings, appropriation, and adoption of 
rity, especially in a prebendal system. Clientelism, patron-system, and clusters different cultural influences and diversities. Globalization illuminates that cul­
became crucial elements in the governmental process. Since independence in tures co-create and coexist. The way in which globalization influenced popular 
I960, Nigeria has never had a stable state power, except in an environment o f culture could be perceived as a new means of modernity, leading to naive illu­
prebendal politics. In essence, the prevailing prebendal system and clientelism sions, false expectations, and false consciousness. This is in spite o f the fact that 
advance global capital and power of the local elite while the poor citizens bear cultural globalization threatened local languages and cultures. Globalization 
the brunt. Against this background, Sawyer adopts an advocacy approach in makes the poor feel ashamed of their poverty most especially when they encoun­
assessing the actions o f the soldiers sent to destroy Odi. ter products o f new technology they cannot consume.
In chapter 17, Folarin and Okodua demonstrate how the Niger Delta con­ In chapter 5, Noordin argues that the expansion of the East African Com­
flict came into the global limelight. For decades, the people o f  the Niger Delta munity (EAC) immediately posed the fundamental question o f the role o f Kis- 
agitated over the sordid acts o f ecocide by the oil multinationals in the process wa'hili in relation to other languages in the process of identity formation in the 
o f  oil exploration and without the expected economic vantages and physical EAC. Noordin analyzes discourses surrounding language, migration, and citi­
development. zenship in Kenya in order to enhance the understanding o f the role of language 
How have communities confronted and challenged globalization? How are in public conception and what it means to be an East African; and she explores 
community-based organizations (CBOs) organizing and mobilizing the poor in how Kiswahili competes with English and French (spoken largely in Rwanda 
the Global South? Onakuse and Lenihan in chapter 11 analyze the relationship and Burundi) to retain and expand its influence in the cultural and economic 
between household food security and CBOs in rural villages in the southern space o f East Africa.
states o f  Nigeria. Through empirical research, Onakuse and Lenihan demon­ Ake is a narration o f the childhood experience of Wole Soyinka. In chapter 
strate that rural CBOs are strategic in the process of livelihood security. 7, Ogunsiji’s postmodern reading of Soyinka’s Ake reveals that the text contains 
From the evidence adduced, it is unclear whether the African political elite echoes o f globalization. Some indicators of the new world order in the text in­
can reassume responsibility for designing socio-economic development. Many clude the references to a transistor radio and a gramophone, the soldiers and 
leaders from the developing world consider globalization as a conspiracy against Hitler to produce echoes of the world wars, photography and fashion designing, 
their countries. They portray globalization as exploitation since “free trade” magicians who “train in India,” confectionaries and provisions, cosmetics, 
forces on developing countries the options o f integration or the severe condi­ snacks and European food, e.g., hamburgers, sausage-rolls. As shown in the text,
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
10 Introduction Rasheed O. Olaniyi, Olutayo C. Adesina, and Akanmu G. Adebayo
all these not only modify the life o f  Ake community but also highlight the sa­ Alubo, O. (2002, August). The social impact of globalization. Paper presented to the 
lient features o f a world in motion. 2002 Damina School, Research Methodology Workshop on Globalization and De­
The power o f clothing to mediate notions of self and society, consumer mocracy (CRD), Kano, Nigeria.
desire, culture, and identity shows the importance of globalization from the Bangura, Y. (2001, May). Globalization and African development. Lecture delivered ai the seminar “Africa in the New Millennium of the Nordic Africa Institute and Afri­
margins. In chapter 6, Flavius Mokake describes the multiple functions o f Kab- can Heads of Mission, Stockholm, Sweden.
ba over the years and how modernization provided the dress a national character Barber, B.R. (2001). Jihad vs. Me World. New York: Ballantine Books.
which justifies the need for its canonization as a national attire for women and a Bhagwati, J. (2007j. In defense o fg lobalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
marketable cultural artifact in a globalizing world. De Soto, H. (2000). The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and 
In chapter 8, Danmole explores the litigious relations between the media fails everywhere else. New York: Basic Books.
and Islam in Nigeria. Danmole posits that through the media, Nigerian Muslims Fadahunsi, A. (2002). The political economy of globalization. African Forum for Devel­
have been able to achieve a greater participation on global issues particularly opment Dialogue. Ibadan, Nigeria, Unpublished paper.
when such issues are a matter o f concern over their religion. Through constant Huntington, S.P. (1996). The clash of civilizations? In The Clash o f Civilizations? The 
contacts with Muslims in other parts o f the world through new media technolo­ Debate. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 1-25.
gies— Internet, cell phones, e-mails— Islamic cultural values have continued to Kellner, D. (2003). Globalization, technopolitics, and revolution. In J. Foran (Ed.), The future o f revolutions, rethinking radical change in the age o f globalization, pp. ISO- 
be transformed. Global media outpourings have not only influenced religious 194. London: Zed Books.
harmony but more often triggered violent religious protests and uprisings against Magubane, Z., & Zeleza, P. (2003). Globalization and Africa’s intellectual engagements. 
what Nigerian Muslims considered political marginalization, Western domin­ In M.B. Steger (Ed). Rethinking globalism, pp. 165-177. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
ance, and blasphemous images or imprints. Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Ronald Badru’s argument in chapter 4 suggests that the ontology o f globali­ Mittelman, J.H. (September, 1994). The globalization challenge: Surviving at the mar­
zation is a commitment to the ultimate institution of a global village where gins. Third World Quarterly, 15(3), pp. 427-443.
common human values are promoted. Contrary to this, compatriotism and cos­ Mkandawire, T. (1999). International policies, African realities. In T. Mkandawire & C. 
mopolitanism constitute a problem in the ethic o f  care. Soludo (Eds.), Our continent, our future: African perspective on structural adjust­
In chapter 10, Okolie focuses on the incidence o f poverty and the possibili­ ment. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.Obi, C.l. (1997). Globalization and local resistance: The case of the Ogoni versus Shell. 
ties o f eradicating or reducing the poverty level within the context o f  “fair trade New Political Economy, 2(1), pp. 137-148.
regime and re-defined investment practices.” Building on this, Emmanuel in Obi, C.L (2001). Global, state, and local intersections: Power, authority, and conflict in 
chapter 13 demonstrates that unlike in China, India, and Malaysia, globalization the Niger Delta. In T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir, & R. Latham (Eds.), Intervention and 
has deepened the fragility and failure of the state in Africa in terms o f poverty transnationalism in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 173-193.
reduction. Sandbrook, R„ & Romano, D. (2004). Globalization, extremism and violence in poor 
The book goes further to explain new forms o f contestations, power rela­ countries. Third World Quarterly, 25(6), pp. 1007-1030.
tions, citizenship, and politics engendered by globalization. There are cleavages Schuftan, C. (1998). Beyond maldevelopment praxis in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA Mo­
and conflicts within and among religions, ethnic groups, states, regions, conti­ nograph, vol. 1.
nents, and hemispheres. It is argued that the world is divided against itself pos­ Singer, P. (2002). One world: The ethics of globalization. New Haven, CT and London: 
ing great challenges to the achievement of equity and justice. Yale University Press.Zeleza, P. (2003). Rethinking Africa's globalization, volume I: The intellectual chal­
lenges. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
References
Adejumobi, S. (2002, August). Perspectives on globalization: From WTO to NEPAD. 
Paper presented to the 2002 Damina School, Research Methodology Workshop on 
Globalization and Democracy (CRD), Kano, Nigeria.
Alao, A. (2007). Natural resources and conflict in Africa: The tragedy o f endowment.
Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
Alemika, E.O., & Okoye, F. (2002). Ethno-religious conflicts and democracy in Nigeria: 
Challenges. Kaduna, Nigeria: Human Rights Monitor.
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
Chapter Two
Globalization: The Politics of 
“We” and “Them”
O S IT A  A G B U
ft is our conception of development and societal goals that determine 
the veracity or otherwise that globalization is either positive or nega­
tive. In short, viewed from the simple criteria of physical well-being, 
self-actualization, and societal cohesion, globalization has been a de­
structive force o f immense dimensions for Africa.
“What is needed is not globalization of world economy but globaliza­
tion o f development.” (Iman 111-Haque, 1999)
Introduction
Let us begin by clarifying what “We” and “Them” mean, though this appears 
obvious in the context of the globalization discourse. By “We,” is meant the 
developing countries, the poorer countries of the South; while “Them,” stands 
for the advanced industrialized countries, the rich countries of the North. Globa­
% lization and its meaning could be taken for granted considering the avalanche of 
literature that exists in this field o f study. However, this will be a mistake, as 
globalization is such an overarching and multi-dimensional concept that it simp­
ly cannot be taken for granted.
This chapter, therefore, approaches this enquiry with caution, even as it tries 
to understand, assimilate, and proffer suggestions for addressing the problematic
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14 Globalization: The Politics of “We” and “Them’ Osita Agbu 15
o f this phenomenon. The historical trajectory and philosophical moorings o f sources, and power. Dare (2001) had shown in his article how transnational 
globalization as well as its practical manifestations as they relate to the inequali­ corporations (TNCs) with the support of global structures had, in collaboration 
ties existing between the advanced industrialized nations and countries o f the with rogue governments in Africa, plundered the rich resources of the continent. 
South are explored in this chapter. The central argument here is that globaliza­ That globalization reflects the increasing contradictions between capital and 
tion creates a dichotomy between “We” and “Them,” or the “poor” and the labor, and the logic o f accumulation between the local and the international 
rich, or the “North” and “South,” a dichotomy that could feed the embers o f cannot be overemphasized.
marginalization, distrust, and insecurity in the world. Implicit in the arguments Indeed, ongoing discussions indicate that the global financial crisis has 
in this chapter is that globalization is not necessarily powered by the invisible further exposed the underbelly of globalization. Apart from the crisis highlight­
hand of the market, but rather, by forces behind the scene, by political calcula­ ing the deep but unhealthy degree o f interdependence today, the situation calls 
tions and expediencies, and by interests that do not hesitate to use political in­ for a rethink o f current global governance structures, being alert to increased 
struments and institutions to attain their goals. It is no secret that globalization is threats o f protectionism, climate change, and generally being mindful o f the 
today impacting almost all areas of human activity. Apart from the issue o f  social dimension o f  globalization.
poverty and its discontents, cultural and social formations are being assaulted at 
an unprecedented rate under the onslaught of finance capital and one-sided 
global information dissemination architecture. In short, though globalization Historical Trajectory in the Growth of Globalization
may have its positive side, depending on one’s capacity to exploit, in the main, it 
generates marginality and crisis, and creates a platform that forces people to Globalization is neither a new concept nor a new phenomenon. It is simply a 
negotiate and re-negotiate their identities in the global arena. The objective o f particular (but critical) moment in the expansion o f capital. It could be argued 
this inquiry, therefore, is to assist us in better understanding the phenomenon, that globalization is a logical stage that could be traced to the slave trade, 
the dynamics of the dichotomy or asymmetry that is created and replicated, and through to colonialism and imperialism, and to the present stage in the expan­
probable ways o f  checkmating the undesirable aspects o f globalization on disad­ sion of capitalism, especially finance capital propelled by new technologies. 
vantaged societies. Ordinarily, this should not be a problem; however, for capitalism to grow, there 
The plethora o f literature about globalization that has been churned out must be some exploitation of either human or material resources. And this is 
tends to confuse rather than explicate the different dimensions o f this phenome­ what has happened. In fact, Tandon (2000, p. 56) equates globalization in its 
non. The discussion about globalization has, in fact, mystified the concept to a broadest sense with the movement of history. The larger movement of history he 
degree that is unhealthy. However, the fact also remains that whether we do also considers as the movement o f civilization itself, which comes with both 
understand globalization or not, it definitely impacts on quality o f  life, the peace positive and negative effects.
and stability o f the environment, and one’s relevance in the twenty-first century The roots o f  globalization date back to the time of European exploration 
(Utomi, 2000). In the main, without necessarily rehashing the literature, the and eventual colonization of other parts of the world. It is believed that the first 
globalization debate has raged between those who see in it opportunities for great expansion o f European capitalism took place in the sixteenth century fol­
economic growth and more efficient markets, and those who see a disadvantage lowing the first circumnavigation of the earth between 1519 and 1521, and at the 
for the late starters mainly o f  the developing world. Many also see economic and early phases o f the slave trade (Institute of Ethics and Developmental Studies, 
corporate globalization as eroding state powers with serious implications for 2002). The salient features were characterized by the search for markets, raw 
weak developing states (Utomi, 2000). It suffices to state that globalization is a materials, and cheap labor. There was an extensive market in Africa where slave 
major site o f contestation with supporters (Ohmae, 1995; Scholte, 1996; Axt- trade was the first sign of globalization. Africa, it appears, was inducted into 
mann, 1998) and opposers (South Centre, 1996; Khor, 2001; Stiglitz, 2003). globalization quite early. It could be said that the second phase of Africa s inte­
From the literature, globalization is assumed to have played a very impor­ gration into the global system was that of the colonial period. In both instances, 
tant role in increasing economic growth and reducing absolute poverty in devel­ Africa was at a disadvantage for several reasons, the most important being its 
oping countries of the South. To this end, proponents of globalization argue that technological weakness.
it has led to better products, lower costs, job opportunities, increased productivi­ However, the process o f integration became more global in the nineteenth 
ty, and improvement in global quality o f life and welfare. Indeed, some believe century as capital moved from Europe to North America and Australia, to open 
that globalization has enriched the world scientifically and culturally, and has up the areas with the building o f railroad systems and agriculture that would be 
benefited a greater part o f the people economically. However, Berberoglu central to the expansion of capital (Akindele et al., 2002). The arrival o f joint- 
(1997) was o f the view that globalization actually accentuates class, regional, stock companies and developments in the acts of banking, industrial capital, and 
national, and local inequalities and that it increases disparities in wealth, re- technology enabled the scramble for and partition of Africa in 1884. Though
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16 Globalization: The Politics of “We” and “Them” Osita Agbu 17
interrupted by the Cold War between the United States and the USSR, globaliza­ vantaged societies of the world. The Marxist tradition over the years has given 
tion was to reassert itself with the effective end of the Cold War in 1990. With birth to other strands that tried to explain social change in different societies. 
this, there was no need this time around for the West to compromise its ideology Some o f these include the dependency theory, world systems theory, radical 
o f globalized trade and culture on account of Communism. Capitalism had see­ Marxist political economy, and Neo-Marxism. Though Marx did not have a 
mingly triumphed. theory o f imperialism per se, which is fundamental to understanding globaliza­
Capitalism— with its dogmas o f promoting private initiatives regulated tion, he did have a theory of history in which capitalism played a big role. This 
mainly by the market forces, free trade, and limited governmental intervention is sometimes called historical materialism, and its basic assumption is that histo­
in public policy formulation and implementation, and also o f individual or mul­ ry is a product o f social forces of production and the contradictions generated by 
tinational accumulation o f surplus, and its supportive procedural democracy—  these forces. Virtually all theories o f imperialism are attempts to explain interna­
became the most important institution around which social progress or social tional political occurrences, mainly from the economic perspective. For Marx­
change was articulated in contemporary times (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2001, p. 3). ists, globalization is viewed as a new age of imperialism where national, region­
Marx had espoused the nature o f capitalism in his three-volume Das Kapital al, and global asymmetries characterized by social injustice and unequal ex­
amidst other writings, noting the importance of the profit motive in the expan­ changes are much more pronounced and pernicious than was the case before 
sion of capital and in its undoing. From Marx’s writings, no region of the world (Institute of Ethics and Developmental Studies, 2002).
was too remote for the penetration o f capital. However, the end of bi-polarism From this perspective, the internal contradictions o f feudalism for instance, 
(itself a product o f  globalization) could be the nunc dimittis of capitalism as it led to its downfall and the establishment of capitalism (MacRae, 1969). Each 
creates neo-bipolarism (between the haves and have-nots), and therefore be­ stage was a necessary precursor to the next. The conditions for capitalism were 
tween the North and South in novel ways (Olurode, 2003). established by feudalism and the conditions for socialism were established by 
It had been observed for instance that significant in the new imperialism capitalism. The historical role of capitalism was particularly important to Marx. 
was the emergence o f several empires in competition, and the predominance of Unlike other modes of production, it succeeded because of its dynamic nature. It 
finance capital over mercantile capital (Hobson, 1938; Magdoff, 1978). Jinadu expanded to every comer o f the globe through its own internal logic and dynam­
(2007, p. 3) also observes that the accelerated and more aggressive push o f the ics. In doing so, backward, pre-capitalist modes of production and their atten­
scramble between 1880 and 1900 was partly and strategically impelled by the dant customs and habits, myths, and superstitions were dismantled, and the 
imperative cardinal foreign policy objectives o f the European countries in order world united for the first time under a single socio-economic system. Subse­
to maintain a balance o f power in Europe. Many therefore view contemporary quently, capitalism would give rise to the formation of a world-wide urban pro­
globalization as the continuation of the historical and structural processes of letariat, revolutionary class consciousness, and the conditions for realization of 
capitalist and imperialist domination on a world scale and o f the global diffusion socialism. According to Economides and Wilson (2001, p. 55), capitalism is 
or replication o f  its economic substructures and cultural and political superstruc­ thus not only a disturbing, dislocating, destructive force, but also a progressive 
tures. According to Jinadu (2007, p. 5), globalization has not only led to the one with the vital historical task o f shepherding the destruction of backward 
marginalization o f Africa but also denied it the possibility o f  auto-centered de­ social formations. This paradox, that capitalism is at the same time destructive 
velopment by regarding African countries as follower-societies in the image of and progressive, which was also central to Marx’s thesis, is one that later Marx­
the globalizing and hegemonizing West. ists have found difficult to assimilate.
The point, therefore, is that there is nothing really new about globalization It was Lenin, however, who dramatically illustrated the internal political 
as a motive force. The forces had been at work from the onset of the industrial implications o f  Marx’s analysis o f capitalism. Lenin, in his Imperialism: The 
revolution (Economides & Wilson, 2001, p. 9). Like the old imperialism, Jinadu Highest Stage o f  Capitalism (1917), famously defined imperialism not as the 
(2007, p. 6), reiterates that the new one is anchored and reinforced by a number possession o f  overseas territories, but as a stage in the evolution of capitalism. 
o f universalizing cultural, legal, political, and social factors that constitute its H aifa century later, social theorist Johan Galtung, in his A Structural Theory o f  
ideology. Imperialism (1971), expanded the concept even further by equating it with any 
form o f international inequality.
Not all theories o f imperialism are Marxist in orientation. In 1902, the Eng­
Theoretical and Conceptual Issues lish liberal economist and social theorist, J.A. Hobson published Imperialism: A 
Study. The work opined that fundamental contradictions in the structure o f  ad­
The perspective through which this enquiry examines globalization in modem vanced capitalist economies in Europe led to the need to export capital overseas 
times is through the prism o f the Marxist tradition, which invariably entails the and hence the rise of imperialism. There is the “realist” theory of imperialism 
dependency explanation of the nature o f  globalization and its impact on disad­ that gave primacy to the struggle for power (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 48-76).
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
USIta A g D U
Globalization is thus a historical process o f  change that has been with hu­ enquiry (see Table 2.1 for a simple list of positive and negative aspects o f  globa 
manity for a long time. It is a system that generates domination and disempo- lization).
werment, and impacts differently and often detrimentally orr individuals, social 
groups, and political entities, especially o f the South. The present character o f 
\  imperialism denotes less explicit control, influence, domination, and even covert Table 2.1: Faces of Globalization
colonization. It can take the character of unequal bargaining power, enabling an 
economically powerful state to determine the economic policies of another, Positive Expectations Negative Realitiesmuch weaker state.
• Market driven • Tariff walls on products from 
Often analyzed at the level o f the global economy as the unit of analysis developing countries
(Biersteker, 1998; Madunagu, 1999), globalization is empowered by an interna­ • World without borders • Borderless only for capital and 
tional division o f  labor broadly characterized by dichotomy between high and technology
low skill intensity o f production between the advanced and developing countries • Competition has killed businesses 
respectively. While the South provided the bulk o f  the raw materials, the North • Increased interdependence in the South
employed superior technology in converting these and exported back to Africa. • Growth hampered by low tech­
Indeed, today there is the added dimension o f  offshoring and production reloca­ • Opportunities for economic nology evolution and lack o f 
tions from the North to the South as a way o f maximizing economies o f  scale. growth capital in developing countries
This is possible as a result o f liberalization -  a critical component o f globaliza­ • Creates unemployment, local 
tion (Akindele et al., 2002). So the history o f  production and reproduction is • Reduces inefficiency businesses and traditional socie­
important in the ability o f  a society to change and in determining its strengths 
and weaknesses (Lumumba-Kasongo, ties threatened with extinction2001, p. 5).
There is little doubt that the economic factor is important in the process of • Provides technology • Has facilitated moral decline
change. Globalization is a process o f economic change with implications for • Enhances concerted global • Increased capacity of external
'» social, cultural, and political relations. Perhaps, we could conceive of globaliza- responses actors to intervene in local gover­
\  '*on as Marxists have done, as a dialectical process of thesis and antithesis nance. ____
that may then produce a synthesis (Olurode, 2003). The two faces o f  globaliza­
tion described below clearly highlight its disjuncture. These are by no means Source: Adapted from I. Ill-Haque, The Human Development Report, 1999.
exhaustive.
Therefore, it is reasonable to opine that globalization generates contradic­ For instance, matters of international trade have become the high politics of 
tions, which further generate other contradictions with implications for all, more the twenty-first century (Economides & Wilson, 2001, p. 84). Questions are 
so those that are disadvantaged. The reconciliation o f  these contradictions has being asked about how fair the international trade architecture is. Competition 
fundamental implications for the global economy and global governance, and and market accessibility do not seem to favor the developing countries. Take the 
these contradictions are played out at the various sites o f contestation and within issue of coffee for instance. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
global governance structures. the price o f raw coffee beans has been on a free fall, while the price o f processed 
coffee continues to rise. Failures of developing countries to gain from the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), lack of market access, and protectionism all point to 
Sites of Contestation deteriorating and not improving international trade for the developing world. In 
Africa, local enterprises are daily being destroyed as a result of globalization, 
Globalization has many sites of contestation that are not bereft o f politics and thereby halting creativity and innovation. While this destructive process is going 
other overt and covert mechanisms and strategies for protecting the interests o f on, the preeminence of transnational corporations (TNCs) continue to grow. 
the advantaged over the disadvantaged. The sites o f  contestation include, for Chishti (2002) counted 63,000 parent firms and around 690,000 foreign affili­
example, institutions and fora relating to issues o f  trade and investment, Infor- ates o f TNCs, and a plethora of inter-firm arrangements that span virtually all 
v mation and Communication Technologies (ICT), finance capital, immigration, countries. Whereas over sixty countries in the developing world have a GNP of 
national policy formulation, poverty reduction, knowledge and technology,’ less than U.S. $10 billion, about 135 TNCs have sales in excess o f U.S. $10 
culture and regions, democratization and reforms, and global governance. These billion (Economides & Wilson, 2001, p. 189). This shows the impact o f globali­
sites are by no means exhaustive, but embody issues o f  critical analysis in this zation and likely reach and influence o f  the TNCs.
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
2 0 Globalization: The Politics o f “We” and “Them” Osita Agbu 21
In the past two decades or so, efforts at addressing lopsided trade relations ic/financial players. While globalization creates a revolution o f rising expecta­
have not been fruitful. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) has proved tions, it at the same time, reduces state capacity with respect to economic and 
to be a failure. It was characterized by constraining economic measures and social policy options.
conditionalities that further pauperized the masses of Africa (Gibbon & Oluko- Clearly visible in the march of globalization in the twenty-first century are 
shi, 1996, p. 57-58). It suffices to state that politics of fair or unfair trade is be­ the contradictions generated by this phenomenon (Olaniyi, 2009). While it re­
ing played out within the ambit o f the WTO and the EU-ACP (Africa, Carib­ quires qualified but cheap labor from countries of the South, it at the same time 
bean, and Pacific) arrangements. While countries of the developing world strive imposes strict immigration measures to check the movement o f labor, which has 
for capacity and access to markets o f the richer countries, the rich countries been a key feature of capitalism. Still, it is estimated that each year, between two 
devise measures to protect their interests and ensure continued dominance of and three million people immigrate to the developed countries. The beginning o f 
trade and markets. the twenty-first century saw more than 130 million people living outside their 
On finance capital, the speed at which capital flows take place today consti­ native countries, and the number has continued to rise by about.2 percent per 
tutes both an advantage and a disadvantage. The movement o f  finance capital, a annum (World Bank, 2000).
key messenger o f capitalism, is almost uncontrollable. While many countries in There is no gainsaying that globalization has therefore enhanced brain drain 
the South compete amongst themselves for access to Foreign Direct Investment from Africa. Prospects for retaining highly skilled individuals are daunting, as 
(FDI), the investments that come do not necessarily go to areas relevant to the the richer countries o f the world snatch up these individuals with better offers. 
needs of the local peoples, but to those areas of interest to the investors. In Nige­ This has given rise to the perspective that, even if FDls and related technologies 
ria, for example, while investments are needed in the agricultural sector and are eventually obtained in Africa, there is no guarantee that the relevant man­
infrastructure development, they rather go to the oil and gas industry. These are power would be available since the most qualified hands are sojourning in for­
resources that constitute the engine o f capitalist production and its survival. The eign lands. Even at this, restrictions on labor mobility as evident in tougher 
ICT sector is one o f  the major forces that propel the globalization process. The immigration laws in the United States and Europe continue unabated. The im­
convergence of three streams of technology— computing, telecommunications, port o f  this is that economic globalization is really about capital rather than 
and broadcasting— ensured that the once far-fetched, almost science fiction' labor, and focused on global accumulation rather than income re-distribution.
“global village” became a reality (Utomi, 2000, p. 64). Information technology Globalization through commission or omission also has a cultural and civi- 
has made it easier for the entire world to be within the reach of global investors. lizational dimension as a site o f contestation. That globalization is impacting 
With trade barriers down, ensured by the Uruguay Round of General Agreement fundamentally on the organization and evolution of traditional societies is not in 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and WTO, the economies of less efficient coun­ doubt. The worrisome dimension is that whereas the advanced industrialized 
tries have suffered, resulting in de-industrialization. In addition, cultural impe­ societies have almost already attained the post-industrial era, globalization is 
rialism is now aided by control of ICT infrastructure by the advanced industria­ threatening to erode the last vestiges o f traditional culture and traditional politi­
lized countries to the detriment of the South. cal organization existing in many developing countries. Some of the values 
Another major site o f contestation is the increasing incidence o f  poverty associated with capitalism and globalization are definitely not the best to emu­
around the world and efforts being made at reducing or curbing it. While one- late. It is agreed that human societies must go through the process o f social 
half o f income worldwide is generated by trade among nations, 1.3 billion change through cultural diffusion and that the imported material and immaterial 
people live on less than one dollar a day and 3 billion people, or half the popula­ aspects are substantial; this does not, however, imply that there should be no 
tion o f the world, live on less than two dollars a day (Utomi, 2000). A situation resistance or options as to what changes are desirable and those that are not. 
in which the assets o f  the top three billionaires in the West are more than the Increasingly, countries like Japan, India, and China are showing that there is a 
GNP o f all least developed countries and their 600 million people is most alarm­ choice in determining the rate and type of cultural diffusion. The developing 
ing and unacceptable, in spite o f  whatever positive impact globalization has had. countries should learn from this. Though culture is the totality o f a people’s way 
This situation is scandalous, as experience suggests that it isxpossible to provide of life, and there is no culture that is closed to influence, however, one should 
and eradicate poverty through right policy choices. > have the freedom and choice o f determining the speed and character o f the 
In addition, the globalization of policy making has resulted in the national changes that are occurring. History indicates that borrowing ideas and material 
polices of individual countries being compromised with implications for poverty culture through diffusion is inevitable, and this has been largely facilitated 
reduction. According to Khor (2001, p. 11), national policies, including the through migration over long distances, a process that is now abridged in time 
economic, social, cultural, and technological, that until recently were under the because o f transportation and the revolution in communication technology (Olu- 
jurisdiction of states and peoples have increasingly come under the influence of rode, 2003). Therefore, conscious effort should be made to monitor and control
international agencies and processes o f big private corporations and econom-
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
•iv i u m io  ui wc ana "1 hem” j Osita Agbu 23
the speed and spread o f  undesirable cultural influences associated with globali­ Muslim, Bad Muslim, as a way o f showcasing the current trend o f contradictions 
zation. between the West and other parts o f the world.
The situation today is that young people in developing countries are under­ Here, there is definitely a focus on religion as the carrier o f evil, and by 
going uncontrolled acculturation, and are under the tremendous influence o f implication a site for the clash of civilizational differences. It appears to be the 
Western culture in music, dress style, food, and behavior. This situation breeds case that Islam has disapproved of and denounced Western civilization and the 
confusion and disorientation in the youth, making them difficult to shape into capitalist economic systems as exploitative and evil, as it is predicated on the 
law-abiding adults. The point being made is that when we consider the centrality exploitation o f  mpn by man, and creating social imbalances. From Islamic pers­
o f culture to human development, globalization in its present form is undoubted­ pectives, capitalism is seen as decadent, highly materialistic and fanatically 
ly undermining the future of young people in Africa and the developing world in secular. This view is shared by many Arab Muslims. It is therefore not surpris­
general. There is consciously or unconsciously media imperialism perpetrated ing that it is from the Middle East that the greatest opposition to capital in its 
by the media networks o f the advanced or rich countries o f  the world. For ex­ modern form, and Western civilization is coming; this could indeed be the be­
ample, reportage on Africa is biased and unbalanced. It is either nature pro­ ginning o f the clash of civilizations (Codesria, 2004). The fact remains that 
grams, implying that Africa is still at the level o f food gathering, or it is conflict, Islam with its elaborate belief system on the provision of welfare finds itself in 
showing wars and starvation. This indeed is imperialism o f a’particular kind! opposition to economic globalization.
Footages of the beautiful infrastructure at Abuja, Nigeria, or the clean environ­ Contestation is also being played out in the field of knowledge and technol­
ment of Accra and civility o f  Ghanaians are never shown. Included also is the ogy. While traditional societies are desirous of protecting their indigenous 
non-recognition o f Africans and peoples o f the developing world that have made knowledge, globalization is making this difficult. Meanwhile, the technological 
giant strides in science, technology, and the arts. The increase in uncensored gap between the developed and developing countries continues to worsen. The 
consumption o f information detrimental to the morals and values of traditional Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
societies, such as pornography and unsavory TV shows, has also become worri­ with 19 percent of the global population has 91 percent of Internet users, for 
some. This is a site o f contestation between negative change and positive example. In addition, tighter Intellectual Property Rights have raised the price of 
change. The spheres o f culture and popular education are also under pressure technology transfer, blocking developing countries from the dynamic knowledge 
from globalization, and these have implications for local languages, consump­ sector. This exclusivity is creating parallel worlds ol “haves” and “have nots in 
tion patterns, and production relations. While there is a need to retain positive the field of science and technology. Developing countries therefore have little 
aspects o f one’s culture, respect cultural differences, and share a common sense option but to steal, borrow, purchase, or embark on a long-term program o f 
ol commitment about the world, it is also imperative for the developing world producing scientists and technologists in order to bridge a gap that is increasing­
needs in the present era to be selective as a matter of urgency and necessity. ly widening.
They can think globally, but must act locally. The political dimension to the current globalization comes in the form o f 
Let us at this juncture examine the issue o f religion and civilizational differ­ the export o f democracy as o f capital. So, democratization and reforms embo­
ences in the age o f  globalization. Globalization took on a different interpretation died in liberalization and decentralization presently constitute mantras o f globa­
after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. Generally condemned lization. States under a one-party system were required to open up the political 
as inhuman and unacceptable, the attacks appeared to be a re-statement o f  the space to admit competition and political liberalism with a view to making the 
ideological differences between the West and the Muslim world. The West led state more stable and to minimize political contestations from ethnic and reli­
by the United States became sufficiently alarmed to unleash offensives against gious groups (Olurode, 2003). This in itself is nothing bad, but what is worri­
individuals, forces, and nations perceived as bearers of international terrorism some is the fact that liberalization of the political space empowered hitherto 
and enemies of the West. Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Palestinian Terri­ amorphous groups and suppressed forces (Agbu, 2004) that went on to challenge 
tory became theaters o f conflict. Many innocent lives were lost, and limbs and the sovereignty o f  states built on shaky foundations of European partition and 
property were also lost in a war on terror that appeared to have no code o f  con­ scramble. In addition, under democratization and the current global economic 
duct or rules of engagement. The crisis in the Middle East therefore took on a crisis, the liberal democratic state is supposed to have been rolled back in prefe­
new dimension, and Arab fundamentalism and the Muslim vanguard clashed rence for private capital. However, the reverse is the < ase as the modern state is 
with this amorphous offensive; It was Huntington who had previously written now relied upon to bail out shaky neo-liberal, democratic, and capitalist states 
that in the immediate post-Cold War global political order, the dominating and their businesses like the auto industry in the United States. Democratization 
source of conflict will be “cultural,” and that the principal conflict o f global comes with expectations, which in many cases African states have been unable 
politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations (Code- to meet, resulting in social and political crises. In recent times, we now hear of
sria, 2004). Perhaps, this prompted Mahmood Mamdani to write the book Good
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24 Globalization: The Politics of “We” and “Them” Ositn Agbu 25
“choiceless democracies” in countries like Benin, Zambia, Malawi, and even In recent times, there has been a better-coordinated opposition to globaliza­
Nigeria. tion through protests from South countries. Anti-globalization protests have 
Globalization also breeds contestation at the level o f global governance. greeted meetings o f the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and the Group o f Eight indu­
This is because global governance has become an important issue in the twenty- strialized countries (G8), and other institutions that serve as support bases for 
first century. Since politics is inherent in all human activity including gover­ globalization. The protests during the WTO meetings in Doha, Seattle, and Can- 
nance structures, it is only logical that it is also found at the level o f global go­ cun in 2003 indicated that there was something wrong in the way globalization 
vernance. Politics here entails who takes the ultimate decisions and in whose was evolving. In Davos, there were protests against the Trilateral Commission, 
interest. The North has increasingly arrogated to itself the right to interfere at the World Economic Forum, while in Washington it was against the World 
will in all structures o f global governance, often, in complete disregard for the Bank and IMF. These were surprisingly not anticipated at all (Chachage & An- 
interests o f others and the basic premises o f  the U.N. Charter. It is therefore, not nan-Yao, 2004, p. 330).
surprising that development no longer features as a central issue or a priority in 
the list of topical issues on the global agenda. While there is the real need for 
new and improved global rules and regulatory arrangements to provide for pub­ Re-Negotiating Participation in the Process
lic goods, protect the global environment, manage global financial risks, and 
discourage anti-competitive processes, global rules have now tended to reflect That globalization has positive elements is not in doubt (see Table 2.1), but 
the interests of the rich rather than give voice or votes to poorer countries and because its negative impact is deeply destructive, it behooves states, individually 
people (Center for Global Development, 2007). As expected, the South has risen and collectively, to respond to globalization by re-negotiating participation in 
up in opposition to the composition and workings of global governance institu­ the process. This has to be done because sharp contrasts exist between the eco­
tions like the U.N., WTO, and World Bank with a view to having better repre­ nomic gains o f globalization and the social and political problems it has generat­
sentation and protecting their interests. ed (Utomi, 2000). Abraham (2006) had noted that the international system is 
driven by an unequal power structure, which has created an imbalance that is 
destroying the economies of developing countries. There is no doubt that the 
Responses from the South approach taken in negotiating the consequences of globalization will induce a 
modification in the process.
A lot has been written about the magnitude and nature of the responses of the Though globalization has been likened to a runaway train that the develop­
countries of the South to globalization (Ake, 1995; Khor, 2001; Aina, 1997; ing countries must get control of, there is a sense in which this train could be 
South Centre, 2003). It suffices to note that it is not as if globalization has had a blocked or diverted. To begin with, each developing and disadvantaged country 
free run. As observed by the call for proposal of the “Joint International Confe­ must define its own destination, or do so in concert with the other developing 
rence on Globalization: Migration, Citizenship and Identity” in 2007 by Kenne- countries to determine the route o f diversion, in order to achieve national objec­
saw State University, Georgia, and the University of Ibadan, globalization by its tives. On the other hand, countries of the developing world should also learn to 
character has attracted opposition; everywhere, mobility, identity, and citizen­ live with capitalism, and engage with it constructively (Chachage, 2004). This 
ship are generating increasing tensions. approach is necessary as globalization’s ideology of free-market liberalism and 
Indeed, beginning from the 1970s, as inequalities between the North and political, economic, and cultural imperialism are made possible through the 
South increased, developing states have called for a radical overhaul o f the in­ exploitation o f weaker partners— the developing countries (Tandon, 1998). 
ternational economic system, involving the regulation and relegation o f  the Underlying the domination and exploitation is the inequality inherent in the 
market, and the introduction of radical redistributive mechanisms. This gave rise distribution of power at the global level. In other words, globalization has been 
to the North-South debate, in which the New International Economic Order largely driven by the interests and needs of the developed world (Grieco & 
(N1EO) became one o f  the most important issues on the irUernational agenda Holmes, 1999). Though supposedly market-driven, it is not actually driven by 
(EconOmides & Wilson, 2001, p. 10). By 2001, Starr (2001) Was able to identify the invisible hand of the market, rather benefits and losses are managed by un­
at least 200 organizations that had anti-corporate, anti-capitalist, and anti­ democratic, opaque, and supremacist forces which defy rational dialogue on 
globalization political programs and agendas. The resistance centered on contes­ most items in the various agreements o f international organizations, such as the 
tation and reforms with respect to SAP, grassroots resistance tb the impact of WTO.
globalization, and delinking, relocalization, and saving localities from the ravag­ In subsequent negotiations, developing countries should begin to attack and 
es o f globalization. strive to alter the conditions that gave undue advantages to the rich countries. 
Where do these advantages lie? They lie in the possession of economic, military,
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26 Globalization: The Politics o f “Wc” and “Them’ Osita Agbu 27
and political leverages, off-shoots o f power. According to E.H. Carr, three main For the West, this should be a more practical philosophy for assisting in address­
elements constitute political power— military power, economic power, and pow­ ing underdevelopment in the South. The wealthier parts o f the world should 
er over public opinion (Razeen, 1998). The possession o f considerable economic realize that the scourge of underdevelopment can increase the dialectics o f capi- 
power is implicit in the notion o f  “hegemony” and domination. Therefore, de­ /->, talism and shake the very foundations of the global economy as presently consti­
veloping countries will do well to begin to accumulate those elements o f power tuted. With the alienation o f vast masses of the world’s peoples, “petty national 
relating to military prowess (if not actual, potential), economic power, and the interests” should give way to “global developmental needs” for the stability of 
necessary information technology to counter media imperialism and accultura­ the international system. The West should also realize that the sociology of 
tion. Nigeria recently launched an observatory satellite into space (N/GCOMSAT economic life in Africa, for instance, is not all about the economic rationale, but 
I), and was expected to launch a communications satellite in 2009 about community welfare. Indeed, there is a sense in which communalism is a 
(N/GCOMSATII) and another (NIGCOMSATX) in no distant future. Its national higher civilization than capitalism with its individualistic character.
television station (NTA) has gone international helping to tell the story o f Nige- In summary, globalization does not mean that there should not be national 
ria, Nigerians in diaspora, and Africa to the world from an African perspective. controls at all; rather, it challenges countries to be more vigilant and proactive, 
This is the type o f  engagement and re-negotiation that the South requires to and to readapt their national strategies to survive in a challenging and exploita­
counter the negative aspects o f globalization that relates to information flow. tive global political and economic system. In this quest for survival, Asia and 
In addition, economic power could relate to industrial strength, size, and South America must meet Africa and together devise and execute a grand al­
skill o f population, degree of technological advancement, and food security. It liance and strategy for confronting unbridled capitalism embodied in globaliza­
could also relate to extensive international influence as a result o f financial pow­ tion.
er, production power, and market power. These are areas that developing coun­
tries need to pay attention to in their contestation with globalization.
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V
Chapter Three
Origin and Dynamics of Globalization: 
A Historical Approach
Samuel Oluwole Ogundele
This chapter attempts a critical examination of the origins and dynamics of glo­
balization with particular reference to Africa. This is done with a view to dee­
pening our understanding and appreciation of its character, scope, and relev­
ance to contemporary life and living. In this context, globalization is defined as 
a human phenomenon enshrined in flows and interconnections at different 
points in time and space. It is a process of villagizing the world in which we 
live, and this goes beyond the domains of economic consideration. However, 
globalization is not an innocent intellectual discourse. This accounts for its nu­
merous definitions and methods of approach, arising from the diversity of ra- 
cial/cultural and disciplinary backgrounds of scholars. Globalization, in its 
simplest form, started during the Stone Age period when some members of 
Homo erectus began to migrate from Africa to Europe and Asia about one mil­
lion years ago.
Introduction
V The globalization discourse should not be construed as a mere academic exer­
cise that has no bearing to reality. Similarly, it is not about “knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake” or an exercise in obscurantism. Since globalization is about 
people, its discourse must necessarily be relatively simple to follow and digested 
by all and sundry. It is against this background, that a non-esoteric approach has
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J t- origin ana Uynamics of Globalization: A Historical Approach Samuel Oluwole Ogundele 33
been adopted in this work. Biological and social exchanges continued during the Homo sapiens stage 
Our contemporary world is a more delicate and more tangled web o f  politi­ o f evolution over 100,000 years ago in Africa. Homo sapiens sapiens (anatomi­
cal, social, economic, demographic, and ecological relationships that cuts across cally modem humans) first emerged in Africa and, from there, many members 
national, regional, and continental boundaries. Although the globalization dis­ of these hominids began some great adventure into the hitherto uninhabited parts 
course is not innocent and therefore occasionally evokes emotions, it remains of the world such as the Americas and Australia. These flows and interconnec­
the sturdy fabric o f  global peace, harmony, understanding, economic progress, tions about 30,000 years ago were possible because around this period, much o f 
and oneness o f  humanity. This underscores the centrality o f  a deep historical the waters from the earth’s oceans froze into glaciers as well as ice fields. Con­
excursion (through the lenses of archaeology and anthropology) to the subject of sequently, the area of submerged land joining northern Asia to North America 
globalization. was exposed. This land link made it possible for the globe-trotters to move on 
Suffice it to say that the present did not just emerge out o f nothing over­ foot into the New World. It is most highly probable that this Homo sapiens 
night. As a matter o f fact, globalization, contrary to popular thinking or belief, group got to Australia through a series of voyages using simple dug-out canoes.
began at least in a very simple way during the Stone Age period (about one Some evidence o f  the phenomenon of flows and interconnections has 
million years ago). The trends continue up till now, with considerable rapidity emerged from historical, cultural, anthropological, and linguistic researches in 
and sophistication, in the face of advanced information technologies and greater Egypt (Champion & Ucko, 2003). To a large degree, Egypt was the center o f  the 
partnerships among other factors. ancient world where peoples from different regions went to acquire enormous 
There is abundant archaeological, anthropological, and art historical evi­ training and education. This is with particular reference to such human endea­
dence in support o f  this development (Ogundele, 2001; Bentley & Ziegler vours as philosophy, mathematics, engineering, and medicine. Egyptian pyra­
2003). Biological and social exchanges have always been an important feature mids and temples were a great example of the successful translation o f the 
o f history. Thus for example, peoples, animals, plants, and cultural traditions knowledge o f ancient science, especially mathematics, into wisdom for the bet­
were migrating and/or diffusing from one comer of the globe to another. Such a terment of the society— that is, the application of scientific knowledge to some 
development underscores the emergence o f new forms of human society among of the practical as well as vital issues of life and living.
other things. For example, the culinary cultures of several parts o f the world, In this regard, numerous non-Africans such as the Greeks and Romans stu­
particularly Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Brazil, and Chile, were signif­ died for several years (up to two decades in certain instances) under the Egyp­
icantly modified. But despite the seemingly simple character o f  these develop­ tian gurus in the sanctuaries of the numerous temples. Two o f the world-famous 
ments as well as their occurrences in many literary works, much is yet to be philosophers who went to school in ancient Egypt were Aristotle and Plato. 
done with respect to the translation of knowledge into wisdom— that is, applying Similarly, one of the local Egyptian gurus was Imhotep, who was the first author 
the knowledge to contemporary issues and problems bordering on food, security of a book on mathematics. This was about 4,000 years ago. It is up till now the 
o f lives and property, and urban violence, among others. These are issues, prob­ oldest known mathematics textbook in the world.
lems, and challenges all deeply rooted in globalism. Therefore, this chapter Medicine usually practiced within the framework o f mysticism (at least at 
attempts to fill in some o f the existing lacunae in this regard. the initial stage o f its evolution) also started in Egypt. Numerous members o f  the 
global village beyond the confines of Africa benefited tremendously from the 
ancient medical practices of the Egyptians. In this respect, although Hippocrates 
Periodizing Globalization remains up till now the undisputed father of modem medicine (Peebles, 1996), 
Egypt at that point in time was the hub of the entire globe. That is to say that 
It seems that globalization as a complex human experience cannot be properly Egypt was the center o f the world, while Europe and America among other 
understood and appreciated without situating it within a deep historical frame­ regions constituted the peripheries or margins. But it would be totally erroneous 
work (Zeleza, 2003). This is because of the fact that humans as early as about to think that this form o f globalization made Egypt a predator, frightening off 
one million years ago had started migrating from one location to another. This the rest o f  the global village. It was not a relationship characterized by over­
development is known in palaeoanthropology as the Horrfo erectine level of dependence and economic exploitation. The concept o f “borderlessness” at this 
hominization— a process that began in Africa. Some members o f this early form period o f human history was based on mutuality of respect. This kind of globali­
o f mankind went to “colonize” parts o f Europe and Asia, having developed a zation is a common-'sense necessity for the promotion o f local, regional, and 
better kind of technology called “Acheulian.” This is in addition to the discovery world peace and progress.
o f fire as a resource for conquering the physical environment. These early homi- Around 5,000 years ago or thereabout, humans started the process of food 
nids or humans were a seafaring lot. Consequently, they were able to occupy production or agriculture in West Africa. Human migrations led to the diffusion 
many islands including remote archipelagos (Hilton-Barber & Berger, 2002). of crops and techniques o f agricultural production from one region to another.
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m a  i v a i  njjpruacn Samuel Oluwole Ogundele 35
Thus for example, some Southeast Asians introduced such crops as cocoyam or beef, and/or game meat. The Portuguese had successfully trained a lot of West 
taro (Colocasia esculenla), water yam (Discorea alata), some varieties o f bana­ Africans on the coasts how to prepare gari flour as early as 1700 A.D. Indeed, 
nas {Musa sapiemum ), and Asian rice (Oryza saliva) to West Africa during the by this time, gari processing had become very popular in such settlements of 
late pre-colonial period. Oil palm {Elaeis guineensis), a West African tree crop, considerable Portuguese influence as Porto Novo, Sao Tome, Fernando Po, 
diffused from the sub-region and reached as far afield as Malaysia. Whydah, and Warri.
Similarly, cassava (Manihot esculenla) and maizfe (Zea mays) got to West In Dahomey (now Benin Republic), F. F. de Sousa, an ex-slave trader of 
Africa from South America. Some Portuguese explorers and traders brought great repute taught a lot of people how to process cassava into gari flour using 
these crops to such West African coastal settlements as Lagos, Lome, and Accra the King’s palace^ as his training centers (Flint, 1974; Ogundele, 2004). In addi­
after 1500 A.D. (Ogundele, 2004; Osae & Nwabara, 1982). All the above crops, tion, African returnees from Brazil and Cuba among other places in South 
among others, were successfully adapted to the West African subregion. They America played a key role in training the local West Africans the techniques of 
remain a major component part o f  the local diet and culinary delights o f West gari production after about 1800 A.D. These ex-slaves otherwise known as 
Africans. By about 1800 A.D., maize had become a well-established secondary Affo-Brazilians or Aguda were already well used to gari as a food item during 
crop in most parts o f West Africa. Indeed, today, the consumption of maize is their period o f servitude abroad. They showed keen interest in popularizing what 
almost (if not exactly) at par with yam in several areas o f  the sub-region, espe­ had become their staple food item in the aftermath o f the Trans-Atlantic slave 
cially Nigeria, Togo, Benin, and Ghana (Ogundele, 2007). The list o f the uses of trade that lasted for about 300 years (Osae & Nwabara, 1982). There is another 
maize among such ethnic groups as Yoruba, Igbo, Asante, and Ewe is a very food item from cassava called lafun or elubo among the Yoruba. Processing 
long one, although most present-day West Africans are oblivious o f its history. cassava into this kind of food item involves a different set of techniques.
Maize can be processed into flour and pap among the Yoruba o f  southwestern During the period of slavery in the Americas, the Africans especially the 
Nigeria. Pap is a soft and almost liquid food for babies and adults alike. Kenke is Yoruba of Nigeria contributed enormously to the evolution of the socio-cultural 
a popular dish prepared from maize among the various ethnic groups in Ghana landscape. The entanglement of African peoples generally in the evolution and 
(Nn Kortey, 2007). Maize can also be processed into local liquor called pito  or development o f cultures and societies outside the shores of the continent, is a 
sekete in Yoruba land. The preparation involves fermentation— an exercise that testimony to the considerable antiquity of globalization. Indeed, no critical anal­
embraces a chemical change because of the action of yeast or bacteria, often ysis and reconstruction of the realities o f the vibrant colors and evolution o f the 
changing sugar into alcohol (Ogundele, 2004). The history and spread o f maize diverse cultural heritages of the New World and, to a lesser degree, the southern 
and cassava, among other crops, is basically about inter-group relations at the part o f the United States of America can be made without giving pride of place 
regional and global levels. For example, the diffusion o f crops and techniques of to Africa. Exhuming these realities in order to create a new world characterized 
agricultural production from different regions of the world could not have taken by peace, progress, and social justice, is possible through the lenses o f a deter­
place in isolation o f other cultural traits such as language and mode of dressing. mined consciousness of a wide range of people. In this regard, globalization 
These are no doubt exchanges rooted in globalization. discourse is capable of combining knowledge with wisdom.
The spread o f  cassava was much slower than that o f maize in West Africa. Despite the numerous physical and psychological difficulties and/or hard­
This is because cassava tubers have a high toxic content and so certain relatively ships the African slaves working in the European plantations went through, they 
rigorous techniques are needed to convert them into edible food items. Some succeeded in achieving some degree o f  regularity and predictability with respect 
Portuguese, having mastered the art o f cassava processing (that is, how to re­ to their indigenous social life and living (Uya, 2003). The African slaves 
move the poison, among other things) from the American Indians, started teach­ adapted some Euro-American and American socio-cultural values to their indi­
ing the West Africans upon reaching the coastal parts after about 1500 A.D. genous ways o f life in order to produce a formidable synthesis. Elements o f  this 
Fluid and sap that contain the poison are systematically removed from cassava development can be seen up to now, in such places as Cuba, Trinidad, Chile, 
after grating the tubers. This takes two or three days to actualize, after which the Haiti, Brazil, Argentina, and the southern parts o f the United States of America. 
spongy mass of cassava in a sack is broken up and sieved gradually with the aid Two o f the most prominent African peoples in this connection are the Yoruba of 
of a wire, plastic, or fiber net attached to a ring or square-like frame. By so Nigeria and the Ewe o f Ghana.
doing, smaller pieces go to the bottom o f a receiver leaving behind lumps. The emergence o f  these new forms o f life in the Diaspora following the 
This stage is followed by frying into a kind o f flour called gari. Gari is a slave trade experience can be better appreciated against the background o f reli­
pan-West African staple, usually prepared into a bulky paste by stirring in a gion, music, and food culture. For example, Santeria has its origins in the Yoru­
bowl or pot o f very hot water. This paste is called eba among the Yoruba of ba religious practice and, to a lesser degree, the Spanish folk Catholic faith 
southwestern Nigeria and as far afield as the southern parts o f  the Republics of (Uya, 2003; Oguntoyinbo-Atere, 2002).
Benin and Togo. Eba is normally eaten with a tasty sauce prepared with fish, Santeria, the worship of saints or deities (Gonzalez-Wippler, 1994), is a
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JO Origin and Dynamics of Globalization: A Historical Approach Samuel Oluwole Ogundele 37
syncretism o f Yoruba religion rooted in the belief in gods and goddesses other­ in Nigeria as well as other parts of Africa. But these difficulties notwithstanding, 
wise known as Orisas. Some o f these Orisas are Ogurt (god o f  metals and war­ Africans showed great courage and resilience. For example, the slaves, especial­
fare); Sango (god o f  thunder and lightning); Osoosi (god o f  hunting); Osun ly those who left for the New World from Nigeria, had played a key role in 
(goddess of the river waters, love, and marriage); Orisa Oko (goddess o f agricul­ rebuilding the form and content of the grammar of human existence in their new 
ture); Yemoja (goddess of the sea) and Obatala (god o f  peace and father o f  all locations. This is in addition to their home countries like Nigeria, Benin, and 
deities); and Obaluaye (god of diseases especially small pox). The devotees Ghana after regaining their freedom in the nineteenth century.
believe that all these Orisas (deities) are comparable in several respects to such Aside from the above, the evolution of African languages has benefited 
Christian saints as St. Peter and St. Lazarus. from contacts with other parts of the global village at different points in time. 
Although the spellings of the names o f these Orisas have changed with the For example, the people of the southwestern region o f Nigeria speak the Yoruba 
passage of time in the New World, it would be erroneous to think that these language with several dialects like the Ekiti, Ijesa, Oyo, Egba, Ijebu, Yewa, and 
deities are exclusively for religious purposes in the Euro-American sense. On [kale. This language is not entirely pure in terms o f  its origins and subsequent 
the contrary the Orisas play a major role among the Yoruba both at home and in development. Such words as alafia (peace) and alubosa (onion) are o f Arabic 
the Diaspora, in addressing the issue o f disease and illness. In this connection, origins. Similarly, idoti that appears so frequently in Yoruba language today 
Santeria is a component part of the ethno-medicine of a lot of people in Chile, etymologically derived from “dirty” in English. All these, among others, have 
Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina among other places around the globe. Here, the been neatly embedded in the Yoruba language with the passage o f time (Ogun­
priest who also doubles as the diviner (comparable to the Ifa diviner in South­ dele, 2004). Such a development is a reflection o f both human and physical 
western Nigeria) is highly respected by all the devotees. movements and socio-cultural diffusion at different time periods. At the local 
Music and dance occupy a conspicuous position in this religion (Santeria). level, some similarities in such words as oju and eju (meaning “eye” in the Yo­
Music involving the playing of samba (especially among the Brazilians) must be ruba and Igala languages in southwest and centra! Nigeria respectively) could be 
appreciated beyond the domains of mere entertainment. Indeed, it is a major suggestive of a common remote ancestry. This might also explain the broad 
instrument for engendering group solidarity and political consciousness among similarity in eti and nti (“ear”) among the Yoruba and Igbo ethnicities. Even as 
the Cubans, Brazilians, and Argentines of African extraction. This is a common- far afield as Ghana, there are similar words and expressions among the Asante 
sense necessity in the face of social injustice and oppression (Ruperez, 2005; and Yoruba. For example, melon seeds are called agusi in southern Ghana, 
Ogundele, 2007; Gonzalez-Wippler, 1994). In the area of food culture, the influ­ while the Yoruba of Nigeria refer to this soup ingredient as egusi. The Yoruba 
ence o f Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized. For example, akara—a popular also call welcome ekuabo or ekaabo, while the Asante people of Ghana say 
snack made from ground beans— is a delicacy in many parts o f the New World, akwaaba. The above examples are a confirmation of the considerable antiquity 
particularly Brazil. Ground beans mixed with water and ingredients like pepper, o f the concept o f “borderlessness” or trans-national interconnections in Africa 
onion, and salt are fried bit by bit in a large metal bowl o f vegetable oil (Ogun­ vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
dele, 2007). The nomenclature has, however, changed through time in the New The above experience shows that no language and, by extension, culture are 
World from akara to akaraje (Gonzalez-Wippler, 1994). totally pure or isolated from the cross-currents of regional and/or global history 
The ex-slaves that returned to Nigeria in the nineteenth century also brought and civilization (Ogundele, 2007; Southgate, 1974). Similarly, English is in­
home a lot of cultural traits from the New World. One o f these was Brazilian debted to a number of cultures or languages, in the course o f its evolution and 
architecture. The style of architecture has to do mainly with arched windows and development into an international communication system. The language bene­
plastered surfaces with ornamental details. This baroque style usually has a fited from the cultures o f Denmark and France among others. All these are ele­
garret in the upper part of the house with a small window (Duro-Emanuel, ments o f globalization, which cannot be reduced only to the contemporary eco­
1989). This is a unique building heritage that started gaining ground in Lagos nomic and political maneuvering o f the African nations and other weaker groups 
and its environs from the late nineteenth century. From here, Brazilian architec­ around the world by the powerful West. In other words, globalization also has a 
ture began to spread to the hinterland of Nigeria, particularly the Southwestern deep historical dimension, and this must be neatly incorporated into any mea­
part. This shows that the Trans-Atlantic slave trade experience, despite its ugli­ ningful discourse on the subject.
ness in several senses, remains an issue too important to be studied from a sim­
plistic perspective. This ugliness can be understood against the background o f Contemporary Globalization: A Discourse
human oppression, disturbance of the equilibrium of the local African econo­
mies and social lives, as well as erosion of the people’s confidence through As noted earlier in this chapter, globalization is a good idea that today’s world 
uncritical assimilation o f Western values and education in general. All these cannot wish away. It is obvious that what affects one country has socio­
problems constitute an anathema to human development on a sustainable scale economic, political, health, and demographic implications for her neighbors as
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LIBRARY
Origin and Dynamics of Globalization: A Historical Approach Samuel Oluwole Ogundele 39
well as the rest o f  the globe. This development did not start today. It is enshrined o f fact, the free market system destroys African capacity to effectively combat 
in the domain o f ancient historical and archaeological record. Contrary to popu­ such serious problems as large-scale unemployment, abject poverty, and politi­
lar thinking, the concept o f borderlessness o f our world is not new after all, cal instability including urban violence.
although its (borderlessness) degree has gone up considerably in the face of It is incontestable that while Euro-American and, to a lesser degree, Asian 
better and more efficient communication systems. * goods and services continue to enter the African markets freely, the reverse is 
But unfortunately, globalization as a human endeavor is now being misused the case for the Western world. Local African goods, especially agricultural 
and abused to the detriment of justice, peace, and progress (on a sustainable products, cannot compete effectively with those from countries like the United 
scale) especially o f  the weaker nations and peoples of the world by the devel­ Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, Japan, and China. This is be­
oped world. The level o f this misapplication and misdirection has increased cause o f the high production costs arising largely from a drastic reduction or a 
tremendously in the last two decades. total lack of subsidies by the African government. The IMF dictates to African 
The twentieth century witnessed a radical change in the conceptualization of governments the amount of subsidies to be given to farmers under the guise of 
globalization as a human phenomenon rooted in mutuality o f  respect. The tech­ one-world macroeconomic policy. It even occasionally “advises” them not to 
nologically advanced nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, give subsidies to their farmers at all.
and France as well as international finance capital constructed some structures to But to the chagrin of socio-economic analysts, the same Western nations 
this effect. These included the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World who are in fact the architects of IMF and WTO still give out subsidies to their 
Trade Organization (WTO). These structures were supposed to help manage and farmers in order to reduce production costs. Again, such cheaper and better 
give direction to the economies o f the weaker nations, but unfortunately, these packaged goods like frozen chickens, enter the African market freely to compete 
remained at the level o f mere rhetoric. These supranational bodies or organiza­ with, and indeed, cripple the poorly packaged and highly expensive local goods 
tions claimed (on paper) to promote international fiscal cooperation as well as or items. Not surprisingly, the former stifles the local African market. This is 
facilitate international trade (Ajayi, 2005). It is increasingly obvious, however, one illustration o f how the technologically advanced nations and multinational 
that arising from the activities of these organizations there is a dire need to pro­ corporations use the instrumentality of IMF and WTO to engage in the objectifi­
mote an open exchange o f  ideas and information on a global scale (Ajayi, 2005). cation as well as pauperization of the African peoples.
On the surface, the idea of free trade championed by these organizations Modem globalization is therefore a new form of socio-political and eco­
(IMF, World Bank, WTO) is good, but a thorough examination shows that con­ nomic enslavement of Africans. It amounts to some interference in the interna! 
trary to the outward philosophy of the stakeholders, it is neither free nor fair in affairs o f the African world by the Western nations. The recent global informa­
several respects. The free market system and other related policies are far from tion revolution, despite its several benefits to all and sundry, is increasingly 
being socially and/or politically innocent. They are not value-free, except one is becoming an instrument of economic, political, and intellectual imperialism. 
economical with the truth. The idea o f free trade is one-sided, and this continues That is to say that they are to a large extent a cover for espionage and economic 
to promote the monopoly o f the West, as opposed to competitiveness and sus­ exploitation. By this token, globalization has become a dreadful monster that 
tainable economic development o f the African nations among others. In rolling walks freely on all fours on the African socio-cultural landscape. This situation 
out economic policies for the entire world, particularly Africa, the Western na­ reminds us o f the fact that Africa’s independence is merely on paper and that its 
tions through these bodies consistently negate the principles o f  democracy and (Africa) real sovereignty is no doubt very fragile.
fairness. It is a commonsense necessity for Africa to reject the current but wrong 
African nations who are puppets (as opposed to real or respected member conceptualization o f globalization that connotes over-dependence o f  the conti­
states) in WTO and IMF, do not have any active role to play with regard to nent on the Euro-American world. This is a negation of the principles of justice 
decision making. This is with respect to the formulation and implementation of and sustainable development. Globalization is naturally a process of flows and 
economic policies that directly affect them. Therefore, it is not an overstatement interconnections embedded in mutual respect. This is opposed to a form o f sub­
to claim here that Africa remains a great pawn on the chessboard o f Euro- servience to the Western world that continues to heap indignities on the weaker 
American neo-colonialism and imperialism (Ogundele, 2001). nations through its numerous toxic economic policies.
The idea that globalization, is rooted in “ inclusiveness” o f  the weaker na­ Taming and broadening the concept of globalization are a great challenge 
tions o f the world is a big ruse. Indeed, the so-called free trade or free market for contemporary African political leaders. These are indeed a task that must be 
system is an anathema to competitiveness, technological development, and done! Political leaders in the Western world must begin to appreciate the philos­
productivity in many respects. Globalization today as a concept is full o f contra­ ophy o f genuine partnership with the African nations. Abject poverty, unem­
dictions largely because it has no regard, among other things, for the develop­ ployment, and political instability in Africa have serious socio-political, eco­
ment o f  local socio-political and economic initiative or conditions. As a matter nomic, and demographic implications for the rest of the global village, particu­
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
• •to1" ui vjiuuanzauon: /\ Mistoncal Approach Samuel Oluwole Ogundcle 41
larly Europe and North America. This can be understood against the background tame, and broaden the concept of globalization as a basis for getting out o f  the 
o f the fact that our contemporary world is becoming more borderless on a daily woods. This is achievable only within the framework o f collective solidarity and 
basis. self-discipline by African political leaders who (with a few exceptions) continue 
to play to the gallery because of their unfettered gluttony.
Summary and Conclusion
References
Globalization is certainly a multi-faceted intellectual discourse involving a deep 
understanding and appreciation o f such variables as ancient history, geography, Ajayi, O.O. (2005). Globalisation and the politics o f marginality. In O. Vaughan 
and exchange networks. Globalization is an age-long concept that can be et al. (Eds.), Globalization and marginality. Ibadan: Sefer Books Ltd.
stretched as far back in time as the Homo erectine stage o f  hominization, going Bentley, J.H., & Ziegler, H.F. (2003). Traditions and encounters: A global pers­
back to at least one million years ago in Africa. Similarly, the ancient Egyptians pective on the past. Vol. 11: From 1500 to the present. Boston: McGraw 
were pioneers in several facets of human endeavors like mathematics, philoso­ Hill.
phy, medicine, and engineering. Greek scholars such as Aristotle and Plato re­ Champion, T„ & Ucko, P. (2003). Introduction: Egypt, ancient and modem. In 
ceived their education and training in some o f the sanctuaries o f the Egyptian P. Ucko & T. Champion (Eds.), The wisdom o f  Egypt: Changing visions 
temples. Indeed, the first textbook on mathematics was written by Imhotep through the ages, pp. 1-5. London: UCL Press.
about 4,000 years ago. Many members o f  the global village in antiquity bene­ Duro-Emanuel, T.L. (1989). The origins and persistence of Afro-Brazilianism in 
fited tremendously from the Egyptian civilization or education. But this was the Brazilian quarters of Lagos island. Unpublished B.A. Long Essay, Uni­
based on mutual respect as opposed to what has been happening as from the late versity of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.
nineteenth century A.D. Flint, J.E. (1974). Economic change in West Africa in the 19th century. In J.F.A. 
The phenomenon o f flows and interconnections continues up to the present Ajayi & M. Crowder (Eds.), History o f  West Africa. Vol. 2, pp. 380-401. 
day. It is unending. The physical human movpments or migrations and the sub­ London: Longman Group Ltd.
sequent spread of ideas o f agriculture from Southeast Asia (during the late Stone Gonzalez-Wippler, M. (1994). Legends o f  Santeria. St. Paul Minnesota: Llewel­
Age period) to West Africa have become an unforgettable experience with re­ lyn Publications.
spect to the construction of the form and content o f the lexicon of modem Afri­ Hiiton-Barber, B. & Berger, L. (2002). The official fie ld  guide to the cradle o f  
can culinary history and geography. The African Diaspora, especially the en­ humankind (Sterkfontein, Swartkrans, Kromdraai <& Environs World Herit­
slaved Nigerians in the Atlantic Slave Trade, contributed to the development of age Site). Cape Tosvn: Struik Publishers
a new culture in such countries as Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Trinidad, Puerto Rico, Nii Kortey, O. (2007), January 15. Personal communication.
and Argentina. Santeria (the worship of saints) was a religious form that arose Ogundele, S.O. (2001). Human origins: A critical perspective. Ibadan: John 
from the mixture of the Yoruba traditional worship and the Catholic faith. To­ Archers Ltd.
day, Santeria devotees are numerous in the New World, particularly Brazil. Ogundele, S.O. (2004). Rethinking West African archaeology. Ibadan: John 
The phenomenon o f globalization from the twentieth century to date is full Archers Ltd.
o f  contradictions. Thus, for example, the formulation and implementation o f  the Ogundele, S.O. (2007). Understanding aspects o f Yoruba gastronomic culture. 
free market system is a testimony to the Western form o f hypocrisy emanating Indian Journal o f  Traditional Knowledge, 6(1), pp. 50-56.
from an insatiable appetite for African natural resources. However, the African Oguntoyinbo-Atere, M. (2002). An exhibition of Yoruba religion, arts and cul­
market is open to all kinds o f goods from the West. It also confirms the current ture among the Cubans: A visitation. In E. Ifie (Ed.), Papers in honour o f  
unbridled immorality and indescribable degree o f insincerity in international Tekena Tamuno at 70. Ibadan: Oputoru Books.
politics. Osae, T.A., & Nwabara, S.N. (1982). A short history o f  West Africa, A.D. 1000- 
Such bodies as IMF and WTO were established by \he Western nations in 1800. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
the twentieth century to “promote” international monetary cooperation and “fa­ Peebles, J.W. (1996). Preface. In C.H. Felder (Ed.), The original African herit­
cilitate” international trade. This development drastically changed the age-old age study Bible, pp. 20-53. Nashville: The James C. Winston Publishing 
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or organizations shows that they (IMF and WTO) are agencies for the promotion Ruperez, E.L. (2005). Puerto-Rico: Cultural and natural heritage. Barcelona: 
o f greater economic domination in post-colonial Africa. Anman Grafiques del Valias.
Africans and other technologically weaker peoples of the world must cage, Southgate, G.W. (1974). A textbook o f  modern European history (1789-1960).
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challenges. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Chapter Four
COMPATRIOTISM VS. COSMOPOLITANISM:
Exploring a New Cosmo-Morality of 
Human Relations from the Yoruba in 
the Age of Globalization
Ronald Olufemi Badru
The chapter explores a new morality of relations among nation-states and 
peoples. Ontologically, the current globalization proecss moves towards the ul­
timate institution of a global sphere of common human values. However, corn- 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism are opposed ethical thinking that negate the in­
stitution of the speculated global sphere. To reconcile and transcend the seem­
ing difference between the forms of ethical thinking, the study recommends the 
institution of alajobi thinking, which espouses common descent of humankind, 
and thus the morality of self-other complementarity in human interaction. Es­
tablishing the globalization process on this ethical thinking leads to a truly 
moral global village.
Introduction
In the contemporary age, one of the core issues dominating the central space of 
intellectual discourse is that of globalization, a subject that seems to be reverbe­
rating from every comer of the perceptible world. Really, the concept o f globali­
zation has become some sort of buzzword (see Scholte, 1996, pp. 43-57). Ac­
cording to Chase-Dunn, the discourse on globalization has become a flood 
(1999, p. 187) which seems to have transformed into a phenomenon heralding 
both qualitative and quantitative changes to the life of the average person as a 
being in the world. The reality of the changes becomes more perceptible when
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Compatriotism vs. Cosmopolitanism Ronald OUifemi Badru 45
we remember that the globalization process has ecological, cultural, communi­ quoting Martin Shaw (2002), summarizes three accounts o f  the meaning of 
cation, economic, and political dimensions and implications (See Chase-Dunn global.
1999, pp. 191-193; also Sklair, 1999, pp. 148-159). The first account has to do with the literal translation Ot the word, belong to 
Although existing literature reveals that there are multifarious conceptions the g lobe}  From this perspective, global means “connected with the natural 
of the phenomenon of globalization, a critical analysis shows that at the core of habitat o f  human kind. . .” The second account explains the concept o f global as 
the phenomenon o f globalization, in the moral sense, lies the moral ideal of “the quality involved in the world-wide stretching o f social relations.” The third 
instituting a global sphere where common human values are respected and pro­ explanation regards the concept as the development o f “a common conscious­
moted. However, the realization o f the moral ideal is threatened by two diame­ ness o f human society on a world scale.”
tric forms of ethical thinking: compatriotism and cosmopolitanism. While corn- From the conceptions given, some inferences could be made. First, the two 
patriotism emphasizes that the whole issue o f morality truly makes sense within latter conceptions somewhat depend on the former conception. Without the 
the notion of a bounded society o f socio-historically related people, cosmopoli­ existence o f the natural habitat of man, there would be no man. If this is the 
tanism reverts to the thinking that morality ought to be transcultural, that moral case, then the issues of stretching social relations among men beyond national 
obligations ought to be founded on the universal ethic o f equal value o f  life. boundaries and developing a common consciousness of human society on a 
Against the foregoing background, the primary focus o f  the chapter is a critical world scale seem unrealistic and impracticable if men had no natural habitat 
examination o f  the two forms o f ethical thinking, with a view to reconciling and (Badru, 2003, p. 17).
transcending the seeming divergence by the institution o f alajobi thinking from Furthermore, the third account somehow accords with the second one. If 
Yoruba cosmology. This thinking is founded on common descent o f  humankind there is a common consciousness of human society on a world scale, peoples of 
(the cosmological aspect) and this invariably generates a moral norm o f self- the world would see themselves as having a common destiny. This understood, 
other complementarity (the moral aspect) in human association and interaction, then they would be more willing to stretch social relations among men beyond 
ihus, it is apposite to make the lexical conjugation, cosmo-morality. Founding national boundaries (Badru, 2003, p. 18). In other words, the second account is 
the globalization process on this ethical thinking leads to a trulv moral global reinforced by the third account.
village. In the words of Cohen and Kennedy, globalization means “the ways in 
i he chapter is divided into five parts. Following the introductory section, which the world is being knitted together” (2000, p. 10). Scholte characterizes 
the second section engages in some preliminary ontological analysis; the third the phenomenon as “the process of the world becoming a single place” (1996, p. 
section examines morality, compatriotism, and cosmopolitanism as well as their 43). He further makes a distinction between international and global relations:
relative strengths and weaknesses; the fourth section explores a new morality of 
human relations founded on alajobi thinking; and the final section is the conclu­ Whereas international circumstances involve crossing considerable distance 
sion o f the chapter. over more or less extended time intervals, global conditions are situated in a 
space bevond geometry, where distance is covered in effective no time. (1996, 
p. 46)
Preliminary Ontological Analysis of Globalization
The distinction made by Scholte (1996) contributes to our understanding of 
In accord with the earlier contention o f Scholte (1996), Adekanye (2004, p. iii) the phenomenon o f globalization because it strikes at the spatio-temporal com ­
also states that globalization has become one o f the most frequently used buzz­ pression, which is taking place in the conduct o f the present-day transcultural 
words in much o f today’s discourse, not just within the social sciences but human relations. However, some critics have submitted that the stated spatio- 
across all academic disciplines and even among non-specialists. But, how do we temporal compression is largely a myth, that “there is no fundamental difference 
ontologically conceptualize globalization? Such an ontological conceptualiza­ between the international submarine, telegraph cable method o f financial trans­
tion would derive from an understanding o f  the phenomenon" that is shorn o f any actions (o f the early twentieth century) and contemporary electronic system s” 
disciplinary attachment, 1 an understanding that strikes at the essence of globali­ (Hirst & Thompson, 1996, p. 197). The criticism can easily be dismissed by 
zation. appealing to two commonplace facts in the contemporary world. First, the use of 
According to Sklair, there is no single agreed definition of globalization Internet facilities, fbr example, has made it possible for peoples to send and 
(1999, p. 144). I his admission, however, is not dismissive of making new at­ receive trans-border messages within seconds. Second, the use o f ATM cards, a 
tempts at understanding the ontology of the phenomenon o f globalization, devo­ new phenomenon in Nigeria, makes it effortlessly easy to make financial trans­
id o f any disciplinary attachment, which tends to make our understanding of its fers without traversing long distances.
ontology conceptually parochial. Towards this direction, Badru (2003. p. 17).
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.. w t / j i i i u p u i i o n i s m Ronald Olufemi Badru 47
The spatio-temporal compression in the conduct o f  contemporary trans- [Tjhis sense of “morality” is a descriptive sense, because a person can refer to 
border human relations is also evident in Held’s conception o f globalization. For an individual’s morality without endorsing it. In this sense, like the original de­
him, the phenomenon denotes: scriptive sense, morality has no limitations on content.
the stretching and deepening of social relations and, institutions across space From the normative perspective, Gert (2005, para. 24) states that moralitx 
and time such that, on the one hand, day-to-day activities are increasingly in­ is an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing behavior 
fluenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and, on the other, that affects other?, and has the lessening of evil or harm as its goal.” Valequez 
the practices and decisions of local groups or communities can have significant ( j 999, p. 496) also accords with Gert’s normative thinking o f morality when he 
global reverberations. (Held, 1995, p. 20; see also, Held, et ah, 1999, p. 15) notes that “morality is a set o f rules stating what you ought and ought not to do.’
In his conceptual analysis of morality, Frankena (1995) distinguishes three 
Furthermore, since the language of “stretching and deepening” implies an kinds o f  moral thinking. First, there is descriptive-empirical inquiry, historical or 
ongoing enterprise, then we can state that the phenomenon of'globalization scientific, such as is done by anthropologists, historians, psychologists, and 
“describe(s) a process, not an end-state” (Habermas, 2001, p. 66). In other sociologists. The focus here is to find out how people do behave in order to 
words, the phenomenon of globalization is in a state o f  becoming; it has not describe or explain their behavior coherently. Second, there is moral thinking 
fully become. which revolves around questions, such as What is good or what is obligatory? 
Reasoning from the foregoing understandings o f global and globalization, Essentially, this moral thinking is prescriptive and tries to prescribe what ought 
one could make some inferences about globalization on the ontological plane: to be done or what ought not to be done. It differs from the earlier explanato- 
1. It is a spatio-temporal phenomenon; it is expressive of a commitment to the ry/descriptive moral thinking. Third, there is “meta-ethicaf moral thinking, 
contraction or total annihilation of the spatio-temporal gap separating different 
nations and peoples of the world; which focuses on critical analyses of the terms used in making evaluative state­
2. It is an unfurling process; it has not fully materialized; and ments. This thinking deals with logical, epistemological, or semantical ques­
3. 1 he end-state of the spatio-temporal process is the institution of a global sphere tions, such as— What is the meaning o f being morally right or being morally 
where common human values are promoted. All the global forces of economy, wrong? How can ethical and value judgments be established or justified? Can 
culture, politics, and communications that wc are presently witnessing are ma­ they be justified at all? What is the meaning o f “ free” or “responsible?”
nifestations, which point to, and also work towards, the given ideal end-state. Certain basic points must be noted from all the different understandings of 
the concept o f morality espoused so lar. First, the concept oi morality is capable 
o f  different interpretations. It would be an inversion of conceptual clarity if this 
Morality, Conipatriotism, and Cosmopolitanism fact is not recognized.
Second, in the prescriptive/normative sense, morality is part o f the subject 
M orality matter o f  ethics, which is itself a subset o f the discourse of philosophy. There­
fore, morality is philosophical in the prescriptive/normative sense. Furthermore, 
I he concept of morality can be examined from two perspectives, descriptive and morality and ethics are intimately related. We cannot ask about the right thing to 
normative (see Gert, 2005). The first perspective can be conceived o f in three do at any point in time without taking into account the sort of agents concerned 
senses; in the decision-making process and the values to which they are attached (Solo­
Sense A: “M orality” is used simply to refer to a code o f conduct put forward mon & Greene. 1999). In the same thinking, normative ethics is also called 
by a society (Gert, 2005, para. 3). One would call this morality in the social moral philosophy (Garner, 2003, p. 610). Ihus, ethics and morality are inter­
sense. changeable in the prescriptive/normative sense. The foregoing sense o f  moralitx 
Sense B: Mojplity refers to a guide to behavior put forward bv some is adopted in the study.
group other than a society— for example, a religious group (Gert, 2005, para. 6). 
One would call this morality in the group sense.
Sense C: “Morality” refers to a guide that a person, perhaps himself, regards C onipa tr io tism  a n d  C osm opolitan ism
as overriding and wants adopted by everyone else (Gert, 2005, para. 1 l^ O n e  Both the concepts of compatriotism and cosmopolitanism have rich philosophi­
would call this morality in the individual sense. According to Gert (2005 para 
10 cal backgrounds: the former derives chiefly from the Platonic and Aristotelian ) , ~
philosophical reflections on civic citizenship, and the latter from the stoic phi­
losophy.
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According to both Plato and Aristotle, the state exists to supply the necessi­
ties of life to man (see Coplestone, 1962a, p. 251; 1962b, p. 92). Therefore, to In simple terms, it is logical inconsistency to love one’s nation without 
preserve the state, Aristotle stated that, loving or giving moral preference to the service of  one’s fellow citizens in rela­
tion to the nationals o f other nations. Thus, compatriotism is defined as a morali­
[EJach citizen will possess a plot of land near the city and another near the ty that expresses a normative commitment to giving priority treatment to com pa­
frontier (so that all may have an interest in the defence of the state). This land triots living within a political community over moral agents living in a foreign 
will be worked by the non-citizen labourers. (Coplestone, 1962b. p. 98) political community. This understanding forms the basis of the concept o f  corn- 
patriotism in the study.
From the foregoing, since Aristotle somewhat makes a distinction between According to Cheah (2006, p. 487), quoting D ’Alembert, “cosmopolitan” 
citizens and non-citizens, we may rightly surmise that a citizen in the Aristote­ derives from the Greek words for “world” (cosmos) and “city” (polis). Specifi­
lian sense is one who holds a stake in the survival and flourishing of the state cally, the moral dimension to the concept of cosmopolitanism derives extensive­
and who participates in “giving judgment and holding office” (Aristotle, 1981, ly from the reasoning of stoic philosophers. However, the first philosopher to 
p. 169). Hence, the emergence of the concept of civic citizenship with the cog­ have given explicit expression to cosmopolitanism was the Socratically inspired 
nate concept o f  patriotism. Cynic, Diogenes in the fourteenth century BCE. It is said that “when he was 
But what is patriotism per se? Patriotism is a strand of what some scholars asked where he came from, he replied, 'I am a citizen of the world’” (Kleingeld 
of  morality have called partialism (see Cuttingham, 1986; Wolf, 1992); the & Brown, 2006, para. 5).
thesis that “it is (not merely psychologically understandable but) morally correct The above notwithstanding, the stoic philosophers provided a philosophical 
to favor one's ow n"  (Cuttingham, 1986, p. 357-358).132 4 Nathanson, quoting basis for the development of  the concept of cosmopolitanism. Perhaps the clas­
MacIntyre, states that patriotism involves loyalty and a preference for the well­ sical philosophical high-ground for the whole idea of cosmopolitanism was 
being o f one’s own country over others (1989, p. 536). Keller also strikes at the provided by the stoic philosophers when they argued that all men are partici­
heart o f  the discussion when he notes that a patriot loves and is loyal to his own pants in the spark of  divine reason; hence the idea of universal brotherhood (see 
country (2005, p. 576). Stumpf, 1994, p. 119). Cicero put it thus:
Perhaps, the foregoing scholars have drawn on the philosophical resource of 
the classics. In the R e p u b l ic  (3 7 5 c ), P la to n ic 4 Socrates calls for a citizen armv since reason exists both in man and God, the first common possession of 
that resembles “the philosophic dogs” who are “as gentle as can be with their men and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have 
familiars and those they know and the opposite with those they don't know” right reason in common. And since right reason is law, we must believe that 
(Pangle, 1998, p. 382). Aristotle also insists that the psychological core of  citi­ men have law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share law 
zenship is a tamed version of what Plato calls “spiritedness” (thumos)— that part must also share justice, and those who share these are to be regarded as mem­
of the soul that generates a passionate, often indignant, sense o f  honor, together bers of the same commonwealth. (Stumpf, 1994, p. 119)
with a fiercely proud and stubbornly loyal love for one’s own people (Panele 
1998, p. 382). Cicero’s notion of cosmopolitanism is that moral duties and obligations 
A reflection on the above reveals that the defining characteristic of the con­ ought not to be restricted only to those who have communal attachments. Ra­
cept o f  patriotism reduces to loyalty to one’s nation. Now, if we understand ther, moral relations ought to be extended to those with whom we do not have 
“compatriot” as including all long-term, law-abiding fellow-residents of a coun­ obvious communal relationships. The reason being that we are all required to be 
try (Miller, 1998, p. 205), then we can see it in the light that patriotism implies benevolent to all persons. Seneca captured the thinking thus:
compatriotism. The logic is this;
Nature bids me to be of use to men whether they are slave or free, freedmen or
1. The notion of a nation without people is unthinkable. Therefore, the concept of free born. Wherever there is a human being there is room for benevolence.
people is vital to any conception of a nation; (Coplestone, 1962b, p. 175)
2. Patriotism means loyalty to one’s nation;
3.-  Loyalty to one’s nation implies development of the well-being of fellow na­ Another philosopher who contributed to the cosmopolitan thinking was the 
tionals in preference to that of other nationals, since they commonly constitute German philosophpr, Immanuel Kant. Kant’s contribution is both moral and 
the nation; political. Perhaps taking a cue from his Stoic predecessors, Kant defines the 
4. Development of the well-being of fellow nationals in preference to that of other ontology of man as being constitutive of  reason. Since all men possess this rea­
nationals is compatriotism; and son, then they are all persons who have equal moral worth. He states that.
5. Therefore, patriotism leads to compatriotism.
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50 Compatriotism vs. Cosmopolitanism Ronald Olufemi Badru 51
. . . rational beings are called persons in as much as their nature already marks compatriots; failure to do this is ingratitude, and this is a vice. In as much as this 
them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as something which is not to be used mere­ vice is a moral wrong, then the virtue o f  gratitude ought to be promoted.
ly  as a means and hence there is imposed thereby a limit on all arbitrary use o f But, the argument is weak in at least two basic respects. First, the duty trig­
such beings which are thus objects o f respects. (Kant, 1981, p. 428) gered by the principle of fairness is not a duty of  a sort that could establish pa­
from the political angle, Kant proposes an institutional structure at the triotic priority (Arneson, 2007, para. 26). This is simple: ^
transnational level. Using the contactarian approach, Kant contends that states Even if the principle of fairness generates a duty to provide goods to one's fel­
should . . . relinquish, just as do individual human beings, their wild (lawless) low country men, this is a return for services rendered, not any sort of response 
freedom, and . . . accustom themselves to public, binding laws, and . . . thereby to the neediness of badly off condition of those to whom the duty is owed.
form a (continually expanding) state o f  peoples (civitas gentium), which would Those to whom 1 owe a duty of fair play arising from the principle of fairness 
ultimately comprise all o f  the peoples on earth (Kleingeld, 2004, p. 306). might all be wealthy individuals who are among the very best off persons on 
For the legal framework of the transnational institutional order, Kant also earth. (Arneson, 2007, para. 26)
introduces the concept o f  “cosmopolitan law” in which both states and individu­
als have rights, and where individuals have these rights as “citizens of  the earth” The second weakness is that the whole duty/logic of reciprocity borders on 
rather than as citizens o f  particular states (Kleingeld & Brown, 2006, para. 28). enlightened self-interest: you give me benefits now because you expect some­
Kant notes that the cosmopolitan law is a “ necessary complement” to the unwrit­ thing o f  equal value from me in the future, though I may not be able to repay 
ten code of existing national and international law, and a means to transform the you immediately. Why operate on the basis of enlightened self-interest? Morali­
latter into a public law o f  humanity (Kant, 1970, p. 108). Kant goes on to em­ ty might require the well-off to help the badly-off forever with no actual beha­
phasize the norm o f  action to the individual in his proposed transnational institu­ vioral reciprocity demanded of the recipients of help (Arneson, 2007, para. 29).
tional order when he states that a world-citizen acts from the pluralistic stand­ This is moral altruism, which a sincere moral agent ought to adopt.
point o f  humanity as a collective actor as opposed to that o f  an egoistic individ­
ual (Kant, 1968. p. 4 11). A r g u m e n t f r o m  sa lien ce
Read carefully and critically, the reflections of the above philosophers give 
us the understanding that moral cosmopolitanism is a normative thinking, which Salience o f  need refers not only to the obviousness and inescapability of  notic­
expresses a commitment to the view that all human beings ought to be regarded ing need but also to the continuing imposition of this knowledge on us (Kamm.
and treated as o f  equal moral value and respect. This position constitutes a clash 2000, p. 664). The reasoning goes that we would be morally unfeeling not to 
with compatriotism. assist those whose needs are salient to us by virtue ot their proximity to us, ra­
ther than trouble ourselves over the problem of distant needy foreigners whose 
needs are not salient to us. Doubtless, it is morally reprehensible to refrain from 
Coinpatriotism vs. Cosmopolitanism helping those who we surely know, because of their proximity to us, are worse 
off. But this also applies to distant needy foreigners. In the present age o f  com­
The centra! normative thesis o f  moral cosmopolitanism reduces to moral impar- munication systems with transnational capacities to transmit and receive infor­
tialism. However, some philosophers of compatriotism have argued that this mation within seconds, rarely can we say that we are unaware of  the needs of 
thinking is defective, and that we are morally justified to be partial to those that distant foreigners.
are “near and dear.”5 The latter position is founded on some grounds.
A r g u m e n t f r o m  “co n tra c t o f  c o n s e n t”
A r g u m e n t f r o m  f a i r  p la y
From the Hobbesian and Lockean perspective, especially, the consent o f  the 
1 his borders on the dutv/logic o f  reciprocity. It states that we have obligations to people in the pre-social life forms the basis for the justification of  the modern 
give benefits in return for benefits received, and we receive benefits from our society (see Wolff, 1996).6 Thus, any duties and obligations of justice thereafter 
fellow' citizens (Kleingeld & Brown, 2006, para. 57). Now, when the benefits we are equally a product of the “contract o f  consent,” which only applies to those 
ought to give our fellow citizens by virtue of the duty/logic of  reciprocity are who have consented to it. Obviously, the thinking provides, in the abstract, 
being contended for by the distant needy, we know at once that the interests of justification for political obligation and compatriotism. If the stale truly exists to 
our fellow citizens trump those of the others. The merit o f  the reasoning is ob­ correct the evils of the pre-social life, which contractarian philosophers pointed 
vious. One has a moral responsibility to reciprocate good gestures from his out, then it would be contra-reason for the people in the modern state not to
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Ronald Olufemi Badru 55
An objection which could be raised against the position of  the chapter is, conceptualized on the basis of self-other complementarity. In the ideal global 
I low could the alajobi perspective solve the problems of obvious discrimination’ village, the concept of otherness is extensive rather than restrictive.
domination, and suppression of the lowly by the mighty, the major problem in 
die present age? The answer is clear. Inasmuch as we could not consistently Notes
discriminate against, dominate, or suppress and still hold ourselves in brotherly 
terms, then the logical conclusion is that the foregoing problems are resolved in I Conceptualizing globalization from a disciplinary matrix tends to be non­
the cosmo-morality of  alajobi. objective in the sense that it does not truly give us the essence o f the phenomenon of 
It has, however, been pointed out that this proposal throws up the problem globalization. What it offers us is just the interpretation o f the concept from a given
ot implementation." I his problem is largely addressed if the policy makers of disciplinary angle.
modern nation-states are committed to the following program of implementa­ 2. The emphasis is in the original.
tion. The constitution of  each nation-state should be drawn up in such a way that 3. Other forms o f partialism, according to Cuttingham, are fam ilism , kinshipism , 
sets aside a given portion o f  its wealth, depending on the economic buoyancy of danism , racism , sexism , and planetism (pp. 359 -360).
the nation-state, to cater for the welfare o f  the clearly perceived unfortunate 4. Emphasis mine.
others in neighboring lands. 1 he phrase “clearly perceived” means that the needs 5. T h is  is borrowed from Nathanson’s work, p. 538.
6 . Th is  work presents illuminating summaries of the political philosophies o f Tho ­
o f  the so-called unfortunate others in those lands must be firstly properly ascer­ mas Hobbes and John Locke, the two philosophers that classically  laid the metaphysical 
tained. This guards against any imprudent use o f  the wealth committed to their foundations o f the modern state in contractarianism. Sec pp. 8-1S; 18-26.
welfare. Thereafter, the reserved wealth is expended to provide for those identi­ 7. Th is  is a logical derivative from the foregoing.
fied needs. The moral justification for this transnational redistribution of wealth 8 . The distinction between “ equal value” and “ equal concern” to life as well as the 
is founded on the alajobi thinking. Thus, observance of  this scheme of redistri­ specific example given is made in the Richard M iller s work cited earlier in the study, p. 
bution is morally obligatory rather than supererogatory. Furthermore, this trans­ 207.
national redistribution o f  wealth is to be channeled through a specially estab­ 9 . I thank the anonymous reviewers o f the chapter for pointing out that there is a 
lished institution that equally has transnational capacities to operate across bor­ tension between compatriotism and cosmopolitanism on political, economic, and uthc: 
ders. grounds as well.
10. Th is  thinking, although modified in what follows, is part of my present work on 
When all nation-states and peoples are morally committed to this proposal, the cosmo-morality o(a la jo b i  as a norm for human interaction in the contemporary world
ihen at least three fundamental things would be achieved: ( 1) people would be 11. I also profusely thank the reviewers for making this valuable sugges- 
responsible in a morally obligatory way to the wellare o f  the unfortunate ones tion/contribution to the quality o f the chapter.
among them; ( 2) nation-states and peoples would have no excuse to exclude 
themselves from this morally binding scheme, since it is constitutionally backed References
at the domestic level; (3) no nation-state or people would be worse off in this Adekanye, J .B . (2004). Globalization: An introduction. Ibadan J o u rn a l o f  the S o c ia l  
scheme o f  redistribution, since what a nation-state or people might lack because S c ie n c e s, 2 (1 ), pp. iii-vi.
of contribution to unfortunate ones in neighboring lands w'ould be provided by Akiw ow o, A . 1983 (1980). A jo b i and A jogbe: Variations on the them e socia tion . Inau­
another nation-state or people contributing to the welfare o f  the former. gural Lecture Series 46. Ile-Ife : University o f Ife Press.
Aristotle. (1981). The p o litics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Conclusion Ameson, R .J . (2007). Do patriotic ties limit global justice? The J o u rn a l o f  E th ics . 9(1-2), 
pp. 127-150. Retrieved on January 11, 2007, from
http://philosophy2.ucsd.edu/%7Erarneson/globalegalitarianjusticel.pdf.
The chapter has argued that the ontology o f  globalization is a commitment to the Badru, R .O . (2003). Globalization as an instrument o f  neo-colon ia lism  in A fr ic a : A 
ultimate institution o f  a global village, where common human values are pro­ c r it ica l exposition. Unpublished M A thesis, Department o f Philosophy, U niversity  
moted. However, the opposed moral claims o f  compatriotism and cosmopolitan­ o f Ibadan, Nigeria.
ism constitute a problem to the realization of  this ideal. In the final analysis, the Chase-Dunn, C . (1999). Globalization: A world-systems perspective. J o u rn a l o f  W orld- 
chapter locates the solution to the problem in alajobi philosophy. It concludes System s R e sea rch , V (2 ), pp. 187-215.
that adopting this thinking as the new morality of human relations would contri­ Cheah. P. (2006). Cosmopolitanism. In M Featherstone, C . Venn, R . Bishop, & J. Philips 
bute to the institution o f  a more just global village. Furthermore, the chapter also (Ed s .), Theory, C ulture a nd  Society: S p ec ia l Issue on P roblem atizing  G lo b a l K n o w ­
attempts to address the problem of implementation of  the proposal made Ulti­ ledge, 23(2-3), pp. 486-496. London: Sage Publications.
Cohen, R „  & Kennedy, P. (2000). G lo b a l sociology. New Yo rk : Palgrave.
mately, one could state that in the ideal global village, founded on the alajobi 
philosophy, “ s e l f  is not conceptualized in isolation of “other.” Rather, it is
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Section II
Globalization and Culture
v \
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Chapter Five
K iswahili Language and the Future of 
East African Integration  in the A ge of 
Globalization
Mwanakombo Mohammed Noordin
The year 2007 represents a crucial turning point in the development o f least 
A frica . It witnessed the expansion o f the East African Community (E A C ) to in­
clude Rwanda and Burundi, apart from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. T h is  ex­
pansion immediately raised the fundamental question o f the role o f K isw ah ili in 
relation to other languages in the process o f identity formation in the E A C . Th is  
study explores how K isw ahili competes with English and French (spoken large­
ly in Rwanda and Burundi) to retain and expand its influence in the cultural and 
economic space o f East A frica . Data for this study include government policy 
papers, reports, and legislation; media debates on the East African integration: 
in-depth interviews with policy makers and K isw ah ili educators in Kenya; and 
focus-group discussion with the East African Integration Task Force in Kenya.
Introd uction
This study is set within two simultaneous developments: the escalation in migra­
tion of  people into and within East Africa; and the expansion of the East African 
ft Community to include Rwanda and Burundi. These processes represent impor­
tant opportunities for East African society, but they also result in significant 
social and political tensions. The revival o f  the community, through the signing 
o f  the Treaty for the Establishment of  the East African Community (EAC) in 
1999, presents the partner states with the opportunity and framework for realiz-
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62 K isw ahili Language and the Future of East African Integration Mwanakombo Mohammed Noordin 63
ing the interest and the desire to co-operate in the cultural and linguistic fields. The main objective of  having Kiswahili as a lingua franca in the EAC is to 
In recognition of  the fundamental importance of  this collaboration, there was a encourage regional unity and sustainable socio-economic development. There 
need to provide for Kiswahili to be developed as the lingua franca  o f  the EAC. also developed the need to harmonize Kiswahili education programs, curricula, 
Kiswahili has been recognized by the EAC as a language o f  unity for politi­ and certification in order to ensure that teaching and research achieve acceptable 
cal, economic, social, cultural, educational, scientific, and technological devel­ standards.
opment. This paper explores the role of  Kiswahili in the integration of  East 
Africa noting a fundamental challenge o f  the five East African states’ different 
language policies and separate ideologies on education and cultural development Statement of the Problem
and practices posed by the communities o f  people living within East Africa. 
Language plays a fundamental role in the process of  identity formation. This This study raises several fundamental questions. The role of Kiswahili language 
study explores this concept in the promotion of national and ethnic identities in in the future of the East African integration scheme has several problems due to 
the region. differing language policies in all the five East African countries. The inclusion 
The original member states— Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania— enjoy close of Rwanda and Burundi also poses fundamental challenges. Rwanda has Ki­
regional, educational, scientific, technological, social, economic, cultural, and nyarwanda and 1-Tench as the official languages; Kenya has Kiswahili and Eng­
linguistic ties for their mutual benefit. This has existed since the colonial times. lish; Uganda has English and several ethnic languages; and Tanzania has Kis­
Between 1930 and 1964, there existed an inter-territorial language committee wahili. This diversity o f  language policies in the EAC countries challenges the 
whose central aim was to promote the standardization and development of Kis­ implementation of  article 137 of the Treaty. Thus, making Kiswahili the lingua 
wahili. franca of  East Africa needs a major overhaul of policies in the five countries and 
These three countries had been cooperating and sharing their resources, political will to do so. To achieve this, there is the need to find answers to the 
exemplified by the rotation of the headquarters o f  this languaee committee as following:
follows: Dar-es-Salaam 1930-1942; Nairobi 1942-1952; Makerere 1952-1961; ♦ What is the role o f K isw ah ili in relation to other languages in the process 
and Dar-es-Salaam again 1962-1964 (Kenya, 2007, pp. 2-8). in 1964 the com­ o f identity formation in the East African states"
mittee was incorporated into the Institute o f  Kiswahili Research, University of  • What is the role o f K isw ah ili in the promotion of national and ethnic iden­
Dar-es-Salaam. tities?
In 1977. the East African Community broke up mainly due to selfish leader­ * With globalization giving the push and ethnicity giving the puli, how do 
ship and phobia. Despite this breakup, and despite the subsequent establishment we enhance social inclusion and integration in the EA C ?
of educational and language bodies in individual countries, the pan-regional • Could K isw ah ili function as a unifying language for socio-economic 
language initiative continued to informally interact and formally seek mechan­ growth within East A frica?
isms to establish a framework for formal cooperation.
The revival o f  the EAC in 1999 presented the partner states with another 
opportunity. Article 137 o f  the Treaty for the Establishment o f  the EAC pro­ Kiswahili for Socio-Economic Development
vides that Kiswahili shall be developed as the lingua franca o f  the community 
(Kenya, 2007, pp. 2-8). Kiswahili play's a vital role in collaboration among the With an estimated population of  125 million people, East Africa has a combined 
East African countries for political, economic, social, educational, cultural, and GDP o f  S44 billion, and it is ranked as one of the fastest reforming regions in 
technological development. The admission of  Rwanda and Burundi into the terms o f  business regulation. A vibrant capital and securities market is being 
Community in 2007 opened up a whole new challenge due to the fact that Kis­ strengthened in the region with a high level of intra- and cross-border invest­
wahili had not been widely used there. ments which range from the agricultural, manufacturing, tourism, mining, build­
•With this in mind, the East African Commission of Kiswahili was estab­ ing, construction and housing, and capital markets, and the financial, education, 
lished in 2007 as a tool for advising the partner states on matters related to Kis­ and health sectors. The infrastructure is also calling for investors in road trans­
wahili research, teaching, learning, and development through policy formula­ port. railways, water and air transport, port facilities, information and communi­
tion, knowledge generation, curriculum review, standardization o f  terminology, cation technology, energy, and water and sanitation services.
and promotion of Kiswahili as a lingua franca. This meant that a mechanism had By pooling their resources and promoting free trade within the region, the 
to be put in place and implemented in an effort to equalize the situation in the EAC aims to emerge as a leading trade entity in Africa. These are some of the 
partner states (Kenya, 2007, pp. 2-8). reasons why major economic expansions o f  such magnitude require the services
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0'4 K isw ahili Language and Ihe Future of East African Integration Mwanakombo Mohammed Noordin 65
of a vibrant language like Kiswahili to facilitate communication within the re- the Germans, the Mazrui rebellion against the British settlers, and the Mau Man 
gion. struggles for Kenya’s independence—which all used Kiswahili as the language 
Further, it was noted that through the Inter-University Council for East o f  communication and mobilization to end foreign occupation.
Africa, a mechanism is being established for mutual recognition of  higher edu­ Kiswahili was used as a liberation language in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, 
cational qualifications in the region. This is an important prerequisite for the free South Africa (during the apartheid era), Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the 
movement of labor. Kiswahili can also function as a unifying language for trade, Congo. Kiswahili has also served as a language for research in various universi­
education, transport, agriculture, and finance. ties in Africa, Europe, Asia, and the United States. Due to the above functions, 
Linguistically, Rwanda is oligolingual with Kinyarwanda used by practical­ various international agencies support research in higher education on Kiswahili. 
ly the total population, while Uganda is multilingual with more than 30 languag­ These are some of the compelling advantages which enabled the African Union 
es. There are similarities in the use of.both the English (official) and African (AU) secretariat to choose Kiswahili as one of the official languages of  the or­
languages. Kiswahili is the official national language o f  Tanzania and is used in ganization.
higher education. Kenya has Kiswahili and English as official and practical 
languages, whereas the rural areas continue using mother-tongue language.
Historically, Kiswahili has been the lingua franca of  the coastal region of Globalization and Kiswahili as a Language of 
East Africa since the fourteenth century. It is spoken by over 120 million people East African Integration
in the Eastern and Central African region. Kiswahili is used internationally in 
this region for economic, political, and social transactions, and in government as While the forces of  regional integration focus on the promotion of Kiswahili, the 
an official language. It has been a written language using the Arabic script since forces of  globalization seem to be pushing for the promotion of the English 
the fourteenth century and the Roman script since the nineteenth century' (Mas- language. With the development in information technology in the region and the 
samba, 2002). Due to these functional attributes of Kiswahili, it was standar­ laying of fiber-optic cables, the goal of many East African countries recently has 
dized in the 1930s and became a language of instruction in East African schools. been to attract foreign investments, particularly call centers. The dream is to 
As a consequence of its being one of  the earliest standardized languages of  Afri­
ca, it was made an official language of the \frican Union in 2004. become like India where many major corporations have outsourced their phone 
operators in order to access a cheaper but well-qualified labor market. For East 
Socially, Kiswahili, as the language of the Swahili people of  the East Afri­ African nations to “be like India,” it is argued, the use o f the English language 
can coast, is a Bantu language. In his book, Massamba (2002) insists that it is 
through trade and religion that Kiswahili spread in the Eastern African region. rather than Kiswahili— needs to be promoted.But East Africans, as a whole, stand to benefit immensely from Kiswahili as 
The Arabs had used it to spread Islam into the hinterland of Congo and, later, it a unifying language. As an indigenous language of Africa, it would provide 
was utilized by the European missionaries in spreading Christianity. This made diversity in international fora and promote acceptance, unity, and homogeneity 
Kiswahili acceptable as the language of choice by the people o f  this region.
The same point can be made politically and educationally. Trade was the among the people of  Africa.Nevertheless, there is talk about the “imperialistic" nature of  adopting Kis­
single most compelling vehicle that brought Kiswahili across the East African wahili by non-Swahili peoples of  Eastern Africa and beyond Here it has been 
countries to Rwanda, Democratic Republic o f  Congo, and the Central African found that, though being a language o f  the Waswahili, other ethnicities had 
region. Kiswahili also facilitated the movement o f  Arab merchants into the inte­
rior o f  Africa. historically embraced it without fear as the Swahili are cosmopolitan and ac­
commodating of others by nature. With a literate history dating back to the se­
It also became the language of politics. Political awareness and the clamor venth century, many non-Swahili people found that effective communication in 
for independence in Kenya and Tanzania during the colonial era mainly used 
Kiswahili as the language to unify Africans and lock out the colonialists. The Kiswahili was a useful skill.Undoubtedly, trading blocs like the EAC can indeed help African countries 
missionaries in Kenya and Tanzania also employed the use o f  Kiswahili to evolve and pursue common and coordinated positions on various international 
spread Christianity and.open up schools in the hinterland. After the standardiza­ trade issues and establish strong multilateral negotiating coalitions.
tion of  Kiswahili in 1930, however, the white colonial administrators employed 
the use o f  Kiswahili for education in the African schools. Having joined the EAC in 2007, the two francophone countries of Rwanda 
and Burundi have started promoting Kiswahili, and English, in order to harmon­
Khatib (2004) looks at the unifying capacity of  Kiswahili as a language for ize their socio-cultural environments with those of Kenya, Uganda, and I anza- 
the liberation o f  the African people. He traced the use o f  Kiswahili since the nia. The use of mass media in this exercise cannot be overemphasized. Radio 
Abushiri dynasty o f  seventeenth century East Africa where the Swahili united stations using Kiswahili as their broadcasting medium are indispensable instru­
against Arab invasion. Subsequently, there was the Maji Maji rebellion against
ments o f  integrating the people.
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
.vicwanipi Language ana ine huture of East African Integration Mwanakombo Mohammed Noordin 67
Consequently, the IPP media group of Tanzania has rolled out a regional and contextual roots in the community. Recent reports allude to the suspicion ot 
Kiswahili newspaper to disseminate regional news. This has been a welcome Kenya’s neighbors as to the potential threat the human resource base of  Kenya is 
development as the readership goes beyond East Africa to the world. With its to the partner states. More qualified to occupy most jobs in E.A. makes the 
accessibility in the web. this newspaper underscores the regional character of the neighbors weary of integration. Rigorous border scrutiny of  passports and body 
media in East Africa. , searches make migration into another partner state an ordeal.
One should also observe that many Rwandans and Burundi's who have lived The role o f  Kiswahili would be to tap the human resource base of Kenya by 
in Tanzania over an extended period as political refugees speak Kiswahili. They supplying teachers, learning resource materials, and logistics to partner states so 
have adopted it and institutionalized it through the use of the Swahili culture as to harmonize Kiswahili language education programs and curricula in East 
(Kawoya & Makokha, 2007). Africa.
Significance of Kiswahili in Africa and Beyond Debates on Kiswahili: A Critique
kiswahili was initially used in Addis Ababa at the AU summit in 2004 and at Media debates have amplified the significance of Kiswahili in recent times. In 
the Pan African Parliament in the same year. There is a need to develop and an editorial article of one of the dailies, the editor decried the reluctance and 
expand the functions o f  kiswahili in the Continent. This can be done bv includ­ lack o f  political will among the politicians in propelling the East African inte­
ing Kiswahili in the ,various language policy documents o f  the countries affi­ gration forward.
liated to the AU. Major regional languages of Africa like Arabic in the North, 
Hausa/Yoruba in the West, and Zulu/Sotho/Tswana in the South can also be S ix  months down the road, Kenya is reluctant to facilitate the constitution o f 
taught in East Africa. This will ensure that member states donate research funds the second assembly. Instead, flexing o f muscles, insincerity, selfishness and 
lor developing these regional languages in the continent. lack o f political w ill dominate. (Bundotich, 2007. p. 12)
The success of these policies would be definite with the inclusion o f  a social 
perspective on the attitudes and needs of  the receptors. Both countries’ policies All this was done to frustrate the formation ol an East African Legislative As- 
had been defined in the colonial era and fully adopted at independence. Not sembly by not electing the nine nominees from Kenya’s parliament. This de­
much thought had been put on the opinions of the receptors. At independence layed and derailed the regional governance program.
more realistic options should have been sought. The language for the develop­ For Kiswahili to function as a unifying language for socio-economic devel­
ment of the people of Kenya and Uganda should be a language that has social opment within East Africa, according to Dellinger (2001), there has to be politi­
ramifications, historical relevance, cultural integrity, and economic significance cal will and intent to use it to facilitate integration. If the political sector o f  East 
In this context, Kiswahili fits in very' well as it has historical stature and Africa is in disarray, the social life is affected and Kiswahili will be used more 
economic relevance now that the expansion of the EAC to include Rwanda and as a language o f  disassociation than one o f  unity. We cannot deny the economic 
Burundi has opened the East African market up to 150 million people. Rwan­ inequalities between the member states, with some being more industrialized 
dans and Burundis do speak Kiswahili especially after their migration into Tan­ than others, but this can be an advantage to all in that the EAC can negotiate 
zania during the 1994 genocide. better tariffs for sale o f  the goods to the world as a regional block. Language 
With English, the failure has been in the extra-linguistics phenomena whe­ then can go beyond politics to promote, through relevant activities in the partner 
reby the lower primary pupils in urban areas had difficulties conceptualizing the states, the meaning and value of community unity. One state’s strengths can 
cultural norms of the language. There have been recorded misinterpretations and boost the capacity of  all the other states.
misunderstandings of  meanings in written works like compositions. At that The East African Integration Taskforce on the issue of language noted that 
level, English lacked the social significance of communications. Having been the Kenyan populace was wary of adopting the Kiswahili as a lingua franca due 
the language of colonialists, it conjured up negative feelings from users and to the fact that “we are better than the rest and we do not need them. Why waste 
needed to be tolerated for the sake of upward mobility. our resources in stooping down to their level?’’ (Report of the EAI1,2007, p. 9). 
The Protocol on the Establishment o f  the East African Kiswahili Commis­ These views were expressed by locals in one of the public hearings called by the 
sion declared: “The East African Kiswahili Commission formed in 2007 has the Taskforce. In critically analyzing these statements, one gets the impression that 
vision o f  being the leader in the promotion and coordination of  the development the Kenyans who were speaking were suffering from a superiority complex and 
and usage o f  Kiswahili for regional unity and sustainable socio-economic devel­ failed to grasp the bigger picture of the advantages of the integration. Much as 
opment in partner states. This is a very noble vision, but language has historical the partner states share a history ol colonialism, Swahili culture, and economic
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
69
k i s w u i i i i i  t.anguage and the Future of East African Integration Mwanakombo Mohammed Noordin
development, the people did not get a chance to internalize the meaning o f inte­ Kenya. (2007). Protocol on the establishment o f the East African K isw ah ili Com m ission.
gration. They conceived it as a step backwards. Several developments could 
have led to this, such as lack of a national referendum in Kenya for people to air Khatib. M .S . (2004). K isw ah ili na Umoja wa Africa. Paper presented at the 3rd meeting 
o f C H A K A M A , Arusha, Tanzania. .
their views, little time to discuss issues, past hurts after the breakup of the EAC Kress, Gunter. (1990). C ritica l discourse analysis. In Robert Kaplan (Ed ). Annual Review
in 1977— all these had not been resolved, and the people needed time to under­
o f  A p p lied  L in g u istics , II . . . . .  , .
stand why the breakup happened and what measures had now been put in place Massamba. D .P .B . (2002). H istoria  ya  K isw ahili: 50 B K  hadi 1500 B K . Nairobi: :e
to ensure that such a loss would not occur. Jomo Kenyatta Foundation. . . .  ,
The historical injustices of closing borders, cutting off families and rela­ Muthwii Margaret. (2001). Language policy and practices in education in Kenya and 
tives, experienced in 1977 had not been resolved. Being socially situated, speak­ Uganda: Perceptions o f parents, pupils and teachers on the use o f mother tongue, 
ers needed to be informed o f the new political, economic, social, and cultural K isw ah ili and English in primary schools. Unpublished Report, Nairobi, 2001.
language structures that had been put in place to avert such a crisis. Govern­ The Saturday Standard, Editorial. Fumbling undermining East African integration. A pril
ments had used the top-down approach in total disregard for historical, cultural, 
Wodak. Ruth. (1989) (ed.) Language power and ideology: Studies in political discourse. 
and political contexts. For Kiswahili to succeed, therefore, all these have to be 
London: Benjam ins Publishing Company.
considered.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussions have shown that the partner states must put in efforts 
to implement the mission of the East African Commission on Kiswahili by pro­
viding resources to train teachers, exchange students, and develop uniform cur­
ricula in the five states. More research needs to be done in all the partner states 
on the language policies and the best practices of  implementation.
4t  The study is profoundly aware that contemporary East Africans confront a
characteristic set o f  dilemmas in seeking to define themselves within a system 
that offers them few viable alternatives and subjects them to many unresolved 
conflicts. This is the reality, but Kiswahili as a lingua franca of East Africa can 
bridge the gaps and offer a moral idea! that can be related to the success of  the 
integration process in East Africa, the African Union, and the world in general.
References
African  Union. (2004). C u ltu ra l ch a rter f o r  A frica . Addis Ababa.
Bundotich, J. (2007). Fumbling undermining East African integration. The Sa turd a y  
Sta n d a rd , April, p. 12.
Dellinger, Brett (2001). Views o f  C N N  television new s: A critica l c ro ss-cu ltu ra l analysis  
o f  the Am erican  com m ercia l d iscourse style. Vaasa: Universitas Wasaensis.
F A IT . (2007). Unpublished report o f the East African Integration Taskforce, sitting at the 
Tow n Hall in Eldoret, Kenya, June 2007.
H a ll, Edward T . (1959). The silent language. New Yo rk : Doubleday.
Kaplan, Robert. (1990). Concluding essay: On applied linguistics and discourse analysis. 
In Robert Kaplan (Ed ). A nnual Review o f  A p p lied  Linguistics. II.
Kaw oya, V ., &  Makokha, J .S . (2009). The case o f K isw ah ili as a regional broadcasting 
language in East A frica . Jo u rn a l o f  Pan A frica n  Studies, 2(8). pp. 11-35.
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
<
Chapter Six
The K a d b a  Dress: Identity and 
M odernity  in Contemporary Cam eroon
Flavius Mayoa Mokake1
Th is  chapter examines the origin o f K a hb a  and the growing importance o f the 
gown among Cameroonian women. It discusses the multiple functions of Kab- 
ba over the years and shows how recent waves o f modernization gave the dress 
a national character which justifies the need for its canonization as a national 
attire for women and a salable cultural artifact in a speedily globalizing world.
Introduction
The Kabba dress has been popular with most Sawa2 women since the early pe­
riods o f  European visits to the coastal regions of Cameroon. Available evidence 
traces its origin to the early period of intimate contact with the outside world. 
Through this contact the coastal people have had a long and interesting history 
with European sailors, Anglo-West Indians, and West Africans (Wright, 1958, 
pp. 16-39). Within this period the principal mission of the pioneer Europeans 
was exploration, but later batches of Europeans included Christian missionaries, 
traders, and political adventurers.
Unlike the Christian missionaries who came to spread the Christian doc­
trine, the pull factor for traders was to exploit and benefit from the lucrative 
trade in slaves along the West African coast (Northrup, 1978, pp. 23-31). Events 
along the coastal regions were to change dramatically with the abolition o f  this 
trade in human chattel. Over the years, many more European and West Indian 
traders arrived on the scene following the suppression of the trans-Atlantic slave
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
Flavius Mayoa Mokake 73
trade to benefit from the emerging trade in goods. The institutionalization of The practice of  body adornment among indigenous women from pre­
what was later described as legitimate trade preceded as much as it precipitated co lon ia l times consisted of using tattoos to decorate the body, fatioos were 
the annexation and colonization of  African territories. pricked around vital spots of the body like the breast, navels, and laps. The tat­
toos provided additional beauty to a woman and influenced the tradition of body 
exposure. In giving new tastes to women, the tattoos spoke a solemn language 
Indigenous Dressing Styles well understood by the indigenes. The marks and signs on the body in an ex­
tremely subtle way revealed the social status of the wearer among peers. Perhaps 
Prior to the arrival o f  Europeans the indigenes had designed certain forms of it was the practice of body exposure that made the women to move half-naked 
dressing styles with the use of local material. These ranged from leaves, bark of paving the way for the introduction of  Kabba in late nineteenth century.
trees, and animal skins and raffia-skirts. These were worn by the coastal peoples 
o f  Cameroon. Other forms of dress included ngwashi, a traditional dress worn 
exclusively by men. Similarly, among the Bakweri women a small skirt-like K abba: Origin and Significance
dress called wanda was very trendy. The history' o f  these early dresses, though 
unclear, points to the fact that different modes of  dressing had evolved over a Though literature on the origins of  Kabba is sketchy, oral tradition dates it back 
long period. to the nineteenth century when the pioneer Christian missionaries, particularly 
Other dressing patterns were in vogue along the coast o f  Cameroon other the English Baptist missionaries, established the first churches in Cameroon. 
than those mentioned above. By the nineteenth century, trading had become According to oral tradition the dress was introduced to the local women by the 
characterized by the exchange of European goods for African raw materials such wife of  the Baptist missionary, Alfred Saker.6 According to the oral account, 
as cotton, ivory, rubber, and palm produce. Generally, before such exchanges Helen Saker7 was uncomfortable each time she encountered indigenous women 
took place, it was not unusual for traders to induce the local rulers with gifts who were naked. To eradicate this practice, efforts were launched in the catering 
such as mirror and loin cloth. I he offering ot such gifts and their consumption center she operated in Akwa, Douala, to correct the anomaly. At the center, 
by indigenous rulers perhaps influenced the dressing style of the coastal people indigenous women were taught basic services like cookery, laundry, and sewing 
o f Cameroon. A sophisticated dress-code thus developed among the coastal as well as the Christian doctrine.
people and those around trade centers who turned out in colorful Western fabrics Accounts have it that Helen was constantly embarrassed and unable to with­
to the envy ot those in the hinterlands. stand the presence of  nude women who freely exposed their natural beauty and 
Before the Kabba dress was introduced in the nineteenth century, the indi­ patterned contours. To her judgment this was a permanent source of  temptation 
genous women wore the fashionable loincloth. A piece of loincloth was tied to the white missionaries. In an attempt to circumvent further embarrassments, 
below the breast and another from the waist right down to the upper knees. This Helen decided to introduce a gown designed like that of Her Majesty Queen 
was common among unmarried women. However it was considered reprehen- Victoria I. The original idea behind this was to design a dress that covered the 
sive for married women to dress in this manner. The married women were ex­ entire body o f  a woman. It was never expected that it would eventually become 
pected to tie a loincloth over the breast with another piece falling from the waist o f  ramifying significance. It is perhaps based on its growing significance that 
well below the knees. Local customs warranted that once a woman was in ma­ Poubum (2007) described the modern Kabba as a historical accident of the most 
trimony, it was indecent to expose her body. Besides, men were obliged to be “genuine common product in this era of cultural metissage” (p. 1). The unprece­
uninterested in another man’s wife. dented consequence has been that the gown became the first complete dress o f  
The popularity of the loincloth among the coastal people in the twentieth the Douala and subsequently other Sawa women.
century was acknowledged by the District Officer o f  Victoria Division, A. R. The original gown had unique features. It was voluminous, covering every 
Whitman.3 In a 1922 preparatory report on the division for the League of Na­ part o f  the body from the lower neck to the ankle. The original gown also had 
tions, Whitman reported the absence o f  any distinctive tribal articles of apparel long sleeves with part o f  the fingers covered. The gown looked more or less like 
or headdress in use, but loincloths were still the garment irp fash ion among the the pastor’s cassock. Perhaps the design was partly influenced by Helen’s mis­
population (1922, p. 2).J The report further acknowledged the influence of  for­ sionary background. A typical traditional Kabba worn by the Sawa women was 
eign intrusion on the dressing style of  the population in these words, “Loincloth voluminous and yoke-shaped. The sleeves of  the gown were designed to be very 
is still the garment mostly worn by both sexes, though European clothing for the lone so as to expose only the tip of  the lingers. It ran all over the entire body 
men and long-loose gowns for the women, known as liberty gowns . . intro­ right down to the ankles hiding the toes. The gown was to be accompanied with 
duced by the Christians from Fernando Po, are becomina popular”5 (Whitman a head-tie to match with the dress, a thing very unpopular today except with the 
1922, p. 6). older and rural Sawa women. In the past, the neck ol the dress was made up ol
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
74 I he Kabba  Dress: Identity and Modernity in Contemporary Cameroon Flavius Mavoa Mokake 75
four pieces of trimmed cloth with the sleeves and body added to it. When the original design o f  the gown. Embroidery and other products o f  the process of 
women wore K a b b a , their breast and backs were not exposed in any way, espe­ globalization have given it new taste and functions. Besides the multiple mean­
cially as the Eurocentric idea had hyper-sexuaiized the breasts. The purpose was ing discussed under the cultural, economic, social, and political spheres, this 
to conceal vital parts of the body (Matute, 1988, p. 22). section examines the factors responsible for the change in designs. It enquires 
The material commonly used for the dress came from Europe and later from whether changes could be explained as a move to be trendy or practical.
West African countries like Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) and Nigeria. In addi­ Different patterns are sewn for different occasions and ceremonies, from 
tion, the size of the gown— determined by the amount of  material used— also wake-keepings to parades and from travel outfits to loose gowns for domestic 
revealed the economic power and social status o f  the wearer. For instance, in the uses. K a b b a  has evolved from something worn by Savva women to a national 
first half of the twentieth century-, prominent women preferred the expensive attire. Climate change has influenced the change in design. It is not clear wheth­
cloth locally called m o d ib o  m o  e s s o v a  liw a to  to stitch their K a b b a . This materi­ er in the past the climate of  the area contributed in the designing of the original 
al, locally referred to as the “material that does not fade,” was high-priced and traditional K a b b a .  It will be hard to determine this because the same design was 
different from what commoners used. The cost of a fathom of m o d ib o  was esti­ worn in the warmer and cooler climatic zones. The fact that much the same 
mated at about six pennies or one shilling, and very few persons could afford pattern dominated across the geo-cultural region seems to suggest that the gown 
this amount especially as about three fathoms were needed to sew a typical tra­ presented a deeper meaning to the people. The argument is made that because of 
ditional K a b b a . the disturbing phenomenon of global warming, temperatures are unbearably 
Not long after its introduction, the new gown symbolized authority and high in most parts o f  the country especially during the dry season, making it 
power. Initially only new converts, wives of  chiefs and notables could wear the extremely uncomfortable to wear the dress. Nonetheless, the women have been 
dress. This was so because only those indigenes who wielded economic power able to adapt the original idea to conform to present climatic situations by wear­
could afford the material used in sewing the dress. Those indigenes that had ing mini- K a b b a  without sleeves or with perforated sleeves.
gained enormous influence and power as middle-men (Austen & Derrick, 1999. The only marked difference o f  the K a b b a  in the past was in terms of the 
PP- -5-92) could afford the dress for their wives. Some acquired pieces o f  Euro­ measurement lengthwise. The size o f  the gown was also determined by the oc­
pean clot-', through tne trade with whites, while others bought it with the casion. As such three relatively different types of Kabba were common among 
proceeds from trade. the women. For instance among the Douala women, the first type was the K a b b a  
The association of the dress with Christianity created barriers as well as Nisadie. o f  a small size worn during house chores, fishing, or in fields during the 
tensions. A,s soon as the Isrst gowns were sown, Alfred Saker was urged by his planting season. It was more common among peasant women.
wife to torbid nakedness in the “Holy House of God. The consequence o f  this The second type was the K a b b a  M u k u k u , a sexy and provocative style, 
law was far-reaching. As a result of its pronouncement, only local Christians usually worn by spinsters but also by married women who wanted to attract their 
were enthusiastic to wear the new dress. Those who did not appear clothed in husband’s attention away from “ local husband snatchers.’ Some unmarried 
K a b b a  were not allowed into church. This created an air of superiority among women also wore it to win the admiration of married men. The third was the 
those who wore the dress. Ihis group saw- themselves as being close to the Eu­ K a b b a  Midene, or the solemn K a b b a , common among the city women and other 
ropeans and thus more civilized than those who resisted wearing the gown. They great women in the society (Mokake, personal communication, 2007). It was 
also perceived themselves as being closer to the heavens as the gown was seen also worn by queens and wives o f  chiefs. This was the very large, expensive 
as not only a passport to sermons but as one into the Kingdom o f  God. This K a b b a , made o f  superior quality material. Only the “high-class’ women could 
feeling o f  intolerance was also expressed against non-converts wearing the afford this type. Women from the lower class who wanted to acquire this type 
dress. Since the gown was perceived as a tool in the hands of the missionaries, had to forgo other items on their market list so as to purchase it. Even within the 
those who rejected the doctrine also rejected it. The refusal to wear the dress upper class, there were differences in the style of  the m id e n e . The main differ­
could be interpreted as an extreme message o f  political, cultural, and religious ence was in the decoration. The decoration of the queen’s m id e n e  was usually 
contempt (Hopkins, 2006, p. 132). Tension did no! only increase between indi­ exceptional to depict class and status. There was yet another difference between 
genes and Europeans; non-initiates and other less privileged women were se­ the K a b b a  worn by the early Christians and the m u k a n ja  women. The m u k a n ja  
verely punished for wearing the dress. were pagan women who had refused to infuse the Christian doctrines into their 
spiritual lives. The K a b b a  worn by the m u k a n ja  immediately communicated to 
Changing Patterns and Meaning o f  K a b b a  in Cameroon the viewer her status, belief, and family history. Thus the dress item became a 
source of  individual and family stigmatization. This somewhat separated a sec­
With the advent of modern fashion designing, changes were introduced in the tion of  women considered as mukanja from the Christian women.
pattern of the traditional K a b b a . Still, most women feel more comfortable in the
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
gown usually worn ^o fim e r ll  ” ,e pa'tem o f  Kabba  n Flavius Mayoa Mokake 77
hlnd this short design was the ™ T n,es was uniquely short T e P3SI' ^  
cated an imane „c . e need for dexibilitv inH d  ' Purpose be- t lw ^nc '1 lilaI "  'S 0,10,1 dlfllcu,t 10 determine the origin 0f tfie aPParei or 16 derive 
medium f0r group a n d T " * !  S0,'darit-V in ‘'me o f  troub1T njfSS,r ^  COn,n,un'- he soc o-economte status of the wearer. New technology »’as ^ d e r e d  the varie- 
ailend such solemn d fam‘ y ,dentif'cation It was m  ' S°  scrved as a ty ol the Kabba  to become so attractive that its value l'as bee” displayed by
as t  i r r * 0  in a « « sewn S  “ mmo" f"  families particularly seamstresses or designers. '
among the Yoruba o A r ’ sot,nds similar io e m  eA.n| ? “ e n!aienal known HeninV r V he of modeni machines and imported textiles from sources like 
and natrons"3/  ^  ne‘gbbonnS Ni8cria. the gown has appropriated new roles 
Cameron ^  » social walk 3 7 ay' ,hC e3Sy acccss 10 c°lorful print fabr|cs dismantles the 
aerds I n e r a t  ar° Und ^  Kabba by dass and economic status. Also, it cuts 
~  rfds; v r r ™ '* K ahhn\  erat,ons a.s more young girls are able to acquire l'orei8n textiles to sew
Z L : : : r z ^ r ,he * * •  <-“ * « « * > *  - * * » c Ui.urai hen ..
m odern Wo t ’ 1°  aS 3 means 10 Possess som ething A fr ic a n  rather than a 
Z  o f V n v e T ’ ° rr8  drCSS- ’ ndeed’ w ,,a t we w ear could be considered  a 
covered  o f t  8  ^  transnatl0naf  g lobal, and loca l fo rces, as B o s w e ll dis-
T h e  c h f - f  a r ng W° men ° f  ,he ,siand o f  Z a n z ib a r (2 0 0 6 , p. 4 4 4 ). 
peop̂ Fasht̂ n̂ n̂ hiŝ  ̂™ fo r the K n h h g  I!" hC P3tIernS ° f  ,he dress bas in va r iab ly  necessitated new  ro les 
term trends in cloth' ^crsPecdve should n°t nccessarilv I cr" ar6er groups of the oast C o in  d'n V'LC vcrsa ’ 0 ,ber tban the tiad itio na l functions it perfo rm ed in 
^ ? * " ,hc -  -  -■  Cam eroon  a ^  ”  SC,VCS 3S an am bassador fo r the cu lture o f  the S a w a  and2
trad itio na l attire  r t ■”  "1 m 'ernat,o tia ' cu ltu ra l interchange. K a b b a  rem a in s the 
190) T h is  * |t,lln ,nS thC n g 0 n d 0  fc s t iva l8 (A usten  &  D e rr ic k , 1999, pp. 184- 
s s s t e  p,ar in ,,ic « * * . the c‘itv  D , nual cu ltu ra l festival o f  the Doualas brings ind igenes and tou rists  to 
styles and patterns h a "  ‘u ^  in by rCcenI global n oce ,an,C,cr' With the out u n d e n t  Th ' " 1  ‘he CUStom * *  for women to wear the gown with- 
::: Kabba Neon ) ' ■£ " 3S als° an occasion for a husband to offer the
o f  loved Failure r  * f r , h 'S| deserv 'Rg w ife - This symbolic g ift w as an expression 
tied w ife  rm  d  ̂ L r l l l s c J,Icou ldhavesexua lrepe rc l|s s io n s ,a sa d isg ru n -  
-  m ay turn d°w n  the sexual advances of the husband-
rŝ rrjr the rural wmn'.' ^  Sghere’ the Kabba has a history as a t°o1 o f  manipulation of  o f  the ruling C ° ^  ' h e .pI° wer clites- As early as the 19(>0s' the women’s wing 
pathy ofthe8S mer00n Nat,onal Un'0n ( C N U )  used the £ abba t0 win the sym- 
s e c d L s  in Do T  ° eCaUSe ° f ,he Use og * e  Kabba  by the leaders o f  the
en durim? AI r  “ ^  C,TeC' ‘ha‘ “ so,icited the s y n ^ 1̂  o f  Ibe local worn-
iicaied sewing d««lop,„cn,. A,'™ “ c™'Y enconniers a rev! made it a m t ‘ieS 3nd po,,tlcal confrontations, the party’s national chairperson 
d u ^ n J o o n S T 3 r P0,,Z f0r 3,1 W° men wing o f  the party to wear the Kabba 
objectives with mdre 9 '  m° Ve by ’he party’s chairperson achieved its desired
J Another more Sawa women developing sympathy for the Pa«y. 
its use dnr' P°  1 ICd atlribute of ,be Kabba which gives i£ a global dimension is 
t t " n t e ^ r o n a r v V o at,0nn  Ce'ebra"'°nS- DuriR8 international ceremonies like 
mon to see a |i ’ ° ay and African Rural Women Day. 't is very com-
Aabba in a unifo0™ "  Cameroon-including very little ch ild ren-dressed  in 
Bm. while in general ,er, • , 8 b“ " ^ ' t o i e d  by „e„ o f  becoming a I f  matenal' 7he most interesting part o f<h's treat o f  the Kabba 
o f  t|,e wi, L f  costume during such national celebrations is the picture
"ob ^ nA n i S  ™by .‘lccreased ' f '* f f c e n < e " m m 'Ie r i I J 'n ' f 1 " : , r : i p r ai ns,,res -  *™*» * * > * « ; »  ^ » « » « * >
",,ossib,e ■“ r r ' p X ;^ morab °2 "7 S
are Mnkrngly so close 10 (he desiened Kahh ’ ,• y’ Madam C e n ta l  Biya, appeared in a well-
social eron b C. hmg 3head of 3 multitude of  women from diverse cultural, 
social, economic, and political backgrounds.
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-viwn.n. luciimy ano Modernity in Conicmporary Cameroon Flavius Mayoa Mokake 79
Also, some female politicians like the current Minister o f  Culture, Madam 
A m a I utu Muna, mostly appear in beautiful designs of  Kabba  in public. It is cosmopolitan area harboring most o f the ports, colonial plantations, and administrative
important to note that neither of these women originated from any o f  the Sawa services. . _
sub-groups. The action o f  these figures is evidently easily understood by the 4 p j|e jmo. Ba (1922) 2, “ Report on the Victoria D ivision, Cameroons I rovince,
public. I heir admiration for the gown has not necessarily been motivated by the Written for the League o f Nations by A . R. Whitman, District O fficer,”  P rep a ra tion  o f  
beauty of the dress. It expresses the dialectics of A'.abba and the integration of Report for League o f Nations, 1922, p. 6 , National Archive Buea).
women into positions of  power. Though during such occasions the dress bridges 5. Ibid. ,
6 , A lfred Saker,Rafter his eviction from Fernando Po, bought a piece o f land between 
social gullies, the masses hardly gain any touch with political figures thereafter. Bpta and Man-of-War Bay from King W illiam  in Bimbia, which he named V ictoria in 
honor o f the Queen. Together with a team of missionaries, he moved from V ictoria  to 
Douala to continue missionary activity, and his wife opened a center to train indigenous
Conclusion women on basic catering skills.
7 Oral accounts link the origin o f the Kabba  dress to the Sakcrs’ daughter, Em ily . 
I he chapter-has attempted to examine the origin and the present multiple func­ This is largely a result o f a confusion o f names or that she probably helped the mother at 
tions o f  Kabba in Cameroon. The dress originated from the era o f  missionary the center.^By the time the Sakers left Cameroon in 1876, Em ily  was still a tot and could 
not have been the one to introduce the dress to the indigenous women. While the origin 
activities along the coast of Cameroon and has since become not only the first may be debated, the infuence has been regional. In Lagos and among the Yoruba, a dress 
complete dress but also the traditional dress of the Sawas. Assorted designs of sim ilar size bears the same name till today. See reference to K abba  wearers in Yoru- 
represent different things to different people. It serves to develop and manifest baland in chapter 7 o f this book.
individual, religious, socio-cultural, class, group and gender identity. It devel­ 8 . The ngondo  festival day is a cultural festival o f the coastal people, particularly the 
oped and strengthened cultural, religious, and national solidarity. The new pat­ Douala, which assembles locals along the shore of the rivers during which certain ance­
terns not only represent a window into social change and cultural adaptation, but stral rituals are performed. During this festival some young girls arc selected for marriage
also the mutuality o f  tradition and modernity, and the determinant role of  fa­ after a parade. This festival that started in the colonial period is still being witnessed 
shion in this mutual relationship. In addition, it emphasized class differences annually and pulls S a v a  indigenes and individuals o f other ethnic groups within the 
'\niie at the same lime it erased distinction, announced new shared goals and national territory and abroad. In fact, the ngondo  festival is an epitome ol a national 
aspirations, contributed to public discourse in a subtle way, and contributed to touristic jamboree. One o f the recent innovations during the festival is the award of an 
honorary-prize to a “ M iss N gondo." The festival is one o f t :-  marked media to market the 
the development of a national identity. These multiple attributes o f  the K a b b a  in Kabba as it is expected o f all the ladies to the festival to appear in K abba. Women from 
contemporary Cameroon justify the need for the canonization o f  the dress as a other ethnic groups than S a n a , in a bid to identify with this ethnic group as well as with 
national attire. the nation, also wear K a b b a  on occasion. See Austen and Derrick ( 1999, pp. 184-190) tor 
a discussion on the evolution o f the ngondo  festival.
Notes
References
1. The author acknowledges with profound thanks the assistance given by Kate 
Nanyongo Vevanje in the colleclion o f data for this paper. A llm an. J. (Ed .). (2004). Fa sh ioning  A frica : P ow er and the p o litics o f  dress. Bloom ing­
2. The term S a n a  in ihe phonology o f the D ouala  and B a k w eri peoples means the ton: Indiana University Press.
coast. It represents the people that inhabit the coastal region. Therefore the noun form of Ardener, S . (2002). (E d .). Sw edish  ventures in Cam eroon 1882-1923: Trade a n d  travel, 
t te word describes the place, while the adjectival form represents the people. Not all the p eop le  and  p o litics . The m em oirs o f  K n u l Knutson, with supporting m aterial. New 
people that the term represents at the micro level are strictly coastal people Neither York & Oxford: Berghahn Books.
B a k a .s , nor Bafour are coastal people but forest people. Their connection to the coast is Austen. R „  & Derrick, J. (1999). M iddlem en o f  the Cam eroon rivers. The D u a la  a n d  
only through the cultural tics with the coastal peoples like the D o ua la  and B a k w eri The ' their hinterland c. 1600-1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
C,nVd,° P 'ng Saw o  idcn,i'y  is- however, a recent creation o f ihe political confrontations o f Back. K .W . (1985). Modernism and fashion: A social psychological interpretation, in M. 
the 1990s in Cameroon. R. Solomon (E d .), The Psychology o f  Fashion, pp. 3-14. Lexington: D .C . 1 leath and 
3 3. V ictoria was founded by Alfred Saker in 1858 after he was evicted from Fernando Company.
I o. A fter the annexation o f Cameroon by the Germans it was among the first administra­ Barnes, R ., & Etcher, J .B . (1992). Introduction. In R. Barnes & J. B . Eicher (Ed s .). D ress  
tive districts during German annexation. When the British took over British  Camcroons a n d  g en d er: M aking  a nd  meaning, pp. 1-7. Oxford: B ER G .
following World War I. V ictoria was elevated to an administrative division. It was a
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
no T h e  Kabba  D r e s s :  I d e n t i t y  a n d  M o d e r n i t y  i n  C o n . e m p o r a i y  C a m e r o o n
BOS11 m ' JouZrnIa]l oo%j He rTitag eT Stu d' ;ikeCs,;  T12(5),’  pidp.c m4 4i9,-v. 4a5n7d h'ntagc in Zanzibar, tnterna- 
L'dter J-B. & Roach-Higgins, M. E. (1992). Definition and classification of dress- 
Implications for analysis of gender roles. In R. Barnes & J.B Richer (Eds 1 
a n d  g end er: M aking and m eaning, pp. 8-28. Oxford: BERG ’
T h i n  (d00t }- Th£ WOrM in drCSS: An«hroPologica, perspectives on clo,hinG 
fashion, and culture. A n nual R eview  o f  Anthropology, 33, pp 369-392 
Hopkins. W  Review of Fa„,,o,„„s
H/nca Today, 52(4), pp. 130-135. ^  7
M a tC E P E R .( ‘ 988)' ThC S0Ci° - CU" Ura‘  leZ ° cies ° f ' he Bakw eris o f  C a m eroo n . Yaounde:
Northrop, D (1978). Trade without ru le rs : P reco lon ia l econom ic developm ent in South  Chapter Seven
eastern  N igeria. Oxford: Clarendon. ^
I’oubum, L. (2007). /foio days are  here. Retrieved September 23 2007 from
http://www.postnewsline.com/2007/05/kaba_days are h.html ’
Whitman, A.R. (1922). Report on the Victoria  division. (British Colonial Renorr m ihe Beyond Mem o ir : Echoes of 
w r i g t ' T r i r s r ; ’ F ; le N a  n a / 192? 2* Nat i ona!  A r c h i v e  ^  cm o n ) . • c Globalization , Identity , and Gender 
Struggle in Soyinka’s A k e : T h e  Y e a r s  o j
C h i l d h o o d
Ayo Ogunsiji
Apart from being a childhood story' of Wole Soyinka, Ake is also a story of the 
people, events, and places associated with Soyinka’s early life and experiences. 
Anchored on the insights of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this chapter 
reveals that the text is more than an autobiography, more than a memoir. It ra­
diates echoes of globalization, identity, and gender struggle. Issues relating to 
Christian religion. Western education, and colonial administration occupy a 
considerable space in the text. Certain events crystallize identity construction 
and ideological polarity, especially from cultural, racial, and gender perspec­
tives. In this way, the text is seen as a site for the interrogation of the contests 
of women’s protest against socio-economic and political exploitation and mar­
ginalization. Considered in this light, Soyinka’s Ake, becomes a multivocal 
(re)construction of realities whose interpretations cannot be divorced from its 
socio-cultural and historical contexts.
Introduction
The  w o rk in g  d e fin it io n  o f  a m em oir adopted by th is stud y is as “ a book or other 
piece o f  w r it in g  based on the w r ite r ’ s personal know ledge o f  fam ous people .
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Ayo Ogunsiji 83
82 Beyond Memoir: Echoes of Globalization in Soyinka’s Ake
texts as potentially revelatory Otways in which discourses consolidate power." 
places or events” (Cambridge, 1985, p. 885). From this definition, it becomes 
clear that there is a link between a memoir and an/a (auto)biography. In fact, (Locke, 2004, p. 2).
Birbalsingh (2004, p. 29) corroborates this by asserting that “autobiography 
overlaps with memoir.” Therefore, Soyinka’s Ake, an autobiography, also quali­ Echoes of Globalization, Identity, and Gentler Struggle in Ake
fies as a memoir, especially because o f  its considerable emphasis on some per­
sonalities, events, and places that impact Soyinka’s life. f  n defined in many ways by many people. Iwara (2004, p. 
Ake is a narration of the childhood experience o f  the young Soyinka, espe­ Globalization has ' globalization “as a process by which differ-
cially the first eleven years o f  his life, terminating at a time he is about to leave 20) cited Mazru 2“  eSd L e t  he, through an expanding network ol
Ake for the Government College, Ibadan. Done from a child’s point o f  view, the e„, regions o f  th : world are pul ^ ^  A w 0 M i (20M , 87) takes
narration recounts the experiences o f  the author as he moves from innocence to exchanges o pc p universalization of concepts, movements, technolo-
experience, focusing on common or popular scenes/sights, sounds, events, plac­ globaltzatton to refer to tl. - ed ,„orld -  , (2009. p. I)
es, and people. The story dramatizes the Christian family background of Soyin­ gy, markets etc. in llH,Ppcoplc of  ,he world are unified into a
ka as metaphorized by the parsonage at Ake and the traditional background considers junction ’together.” Globalization, therefore, carries such
symbolized by Soyinka’s grandfather (called “ Father”) and Isara as a communi­ stngle society and1 r»"®o^.ogetn  ̂ (Ashcrolli Griffiths & Tiffin
ty. Soyinka’s father nicknamed “Essay” is a strict, meticulous head-teacher; he connotations as hyb d Jis,ance-  (Cairncross, 2001), the collapse of
is a Christian and a disciplinarian. Soyinka’s mother, nicknamed “Wild Chris­ “trade liberalization” (Awonusi 2004 p.
tian” (probably because o f  her religious zeal) is a devoted Christian who will 
pray seriously to remove “emi esu” (the devil’s spirit) when observed in any of 
her children or wards. 86)' Althnneh nlobalization and modernity are not exactly the same thing they\  i °  i S,ph Takin° globalization as the transnational diffusion of  ideas, 
Ake is a good background to the life and personality o f  Wole Soyinka as are closely related. T«k n g obahz cuhure, we certain-
well as his subsequent writings. The narration demonstrates Soyinka’s preco- behefs, languages, e tc^cdm ^ina tm ^ n, Modernity itself refers to
ciousness and inquisitiveness as well as the doggedness and determination X  ?CC ” a'  b ' a oests a staae in human development. It implies advancements 
which later blossomed in his adult life. As a memoir, the text relives the perso­ the present and s u g g e s ts^ ta g e ^ n  ^  ^  econ0my, politics
nalities and influences of  Soyinka’s grandfather, and those o f  Rev. and Mrs. m such areas o f  hur _• ■ words, globalization is a feature of
Ransome Kuti (Daodu and 13eere) as well as the memory o f  Ake community. education, common cation, e t e j n  ^  ^  ^  ^  contcxt in which we
Thematically, A k e  is preoccupied with the innocent childhood experiences modernization ani - . cultural. Within the context o f  Soyinka s
o f  a young boy whose daily activities make him predisposed to and conscious of  apply it in this c h a p te r • becomes discernible. This cross-cultural
his identity. He is exposed very early in life to two different traditions— the 
modern, Western culture represented by mainly Christianity, Western (formal) fnfiVnce l e S o  the  construction of  new identities and stimulates female gend­
education, and colonial administration, and the traditional, African culture which er struggle reading of Soyinka’s Ake reveals that the text contains
Father and the Isara Community, among others, stand for. This situation predis­ pos m t  g e indicators of the new world order in the text in-
poses Soyinka to cultural hybridity. According to Larsen (1983, p. 181), the echoes o f  global,rmf.om Some i n d t c a ^  ^   ̂ gramophone (Soyinka, 198l, pp
world depicted in Ake  is greatly influenced by both Christianity and ancient, 
native traditions. The text may be seen as a metaphor o f  drama o f  individual and fo t', ! oj ThtTsoIdiers end Hiller (pp. 1 10-114) to produce echoes of the world 
collective existence as the author journeys from innocence to experience, sens­
ing and feeling (although from a child’s perspective) religious devotion, tradi­ (p. 151), confectionaries and provisions (p. )> shown in the
tional customs and beliefs, parental protection and care (or control), women p -  - d  . e h  " T o n  s  r u *
protest against economic and political exploitation, and so on. • al! would come to his house ,o listen ,0 radio news. To
It thus becomes obvious that although Soyinka’s Ake  is a record o f  a child’s o f  Soyinka s ■ a„ ach to Ihe news, Soyinka foregrounds
personal experiences in life, the story touches on broader global issues such as show Ihe inapononcer .hat rhese p P lhat it becomes “an object
identity (re)construction, political and economic emancipation, women’s empo­ the expression 1 HE NEW S »^ a P  P^ ^  1981 ,P- 108). Else-
werment and gender struggle. It moves from a memoir (autobiography) to a site o worship 0 Essay and a " -AKINS PHOTO STUDIO:
for the interrogation o f  certain aspects o f  globalization, especially when ap­
proached and deconstructed or, more appropriately, reconstructed via CDA 7 X  '"N 'TZ , S  PORTRAITIST" (p. 3») and "MRS T. DANJOKO. 
which, among others, “ . . . views the systematic analysis and interpretation of l S n D O N - ™ ! n W  SEWING MISTRESS” (p. 40, The expression
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
" L O N D O N - T R A IN E D '’ depicts the peop le ’ s love for e xo tic  s ty le . But iron ical- Tinu (his sister) to school His presence in the school causes laughter among the 
iy, the apprentice-g irls o f  M rs. B a n jo k o  w ear “ . . . un ifo rm s o f  b lue , shapeless teachers, and when asked whether he had come to school to keep his sister’s 
dresses (p. 40). M ore im portantly , the text em p loys the m edium  of En g lish - company, Soyinka replies: “No, I have come to school” (p. 24). With further 
the language w h ich  is now alm ost syn o nym o us w ith  g lo b a liza tio n . A k e  is a probing, he affirms his determination and readiness to come to school always, 
product o f  a second language situation  and consequently  it re flec ts  the c r is s ­ saying, “1 shall come everyday” (p. 25). Epistemically, this statement expresses 
cro ss  in fluences between the En g lish  language and the Y o ru b a  language as w e lI Soyinka’s commitment to what he believes in and, deontically, the statement 
as between the W estern  and the A fr ic a n  (Y o ru b a ) cu ltu res as show n in such commits him to a course of future-action. At another level ol delicacy, the 
exp ress io ns as “ ch ew in g  s t ic k ”  (S o y in k a , 1981, p. 7 7 ), “ n ative  d o cto r”  (S o y in k a , statement can be said to amount to primary performative which can be made 
1981, p. 70), and “ju n io r  w ive s”  (S o y in k a , 1981, p. 182). Such  fo rm ations are explicit thus: “1 hereby promise to come always ’ (Lyons, 1995, pp. 238-239).^
features o f  N igerian  E n g lish ; they are a product o f  the attem pt to n a tiv ize  the The effect o f  Western education on the people of Ake as a whole is im­
E n g lish  language in N ig eria . In ad d ition , w e also  see these features as being mense. Even at an informal level, the Women Group under the leadership of  
cond itioned  by the necessity  o f  d iffu sed /h yb rid ized  cu ltu re . O ther co inages Mrs. Ransome Kuti makes effort to teach some illiterate young women how to 
w h ich  help  to define the identity o f  A k e  as a product o f  a second language s itu a­ read and write in order to improve the quality of their lives (Soyinka, 1981, pp. 
tion inc lude “ e levenses”  (p . 1 17), “ aka ra lo g ics”  (p . 5 5 ) , “ a taro d im ensis”  (p . 5 5 ), 180-181). The women see the need for education as a means of  empowerment, 
etc. “ E leven ses”  is used to refer to light refreshm ent taken between m eals , w h ile  and they vigorously pursue its spread (although informally) among their mem­
“ a k a ra lo g ic s ,”  and “ atarod im ensis”  m ake re ference to “ akara”  (bean ca ke s) bers. In this connection, education is also portrayed as a tool for identity 
prepared with atarodo (ground fresh pepper). “ A ka ra lo g ic s ”  and “ atarod im en­ (re)construction; it makes a difference between the “onikaba” (gown wearers)—  
s is ”  are a blend o f  Y o ru b a  and En g lish . At a m acro  le ve l. The lin g u is tic  ing enu ity  wives o f  professionals such as teachers, pastors, pharmacists, etc. (Soyinka. 
dem onstrated by S o y in k a  w ith  these form ations m ay be seen as an attem pt at 1981, p. 177); and the “aroso” (wrapper wearers)— the illiterate women.
both “ g lo ca liza tio n ”  and g lobalization . At a m icro  le ve l, the lin g u is t ic  cairn, The religion o f  Christianity is no doubt a close ally of Western education. In 
helps to encapsulate the hybrid ized  identity  o f  W o le  Soyinka as a w r ite r . 'This Ake the two variables w'ork hand-in-hand to modify the lives of the inhabitants 
becom es clearc- as we witness instances o f  co d e-m ix in g  and co d e-sw itch in «  in of Ake community as well as the region as a whole. 1 his crystallizes as we wit­
the text. ness the influence of Rev. and Mrs. Ransome Kuti, particularly on the Women 
Group. Mrs. Ransome Kuti, an educated Christian woman, is shown as a galva­
E x a m p le s  o f  cod e-m ixing  in the text include: nizing force behind the women s ideological stance. With collective resolve, 
!. Omo, let’s go (Soyinka, 1981. p. 56). they protest aaainst taxation when they say, “special o, ordinary o. levy o . . . our 
2. Three years old wo (Soyinka, 1981, p. 24). Beere says . . . no more. The women of Egba say, NO MORE I AX, of  any kind
3. He cannot la anything (Soyinka, 1981, p. 102). We reject all forms of taxation” (Soyinka, 1981, p. 298). As shown above, 
4. Now, the matter has reached gongo (Soyinka, 1981, p. 208). the women’s demand is foregrounded in capital letters, and the pronoun we 
T he following examples also illustrate code-switching: suggests collective resolve.In the heat o f  their protest, the women dare the Alake of Egbaland and stun 
1. “What is this?” “Omo tew/?” (Soyinka, 1981, p. 127).
2. “We’ve heard enough. Oya, e nso I ’Ake" (Soyinka, 1981, p. 202). the District Officer, the agent of colonial administration. Mrs. Kuti charges at 
3. “A man cannot argue with his soul. Ibanuje ko m'omode, ko m ’avba" the District Offcer: “You may have been bom, you were not bred” (Soyinka, 
(Soyinka, 1981, p. 146). 1981, p. 211). Even the dreaded Ogboni cult is not spared. As a form o f  “ fac­
tion,” a sub-genre of literature which blends fact with Action, Ake uses this real 
These expressions help to define the identity of  the text as well as that o f  the historical event to encapsulate female gender struggle in the pre-independence 
author as products o f  biculturalism/bilingualism. The code-mixing and code- Egba community to re-define social, economic, and political structures. Ordina­
switching involve English and Yoruba languages and by extension English and rily, no Yoruba woman would have dared a paramount ruler like the Alake o f  
Yoruba cultures. The two sociolinguistic phenomena produce the yoking o f  two Egba, to talk of  confronting, the Ogboni cult, but with the influence of Chris­
languages and cultures to forge new' realities—just as it has become evident in tianity and Western education, Mrs. Ransome Kuti infuses her women group 
the age o f  globalization. with new consciousness that equips them to assert themselves.
Apart from language, Western education and Christian religion are demon­ Again, identity is shaped on religious-cum-cultura! basis. For example, at 
strated as symbols of  globalization in A k e . The presence o f  the school and the Soyinka’s residence at Ake, there are some inscriptions on the embroidered, 
church (the Anglican communion) in the text is o f  a thematic effect. Very early framed glazed homilies hung on the wall which read thus: “REMEMBER NOW 
in life, the boy, Soyinka, show's his interest in Western education as he follows THY CREATOR IN THE DAYS OF THY YOUTH:” “EBENEZER
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86 Beyond Memoir: Echoes of Globalization in Soyinka’s Ake Ayo Ogunsiji 87
HITHERTO HATH THE LORD HELPED US,” “HONOUR THY FATHER can be properly understood by going beyond its grammar (phono-graphology, 
AND I ID MO 1 HER, etc. (Soyinka, 1981, p. 94). These homilies are not mere structure, lexico-semantics) to relate it to is social, cultural, and historical con­
decorations—the inscriptions are biblical echoes which serve as religious in­ texts. The text is rrtultilayered, and perhaps this is why some post-.4/:e writings 
junctions; they help to define the religious mood in Soyinkn’s family. In order to of Soyinka still allude to it as a demonstration of intertcxtuality. To confirm this. 
underlie the importance of  the messages they bear, the inscriptions are fore­ Ogunba (1994, p. 18) submits that Soyinka’s Ake is “a very useful glossary to 
grounded in capital letters. We can compare this Christian religious mood with some o f  his writings.^ The philosophical and critical tone set in the text blos­
the aura of  fear that surrounds the O g b o n i  cult: soms in the subsequent literary and even noil-literary, political writings ot 
Soyinka.
I he Ogboni slid through Ake like ancient wraiths, silent, dark and wise, a 
tanned pouch of Egba history. . .. We were afraid of them . . . we heard of them 
that they sent out child kidnappers whose hand was essential to some of their 
rites and ceremonies. (Soyinka, 1981, p. 203) [emphasis added] References
There is a form o f  polarity that is set up between Soyinka’s Christian household Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., & Tiffin, H. (Eds.). (1995). The post-colonial studies reader. 
at Ake and the clandestine O g b o n i  group. The pronoun “we” refers to the mem­ London: Routledge.
bers o f  Soyinka’s household while “they” and “them” refer to the mem­ Awonusi, S. (2004). Globalization and hegemonic English in Nigeria: Identity conflicts O g b o n i  and linguistic pluralism. In D. Oni et al. (lids ), Nigeria and globalization  (pp. 85- 
bers. Here, the pronouns “we” on the one hand, and “they” and “them” stand in 102). Lagos: Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization (CBAAC).
antithetical relationship. Birbalsingh, F. (2004). The autobiographical writings. In B. Lindfors <C B. Kothandara- 
I osvards the end o f  the novel, a note of racism is introduced to reinforce the man (Eds.), The w riter as mythmaker: South Asian perspectives an d o le  Soyinka  
issue of  identity. In reference to the bombing of Japan during World War 11. (pp. 27-40). Eritrea: African World Press.
Mrs. Ransome Kuti shows her bitterness against the whites saying: Cairncross, F. (2001). The death o f  distance. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Cam bridge In ternational D ictionary o f  English . Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 1985.
llie white man is a racist . . .  to him the black man is only a beast of burden, a Fairclough, N. (1995). C ritica l d iscourse analysis The critical study id language. Lon­
work-donkey. As for Asians—and that includes the Indians, Japanese, Chinese don: Longman.
- U >o on t.ney are only a small grade above us. So, dropping that terrible Iwara, A. (2004). Identity, politics, globalization and. socio-political engineering in Nige­
weapon, experimenting with such a horrifying thing on human beings—as long ria. In D. Oni et al. (Eds.), Nigeria and globalization (pp. 19-36). I.agos: CBAAC.
as they are not white—is tor them the same as experimenting on cattle (Soyin­ Larsen, S. ( 1983). A w riter and his G o d : A study o f  the importance a j  Yoruba myths and  
ka, 1981, p. 227) re lig io u s ideas to the writing o f  Wole Soyinka. Stockholm: t Jniversity of Stockholm.
Locke, T. (2004). C rit ica l d iscourse  analysis. London: Continuum.
Mrs. Kuti’s revelation o f  the racist tendency in the whites as shown above Lyons, J. (1995). Lin g uistic  sem antics: An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­
throws up for interrogation the issue of racial identity and inequality, and ques­ sity Press.Mazrui, A. (2001). Unpublished public lecture given at the Center for African Studies. 
tions the basis of the whites’ inhuman treatment of the non-whites. It still needs Livingston Campus, Rutgers University, New Jersey.
to be said that even now in the present age of  globalization with its good sides is Ogunba, O. (1994). Ake as a background to Soyinka’s creative writings. In O. Ogunba 
not without the charge o f  inequality as it is largely one-sided, especially on (Ed.), S o y in k a : A co llection  o f  c ritica l essays (pp. 1-18) Ibadan: Syndicated Com­
economic and technological planes. munications Ltd.
Soyinka, W. (1981). Ake: The yea rs o f  childhood. London: Rex Codings.
W ikipedia. (n.d.). Globalization. Retrieved July 23, 2009, from
Conclusion en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization.
Soyinka’s Ake is an interesting autobiography, a memoir that is rich in content, 
language, and style. The text describes Soyinka’s family background, his love 
and desire for education at a very' tender age, his inquisitive nature, and the 
effect o f  Christianity and Western education on Ake and its inhabitants. In addi­
tion to doing this, Ake radiates echoes of globalization, identity (re)construciion 
and female gender struggle against certain repressive forces. Seen through the 
lens of CDA, Ake becomes a multi-semiotic (Fairclough, 1995, p. 4) text that
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
Chapter Eight
From  the Global to the Lo c a l : 
T he Media and  Islam in 
N igeria , 1979-20071
) I. 0. Dan mole
This chapter examines the global nature of media forces on Nigerian Muslims. 
The study alludes to the ways through which new media technologies have 
been impacting on the lives o f Nigerian Muslims from the last quarter o f the 
twentieth century. In particular, it explores the reactions o f many Muslims in 
Nigeria to appropriated messages from new media technologies especially the 
Internet on developments in other parts of the world.
Introduction
T h e  term  “ g lo b a liza tio n ”  encapsulates various th ings; it has inc luded the sw ift  
f lo w  o f  in fo rm atio n , exchange o f ideas and know ledge , appropriation  o f  c u l­
tures, c lo se r eco n o m ic ties, and the m ovem ent o f  people across national bounda­
ries (S t ig litz , 2 0 0 7 , p. 4 ; G iddens, 1990, p. 6 4 ; Ferguson, 1992, p. 6 3 ; R o b e rt­
son , 1987, pp. 2 0 -3 0 ) . M ost o f  these developm ents are made possib le  through 
m ediated in teractions , w h ich  were them selves the resu lt o f  great strides in sa te l­
lite techno log ies o f  the post-W orld W ar I I  era (T h o m as , 2 0 0 5 , p. 17; G u re v itc h , 
1997. pp. 2 0 4 -2 2 4 ). Law ren ce  Babb (1 9 9 5 , p. 3 ) has noted that m edia products 
such as printed w o rd s , photographs, audio record ings, and videotapes can be 
transported o ve r long  d istances, and these can be m ass reproduced and so ld  
cheap ly  to the p u b lic . E q u a lly , the media has reduced p h ysica l d istance , w h ic h  
in effect has been im pacting  re lig ion in South A s ia  (B a b b , 1995, p. 3 ). B a b b ’ s
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
90 t-rom [lie Global to the Local: The Media and Islam in Nigeria, 1979-2007 H. O. Dantnole 91
observation  is also true of A fr ic a  in genera l and N igeria  in p a rticu la r. Indeed , the im ages o f  the rise o f  Is lam ism  in Iran and conflicts in the M id d le  East. M an y  
genera! public, accord ing  to M e y ro w tiz  (1 9 8 5 ), consum es m edia products and M u s lim  youths w ere im pressed w ith  the developm ents e sp e c ia lly  in Iran  and 
° “ en creates harm ony am ong re lig io u s co m m un ities , although at the sam e tim e borrow ed the garb o f  Is lam ism  that pervaded the Is lam ic  revo lu tio n  in Iran . O ne 
it fosters discontent. o f  such  groups in N ig e ria  was the M u slim  Brothers who d isp layed  a la ck  o f 
understand ing o f  N ig erian  h istory by seeking to turn N ig e ria  to a M u slim  state 
Reinforcement o f Islamic Values (S a n u s i, 2 0 0 4 ).
T h e  un ity  o f  the M u slim  Bro thers, however, was not to endure tor a long 
I he m edia has in recent years helped to re in fo rce  Is la m ic  va lues (S reb ern y- tim e. T w o  im portant reasons can help exp la in  this developm ent, f i r s t ,  the atten­
M oham m ad i & M oham m adi, 1994; M o rle y , 1994). M edia m ateria ls  such  as tion w h ich  the m edia turned to Iran , was receding after years ot the su ccesstu l 
aud io- and videotapes, com pact d isc s , and the com puter have been in w id e ­ re vo lu tio n . Second , the M u slim  B ro thers received considerab le assistance from  
spread use amongst N igerians in c lu d in g  M u s lim s . These m ateria ls c o lle c t iv e ly  the Iran ian  governm ent through the aw ard o f scholarsh ips to study in Iran  (S a ­
re ferred  to as “ sm all m edia”  have been im prov ing  the know ledge o f  M u s lim s  nusi, 2 0 0 4 ). T h e  resu ltant effect o f  this was the penetration o f  S h iite  doctrine 
and non-M uslim s a like  on the tenets o f  Is la m . Th e  Q u r’an for instance is now  into N orthern  N ig e ria  and this in ev itab ly  led to doctrinal co n flic ts  in Sunn i dom ­
a va ila b le  on all these aforem entioned m edia products. Anecdota l ev id ence  sug­ inated areas. A  th ird  but less im portant reason is that the charism atic  F .l-Z a k za k y  
gests that m any M u slim s leant and re-Ieam  the Q u r ’an and a ll other Is lam ic  left the group because o f  the Sh itte tendencies to form his own group. Y e t , in 
duties through repeated p lay in g  o f cassettes o r d iscs. T hu s , the m em orization  o f  spite o f  the fact that the group broke into different parts, rad ica l Is lam  that had 
som e chapters or verses o f  the Q u r’ an am ongst M uslim s has im proved because been borrow ed during  the Iran ian revo lution continued to be their pattern and 
o f  the application  o f  m edia technolog ies by m any N igerian  M u slim s . approach to Is la m ic  issues. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to im p ly  that the 
B e fo re  the present age o f  g lo b a liza tio n , Is la m , like  C h ris t ia n ity , has been a global m ed ia ’ s coverage o f  the Iran ian  revolution ot 1979 did pave the w a y  lo r 
g loba l re lig ion . H o w ever, the re lig ion  has been experiencing its own share o f  the young  M u s lim s  in severa l parts o f  the w orld  to emulate A ya to llah  K h o m e in i. 
ga ins o f  g lobalization  as w e ll as its d iscontents. Through direct sate llite  co m m u ­ T h is  em ulation  gave a lift to the Shitte w h ich , in turn, led to co n flic ts  w ith  Sunn i 
n icatio n , N igerian  M u slim s have continued to m aintain close contacts w ith  o ilie r M u s lim s  in m any areas o f  the northern states o f  N igeria
M u s lim s , most esp ec ia lly  in the A rab  w o rld . These contacts have led to som e H o w e ve r , another developm ent that was irksom e to M u slim s old and young 
leve l o f  enforcem ent o f  Is lam ic  va lues. w as the R u sh d ie  A f fa ir  (P isc a to ri, 1990, pp. 767-789; Esposito . 1999, pp. 249- 
B y  the last quarter o f  the twentieth cen tu ry , M uslim  organ izations w ere in ­ 252). T h e  R u sh d ie  A f fa ir  stem m ed from the publication ot a book entitled  T h e  
vo lved  m using telev ision for the propagation o f  the tenets o f  Is la m . In addition  S a t a n ic  V e rs e s  (1 9 8 8 ) by a form er M u s lim , the B rit ish  w riter Sa lm an  R u sh d ie  
audio- and videotapes w ere used by M u s lim  c le r ic s  to d issem inate their ideas to T h is  book w as, and s t i l l is , regarded by M u slim s as an attack on Is lam , w h ich  as 
the la rger pub lic . A n  im portant organ ization  in Northern N igeria  that used the K o h n  V o ll  suggests, w as seen by M u slim s as a continuation ol the W estern  
m edia to shape the lives  o f  its m em bers w as the J a m a a tu l Iz a la t  a l - B id 'a h  w a  W o rld ’ s C rusad e against basic Is la m ic  va lues o f com m unity re sp o n s ib ility  and 
Iq a m a  a s  S u n n a h  (T h e  M ovem ent fo r the E rad ica tio n  o f  Innovation  and the obedience to G od . K o h n  V o ll (1 9 8 9 , p. 2 ) is probably correct because m any 
Estab lishm ent o f  S u n n a h ) . She ikh  A b u b akar G u m i founded the o rgan ization  in N ig e rian  M u slim s perce ived  R u sh d ie ’ s book as an affront on Is lam  and its v a l­
1978 (S a n u s i, 2004 ; K u ka h , 1993, pp. 2 1 6 -2 4 2 ). The  group p o p u la rly  ca lled  ues. T h is  was perhaps w h y  m any notable publishing com panies in the U n ited  
h a l a  had considerab le access to the m edia for severa l years . Not o n ly  w ere the States d id not accept the m anuscrip t, as they were apprehensive ot the anger and 
preach ing  o f  Shaikh  G u m i aired on te lev is io n , they w ere also recorded on audio- protests that the pub lication  o f  R u sh d ie ’ s book would attract from  M u s lim s  
and v id eo tapes, and w ere sold at ve ry  cheap prices . I f  such m edia gadgets w ere across the w o rld  (M a z ru i, 2 0 0 6 , pp. 246-247 ). The com panies p o ssib ly  rea lized  
m eans o f  spreading in form ation in the last yea rs  o f  the twentieth cen tu ry  the that such  protests w ou ld  be dangerous to their com panies and business in terests. 
new  m edia technolog ies p a rticu la rly  the Internet, have been v e ry  im portant Both  the e lectro n ic  and the print m edia in the W estern w orld  gave attention to 
m edia outlets through w h ich  N igerian  M u s lim s  have been in vo lve d  in global reactions that fo llo w ed  the publication  o l Rushd ie ’ s book. Reports in the in te r­
issues. national m edia w ere  aired on te lev is io n  stations in N ig eria . N ew spapers in  tlu  
co un try  a lso  reported reactions to R u sh d ie ’ s book. The reactions o f N ig e rian  
Media, Islam, and Religious Crisis in Nigeria M u slim  youths fo llo w ed  the pattern in other parts o f  the w orld  w ith  a large pop­
u lation o f  M u s lim s .
R a d ica l Is lam  that grew  in leaps and bounds in the 1970s could be traced to the In M arch  1989, o ver 300 M u slim  youths protested against the p u b lica tio n  o . 
role p layed  by the m edia. Betw een 1978 and 1980, there was h a rd ly  any  day the R u sh d ie ’ s book in Kad u na  because the book was seen as b lasphem ous against 
m edia w o u ld  not report events in Iran and the M id d le  East. These reports carried Is la m . These  protesters handed a letter o f  protest to the B rit ish  C o n su l in K ad u na
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
" vjim.’ai 10 me Local: I he Media and Islam in Nigeria, 1979-2007 I I .  O. Danmole 93
(N o b le , 1989). ! he protests by m any N ig erian  M u slim s did not stop at the con­ parts o f  the w o rld  reacted s w ift ly . Betw een  Septem ber 2005 and the first quarter 
dem nation o f the book alone, som e N igerian  M u slim s w ere  so ang ry  that they o f 2006, there w ere protests and vio lent riots in m any parts o f  the M u slim  w o rld . 
endorsed A ya to lla h  K h o m e in i’ s f a t w a  o f  death sentence on R u sh d ie  (N o b le , The co n tro versy  that the cartoon evoked created tension in in ter-governm ental 
1989). Apart from  that, the protesters threatened to k ill the N ig e rian  N obel L a u ­ re lations and re-opened the debate on the extent o l tree speech and the liv e s  of 
reate, W ole S o y in k a , because o f h is c r it ic ism  o f  A ya to lla h  K h o m e in i o ver the M u slim s in Eu ro p e and the W estern w o rld . Ih e  cartoon con troversy  represented 
fcitw a  on R ushd ie . Som e o f  the p lacards carried  by protesters read "H an d o ver in th is era o f  g loba liza tion  a c lass ica l exam ple o f  a c lash o f  cu ltu res.
R u sh d ie  for ju s t ic e "  and “ S o y in ka  M ust D ie ”  (N o b le , 1989). B e  that as it m ay, T h e  pub lishers o f  the newspapers in w h ich  the cartoons o r ig in a lly  appeared 
m any M uslim s in N ig e ria  did condem n Rushd ie  and h is S a t a n ic  V e r s e s ; neve r­ held the v ie w  that it w as norm al in D enm ark  to d issem inate sa tir ica l in fo rm atio n  
the less, the v ie w s  o f  the protesters on W o le  S o y in k a  did not rece ive  w id e  sup­ to their readers. A cco rd in g  to them , they satirize  Jesus C h ris t and w rite fu n n y  
port. T h e  co n tro versy  w h ich  the book generated in N ig e ria  m ade the N ig erian  stories o f  the D an ish  roya l fa m ily . T h e  pub lishers did not p o ssib ly  take into 
Suprem e C o u n cil fo r Is la m ic  A ffa irs  to recom m end that, consideration  the re lig ious and cu ltu ra l fee ling s o f  M u slim s in the ir coun try  or 
any other p lace that m ay lik e ly  have access to the paper in the present-day f lo w  
Salman Rushdie having blasphemed God, the Holy Prophet Mohammed (M ay o f in fo rm atio n . A s  H ila l K hashan  (B ra n ste n , 2 0 0 6 ) rig h tly  observed when he 
tin 1 eace o f A llah  be Upon Him) and Islam, deserves the maximum punish­ opined that:
ment for his grievous offence as laid down in the Sharia, and that the Federal 
Government should prohibit the importation o f the infamous publication and its Political socialization is extremely deep and religious inculcation is essential in 
serialization in any print or electronic medium in Nigeria. ( The Guardian 
March 1, 1989) raising Muslim kids since we live in a highly interactive world, characterized 
by rapid communication and access to information, it becomes extremely d iffi­
cult to talk about targeting a specific audience.
The position o f  th is pow erfu l um bre lla  organ ization  for M u s lim s  in N ig eria  
was meant to reduce the grow ing re lig io us tension w h ich  the pub lica tion  was V io le n ce  against D anish and European interests spread across Eu ro p e . 
generating in N ig e ria . H o w ever, the Su ltan  o f  Soko to , Ibah im  D a su k i, be lieved W h ile  the D an ish  governm ent insisted that it was not going to apo log ize , the 
that the A y a to lla h ’ s fa tw a  was A lla h 's  d irective  (N o b le , 1989). On its part, the paper that firs t published the cartoons tendered an apology because o f  the v i ­
Fed era l M ilita ry  G overnm ent (F M G )  declined any o ff ic ia l position . In other o lence that the cartoons provoked w h ile  s till standing by the cartoons. It w as 
w o rd s, the governm ent, w h ile  m aintain ing  d ig n ified  neu tra lity  because o f  the therefore not su rp ris in g  that the co n tro versy  spread to N ig e ria  ju s t  as it w as s t i ll 
. c c j la i  nature o f  the N igerian  state, be lieved that there should be respect for the rag ing in Eu ro p e and other parts of the w o rld .
‘sen s it iv it ie s  o f  people o f  d ifferent cu ltures and backgrounds”  (N o b le , 1989). B e fo re  the v io len ce  linked  w ith  the pub lications o f  the cartoons began in 
V iv id  images are much more l ik e ly  to bring about serious em otional reac­ N ig e ria , the m edia in the country  carried  reports o f  v io lent reactions to the c a r­
tions than verbal m essages or w ritten words (S p a rk s , 2 0 06 , p. 182). Indeed, toon pub lica tio ns in other parts o f  the w o rld . These  included the k ill in g  o f  a 
te le v is io n  im ages and w orks o f  art that M u slim s  consider as v io la tin g  Is lam ic  C a th o lic  p riest in T u rk e y  and other deaths in other countries o f  the M u s lim  
cu ltu re  and be lie fs have a lw ays attracted reactions from M u s lim s . T h e  D an ish  w o rld . T h e re  w ere a lso  reports o f  protesters losing their lives  in encounters w ith  
new sp ap er cartoons o f  2005 c lea rly  illu stra te  this point. These  cartoons evoked secu rity  agencies in Lebanon , Pak istan , A fg h an istan , and severa l other co u n ­
angry' em otions am ong M u slim s in Europe and other parts o f  the w o rld , in c lu d ­ tries. T h e  v io len ce  that accom panied the con troversy  w as so w idespread that 
ing N ig e ria . The  co n tro versy  that fo llow ed  the pub lication  o f  these cartoons M u slim  leaders in Eu rope , the O rg an ization  of Is la m ic  C onference (O IC ) ,  and 
re ce ived  some attention from the media in N igeria  e sp e c ia lly  because there w ere other w o rld  leaders inc lud ing  the U n ited N atio ns Secretary  G en e ra l, K o f i A n a n , 
protests and riots w h ich  were d irectly  connected w ith  the co n tro ve rsy  that the appealed for peace. T h e  reactions from these M u slim  countries w ou ld  appear to 
p ub lica tio n  o f  the cartoon generated.
have in flu en ced  M u slim  youths in N ig e ria  in their reactions to the pub lica tion .
It is perhaps in stru ctive  to provide a b r ie f  background o f  the co n tro versy  be­ N ig e rian  M u s lim s , like  other N ig e rian s , were aw are o f  the developm ents as 
fore a n a lyz in g  the response o f  N igerian  M u slim  youths and som e m em bers o f  they w ere un fo ld ing  on the Internet. M an y  M u slim  organ izations in N ig e ria  such  
the p o lit ica l e iite  in  the country . On Septem ber 30 , 2 0 0 5 , a D an ish  new spaper, as the M u s lim  Students Socie ty  o f  N ig e ria , A n sa r-U d -D een  S o c ie ty , and N a sru l-  
J y H a n d s  P o s te n , pub lished  cartoons ca rica tu rin g  Prophet M oham m ad .2 These  la h i-Fa th i S o c ie ty  o f 'N ig e r ia  (N A S F A T )  m aintained their own w ebsites, and 
cartoons w ere reprinted in m any European new spapers.
the ir m em bers across the country em ployed e-m ails and text m essages to contact 
The cartoons w ere meant for a D an ish  audience w here they w ere not con­ each other on m any global issues. Apart from  websites be longing to M u s lim  
strued as o ffen s ive . H o w eve r, from the M u slim  point o f  v ie w , the cartoons w ere o rg an iza tio n s , a large number o f  M u slim s patronized cyber cafes in m ajo r c it ie s  
o ffen s ive  as Is lam  forb ids any representation o f  Prophet M oham m ad in any o f  the co u n try . These  cyber ca fes , w h ich  sourced pow er from standby generators
form because o f  fear o f  ido latry . Subsequently , M u slim s in Eu ro p e and other
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
11. O. Danmole 95
b y M u 'Z l s  d u r t g  ',he f f ™ " ™ "  <* infer. S eco n d ly , protests associated w ith  re lig ion in the co un try  before 2005  w ere 
êh,  carritvS  * ««*•>s, i t a lw ays avo ided by the p o lit ica l e lite  because o f the sen s itive  nature o f  re lig io n  in ui"T r d 01"'1 the N ig e rian  p o lity . In  the case o f  the cartoon co n tro versy  and the subsequent 
re lig ious rio ts , m em bers o f  the K an o  State Mouse o f A sse m b ly  supported the 
" C" '  •ndl ' S ll^ X ! i ^ r t| i r ^ T . * V ' fef  ̂  M d  n ew sP apnrs__ protests albeit in a non-vio lent m anner. These leg isla tors burned the flags o f  
ecauseofthe sensitive nature ofreligfon a m o n ^ N ^0^ ' 31 re,igious issues both D en m ark  and N o rw a y  in the presence o f  a ve ry  large c ro w d . Just lik e  m any  
°  I\C med,a durin8 cartoon controversy and t h o J T  r"5' ,ndeed’ a Peri)sal M u slim  countries, p a rticu la rly  Saudi A rab ia  and K u w a it , the K a n o  State H ouse 
'he Nigerian media had been a careful distiller of ? ef° re i(’ indica'ed that o f A sse m b ly  ca lled  for a boycott o f  D an ish  goods and did pass a reso lu tion  fo r 
' K> 'nformation highway as represented bv the Inf ^  ab° Ut re,igion- However the cance lla tio n  o f  a €23 m illio n  order for buses. Sa le  o f  D an ish  and N o rw eg ian  
to change the face o f  flow o f  religious^^newstthe T  N ''geria has c°ntinu3 products w ere also  to be affected by the resolution (W ik ip e d ia .o rg ).
‘ 'S " ledla 'echn°logy is increased geometrically. ^  35 ' he emP,0yment of T h e  cartoon co n tro versy  was not the only incident that fueled re lig io u s rio ts  
in N ig e ria . M any re lig io us riots in the past had their o rig in s  in e th n ic ity  and 
in Lago's 0  W a ' i o n s other so c ia l problem s w ith in  the N igerian  state. Som e re lig io u s c rise s  e sp e c ia lly  
in northern N ig eria  began on perce ived lack o f  respect fo r the Q uran by non- 
M u slim s or d isp leasure w ith  pub lications in N igerian  new spapers jud ged  by 
N ig erian  media per  *>, but from what some o f  them read" CO" tro versy  fr°m  the M u slim s as insu lting  to th e ir re lig ion . A  good exam ple w h ich  w as s im ila r  to the 
anous institutions and cyb er cafes. Indeed their sw ift ?e ,nteniet in their c ircum stance  that produced the cartoon controversy was the M iss  W o rld  re li­
nor s o ffice  w as reported ly fac ilita ted  "  lhe gover- gious c r is is  in Kad una w here m any live s  were lost. The  c r is is  w as sequel to an 
through them c e ll phones. These youths were a^ W  n l  3nd ,e * '  messages opinion by D an ie l Is iom a o f  This D a y  newspaper that Prophet M uham m ad 
state, B o la  A hm ed T in u b u  (T h o m as , 2007) T h em jy en ^  b>, g o ve rn ° r  o f  the w ould  have approved the M iss  W o rld  contest and even m arried  a b eautifu l 
stcrs to continue to be la w  ab id in 2  because thei n Z Z  ^ ' ^ d  the prote- queen. T h e re  is no doubt that the jo u rn a lis t  carried  her satire  o f  the Prophet too 
far. She a lso  dem onstrated a poor understanding o f  Is lam  and consequently  
failed to th ink about the se n s itiv it ie s  o f  M u slim s in the co u n try . N eve rth e less , 
churches and C h ris t ia n s  in the northern cities o f B a u c h f  ^  d ' rec ,ed  al the v io len t eruptions that fo llow ed the comm ent o f  the jo u rna list in northern 
(  cm ocratic U nderground, 20 0 6 ). M ed ia  repons also i \  J ld u g ln > and Kats in a  N ig eria  created re lig io u s tension. The  report spread very  fast in N ig e ria  and the 
vho perhaps w ere not interested in the cartoon com  inu 'Cated 'hat hoodlum s north in p articu la r, not because a large num ber o f the protesters read the issue o f  
Protests to ven, a deep-rooted anger o ve r oU o SOc h  7 ^ '  JO '‘ned the vio lent This Day but the new s w as greatly  circu lated  by those w ho had access to the 
co un try . Thus, the protests provided o o Z l l  t  issues in 'he Internet as the new spaper posted its d a ily  issue on its w ebsite , like  m ost lead ing  
new spapers in the co un try . T h e  protesters were reportedly m o b ilized  by M u slim  
students in tertiary  institu tions in the area (Y a h y a , 2006 ; A d e w u y i, 20 0 6 ).
B y  1989, the w earin g  o f  the h ija b  had become a co n tro vers ia l issue in 
crises— *  - Fran ce . B y  the 1990s, most esp ec ia lly  w ith  the introduction o f  the S h a r i ’ a in 
southeastern Nigeria, there were retaliLort auackl on W3S ' he «»« «ha., in 1999, som e states in northern N igeria  introduced the h ija b  as a co m p u lso ry  part 
lurches that were burnt in northern N ii^ rh  Two m° SqUeS because o f  the o f  g ir ls ’ un ifo rm s in state schoo ls. H o w ever, this soon assum ed p o lit ica l d im en ­
reportedly burned down, and many Mus fms l o s I X '  7 ^  ° ni* ba were sions. T h e  h ija b  co n tro ve rsy  and the d ilem m a this posed to the secu la r N ig e rian  
whom were from northern Nigeria a l s o T o k  i f  Mus,i^ -  most of state fo llo w ed  rap id ly  on the heels o f  an ti-h ija b  controversies in the W estern  
own before the situation was l o u g h ,  u n d e f c o n t o T f V n T ^  bar™ ** *  the m edia . In Fran ce , P resident Jacques C h ira c  had called  for a la w  banning M u slim  
burning o f mosques in Onitsha and the loss of i; £V(?A News> 2006). The head scarves, Jew ish  .sku llcap s , and large C h ristian  crosses from  French , state 
explained in terms o f  the fact that Chrisfianfa d t h /  T ’̂  there ™  ^ sch o o ls . France  banned the use o f  h ija b  and other re lig io us item s in its state 
northern Nigeria were always a, the r e c e Z r L  pIaces ob worship in schoo ls in 2004 . T h e  h i ja b  debate soon spread across countries o f  the W est and 
there. H o w eve r, the re ta lia tion  increased r e L o l V n T  re l,f i ’° US~d rive n  crises subsequently  found resonance in N ig eria .
stro yed  the nascent dem ocratic d isnensaiinn  ?, Z  and c ° u ld  have de- T h e  h ija b  co n tro versy  became d ist in c tly  located in O yo  S tate , N ig e ria , as a 
q u ic k ly  taken by the governm ent. ‘ °  ‘ '§ e n a  ' f  actions had  not been sym b o l o f  the new contest. O n Feb ruary  2 4 , 2003 , irate Is la m ic  a c tiv is ts  invaded 
som e secondary schoo ls in Ibadan, the state cap ita l, beating and in ju rin g  stu ­
dents and teachers. T h e y  cla im ed  to be protesting against a lleged d isc rim ina tio n
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
“6 F r o m  ihc Global to the Local: The Media and Islam in Nigeria, 1979-2007 H Q. Danmole 9 7
against fem ale M u s lim s  in the p ractice o f  their faith . Th e  inc ident led to the C h u rch ; indeed , the v is it  to the M idd le  East encouraged m any o thers to resort to 
closure o f  the en tire  p r im a ry  and post-prim ary institutions in the state for several the Internet to find  m ore in form ation about the v is it  and reactions to it ac ro ss  the 
days. On M arch  13, 2 0 0 3 , this incident was repeated at another secondary w o rld . In ad d ition  the Internet served as a veritab le source o f  re ference  on the 
schoo l in Ibadan, the Q ueen o f  A p o stles , O luyo ro , w here the p r in c ip a l w as m an­ V a tican  for those M u slim s  who had a passing know ledge of what it represents 
handled for d isa llo w in g  students from  putting on the h ija b  as part o f  th e ir school (A d isa , 2 0 0 7 ; O la re w a ju , 2 0 0 7 ; Y a h a va , 2007).
un ifo rm s. The Is la m ic  m ilitan ts  later got the p rinc ipa l arrested and detained until S ig n ifica n t as the v is it w as, the cru c ia l point o f  the tour, as ev id enced  by the 
her students m o b ilize d , m arched on the po lice  station, and forced the p o lice  to reportage, w as the ca ll by the Pope for harm ony between d iffe ren t re lig io n s . 
release her (S o c ia lis t  D e m o cra cy , 2 0 0 3 ). Indeed, N ig e rian s  across the re lig ious d iv ide , w ho  watched the v is it  on both 
Tow ards the end o f  the first decade o f  the tw en ty-first ce n tu ry , the ro le o f  terrestria l and sa te llite  te lev is ion  stations, believed that the v is it  m arked  a new  
the m edia in the h i ja b  co n tro versy  had become clearer. A cco rd in g  to M ahdi era o f  re lig io u s understand ing amongst people of d ifferent fa ith s  in  the co u n try  
(n .d .) : (A w o y e m i, 2 0 0 7 ; N jo k u , 20 0 7 ). It is perhaps not su rp ris in g , that the K in g  o f  
Saudi A ra b ia , A b d u lla h  bin A b d -a l-A z iz  al Saud, v is ited  Ita ly  in N o vem b er 
With a barrage o f  indoctrination through the media, induction in schools 2007 (A d n K ro n o s  In ternationa l, 2 0 0 7 ). He also made re ference to the need for 
and Islamic state laws and other instruments o f control, women’s dressing is re lig ious d ia log ue w ith  a v ie w  to prom oting peace between Is lam  and C h r is t ia n i­
being steered towards monotypic codes. ty. C le a r ly , the f lo w  o f  in form ation from  global m edia netw orks aided b y  the 
Internet and o ther gadgets to d ifferent parts o f the w orld  no doubt created an 
enduring atm osphere for the bu ild ing  o f  bridges between M u s lim s  and non- 
Media and Religious Harmony M u slim s .
< eritab le  opportunities fo r re lig ious understanding between M u s lim s  and people 
o f  other faiths, e sp e c ia lly  C h ris t ia n ity  had been provided through new s and Conclusion
im ages from new m edia techno logy. T w o  exam ples w il l  be su ffic ie n t to i l lu ­
strate th is point. T h e  com p letion  and opening o f a large m osque in R om e in G reat strides in the developm ent o f technology have fac ilita ted  the process of 
was given w id e coverage by the trad itional m edia as w e ll as com m ents and g lo b a liza tio n ; th is  in turn has brought some degree o f  transfo rm atio n  in the 
ohms on the Internet by in d iv id u a ls  across the w orld . T h is  was because the m os­ practice o f  Is lam  am ongst M u slim s in N igeria . Through the m edia , N ig e ria n  
que was not only la rge , it was to m any M uslim s the most im portant in Eu ro p e as M u slim s have been able to achieve a greater participation on g lobal issues p ar­
i! was If ic on ly one “ located in the heart o f  C h ris t ia n ity , in the M e cca  o f  C ath o ­ ticu la r ly  when such  issues are a matter o f  concern to their re lig io n . C o n stan t 
lic ism ”  (H ab erm an , 1989). A part from  that, the mosque w as an eye opener for contacts w ith  M u s lim s  in other parts o f  the world through new  m edia te ch n o lo ­
in ter-re lig ious d ia logue between M u slim s and C h ris tian s . O ra l ev id en ce  in N ig e ­ g ies— Internet, c e ll phones, e-m ails— Is lam ic  cu ltu ra l va lues have co n tinued  to 
ria suggests that m any  M u s lim s  w ere happy w ith  the opening o f  the m osque, and be transm itted and transform ed . H o w eve r, the sam e process o f  m ed ia-a id ed  
Is lam ic  preachers in N ig e ria  w ho watched the reportage on loca l te le v is io n  made transform ation  in re lig ious activ it ie s  o f  N igerian  M u slim s has contrib uted  to 
reference to the event as a sign  o f  the spread o f  Is lam  to areas w here hitherto re lig ious protests and clashes p a rticu la rly  amongst M u slim  youths and o rg a n iza ­
Is lam  was not accepted in the ir preaching effort (K a s im , 2 0 0 7 ; Ib ra h im , 2 0 0 7 ; tions who w ere  reactin g  to new s, im ages, and in form ation on the In ternet w h ich  
O lo w o d o la , 2 0 0 7 ). T h e se  preach ings prompted m any M u slim s  in N ig e ria  to to them w ere ag a inst Is lam ic  beliefs and w'ere meant to underm ine the sta tus o f  
patronize cyber ca fes fo r m ore in form ation  on the mosque at a tim e when In te r­ M u slim s and Is la m . N everthe less, the sam e media techno log ies through im ages 
net fa c ilit ie s  were not too com m on in the country' (Y u s u f , 2 0 0 7 ; H a ssan , 2 0 0 7 ) and news have created opportunities that have pointed d irections to h a rm o n y  
H o w eve r, m any C h ris t ia n s  a lso  felt, and s till feel, that the sam e’ hand o f  frien d ­ am ongst d iffe re n t re lig io n s .
sh ip should be extended to the C h ris t ia n s  in Saud i A rab ia  (B a m id e le  2007- 
A k in so la , 20 0 7 ). Notes
A lso  in Feb ru ary  and M arch  2 0 0 0 , Pope John Pau l I I  undertook a tour o f  
som e M id d le  Eastern  co u n trie s , notab ly , Egypt and Israe l. T h e  v is it  w as w id e ly  
reported in both the e lec tro n ic  and the print m edia a ll over the w 'orld . T h e  pub­ 1. This study has benefited from the research on the Media and Religious Publics in 
Southwestern N igeria sponsored by the British Academy between 1996 and 1999.
lic ity  g iven to the v is it  w as probab ly borne out o f  the fact that Pope John Pau l II 2. Between January and the beginning of February 2006, newspapers in N orw ay, 
was the first Pope to v is it  E g yp t— a m a in ly  M u slim  country . T h e re  is no doubt Germany, Italy, and Spain reprinted the cartoons. See Reynolds, P. (2006). Cartoons and 
111111 man-v M u slim s in N ig e ria  knew  that the Pope is the head o f  the C ath o lic the globalization o f protests [Electronic version], B B  C. News.
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
9 8 l-'fom the Global to the Local: The Media and Islam in Nigeria, 1979-2007 II. O. Danmolc 99
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UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
Section III
Marginality: Africa and the Political 
Economy of Globalization
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
. ' 5 ?
'•Ii Chapter Nine
Globalization  and the Privatization  
of State-O wned Enterprises: An 
Em pirical Analysis of the Impact of 
Privatization  on the N igerian
Economy
David  Omeiza Mo v b i
Spawned largely by !be ascendancy o f global forces, Nigeria’s privatization 
program generated a lot o f controversies, especially with regards to its underly­
ing motives and the likely implications. This chapter is a critical evaluation o f 
the outcome o f the privatization program in the Nigerian economy within the 
context o f a globalized economic system. It determines that privatization has 
not resulted in any significant improvement in the Nigerian economy. Instead, 
privatization is exposed for what it really was: one o f the features o f a new 
phase in the export o f capital from the advanced capitalist countries.
Introduction
The inherent inability of states to independently satisfy their socio-economic 
needs has always been a fundamental impetus for international economic inte­
raction. It is against this background that the international economic system has
UNIVERSITY OF IBA ______DAN LIBRARY
viiuuiiii/.auon ana the Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises David Omeiza Moveh 105
witnessed increased interdependence and changes, so much so that the contem­ tional Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World I rade Organization (W I O) in 
porary world has become a global village. contemporary interstate economic interactions. Globalization therefore deals 
Globalization, which has become the most defining feature o f  the contem­ with the increasing breakdown ol trade barriers and increasing integration o! 
porary international system entails a process and pattern of  interaction- through world markets. This is evident in its push of free market economics, liberal 
which nation-states, societies, international institutions, non-governmental or­ democracy, good governance, gender equality, and environmental sustainability 
ganizations, and multinational corporations are linked and networked together among other holistic values for the people of member states.
towards achieving their objectives (Balarabe, 2002). While its p roponen t and Although globalization is multidimensional, and can be understood in dif­
supporters argue that the globalization process encourages the sharing o f  basic ferent perspectives— social, economic, cultural, and political— it is essentially 
knowledge, technology, investments, resources, and ethical values, there has an economic phenomenon aimed at the increasing integration of  national econ­
been increasing disillusionment among many policy makers, analysts and aca­ omies through its emphasis on neo-liberal economic ideas.
demics concerning the benefits o f  globalization.
As noted in Khor (2003, p. 1), the reasons for the negative attitude towards 
globalization include: first, the lack o f  tangible benefits to most developing Tabic 9.1: U.S. Assistance to Nigeria (S millions, fiscal years)
countries from opening their economies— despite the well-publicized claims of 
export and income gains; secondly, the economic losses and social dislocation PROGRAM 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
caused to many developing countries by rapid financial and trade liberalization; Actual Actual Actual Actual Est. Req.
thirdly, the growing inequalities o f  wealth and opportunities arising from globa­ DA 15.8 23.2 13.6 14.8 14.00 21.2
lization; and finally, the perception that environmental, social, and cultural prob­ CSH 36.6 47.9 42.5 28.2 21.5 19.6
lems have been made worse by the workings of  the global free-market economy. ESF 15___ 18___ 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0
Against this backdrop, it has been argued that the asymmetry o f  power and FMF Grants .990 .800
interests o f  member states in the global village, as well as the lopsidedness in the GIIAI 85.9 138.1 ; 272.0
rules o f  the game therein, cannot benefit Africa and her people (Akindele & IN Cl 1. _ ______ 2.2___ | .990 ji .400
Gidado, 2002). Yet, virtually all African countries including Nigeria have con­ NADR-ATF ! .435
tinued to adopt- hook, line, and sinker -policies engendered by contemporary imp : .792 j! .590
economic globalization. This chapter examines the outcome of the privatization fOTAl | 66.5 75" 1.. 61.1 136 2 | 181.9 j! 320.1
program in the Nigerian economy within the context of a globalized economic 
system. Tab ic A b b rev ia tio n s :
The chapter is divided into six parts. Following this introduction is an ex­ DA = Development Assistance
CSH  = Child Survival and Health Programs Fund
amination of the nexus between globalization and privatization. This is followed E S F  = Economic Support Fund
by an examination o f  Nigeria’s economic crisis and the emergence o f  privatiza­ FM F = Foreign M ilitary  Financing
tion, followed by an examination of globalization and the ascendancy of neo­ G H A I = Global 1 IIV /A ID S  Initiative
liberalism as a key factor in the emergence of  privatization in Nigeria. The fifth IM E T =  International M ilitary Education and Training (Notification required)
part o f  the work is an examination of some macro-economic indicators before IN C L E  = International Narcotics Control & Law  Enforcement
and after the introduction of the privatization program. The final part o f  the N A D R -A T F  = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
work is the summary, conclusions, and recommendations.
Source: Congressional Research Service (2006): United States Library of  Con­
gress
Globalization and Privatization Nexus
The resurgence of neo-liberalism in contemporary economic theorizing, 
Globalization refers to the process o f  the intensification o f  economic, politi­ which had been relegated by the dominance of Keynesian economics, was due 
cal, social, and cultural relations across international boundaries. It is principally mainly to the rise to 'power of groups espousing neo-liberal economic ideas 
aimed at the transcendental homogenization of political and socio-economic during the political tenure of the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the Unit­
theory across the globe (Akindele &. Gidado, 2002, p. 3). Globalization is equal­ ed States and Great Britain respectively. These regimes not only strengthened 
ly aimed at “making global,” that is, being present world-wide— as in the prima­ the role o f  international financial institutions, but foreign aid and assistance to 
cy and emphasis on the activities of its agents— the World Bank, the Intema- the crisis-ridden states in Africa and other developing states became increasing!)
UNIVERSITY OF IBAD
N LIBRARY
1 0 6 Globalization and the Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises David Omeiza Moveh 1 0 7
tied to econom ic and p o lit ica l libera liza tion  in the d eve lo p ing  states hitherto rose ra p id ly  from  S2 0 .9 4  U .S .D . per barrel in 1979 to S36 .94  U .S .D . in 1980 and 
characterized by the p rim acy  o f  the state in a ll aspects o f  life in c lud ing  the $40  U .S .D ’ in 1981, fe ll to S29 U .S .D . in 1983, and to a low  le ve l o fS 5 .2  U .S .D . 
econom y. Tab le  9.1 above is a concrete exam ple o f  the susta ined  assistance in 1986 (M u sa , 1998, p .2 3 ). Consequently , the co u n try ’ s exte rna l reserves fe ll 
N ig e ria  enjoyed from  the U n ited  States w ith  the enthronem ent o f  a c iv i lia n  re ­ sh a rp ly , and its foreign debts mounted. In addition to th is , the p re va ilin g  structure 
g im e and the general p riva tiza tio n  o f  the N igerian  econom y. o f  p o lic y  in cen tives  and control encouraged an im port-oriented consum ption 
Thus, w h ile  the s ize  o f  governm ents in the econom ies o f  A f r ic a  (and by im ­ pattern .
p lica tion  N ig eria ) w as on the increase at the dawn o f  p o lit ica l independence, the In the face o f  r is in g  im ports, governm ent d e fic its  w idened and effo rts at 
1980s saw the rise  o f  a trend in the opposite d irection— p riva tiza tio n s . It is, co n ta in in g  the adverse developm ents created some other serious prob lem s such 
h o w eve r, pertinent to note— as Petras and V e ltm eyer (2 0 0 1 , p. 9 3 ) observe—  as eco nom ic depression , ris in g  prices , in fla tion  (fro m  21 percent in 1981 to 40  
that, percent in 1984), unem ploym ent w h ich  in 1986 was 5.3 percent, and persistent 
balance-o f-paym ent d e fic its  (M u sa , 1998, p. 24 ).
The privatization strategy of the imperial centre is in the first instance to homo­ T h e  firs t response o f  the N igerian  governm ent to the deteriorating econom ic 
genize every region of the world economy subject to its penetration. The co nd itio ns in  the coun try  w'as to introduce some stab ilization  austerity  and co u n ­
process of privatization is thus not principally a means of taking over enterpris­ tertrade m easures between 1982 and 1984. The Eco n o m ic  S tab iliza tio n  A c t 
es and penetrating markets so much as it is a means of eliminating alternative (1 9 8 2 ) im posed m ore stringent exchange control m easures and im port re s tr ic ­
structures of production which could compete or challenge an imperially domi­
nated world. tions supported by appropriate m onetary and fisca l p o lic ie s .
In  o rder to secure foreign assistance to so lve its balance o f  paym ent prob­
lem s, the governm ent approached the International M onetary  Fund for a three- 
yea r extended loan fa c ility  in 1983. In line w ith  its neo-libera! p o lic ie s , h o w eve r, 
Nigeria’s Economic Crisis and the Emergence of Privatization and the log ic o f  the process o f g lobalization , the IM F  introduced som e co n d i­
tions that m ust be met for the loan to be g iven . These  were a 60 percent d e va lu a­
P riva tiza tio n  m ay n a rro w ly  be defined as the d ivestitu re  or transfer o f  state- tion o f  the national cu rren cy , rationa liza tion  o f the s ize  o f  the p ub lic  se rv ice , 
ow i.od  enterprises to p rivate  in itia tives . B ro ad ly , ho w ever, p riva tiza tio n  can also trade lib e ra liza tio n , and rem oval o f  petroleum  sub sid y . B y  D ecem ber 198 .'. 
be seen as an um bre lla  term  used to describe varieties o f  p o lic ie s  w h ich  encour­ h o w e ve r, the Shagari adm in istration w as ousted in a coup, and the B u h ari ad­
age com petition and em phasize the role o f  m arket forces in p lace  o f  statutory m in istra tio n  cam e to pow er.
re stric tio ns and m onopo ly  pow er. Fo r the purpose o f  this chapter, p riva tiza tio n  T h e  articu la tion  and im plem entation o f  the B u h ari ad justm ent program  in ­
is seen from this persp ective .
c luded am ong others, increasing  the rate and vo lum e of internal revenue ra ised  
N ig e ria ’s p riva tiza tio n  program m e w as part o f  a tra jecto ry  o f  the general through the paym ent o f  taxes , fees, and le v ie s , and p rivatiza tio n  of p ub lic  enter­
c r is is  in the N igerian  state and econom y, w h ich  cu lm inated in the adoption o f  an 
p rises (U sm a n , 1985, p. 15).
e x te rn a lly  induced structu ra l adjustm ent program  in the m id -1980s . Indeed, the A c c o rd in g  to U sm an (1 9 8 5 , p. 15) the Buhari program  o f  ad justm ent did 
dependent cap ita list o rientation  o f  the N igerian  state and eco n o m y, and its re su l­ not start w ith  any  genuine recovery  process. O il s till dom inated the eco nom y, 
tant degeneration, beg inn ing  from  the late 1970s to the 1980s m ade the N igerian  and the w eak  and dependent structure persisted as indicated by the high debt 
state vu lnerab le  to the increasing  tendency towards g lo b a liza tio n .
p ro file .
In the 1960s the N ig erian  econom y was based on the export o f  p rim ary  T h e  econom y w as alm ost the reason for the overth row  o f  the B u h a ri re­
ag ricu ltu ra l products. C o nseq uen tly , the governm ent w as ab le to sustain  its g im e ; it w as described as show ing  no signs o f  re co very , and that co n tra ry  to 
d irect in fluence in the econom y from  the proceeds o f  such exports . T h e  o il boom exp ecta tio n s , the nation was subjected to further decline thereby push ing  o rd i­
o f  the 1970s, h o w ever, brought w ith  it fundam ental changes that u lt im ate ly  n a ry  N ig e rian s  into conditions o f  sca rc ity , lo w  liv in g  standards, and su ffe rin g . In 
resu lted in a traum atic econom ic c r is is .
th is s itu a tio n , it w as not su rpris ing  that the State-O wned En te rp rise s  (S O E s )  in 
In addition to the p reva lence  o f  corruption in the nature and p ractice  o f  p o li­ N ig e r ia  becam e characterized  by apparent iow -capacity  u tiliza tio n . T h is  s itu a­
tics and governance, the N igerian  econom ic c ris is  o f  the late 1970s and ea rly  tion preceded the introduction o f  the first com prehensive p riva tiza tio n  program  
1980s was the result o f  tw o  m a jo r interrelated factors. These  are , f ir s t ly , the sh ift by the Babang id a  adm in istration  in 1988 w ith  the prom ulgation o f  the P r iv a t iz a ­
from  a d iverse ag ricu ltu ra l econom y to a m ono-cultural eco nom y dependent tion and C o m m e rc ia liza tio n  D ecree N o. 25 . Under this phase o f  p riva tiza tio n  the 
so le ly  on o il exports and seco nd ly , the glut in the o il m arket in the 1970s and o b jective s  o f  the program , accord ing to the governm ent, inc luded :
1980s. The  glut in the w'orld o il m arket and the resultant fa ll in o il export and its 
p rices were reflected in the corresponding fa ll in revenue. C ru d e  o il p rices w h ich
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108 Globalization and the Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises David Omeiza Moveh 109
1. To send a clear message to the local and international community that a (IFC) and the International Development Association (IDA). Since the United 
new Nigeria is open for business. States makes the biggest contributions to these organizations in practice, it con­
2. To restructure, rationalize, and improve the efficiency of public enterpris­ trols their activities and directs them primarily towards the external economic 
es. expansion of American monopolies. (Kozlov, 1977, p. 224)
3. To raise funds for financing socially oriented program.
4. To reduce the burden on the treasury. Kozlov further notes that the structure and activities of these banks and 
5. To expose Nigeria to international competition and performance by at­ other credit institutions reveal the distinctive features of present-day capitalist 
tracting foreign resources. (Bureau for Public Enterprises-BPE, 2005: 12) export. These activities include:
The privatization and commercialization program ran till 1999, with mod­ (a) Every possible assistance is rendered to expand private capitalist enter­
ifications from time to time. By 1999, the Obasanjo administration ushered in prise in the developing countries against the growing state sectors of the 
the second phase o f  the privatization program with the enactment o f  the Privati­ economy.
zation and Commercialization Act. At the fourth Pan-African privatization (b) Foreign monopoly capital is intensively merged with local national capital 
summit, which was held at Abuja in November 2002, President Obasanjo de­ so that the latter can be involved as a junior partner in the exploiting and 
clared: robbing of the people of developing countries.
(c) These organizations themselves, the economic basis of which is the export 
From the Adebo panel (1969), Udoji panel (1973), Onosode panel (1981) of capital are typical of the new collective colonialism that is the union of 
through Al-Hakim (1984) the performance of public enterprises has been the imperialist powers, with the United States at the head for the financial en­
subject of extensive studies in Nigeria. Without exception these studies agree slavement’s of new states. (Kozlov, 1977, p. 244)
that our public enterprises have not added value to our economy rather they 
have consistently reduced value through wastage, mismanagement and overde­ The capitalistic nature of the global economic system as captured in the 
pendence on the treasury. (Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) 2005: 15) foregoing suggests that the emphasis on neo-liberal economic theories must take 
precedence if the system is to be sustained. Thus, the developed capitalist econ­
in spite o f  a plethora of  works on the negative impact o f  SAP in Nigeria, its omies of the West have continued to seek new ways of  ensuring the ascendancy 
element o f  privatization and commercialization of SOEs continued unabated o f  neo-liberal economic theories in a world characterized by increasing interde­
amid controversies. SOEs, which were once seen as imperative for the develop­ pendence.
ment o f  Nigeria, were described as “inefficient and unproductive.” Without In order to sustain this asymmetric global economic system, an international 
prejudice to internal factors like corruption, one other important factor that ac­ capitalist financial system was established. This financial system comprises the 
counted for this paradigm shift lies within developments in the global economic IMF, IBRD, IDA, WTO, and IFC who, incidentally, became the champions of 
system. the privatization program. At a time when infrastructural decay was at its peak, 
the debt crisis on the increase, as well as a mounting pressure on government to 
deliver, the package of structural adjustment inclusive of privatization seemed to 
Globalization and the Ascendancy of Neo-Liberalism: have been adopted in Nigeria and other developing countries on the basis o f  its 
A Key Factor of Privatization in Nigeria political expedience. This was particularly the case in Nigeria. As Jega has 
noted:
Contradictions inherent in the emerging capitalist economies of  Europe necessi­ By the time the Babangida regime came to power, the economic crises had be­
tated the export o f  capital to foreign lands at the earliest period of globalization. come acute in all its manifestations. International pressure had been mounted 
The export o f  capital from these societies which began from the era of  monopo­ by all the Bretton Woods institutions and domestic demand for a resolution of 
ly capitalism has not receded; rather it has taken new forms. The latest form the crisis had also heightened. (Jega, 2000, p. 18)
being characterized by the push for structural adjustments and privatization. 
Kozlov notes:
One of the most important forms of capitalist export that have developed since 
the Second World War is the activities of international state monopoly credit 
organizations of which the most prominent are the International Bank for Re­
construction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation
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vjiuuuiiicaiion ana me 1'rivatization of State-Owned Enterprises David Omeiza Moveh I I I
Table 9.2: Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product and Growth Rate Macro Economic Indicators before and after Privatization
before and after Privatization (1970-2004)
Among the supposed benefits of privatization is that more revenue shall be 
available for the financing of socially oriented programs, thereby reducing the 
hardship majority of  Nigerians have had to contend with. In the light of this, 
what was the general economic condition in Nigeria before and after privatiza­
tion? V
Table 9.3: GDP Per Capita Growth Rate in Nigeria before and 
after Privatization
YEAR GDP PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE IN 
PERCENTAGE
1980 1.0
1981 -0.15
1982 -3.3
1983 -8.2
1984 -7.7
1985 6.4
1986 -0.5
1987 -3.5
1988 6.7
1989 4.1
1990 5.1
1991 1.8
1992 -0.1
1993 -0.7
1994 -2.7
1995 -0.5
1996 1.3
1997 0.8
1998 0.8
1999 -1.4
2000 1.3
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin (various issues)
The Gross Domestic Product and Its Growth Rate before and 
after Privatization in Nigeria
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin (various issues)
Table 9.2 (above) shows the GDP and the GDP growth rate before and after the 
introduction of  the privatization program. It also indicates that the Nigerian 
economy experienced the highest GDP growth rate of 21.0 percent in 1971. This 
was prior to the introduction of the privatization program, when there was a
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112 Globalization and the Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises David Omeiza Moveh 113
dominance o f  state-owned enterprises in the economy. However, the pre- 
privatization period also witnessed the highest decline in the GDP growth rate as From Table 9.4 above, it is also evident that the inflation rate in the pre­
the GDP growth rate fell from 8.0 percent in 1977 to -8.0 percent in 1978. privatization period was lower in comparison with the post-privatization period. 
In the Post-pnvatization period, the average GDP growth rate from 1988 to This is so because from 1980 to 1988 the average inflation rate was 17.8 per­
2004 was 4.7 percent. This represented a slight increase in comparison with the cent, while from 1988 to 2004 the economy recorded an average o f  22.2 percent 
pre-privatization period where the average GDP growth rate from 1970 to 1988 inflation rate.
was 3.5 percent. The situation however is different with the GDP per capita 
growth rate as shown in Table 9.3 above. Indeed, Table 9.3 indicates that the Table 9.5: Incidence of Poverty in Nigeria before and after 
pre-privatization period recorded an average per capita growth rate of 1.9 per­
cent from 1980 to 1987. In the post-privatization period, however, the average Privatization
per capita growth rate from 1988 to 2000 was 1.7 percent. This implies that the 
introduction of  the privatization program has not been accompanied by an in­ YEAR POVERTY ESTIMATED ESTIMATED 
crease in the GDP per capita growth rate. LEVEL POPULATION IN POPULATION LIVING 
MILLIONS IN POVERTY
1980 27.2% 65 17.7% millions
Table 9.4: Inflation Rate in Nigeria before and after Privatiza­ 1985 46.3% 75 34.7% millions
tion 1992 42.7% 92 39.7% millions
1996 65.6% 120 67.1% millions
|  YEARS INFLATION RATE IN 
PERCENTAGE Source: Federal Office of  Statistics, Digest o f  Statistics (various issues)
1980 9.9
1981 20.9 Table 9.5 above reveals that there was a steady increase in the incidence of 
1982 7.7 poverty in Nigeria even after the introduction of the privatization program. 
1983 23.2 While in 1985 less than half of the population was living in poverty, more than 
1984 39.6
1985 half o f  Nigeria’s population (65.6 percent) was living in poverty by 1996. Fur­5.5
1986 thermore, the incidence of  poverty in Nigeria was projected to increase from 5.4
1987 65.6 percent in 1996 to 70.7 percent in 2000. However, the result of a Nigerian 10.2
1988 38.3 living standard survey 2003/2004 from the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) 
1989 40.9 showed that the incidence o f  poverty declined to 54.4 percent in 2003/2004 
1990 7.5 (CBN, 2004).
1991 13.0 The increasing incidence of poverty in Nigeria is also evident in the coun­
1992 44.5 try’s ranking among the comity of nations. The United Nations Development 
1993 - Programme (UNDP), Human Development Index (HD1) ranked Nigeria as 137th 
1994 - among the 174 countries listed with HDI of 0.384 in 1996. By 1997, the country 
1995 72.8 slipped to 142nd position and ranked among the 44 poorest countries (CBN, 
1996 29.3 1999)
1997 8.5
1998 10.0
1999 6.6 \
2000 Unemployment and Privatization6.9
2001 18.9
2002 19.6 Despite the absence^of concrete data on the trend o f  unemployment in pre- and 
2003 18.3 post-privatization Nigeria, there are suggestions that the level o f  unemployment 
2004 15.0 too has been on the increase even after the introduction of the privatization pro­
gram. According to the Central Bank o f Nigeria,
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin (various issues)
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vj.v/uan^uun ana ihe Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises : David Oineiza Moveh
115
. . . The level of unemployment in Nigeria has increased at an alarming rate. therefrom into efforts at poverty reduction. It is on this basis that the following 
This is evident in the high incidence of criminal activities and violence the recommendations are made.
country has witnessed since 1999. (CBN, 2000, p. 45)
♦ Recommendations
Discussion of Findings *
First, a conscious £nd genuine effort must be in place to-combat poverty and 
The foregoing macro-economic indicators suggest that while the Nigerian econ­ inequality. This therefore, means that the role of the state must be proactive. 
omy continued to record growth, other socio-economic indicators like the GDP Privatization in Nigeria, it has become obvious, is premature because the initial 
per capita growth rate, inflation rate, poverty, and unemployment levels did not motives underlying the establishment of SOEs are yet to materialize. Thus, 
record any positive improvement with the introduction of  the privatization pro­ reforms should be cautious and for the benefit of all and not a few. Pro-poor 
gram. This is in spite o f  the fact that within four years o f  the privatization and policies like massive investments in agriculture and the provision o f  subsidy in 
commercialization exercise in Nigeria, the Technical Committee on Privatiza­ the rural areas should be a priority in order to achieve a balanced development 
tion and Commercialization (TCPC) realized over 3.7 billion naira as gross program.
privatization proceeds from the affected enterprises whose original investment Second, rather than the outright sale and transfer o f  ownership o f  state- 
was 652 million naira. In all, the TCPC during its tenure privatized 88 out o f  a owned enterprises to private entrepreneurs, the emphasis should be on commer­
total o f  111 enterprises slated for privatization (Anyawu, 1997). Similarly, from cialization. In this regard, there must be efforts geared towards the following:
1999 to 2004, the Obasanjo administration continued the privatization o f  public 
enterprises with a total o f  13 privatization transactions completed. These trans­ i. Making the enterprises receptive to changes in the environment
actions also brought in a total of over 30 billion naira (Akpotor, 2005, p. 224) ii. Resolving the problems of under-management
with no evidence as to how the proceeds were utilized. Thus, the’argument sug­ iii. Encouraging employee identification with the enterprises.
gesting that more revenue will be available for the financing o f  socially oriented 
programs due to privatizations is false, as the alleged benefits were yet to mate­ Finally, in industries with a relative degree of development, the government 
rialize almost 20 years after it was first introduced. may systematically withdraw and lease or sell the enterprise to a company 
It should suffice at this point to assert that the fears expressed in the opposi­ formed by workers. In this case, steps may be taken to limit the shareholding of 
tion to globalization, particularly its element o f  privatization, was not misplaced. any one worker so that the company does not get dominated by a few persons.
Evidence from this study suggests that, just like the assumption that SOEs have 
not added value to the Nigerian economy, privatization too has not resulted in 
any significant improvement in the Nigerian economy. In fact, the above find­
ings confirm the argument by Smith and Niam (2000, p. 43) that “globalization References
and its element o f  privatization have carried with it a remarkably uneven distri­ Akpotor, A.S. (2005). Deregulation and globalization in Nigeria: Issues and perspec­
bution o f  cost and benefits. The results for the most part have been to exacerbate tives. Ekpoma: Ambrose Ali University Publishing House.
inequalities o f  wealth, consumption and power within and between countries.” Akindele, S., & Gidado, T. (2002). Globalization, its implications and consequences for 
Africa. He Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press.
Anyanwu, J.C. (1997). The structure of the Nigerian economy (1960-1997). Onitsha: 
Summary and Conclusions Joane Educational Publishers, Ltd.
Balarabe. K. (2005). Democratization and globalization: A dialectical framework for 
This chapter has attempted to show the connection between globalization and understanding democratization in Nigeria. Birmingham, AL: University of Bir­
privatization in Nigeria as well as the outcome o f  this connection. It establishes mingham Press.Bureau for Public Enterprises BPE. (2005). Proceedings of the fourth Pan-African priva­
that privatization in Nigeria was part of the trajectory of  the globalization tization summit, 6-8 November, 2002, International Conference Centre, Abuja.
process. However, when weighed against the supposed benefits o f  the privatiza­ Campbell, A. (2006). United States grants to developing countries. Washington, D.C.: 
tion program, evidence indicates that the general developmental trends o f  the Congressional Research Service, United States Library of Congress.
Nigerian economy did not record any significant improvement with privatiza­ Central Bank of Nigeria. (1999). Annual report and statement o f account for the year 
tion. This is particularly the case when seen in the light o f  the lopsided nature of ended 31 December. 1999. Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria.
the implementation of  privatization and the failure to channel the proceeds Central Bank of Nigeria. (2000). Statistical bulletin. Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria.
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Central Bank of Nigeria. (2004). Annual report and statement o f account for the year 
ended 31 December, 2004. Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria.
Federal Office of Statistics. (2000). Statistical bulletin. Abuja: Federal Office of Statis­
tics.
Jega, A. (2000). Identity transformation and identity politics under structural adjustment 
in Nigeria. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.
Khor, M. (2003). Globalization and the south: Some critical issues. Lagos: Spectrum 
Books Limited.
Kozlov, G.A. (1977). Political economy o f capitalism. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Musa Y.S. (1998). Privatization and commercialization in Nigeria: Analysis o f causes 
and implementation. Unpublished master’s thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 
Nigeria.
Petras, J., & Veltmeyer, H. (2001). Globalization unmasked: Imperialism in the 21" Chapter Ten
century. Halifax, NS: Femwood Publishing Limited.
Smith, G., & Niam, M. (2000). Altered states: Globalization, sovereignty and gover­
nance. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
Usman, Y.B. (1985). The Structure of the Nigerian economy and the real meaning of Contemporary Trade, 
adjustment. A paper presented at a conference on the Nigerian Economy and Society 
since the Berlin Conference, Organized by Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Investment Practices, and the 
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, from November 11-15, 1985.
Challenges of Regionalism and 
Poverty Alleviation in Africa
A loysius-Michaels Okolie
The chapter interrogates the processes underlying the production and distribu­
tion of global wealth and how these determine development initiatives in Afri­
ca. Specifically, the chapter focuses on poverty and the possibilities of either 
eradicating or reducing it. The chapter argues that concrete solutions to the high 
rate of poverty lie outside the current attempt to enthrone and consolidate re­
gional economic blocs anchored on the New Partnership for African Develop­
ment (NEPAD). Indeed, Africa should look beyond economic regionalism to 
re-emphasizing identity politics and consolidating domestic economic structure 
within the ambit of nationalistic resurgence.
Introduction
The global political economy is driven by capitalist ideals, principles, and pre­
ferment. Indeed, the period 1977 to 1990/91 was generally regarded as “a World 
of two Worlds” when socialist and capitalist values engaged in bitter and con­
suming competition for control and dominance o f  global production space. 
Since then, the global political order has continued to thrive on capitalist values
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
I 18 Contemporary Trade, Alleviation in Africa Aloysius-Michaels Okolie I 19
and innuendos. Therefore, any discussion on globalization (as an idea or 
process) must come to terms with the fact that it is an inevitable outcome of Eliagwu (2005, p. 315) remarked that “while these contradictions are glar­
capitalist expansion. It is intimately engrained in capitalist values and propensi­ ing and provide new challenges for regional groups, they raise the issue o f con­
ties. Global capitalism “fundamentally thrives and promotes expansion and flict management and coordination.” He also stated that one o f the first problems 
extemalization o f  investment finance and international finance and has contin­ among members o f a regional organization is that of striking a balance between 
ued to change in content and substance in line with changing pattern and charac­ two types of nationalism: supra national and nation-state.
ter o f the existing predominant mode of production” (Okolie, 2007, p. 1). After a critical review of several definitions of globalization in the litera­
Basically, contemporary globalization seeks to free economies by disman­ ture, and taking into cognizance the manifestations and character o f the pheno­
tling all barriers to free movement of goods, services, labor, and investment menon, this chapter conceives globalization as the process o f  evolving a global 
capital. In this case, capital becomes international capital with seemingly patent community that is anchored on shared developmental values, principles, and 
and unrestricted investment potentials. Simply put, it implies that the world is norms. As a process, it moves in a spectrum-like dimension and basically re­
facing “the end o f  geography” (O’Brien, 1992). Arising from the above discus­ volves around the dominant values o f  the prevailing global order. Such an order 
sions is the fact that trade and investments remain the key pillars o f  globaliza­ evokes conformity with acceptable developmental precepts; rules that govern 
tion in our world. This chapter will interrogate the challenges posed by contem­ such interrelationship naturally emerge from the dominant economic order and 
porary trade and investment practices to poverty alleviation in Africa. It will aim primarily at legitimizing the prevailing global order and sustaining the 
explore the linkage between attempts at regionalism and the seeming resurgence checklists associated with the globalization ideals.
o f nationalistic fervor in Africa. The implications of these developments for The above naturally explains why globalization remains fundamentally an 
poverty alleviation and/or reduction shall constitute the central focus o f  the ongoing process, reflecting the gigantic movement o f history and global trade 
chapter. The chapter is divided into four sub-themes, viz, globalization; trade and investment potentials. The centra! plank of contemporary globalization is 
and investment practices; Africa’s response to contemporary trade and invest­ essentially liberalization of trade and international finance. Indeed, liberalization 
ment practices; evaluation, prognosis, and conclusion. “is a complex of measures aimed at reducing government involvement through 
policies o f privatization, and deregulation, and implied the elimination o f laws 
and rules that were assumed to hinder the market” (Hout, 2006, p. 10). Mean­
Globalization: Trade and Investment Practices while, trade liberalization falls within the orbit of economic globalization. As 
noted by Khor (2001, p. 1):
Most definitions o f globalization do not take into cognizance the differing di­
mensions o f the term. However, Rodrik (2000) noted that some scholars in their Economic globalization is not a new process, for over the past centuries firms 
attempt to define the subject often see it as encompassing many different phe­ in the economically advanced countries have increasingly extended their out­
nomena, some o f which have little or nothing to do with globalization as econ­ reach through trade and portion activities to territories all over the world. How­ever, in the past two to three decades, economic globalization has accelerated 
omists define it. He noted that economists generally define globalization as as a result of various factors, such as technological development, but especially 
encompassing declining barriers to trade, migration, capital flows, technology the policies ofliberalization that have swept across the world.
transfers, and foreign direct investment.
Globalization is largely a process. It is associated with movement o f  history The principal aspects of this liberalization process are finance, trade, and 
itself and has political, economic, and socio-cultural ramifications. Seteolu investment. Trade liberalization suggests unfettered movement o f goods across 
(2004, p. 6) identified the following as some of the key elements o f globaliza­ global boundaries. It involves dismantling territorial boundaries and removal o f 
tion: time-space compression, bi-polarto uni-polar system, international division tariffs for free movement of goods and for trade to take place under the regulato­
ol labor and polarized system, global economy through the integration o f  local ry framework o f the World Trade Organization (WTO).
economies using the instrument of structural adjustment jjrogram, flow o f per­ The WTO is an international organization designed to supervise and liberal­
sons, culture, ideas, and finance. He stated further: ize international trade. It was established on January 1, 1995, to replace the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was created in 1947. 
Meanwhile, globalization, as a process, is informed by a set of ideas: free mar­ Among other functions, the WTO deals with the rules of trade between nations 
ket capitalism or neo-liberalism. According to the ideology of the free market, at a near-global level. It is also responsible for negotiating and implementing 
the role of the state is to promote increased profit for business. In fact, globali­
zation has created some challenges to the sovereignty and power of state and new trade agreements and for ensuring compliance to trade rules by signatories 
even regional blocs. to the charter.
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120 Contemporary Trade, Alleviation in Africa Aloysius-Michaels Okolie 121
Another important aspect of economic globalization is financial liberaliza­ Primarily, it disparages the mental apparatus and psychic motor and reverberates 
tion. According to Patnaik (1999, p. 1-2): on the levels of attitudinal and behavioral patterns. It demeans innate values of 
man and dehumanizes him to a level of near irrelevance. Indeed poverty remains 
The essence o f  financial liberalization consists in three sets o f measures: first, the worst experience a man could face. Indeed it is better seen as the worst de­
to open up a country to the free flow o f  international finance; secondly, to re­ preciating currency of human ideals, propensities, and idiosyncratic qualities.
move controls and restrictions on the functioning o f  domestic banks and other Meanwhile, two models of poverty exist in the literature; they include abso­
financial institutions so that they properly integrate as participants in the world lute and relative poverty. The former concerns economic deprivation in terms of 
financial markets; and thirdly, to provide autonomy from the government to the an objective, fixed standard. As stated by Offiong (2001, p. 96), “This implies a 
Central Bank so that its supervisory and regulatory role vis-a-vis the banking 
sector is dissociated from the political process o f  the country, and hence from level of income that imposes real physical suffering on people in hunger, disease 
any accountability to the people. and the massacre of innocent children.” Moreover, absolute poverty refers to the 
inability of people to maintain psychical survival on a long-term basis, while 
Basically, financial liberalization is undertaken in the guise of attracting relative poverty means the suffering that stems from inequality; it is thus the 
capital inflow. Thus Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a major component of situation of being economically deprived compared to some other particular 
international capital flows (investments). This investment involves not only a groups (Bryjak & Soroka, 1992, p. 185).
transfer of funds (including the investment of profits) but also a whole package Arising from the above is that poverty can be measured in various ways. 
of physical capital, techniques of production, managerial and marketing exper­ Ogboi (2003, p. 19) identified four criteria, viz:
tise, products advertising, and basic practice for the maximization of global 
profits (CBN, 2003, p. 8). a. Economic criteria measured in terms o f  income, expenditure, and welfare;
In sum, foreign direct investment can be conceived as embracing the fol­ b. Sociological criteria measured in terms o f ethnicity, minority group, reli­gion, and social status;
lowing: c. Characteristics o f  household head measured in terms o f  occupation or em­
•  New equity from the foreign company in the host country ployment status; or in terms o f  the sex o f  the household head; and
•  Long- and short-term net loans from foreign to host country d. Locational criteria divide an area or region to capture the spatial pattern o f  
•  Reinvested profits from foreign business concerns. inequality and poverty and the effect o f  public anti-poverty policies.
Subsequent discussions in this chapter will examine how the existing trade Nonetheless, the above criteria are not collectively exhaustive and mutually 
and investment practices impact on poverty alleviation and threw up new vistas exclusive. Indeed there exists a double standard in the “scientific” measurement 
of enquiry on regionalism and the resurgence of nationalism in Africa. of poverty. For instance, the World Bank’s one dollar a day criterion applies 
only to developing states; and indeed both the Bank and the UNDP fail to ac­
knowledge the existence of poverty in Western Europe and North America. In 
Incidence of Poverty in Africa fact, they base their measurement of poverty in the West on minimum levels of 
household spending required to meet essential expenditure on food, clothing, 
The intention here is to demonstrate empirically the incidence of poverty within shelter, health, and education (see Chossudovsky, 2002, p. 7, for extension of 
Africa. Poverty can simply be conceived as a situation of want; a situation in the argument).
which the people living within particular localities are placed, where they are However, the preceding argument does not vitiate the fact that Africa is not 
naturally and/or artificially condemned to a hapless and helpless low level of thoroughly a poor continent. Available indices, however, validly demonstrate 
social reproduction of their state of existence. They therefore wallow in abject that Africa is not only the poorest region in the world, but it is also the only 
want, misery, malnourishment, and malnutrition. Besides, such people have major developing region with negative growth in income per capita during 
fundamentally very little opportunity to change their condition of social exis­ 1980-2000 (Sachs et al., 2004, p. 117). The tragedy remains that “while other 
tence. countries in Asia and Latin America are slowly but surely pulling themselves 
Basically, poverty is not specifically synonymous with inequality. As noted out of the poverty club, African countries are regressing into lower levels of 
by Offiong (2001, p. 97), “Whereas poverty is concerned with the absolute stan­ deprivation, with the result that the number of poor people in this region is ex­
dard of living of a part of society, that is, the poor, inequality is the relative pected to rise from 315 million in 1999 to about 404 million in 2015” (Stephen, 
living standards across the whole of society.” Fundamentally, poverty affects 2006, p. 2). Hence, Madavo (2005, p. 2) observed that Africa is the only region 
both the physical and psychological dimensions of man’s existential conditions. of the World where poverty is increasing in stark contrast to the dramatic gains 
in the fight against poverty that are seen elsewhere, most notably in Asia . . .  at a
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----- Aloysius-Michaels Okolie 123J ncvimiun in Airica
time when globalization is integrating the World economy and contributing to The above analysis vividly points to the fact that poverty is endemic in 
growth in many least developed countries, Africans are being marginalized. The Africa It therefore remains to be seen how contemporary trade and mvestment 
continent's share o f world trade has declined from 3.5% in the 1970s to 1.5% practices have addressed this hydra-headed cankerworm.
today.
The above reinforced the argument that Africa is consistently lagging be­
hind in such areas as access to piped water and sanitation, primary education Table 10.2: Selected Development Indicators for Major Devel­
completion rates, and gender equality. This pattern, as noted by Madavo (2005, oping Regions < ■
p. 2), is compounded by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and by a series of destructive 
conflicts. Thus, presently, over 25 million Africans live with HIV/AIDS, and the uiNl per Average Life expcc Under-five Average 
disease has orphaned another 12 million children. He also remarked that an capita growth rate tancy at mortality annual 
estimated 20 million people have been displaced by conflicts, with large num­ 2001 in GDP per birth, 2001 rates, 2001 growth in population, 
bers dying in such places as the Great Lakes region, and in Sierra Leone, Sudan, (dollars) capita 1980- (years) (deaths per 2001 (per-
and Somalia. 2000 (per- 1000 live
The situation is even more critical in sub-Saharan African states where po­ 172.5 2.3
verty has reached an intolerable level. Table 10.1 below shows that apart from Topical 271 -1.1 46.0
sub-Saharan Africa, other regions in the developing world have reduced the Sub-
incidence of poverty to a large extent over the period under review: Saharan
449 3.3 62.6 95.3 1.7
Table 10.1: Poverty in the Developing World, 1950-2000 (in South
percentages) Latin 3,669 0.5 70.6 32.7 1.4
0.8
__ 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 East Asia 3,710 6.4 70.2 38.3
East Asia 86.6 77.5 71.1 67.2 31.3 6.0 and
South Asia 44.3 37.2 32.1 34.4 18.5 7.8 the Pacif-
Sub-Saharan Africa 59.3 53.2 52.2 49.9 55.3 54.8 68.4 49.8 2.0
Middle East & North Africa 26.3 24.3 13.4 4.3 5.2 7.8 Middle 2,207
0.9
Latin America 22.0 16.0 9.4 3.6 5.3 5.2 East and 
Eastern Europe North 17.8 9.2 3.3 1.7 0 0 Africa
Source: Culled from Osakwe (2006, p. 7) a. Population-weighted averages of countries in the region.
b. GNI, gross national income. , r  , ,
As noted from the table above, the poverty level in sub-Saharan Africa c. Thirty-three-country sample listed in Table 10.2; other regions are as defined by the
dropped sluggishly from 59.3 percent in 1950 to 49.9 percent in 1980 and rose World Bank.
again to 55.3 percent in 1999 before dropping a little again to 54.8 percent a 
decade later. Source: World Bank (2003).
In addition, Table 10.2, which presents a share of population living on less 
than one dollar a day between 1987 and 1998 is even more instructive. In addi­
tion, Table 10.2 which presents selected development indicators for major de­ Africa’s Response to Trade and Investment Practices
veloping regions is even more revealing. The thirty-three sub-Saharan African 
countries studied had a combined population of 617 million in 2001, with a Most states in Africa have no doubt embraced the policy of trade fiberafization 
population-weighted average annual income of $271 per person, or a mere 74 and demands of foreign direct investment. For instance Table 10.3 below d 
cents a day. All the countries had a life expectancy at birth below 60 years, and monstrates, among others, that tariff walls in selected African countr.es for the 
in all but Ghana, Madagascar, and Sudan, life expectancy at birth is below 55 period following the establishment of WTO have contmued to be dismantled by 
years. Child mortality rates (deaths before the age of five per 1,000 live births) most states in Africa.
are above 100 in every country.
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Aloysius-Michaels Okolie 125
cated on liberalization of trade, finance, and foreign investment. Indeed several 
Table 10.3: Tariff Walls in Selected African Countries, 1986- states had recorded remarkable investments into their economies. However, 
2000 (in percentages) Table 10.4 shows, among others, that Africa’s share of global inward FDI flows 
fell from 1.8 percent in the period 1986-1990 to 0.87 over the period 1999-2000. 
1  Country 1986-1990 1996-2000 % Change Indeed, these figures are well below the developing countries’ average o f 17.5 
Mozambique 15.6 15.5 -0.1 percent and 17.9 percent over the same period.
Ethiopia 29.6 25.5 -4.1
Cameroon 32.0 18.5 -13.5
Sierra Leone 30.9 18.3 -12.6 Table 10.4: Pattern of Tariff Changes in Africa, 1980-2002 
Burkina Faso 60.8 25.4 -35.4
Nigeria (Average Scheduled Tariffs)29.7 24.1 -5.6
Cote d’Ivoire 26.1 18.5 -7.6
Tunisia 26.0 1980-1985 1990-1995 2000-200230.9 4.9
Congo, DR All Africa (29) 32.8 23.2 16.132.0 16.2 -15.8
Rwanda 33.0 Regions21.4 -11.6
Zambia 29.9 North Africa (4) 35.2 27.2 24.314.0 -15.9
Mauritania 22.3 West Africa (10) 38.5 23.4 14.415.9 -6.4
Uganda 25.0 Central Africa (6) 33.1 20.4 16.410.9 -14.1
Senegal 13.5 East Africa (5) 32.5 26.1 16.019.3 5.8
Malawi 18.0 Southern Africa (4) 19.5 17.7 12.918.9 0.9
Algeria 24.6 Export Orientation24.9 0.3
South Africa 15.2 Manufacturing 28.1 20.4 16.57.9 -7.3
Egypt 39.7 Agriculture 40.2 22.5 14.526.2 -13.5
Mauritius 36.3 Mining/ Resources 50.5 18.4 13.225.6 -10.7
Madagascar 6.0 Oil 30.7 25.2 20.26.6 0.6
Kenya 40.3 17.1 -23.2
Ghana 18.8 14.6 Source: Ackah and Morrissey (2005, p. 14)-4.2
Source: Adapted from Osakwe (2006, p. 4).
Evaluation
The above table indicates that relative to the establishment o f  the WTO a 
number of countries had a reduction o f trade barriers in the 1996-2000 period— Available indices indicate, among others, that trade liberalization persistently 
a period after the establishment o f the WTO. Indeed apart from Tunisia, Seneg­ decreased Africa’s share of world trade. Indeed, the direct impact o f tradj libera­
al, Malawi, Nigeria, and Madagascar that raised their respective tariff walls lization should be to increase the exposure of economies to international trade 
above what it used to be before the WTO, the rest o f the countries reduced their and practices, which would be reflected in an increase in the volume and value 
respective walls in positive response to demands of liberalization o f trade In o f trade. In other words, one would have expected that the openness o f Africa’s 
tact, Table 10.4 below shows that since the 1960s, and especially in the 1990s economy would have resulted equally in an increase in the share o f its world 
almost all African countries liberalized their trade regimes, at least in quantita- trade. But the share o f Africa in world trade, especially that o f sub-Saharan 
C ‘I™ ! ' Althou&h there has been a Progressive reduction o f tariffs, the period Africa, has been declining. The decline is as a result o f some factors which in­a
after 1995 was remarkable. . clude the fact that its exports have grown much more slowly than world exports. 
Meanwhile, a review of development strategies adopted by most states in Secondly, its exports are dependent on primary products; and thirdly, its imports 
Africa in the years following the dismantling of the socialist bloc reveals a re­ have grown much faster than its exports. In 1990, exports from sub-Saharan 
curring developmental decimal, the refocusing of development strategies within Africa were 1.2 percent o f total world exports. In 1995, when the WTO was 
the precept of devaluation, deregulation, privatization, commercialization mo­ established, it declined to 0.9 percent. In 1999, it was still 0.9 percent 
netization, and other neo-liberal reforms. These reform agenda are largely predi­ (UNCTAD, 2001, p. 27).
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c-oniemporary Trade, Alleviation in Africa Aloysius-Michaels Okolie 127
The manipulation of agricultural subsidies by developed states went further It must also be noted that most economies in Africa are primary community 
to undermine development efforts in Africa. An evaluation o f the European producers and thus are subjected to adverse and volatile world prices. T he flood­
Union s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) shows that agricultural prod­ ing o f domestic economies in Africa with imported products brings adverse 
ucts were heavily subsidized with $51 billion U.S.D., and this is a sector that competition and undermines expansion of local manufacturing concerns. It can 
accounts for less than 2 percent of employment in Europe (UNDP, 2005, p. be observed that industrialized capitalist economies which propagate free trade 
130). Sugar, the most important item in this policy, receives subsidies that ena­ still use discriminatory tariff and nontariff barriers to protect their respective 
ble the farmers to produce so many surpluses which are then dumped on world economies. In other words, they build their economic policies largely on neo­
markets. The resultant effect is that Europe becomes the world’s second largest mercantilism. For instance, the United States of America extends heavy subsi­
exporter of sugar, a product in which it has no comparative advantage. dies to its cotton farmers. Again, the EU, in direct contradiction to free market 
It is indeed the developing states that bear the brunt o f  these subsidies. This and liberalization policy, has discriminatory common agricultural policy.
is because the subsidized EU sugar exporters lower the world prices. A country In line with the view stated by Cooper (2003, p. 119), the type of invest­
like South Africa loses $151 million U.S.D., while Mozambique, a country that ment that enters developing economies adds little to the host country capital 
is building a competitive sugar industry that employs a large number of agricul­ stock. Generally, most FDI have not been in process manufacturing or in general 
tural laborers, is kept out of EU markets by an import quota allowing it to supply manufacturing or a productive sector o f the economy. Rather, such investments 
an amount equivalent to less than four hours’ worth of EU consumption (UNDP are concentrated in exploitation of the natural resources o f the host country.
2005, p. 131). Again, in real terms, investment in developing economies were, strictly 
The above scenario further underscores the need for fair trade. Fair trade re­ speaking, not FDI but mopping up of speculative capital which adds little to 
fers to trading partnerships which, inter alia, aim at sustainable development for domestic capital stock.
excluded and disadvantaged producers. Primarily, it aims at providing better In sum, rather than bring improved management, new production tech­
trading conditions that would be rooted in justice, fairness, and sound interna­ niques, quality control, and access to foreign markets, as well as exerting com­
tional morality. In fact, fair trade movement aims at achieving the following: petitive pressures on local producers, foreign investments rather de-capitalize 
the economy and intensify capital flight (the actions of investors in Africa’s 
a. To improve the livelihoods and well-being of producers by improving communication sector is very instructive). Thus, even with remarkable liberali­
market access, strengthening producer organizations, paying a better price zation o f African economies, the continent’s share of world trade has declined 
and providing continuity in the trading relationship; from 3.5 percent in the 1970s to 1.5 percent by 2005. Madavo (2005, p. 2) re­
b. To promote development opportunities for disadvantaged producers, espe­
cially women and indigenous people, and to protect children from exploi­ marked that “the decline is equivalent to an annual loss o f approximately $70 
tation in the production process; billion. When compared with the $25 billion that come to Africa each year in the 
c* To raise awareness among consumers of the negative effects on producers form o f overseas development assistance, the significance o f Africa’s declining 
of international trade so that they exercise their purchasing power positive­ participation in international trade becomes clear.” Therefore, at a time when 
ly; globalization is integrating the world economy and contributing to growth in 
d. To set an example of partnership in trade through dialogue, transparency, many least developed countries, Africa remains marginalized; hence the persis­
and respect; tence o f  the vicious circle o f poverty.
e. To campaign for changes in the rules and practice of conventional interna­
tional trade; and *
f. To protect human rights by promoting social justice, sound environmental 
practices and economic security. (WTO) Developmental Option
Meanwhile the protagonists o f the above are convinced that it will enhance Most states in Africa had groped in the dark for decades after independence. The 
trade justice. Hence the developing country governments would be able to freely challenges o f development and poverty alleviation had driven post-colonial 
choose best polices unimpeded by WTO restrictions. However, Sharman (2005, political leaderships to wallow from one development strategy to another. Thus 
p. 2) noted that “fair-trade primarily helps those who sell their goods abroad! from import-substitution industrialization in the 1960s, most o f these states 
The very poorest farmers produce for local markets; not foreign ones. They are experimented with various strands of export promotions, indigenization policy, 
being priced out o f  those markets by subsidized goods ‘dumped’ by corporations structural adjustment programs, and presently with modified strands of 
based in rich countries.” This therefore results in the persistence of “ forced libe­ IMF/World Bank-foisted economic reform agenda. However, these policies 
ralization” that inherently re-creates trade deficits against African economies. yielded meager returns as poverty becomes rather entrenched. The preceding 
discussions further strengthen our argument that poverty is more than ever more
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN
LIBRARY
128 Contemporary Trade, Alleviation in Africa Aloysius-Michaels Okolie 129
endemic. Presently, Africa’s contribution to global GDP is less than 2 percent g. By relying on NEPAD initiatives which was foisted with little or no 
and her contribution to world trade has declined from 4 percent to less than 2 consultation with the local population, the implementation of the strat­
percent, and Africa attracts less than I percent o f global capital flows. egies contained therein will at best produce development strategies that 
Therefore, in an attempt to reverse the above trend and reposition the conti­ will continuously reproduce “a wholesale repudiation of the State of 
nent for robust global competitiveness associated with globalization, African being o f the African man.”
leaders initiated the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (for a 
comprehensive analysis o f  the origin, goals, principles and structure o f NEPAD, 
see Okolie, 2004, pp. 287-299). Therefore, both NEPAD and the formation of Prognosis
regional and sub-regional organizations constituted direct responses by African 
leaders to turn around the economic fortunes o f the continent. However, the Anchoring development planning and implementation on the above also sug­
formation o f regional and sub-regional bodies such as Economic Community of gests that constituent States should go back to their respective cultural-specific 
West African States (ECOWAS); EU; African Union; East Asian Commission, developmental conditions, rediscover and re-emphasize their unique material 
etc., are concrete countervailing blocs against liberalization of trade and invest­ conditions, and re-build their national economies along the lines of a re-defined 
ment potentials. This is primarily because, by encouraging exclusive trading and re-tooled mercantilist orientation.
blocs and enhancing discriminatory tariff practices, these regional and sub­ Primarily, this is not to make a case for protectionism, or for a policy of de­
regional groups wittingly and unwittingly undermine unfettered movement of linking or autarky. There is enough to support a belief in complex interdepen­
global goods and services. Hence rather than promoting universalization of dent principle anchored by materialist understanding o f global interaction. How­
globalization ideals, these groups engender segmented liberalization o f trade and ever, building and consolidating national economies with the intent of pursuing 
investment practices. integration at a later date remains the way forward. Contemporary globalization 
However, these regional and sub-regional organizations, together with the moves under the fulcrum of competitiveness and liberalization; and with the 
NEPAD initiative had failed to stem the tide because o f the following reasons: present structure o f the disoriented national economies in Africa, the task ol 
a. The economic foundations o f most states in Africa are weak, inchoate, alleviating poverty and meeting the demands and challenges o f the Millennium 
*  and dependent; and hence remain rather compliant to external dictates, Development Goals (MDG) by 2015 shall remain a mirage.
shocks, and manipulations;
b. The factors of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism implanted 
divisive tendencies and mutual distrust among African states. This Conclusion
makes internal cohesion and development difficult;
c. The circulation o f  political leaderships masquerading as lackeys to 
global capital rather complicates development difficulties. In addition, An attempt has been made to demonstrate that most states in Africa are very 
the low autonomization of most states in Africa, arising from persis­ poor. This chapter has explored the persisting and escalating incidence of pover­ty and the challenges posed by contemporary trade and investment practices in 
tence o f rudimentary productive forces, reduces State apparatus to mere 
personalized tools used for self-aggrandizement and expropriation; alleviating or eradicating poverty in Africa. It noted, among others that, the 
d. Most of the development strategies were imposed by external machina­ prevailing checklists o f  contemporary globalization rather deepen the incidence 
tions and hence do not accommodate internal development ingredients. of poverty and complicate development initiatives aimed at redressing the ugly 
Like NEPAD, these policies did not accommodate the civil society in situation. Thus, it observed that the poverty level in Africa, especially in sub- 
the planning and execution of development strategies; Saharan Africa has been critical and seemingly intractable.
c. The existing structure o f global political economy consistently sustains However, this chapter considered development options and the primary ideas behind the establishment of regional and sub-regional organizations, in­
the existing domination and undermines all efforts to reverse the trend. 
Indeed, all existing international institutions including the UN, WTO, cluding the NEPAD. Among others, it remarked that NEPAD, like preceding 
G8, NATO, etc., serve the aforementioned purpose; development initiatives, is bound to fail in its task of stimulating sustainable 
I fhc dominance o f political leaderships in Africa with visionless, out­ human development for reasons enunciated above.To redress the situation, this chapter advocated for a resurgence of nationa­
landish, and prostrate ideas on the way out of the woods; immersed in listic fervor. While not advocating for delinking, it argued that constituent states 
ideological tabula rasa further consolidates the asymmetrical relation­
ship between the developed and developing states; and should go back to their roots and re-strategize their development initiatives in 
line with their local conditions. African states should see development from their ^  
peculiar circumstances; and think more of how productive sectors of' their re-
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
130 Contemporary Trade, Alleviation in Africa Aloysius-Michaels Okolie
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development *20091 w u
York: Oxford University Press developm ent report. New
WOrW„Drtd” B,(„2k000 ''nd 2001’■ * '« " * » < * » » «  « « .  Washing,o„ D.C : The
Ww i UT. O( IWi T5)O. s S   Geneva: WTOW. a s h in g ,D.c ., The W„rld BangTrading into the fu ture . Chapter Eleven
Community-Based Organizations: 
Household Food and Livelihood 
Security in Southern N igeria
Stephen Onakuse and Eamon Lenihan
This study explores the relationship between household food security and 
community-based organizations (CBOs) in rural villages in southern states of 
Nigeria. The research is underpinned by the established observation that rural 
CBOs are a significant factor in the process of livelihood security, particularly 
in rural villages. The relationship which is cultural in context indicates that the 
processes and involvement of indigenous CBOs empower rural poor people in 
demand time, in resource access and utilization, and in local support. The asso­
ciations also explore the knowledge, culture which suggests that food insecurity 
might be a thing of the past if the ethos of CBOs is proactively employed to 
livelihood and food security programs among rural poor.
Introduction
Over the past 40 years, Nigeria has had about 44 poverty and livelihood insecu­
rity eradication programs, which were either derailed or disrupted without 
I achieving their objectives. Livelihood insecurity has become the norm; it has 
become so commonplace and almost taken for granted as a natural feature by the 
citizenry. Forty-nind years after independence, food insecurity remains one of 
the most pressing issues in Nigeria’s development despite the global nature in 
which poverty and development issues are based and discussed in the twenty- 
first century. It has not only become entrenched and multifaceted over decades, 
but has also continued to elude efforts made towards eradicating it.
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I J>‘ * Community-Based Organizations Stephen Onakuse and Eamon Lenihan 135
Nigeria is supposed to be a rich country given the enormous human and ment, health services, education, etc. through indigenous systems that are spe­
mineral resources available in the country. In particular, one issue that keeps cific in history, indigenous knowledge, and local traditions.
recurring is the increasing poverty level in the country. Nigeria is a poor country Important topical areas, however, such as the dynamics o f livelihood secu­
judging from its $260 per capita in 1996 and during the 1990s the nation showed rity framework built around the mechanisms of human development and the 
no appreciable growth in per capita GDP. In fact it declined for most part o f  the issues o f  food security have attracted different approaches, and still raise many 
decade except in 1996 and 1997 when per capita growth is 0.54 and 0.32 respec­ questions. Difficulties £tem, on the one hand, mostly from controversies around 
tively. This is however, in line with the average growth o f real GDP which aver­ theories o f livelihood’'approaches (top-down approach) and cpnceptual models 
aged about 2.5 percent in 1995, although the performance was marked by varia­ of individual, household, and community interactions and, on the other hand, 
tions from 1.01 in 1994 to 3.38 in 1996 (CBN, 1998, WB, 1996). from the non-use o f traditional strategies to simulate livelihood security.
The relative conceptualization of poverty is largely income based. Accord­ There is thus a clear gap between the standards of livelihood security ap­
ingly, poverty and food insecurity depicts a situation in which a given material proaches and the real facts; however, rural poor people have continually modi­
means o f sustenance, within a given society, is hardly enough for subsistence. fied local traditions for or as survival strategies. There is a growing interest 
Food insecurity in southern Nigeria is both widespread and deep. Southern Ni­ centered on the modelling o f socially-articulated network arrangements across 
geria and the entire country in general has progressively slipped from being one households, extended family, and the community (informal lending, sharecrop­
of the middle-income oil-producing countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s ping, and other risk-pooling strategies) as a major approach to livelihood secu­
to one of the lowest income countries in the early 1990s. Moreover, the 2004 rity (Agarwal, 1991, Udry, 1990; Thi-Dieu-Phuong, 1998). Meanwhile the 
edition of the UNDP’s Human Development Report placed Nigeria in the 151st widespread use o f CBOs has been observed throughout traditional livelihood 
position, based on the Human Development Index. Casual evidence o f the grow­ settings in rural villages (Platteau, 1991: OIowu, et al, 1991). The partition of 
ing intensity of poverty and livelihood insecurity in the country can be glimpsed community in terms o f tradition, religion, region, and ethnic groupings has made 
from the rising incidence of mass unemployment, urban poverty and homeless­ it difficult to demonstrate their framework of operation in a formal model 
ness among the poorest groups; diminished access to quality foods and nutrition, (Nweze, 1991).
health care, and educational facilities; and the rising incidence o f  street begging; The informal, rural, and socially-articulated CBOs arrangements erase the 
among others. doubt that networks, individual values, and moral behaviors to coping strategies 
The basic causes o f  poverty in Nigeria have been identified to include in­ could be viably harnessed into food security policy development. Carter (1997) 
adequate access to employment opportunities for the poor; lack or inadequate found that rural households in the Sahel, if socially and economically isolated, 
access to assets such as land and capital by the poor; inadequate access to the would annually face a 21 percent probability of falling below food subsistence 
means of fostering rural development in poor rural villages; inadequate access to level. This probability decreases to 16 percent when reciprocal social sharing is 
markets for the goods and services that the poor produce; inadequate access to involved. Rosenzweig (1988) also confirmed the critical role an extended 
education, health, sanitation, and water services; the destruction o f  the natural household plays in insuring consumption against adverse income shocks. There­
resource endowments which has led to reduced productivity o f  agriculture, for­ fore, households seek and rely on CBOs’ livelihood strategy mechanisms that 
estry, and fisheries; the inadequate access to assistance by those who are the can provide a relative flow o f livelihood resources organized around norms of 
victims o f transitory poverty due to factors such as erosion, floods, pests, and conduct and moral principles o f reciprocity.
civil disturbances; and inadequate involvement of the poor in the design o f  de­ The main objective of this study is to explore the relationship between 
velopment programs. These multidimensional causes of material and non­ CBOs’ orientation and the livelihood experiences o f  rural poor people who are 
material deprivation make livelihood insecurity endemic in Nigeria (FOS food insecure through lack of access to and exclusion from obtaining meaning­
1999). ful livelihoods. The study aims to explore the relationship and networks used by 
In rural Nigeria, seasonal and inter-annual income fluctuations pose a se­ the rural poor through CBOs’ activities in coping for short- and long-term peri­
vere problem o f livelihood security to a larger percentage o f  the population (70 ods o f  scarcity. The hypothesis therefore is that harnessing and exploiting com­
percent) (UNAIDS, 2004). Household survival and welfare depend on the ability munity-based organizations’ knowledge contribute to long-term household food 
to anticipate and cope with income shocks. Over the past decade, the World and livelihood security. Furthermore, in order to explore the effects o f  CBOs’ 
Bank, Development Agencies, Research Institutes, and NGOs have made impor­ choices, indigenous beliefs and members’ risk-sharing on food security, the 
tant theoretical and empirical contributions in the area of food security, poverty study seeks to evaluate the diversity of rural households’ strategies for adapting 
alleviation, nutrition, and HIV/AIDS control and prevention. These contribu­ short- and long-term livelihood security responses. In addition, it is important to 
tions have yielded new thoughts and insights on the roles o f the poor (them­ go beyond and explore the collective approach mechanism of CBOs, and to 
selves) in achieving food security, sustainable livelihoods, gender empower- determine if the impact of these strategies on resource allocation could be re­
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136 Community-Based Organizations Stephen Onakuse and Eamon Lenihan 137
sponsible for the ties and dynamics of CBO formation in rural communities tion negates the above assumption. On the one hand, Zeller s et al., (2001) ar­
I inally, the study set out to explore how government policies or programs im­ gument could be valid in an urban condition where networks are severed due to 
pact on CBOs activities (if any), and on food and livelihood security in the formalized models o f relation (erosion of “extensive family” with preferred 
current global economy. nuclear family), but between rural village contexts where extensive family val­
ues, neighborliness, and familiarity are unique, the size o f such extension be­
comes strength based on the density o f their networks.
The Structure of Community-Based Organizations The ability o f individuals to manipulate his or her network within CBOs 
resides on their social ties. Louch (2000), therefore, defines these networks of 
CBOs are local and indigenous to the poor which are created, owned, and sus­ integration in terms of connection between pairs of individuals (dyads) within a 
tained by poor members themselves and are present in all parts of southern Ni­ network. He used transition to refer to the empirical situation where mutual 
geria in a wide variety o f  forms. This excludes the other CBOs that are urban connections exist between individuals in a network. These types o f mutual con­
with international business networks. Perhaps the most common form are the nections are sometimes relatively small, contained in groups where everyone is 
small, relatively informal, common-interest, trust-based groups, including sav- likely to associate in some way with everyone else.
'nSs Sroups and rotating savings associations, self-help groups, funeral associa­ The aggregated explanation of social capital explores the actual or potential 
tions, village banks, water user groups, and mutual aid societies (Van Duuren, resources which are linked to membership in a group or in association working 
2004; IFAD, 2005; Marsh, 2003; FAO, 2002; Crowley, 1993). These are usually together to provide each of its members with the backing o f the collectively 
limited in size to between about 5 and 25 individuals, in which all or most mem­ owned capital against livelihood insecurity (Bourdieu, 1993). The emphasis is 
bers are of a similar social or economic status or physical ability and know each upon social networks that provide access to members o f a connected group. The 
other personally. Members often reside near one another and enjoy bonds of outcome of such association is ultimately economic reward reaped through on­
friendship, kinship, or alliance. going participation in the network as mutual benefits accrue. I herefore, social 
Depending upon the objectives of the organization, the optimal size and capital is a means expressed through the activities of CBOs in a social connec­
structure vary. ! he structure o f CBOs is determined by the felt need which is the tion to collectively gain access to resources which are keenly sought m poor 
endogenous process o f group formation, and also by traditional regulations rural communities. Bourdieu’s (1993) particular application of the concept of 
based on norms, values, and beliefs. The purpose of such organization does not social capital relates to understanding how individuals draw upon social capital 
warrant written rules because the conditions arc based on mutual trust and un­ networks to improve their livelihood conditions where access to assets remains a 
derstanding of felt needs. Also gender and size o f the group determine its initial major problem to livelihood security amongst rural poor people.
formation. Usually, the principal agents o f CBOs formation are branded in age Rural poor people in southern Nigeria belong to relatively expansive per­
grade, occupation, size o f extensive family, gender, and those with access to sonal networks, many o f whom are connected by virtue o f common religion, 
information. Importantly, the formation o f these groups overwhelmingly is ethnic group, family, occupation, economic situation, language, region, and 
based on livelihood felt needs and harsh economic conditions. However, the geographical location; where all individuals in the network have a potential 
resources available create for a substantial variation in organizational character basis to associate with one another (livelihood insecurity) with common interest 
and structure which are important elements in determining the kinds and types (needs and access to assets of production) and to communally manipulate their 
o f membership. social networks within the constraints that affect their everyday life.
The relationship between members o f the same group (a particular group Majority o f the CBOs examined show a multiple possible connection kind 
who live in the same hamlet or village) implies that local information exchange of relationship within the framework which is relied on— that is, the greater the 
between members is facilitated while building a strong tie and mutual trust. This number o f members organized within the common area o f  interest, the more 
makes it possible for nearly, if not, all members to be related to each other; this likely a better cohesion to achieving livelihood results through combined mutual 
is a reason for greater knowledge of each other’s asset$, liabilities, and liveli­ assistance. Thus mutual sharing associates are more connected than those who 
hood status (Zeller et al., 2001). Devereux and Fishe (1993) conclude that indi­ are non-members o f such groups or indifferent. Feld (1981), also argues that 
viduals facing similar magnitude of risks have an incentive to form a group that most ties develop around specific focus (livelihood security), including persons, 
is the heterogeneity of livelihood among households or community which facili­ places, social positions, activities, and groups. This understanding can be ex­
tates mutual help. tended to deal with multiple overlapping roles among members of CBOs in 
Zeller et al. (2001) argued that a group beyond a certain size may experi­ terms of member’s participation in multiple foci— work, family, etc. with 
ence increased difficulty in exchanging information and in coordination. But the connections cutting across dense networks with heterogeneous character.
binding norms, values, and belief coupled with equal livelihood economic situa­
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>~uiiiiiiuimy-tsaseu organizations Stephen Onakusc and Eamon Lenihan 139
The most stated objectives o f the informal mutual savings and loan organi­ families alive and thriving and capable of participating in food security generat­
zations obtained through the survey exercise group discussion across the three ing activities as the need and opportunity arise (Ratner, 2000). Therefore, CBOs 
regions are summarized as follows: are an enhancing strategy that focuses on the potentials and opportunities based 
in indigenous knowledge that rural poor people maximize in order to pull them­
(a) To improve the socio-economic conditions of merfibers, especially those selves. Because rural poor people have their own definition o f desired livelihood 
in the rural areas through the provision of loan assistance, skills acquisi­ outcome, indigenous organizations, or groups therefore undertake a variety of * 
tion, reproductive health care service, adult literacy, and child education; strategies (swapping, trading, sharing labor, barter system, and borrowing from 
(b) To build community capacities for wealth creation among enterprising one household to another) based on established networks which are primarily 
poor people and to promote sustainable livelihood by strengthening co­
operation; and kinship and communal in nature.
(c) To attain livelihood security through the provision of microfinance sup­
port and skill acquisition development for income generation.
Data and Method
The southern states o f Nigeria are a polyvalent cultural and ethnic estate 
with historical contiguities and linkages between the ethnic groups and region. The study was based upon primary data, collected through fieldwork and secon­
Based on this polyvalence, it will be difficult to determine the genuine require­ dary data obtained from the critical assessment of relevant documents and pub­
ments and priorities o f rural poor people in terms o f household food and liveli­ lished literature with a view to understanding the topic and the context o f issues 
hood security. So, an understanding o f inherent traditional means of survival that evolve around household food and livelihood security. The study draws on a 
presupposes that the common cultural values be carefully evaluated. This proc­ comprehensive field survey of 1620 households conducted in 2003 in 18 states 
ess provides a difficult task to actually perform a concise and specific research o f Nigeria. The three regions surveyed—the Southwest, Midwest, and South­
that spread across the colossal units o f tribes and ethnic groups that spread east— are based on the initial division soon after independence. The three re­
across all the regions and villages in southern Nigeria. gions chosen for this research have tropical environments with characteristic 
The daily activities o f rural poor villages in southern Nigeria are based on tropical rainfall patterns of two distinct seasons— the dry and the wet seasons.
the actions of CBO networks which control livelihood security activities of the The sampling procedure employed in this study is a multi-stage stratified 
poor with a distinguished history traced to indigenous economic and moral random sampling, involving four stages. At the first stage, all the 18 states were 
realms in determining well-being, which has overly provided a diagnosis o f rural identified and selected out of the 36 states, taking into consideration the regional 
household livelihood within individuals, households, and communities. division in operation in the country. At the second stage, 54 local government 
An understanding o f the cultural dynamism of groups/communities in a way areas were randomly selected out of the 18 states in the southern part o f Nigeria. 
recognizes potential sources o f livelihood security, which provides a cushion Proportionality factor of three was introduced to derive the number o f study 
against food insecurity in the social support mechanisms o f “extensive family” villages in each state and also the numbers of existing local government areas.
and local institutional maintenance. Rao et al. (2004) summarized these dynam­ The study is strictly rural; therefore areas with cosmopolitan nature were pur- 
ics to mean the relationships among individuals within groups, among groups, posively excluded from the study. Lists of 162 villages were randomly selected 
and between ideas and perspectives, which is symbolic with identity, aspiration, from the list o f  total villages in the eighteen states obtained from the Federal 
exchange, co-ordination, structures, and practices that serve relational ends, such Office o f Statistics (FOS) and the National Population Commission (NPC).
as ethnicity, ritual, heritage, norms, meanings, and beliefs. From the list o f villages, the first village was automatically selected, while three 
The apparent complexity with the key dimension o f  social relation in villages each were selected from the 54 local government areas.
households circulates within age and gender, which affect access to, control At the third stage, a household list in the selected villages was obtained 
over, and use o f resources (land, tools, and labor), output, and income (Ellis, from community members based on household head representation. The number 
2000). Even though they may pursue the same strategies as men (e.g. migration, o f respondent households from each village was selected using another propor­
diversification of income source, borrowing), they do so under different institu­ tionality factor such that the number of respondent households from each village 
tional rules thus making intra-household resource allocation to vary significantly was proportional and equal to the number o f households obtained in other vil- v '« 
between cultures. lages despite size and population difference.
One key to understanding popular adaptive strategies and their underlying At the fourth and the last stage, a household numbering was done. This was 
ideologies may be found in the terminologies, idioms, and phrases used in eve­ followed by random selection of households from the list of households by writ­
ryday life in an informal economy. There is no question, however, that the in­ ing the number o f the household on small pieces of paper and picking a number
formal economy is large and that it forms an important piece o f what keeps
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NO Community-Based Organizations Stephen Onakuse and Eamon Lenihan 1 4 1
o f papers, which correspond with the number o f respondents, expected from the separated/widowed or their spouse has migrated away for economic reasons and 
village. the women are left behind to keep the household together.
The aPProach employed here will make it possible to compare whether any Between the 18 states in the three regions, the percentages of male were all 
difference exists between households that rely on CBOs’ activities and those above 90 percent, except for three states: Osun, Cross River, and Ekm which 
that are not members o f  CBOs, in terms o f benefits o f CBO membership Quali- recorded a significant percentage of female headed households of 7.8 percent,
tative studies have reported the coexistence o f traditional knowledge and CBOs 6 7 percent, and 6.7 percent respectively. This distribution has two implications 
o ™  ° f  biodiversity and environment conservation practices (UNEP/CBD on livelihood security when disaggregated by age. While the distributions still 
rank all the respondents on the average at their economically active age, it is an 
The questionnaire was divided into different sections, which are interre­ indication that they are still at the active age for economic activities and chi d 
lated, and together they explore individual household’s characteristics. The bearing. In the first reason cited, the ability of family to go about their daily 
questionnaire was designed to facilitate a concise and in-depth evaluation to activities in order to earn income with which they cater for their family basic 
access household strategies and also to exploit CBOs’/groups’ interaction with needs is enhanced. Thus, these daily activities can result in reduction in liveli­
livelihood security. The questionnaire not only gathers qualitative data, it also hood insecurity as women and children are in most cases left behind while the 
enables insight into household’s livelihoods activities with additional questions active male or the head of the household migrates. Therefore, the larger the 
about issues with wider context in which households struggle with to produce family size, the more thinly spread is the family’s income on basic needs, lead­
livelihood needs. ing to a further aggravation of livelihood insecurity. The above postulations are, 
however, subject to the respondent’s level o f education, family relation, income, 
access to assets o f production, as well as affiliation to CBOs.
Results and Discussion Literacy was not a mandatory condition in the determination of CBO mem­
bership, but it is an advantage. Analyzed data from the field survey shows that 
The analysis is based on the survey of 1620 households in 18 states in the south­ 47.3 percent of the entire population surveyed had no formal education while the 
ern part of Nigeria. The study advances that CBOs’ ethos exerts a significantly age range of between 51-60 had the highest (54.4 percent) o f those who had 
positive impact on individuals, households, and community livelihood security never been to school; 27.2 percent represent those who have finished primary 
in rural areas where such CBOs are operational. Membership and levels o f  in­ education, and 19.3 percent with secondary levels. However, 6 percent obtained 
volvement in CBOs’ activities makes it possible to investigate the benefits de­ a diploma (these comprise pensioners and retirees, while 0.2% represents those 
rived from such an association and its ability to smoothen food insecurity at the with university degrees). There was a significant variation in educational at­
individual, household, and community levels. The research findings presented in tainment by head o f household by state and region. This shows that most o f the 
this chapter show the wide range of CBOs found in rural villages across the female heads had little or no education (13.3 percent), while men had 86.7 per- 
three regions o f southern Nigeria. Informal CBOs at the village-level often sub­ cent.
stitute for missing formal institutions and formal safety nets, but CBOs tend to There is a strong correlation between the size of the household and liveli­
persist even during very hard times. This type o f  understanding will avoid the hood security of the household. From the survey result, the 18 states from south­
pitfall o f  undermining (inadvertently, perhaps) existing formal institutions— by ern Nigeria had an average household’s mean size of 5.6, while a typical house­
introducing competing institutions that may be attractive in the short run espe­ hold in rural southern Nigeria villages consist of between 1-18 persons. The 
cially from the point o f view o f the World Bank and UNDP. survey result indicates that the relatively large household size is peculiar 
The results o f  the research illustrate that there is a relationship between a throughout the 18 states surveyed and there is no particular ethnic group or 
nourishing associational life and livelihood security which portrays that house­ region which demonstrates a higher degree of preference for large family size 
holds and villages with higher social capital, as measured by membership in Livelihood insecurity has the propensity to be dominant in areas with low-level 
tunctionmg groups, have higher incomes (Narayan & Ebtfe, 1997- Naravan & education while the gap between food security, knowledge, and ignorance are 
Pritchett, 1999). ’ y oc further expanding. One o f the characteristics of the poor, which remains consis­
The characteristics and socio-economic indices o f  household heads shows tent over time, is their tack of basic education.
that 97.2 percent are men, while a marginal 2.8 percent are female head o f Current understandings of livelihood security place considerable-emphasis 
households with the southwest having a higher percentage o f 3.5 percent when on ownership or access to assets that can be put to productive use as the building 
compared to the other two regions. This disparity is probably due to the cultural blocks by which the poor can construct their own routes out o f poverty (World 
context in which females rarely become heads of households unless they are Bank, 2000). Naturally, each of the regions and their villages has particular asset 
characteristics. The largest single contributing source of livelihood to the poor
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142 Community-Based Organizations Stephen Onakuse and Eamon Lcnihan 143
(income) was agriculture 81.48 percent, fishing 3.15 percent, business/hotel 9.75 through different forms of co-operation through labor sharing, credit, bulk pur­
percent, construction 5.25 percent, petty trade 0.12 percent, tailoring and trans­ chase, contribution of cash and other related materials.
port 0.06 percent respectively, and other 0.12 percent. Membership may be restricted or unrestricted. In unrestricted associations 
For much o f rural villages in the three regions o&southern Nigeria, farming membership may cut across age, sex, and occupational or socio-economic status, 
is still the primary source o f livelihood. Changes in the scale and nature o f rural- while in restricted associations, membership is based on age, occupation (such 
urban interactions and their relevance for the livelihoods o f  different groups are as farmers or traders), or other socio-economic criteria. More than 70 percent of 
therefore largely related to transformations in the agricultural sector which has such organizations identified in the southern region were restricted; farmer’s 
not occurred. Rather, a combination of factors, ranging from government poli­ organizations predominated, which may be due to the fact that farming is, or is 
cies (for example, land tenure systems and agricultural policies) to village-level perceived as, an important economic activity in rural villages. Prospective mem­
characteristics (for example, population density and natural resource features), bers of CBOs must be recognized as honest, well-behaved, and respectable. 
inter-household differences (for example, those between wealthier and vulner­ Over half of the organizations required that at least two members attest to the 
able households, and those between migrants and indigenous residents), and character o f any prospective member. Individuals without visible means o f live­
intra-household differences (between genders and between generational groups) lihood are encouraged to join, since one of the aims of the organization is for 
all combine to affect agriculture. mutual assistance/benefits.
This section of the analysis explores what local informal networks or The levels o f  involvement from analyzed data based on the type o f  organi­
CBOs/groups which are present within the sample areas in the three regions and zation shows that youth organizations represented 52 percent o f active members, 
investigates the level o f participation and benefits accruing from membership in 35 percent nominal members, 11.6 percent in executive position, and women’s 
these organizations. The research examined the perceived benefits o f participa­ groups with 50 percent being active members, 40.6 percent nominal members, 
tion in these groups, and measures the amount of horizontal integration (groups, and 9.4 percent in executive position. Also, market organization has 50.6 per­
i.e., religion, ethnicity) and vertical integration (different social groups, i.e.’ cent nominal members, 37.1 percent as active members, and 12.4 percent in the 
ethnic mixing) within them. The section also seeks to evaluate individuals and executive rank.
households head membership, participation and involvement in indigenous The importance of CBOs is particularly instructive for understanding the 
CBOs and to explore whether a smoothing effect on livelihood security in rural plight of rural poor people, minorities, and marginalized groups who construct 
areas exists from such membership. The overall result shows that the rural these networks o f  association for survival. CBOs’ networks are basically strate­
dwellers participate actively in indigenous CBOs as a coping strategy. gies for survival based on a symmetrical pattern of mutual expectations through 
The distribution of various types of indigenous organizations among rural bartering and exchange of trust in the sense of borrowing, working together 
poor people indicates that the choice o f different names for CBOs is for the (labor), marketing, bulk purchase, and other local survival mechanisms centered 
purpose of clarity, identification, and ease of classification. An example o f  this on networks within, between, and beyond the communities.
is a credit union commonly referred to as esusu among market women’s organi­ The income bracket category between members’ and non-members income 
zation. The propensities for collective action in CBOs’ approaches are infor­ bracket ranges from less than N 1,000 per annum to N50.000 and above. In the 
mally designed to recognize the attributes and potential contributions o f  all, first category, the following percentage distribution was obtained for member­
irrespective of age, gender, or class; and to exploit local opportunities for col­ ship: (less than N l, 000 per annum) 0 percent, (N 1,000-5,000 per annum) 11 
laboration which exist for mutual gain. The Southwest region shows an aggre­ percent, (N5,000-I0,000 per annum) 32.8 percent, (N 10,000-20,000 per annum) 
gate distribution o f  CBOs o f 40.1 percent, Midwest region 11.1 percent, and 18.1 percent; (N20,000-30,000 per annum) 12.3 percent, (N30,000-50,000 per 
Southeast region 48.8 percent o f the common indigenous CBOs found across the annum) 20.5 percent, and (N50.000 and above per annum) 5.2 percent. Non­
three regions. members show a decline in income as categories increase while there were no 
The results from the survey cutting across all the villages surveyed shows members in the category of less than N 1,000 per annum in the income bracket 
that 97 percent of individuals belong to separate networks o f relationships based when compared to members in the following range (less than N 1,000 per an­
on his or her neighborhood, ethnic group, region, religion, age, and gender. Each num) 10.4%, (N1,000-5,000 per annum) 25%, (N5.000-10,000 per annum) 
of these groupings operates with different norms and levels o f  mutual obligation 52.1%, (N 10,000-20,000 per annum) 10.4%, and (N20,000-30,000 per annum) 
or expectation, and generates different levels o f generalized trust towards others 2 . 1% .
within or outside the grouping. For example, in Laogun-Araromi village, Ede, There is a statistically significant difference between membership income 
Osun State, the women’s group in the village prioritized their life chances on bracket and non-members income bracket, especially with those with strong 
members’ ability to contribute towards the education of their children. The cha­ sense of involvement. But the numbers o f members’ income bracket decrease as 
racteristic feature o f  all the indigenous organizations was resource mobilization the income bracket levels increase from N20,000 to N50,000 and above. 1 he
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
145
Stephen Onakuse and Eamon Lcnihan
I l l Community-Based Organizations
income distribution levels show that many respondents who are members of rural societies through cultural elements and ind.geno.fl know edg croup members and communal ties to forge indigenous cultural act o 
CBOs and who had a level of social commitment towards their organizations 
stand better chances of increased income from their livelihood activities. stimulate mutually beneficial interactions among groups anc 
The research shows that membership o f CBOs, based on traditional norms solutions that are effective, sustainable, equita > e, an e knowledgeeauired for creative and flexible combinations of cultural and C B °  knowledge
o f solidarity and reciprocity, are key elements in household livelihood strategies 
and community cohesion through the various activities commonly executed to livelihood security. Many development programs have ^  J cr a
between and among members. Farm input (38.83 percent) ranked highest among tance o f local participation. The emphasis on local particip mdividu-™  b ^ o ry  o f  prOEram failures. The efforts of .he poor th a n *  v c s a n £ ho 
the activities of CBOs compared to others such as sales (22.16 percent), training 
(17.04 percent), community development activities (11.54 percent) and bulk E  -who strive to improve their own livelihoods ohen w,tlh, » « < ,
purchase (6.98 percent). Together, these activities through indigenous CBO family and friends, is by far the most common strategy forJivel hM  
networks ensure sustainable levels o f livelihood security and provide a safety for rural poor. Members agree to work together to achieve object ves t 
net for the most vulnerable groups. been collectively identified and are important to their Im lA o o d s. n m > ^
The financial benefit through CBOs’ activities with well-functioning local non-members also benefit from the extensive network of relat.o
institutional arrangements and localized livelihoods systems differs in economic m em bers, research ^  revea,ed that several indigenous be lie fs and Practices
gains as the major difference in collective benefits between members and non­
members of CBOs depends on their management patterns. The benefits from contribute to livelihood security management through the differ-
collective association suggest that stimulating participation among members of which help to overcome the barriers o f  access, literacy, languag ’ with
CBOs such as women’s organizations and other indigenous groups may improve ences, and physical isolation. These charactenst.es prov.de CBO memblivelihood security tools used to inform, secure access to resources, a n ^ p ^ ^  ^
rural poor livelihood security and also promote access to livelihood assets and 
communal values. education for members about livelihood security strategies •
CBOs in rural villages is crucially conditioned by low cu_ ure 
terns which are key characteristics that underpin CBO >n.m .ves^ 
Conclusion and Implication for Policy acteristics such as participation, tradition, .nd.genous t o o ^ c ,  ^capital, which are peculiar tools for CBOs success, a
unexplored in policy development for rural poor r „id and an
This research has provided insights into the various ways that CBOs, rooted in The challenge ahead, therefore, will be to find a level p aying fieW, »  ^  
culture and traditional knowledge, could generate and influence policy change acceptable compromise between the dynamics of rural li , meet
and public action on livelihood security. The thin line between livelihood secu­ developing a tractable conceptual system that is known t0* ^  flexib 
rity and livelihood insecurity lies in the balance between different institutional the needs of, the rural poor. The following suggestions_shou d be 
forms (formal) and indigenous organizations (informal) approaches to develop­ consideration in household and livelihood security policy formulation.
ing livelihood strategies on which the practices of household food security poli­
cies are creatively designed by and for the poor through the application o f in­ • Building the organizational capabilities of CBOs, suitably adaptive to
digenous knowledge.
For many rural poor individuals and households in rural southern Nigeria, .  Recognihon'of social^and cu.tura. capacity associated with
the means to sustainable livelihoods are scarce due to lack o f access to various processes and increment in group performance through enhanced access
capital assets. The lack o f access by individuals alone is an indication that CBOs and abilities to meet livelihood needs; .
have a role to play, on the one hand, in maintaining traditional safety nets for the .  Explore the complementary synergies that exist between
less economically privileged through the “user-contribute” risk-sharing game informal institutions to create innovative pathways for p decjsion.
and, on the other hand, in improving the functioning of’ networks of working .  There is a need to review the political dimensions °  ec . jn socia| 
together in areas of traditional financing and labor sharing as a means to liveli­ making and their positive or negative impact on ach.e g 
hood security. The majority of these organizations o f the rural poor rely more on development goals in rural areas as well as on the etticacy
networks o f solidarity to secure livelihoods. macroeconomic policies on CBOs, and r.ovemments
The linkages between indigenous knowledge and livelihood security are .  Greater public investment in the rurol sector ,s rc ,u . f  0° Z  " Z ° ° ’ should provide transport and matkeling tnftastructu P
totally influenced by economic decisions of the poor and the lack of improved producers are often located in marginal areas poorly served y -
economic opportunities, and how individuals, households, and communities ___________m n r l / o t C  O f l H  1 1 1 1 3 1 1 !*? .
respond to livelihood opportunities. The network o f relationships in traditional
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
146 Community-Based Organizations Stephen Onakuse and Eamon Lenihan 147
Louch, H. (2000) Personal network integration: Transitivity and homophily in strong-tie 
Finally, it is important to note that CBOs’ activities necessarily empower relations. Social Networks, 22(1), pp. 45-64.
rural poor in gaining access to strategies that help secure livelihoods security. Marsh, R., (2003). Working with local institutions to support sustainable livelihoods. 
Although networks may indeed empower individuals and help build and main­ Rome, Italy: Rural Development Division, FAO.Narayan, D., & Pritchett, L. (1999). Cents and sociability: Household income and social 
tain CBOs’ activities, there is evidence to suggest that the'character o f members capital in rural Tanzania. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47, pp. 
also plays a role in terms o f value, norm, trust, levels of involvement, and mem­
bers’ contributions. 871-897,Narayan, D., & Ebbe, K'S (1997). Design o f social funds: Participation, demand orienta­
These findings hold implications for both contingency and long-term mod­ tion and local organizational capacity. (World Bank Discussion Paper 375). Wash­
els o f the relationship between group network structures and livelihood security. ington, D.C.
However, the result suggests that integrative structures through the activities of Nweze, N.J. (1991). The role of women's traditional savings and credit cooperatives in 
CBOs yield higher access to assets and capitals o f production. Unfortunately, small-farm development. In C.A. Oguta (Ed.), Issues in African rural development, 
little inquiry exists at the intersection o f  formal structure and the informal rela­ pp. 234-253. Little Rock, AR: Winrock International Institute for Agricultural De­
tionships uncovered via social network analysis. The output o f this research will velopment.Olowu, D., Ayo, B.D., & Akande, B. (1991). Local institutions and national development 
enable the development o f close links between local government authorities, in Nigeria. Ile-Ife: OAU Press.
state government, federal government, and NGOs to develop a coherent rural Platteau, J-P. (1991). Traditional systems of social security and hunger insurance: Past 
livelihood security policy framework that promotes rural and urban poor peo­ achievements and modem challenges. In E. Ahmad, J. Dr6ze, J. Hills, & A. Sen 
ple’s food and livelihood security. (Eds.). Social security in developing countries, pp. 161-2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rao, V., & Walton, M. (2004). Culture and public action: An introduction. In V. Rao & 
M. Walton (Eds.), Culture and Public Action: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue on 
References Development Policy, pp. 56-84. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press.Ratner, S. (2000). The informal economy in rural community economic development. 
(TVA Rural Studies Program/Contractor Paper 00-03). Retrieved on March 10, 
Agarwal, B. (1991). Social security and the family: Coping with seasonality and calamity 2005, from < http://www.rural.org/publications/Ratner00-03.pdf >.
in rural India. In F. Admad, i. Dreze, J. Hills, & A. Sen (Eds.), Social security in de­
veloping countries, pp. 17-24. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rosenzweig, M.R. (1988). Risk, implicit contracts and the family in rural areas of low- 
Bourdieu, P. (1993). The forms of capita). In J.G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook o f theory income countries. The Economic Journal, 98(12), pp. 1148-70.Thi-Dieu-Phuong, G.N. (1998). Food insecurity and the evolution o f indigenous risk­
and research for the sociology o fe ducation, pp. 241 -258. New York: Greenwood. sharing institutions in the Sahel. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, the Ohio State 
Carter, M. (1997). Environment, technology and the social organization of risk in West 
African agriculture. Economic Development Cultural Change, 45(3), pp. 557-590. University.
CBN. (1998). Statistical bulletin, 9(2). Udry, C. (1990). Credit markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as insurance in a rural econ­
CBN. (2001). Economic andfinancial review, 39(2). omy. World Bank Economic Review, 4, pp. 251 -270.
Crowley, E. (1993). Guinea-Bissau’s informal economy and its contributions to eco­ UN AIDS. (2004). 2004 Report on the global AIDS Epidemic. Geneva: UNAIDS.UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2001. Human development report: 
nomic growth. Report to the United States Agency of International Development 
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tract 657-0025-C-00-3078-00. Bissau: USAID. UNEP/CBD. (2003). Composite report on the status and trends regarding the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities relevant to the con­
Devereux, S., & Fishe, M. (1993). An economic analysis of group-lending programs in servation and sustainable use of biodiversity. (UNEP/CBD/WG8J/3/INF/1). Wash­
developing countries. The Developing Economics, 31(1), pp. 102-121.
Ellis, F. (2000). Rural livelihoods and diversity in developing countries. Oxford: Oxford ington D.C.: United Nations Environmental Protection.
University Press. Van Duuren, B. (2004). Consultancy on institutional analysis in Cambodia, for the FAO 
Federal Office of Statistics. (1999). Poverty profile for Nigeria 1986-1999. Lagos: Fed­ Netherlands Partnership Programme (FNPP). Food security sub-theme 9: Enhanc­
eral Office of Statistics. ing the livelihoods o f the poorest. Rome: FAO.
Feld, S. (1981). The focused organization of social ties. American Journal o f Sociology World Bank. (1996). Nigeria: Poverty in the midst o f plenty. The challenge o f growth 
86(5), pp. 1015-1035. with inclusion. (A World Bank Poverty Assessment, Population and Human Re­
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ing Number 2). Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
IFAD. (2005). Achieving the millennium development goals: Rural investment and World Bank.
enabling policy discussion. Panel Discussion Paper IFAD Governing Council— Zeller, M., Sharma, M., Henry, C., & Lapenu, C. (2001). An operational tool for evaluat­
Twenty-Eighth Session, 16-17 February, 2005. ing poverty outreach o f development policies and projects. (Discussion Paper No. 111). Washington, D.C.: IFPRI.
UNIVERSITY OF IBA
AN LIBRARY
Chapter Twelve
Trade Liberalization and 
Employment in N igeria1
Olayinka Idowu Kareem
This chapter examines the effects of globalization measured by trade liberaliza­
tion on employment generation in Nigeria. Globalization is a multidimensional 
concept that encompasses economic, political, social, and cultural aspects of 
human endeavor. It finds that openness of the economy and liberalization of 
customs and excise duties tend to enhance job creation. However, the liberali­
zation of exchange rate and import duties enhance the level of unemployment 
through high cost of exports. Thus, the present trade liberalization is not em­
ployment enhancing. Hence, the chapter suggests a regulated trade liberaliza­
tion policy that protects the domestic producers for some period before totally 
opening the Nigerian borders for international competition. The implication of 
this is that Nigerian economy and Africa at large have not been fully integrated 
into the global economy, and adequate integration would depend on the rate at 
which the continent can be structurally and technologically transformed.
Introduction
The concept of globalization is multi-dimensional, as it encompasses political, 
social, economic, and cultural aspects of human endeavor. Different meanings 
have been given t<5 the concept of globalization depending on the way each 
author perceives it. However, the consensus is the freedom or non-barrier to 
goods and services across the border. This is also known as liberalization. Libe­
ralization is the breaking of barriers to the exchange o f things, be it economic, 
cultural, political, or social. The economic liberalization dimension to the issue
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Olayinka Idowu Kareem 151
of globalization deals with freedom in the movement o f goods and services lization on employment using Nigerian data. Apart from the above section, the 
across the borders o f the trading countries. This means that the barriers have review of literature shall be done in the second section. Section three presents 
been broken to allow for the exchange o f trade among trading parties. It is this the theoretical framework, while the fourth section talks about unemploy- 
free movement o f  tradable goods and services among countries that is known as ment/employment in Nigeria. Section five deals with the model and the empiri­
trade liberalization. * cal findings are given in section six. The last section concludes and gives policy 
However, this issue of globalization has generated three schools o f thought. implications.
The first is those that believe that globalization is the best thing that could hap­ »
pen to this world (Adewuyi, 2001; Omar, 1990). These benefits include access 
to modem technologies that are not available domestically, exchange o f fruitful Literature Review
ideas, and access to goods and services at a relatively cheaper rate to the domes­
tic economic. It encourages specialization and competitiveness, enhances mod­ There is no consensus definition o f globalization in the development literature. 
ernization, access to latest information, and frontier o f knowledge. They argued The concept o f globalization means different things to different people. Most 
that all these put together would enhance the economic activities in any country economists take globalization to mean the closer integration o f  economies 
and thereby accelerate economic growth and development. The second school through trade and the flow of factors. This allows a lot of interpretations on how 
believes that the advent o f globalization has really brought a lot more havoc than it could be measured. Some economic analysts believed that globalization is 
good to any economy (Asobie, 2001; Igudia, 2003). They argued that globaliza­ indicated by the relative commodity prices between trading nations.
tion tends to marginalize developing countries, particularly Africa, given the According to O ’Rourke and Williamson (2000), it is the convergence o f 
continent’s level o f  development (Magubane & Zeleza, 2003). Also, it encou­ relative prices that is know^ as the central manifestation o f globalization. While 
rages dumping o f  goods and services to countries that are not competitive, espe­ some used growth rate of trade and factor (but capital rather than labor) flows to 
cially those in the developing world. Also, it erodes one’s copyright privileges measure globalization, others take it to be economic liberalization, which en­
as people can use one’s work without giving adequate credence or acknowledg­ hances closer economic interactions, and even some set o f analysts gave a nar­
ment. It is also seen as encouraging the oppressor over the oppressed. The op­ rower definition to globalization as being the organization and governance of 
pressors in this case are the developed countries while the developing countries global production systems (Lall, 2002). Adewuyi (2003) takes globalization to 
are the oppressed. It is also observed that it discourages local production o f mean the process o f both vertical and horizontal integration that involved an 
goods and services, given that most developing countries’ goods cannot compete increased volume and variety of transnational transactions. Omar (1990) con­
favorably with those o f the advanced nations. Then, the domestic industries ceives globalization to mean the integration of the domestic economies via fi­
would be forced to go out o f business, thereby leading to massive retrenchment nancial and trade interactions, leading to the collapse of barriers to trade that 
and thus increasing unemployment levels in the country. Due to these facts, makes the domestic economics to be influenced by the policies o f other products 
some policy makers and analysts in the developing countries have been going through trade and investments. Igudia (2003) defines globalization as the union 
against the globalization o f their economies based on the facts that it has the o f  countries o f the world where the national economies are opened and the eco­
potential o f increasing the level o f unemployment, aggravating poverty, and then nomic activities were integrated with those of the international community, thus 
creating crises within the country (Asobie, 2001; Alao, 2007). representing a global village.
Furthermore, the last school of thought opines that globalization can have However, economic geographers take globalization as the shifts in the loca­
positive or negative effect, depending on the way each country introduces or tion o f  economic activity consequent upon shrinking economic distance. Outside 
accepts it (Ajayi, 2001; O ’Rourke & Williamson, 2000). Their argument is the discipline o f  economics, globalization has been defined in a variety o f  ways, 
based on the fact that while some countries have gained, others have not. For in which some take it to be synonymous with capitalism, multinational corpora­
instance, the Asian Tigers2 gained due to their own way o f introducing globali­ tions, and big business.
zation, which involves adequate transfer of knowledge and technology that Globalization simply entails the liberalization of the political and economic 
made their products able to compete favorably in global market. But in several aspects o f  human life in any country. The trade liberalization aspect o f  globali­
other developing countries, the reverse is the case as most o f their domestic zation would be the focus o f this chapter as it has a significant impact on the 
industries were not protected, thereby declining due to international competition, domestic economy, although it is agreed that export-oriented economies have 
which then lead to reduction in employment levels. performed better than the import-oriented economies in terms o f  standard of 
Therefore, given the aforementioned, the question that arises is, Does globa­ living, wages, and employment (Herzer et al., 2004).
lization reduce the level o f employment in developing countries? This question This does not say whether or not globalization has been good for growth 
leads us to the objective o f the chapter, which is to determine the effect o f  globa­ and employment in developing countries. The secret behind the Asian Tigers’
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1 5 2 1 rade Liberalization and Employment in Nigeria Olayinka Idowu Kareem 1 5 3
export success did not rest on passive liberalization, but that o f building domes­ bijities frontier. As the exportable sector is more labor-intensive than importa­
tic capacities and leveraging international markets and resources (Mathews & ble the change in the composition of employment increases the aggregate de­
Cho, 1999). There is sharp contrast between these countries’ experiences and mand for labor and reduces for capital. Consequently, the equilibrium real wage 
those o f many other countries that liberalized their economies without eventual­ rises and capital rental falls. Aggregate employment does not increase because 
ly achieving comparable growth in exports, incomes, or employment. In other labor supply is rigid, but the increase in wages encourages producers to adopt 
words, there is an important missing link in the conventional approach to globa­ more capital-intensive techniques in both sectors.
lization and employment. The forces o f globalization that are external, i.e., New trade theory, which was exemplified by Grossman and Helpman 
shrinking economic distance, mobile resources, and the like, only provide op­ (1990), takes technological differences, scale economies, and externalities into 
portunities for employment generation. The level at which poor countries utilize account. This theory makes use of more realistic assumptions than the H -O ; it 
these opportunities or not depends largely on their ability to mount policies does not produce unambiguous predictions for employment. To a large extent, 
geared toward competitiveness; these policies are often at variance with the the specific pattern o f  comparative advantage is indeterminate, and opening up 
liberalization associated with globalization, that is, the removal o f government to trade does not show how factor use will change. Once scale, agglomeration, 
from investment, technology flow, as well as international trade. externalities, and the like are introduced into the trade model, there arises the 
According to Stiglitz (1990) and Lall (2001), it is a well-acknowledged fact possibility o f multiple equilibrium. Thus, market might clear at a low level or 
that many successful so-called Asian Tiger economies did not liberalize their low growth equilibrium where developing countries specialize under free trade 
trade and FD1 policies, but rather used widespread interventions in capital, tech­ in low-technology, slow-growing activities. If, however, they can mount a con­
nology, and trade flows to enhance and promote competitiveness. Their trade creted strategy to develop the skill and technology base necessary, they could 
interventions provided a domestic base for building proficiency in export activi­ arrive at a higher-level equilibrium. In such conditions, the impact o f liberaliza­
ties and in reaping scale economies while FDI interventions were used to streng­ tion on employment depends on which equilibrium is reached, which depends in 
then the local technological base. Their export orientation was critical to the turn on government policy.
success of these interventions, as it provided the competitive spur needed to 
force the development of capabilities in protected industries (Lall, 2002).
Unemployment/Einployment Trends in Nigeria
Theoretical Framework Unemployment has been seen as a great problem to global economic develop­
ment. In recent years, both developed and developing countries have witnessed 
It is appropriate to apply trade theory to globalization and job creation given the the problem, though the developed countries have been curtailing the rate of 
fact that many analysts take globalization to be the rise in exports and imports their unemployment (Kareem, 2006). But, in developing countries, especially 
consequent upon trade liberalization. This narrow definition allows them to test that o f Africa, and Nigeria in particular, unemployment has been on a spiral 
with standard trade theories the impact o f  greater trade on the labor intensity o f  increase which has culminated into reduction in household income and standard 
production in the static comparative setting that characterizes most such theo­ of living, thus, increasing the level o f poverty.
ries. The relevant theory is the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model that was put for­ Employment generation has been seen as a means of alleviating poverty, 
ward by Heckscher and Ohlin (1933). The model deals with two factors o f  pro­ increasing the level o f economic activities, and thereby translating into econom­
duction— labor and capital—under the assumptions o f perfectly competitive ic growth. Employment can be defined as a situation where someone within the 
markets and identical production functions with freely available technologies labor force bracket willing and able to work engaged in a satisfactory economic 
across countries. This model shows that a rise in trade raises the demand for activity, or would otherwise be unemployed. There are many types o f unem­
labor-intensive products in poor, labor-surplus countries. This is commonly ployment in the literature ranging from frictional, to seasonal, cyclical, and 
taken to mean that in H-O all markets clear with macroeconomic equilibrium structural unemployment. The International Labor Organization (2001) identi­
and full employment throughout, a rise in trade can only cause an inter-sectoral fied unemployment among the youth in Africa and Nigeria in particular as a 
shift towards labor-intensive activities (so, higher wages), not greater employ­ major socio-economic problem.
ment. Furthermore, accbrding to Ariyo (2006), the level of employment is the 
Fitzgerald and Perosino (1995) note that the H-O model unambiguously avenue for any human being to make a decent living. The statistics of unem­
predicts the direction o f change of aggregate and sectoral employment and fac­ ployment in Nigeria between 1990 and 2004 is given in Figure 12.1 below. The 
tor prices. Output increases in the exportable sector and decreases in the import­ statistics show that unemployment in Nigeria has been on the high side, ranging 
able sector as instantaneous adjustment takes place along the production possi- from 30 percent in 1990 to 34 percent in 2004. It could also be seen that unem-
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN
LIBRARY
155
1 1  out Liucrauzauon and bmployment in Nigeria Olayinka Idowu Kareem
technology to the domestic economy. For instance, in the extractive industry, 
ployment rate in Nigeria has been consistently high even though it may show especially the oil and gas sector of the Nigerian economy, most of the technical 
some decline, which is worrisome despite the inflow o f foreign capital into the expertise that is used in the operations are provided by foreigners. The issue of 
country. domestic contents that have the potentials o f creating many employments are not 
considered.
Figure 12.1: Unemployment Rate in Nigeria (%) Figure 12.2: Tqtal Foreign Private Capital in Nigeria (in mil­
lions of Naira)
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (2006)
year
Figure 12.3: Total Unemployment Rate and Inflow of Foreign 
Source: World Development Indicator (2007) Capital
On the contrary, the inflow of foreign private capital to Nigeria in 1990 was 
about N10.5 billion, and by 2000, it has gotten to over N16 billion. In 2004, 
inflow of foreign capital has increased to over N20 billion (see Figure 12.2 and 
Figure 12.3 below). These statistics show that Nigeria has been experiencing 
increases in the inflow o f foreign capital to the economy; however, this has not 
been translating into an increase in employment to the generality o f the people. 
Given this, we are tempted to ask, What kind o f  foreign capitals are brought to 
Nigeria?
The simplest answer to this question is that most o f these foreign invest­
ments or capital that were brought to Nigeria came with their manpower and year
technical expertise, which gives little opportunity for the majority o f Nigerians 
to be gainfully employed and at the same time, did not allow the transfer of Source: World Development Indicator (2004)
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
156 Trade Liberalization and Employment in Nigeria Otayinka Idowu Karecm 157
Methodology order to control for this shortcoming that might arise from the ADF test, we make use of another unit root test called Phillips-Perron (PP) that is developed 
by Perron (1997). According to Herzer et al. (2004), this test evaluates the time 
This chapter set up an econometric model to test the long-running relationship series properties in the presence of structural changes at unknown point in time 
between globalization (measured by trade liberalization) and employment. We and, thus, endogenizes this structural break. The specification goes thus:
used import duty (IMPD), custom and excise duty (CED), exchange rate (EXC), 
and level o f openness (OPN) to measure trade liberalization, while the labor 
force participation rate was used as an index o f employment. We used annual T { f o - r 0t  se(x )(  7 ^
time series from 1970 to 2004. The sources o f these data are from the National L  = L (3)
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), CBN Statistical Bulletin, and World Development Wfo2 2 / 0̂
Indicator (WDI). A A
What we shall first do under the methodology is to specify the multiple Where oc is the estimate, and tK is the t-ratio of cc,se(cc) is the coefficient 
regression model that shows the effect o f globalization on employment. This standard error, and s is the standard error of the regression test. Also, y0 is a 
chapter draws from that o f Riddel and Schwer (2003) which tries to determine consistent estimate o f the error variance, while f 0 is the estimate o f the residual 
the relationship between employment growth and innovative capacity. There­ spectrum at frequency zero.
fore, this chapter specifies the following multiple regression equation using Thus, after testing for the stationarity or otherwise of the time series, the 
annual data for the natural logarithm o f the variables: next step is to test whether these time series can be used together to give mea­
InLFPR = oto+ a|InCED,+ a2InlMPD, + a3InOPN,+ a4lnEXC, + p ,------- (1) ningful results in the long run, and this is derived through the cointegration test. 
Where LFPR is the labor force participation rate, CED is the custom and excise This chapter shall be using the Johansen cointegration test, which was developed 
duty, IMPD is import duty, OPN is the level o f openness in the economy, while by Johansen (1995) rather than that of Engle-Granger (1987). The reason for this 
EXC is the exchange rate. Oq is the constant and a,. a2- a3 a4 are the coefficients, is that Engle-Granger usually estimates the regression equation and tests the 
while p, is the stochastic or error term. residuals for stationarity, which might be biased. Apart from that, it assumes one 
Theoretically, there is no exact consensus on the relationship that might cointegrating vector in the systems with more than two variables, and lastly it 
exist when an economy is liberalized (economic globalization) and the employ­ assumes arbitrary normalization of the cointegrating vector. Given these short­
ment rate. While some policy makers argue that liberalization would bring about comings of the Engle-Granger cointegration test, we specify the full information 
a reduction in the level o f employment, especially when the domestic firm’s maximum likelihood (FIML) cointegration approach developed by Johansen 
products cannot compete favorably with the imported ones. Others believe it (1995). This approach is based on the vector autoregressive model (VAR (p)) 
will enhance the level of employment in the domestic economy as the producers given as follows:
of the imported products would be encouraged to start producing the imported 
products locally, which will generate employment. y ,  =  A y ,-1 + ••  • + A Py , - P +  Bx, + * , w
Prior to testing for the direction o f causality between the time series, the Where y, is a K  -vector of non-stationary 1(1) variables, x, is the d-vector of 
first step is to check the stationarity o f the variables used in the models. The deterministic variables, and i  t is a vector of innovations. The VAR can be re­
purpose o f  this test is to establish whether the time series have a stationary trend, 
and, if  non-stationary, to show order o f  integration. The Augmented Dickey written letting Ay, = y ,  —y,_i
FAuyll, er=  (cAcDF) unit root test shall b e+  used to test the stationarity o f all the time series that will be used in this chapter. ADF eq u+at i•o•n goes thus:y t i + x ts + P A y ,- \ M y ,-2 ••+P £ y ,- P + K (2)
Ay, = n  y,_, + X r .Ay,-t + Bx, + 1, (5)
Where x, is the exogenous regressor, such as intercept and tiipe trend, while a, p i-l
and 8  are the parameters to be estimated and V, is the error term that is assumed w h e re
to be the white noise. The null hypothesis for the unit not is that H0: a =1 and the 4
alternative hypothesis is H,: a < 1.
However, due to the probability of structural changes that might have oc­ n = Z4-I. r^-±At
curred in the time period covered by the chapter, the ADF test might be biased i-l _/=/+!
in identifying data as being integrated even if there are structural changes. In This approach asserts that if the coefficient matrix FI has reduced rank z  < K ,
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
158 Trade Liberalization and Employment in Nigeria Olayinka Idowu Kareem 159
then we can have K X T  matrices ccand J3each with rank r such that O  =oc Empirical Results
P and /? 'y , is I (0). Given this, r is the number o f cointegrating relations, i.e., We begin our empirical analysis by showing the degree of association between 
the cointegrating rank, and each J3column is the cointegrpting vector. It should trade liberalization (as measured by CED, OPN, IMPD, and EXC), and em­
be noted that the element o f cc s are called adjustment parameters in the vector ployment through the multiple regression analysis. Table 12.1 depicts the result 
error correction (VEC) model, while the unrestricted VAR is used to estimate of the ordinary least square (OLS), and it shows that statistically significant 
the above f l  matrix. positive relationships exist between labor force participation rate (InLFPR) and 
custom and excise duty, as well as level o f openness in the economy. This 
Furthermore, another test involved the treatment o f  error term in the test means that the more the level of liberalization o f custom and excise duty, the 
above as equilibrium error, thus it uses this error term to tie the short-run beha­ higher would be the level of employment in the country. That is, as government 
vior o f the InLFPR to its long-run value. This test is called error correction puts its hands off the custom and excise duties, it will allow free flow of goods 
model (ECM), which was popularized by Engle and Granger (1987). The speci­ and services, including technology that would then increase the level o f econom­
fication goes thus: ic activities in the country and thereby increase the level o f  employment and 
AlnLFPR, —Qq + o[ IKET>iA M XPDt_x + q E > C ^ q ln O P N + q  ECT, , +£, income. Also, if the country throws its borders open, there will be inflow of 
(6) investments, which will increase the level o f domestic productivity and thereby 
A translate to higher employment rate. As it could be seen in Table 12.1 below, a Where is the first difference and ECT,.| is the error correction term lagged by negative relationship exists between exchange rate, import duties, and employ­
one period while £ t is the error term. ment.
The Granger causality approach shall be used to test the direction of causali­ The reason is that as the country liberalizes exchange rate and import duty, 
ty between globalization and employment in Nigeria. This approach tests imported products become less expensive which encourages more imports, and 
whether one variable, say x, causes another variable, say y , so as to ascertain to the export sector will witness low productivity as well as the domestic industries 
what extent the current value o fy  can be explained by its previous values alone since they cannot compete favorably with foreign products, which is due to their 
and to check whether the inclusion of the lagged values of.v can improve the marginalization in global trade. This will lead to retrenchment or layoff of staff 
explanation. Granger (1969) asserts that is said to be Granger caused by x  if.r that would aggravate the unemployment rate, which often leads to crises of 
helps in the prediction ofy. different kinds. The autonomous variables show that if the country does not 
In other words, x  Granger causes y  if  only its lagged values are statistically globalize— that is, restrict inflow and outflow of goods and services— there will 
significant. This approach is preferred to the correlation method that is some­ still be an increase in the employment level given the value of the constant, 
times used in the literature, given the fact that correlation does not necessarily which is 3.7405. The implication of this is that even if Nigeria did not embrace 
imply causation in any meaningful sense o f the word. There are several magnifi­ globalization as it is, which has made the country dependent on the advanced 
cent correlations, which are simply spurious or meaningless in econometric countries, the country will still be better off.
analysis. From Table 12.1, the degree o f  responsiveness of job creation to custom 
We specify the Granger causality equation o f the form: and excise duties as well as openness is 0.0175 and 0.0152, respectively. This 
n n indicates that for every 1 percent liberalization of CED, there will be about 1.8 
Y, = a i  + 'Y J a X , - ,  + Y J P y ‘- j  + U .----------------(6 ) percent jo b  openings, and also for every 1 percent increase in openness of the 
< = i  y = t country’s border, there will be 1.5 percent rise in the level of job creation in the 
n n country. However, the responsiveness of job opportunities to 1 percent exchange 
X , =  b i +  '*T  X ,X i - • + S ,Y j ___________(7) rate liberalization is a reduction in the level o f job openings by 0.1 percent, l = l 1=1 though it is statistically insignificant. But, for every I percent import duty libera­
Where the Y and X represent employment and globalization, respectively. It is lization, there will be a statistically significant 2.9 percent reduction in the level 
assumed that the disturbances U„ and U2l are uncorrelated. The F-statistic is o f jo b  creation.
used for the joint test o f the hypothesis that: The coefficient o f determination (R2) indicates that about 88 percent of the 
In equation (6) cti = a 2 = - -  - = an= 0  and 8, = 52 = —  = 8n = 0 in equation (7). changes in the level of employment in the country are caused by the indices of 
globalization. The joint significance of the model, F-statistic, which is 52.2179, 
shows that the model is statistically significant to the chapter and can really 
explain the reason for the changes in the level o f job openings in the country.
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1 6 0 Trade Liberalization and Employment in Nigeria Olayinka Idowu Kareem 1 6 1
Given this result, it is necewssea ry to test its reliability— that is, whether it is not a spurious regression. This have done through the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) stationarity test. Table 12.4: Johansen’s Cointegration Test
Table 12.1: Multiple Regression Result Hvnothesis Trace Test Statistic
Null Alternative Statistic critical value 5%
| Variable Coefficient T-statistic Prob R2 = .878l R = 0 r - 1 97.9778 87.31
C 3.7405 133.5304 0.0000 Adj R2 = 0.8613 R<I r =2 64.6981 62.99
InLCED 0.0175 2.1287 0.0419 S.E = 0.0095 R<2 r = 3 39.1917 42.44
LnEXC -0.0013 -0.4441 0.6602 F.Stat = 52.2179 R <3 r = 4 20.6221 25.35
InIMP -0.0297 -4.1523 0.0003 Prob(F-Stat) = 0.0000 R<4 r = 5 8.8728 12.25
InOPN 0.0152 2.9811 0.0058 D. Watson = 1.8505
Source: Computed
Source: Computed
Table 12.2 above shows that all the time series that were used in this chap­
ter are stationary at their first difference—that is, they are integrated of order 
Table 12.2: ADF Test one, i.e., 1(1) variables, except that o f InLFPR that is integrated o f order two, i.e. 
1(2). We got the same result for the Phillip-Perron stationarity test, which then 
First Second indicates that there is no influence of structural break in the model (see the dia­
Variable Level Difference Difference Integration Order gram o f the variables trend at the appendix). Thus, given the fact that most o f 
InCED -2.2957 -7.2812 - KD these variables are 1(1) variables, we need to know whether using them together 
InEXC -2.2874 -5.5375 - 1(1) in the model would yield reliable results through the cointegration test.
InIMPD -2.2983 -4.7021 - KD Table 12.4 also above shows the result of the Johansen cointegration test. It 
InOPN -2.4118 -3.7854 - KD shows that the time series are above the critical value o f 5 percent at two levels, 
InLRPR -0.2992 -1.6806 -5.7075 KD meaning that we have two co-integrating vectors (or equations) at that level o f  
significance. Since the variables are cointegration, then there would be no loss 
Source: Computed of information, implying that there exists a long-run relationship between globa­
lization and the level o f job creation.
Note: The 5% critical value fo r  AD F Statistic approximately is -3.5530, while The parsimonious results confirm what we got in the multiple regression 
-3.557 and -3.6220 are fo r  the first and second difference, respectively. above that the short-run changes in InCED and InOPN have a statistically signif­
icant positive effect on job creation as measured by InFPR, while InIMPD and 
Table 12.3: Phillips-Perron Stationarity Test InEXC have a significant negative effect on InLFPR. Thus, the coefficient o f 
ECT(-l) that is the degree of adjusted shows that about -0.7536 o f the differenc­
First Second es between the actual and the long-run, or equilibrium value o f job openings 
Variable Level Difference Difference Integration Order (InLFPR) is eliminated or adjusted each period (see Table 12.5). However, the 
InCED -2.2339 -7.2654 - Id) speed of adjustments from the short-run disequilibrium to equilibrium in the 
InIMPD -1.8064 -4.6691 - KD present period is 75 percent, and it is statistically significant, which justifies the 
InOPN -2.4463 -6.5431 - KD use o f the error correction model in the chapter.
MnEXC -2.2516 -5.6267 - l i f i ) Furthermore, it is appropriate to know the direction o f  causality between 
InLRPR 1.7845 -1.6041 -5.8565 id) globalization and employment. The Granger causality test results shed light on 
this, by using the lag specification as obtained from the EVIEWS.
Source: Computed
Note: The 5% critical value fo r  AD F Statistic approximately is -3.5530, while 
-3.557 and -3.6220 are fo r  the first and second difference, respectively.
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162 Trade Liberalization and Employment in Nigeria Olayinka Idowu Kareem 163
Table 12.5: Parsimonious ECM The interesting thing to note from these results is that the two variables, 
InCED and InOPN, that have positive relationship with job  creation Granger did 
I Variable Coefficient T-Statistics L : Prob not cause it, while those that have negative relationship, InIMPD and InEXC, 
C 3.7319 1256.89 0.0000 * Adj R2 = 0.9986 Granger caused job creation. This means that the globalization (trade liberaliza­
InCED (-1) 0.0186 23.9627 0.0000 S.E. =0.0009 tion) indices that have more influence on job creation level in Nigeria are the 
Akaike = - exchange rate liberalization and that o f  import duty liberalization. Thus, g lobali­
InIMPD (-1) -0.0303 -44.949 0.0000 11.0611 zation through trades liberalization as practiced in Nigeria has adverse effect on 
Schwarz = - the level o f  job creation in the country, given the fact that most o f the industrial 
INOPN (-1) 0.0162 32.6606 0.0000 10.7405 products cannot compete favorably with their imported counterparts. The same 
F.Stat. = thing can also be said o f other countries in Africa, because many o f the countries 
InEXC (-1) -0.0017 -3.3997 0.0023 3733.846 on the continent cannot compete favorably with their foreign counterpart, which 
Prob(F.Stat) = 
InEXC (-2) 0.0012 2.2566 makes them inferior partners in global trade.0.033 0.0000
ECM (1) -0.7536 59.3493 0.0000
Source: Computed Conclusion and Policy Implications
The principal objective o f this chapter is to determine the effect o f  globalization 
Table 12.6: Pairwise Granger Causality Test job  creation in Nigeria. Econometric techniques have been applied in order to 
determine this relationship. The literature shows that different arguments have 
| Null Hypothesis Obs F-Statistic been put forward on the impact o f globalization on the level o f  employment in Probability Decision
InCLD does not Granger cause InLFPR 32 1.1707 0.3254 any country. Some believe that the relationship is positive, while others argue Accept
InLEPR does not Granger cause InCED 4.0301 0.0294 that it is negative. Though, globalization (as measured in this chapter as eco­Reject
InEXC does not Granger cause InLFPR 32 5.0476 0.0137 Reject nomic liberalization) has it pros and cons, this chapter tends to find out what is 
InLFPR does not Granger cause InEXC 2.5067 0.1003 Accept its effect on the job creation level in Nigeria.
InIMPD does not Granger cause InLFPR 32 0.9230 0.4095 Accept Given the econometric analysis used in this chapter, we found out that g lo­
InLFPR does not Granger cause InIMPD 4.7866 0.0166 Reject balization has been hampering on the level o f job creation in the country, though 
InOPN does not Granger cause InLFPR 32 2.6639 0.0879 Accept we have two very important variables that gave this indication, exchange rate 
InCED does not Granger cause InOPN 1.4148 0.2604 Accept and import duty. But the outcome o f our analysis shows that the effect o f  ex­
change rate is not significant, while that o f import duty liberalization is the most 
Source: Computed significant that hindered the job creation level. This is reasonable because if 
there is increase in the liberalization o f  the import duty, there would be inflow o f 
In Table 12.6 above, the result shows that for the Granger causality between all sorts o f products in the country, thereby turning the economy into a dum ping 
InCED and InLFPR, the causality is from InLFPR to InCED, i.e. InLFPR —► ground. This will greatly affect the productivity level of domestic industries and 
InCED. This is, custom and excise duty does not Granger cause job  creation but in turn the level at which the economy can create jobs. If jobs are not provided 
job  creation Granger cause custom and excise duty. The second hypothesis’test for the citizenry, it might aggravate crises through youth restiveness, and this 
shows that exchange rate Granger cause job creation (InLFPR), while job  crea­ could be seen in the Niger Delta area o f  the country.
tion does not Granger cause exchange rate, that is, InEXC — InLFPR. This Thus, this chapter concludes that globalization as measured by trade libera­
means that there is unidirectional causality from InEXC to InLFPR The Gran­ lization is not job creation/employment-enhancing given the current economic 
ger causality between InIMPD and InLFPR indicates that there is unidirectional situation in the country. Therefore, caution should be made to the rate at which 
causality from InIMPD to InLFPR, i.e. InMPD -  InLFPR. This means that it is the country is going by its trade liberalization policy, if it is to achieve a rise in 
import duty that Granger cause import duty. While for the causality between the level of job creation. This could also be inferred for other African countries, 
InLFPR and InOPN, we found that there is independent causality among them. since the continent is greatly marginalized in global trade.
This indicates that as job creation does not Granger cause openness so also The policy implication o f  our results is that if care is not taken, the produc­
openness does not cause job creation. tivity o f the domestic industries might be falling, which will affect the rate o f 
job openings, income, poverty, and the country’s gross national product. There-
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164 Trade Liberalization and Employment in Nigeria Olayinka Idowu Kareem 165
fore, to correct this likely problem(s) o f globalization, Nigeria, and by extension 
Africa, should make efforts to regulate the kind o f trade liberalization policy Herzer, D., Nowak-Lehmann, F., & Siliverstovs, B. (2004). Export-led growth in Chile: 
they would adopt, especially pertaining to import duty, so as to bring the desired Assessing the role of export composition in productivity growth. Retrieved May 10, 
outcomes. Thus, we recommend regulated trade liberalization for the country. 2009, from www.igi.wiwi.uni-goettingen.de.
Igudia, P. (2003). Globalization and economic development: Nigeria’s experience and 
prospects. Paper presented at the 44,h NES Conference, Ibadan, Nigeria.
ILO. (2001). World employment report 2001: Life at work in the information economy 
Notes Geneva: International Labour Organisation.
Johansen, S. (1995). Likelihood-based inference in cointegrated vector autoregressive 
1. I want to thank Mrs. Fatima Olanike Kareem and our son Farouq Olamide Ka- models. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Singapore, and Taiwan. These countries recorded exceptionally high growth rates and of Nigerian Economics Society (NES), Calabar, Nigeria.
rapid industrial development in the early 1960s and 1990s. Lai I, S. (2001). Competitiveness, technology and skills. Cheltenham: Edward Eiger.
Lall, S. (2002). The employment impact of globalization. QEH Working Paper Series 93,
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C h a p t e r  T h ir t e e n
Globalization, Poverty, and the 
Failure of States in Africa:
Is There a Connection?
Olalekan Emmanuel Obademi
This chapter attempts to connect three issues: globalization, poverty, and state 
collapse. It focuses on globalization and the obvious endemic poverty in some 
African countries as it relates to trade, migration, and technology transfer, and 
examines how these have led to the failure of nation-states on the continent. As 
much as one cannot downplay the benefits of globalization in the light of evi­
dence from countries like China, India, Malaysia, and so on, evident as signifi­
cant reduction in poverty levels occasioned by enhanced access to markets and 
factor mobility among others, we must not lose sight of the dangers of cultural 
and institutional homogenization due to globalization. In addition, unbalanced 
trade relationships, imported terrorism, and other social vices are negative sides 
of globalization. In the concluding part of this chapter, relevant recommenda­
tions are made that can help shape global policy thrusts of developed nations 
and the less developed ones in order to maximize and spread the gains of glob­
alization.
Introduction
The word globalization has been defined by many people and organizations. 
These definitions have emphasized different issues. Globalization is defined by 
the OECD (1993) as the process by which markets and production in different
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
168 Globalization, Poverty, and the Failure of States in Africa Olalekan Emmanuel Obademi 169
countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to the dynamics of trade technological change, market forces, environmental factors, reduced transporta­
in goods and services and the flows o f capital and technology. Globalization has tion and distributional cost, distributed risk, the media, and the spread o f the 
also been defined by the World Bank as the enhancement o f  worldwide interde­ English language.
pendence and the general awareness o f deepening global connections. It is the Globalization has diverse economic, political, social, and cultural effects on 
growing integration of economies and societies. It is the growth o f worldwide all nations of the world, though in varying degrees. The popularity of economic 
networks of interdependence including the large-scale operation o f finance and globalization is traceable to the emergence of the global economic order her­
business on a world scale irrespective o f national borders. alded by an economic conference held in Bretton Woods, New England. It is 
Globalization entails the dismantling o f international trade barriers, invest­ important to say that there is the suspicion that all the effects o f globalization 
ment regulations, foreign exchange controls, and removing barriers to labor will in one way or another contribute to the failure o f states if they are not prop­
mobility. It is instructive to point out that though the word globalization has erly managed.
recently gained popularity in its usage, the features that characterize globaliza­
tion had been prevalent at different periods o f world history.
As reported in a World Bank Report (2002), the first wave o f what is re­ The Benefits of Globalization
ferred to as modem globalization was between 1870 and 1914 with significant 
migration of people from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to Europe and North Scholars who support the current wave of globalization have highlighted the 
America. This first wave o f globalization resulted in the relocation o f 10 percent benefits o f globalization, which cannot be denied. These benefits include:
o f  the world population permanently. One striking feature o f  globalization is the 
migration of people from one location to another. The second wave o f globaliza­ a. more efficient resource allocation or what is generally referred to as allo­
tion was between 1950 and 1980, characterized by mobility among citizens of cative efficiency;
Europe, Japan, and North America as a consequence of increased economic b. the possibility ofthe development of financial markets;
opportunities in these countries. c. increased flow of capital to developing countries;
It is interesting to note, however, that the recent wave of globalization d. the prospects of increased international trade;
which started in the early 1980s has a momentum that surpasses the aforemen­ e. enhanced access to global markets for the sale of goods and services;
tioned waves. This momentum is not unconnected with the breakthrough re­ f. enhanced political understanding among nations of the world; and
corded in information and communication technology that has turned the world g. poverty reduction.
to a global village. New technology has shrunk distances.
The momentum o f the recent globalization has been accentuated also by the The issue o f poverty reduction as a major benefit of globalization has taken 
increasing regionalization of different parts of the world. It is on record that the center stage because all the benefits o f  globalization should ultimately add up to 
Maastricht Treaty with the completion of the European Single Market propelled a better standard of living most especially since the definition of poverty now 
the vision of the United Europe that facilitated the idea o f a unified currency embraces far more than economic or monetary considerations to include issues 
known as the Euro. of having a political voice, equitable distribution of social amenities, better 
On the African continent also, the emergence o f the African Union being access to markets, etc. Many researchers have laid emphasis on how well global­
the result of the reorganization of the Organisation of African Unity has helped ization has resulted in poverty reduction.
in advancing the new wave of globalization. Even within the African and Asian Researches have shown that globalization has resulted in poverty reduction 
continents, sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community o f West in China, India, and Malaysia. The number of extremely poor people in open 
African States (ECOWAS), the South African Preferential Treatment Trade economies of Asia otherwise known as the new globalizers has declined by 120 
Area (PTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have million between 1993 and 1998 (World Bank, 2002). This is evident as signifi­
resulted in massive movement of people and capital across national borders. cant increases in access to education, better health, and better employment op­
Regionalization essentially is the mid-way dimension o f the move towards glob­ portunities, among others, have been recorded. It is also in literature and af­
alization. firmed in the World Bank Policy Research Report in 2002 that as a result o f 
globalization, developing countries’ exports have risen significantly by almost 
Though there is the view that regionalization being pursued by different 
geographical blocks is one way nations within the same block try to maximize 80 percent between 1980 and 1998 (World Bank, 2002).
the benefits inherent in globalization, it has nonetheless energized the wave of This positive result seems to be consistent with the effects of the first wave 
globalization. On the whole, globalization has been enhanced and is still being o f globalization which took place from 1870 to 1914 and had the resultant effect 
driven by some forces and phenomena among which are competitive advantage, o f exports being doubled to 8 percent from an earlier figure while foreign capital tripled relative to income in developing countries o f Africa, Asia, and Latin
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
170 Globalization, Poverty, and the Failure of States in Africa Olalekan Emmanuel Obademi 171
America. With the latest wave o f globalization the more globalized developing Currently in 2009, about one-fifth o f the world population lives on less than 
countries have succeeded in increasing their per capita growth rate from 3 per­ a dollar per day, and the bulk o f people in this category are in Africa. Globaliza­
cent in 1970s, to 4 percent in 1980s, to 5 percent in the 1990s. tion that has expressed itself in regional integration in most parts o f the world 
A notable aspect o f the benefits of globalization as it concerns poverty re­ has adversely affected poor countries and their people. The rate o f collapse of 
duction is the issue o f  remittances by migrants. Remittances from migrants who businesses in the first few years o f integration due to competition has always 
moved from developing countries to developed economies have helped in im­ resulted in the loss ofjpbs. Studies in Colombia, Chile, and Morocco after liber­
proving the welfare o f  their people in their countries of origin since they have alization showed a hijh  rise o f “churning” entry and exit of firms with the resul­
the privilege of earning better income in their new locations. tant effect o f high labor turnover.
Studies have shown that migrants from Mexico earning $31 per week at On the global scene, the reduction in tariff by developing countries ought to 
home started earning $278 per week on relocating to the United States of Amer­ improve trade relations between them and developed nations but this is not usu­
ica. Consequent upon the new wave o f globalization, there has been a rise from ally so because many developed countries still put up barriers to limit the entry 
25 percent to 80 percent in labor-intensive manufactures from countries such as of products from less-developed countries. Globalization tends to promote and 
India, Indonesia, Turkey, Morocco, and China. In addition there has been an protect the idea o f global standards, which may work against the welfare of 
increase in the export o f  services from 9 percent to 17 percent. developing countries. Worse still is the fact that when people from the develop­
ing countries migrate to the developed ones, the economic opportunities open to 
them as jobs and investment are discriminatory and below their skills, hence 
Globalization, Debt, and Poverty they are often under-employed and may not be able to send reasonable remit­
tances to their dependents in their home countries. The negative effects o f the 
Globalization was earlier seen generally as beneficial because o f its possibility globalization of finance has become obvious with the loss of jobs in Africa 
of fostering greater interdependence among nations and facilitating freer flow of arising from the global financial crisis that started in the Unites States o f Amer­
international trade, capital, information, and competition. However, this is not ica that has been transmitted to different nations of the world. The weakness of 
absolutely true in the real sense of it, judging from the balance o f evidence. The supervision in Africa has made its impact more severe as evident in the crash of 
increasing debt situation o f  many developing countries especially in Africa has the prices o f quoted stocks.
given reason for serious concern. Consequently, there have been hues and cries 
over whom and which countries globalization will ultimately benefit.
There have been those that believe and affirm that globalization expressed Table 13.1: External Debt of Selected Countries ($ Million)
as a global marketplace tend to widen inequality among nations. At issue is the 
fact that unfair competition and inequality existing in the lopsided trade relation­ Country 1990 2003
ship have caused the situation o f “unequal partners, unequal rewards,” and have Burundi 907 1,310
also led to the precarious debt condition in many developing countries. There is Chad 528 1,499
the widespread view that Africa’s contemporary socio-political and economic Cote d’Ivoire 17,251 12,187
distress is accentuated by the current globalization regime which has also been Ethiopia 8,630 7,151
aggravated by the aggressive international imperialism of trade and money. Nigeria 33,439 34,963Republic of Congo 10,259 11,170
The control o f  global resources and o f the international produce markets, Sierra Leone 1,196 1,612
price fixing, and significant subsidy of the rich nation’s domestic products have Somalia 2,370 2,838
continued to ensure the underdevelopment of Africa. The case is such that Sudan 14,762 17,496
whether it is farm produce, fossil fuels, solid minerals, Africa has always had to 
play catch-up and second fiddle and thus recording unfavorable balance of pay­ Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005.
ments and subsequently a high debt overhang. As a consequence of this sce­
nario, Africa has always had the lowest share of global wealth.
The malfunctioning of the global system and institutions has resulted in a This disadvantaged position of most African countries has resulted in con­
situation whereby, while world trade for countries in Europe, the United States, tinuous increase in the figure of their human poverty index as well as the debt 
China, and Japan are increasing, it is declining for African countries. This trans­ profile (see Table 13.1, Table 13.2, and Table 13.3). The debt problem made it 
lates into uneven development evident as a continuous rise in the living stan­ difficult for most of these countries to have resources sufficient enough for the
dards of the rich at the expense of many African countries.
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1 7 2 Globalization, Poverty, and the Failure of States in Africa Olalekan Emmanuel Obademi 1 7 3
provision o f basic social services. The figures of the external debt o f some of Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Mignel et al. (2004), Do and Iyer 
these countries and other associated issues highlighted below are quite instruc­ (2007b, p. 2) found that poorer countries face a greater risk o f  civil war.
tive.
Table 13.4: People Living on Less Than S2 a Day (%)
Table 13.2: External Debt as Percentage of GNP Rcsion 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001
China 88.1 78.5 67.4 72.6 68.1 53.4 50.1 46.7
East Asia & Pacific 84.4 76.6 67.7 69.9 64.8 53.3 50.3 47.4
South Asia 89.1 87.2 86.7 85.5 84.5 81.7 78.1 77.2
Sub-Sahara Africa 73.3 76.1 76.1 75.0 74.6 75.1 76.1 76.6
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005.
Source: World Bank, Annual Report, 1997
Globalization, Crime, and War
Table 13.3: Regional Poverty Estimates (people living on less Understandably, a significant feature of globalization is the migration o f  people 
than SI a day) (millions) from one location to the other, and incidentally this has not been lacking in the 
various waves o f globalization. As at year 2006, the number o f people living 
| Region 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 outside their country of birth was estimated to be over 180 million or 3 percent 
China 634 425 308 375 334 212 223 212 of the world population (World Bank, 2006).
1 Hast Asia & Pacific 796 562 426 472 415 287 282 271 This movement has serious impact in the form of social, economic, cultural, 
South Asia 475 460 473 462 476 461 429 431 and political challenges it poses on the source and destination countries. On a 
Sub-Sahara Africa 164 198 219 227 242 271 ' 294 313 positive note, Yang and Martinez (2006) found that an increase in remittances 
leads to a reduction in migrants’ household poverty in the Philippines as it has 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005. done in many other migrants’ countries. However, in the destination countries, it 
has induced social and civil unrest due to the resistance often put up against 
As a result o f poverty, marginalized countries in the globalization trend migrants by nationals of the destination countries with regard to migrants’ un­
stand the risk o f internal conflict. For example, Quy-Toan Do and Lakshmi Iyer hindered access to social and economic benefits.
(2007a) examined civil war in Nepal and found that poverty is the biggest de­ Another dimension to the issue o f crime and war is that more often, rich 
terminant o f whether a district will experience conflict. This is quite true also for terrorists recruit poor and vulnerable people to join in the execution o f their 
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, among many other African countries. They esti­ terrorist acts with promise of financial gains. This has played itself out in Soma­
mate that from 1996 to 2004 that a 10 percent increase in poverty is associated lia, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone. Also the reduction in barriers, which is a key 
with 24 additional conflict-related deaths in a district. In contrast, variables issue in globalization, has led to easier acquisition of arms and ammunitions 
measuring social divisions such as caste polarization or linguistic fractionaliza- gotten at very cheap rates due to the activities of unscrupulous businessmen and 
tion do not have a significant association with conflict intensity, suggesting that smugglers.
support for conflict comes from economically deprived areas and not mainly In addition, the increased connections between nations have resulted in the 
from social divisions. \ movement of hard drugs from one part of the world to the other with its atten­
Since 1945, over 70 poverty-induced civil wars have broken out in different dant consequences. The ease at which funds can be transferred from one part o f 
parts o f  the world resulting in about 20 million deaths and displacing over 65 the world through electronic means being a major future o f  globalization has 
million people. In the same vein, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) stated that control­ further increased the crime rate even in developing economies.
ling other factors, higher dependence on primary commodity export, which is a While it is true that at some point in time globalization has resulted in the 
major feature o f most poor African countries, increases the risk o f conflict very rise o f developing countries’ exports, this has not translated into better standards 
substantially. Citing cross-country studies by scholars, including Collier and of living for the people of these countries due to official corruption in high 
places. Interesting though quite unfortunate, corrupt government officials and
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174 Globalization, Poverty, and the Failure of States in Africa Olalekan Emmanuel Obademi 175
businessmen have accomplices in developed countries. The result o f this is capi­ to their neighbors. Nation-states that are unable to perform certain minimal 
tal flight while the nations shortchanged are denied the needed resources that functions for the security and well-being of their citizens are generally classified 
would have been used to move their economies forward. In some instances, as failed states. These states often have weak institutions, high debt profile, high 
many interventions in form o f aids to developing countries are not delivered but poverty rate, and as such, many o f them fall under the Low Income Countries 
redirected back to the developed economies, and in cases where they are deliv­ Under Stress (LICUS). Now as it relates to Africa, many conflicts have been 
ered, they are usually not delivered in full. linked to clashes between migrants and local nationals in countries like Ethiopia, 
As a consequence o f globalization, there has been an increase in foreign- Sierra Leone, and Rwanda.
induced crisis in Africa in countries like Niger Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Chad, From the figures earlier presented on the tables above and taking a good 
Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and even Liberia. Another angle to the problem caused look at the features o f fragile and failed states and the fact that many o f the 
by globalization is that in order to reap the benefits o f  globalization which bene­ countries highlighted had at one time or another been classified as a fragile state 
fited land owners in Ethiopia and Congo, there were sharp contests for available and in some cases failed states, one cannot help but see the linkage between 
lands resulting in conflicts. The lopsided land ownership, though traced to many globalization, poverty, and state failure.
years o f  misrule, has continued to be a reason for continuous crisis in these Apart from poverty, there are, however, other factors that encourage crisis 
countries. in developing countries. For example, in Sudan there has been continuous resis­
tance to the effects o f cultural change that globalization is putting up. In many 
other African countries, including Nigeria, there is the subtle resistance to cul­
Globalization, Poverty, War, and Failure of States tural and institutional homogenization that globalization portends. While a seg­
ment o f the society tries to embrace Western civilization and education, another 
Although the pains o f  World War I and World War II are behind us, the lessons segment resists vehemently the influence of Western civilization and education 
o f  those experiences should not be forgotten if global peace is to be achieved. thereby causing social tensions that have in many cases snowballed into major 
Taking into consideration the first wave o f  globalization between 1870 and 1914 conflicts. For example, there were reported cases o f parents withdrawing their 
with the migration and mass relocation o f  people from one place to the other, children from the conventional schools to Arabic schools in some parts o f  N ige­
there was a quest for territorial expansion by different emerging nations that ria at a time before the intervention o f  the federal and state governments.
built up into conflicts and killings, which became full-blown in the years of As reported by the World Bank, sometimes a foreign culture is seen as a 
World War I. threat to local cultures and societies do often seek to protect their culture due to 
The issues that led to World War II between the period o f 1939 and 1945, some suspicion. In the light of the historic scramble for Africa by developed 
among which is the dispersal and migration o f  Jews to different parts o f  the nations, there is the need for some caution.
world, are quite significant. History has it that the migration o f  the Jews from Other dimensions to this are that, as a consequence o f globalization, many 
the Middle East to countries in Europe, where they started making economic African nations have suffered and are still suffering unbalanced trade relation­
progress and expansion to the displeasure o f  people in their host countries, con­ ships, loss o f  jobs due to the collapse o f  small domestic enterprises as a result o f  
tributed to the fueling o f the crisis that resulted in World War II, though there competition, and inequality in the distribution of income. There are evidences 
were other reasons linked to the expansionist tendency o f  the then German gov­ that growing integration has sometimes led to heightened inequalities within 
ernment. countries and these in turn have fueled social and political crises that have re­
In order to adequately discuss the issue o f globalization, poverty, fragility, sulted into full-blown wars. For example, in Uganda and Nigeria, while integra­
and the failure of states, it is imperative to define and explain the concept of tion has led to increased economic growth, income inequality has widened the 
state fragility and state failure. The United States Agency for International De­ gap between the rich and the poor.
velopment defines a fragile state or failed state as that characterized by a grow­ This scenario is one of the things that has fueled crisis in the Niger Delta 
ing inability or willingness to assure the provision o f basic services and security region o f  Nigeria, and which has further been complicated by the frequent oil 
to their population. Fragile states are also defined as those whose government spillage, gas flaring, and general environmental pollution rendering many Nige­
cannot and will not deliver core functions to the majority o f  its people including rians poor through their being denied the privilege o f  farming and fishing. 
the poor. Though bedeviled by a negative consequence o f weak government institutions in 
The World Bank defines a fragile state based on its own internal country many African countries, the positive effect of globalization is that the improved 
policy and institutional assessment exercise affirming that fragile states have the healthcare facilities have led to overpopulation and associated social vices.
peculiar features of having a significant number o f poor people. They are those 
that create a negative spillover evident as conflict, instability, and refugees’ flow
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
176 Globalization, Poverty, and the Failure of States in Africa Olalekan Emmanuel Obademi 177
Conclusion: Curtailing the Negative Effects of Globalization Do, Q., & Iyer, L. (2007a). Poverty, social divisions, and conflict in Nepal. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 4228.
Do, Q., & Iyer, L. (2007b). Geography, poverty and conflict in Nepal. Harvard Business 
It may not be too far from the truth to say that globalization may have done School, Working Paper No. 07-065.
more harm than good to many African countries and other developing countries Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war. American Political 
in other parts o f  the world, judging from the arguments put up in the earlier part Science Review, 97, pp. 75-90.
o f this chapter. The question now is, How do we curtail the negative effects o f  Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict: An 
globalization especially with reference to Africa? instrumental variables approach. Journal o f Political Economy, 112(4), pp. 725-753.
First o f  all, consider the loss o f  jobs arising from business collapse as a OECD. (1993). Annual report: Trends in international migration.
consequence o f  globalization, and also consider the fact that this loss o f  jobs Torres, M., & Anderson, M. (2004). Fragile states: Defining difficult environment for 
may not be a short-run effect as some have claimed. Those who lose their jobs poverty reduction (UK-DFID PRDE Working Paper No. 1), London.
may not easily be able to get needed skills to benefit from emerging opportuni­ UNDP. (2000). Human poverty report: Overcoming human poverty.World Bank (2006). World Bank policy research report.
ties, so there should be policies o f  social protection such as insurance, pension World Bank. (2002). Globalization, growth and poverty. Budding an inclusive world. 
funds, and social safety nets to help the unemployed. In addition, taking a look Oxford University Press.
at it from the angle o f environmental pollution, there is the need for environ­ World Bank. (2005). World Bank development indicators.
mental regulations to be enforced through WTO sanctions, while the core ac­ Yang, D., & Martinez, C.A. (2006). Remittances and poverty in migrants’ home areas: 
tions stipulated by the Kyoto protocol aimed at addressing global warming Evidence from the Philippines. In Q. Ozden & M. Schiff (Eds.), International mi­
should be enforced also. gration, remittances, and the brain drain, pp. 81-121. New York: Palgrave Macmil­
The responsibility o f  curtailing the negative effects o f globalization does lan.
not leave out the government o f African countries. There is the need for the 
governments o f  African countries to put in place appropriate and workable poli­
cies coupled with the strengthening o f institutions that will adequately support 
growth. Creating an enabling environment for businesses to thrive is germane, 
and doing this may involve issues like giving tax holidays, subsidy to local 
firms, contract enforcement, protection o f property rights, well-functioning 
bureaucracy, and regulations and good governance. This is important because 
the quality o f government policies to a large extent has a link with how well a 
particular country can access the benefits o f globalization. It is common knowl­
edge that macroeconomic instability occasioned by corruption and associated 
crisis have undermined the rate o f integration o f  African countries into the 
global economy.
References
Caglar, G., & Maurice, S. (2007). International migration: Economic development policy.
Retrieved July 9, 2007, from http://econ.worldbank.org.
Calvo, S., & Reinhart, C. (1996). Inflow of capital to developing countries in the 1990s.
Journal o f Economic Perspectives, 10(2), pp. 125-128.
Collier, P., & Dollar, D. (2002). Aid allocation and poverty reduction. European Eco­
nomic Review, 26
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic 
Papers, 56, pp. 563-595.
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2002). On the incidence of civil war in Africa. Journal o f 
Conflict Resolution, 46(1), pp. 13-28.
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Pattillo, C. (2001). Flight capital as portfolio choice. The 
World Bank Economic Review, 15(1), pp. 55-80.
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Section IV
Crisis: Hot Spots and Contestations
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Chapter Fourteen
A Cross-Regional Analysis of African 
Conflicts in the Age of Globalization
Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson
Within the last two decades, millions of people have been killed in wars in 
Africa. Millions have died from diseases and epidemics generated by wars. 
Many have also been raped or had body parts amputated. From the Mano River 
Union to Darfur to Rwanda, these conflicts have remained endemic. Most of­
ten, these conflicts characterized as ethno-religious, identity-driven, and intra­
state politics are mainly anchored on competition for shrinking economic spac­
es in the face of worldwide market economy. We argue that the fallout from the 
end of the Cold War played a significant role in the crises as industrialized na­
tions are consolidating and monopolizing the wealth of the world in the name 
of globalization. As a result of the marginalization of Africa, identity has be­
come a tool for competition in order to gain undue advantage by one group 
over another. This study investigates the identity context and marginality in 
African conflicts. The paper concludes by stating that identity has been em­
ployed as a mobilization tool to access socio-economic and political space by 
marginalized groups.
Introduction
The last two decades in Africa can be called the age o f  civil wars. It reached its 
apogee in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Sail (2001, p. 9) observed that “as 
many as 20 countries in Africa have experienced civil wars or other forms o f  
violent conflict in the past two decades. The Rwandan genocide was an excep-
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I oz a  <_ioss-Kegionai Analysis oi Alrican Conflicts in the Age of Globalization Agbo Uchcchukwu Johnson 1 8 3
tionally tragic episode.” Civil war is any armed conflict that involves (a) mili­ Religious (ethnic and other identities) movements, for example, are creating 
tary action internal to the metropolis; (b) the active participation of the national their global spaces and operating 'n t0,a' disregard of the interest o states, capi 
government; and (c) effective resistance by both sides (Small & Singers, 1982). tal and imperialism. The information superhighway is creatmg possibilities of 
Civil war as a concept therefore centers on the internal ity o f the war to the terri­ the invention of meaning and action that are not controlled or predetermined 
tory o f a sovereign state and the participation of the government as a combatant (Ibrahim 1998, p. 44). To understand these issues, we have to look at the domi­
(Sambanis, 2004). nant ideology in the world today- Globalization has transported capitalism to 
While genocide requires that acts be perpetrated against a group with an ag­ every comer of the world. In addition, everywhere it stops, it plants competition. 
gravated criminal intent, namely, that of destroying the group in whole or in In the developing nations with weak economies, capitalist competition took 
part, the degree to which the group was destroyed in whole or in part is not different forms. One of the fortfls is identity. Identity has become a tool for 
necessary to conclude that genocide has occurred. That one o f the acts in the competition by one group against another in order to gain undue advantage.
definition was perpetrated with a specific intent suffices. In other words, the The relationship between identity and competition is interesting because it 
intent which is peculiar to the crime of genocide need not clearly be expressed. represents a link between social interactions and individual cognitions, and this 
The intent may be inferred from a certain number of facts such as the general can contribute to our understanding of processes that are framing ethnic identifi­
political doctrine which gave rise to the acts possibly covered by the definition, cation in our society (Lubbers, M°*'na> *  McCarty, 2007). I he terms identity 
or the repetition o f  destructive or discriminatory acts. The intent may also be and “ethnic identity” have a strong political economy dimension. Political actors 
inferred from the perpetration of acts which violate the very foundation o f the in their contest for state power use these words. Two theories are commonly 
group, acts which are not in themselves covered in the list in Article 4(2) which used to explain identities, namely: social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 
are committed as part o f the same pattern of conduct (United Nations, 1948). 1986) and identity theory (IT) (Stryker & Serper, 1982). Both theories state that 
There is no doubt that the Mano River Union, Darfur, and Rwanda conflicts people have repertories of identities (both personal and social) and that the iden­
have benefited from the two definitions. They are civil wars and also genocida! tity that becomes salient varies aCcording ,0 ^ie social environment. SIT alludes 
in nature. Although some of the conflicts in Africa have been going on for sev­ to categories of social environment, and 11 to social network as environment. 
eral decades, the fall o f the Berlin Wall (and invariably the ascendance o f  globa­ The point, as Imobighe (2005) obServed was>
lization) signaled a major change in the nature of conflicts and in the attitudes 
and motivations o f the actors involved. The root causes o f the violence asso­ [T]o satisfy their needs, human beings must of necessity interact with, and in 
ciated with the conflicts might not always be the same as the mechanisms that the process make demands on their environment, then society and fellow hu­
sustain a given conflict. It is also important to identify trigger factors and factors man beings. In the process of su ^  interactions, conflict could arise due to the incompatibility of the goals they Pursue, or incompatibility of the means they 
of escalation or de-escalation of each conflict (Sail, 2001, p. 10). It was in this are using in pursuing their chosen goals. Often times, it is difficult to establisi 
direction that Stedman (1991, p. 374) stated that crises and conflicts in Africa, the precise causes of conflicts largely because conflicts are social phenomena 
especially at the national and sub-national levels, could be seen to revolve involving human beings and are not necessarily given to a given scientific ex­
around the four important issues of identity, participation, distribution, and legi­ planation. (p.l)
timacy. O f the four issues raised, identity has been more pronounced in African 
conflicts in the age o f globalization. Nationally, sub-riationalists have been com­ Whichever direction the theorizing moves, the issue is that identity prob­
peting for participation, distribution, and legitimacy. This paper investigates the lems are more pronounced when competition becomes tougher. The economic 
identity, context, and marginality in Africa’s conflict, drawing from the Mano realities of capitalism violating human security in its chess o f capital and profit 
River Union, Darfur, and Rwanda. gave rise to negative forms of identity politics and their explosive consequences. 
The binary categories that emerged include Sikh/Hindu and Muslim/Hindu in 
India; Pathan/Muhaji in Pakistan; Tutsi/Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi, Chris- 
Globalization and Identity in African Conflict tian/Muslim, Hausa/lgbo, settler/indigene in Nigeria, Muslim/Christian and 
\ Arabs/Blacks in Sudan; Sinhala/Tumil in Sri Lanka; (xenophobia in South Afri­
Globalization is an ideology of worldwide integration from the nation-state to ca and Cote d’Ivoire against foreign economic migrants, and contempt for fo- 
the global system. However, it is obvious that all the players are in the game but reigners/non-Christians by nationalist respectively); and in numerous cases, the 
not equal in the game. The weaker ones are being dictated to by the more power­ nationalists versus the terrorists/rubels. What it does mean seems to be that 
ful, and they are confronted by rules, situations, and conditions that are not in whatever the issue might be, each group constructs a discursive practice that is 
their interest (Nnoli, 1998). The other side of globalization is that it is also about antagonistic to that o f the other (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 43). As Annan (1997, p. 8) 
the operation of social movements that are not bound by the state or by capital. stated,
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184 A Cross-Regional Analysis of African Conflicts in the Age of Globalization Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson 185
class Americo-Liberian families, and that of the tribal population takes place at a 
H ]his particularistic and exclusionary form of identity politics has intensified much slower rate. Also, marriage among the Americo-Liberians was as much a 
in recent years within and among nations—it is responsible for some of the political act as it was a social and economic one, which establishes more than a 
most egregious violations of international humanitarian law and in several in­ bond between two individuals. It also interrelates as a series o f corporate groups 
stances, of elementary standards humanity—negative fprms of identity politics 
are a potent and potentially explosive force. Great care must be taken to recog­ to whom the parties to the marriage may turn for political alliance, information 
nize confront and restrain them lest they destroy the potential for peace and regarding changes in the political climate, and access to the spoils available in 
progress that the new era holds in store, (p. 8) the state (Liebenow(; 1970).
The military establishment was also firmly under the control o f the True 
The human agency of a given identity may be (or is) a function o f the do­ Whig party. Patronage prevailed over professionalism in the appointment of 
minant language of politics o f the “significant other” (Adesina, 2000). Indeed, officers, and the enlisted men within the Liberian Front Force, who were mainly 
the significant other was what turned the Mano River Region, Darfur, and drawn from the tribal people of the country, who were considered as stooges. 
Rwanda into identity conflicts. The enlisted men were held in awe by the people in the interior. Because o f the 
license, the government permitted them to rip off the tribal villages in order to 
compensate for their low pay and their exclusion from the officers corps. The 
The Political Economy of the Mano River Union Conflict tribal villages were also excluded from development in order not to expose them 
to good life and education, which may later threaten the domination of the (ex­
Liberia slaves) Americo-Liberians.
This socio-economic and political oppression prevailed throughout the era 
The Mano River Union (MRU) was established in 1973 by Liberia, Sierra o f Presidents Tubman and William Tolbert, which prepared the ground for the 
Leone, and Guinea with the objective of achieving economic integration Liberian crisis. For more than a century, the country was dominated politically 
amongst the member countries. The Union aimed to establish a Customs Union and economically by descendants of freed slaves otherwise referred to as 
amongst member states, but rather than achieving the aim, it has been bedeviled “Americo-Liberians” (Berman & Sams, 2000).
by intractable conflicts beginning from the early 1990s (Agbu, 2006). The 1990s In 1980, Army Master Sergeant, Samuel Doe, led a bold coup d’etat in 
was a most dramatic period in the history of West African sub-region, with civil which President William Tolbert was killed. Because of a widespread dislike for 
wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone leading to the loss of hundreds of thousands of the minority Americo-Liberians elite, this coup was warmly welcomed by a 
human lives. Several thousand more were mutilated and scattered into refugee large segment of the Liberian population. However, it was not long before Doe 
camps (Ka, 2001). The Liberian conflict was fertilized by politics o f exclusion, increasingly became oppressive and unpopular. He surrounded himself with 
which translated to economic empowerment of one group over the other. members of his Krahn ethnic group at the expense of the others. His ruthlessness 
Liberia was established in 1822 as refuge for freed American slaves. The and incompetence made him feared and reviled (Berman & Sams, 2000). The 
country has existed as an independent republic since 1847. The long history of style o f  governance which Doe adopted generated an ethnic power struggle to 
Liberia’s independence would have worked in her favor to develop a modem capture state power. It also became glaring for the indigenous ethnic groups 
nation-state in Africa, but this failed as the Americo-Liberians (ex-slaves) made outside the Krahn power cult that Doe leadership was not different from the 
themselves the dominant class against the indigenous groups o f Liberians. Americo-Liberian hegemony since he cannot even press for the common interest 
Therefore, power was captured by the Americo-Liberians who enthroned a one- o f all or better still, the oppressed indigenous groups under former Americo- 
party state. The True Whig Party’s monopoly of power permitted it to maintain Liberian leadership.
control over all other forms o f organization within the republic. Americo- This generated ethnic competition for power, which was demonstrated by 
Liberian political elites recognized the dangers inherent in the exposure of the the 1985 attempted coup which Doe assumed to have been led by Mano and Gio 
tribal people (native) to Westernization, industrialization, and urbanization officers. The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) killed as many as 3,000 Mano and 
through the open-door policy. They hoped not only to avoid the dangers, but Gio civilians (Howe, 1997), as deterrence for other ethnic groups to fall in line 
also to put the open-door policy to work in perpetuating the supremacy of the and accept Doe’s oppressive rule. Instead of deterring other groups, however, it 
Americo-Liberian ruling class (Liebenow, 1970). created a fertile ground for armed rebellion which Charles Taylor (his former 
The control o f the Americo-Liberian-Ied True Whig Party in politics, eco­ ally) led. Charles Taylor therefore used the Mano and Gio ethnic groups that had 
nomics, and civil society was total. The President’s son, William V.S Tubman been subjected to severe repression to launch a guerrilla war against the Doe 
Jr., was appointed the President-General of the Labour Congress o f Industrial regime. The prosecution of the guerilla campaign by the National Patriotic Front 
Organization o f Liberia. Recruitment of new political leaders came from low- of Liberia (NPFL) and other factional groups that emerged to root out Doe, was
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186 A Cross-Regional Analysis of African Conflicts in the Age of Globalization Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson 187
successful because there was already an army of the deprived and oppressed 
who were waiting for leadership to be provided. [T]he tragedy of Sierra Leone is that her people are among the poorest in the 
world, while the country is among the richest. The reasons for this are entirely 
man-made. Other countries in the world are poor because of natural disasters, 
Sierra Leone few resources, unfertile territory or bulging populations. Not so in Sierra Leone. God bless this land with an abundance of resources. Just a relatively 
few people are responsible for the miserv and hardship suffered by so many. (p.
Sierra Leone is located on the southwest coast o f Africa. It is sandwiched be­
tween Guinea and Liberia. The British colonial administration divided Sierra 1)
Leone into two distinct political areas: the colony (26 square miles) and the When the NPFL and RUF were formed, a lot o f jobless young people joined 
protectorate (27,540 square miles). One feature o f the colony was the existence the movement because it promised to give them hope, power, and a new mean­
among its population o f a community known as Creoles numbering over 25,000 ing in life. Both movements had a common program and vision. Their magic 
who settled there as repatriated slaves in the late eighteenth century and the first concept o f building power was to reward supporters and build a base o f  political 
half o f the nineteenth century (Kilson, 1970). power (Reno, 1997). Taylor and Sankoh knew that the Mano River States of 
The early contact o f the Creoles with Western culture offered them the Liberia and Sierra Leone have failed the people, and worked on their psycholo­
opportunity to have education, enabled them to attain a measure o f wealth and gy o f  political economy.
influence in commerce, and colonial civil service. In this connection, the Creole The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and RUF became vehicles 
community also gained political ascendance in Sierra Leone in spite o f their for personal enrichment, and the diamond mining areas and other natural re­
small numbers (Agbo, 2006). sources location became their prime target. Young people with little schooling 
Sierra Leone is a multi-ethnic country. In terms of its ethnic composition, were particular targets in both movements’ recruitment efforts. They were 
this is rather varied. In the South and Southeast are mainly the Mendes, Sher- molded quickly not to share a political belief or ideology, but instead to partici­
bros, Vais, Kissis, and Kono; in the North, the Temmes, Limbas, Kurankos, pate in resource extraction, the mining and trading of diamonds, the monitoring 
Mandingos, Susus, and Ynlunkas. In the Western area, with the capital Free­ and taxing of trade across the border, and the looting of household property 
town, there are visible intermixes among the various group over the generations, (Ewinstein, 2005).
blurring the linguistic cultural distinctions of any one group, especially the 
Creoles (Boas, 2001, p. 713).
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991. The Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh was predominantly formed by politi­ The House Divided in Sudan: Darfur Crisis
cal exiles to overthrow Joseph Momoh’s one party rule and to restore multi­
party democracy in the country (Agbo, 2006, p. 33). Zach-Williams (2001) The Darfur region forms what is known as western Sudan. The region has a 
argued that the Sierra Leonean conflict had hardly any ethnic or religious di­ dense population of 5.4 million people o f  various ethnic groups. Prominent 
mension, usually common in many other civil wars. However, the Mende and among these ethnic groups are the Zaghawa, who are non-Arab nomads who 
Creoles and to some extent the Kono are the dominant groups. Zach-Williams inhabit the northernmost zone which is part o f the Libyan Sahara. The area has 
(2001) further contended that the traditional structure of antagonism in the war other minority ethnic groups. The Eastern and Southern zones o f Darfur are 
was very complex. Again, it appeared that the use of violence as a means of populated by Arab sub-clans (the Rezeigat, Habbaniya, Beni, and Halba) who 
achieving political and economic power was deeply rooted in the Sierra Leonean are cattle herders. The central area of the region is mainly inhabited by the Furs 
political culture. from which the region got its name, Darfur: Land of the Fur (Ihekire, 2007, p. 
Kabbah (1999) stated that the intimidation of the general public by succes­ 10).
sive dictatorial regimes, the high level o f literacy, high unemployment, poverty, The people of Darfur are mostly farmers and animal herders who depend on 
lack of social programs for the youth, and the failure of thfe judicial system the same arid environment for natural resources. The civil war in southern Su­
killed loyalty and any sense of belonging in the state. All these created a deep- dan began in the early 1980s. It was fought between the Sudan People’s Libera­
seated cynical attitude towards government, politics, politicians, and the public tion Movement (SPLM) and government forces for over 20 years. A compre­hensive peace accord between the government of the Sudan and the SPLM was 
administration apparatus.
What various regimes in Sierra Leone denied the people were freely given reached, which ended the crisis. The Darfur crisis sprang up to change all the 
to the masses through violence by RUF. Lamenting the situation in Sierra Leone progress made in achieving peace in Sudan. Darfur is home to a complex mix for which the tribe remains a key identifying factor. There are a minimum o f 36 
Penfold (1998) contended that main tribes, but some sources cite as many as 90 by including sub-divisions or
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/ '  <~iuss-Hegionai Analysis oi African Conflicts in the Age of Globalization Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson 1 8 9
clans. This mix is composed o f two major black groups, Arabs and non-Arabs, and started to redress the deep-rooted political and economic marginalization of 
the latter known locally as “zurga.” Centuries of coexistence and intermarriage the region by successive Sudanese governments since independence. The situa­
have reduced distinctions o f the cultural identification or non-identification with tion was compounded in 1984 when Arab herdsmen were forced by near-famine 
the Arab world as members o f both groups are dark-skinned. Except for the conditions caused-by drought to migrate southward in search o f water and pas­
Zaghawa, who specialize in herding camels, the indigenous black African ture for their animals. These migrations were responsible for clashes between 
groups depend on subsistence farming and animal husbandry, while groups of the migrating Arab nomads and non-Arab farming communities and have been 
Arab extraction live on camel herding in northern Darfur (Abraham, 2004). partly responsible fop the violence (Ihekire, 2007, p. 11).
The open rebellion in Darfur, which resulted in many casualties and the The violent conYlict in Darfur is, therefore, the outcome of mismanaged 
displacement of hundreds of thousands o f people, erupted in early 2003. This socio-economic and political issues in Sudan by the power elites in the North, 
happened when the two loosely allied rebel groups, the SPLM/Army (SPLM/A) especially the Arabs. The key to understanding the escalating ethnic violence in 
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked government military Darfur is also the concept of “Dar” (the tribal homeland). Historically, the indi­
installations. The resolve of the two movements was predicated on the political genous groups and earlier settled Arab migrants each had their own Dar. The 
and economic marginalization o f the region. The groups also complained about major tribes voluntarily agreed to settlement of other groups and accorded them 
an alleged 20-year campaign by the government to recruit militias o f Arab origin a recognized administrative status (Abraham, 2004).
in Darfur and Chad. Further, they pointed out that the militia o f Arab extraction Politics set in when the economic space for both groups started narrowing 
known as the “Janjaweed” had been receiving greatly increased government down considerably. Yousef Takana listed three traditional, resource-based con­
support to clear civilians from areas considered disloyal (Abraham, 2004, p. flicts between 1968 and 1976, five between 1976 and 1980, and 21 between 
523). The Darfur conflict is being debated in the international community 1980 and 1998. In these conflicts, he attributed the rapid escalation of violence 
whether what the Janjaweed carried out there in the name o f civil war consti­ to the absence o f  development efforts in the region and the shortcomings of 
tutes genocide or not. The issue is that the war took a racial dimension and not a government administration, including its deliberate weakening o f the “native 
religious one, since over 90 percent of Darfur people are Muslims. The matter is administration systems that had for generations helped Darfur’s tribes regulate 
that the issues involved in the civil war in Darfur are deep and wide ranging. their affairs” (Abraham, 2004).
The conflict has three facets. One is the tension between government-aligned Instead of the government of the Sudan envisaging the direction these spo­
forces and the rebels, while the second one is between government militia and radic conflicts were moving, it decided to play ethnic politics. Government 
civilians. The third one involves the conflict within the Darfur communities manipulation of the ethnic fabric of the region gradually produced an alarming 
themselves (Abraham, 2004, p. 524). shift in the nature o f the conflict, with ethnicity becoming a major mobilizing 
The conflict in Sudan had its seeds sown by the colonial government be­ factor. Traditional forms of conflict gave way to ethnic-engineered conflict. 
cause until 1956, the southern part of Sudan was completely cut off from the Ethnically driven conflicts that emerged in the late 1980s were sustained and 
north until independence. They did not allow people from the North to go to the exceptionally fierce, with ethnic solidarity helping to draw in additional parties. 
South, neither did they allow people from the South to go to the North. So with Fighters began identifying themselves more broadly as “Arab” or “non-Arab” 
that policy of trying to separate the two parts o f the country, they sowed the for the first time in the 1987-1989 conflict between Fur and the Arabs (Abra­
seeds o f this conflict (Editorial: Daily Trust, October 29, 2002 p. 2). In this vein ham, 2004).
Ihekire (2007, p. 11) contends that The government reaction, therefore, was to contain the non-Arabs with 
Arab government militia, Janjaweed, instead of addressing the economic issues 
[TJhe ongoing conflict in Darfur has its roots in both remote and immediate that gave vent to the rebellion. The scramble for these limited natural resources 
causes. The remote cause can be traced to independence in 1956, when power and non-recognition o f  the collective grazing rights of the people led to innu­
was bequeathed to a small Sudanese group of Arab elites in the Khartoum area merable inter-ethnic conflicts. Added to all these are the problems o f political 
of the country. This sowed the seeds of racial discrimination, politics of exclu­ marginalization and lack o f socio-economic development, which has been en­
sion and exploitation and the institution of politics which undermined the rights 
and privileges of the people, (p. 11) trenched in the region over the years. These factors escalated the violence, 
which already existed among the different ethnic groups.
After independence also, the national government in power committed a lot At the root o f much o f the conflict is competition over fertile land and wa­
of mistakes, as the South was kept a step behind the North especially in econom­ ter, exacerbated by desertification in Northern Sudan and the drought that has 
ic development, education, and health care (Khalil, 2002). In this manner, the affected Darfur on and off since the 1970s. Nomadic groups of all origins from 
national government led by the Arabs in the North marginalized the Darfur the Northern semi-desert belt have been pushed southward in search of grazing 
people. To redress this, they formed the Darfur Development Movement in 1966 lands and water. The regular presence in Darfur’s agriculturally rich central belt
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190 A Cross-Regional Analysis of African Conflicts in the Age of Globalization Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson 191
of the nomads and their herds has caused friction with farmers. Ecological de­ antagonism. The role of the Rwandan elite class in that process during the Ger­
cline and lack of development in the entire region have combined to impoverish man protectorate and especially during the Belgian colonization and the first and 
Darfur people of all ethnic backgrounds (Abraham, 2004). the second republics was primordial. That divisionist policy was, however, fa­
These created the SLA/A, JEM, NMRD and Sudan Federal Democratic vored by contradictions that were remotely based on identity but were, in reality, 
Alliance (SFDA) as parties to the conflict in Darfur. The salient feature of this directly social and political (Gasana et al., 1999). This history o f  identity au­
conflict is that it developed thored by colonialism was sustained by the post-independence political elite. As 
Eteng (2006) observed,
[A] subaltern identity that also had the potential of being either exclusive or in­
clusive. The two meanings were not only contradictory but came from the ex­ Ethno-nationalism denotes the crystallization of socio-nationalism conscious­
perience of two different insurgencies. The inclusive meaning was more politi­ ness among members of an ethnic group which regards itself both as a distinct, 
cal than racial or even cultural (linguistic). The racial meaning came to take a identifiable objective group in-itself, as well as a group for itself a community 
strong hold in both the counter-insurgency and insurgency in Darfur. The Save interest relative to other ethnic groups. An ethnic group manifests such con­
Darfur campaign’s characterization of the violence as “Arab” against “African” sciousness of communal nationalism, when in the context of nation-wide com­
obscured both the fact that the violence was not one-sided and the contest that petitive and conflictual socio-economic, political, and cultural contacts with 
was critical precisely because it was ultimately about who belonged and who other ethnic formation, delimits its geographical and cultural pan-ethnic space, 
did not in Sudanese politics. The depoliticization, naturalization and ultimately, organizes and mobilizes members in socio-cultural political associations 
demonization of the nation “Arab” as against African has the deadliest effect, through which it articulates its ideology and world view, its interest and value 
whether intended or not, of the save Darfur campaign. (Mamdani, 2007, p. 6) preferences, and its strategies for accessing political power and available mate­
rials benefits and opportunities, and from which its draws physical, material 
and human resources when and where necessary, (p. 46)
Rwanda: Genocide and Identity
In Rwanda, shortly after independence, the Hutu-led administration decided 
The Rwandan genocide has been contextualized severally but the identity con­ that the Hutu/Tutsi identity should be spelled out on identity cards, and by im­
text remains a little-discussed issue. Identity competition revolves around the plication, should supersede the national identity. From that moment, being Tutsi 
consideration of ethnicity, culture, race, and religious affinity. These predomi­ meant less rights, more persecution, exile, etc. In 1994, it was the reference to 
nate and influence decision making and mobilization for political power in order the identity card that determined those who were to be victims o f  genocide 
to allocate resource-based identity (Iwara, 2006). Ethnic identity is only one (Ibrahim, 1998). President Habyarimana’s regime instituted the violence which 
expression of the myriad of identities exploding in Africa. Identities, ethnicity, led to the April-June 1994 genocide. The regime witnessed a rise in regional and 
religion, clan, caste, etc. are multiple and are located in memories that are deep­ ethnic discrimination through a policy known as regional and ethnic equili­
ly entrenched in a rich blend of history and myth (Ibrahim 1998, p. 43). Armed brium. It established a quota for ethnic groupings and regions proportional to 
with different theories on race inequality fashionable at that time in nineteenth their representation in the population as far as access to education and to jobs in 
century Europe, the colonizer deliberately falsified the sociological reality of public administration and the private sector was concerned. The Hutu from the 
Burundi and Rwanda by affirming high and loud that the ethnic components in North, the region which the regime claimed had been historically discriminated 
the country were fundamentally different and on this basis it manufactured the against, gave themselves the lion’s share (Gasana et al., 1999, p. 158).
Hamitic myth whereby the Mututsi (Tutsi) was superior, came from “outside,” The Tutsi (15 percent of the population) saw themselves awarded a quota of 
was dominant, a conqueror, physically imposing, more intelligent, cunning, 90 percent on this basis and many of them were satisfied with the share due to 
profound, and arrogant. In short, a the cessation of harassment— even if they found themselves excluded from 
political and senior posts in the administration and in the army. The Hutu from 
[BJIack European made to govern and lord over the others. While the Muhutu the South and from the central parts of Rwanda were ousted from their dominant 
(Hutu) was negro and, like all other negroes, a big child and all children are su­ positions by the Hutu from the North (Gasana et a!., 1999, p. 158).
perficial, being light, impulsive, etc. The Bantu farmer had a stocky build and What this policy entails was that the government of Rwanda officially 
was naturally created to serve blindly and obey the “Tutsi lord.” (Grahame et created two worlds in one state. The inclusive and exclusive, oppressors and 
al„ 1999, p. 89) oppressed, insiders and outsiders (exiled). This was against the tenet o f  capitalist 
globalization which encouraged free competition not on an ethnic basis but on 
The historical overview shows the complexity o f the history of Rwanda the basis o f skills. But those who were favored saw nothing wrong with the 
which should not in any way be reduced to a conflict between the Flutu and the system. Under this situation violent conflicts became inevitable. With the oppor­
Tutsi, as history also shows us the essentially planned character o f an ethnic
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192 A Cross-Regional Analysis of African Conflicts in the Age of Globalization Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson 193
tunity provided by ethnicity for those in power and political positions, ethnic are used to influence the authoritative allocation o f resources to groups and 
rivalry and conflicts were promoted. In the same vein, Ayoade (2005) stated that individuals (Ibrahim, 2000).
The groups or individuals that capture state power hardly allow the oppor­
[AJpart from the opportunistic application of ethnicity, it is also the handiest tunity to slip out of their hands. As repression increases, there is a marked in­
explanation of failure, but never of success. Nobody who succeeds to secure a crease in the rate of the decomposition and/or disarticulation o f  effective state 
job (political power) through the manipulation of the ethnic machine never authority and legitimacy, and the coercive apparatus of the state becomes terro­
owns up to its contributions. However, unsuccessful candidates are often too 
quick to attribute failure to ethnicity. It is therefore a paradox that unsuccessful ristic in its actions, rather than playing its expected role as the organ state build­
candidates acknowledge efficiency of ethnicity in inter-ethnic competition ing. This situation provoked the intensification of different forms o f identity 
while successful candidates (insiders) continue to deny its role. (pp. 1-2) mobilization and consciousness (ethnic, regional, communal) and even confla­
gration (Ibrahim, 2000). The most important question, therefore, is the percep­
Today, the Tutsi are in power, and they have banned the two words “Tutsi” tion and fear o f domination by a group (especially those that are not favored by 
and “Hutu” from public discourse. But since only one group is in power, nothing the power equation). Violent ethno-regional conflicts therefore, are usually 
has changed, only the identity of the victim. In essence, if the state cannot pro­ linked to the perceptions o f group domination in the absence of channels for 
vide security for members of the community and it cannot provide public goods, articulating demands (Osaghae, 1992, pp. 219-220). In such situations, there­
other actors cannot but step in (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 44). The process of identifica­ fore, ethnicity becomes a strategy of competition in which ethnic identity is 
tion and differentiation is driven by emotion. Identification is aimed at protect­ deployed in the campaign for support. In such a campaign, the affected person 
ing and advancing the interest of the ethnic group thus exhibiting some form of or group o f persons equate personal interests with group interest in such a way 
self-preservation and self-perpetuation. Obviously, the condition for ethnicity is that the group sees itself as endangered by the loss of the position. In fact, the 
that at least two ethnic groups must be contending for resources (Ayoade, 2005). most important ingredient of ethnicity is how to successfully transform personal 
Indeed, the conflict in Rwanda as in most African situations, arose as a result of into group interest. In a way, it sounds strange because the individual personifies 
groups contending for space to appropriate resources. the group. In reality, however, once the individual achieves his or her goal, the 
group becomes irrelevant until the need arises again. Such occasions, however, 
serve to keep the group alive (Ayoade, 2005, p. 2).
Identity and Marginality in African Conflict
To begin with, even though conflict is inevitable, violent conflicts can be Conclusion
avoided if those who control state power decentralize governance and allow the 
resources of the state to be equitable. In this connection, exclusionary politics In the framework of identity problems in this study, it is clear that without un­
led to conflict and if not properly managed will further lead to violent conflict. It derstanding the political economy of conditions in Africa in the age of globaliza­
also follows that most African states are pluralistic, and as such, breed identity tion, we cannot understand the underlying variables in identity conflicts in Afri­
consciousness in pursuit of competition for available resources in the state. In ca. From Mano River Union, to Darfur and Rwanda, overwhelming evidence 
the absence of other channels of resource accumulation and distribution, the soul abounds that the conflicts were engineered substantially by the economic condi­
o f African states becomes important to the political elites. tions in which the people found themselves. They became pawns in the hands of 
The state in Africa is everywhere, and its power appears boundless. There is the political elites in power. Instead of governance addressing development 
hardly any aspect of life in which the state does not exercise power and control. issues for common interests, it degenerated into a cult of identity that excluded 
That makes the capture of state power singularly important (Ake, 1996, p. 23). others. The creation of two worlds in the state along ethnic lines by political 
In this power contest, the elite struggle for political power by mobilizing regio­ leaders exacerbated identity conflict in Africa.
nalism, racism, and ethnicity. The faction that gains power also relies on these to The Mano River Union, Darfur, and Rwanda conflicts were fertilized by the 
establish hegemony and to perpetuate its controls on state power (Jega, 2000). inclusion-exclusion binary. The ethnic characterization and stereotypes of iden­
Historically, identity-based politics have been significant in struggles for politi­ tities that feature in the conflicts are by-products o f competition for state re­
cal power and control o f the state. The state has, historically, shaped and condi­ sources. The parochial identities that emerged in the conflict became tools of 
tioned the arena for competition over scarce societal resources and for expanded mobilization and appropriation in a plural society.
accumulation (Jega, 2000). The first issue is the control of political power and Pluralism can, however, be turned to advantage when an environment of 
its instruments such as the armed forces and the judiciary. The second is the healthy competition is created. When ethnic groups compete for production 
control of economic power and resources. Both are powerful instruments that rather than consumption, a rational situation o f national development is created.
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194 A Cross-Regional Analysis of African Conflicts in the Age of Globalization Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson 195
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Chapter Fifteen
Globalization, Identity Politics, and 
the Escalation of Ife-Modakeke Crisis
Olajide O. Akanji
This chapter argues that globalization contributed to the transfomiation of Ife- 
Modakeke crisis from a minor intra-ethnic problem of the mid-nineteenth cen­
tury to an issue of global concern by the twenty-first century. The various di­
mensions the crisis had assumed in the course of the years, the chapter argues, 
underscore the centrality of the process of globalization in it. Specifically, the 
chapter claims that the volatility of the recent phase (1997-2000) of the crisis 
was due to the availability of foreign munitions and the activities of Diaspora 
hometown associations. These two factors, the study infers, are engendered by 
forces of globalization. Hometown associations, such as the Modakeke Pro­
gressive International, mobilized support and resources towards the communal 
crisis in Nigeria. The associations equally provided propaganda space through 
the Internet and funds for the home communities. This, the chapter contends, 
facilitated the procurement and use of sophisticated weapons and foreign muni­
tions, which protracted the crisis and worsened its lingering human cost.
Introduction
This chapter analyzes the interface between globalization and the Ife-Modakeke 
crisis. Globalization is assumed to be capable of engendering socio-economic 
development; in the same way, it is considered to be central to the problem of 
violent crises. It is around the question o f violent crises, which often manifest at 
ethnic, sub-ethnic, religious, and political levels, that the issues of human rights
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198 Globalization, Identity, and the Escalation of Ife-Modakeke Crisis Olajide O. Akanji 199
and citizenship in Nigeria revolve. The Ife-Modakeke crisis is an age-old prob­ tween the two groups, records showed, was peaceful, as evidenced by several 
lem in Yorubaland of southwestern Nigeria. Several attempts have been made to cases of inter-group marriages.
, analyze the problem. This accounts for a substantial body o f scholarly works on Communal bitterness, animosity, and hostilities, however, ensued between 
it. Yet, the fluidity and volatility of the crisis in recent times has continued to the two groups (Ife and Modakeke) over a number of issues, including the loss 
v demand that new perspectives be used to examine it. This chapter thus seeks to o f a settlement called Ibadan (initially considered by the Ife as an outpost o f Ife 
engage what can be called the Ife-Modakeke phenomenon (i.e., the Ife- kingdom) by Ife warriors to some displaced Oyo warriors resident in the settle­
Modakeke crisis) from the perspective o f the role o f globalization. By so doing, ment around the late eighteenth century. The hatred generated by the loss of 
it attempts to redefine the Modakeke phenomenon as one that is much more Ibadan reverberated all through the Ife Kingdom, where many o f the displaced 
expansive and complex than it is often portrayed in the literature. Oyo people had settled and were living peacefully. The hatred, with time, snow­
Apart front the introduction and conclusion, the chapter is divided into three balled into open armed confrontations. For instance, the two communities en­
sections. The first section undertakes an historical overview o f the pre-1997 gaged in a bitter war twice in 1849. This was followed by a period o f relative 
phase of the crisis. The second and third sections focus respectively on the anal­ peace, which lasted till 1880. Between 1881 and 1886, the two communities 
ysis o f  the nature o f the recent (1997-2000) phase o f the crisis and the role of resumed hostilities against each other. This was during the civil war that en­
globalization in it. gulfed the entire Yorubaland from 1877 to 1893 (Albert, 1999, p. 147; Akanji, 
2008, pp. 204-205; Johnson, 1921, p. 232).
It took the intervention of the British imperial power to mediate a truce and 
Ife-Modakeke Crisis: A Pre-1997 Overview bring the war to an end in 1886. An aspect o f the truce emphasized the reloca­
tion o f Modakeke community from Ife territory. Modakeke community was to 
I he crisis involving the Ife and Modakeke people is among the protracted sub- be relocated to nearby Oyo communities, particularly to Ode-Omu, by 1886. 
ethnic crises in Nigeria. The crisis dates back to the eighteenth century history of This directive was however ignored. It was not until 1909, after the British oc­
, in-and-out migration in Yorubaland. The Yoruba ethnic group, to which the Ife cupation and colonization of Yoruba land and other ethnic groups, that the relo­
r i d  Modakeke people belong, is an omnibus group comprising of many sub- cation clause in the truce was implemented. Nevertheless, British colonialism in 
*  ethnic identity groups. Among these sub-ethnic groups are the Oyo, Ife, Egba, Yorubaland, albeit Nigeria in general, contributed to the continuation and sus­
Kgbado, Ijebu, Ijesha, Ekiti, Akoko, Ondo, (Ajayi & Akintoye, 1980, p. 281) tenance o f the Ife-Modakeke crisis. One aspect of British colonial rule can be 
and Igbomina (Aleru, 2006). Historical accounts revealed that a dynamic and identified as having impacted on the crisis.
highly impactful in-and out-migration, occasioned by wars, trade, festivals, Principally, the colonial economic policy was instrumental to the re- 
marriages, natural disaster, and others, occurred among the various Yoruba sub­ emergence of Modakeke community back in Ile-lfe between 1919 and 1923, and 
ethnic groups in the pre-colonial days. In spite of this fluid inter-group relation­ the consequent resuscitation of the old communal hostility from 1946 onwards. 
ship, the numerous sub-ethnic groups maintained their separate and distinctive This was because the colonial economic policy was such that emphasized the 
identity. It is in this context that the genesis of Ife-Modakeke relationship, which need for the colonies to be self-supporting. This, however, did not imply that the 
initially was cordial, is to be understood. policy was aimed at building the economic capability of the people; rather, it 
Generally speaking, the literature on inter-group relations in Yorubaland, was geared at removing the financial burden of administration from the colonial 
and Nigeria in general, concurred that the Modakeke people are the descendants government. Part o f the economic policy was the introduction o f a compulsory 
of the people displaced by the collapse and disintegration of the old Oyo Empire tax system. Alongside the tax system was the monetization of the offices o f the 
in the eighteenth century (Johnson, 1921; Akinjogbin, 1992; Albert, 1999; traditional chiefs. Both the tax system and the monetization of the offices o f  the 
Akanji; 2008; Oyeniyi, 2006). The displaced people, records showed, were traditional rulers were sequel to the adoption o f the indirect rule political system 
primarily Yoruba people of Oyo descent— i.e., they were o f  Oyo sub-Yoruba o f government, which turned traditional rulers/chiefs into stipendiary staff of the 
ethnic group. The displaced Oyo people were, however, scattered into other sub- colonial government. Given this system, traditional chiefs and rulers were paid 
Yoruba ethnic groups, such as the Ife and the Egba (Johnson,'1921, p. 13). This monthly income from the tax generated from their domains. This implies that 
was the genesis o f the contact between the Ife and the Modakeke. This suggests the value of each traditional chief/ruler’s monthly income was determined by the 
that Modakeke people are not Ife (though both are Yoruba); they are traditional­ number of taxable adults, and by implication, the human population in their 
ly Oyo people (i.e., they belong to the Oyo sub-ethnic group). However, the domain. This, however, was contrary to ancient custom and practice among the 
displaced Oyo people who domiciled at Ife, after years o f  settlement in Ife terri­ Yoruba people, where traditional rulers/chiefs lived primarily on proceeds from 
tory, adopted the name Modakeke as a mark of identity. Initial relationship be- their farms, freewill gifts to the crown, tributes from the vassals, and war boo­
ties, among others.
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LIBRARY
200 Globalization, Identity, and the Escalation of Ife-Modakeke Crisis Olajide O. Akanji 201
A consequence o f this policy was that traditional rulers/chiefs had to devise Ife-Modakeke Crisis, 1997-2000
ways to enhance the taxes generated from their domain; since their monthly 
incomes depended on it. This, going by archival records, partly explains why the The fragile relationship between the Ife and Modakeke in the 1980s deteriorated 
traditional ruler of the Ife kingdom, Ooni Ademiluyi (1910-1930), acceded to and degenerated into bitter communal war or simply put, a “communal holo­
the entreaties of the British District Officer in the Ife/Ijesha Division to allow caust,” between 1997 and 2000 over the issue o f autonomous local government 
the return to Ile-Ife o f Modakeke people, who had earlier been dispersed from status for Modakeke. The> genesis of the “holocaust” is traceable to the Mod­
Ife kingdom to other Yoruba towns and cities in 1909 (National Archives, akeke agitation for internal self-determination from Ife dominance, as evident in 
I922a-c; National Archives, 1947). The Modakeke people thus returned to Ile- their demand for autonomous local government status in 1996. It was the politi­
Ife and Ife territory between 1919 and 1923. The return of the Modakeke people cization and manipulation of this issue that, however, provoked the orgies of 
to Ife territory between 1919 and 1923, however, resulted in the resuscitation of violence that occurred from 1997 to 2000. The manipulation and politicization 
the old animosity between them and the Ife, as the relationship between the two was evident in the way and manner the military government, under General Sani 
groups was again fractured from 1946 onwards over the issues o f payment of Abacha, and the political elite executed the federal government territorial re­
land rent (ishakole) and the right to land ownership (Akanji, 2007, pp. 82-86; structuring (state and local government creation) policy. This is because, on the 
Akanji, 2008, p. 207). But, unlike the pre-colonial history o f the crisis, which one hand, while the government conceded to Modakeke’s request for an Ife East 
was dominated by armed confrontations, the crisis during the long years o f co­ local government, it tacitly denied their request for the composition and location 
lonial rule (1893-1960) was characterized by periodic protests, litigations, dis­ of the headquarters o f the council. The Modakeke had requested and anticipated 
play o f collective obstinacy, and agitation for land rights, resource control, and that the proposed Ife East local government would be headquartered in Mod­
internal self-determination. akeke and that this should comprise mainly of Modakeke and its villages.
The post-colonial phase of the crisis was characterized by the continuation On the other hand, the most visible evidence of political inconsistency and 
of the above pattern o f protestations and contestations, except that it was more manipulation was the release, by the federal and state governments, o f conflict­
, o f a quest to assert the right to internal self-determination, as inherent in the ing locations/names o f the headquarters of the Ife East local government coun­
T demands for autonomous local government by the Modakeke. The nature of the cil. For instance, while the official press release of December 4, 1996, by the 
crisis between 1960 and early 1990 was therefore different from the colonial and secretary to the federal military government, Alhaji Gidado Idris, and which was 
pre-colonial accounts. For example, while I960 to 1979 could be tagged a pe­ carried by all major national newspapers, named Enuwa, an Ife community, as 
riod of relative peace between the two communities, since there was no signifi­ the headquarters o f the local government (“FG names new LGs,” 1996, p.l). 
cant incidence of open intransigence (except for the controversies and legal The federal government gazette, signed by the Head of State on November 18, 
tussles over the interpretation of the Land Use Decree of 1978), 1980 marked 1996 (but which was released to the public on December 30, 1996) listed Mod­
the onset and resuscitation of violent clashes and antagonism between them. The akeke as the headquarters o f the council (FGN, 1996). Similarly, the federal 
relative peace of I960 to 1979 could be adduced to some factors: the immediate government gazettes of March 2, 1997, and that o f December 1, 1998, headquar­
post-independence political turbulence in the country, which, first, culminated in tered the Ife East local government in Modakeke (FGN, 1997; FGN, 1998; 
the military intervention o f 1966, followed by a period of military rule (1966- Akanji, 2007, p. 230). In the heat of the controversy generated by the conflicting 
1979), and then the civil war (1967-1970). reports, and to dampen tension, the state government named Oke Ogbo, a sup­
Conversely, the return o f  democratic governance in October 1979 resusci­ posedly neutral community, as the headquarters of the council. This, however, 
tated the age-old crisis. This was due to the politicization and manipulation of was not accepted by the Modakeke, who considered Oke Ogbo an outpost of Ife. 
issues relating to the two communities by the governing elites. For instance, This question o f an acceptable council headquarters laid the basis for violent 
violence erupted in 1981 between the two groups over the failure o f the state confrontation in 1996, as both communities had good reasons to lay claim to the 
government to grant territorial autonomy to Modakeke as allegedly promised by council headquarters. The situation degenerated and snowballed into full-scale 
the ruling political party, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) during its electio­ hostilities in 1997, with horrendous human rights implications.
neering campaigns. The leadership o f the ruling party was identified as a contri­
butory factor in the failure o f the state government to grant the request o f the 
vModakeke (Ibidapo-Obe, 1981, p. 16). Similarly, the granting o f an autonomous Globalization and the Recent Phase of 
local government status to the Modakeke in 1983 by the National Party of Nige­
ria (NPN)-led state government (the political party that succeeded UPN after the Ife-Modakeke Crisis: The Nexus
1983 election) smacked of political manipulation. As a result, the two communi­
ties were on edge all through the 1980s to the 1990s. The preceding analysis gives an unmistakable impression of a close connection 
between globalization and the Ife-Modakeke crisis; as evidenced in the role
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202 Globalization, Identity, and the Escalation of Ife-Modakeke Crisis Olajide O. Akanji 203
colonialism played in shaping the crisis in the late nineteenth century through to Ife by encouraging host and others to engage in mutually beneficial activities.
the mid-twentieth century. This section, however, examines the role o f globali­ (Ife Descendants Union, Houston)
zation in the recent phase of the crisis. This is sequel to such an assertion by 
Abiodun Alao, an expert in war and conflict studies, who noted that “the conflict Similarly, the Constitution of the Modakeke Progressive International, 
benefited from the effects of globalization, as both sides were alleged to have United States, declared the objectives of the association to include,
set up websites on the Internet to solicit for financial contributions for arms 
procurement front their respective indigenes in the diaspora” (Alao, 2007, p. To protect and develop Modakeke community in the USA. To foster friendship 
75). In the light of this, the chapter examines the role of diaspora hometown among Modakeke sons and daughters in the United state of America (USA). To 
associations and the use o f foreign munitions in the crisis. play a leading role in the development of our town-Modakeke. (Modakeke Pro­gressive International, Houston)
In the same vein, Egbe Omo Ife, Dallas, United States, decleared its objec­
Role o f  Hometown Associations in the Diaspora
tives as,
The salience o f  civil society social networks, including hometown associations, Our objectives are to promote the interest of He Ife indigenes; the ancestral 
ethnic, or tribal associations, cannot be overemphasized in the overall working home of all Yoruba in and outside of Nigeria, wherever they may be committed 
and configuration of modem communities. This is due to the critical roles such to the economic, cultural, educational and social development of lie Ife . . . 
networks play in fostering societal peace and mitigate inter-group violence. (Egbe Omo Ife, Dallas)
Ashutosh Varshney (2000), for example, argued that civil society social net­
works, both intra and inter-ethnic (organized and/or casual) played significant The above suggests that the Ife and Modakeke diaspora hometown associa­
roles, albeit differently, in ethnic conflict. Olaniyi (2003, pp. 341-342) also tions can be categorized as social networks. But, contrary to Varshney and Ola- 
noted that “social networks extricate and disentangle urban communities from nivi’s theses, these diaspora hometown associations were one of the factors that 
, ethnic chauvinism. Indeed, inter-ethnic social networks . . . constitute horizontal escalated the recent phase (1997-2000) of the Ife-Modakeke crisis. In one way 
•  ties that halt contentious issues from degenerating into horrendous violence.” It or the other, these offshore (diaspora) hometown associations played a critical 
is in this context that the roles of hometown associations, established by the role in the 1997-2000 phase of the crisis. The involvement of these associations 
indigenes o f  Ife and Modakeke communities in the United States and the United added, however, a new twist to the age-long crisis. This is because never before 
Kingdom, are examined. the 1997-2000 incident was there any record o f external (offshore) involvement 
Hometown associations were established by Ife and Modakeke indigenes in in the crisis.
the diaspora. Among the notable ones are the Ife Descendants Union, United One significant, though rather negative, contribution of especially the Mod­
States, Modakeke Progressive International, United States, and Egbe Omo Ife, akeke Progressive International, United States, was in creating a propaganda 
United States, and Modekeke Progressive Union, the United Kingdom, with space through the Internet. The association maintained an active website through 
branches in Europe and the United States. A cursory look at these diaspora ho­ which it disseminated information about the crisis to the whole world. The in­
metown associations reveals a number of salient facts. First, these associations formation on the website, however, reflected the Modakeke version/side o f the 
had relationship with sister associations in Nigeria (or better put, they were age-long struggle. Though the association claimed that the website was not a 
branches o f  the parent associations in Ife and Modakeke communities in Nige­ propaganda space, yet, it painted the Ife as the guilty party, the belligerent, and 
ria). Second, these associations had active Internet presence. Third, the associa­ bellicose community. For example, commenting on the issue o f Ishakole (royal­
tions had organizational structures, which were either formal or informal. ty) (which was one of the issues that underpinned the crisis), the association 
Fourth, they were non-profit, non-political organizations in nature. And lastly, stated that
their principal objective was the promotion of the socio-econonjic development 
of their respective communities in Nigeria. For example, the Ife Descendants The payment of Isakole continued till March 29, 1978 when the Land Use De­
p in io n  (IDU) in Houston, in the United States, established in 2000, had as part of cree was promulgated by the Obasanjo regime. The Decree vested the owner­
its objectives, ship of all land in the state. All the citizens have as from that date become te­
nants of the state. Being habituated to living on other people’s sweet, the Ife 
To develop lie Ife technologically, socially, and economically;. . . preserve the stoutly resisted the enforcement of the Decree . . .  It is against this background 
rich and diverse culture of Ile-Ife and improve the image of He Ife in the global that the fierceness and desperation with which Ifes are now pursuing their mad 
arena. To serve as a vehicle for the promotion of economic development of He and unlawful ambition can be best appreciated. It is foreign to their culture to apply themselves to tasks capable of securing their tomorrow. It is, however,
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
204 Globalization, Identity, and the Escalation of Ife-Modakcke Crisis Olajide O. Akanji 205
congenital and hereditary in them to seek to appropriate the product of other’s 
labor. What a despicable and dishonorable way of life. (Modakeke Progressive Foreign M unitions
International, Houston)
Another issue that escalated the recent phase of the crisis was the availability 
In another place, the association pointed out that * and use o f  sophisticated weapons. Foreign munitions, such as machine guns, AK 
47 rifles, cartridge rifles, among others, were common features of the crisis 
We have lived side by side for more than a hundred and sixty years, they have between 1997 and 2000i.'This was attested to by the police commissioner in 
not been able to integrate or assimilate us through natural processes. Now they 
are desperate to do it by force of arms. . . . They don’t have the population. Osun State, Mr. Sunday Aghedo, who, though he initially denied the use of 
They don’t have the material resources. They don’t even have the goodwill, fel­ sophisticated and imported weapons outside of locally made weapons by the 
low-feeling or spirit of comradeship which are fundamental requirements for combatants, revealed that highly sophisticated weapons were being used (Akan­
anyone who wants another person to associate or identify with him. They now ji, 2007, p. 222). Similarly, the arrest in 1997 of a principal actor, from one of 
resorted to force to realize their dream status of Lords and masters in a feudal the warring communities in the raging crisis with large quantities of sophisti­
enclave in which others will labor for them to live, it is this inhumanity, and cated arms, points to the presence and use o f  sophisticated foreign munitions in 
indeed bestiality that we are resisting and continue to resist. (Modakeke Pro­ the crisis (Akanji, 2007, p. 222). The pertinent question this raises is: “How did 
gressive International, Houston) such weapons get into the hands of the combatants?” A quick and simple answer 
to this is that, in the age of globalization, arms and ammunition do not have 
The website was no doubt a propaganda media by the Modakeke communi­ bounds any more. They can be easily procured, whenever the means and will to 
ty in the diaspora, given the sly and provocative nature o f its content. Through do so are available. But, beyond this, and given the connection the two commun­
this medium, the Modakeke in the diaspora were encouraged and mobilized to ities had with the outside world through their hometown associations in the 
support their kith and kin fighting the Ife between 1997 and 2000 in Nigeria. United States and United Kingdom, it is possible to deduce that the Diaspora 
Thus, instead of engendering means to an early and amicable resolution of the hometown associations aided the procurement of foreign munitions. In the same 
^risis, the content of the association’s website, which was inflammatory and vein, it would indeed be a misnomer not to link the availability of foreign, so­
critical of the Ife political elite, on the one hand, and the generality of Ife com­ phisticated munitions to the financial contributions of the Diaspora hometown 
munity, on the other, escalated it. associations to the “contributory schemes” in the two communities. Another 
Another impact of the diaspora hometown associations in the crisis was in way, however, to answer the question is to consider the allegations that the fed­
the provision of funds. Ife and Modakeke in the diaspora, through membership eral government of Nigeria supplied the Ife community with sophisticated wea­
in hometown associations in the countries of their residence, contributed finan­ pons during the crisis. This allegation was based on the fact that some of the 
cially towards the cause of their communities in Nigeria. This was due to the weapons seized by Modakeke combatants from Ife combatants bore the insignia 
existence, at the time, o f community contributory scheme in both Ife and Mod­ of the federal government. This, on an objective note, could have been arms 
akeke communities in Nigeria. For example, the community contributory seized from some of the policemen dispatched by the government to the two 
scheme was referred to as “Owo menumo" (i.e., a secret contribution) in Mod­ communities during the crisis.
akeke (Olawade, 2003), while among the Ife, it was carried out under the guise But, whichever way the issue is considered, the fact that sophisticated wea­
o f development levy (Ajayi, 2003; Modakeke Progressive International, Hou­ pons were used in the communal crisis shows the centrality of globalization in it. 
ston). The scheme was, however, voluntary, but the fact that members of the two This is because the process of globalization facilitates and enhances mobility 
communities were convinced o f the rightness of their communal cause made and movement of people and materials, including weapons, across borders and 
them to wholeheartedly participate in it. This scheme provided the means by space. This no doubt explains why the crisis, particularly between 1997 and 
which the combatants in both communities were fed and equipped, and the mer­ 2000, was gruesome and with high human and material cost. The gale o f arson 
cenaries among them were paid (Akanji, 2007, p. 225). It should, however, be that characterized the 1997-2000 crises was unprecedented, given the fact that 
noted that the community contributions scheme may not have been the only there had not been any other time when the casualty rate was as high as that of 
source of finance for the conflict. Ajayi (2003), for example, alleged that the Ife the period. For example, in 1981, a total o f about 20 people died; not less than 
fiinded the crisis from the community contributory scheme and donations of 100 sustained injuries of one form or the other, while properties worth millions 
money and materials by Ife indigenes home and abroad. He equally argued that o f naira were either burnt or looted (Ibidapo-Obe, 1981, p. 29). In 1983, the 
Ife political elite used their positions and connection in government to import, crisis resulted in the death of 7 people; 21 persons suffered varying degrees of 
under diplomatic cover, large quantity of arms. injury, and many valuable properties were vandalized or destroyed (Omolowo, 
1983, p. 1). However, though the 1997-2000 incidences lacked any official
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
206 Globalization, Identity, and the Escalation of Ife-Modakeke Crisis Olajide O. Akanji 207
record o f the statistics o f the losses that attended it, a newspaper report put it as Aleru, J.O. (2006). Old Oyo and the hinterland. Ibadan: Textflow Ltd.
over 600 deaths and properties worth several millions destroyed (Akanji, 2009, Egbe Omo Ife, Dallas, (n.d.). Egbe Omo Ife, Dallas, Texas, USA: The home of the crad- 
p. 46). Similarly, the fact that the recent phase o f the crisis lasted for four unbro­ lers. Retrieved June 10, 2009 from http://egbeomoifcdallas.org.
ken years attests to its unprecedented nature. Federal Government ofNigeria (FGN). (1996, December). Official gazette 83(72). (State Creation Transitional Provision) Decree no. 36. Abuja: Government Press.
Federal Government ofNigeria (FGN). (1997, March). Official gazette 84(7). (Local 
Government Basic Constitutional Transitional Provisions) Decree no. 7. Abuja: 
Conclusion Government Press.
Federal Government ofNigeria (FGN). (1998, December). Official gazette 85(65). (Local 
The foregoing analysis has attempted to situate the escalation of the Ife- Government Basic Constitutional Transitional Provisions) Decree no. 36. Abuja: 
Modakeke crisis within the context of globalization. Globalization, the chapter Government Press.
noted, engendered the formation of diaspora hometown associations by Ife and “FG names new LGs” (1996, December 5). The Punch, pp. 1-2, 6.Ibidapo-Obe, K. (1981) Report o f the judicial commission o f inquiry into the communal 
Modakeke people in the United States and the United Kingdom. These associa­ disturbances in Oranmiyan central local government area. Ibadan: Government 
tions provided propaganda space and served as the conduit pipes for external Press.
funding o f the crisis. In addition, the Diaspora hometown associations engen­ Ife Descendants Union, Houston. (2000). I.D.U. lle-Ife: Where the World Begins. Re­
dered the availability and use of sophisticated weapons and other foreign muni­ trieved June 10, 2009, from http://ifedescendants.org.
tions in a crisis that was purely local in nature. These escalated the crisis and Johnson, S. (1921). The history o f the Yorubas: From the earliest times to the beginning 
intensified the casualty rate. Besides this, British colonial activities among the o f the British protectorate. Lagos: C.M.S Bookshop.
Yoruba people, which started in 1893 and lasted all through to 1960, equally Modakeke Progressive International, Houston, (n.d.). Modakeke and Ife: How it all 
shaped the crisis. In all, the long drawn, protracted nature of the Ife-Modakeke began. Retrieved June 10, 2009, from http://modakeke.org.
crisis was no doubt a function of a number of factors, including the process of National Archives. (1922a). Re-migration of Modakeke: Correspondence about, in file 
globalization. This partly explains why the crisis has remained knotty despite no. 1929, Vol. I, Oyo Prof 1. Ibadan.National Archives. (1922b). Letter from Mr. Birch, the District Officer, Ibadan to the 
^several interventions by governments, individuals, groups, and non­ Senior Resident, Oyo Province 25-3-1922. In file no. 1929, Vol. I, Oyo Prof I. Iba­
governmental bodies. dan.
National Archives. (1922c). Letter from W. A. Ross, Senior Resident, Oyo Province to 
the Secretary, Southern Province, Lagos, 16-10-1922. In file no. 1929, Vol. 1, Oyo 
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National Archives. (1947). Letter from the Modakeke Progressive Union, Lagos, to the 
Ajayi, J.F., & Akintoye, S.A. (1980). Yorubaland in the nineteenth century. In O. Ikime Senior Resident, Oyo Province, 18 August 1947. In file no. 1929 Vol. II, Oyo Prof. 
(Ed.), Groundwork o f Nigerian history, pp. 280-302. Ibadan: Heinemann Education­ I, Ibadan.
al Books Ltd. Olaniyi, R. O. (2003). Ethnic conflict, segregation and civil society: Metropolitan Kano 
Ajayi, I.O. Personal communication, December 12, 2003 (O.O. Akanji, interviewer). in contemporary time. In F. Laurent & 1. O. Albert (Eds.), Security, crime and se­
Akanji, O.O. (2007). Migration, group rights and communal conflicts in Ife-Modakeke, gregation in west African cities since the 19th century, pp. 333-352. Paris and Iba­
Nigeria. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Ibadan. dan: Karthala and IFRA.
Akanji, O.O. (2008). Identity-based conflicts in Africa: The case of Ife-Modakeke, Nige­ Olawade, T. Personal communication, October 25, 2003. (O.O. Akanji, interviewer).
ria. In B. Zewde (Ed.), Society, state and identity in African history, pp. 201-221. Omolowo, U. (1983, July 21). Press statement by Oyo state commissioner of police. 
Addis Abba: Forum for Social Studies (FSS). Daily Times, p. I
Akanji, O.O. (2009). Group rights and conflicts in Africa: A critical reflection on Ife- Oyeniyi, A. B. (2006). Problems of inter-group relations in Nigeria: Origin and causes of 
Modakeke, Nigeria. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 16(1). pp. Ife-Modakeke conflict. In O. Akinwunmi, O. O. Okpeh, Jr., & J. D. Gwamna (Eds.), 
31-51. \ Inter-group relations in Nigeria during the I9'h and 2(fh centuries, pp. .711-735. 
Akinjogbin, LA. (1992). Ife: The years of travail, 1793-1893. In I. A. Xkinjogbin (Ed.), Makurdi: Aboki Publishers.
The cradle o f race: Ife from the beginning to 1980, pp. 148-170. Port Harcourt: Su- Varshney, A. (2000). Ethnic conflict and civil society: India and beyond. Paper presented 
nray Publishers. at the 2000 research training workshop, Centre for Research and Documentation 
Alao, A. (2007). Natural resources and conflicts in Africa: The tragedy o f endowment. (CRD), Kano, Nigeria.
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Albert, I. O. (1999). Ife-Modakeke crisis. In O. Otite & I.O. Albert (Eds.), Community 
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UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
Chapter Sixteen
The 2001 T iv-Jukun Etetnic Crisis: The 
“Indigene-Settler” Factor 
Reconsidered
Moses T. Aluaigba
The Tiv-Jukun ethnic conflict remains one of the most prolonged and violent 
crises in Nigeria. Since its first episode in 1959, it has re-occurred in 1979- 
1980, 1990-1992 and 2001. The 2001 incident witnessed the worst human ca­
sualty and material loss. It has often been accounted for mainly by the “indi­
gene-settler” factor superseded by earlier migration of the Tiv people to the 
present Taraba State. This chapter, however, argues that there were other core 
predisposing factors responsible for the 2001 crisis, including the involvement 
of the federal government in the crisis, politics, poor management of previous 
occurrences, and the impact of globalization. The chapter recommends consti­
tutional amendment, implementation of the 10-point plan of action, guarantee 
of citizens’ rights, punishment of perpetrators of violence, and compensation of 
victims as ways of permanently ending the conflict.
Introduction
i
Polarisation between ethnic groups and resulting conflicts between them as they compete 
for resources, political and economic power and other goals, has spawned negative con­
sequences of tremendous proportions, of which genocide, ethnic cleansing and civil war 
are but a few examples (Stremlau, 1999, p. 1).
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210 The 2001 Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis Moses T. Aluaigba 21 I
Nigeria, undoubtedly, is a multi-ethnic state (Bamishaiye, 1976, p. 71). The deduction arising from the foregoing is that at independence, Nigeria 
Although there is no agreement among scholars on the exact number of ethnic inherited a culture o f ethnicity that produced an unending cycle o f ethnic con­
groups in Nigeria, it is estimated that between 250 and 400 different nationali­ flicts. These conflicts have not only been “a decisive factor in the country’s 
ties make up the political entity presently identified as Nigeria (International political turbulence and instability” (Suberu, 1996, p. 12), they‘have impeded 
, IDEA, 2000, p. 90; Agbese, 2001, p. 135; Maduagwu, 2004, p. 36; Leith & the process of national integration (Benjamin, 2002, p. 7) as well as “put a dam­
Solomon, 2006, p. 4). These various ethnic formations, as diverse in terms of per on further political and economic development” (Leith & Solomon, 2006, p. 
culture and language as they are, however, interacted at different levels in the 4 ).
pre-colonial era through trade, marriages, and even wars. These interactions The Tiv-Jukun ethnic conflict is one of the many conflicts in Nigeria, but 
prevailed until 1861 when the British systematically colonized the territory via apparently is the most prolonged ethnic conflict predating even the birth of 
suppression and finally created Nigeria through the historical act of the amalga­ modem Nigeria (Alubo, 2006, p. 89). The uniqueness of the conflict stems from 
mation in 1914. This creation was later to be described by Nigeria’s foremost the fact that it remains “the most violent and well organized ever witnessed 
nationalists Obafemi Awolowo and Ahmadu Bello as “a mere geographical outside the Nigerian civil war” (Best, 1999, p. 86). The terrifying aspect o f the 
expression” and “the mistake of 1914” respectively (Maduagwu, 2004, p. 37). Tiv-Jukun conflict is its propensity to unleash heavy human casualty and ma­
These statements right from the outset crystallized the burning problems inhe­ terial loss on the two ethnic groups whenever the conflict occurs. Beginning in 
rent in the divergent emerging Nigerian state, with ethnicity being one o f such 1959, the Tiv-Jukun standoff has taken place severally in 1979, then in 1987, 
core problems. 1990, and 2001 (Bur, 2002, p. 10).
Most writers attribute the negative traits of ethnicity in Nigeria to the co­ The 2001 Tiv-Jukun conflict stands out clearly as the most devastating 
lonial experience which the country went through (Philips, 1984, pp. 153-155; episode o f the crisis compared to its previous incidents. This is based on the 
Kankara, 1998, pp. 2 -11; Odunuga, 1999, p. 221; International IDEA, 2000, p.’ carnage and material loss occasioned by the crisis (Okocha, 2001, p. 5) that 
144; Leith & Solomon, 2006, p. 4). For example, Leith and Solomon argue that attracted the attention o f the international community. Various factors have been 
used in explaining the 2001 crisis, principal among which is the “indigene- 
[a]s a result of boundary demarcation during the colonial period, Nigeria as po- settler” issue. What this chapter has attempted to do is to employ other equally 
•  iuical entity was created in 1914—a multi-ethnic nation consisting of more very fundamental factors in explaining the 2001 Tiv-Jukun ethnic tragedy. Some 
than 200 ethnic groups speaking over 250 languages. . . . Although these other factors considered include the role played by politics in the conflict, poor 
groups interacted with one another before the colonial era, they were not pri­
mordial societies, and the artificiality of the British-drawn boundaries contri­ management of previous occurrences, the involvement of government in the 
buted to the social construction of these ethnic groups, so much so that the 2001 version of the conflict, as well as the impact of globalization, which 
creation of these ‘tribes’ [is] closely linked to the era of colonial rule. (2006 p created an enabling environment that fuelled the crisis.
4)
The International IDEA (2000) further underscores the point raised by Leith Defining Ethnic Conflict
and Solomon (2006) above to the effect that it is on the basis o f the institution of 
ethnicity in Nigeria by the British colonialist that the Nigerian ruling elite has Ethnic conflict has been defined by Rosel (1995, p. 123) as “a conflict which 
capitalized on the circumstance to manipulate ethnicity in an attempt to preserve result from real or perceived ethnic differences, which in their turn are en­
their interest, with ethnic conflicts as the resultant centrifugal consequences in hanced, re-interpreted and politicized with the help of a new and dangerous 
the country. Indeed, doctrine— ethnic nationalism.” Rosel further points out that there is always a 
tendency for such a conflict to degenerate into “an armed conflict . . .  to the 
The Nigerian political elite who inherited the powers of the colonialists at inde­ point where both parties reach the conviction that their opponent seeks their own 
pendence in I960, continued this manipulation of ethnic differences for their total destruction and where— in a posture of defence—each will try to annihilate 
own selfish interests. In the process . . ., the urban-based ethnicity of the past the adversary first” (1995, p. 124).
•  has now been reinforced by ethnic mobilization in rural areas, which pits ethnic In an attempt to conceptualize ethnic conflict, Bangura (1995, p. 6) ob­
communities against one another in an attempt to claim entitlements on ethnic 
basis. The Hausa-Kataf, Jukun-Tiv, Kuteb-Jukun, Hausa-Mambilla and Ogoni- serves that “many ethnic conflicts erupt spontaneously, most need political en­
Andoni blood-lettings are concrete examples of this. (International IDEA trepreneurs or mobilisers, a network of organizations, and a discourse or set of 
2000, p. 93) principles or ideas to activate them.” He concludes that any time a conflict 
erupts, “there are usually two or more organizations competing, sometimes 
violently, for the loyalty of an ethnic group” (1995, p. 6). Cohen (cited in Leith
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
212 The 2001 Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis Moses T. Aluaigba 213
& Solomon, 2006, p. 3) conceives ethnic conflict as a situation that is deter­ continent, thus emerging as either kingdoms or empires with varying histories of 
mined by what he calls “self/other relationship.” In this kind o f relationship, origin.
,, there is subjective perception o f identities anchored on self—interest that the According to Denga (cited in Alubo, 2006, p. 89), the Tiv, a Bantu 
groups involved seek to protect and satisfy at all costs; this provides an igniting offspring, migrated from Central Africa via the Cameroons to their present ab­
force to propel a conflict. ode in the Benue Valley in the eighteenth century. The migration o f  the Tiv who 
No matter the notion attached to ethnic conflict, what is clear and must be are traditionally farmers to .this area was triggered by the search for fertile farm­
borne in mind is that ethnic conflict is characterized by an instance in which two lands and expansion in their population. According to the Tiv account of the 
or more contending ethnic groups, on the basis o f their ethnic differences and conflict, they first settled in “Waka” which was later renamed by the Jukun as 
scarce resources, are entangled in a clash which could be violent in a bid to Wukari (Best et al., 1999, p. 88); at the time of their settlement, the Jukun were 
outwit each other in the course of preserving the interest o f either o f the groups still in the site of their ancient Kwararafa Kingdom, eighty-three kilometers 
involved. This conflictual relation in most cases results in catastrophe in terms north o f  Wukari. The Jukun only came to “Waka” on invitation by the already 
o f human and material losses. settled Tiv group and subsequently renamed and took control o f the town. This 
claim o f  indigeneship of Wukari by the Tiv coupled with other accompanying 
emerging factors accounted for the recent violent conflicts between these two 
Antecedents of the Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Conflict minority ethnic nationalities in the past four decades.
The Jukun, on the other hand, migrated from Yemen along with the Kanuri 
There is no consensus on the genesis o f the confrontation between the Tiv and who settled in Lake Chad while the Jukun settled in the Benue Valley where 
Jukun ethnic groups. According to Torwel (2005, p. 5), conflicts o f violent di­ they established the Kwararafa Kingdom that flourished up to the nineteenth 
mension between the Tiv and Jukun have occurred since 1953. To Bur (2002, p. century (Asuni, 1999, p. 2; Best et al., 1999, p. 87; Anifowose, 2003, p. 50). 
10), the first occurrence of the clash between the two groups started in 1959. On This Jukun kingdom thrived until it collapsed due to the activities o f the invad­
the contrary, Anifowose (2003, p. 52) states that violent conflict involving the ing Fulani Jihadists. With this fall, the Jukun shifted base to Peju and again from 
Tiv and Jukun people was first recorded in 1977 in the Wukari area o f the then there, the capital was finally set up in 1840 in Wukari. The Jukun claimed that 
Gongola State. However, what these divergent accounts indicate is that there is a they were the original indigenes of Wukari while the Tiv were the settlers or 
long standing feud between the Tiv and Jukun ethnic nationalities. newcomers because the Jukun out of generosity gave a portion of the land to the 
Prior to the era of colonialism, the Tiv and Jukun groups enjoyed a harmo­ early Tiv immigrants to settle. However, due to the rapidly growing population 
nious inter-ethnic relationship (Alubo, 2006, p. 97; Avav, 2002, p. 14). The two of the Tiv, they started expanding their settlements to other Jukun towns and 
groups lived with other ethnic groups such as Chamba, Kuteb, Ichen, Hausa, areas. In doing this, the Tiv renamed the new settlements using Tiv names. For 
Fulani, etc. in what was later carved out as Wukari Federation. The coming of example, “Tsokundi was renamed as Ayu, Chachanji changed to Peva, Rafin 
the British colonialists changed this cordiality between the Tiv and Jukun be­ Kado to Genyi, Bako to Abako, Kante to Santyo, Wukari to Waka” (Best et al., 
cause the nature o f colonial policy in the area favored the Jukun more than the 1999, p. 107). This created fear of domination among the Jukun; hence they 
Tiv (Anifowose, 2003, p. 50; Alubo, 2006, p. 96). This was more so given that embarked on the “rejukunization” process, a plan of re-conquest that has made 
the Jukuns were more receptive to the British colonizers while the Tivs vehe­ bloody conflicts inevitable.
mently resisted the British conquerors. Similarly, the Jukun had established 
formal political structure amenable to the British Indirect Rule system unlike the 
Tiv whose republican nature precluded any centralized government. The British The 2001 Version of the Crisis
therefore brought the Tiv and other surrounding ethnic groups under the authori­
ty o f the Aku Uka perceived to be superior to other groups (Hagher, 2002, p. The 2001 Tiv-Jukun conflict was a replica of preceding episodes. In short, it has 
10); naturally this planted a seed of discord among the Tiv and Jukun who were been seen as an offshoot of past contestations between the two groups over 
hitherto friends. issues as land, acceptance of Tiv as indigenes o f  Taraba State, inclusion of the 
'  Anthropological records (see Asuni, 1999; Best et al., 1999) indicate that Tiv in Wukari Traditional Council, fears of domination over Jukun by Tiv and 
both the Tiv and Jukun migrated to Wukari in the present-day Taraba State of the issue o f  marginalization (Alubo, 2006, pp. 109-110). What set the 2001 
Nigeria. The peak of these migrations is shrouded in the criss-cross movement crisis aside distinctively is the scale of brutality, human rights abuse, and high 
of various ethnic groups across the entire African continent in the eighteenth human casualty rate as well as the manner the disaster was ignored by the feder­
century. These movements underscore the dislocation of many ethnic groups in al government under the then President Obasanjo (Human Rights Watch, 
Africa who happened to have migrated in part or in total to other parts o f the 2002a).
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
214 The 2001 Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis Moses T. Aluaigba 215
The incident that immediately triggered the 2001 conflict began on June 13, Date of Events
2001, when a Tiv farmer and Fulani herdsman engaged each other at Tse Occurrence Tiv Account Jukun Account
Ikyambe, a village co-habited by the Tiv, Fulani, Hausa, Etulo, and Sayawa 9/8/2001 Toho Abanyi village was Three vehicles were burnt at Jootar along 
ethnic nationalities. According to Hagher (2002), attacked and two people with passengers.
were killed.
On that fateful day, . . .  [a] Fulani herdsman, trespassed into the farm of Mr. 9/9/2001 Governor Akume visited Jootar and or- 
Iortim Umande, a Tiv farmer. When challenged by the farmer, the Fulani dered the military men to leave the area.
herdsman drew his dagger and stabbed the Tiv farmer to death. This led to re­ 9/12/2001 Jandekyura (Tiv village) was attacked by 
prisals by the Tiv, and subsequently the Jukun took over and wage war o f eth­ the Fulanis.
nic cleansing on the Tiv o f Taraba State. (2002, p. 26) 9/12/2001 The Police reported that Tiv killed one of 
their officers at Jandekyura.______________
There are conflicting chronologies of how the crisis unfolded based on self- 9/13/2001 Jandekyura was attacked. Sondi was attacked by Tiv.
exonerative accounts by both the Tiv and Jukun people; these varied accounts in 
slight details highlight the day-to-day narrative of all the events during the pe­ 9/14/2001 Gur village near Jootar Fyayi village was destroyed by Tiv.was attacked.
riod of the inferno. Table 16.1 is the tabulated Tiv-Jukun side-by-side account of 9/15/2001 Jukun attacked Vaase and Vaase village was attacked by Fulani.
the crisis in 2001: a lunatic was killed.
9/17/2001 Rafin Kada was attacked by Tiv.
Table 16.1: Chronology of Events in the 2001 Tiv-Jukun Con­ 9/20/2001 Arufu, Ikwe, and Akwana were reported 
flict in Taraba State to have been burnt down by the Tiv,9/25/2001 Chinkai was attacked by Tiv, 1 killed,
four injured.
Date of Events 9/26/2001 Chinkai was attacked again by the Tiv.
Occurrence Tiv Account Jukun Account
6/13/2001 Fulani herd trespassed into Fulani herd trespassed into a Tiv man’s 10/ 1/2001 Rafin Kada was attacked a second time by 
a Tiv man’s farm. The farm. The incidence resulted in some loss the Tiv, two boys killed, three injured, 
incidence resulted in a of life. operation lasted for 4 hours and 25 mi­
fight and there was loss of nutes.
life. 10/4/2001 Dooshima village was attacked, and road 
6/21/2001 Aku Uka called for a meeting to calm the block mounted by the Tiv was dismantled 
tension between Tiv/Fulani. by a combined Fulani/Jukun/Hausa 
7/2/2001 Fulani attacked Tor Danusa village, Don­ youths, Ibi LGA.
ga Local Government Area (LGA). 10/6/2001 Abako (Tiv/Jukun village, predominantly 
7/3/2001 A staff o f PH Construction Company was Tiv) and the road block mounted by the 
shot (Donga LGA) by Tiv. Tiv dismantled.
7/6/2001 Meeting on Tiv-Fulani crisis. 10/7/2001 Abako attacked.
8/13/2001 One Fulani man was killed, another in­ 10/10/2001 Nineteen soldiers were 
jured by Tiv at cattle market, Katsina- Ala captured at Vaase by Tiv 
road, Wukari. militia group. The soldiers 
9/5/2001 Ikyaior was attacked and Chonku village was attacked by the Tiv. were moved to Zaki-Biam 
14 people (12 Tiv, 2 Igbo) and killed.
were killed. 10/13/2001 Dan Anacha in Gassol Dan Anacha was attacked by the Jukun 
9/6/2001 Jootar was attacked and LGA was attacked. militia.
three people killed.
9/7/2001 Gboogboo was attacked 10/19/2001 Soldiers on a reprisal 
and two people were attack invaded Kyado.
killed.
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216 The 2001 Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis Moses T. Aluaigba 217
Date of 
Occurrence EventsTiv Account Date of Events
10/22/2001 Jukun AccountSoldiers attacked defense­ Occurrence Tiv Account Jukun Account
less civilians at Gbeji and 3/21/2002 Refugees from Wukari 
killed over 150 civilians. LGA were repatriated.
—
10/23/2001 Zaki-Biam was razed, 3/16/2002 Two Fulanis killed at Tsokundi road and 
properties were destroyed, over 40 cows killed too, seven herds of 
over 100 people killed, cattle were taken to Benue State. Also, a 
thousands fled to the car was shot at Rafin Kada road by the 
hinterland. Tiv.
I 1/15/2001 3/26/2002 An Achaba (motorcycle) boy was killed Nigeria Red Cross Society distributed by Tiv at Ikyaior village after conveying 
relief materials to refugees in Wukari.
11/18/2001 the Tiv home, the motorcycle was taken One Fulani man was killed at Asaa (Jukun away.
village) by the Tiv.
11/23/2001 3/30/2002 A Tiv militia in army uniform was caught One Mallam Wuryeba Adunga Yerima at Gidan ldi.
Ason was killed by the Tiv and his body 
dumped in a well by the Tiv.
12/5/2001 Source: Compiled from Alubo, O. (2006). Nigeria: Ethnic Conflicts and Citi­300 cows belonging to the Fulani were 
killed by the Tiv at Tsokundi. zenship Crises in the Central Region (pp. 116-119). Ibadan: PEFS.
12/9/2001 Three Jukuns were shot at Chinkai by the 
Tiv. The pattern of perpetuating violence during the conflict was swift. Both 
12/10/2001 One Fulani and one Jukun were shot at sides made use of well-armed youth militia as well as retired military officers. 
Nwuben bv the Tiv. According to Alubo, the violence that was unleashed on either side was charac­
^  12/17/2001 Chinkai was attacked by the Tiv two terized by:
people killed, four badly injured.
12/29/2001 • Burning of houses;Arewa Consultative Forum visited Wukari • Killings of the enemy;
for fact finding.
1/6/2002 • Stop and search operations through which the enemy is pulled A woman was killed at Rafin Rada by the 
Tiv. from passing vehicles and summarily executed;
1/20/2002 Four people were shot at Bantage and a • Looting of property', including food and other farm produce;
farm was set ablaze by the Tiv, • Stealing of domestic animals and/or their slaughter by militia 
1/2 1//2002 A woman was hurt at Sondi by the Tiv. groups;
• Molestation of women; and,
2/ 12/2002 Five Jukun women were kidnapped by the • Mass exodus to safety (2006, pp. 115-116).
Tiv.
2/12/2002 Two vehicles were bent at Tsokundi by 
the Tiv. The precise number o f casualties from both the Tiv and Jukun sides arising 
2/15/2002 from the 2001 crisis has not been ascertained compared to the 1990-1992 occur­Seven cows rustled at Chinkai by the Tiv rences in which up to 6,000 people were reported killed (ISHR West African 
2/16/2002 Thirty cows taken away from Yantukpa Committee, 2001, p. 6). Although as documented by ISHR West African Com­
by the Tiv to Benue Stattj, one pickup van mittee (2001, p. 8), 500 unarmed civilians were killed when the troops from the 
was seized at Sondi by the Tiv militia 23rd Armoured Brigade from Takum on October 23, 2001, raided Zaki-Biam and 
# / 18/2002 A Fulani man killed and beheaded at the villages of Vaase, Gbej'i, Anyiin, and Jootar. This number of the dead ex­
Rafin Kada road by the Tiv. cludes those killed by the Tiv and Jukun militants in various warring locations in 
3/7/2002 Refugees from Ibi LGA Taraba and some parts of Benue States. Another source (see Alubo, 2006, p. 
were repatriated back to 
Ibi. 125) has it on record that 15 villages were raided by the army. With regard to 
3/14/2002 Refugees from Gassol refugees, the Environment and Development Challenges News (n.d., 1) account 
LGA were repatriated. indicates that over 50,000 people were internally displaced by the conflict. The 
bottom line of all these records is that the conflict was a monumental calamity as
UNIVERSI Y OF IBADAN LIBRARY
218 The 2001 Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis Moses T. Aluaigba 219
both sides in the crisis suffered heavy human and materia! losses as well as lions into the National Assembly, the Nigeria Peoples Congress (NPC) Jukun 
social dislocation. * candidate lost to the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) 3 iv candidate.
In 1983, when Alhaji Bamanga Tukur won the governorship election in the 
* former Gongola State, he attributed the victory to the support given to him by 
Factors Responsible for the 2001 Episode the Tiv and went ahead to appoint a Tiv man, Dr. Samuel Tor Agbidye, as 
commissioner to the chagrjn and surprise of the Jukuns (Best et al., 1999, p. 95). 
A myriad of factors collaborated in exacerbating the 2001 Tiv-Jukun conflict. In the 1987 local government elections in Wukari local government, the Tivs 
Ihese factors are, however, not in themselves adequate explanatory frameworks supported Alhaji Danladi Shehu, a Hausa man, to defeat the Jukun candidate. 
for full analysis of the crises because o f their attachment to deep-rooted contro­ Subsequently, a Tiv man was appointed deputy chairman of the local govern­
versies between the Tiv and Jukun in the past four decades during which the ment. Former governor o f  Taraba State, Jolly Nyame also appointed Hon. David 
conflict has been witnessed at different periods. Some o f these factors have been Orbee Uchiv as his special adviser. The rising political influence o f the Tiv in 
sketched below: Taraba politics has deepened Jukuns’ fear of political domination by the Tiv. In 
2001, there was therefore a “. . .  planned and deliberate effort to exterminate [the 
Tiv] people from Taraba” (Hagher, 2002, p. 197); this bred enough velocity 
“Indigene-Settler” Factor needed by the crisis to produce the kind of inferno witnessed in 2001.
The “indigene-settler” factor is often explained as being central to the Tiv-Jukun 
conflict (ISHR West African Committee, 2001, p. 6; Avav, 2002, p. 27; Anifo- Poor Management o f  Previous and the 2001 Episodes
wose, 2003, p. 54; Alubo, 2006, p. 92). However, the “ indigene-settler” issue 
alone is not sufficient enough in explicating the 2001 episode. The “indigene- The lackluster attitude of government in handling past Tiv-Jukun crises encour­
5, settler” factor has become a bone o f contention because, as it has been ex­ aged perpetrators of the atrocities during the 2001 case knowing fully well that 
plained, they would go unpunished in the long run. Government had never been firm in 
punishing culprits in the past; similarly the non-compensation and rehabilitation 
Since the creation of states about two decades ago other ethnic groups especial­ of victims o f earlier crises leaves the wounds inflicted on them unhealed. For 
ly in Taraba and Nasarawa States have viewed the Tiv as a threat. Consequent­ example, the 10-point agreement reached between the federal government and 
ly, they have been unwilling to share political power or natural resources with Taraba state government meant to ensure peace after the 1990-1993 crisis has 
the Tiv whom they now firmly refer to as “settlers” “immigrants” or “non- never been implemented (Anifowose, 2003, p. 54), the Tivs are still calling for 
indigenous.” (ISHR West African Committee, 2001, p. 6) its execution. As for the victims of the 2001 conflict, it was on July 5, 2007 (six 
years after the crisis), that an Enugu High Court headed by Justice Lewis Alla- 
It is in an attempt by the Jukun to re-claim their land from the non­ goa ordered the federal government to pay N41.8 billion as compensation to the 
indigenes the Tiv, and whenever a slight opportunity presents itself (as in 2001), victims o f the Zaki-Biam massacre (Anza, 2007, p. 46). Also, in the case of the 
it is capitalized upon to cause atrocious conflict. 2001 crisis, the partial “poor and insufficient handling of the situation . . . [and] 
the Nigerian military involvement on the side of the Jukun” (Torwel, 2005, p. 2) 
made the other party to the conflict, the Tiv, to ensure . . the effective and 
Political Consideration decisive defence of [their] territories and people. . .” (Hagher, 2002, p. 195). 
This exceedingly fueled the crisis.
Politics played a major role in fueling the 2001 episode o f the Tiv-Jukun con­
flict. According to Torwel (2005, p. 4), “. . . almost all the violent conflicts in­
volving Tivs and Jukuns occurred within political electioneering periods since Involvement o f  Government
. 1953.” The introduction o f party politics in Nigeria has always pitched the Ju­
kuns against the Tivs, and the two have always belonged to different political The involvement of the federal government in the 2001 conflict is well docu­
parties since 1954 (Asuni, 1999, p. 2). And due to the numerical strength of the mented (ISHR West African Committee, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 2002a; 
Tiv, candidates supported by the Tiv or o f the Tiv origin have always won elec­ Human Rights Watch, 2002b; Human Rights Watch, 2002c; Torwel, 2005; 
tions against their Jukun counterparts. For example, in the 1956 Federal Elec- Environmental & Development Challenges, not dated). On October 10, 2001, 19 
soldiers were captured at Vaase by Tiv militia and subsequently killed in Zaki-
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
Hie 2001 Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis Moses T. Aluaigba. 221
Biam. In an attempt to trace the killers of the 19 slain soldiers, on October 23, every Nigerian is a citizen in whatever part of the country he/she lives irres­
2001, soldiers from the 23rd Armoured Brigade of the Nigerian army based in pective of place o f birth and must be accorded full rights as an indigene of 
Yola, Adamawa, invaded the four villages of Anyiin, Zaki-Biam, Gbeji, and the place. This will surely reduce, if not eradicate, the prevalence o f ethnic 
I se-Adoor utilizing heavy weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, conflicts (such as the 2001 Tiv-Jukun conflict) based on the dichotomy be­
and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. According to reports, the “soldiers were tween who is an indigene and who is a non-indigene among Nigerians.
under specific orders from the government of President Obasanjo and his De­ b) Implementation o f the 10-point plan of action: After the series o f  crises 
fence Minister General Yakubu Danjuma . . (ISHR West African Committee, between the Tiv and Jukun from 1990 to 1993, the federal government in­
2001, p. 2) to carry out the operation. This overt intervention o f government- tervened to adjudicate. A 10-point plan of action was the major output of 
controlled army in the conflict against one side to the crisis, the Tiv, regrettably the intervention and in it, the governments of Taraba and Benue States were 
led to the Tivs’ suffering heavy casualties. This no doubt exacerbated the crisis. to provide equal opportunities in employment to all indigenes devoid of 
ethnic or indigeneship consideration. This plan has not been implemented 
by these states. If it is implemented, it will serve as a long-term, if not a 
Impact o f  Globalization permanent solution to the long-standing dispute between Tiv and Jukun in­
habitants of these states by diluting sentiments amongst the two groups.
Many analysts (for example, see Cohen, 2001, p. 75; Holton, 2000, p. 140; c) Guarantee of citizens’ rights: The two states should guarantee citizenship 
Snow, 2008, p. 147; UNDP Report, 2001, p. 345; Woods, 2001, p. 389) of glo­ rights to all their inhabitants. The federal government must compel the two 
balization have highlighted their objection to the phenomenon because of its states o f Taraba and Benue involved in the conflict to guarantee citizenship 
excruciating consequences on developing societies. Apart from the economic rights to all their inhabitants. Rights that relate to life, property, jobs, etc. 
distortion in developing countries occasioned by the dismantling of national should be given to all Jukun residents in Benue just as the same should be 
economic boundaries thus accelerating interconnectedness and giving way to given to Tivs living in Taraba.
free flow of capital, products, and services, globalization has produced varie­ d) Punishment of perpetrators: Perpetrators of violence during the 2001 con­
gated fo-rns o f  insecurity in the world today. Insecurity of individuals and their flict must be identified and prosecuted through the law courts, and if found 
A  communities is compromised because of the advantage the unrestricted illegal guilty must be punished accordingly. This will serve as a deterrent to others 
trade in anus, drugs, and women the globalized economy offers. This pesky with a similar intention to foment trouble in the future to refrain from doing 
development . . is contributing to the violence and crime that threatens neigh­ so.
bourhoods around the world” (UNDP Report, 2001, p. 345). This scenario of e) Compensation: The federal government should devise a mechanism of 
violence and criminality is typified by the carnage that transpired during the compensating all the victims of the 2001 crisis. This will ameliorate the 
2001 Tiv-Jukun conflict. Due to the free flow of weapons into Nigeria from psychological trauma such surviving victims experienced, and it will tre­
neighboring countries, both the Tiv and Jukun groups accessed these arms with mendously foster faster reconciliation among the communities that were in­
ease. The willful use o f these weapons during the crisis gave it the attribute as volved in the conflict.
one o f the most violent inter-group conflicts Nigeria has ever experienced since 
independence.
Conclusion
Recommendations Conflict is undoubtedly inevitable especially in human relations. The ability o f a 
given society to develop mechanism(s) of settling conflicts whenever they erupt 
The resolution of conflicts involving ethnic groups is a herculean task that is among groups that make up such a society without recourse to violence deter­
odious. However, in the case of the last Tiv-Jukun conflict that occurred in mines how matured that society is. It is also a measure o f the level o f  advance­
2001, the following recommendations are made: ment the society has reached in overcoming the excesses of primordial senti­
♦ V ments in its fold. Nigeria, has contended with the problem of ethnic conflicts 
1 Constitutional amendment: The constitutional review proposed by the Na­ since independence without any headway in sight towards permanently eliminat­
tional Assembly and billed to take off in 2008 must ensure that Chapter III, ing the dreadful social ill.
Sections 25, 26, and 27 of the 1999 Constitution which deals with citizen­ The Tiv-Jukun conflict with particular reference to the 2001 episode dis­
ship must be amended to be unambiguous on the issues of citizenship and cussed in this chapter is one of the conflicts in Nigeria whose solution still re­
indigeneship in Nigeria. The constitution must state clearly the fact that mains elusive. Already tens of thousands of lives have been lost in the conflict
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
222 The 2001 Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis Moses T. Aluaigba 223
as well as properties valued at millions of naira. Even those who survived the Environmental & Development Challenges, (n.d.). NIGERIA: Resource aspects of com­
crisis have either been dislocated or totally disorganized in life. Inter-communal munal clashes. Retrieved May 24, 2006, from
relations have gone sour and have been poisoned with hatred. It is difficult for http://www.edcnews.se/Research/Nigeria-Tiv.html.Hagher, I. (2002). Beyond hate and violence: Understanding the Tiv struggle for citizen­
development to be nursed both at the individual and societal levels under this ship rights and social justice in Nigeria. Ibadan: Caltop Publications.
kind of scenario. Government, in tune with best practices around the world, Holton, R. (2000). Globalization’s cultural consequences. Annals of the American Acad­
must always be impartial in handling conflicts of this nature. For the Tiv and emy o f Political and Social Science, 570, pp. 140-52.
Jukun people, they must recognize that time has come for them to permanently Human Rights Watch. (20t)2a). Nigeria: President ignoring gravity of military massacre. 
sheathe their swords and to know that better, modern mechanisms of resolving Retrieved May 23, 2006, from
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zation debate, pp. 387-99. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Chapter Seventeen
Petroleum , the Environment, and the 
Economics of Nationalism in the 
Niger Delta
Sheriff Folarin and Henry Okodua
The Niger Delta conflict has come into global limelight for some time. The in­
digenes of the area have agitated over the sordid acts of ecocide and the ab­
sence of physical development. In recent months, several factors have added a 
dangerous twist to the crisis. They include organized militia formations, the 
most notorious of which is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND); expanding nature militia operations, including their attacks of 
Niger Delta and non-Delta targets of national strategic importance such as the 
oil installations; the July 2009 attack of the Lagos Atlas Cove; and kidnapping 
of expatriates working in the oil fields. This chapter reviews the various dimen­
sions and manifestations of the crisis and makes a number of recommendations.
\ Introduction
¥ The Niger Delta crisis has, in very recent times, taken a much more dangerous 
dimension, underscoring the degeneration of the issue due to the failure of gov­
ernments at all levels and other non-state actors, including the multinational 
companies (MNCs), to bring the crisis to an end. The emergence of militia and 
cult groups among the communities in the last three years points to the aggrava­
tion and deterioration, rather than resolution, of the conflicts. The government’s
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226 Petroleum, the Environment, and the Niger Delta S h er iff Folarin and Henry Okodua 227
seeming complicity and protection of the MNCs, using instruments of coercion more species of freshwater fish, economic trees, and a wide variety of crops than 
to protect the foreign companies, has multiplied illegal means and instruments to any other ecosystem in W est Africa.
fight the cause of “economic and social emancipation,” as some militants In 1956, Shell British Petroleum (now Royal Dutch Shell) discovered crude 
claimed in February 2007 in an interview by Jeff Koniange of the American oil at Oloibiri, a village in  the Niger Delta, and began commercial production in 
Cable News Network (CNN). This study examines the protracted Niger Delta 1958. Today, there are 6 0 6  oil fields in the Niger Delta, of which 360 are on­
crisis, exacerbated by oil, ecological, and socio-ethnic factors, and its implica­ shore and 246 off shore (EIA, Nigeria Country Analysis Brief, 2005). Nigeria is 
tion for Nigeria’s external relations. It does this by revisiting the many unre­ now the largest oil producer in Africa and the sixth largest in the world, averag­
solved issues, including the Ogoni crisis, which explain the escalation of the ing 2.7 million barrels p e r  day (bbl/d) in 2006. Nigeria’s economy is heavily 
crisis. dependent on earnings from  the oil sector, which provides 20 percent of GDP, 
While social and relative deprivation is considered primary and environ­ 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65 percent of budgetary 
mental issues are looked at as the secondary causes of the problem in some revenues (CIA World Fact Book, 2005, cited in Nwilo & Badejo, 2006).
studies (in some, it is reduced to political and some ethnic or communal), the The Niger Delta Crisis is unarguably related to environmental problems in 
impact of the Niger Delta problem on Nigeria’s relationship with the interna­ the area which surprisingly is closely linked to the activities of its oil industry. 
tional community is the only consideration in some others; efforts to situate the The problem of oil spills, deliberate destruction of the mangrove to pave way for 
environmental issues and the eventual world attention are infinitesimal and pipelines, disappearance o f the aqua life again due to oil spills and frequent 
insignificant, or almost non-existent. This chapter attempts to correct that by movements of heavy ships, etc. are common occurrences in the Niger Delta. 
reexamining the activities of the oil companies which have created enormous Communities in the region had ventilated their grievances through political and 
ecological problems in the region, in addition to the abjection of the people, constitutional means against the marginalization and environmental abuses of 
thereby leading to internal strife. their soils and waters from independence (Seminitari, 2006). In more recent 
This study therefore considers the role of environmental issues in the Niger times, particularly from the 1990s, they had become more restive and violent in 
Delta crisis. The link between the environmental issues and conflict in the Niger their protests against the activities of foreign oil companies, notably Royal 
Delta is established, while the role of government in the crisis, its protection of Dutch Shell (Shell Petroleum Development Company). The 1990s witnessed the 
the multinational oil companies at the expense of its own people, and elimina­ outburst of violence against transnational oil corporations, the government’s 
tion of environmental activists including Ken Saro-Wiwa in mid-1990s, are seeming conspiracy with them, and the use of one ethnic group against another, 
discussed. However, the emergence of vicious militant groups, such as the Niger or infiltration by transnational corporations TNCs/government of ethnic groups 
Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of with black sheep, which bred grave intra- and inter-ethnic hostilities (Agbese, 
the Niger Delta (MEND), and their many incursions on the economic and re­ 2002).
source base of the region which constitute a setback to Nigeria’s economic de­ The government’s complicity in the crisis found manifestation in the de­
velopment, coupled with the huge environmental crisis in the region, represent ployment of heavily armed military personnel to fight and dislodge the militants; 
the economic cost of the phenomenon and also explain the international dimen­ guard oil facilities, operations, expatriates and the MNCs (Ikpatt, 2001). In addi­
sion of the crisis. tion, oil companies have had to recruit jobless local youths to watch over oil 
interests, thus setting local people against themselves. The official reason given, 
however, was that the presence of heavy security would act as deterrence to 
Backgrounds to the Niger Delta Crisis aggressive communities from destroying oil installations. The rationale behind 
this was controversial as it also showed insensitivity to the fundamental causa­
The Niger Delta region covers an estimated area of 20,000 km2 within wetlands tion of persistent conflict, namely abjection and denials.
of 70,000 km2 formed primarily by sediment deposition. It is located on the 
south-south geographical region of Nigeria and has a population of about 20 
million people made up of many ethnic nationalities. The region comprises of Impact of Oil Industry on the Environment in the Niger Delta
nine states which include Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, 
Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. However, the core Niger Delta region includes the three Some of the major environmental concerns of the negative exploration activities 
states of Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. The Delta environment is made up of four of oil companies in the Niger Delta include oil spillage and gas flaring in the 
major ecological zones which include: mangrove swamp forests, freshwater area. The net effects of these shortcomings have expectedly made life extremely 
swamps, coaster barrier islands, and lowland rainforests. Thus, the well- difficult in the region. Nwilo and Badejo, (2006), in support of the foregoing, 
endowed ecosystem of the Delta is simply incredible as it naturally can sustain pointed out that since the discovery of oil in Nigeria in the 1950s, the coun-
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
228 Petroleum, the Environment, and the Niger Delta Sheriff Folarin and Henry Okodua 229
try has been suffering the negative environmental consequences of oil devel­ Table 17.1: Record of Oil Spill Incidents in Nigeria, 1976-2005
opment. Akpofure et al., (2000), cited in Nwilo and Badejo (2006), claim that 
' .'v/hen there is an oil spill on water, spreading immediately takes place, with the YEAR NO. OF QUANTITY <%) OF QUANTITY (%) OF 
gaseous and liquid components evaporating. OIL OF OIL QUANTITY RECOVERED QUANTITY 
Other studies have also shown that oil on water surfaces also interferes with SPILLS SPILLED OF OIL (BARRELS) RECOVERE 
gaseous interchange at the sea surface, and dissolved oxygen levels will thereby (BARRELS) SPILLED D
be lowered. This no doubt reduces the life span of marine animals. Microorgan­ 1976 128 26)157.00 0.84 7,135.00 27.28
isms also degrade petroleum hydrocarbons after spillage (Atlas, 1981; Leahy & 1977 104 32.879.00 1.05 1,703.01 5.18
Colwell, 1990; Atlas & Bartha, 1992). Oil spill incidents have occurred in 1978 154 489,294.00 15.67 391,445.00 80.00
various parts and at different times along the country’s coast. According to 1979 157 694,170.00 22.24 63,481.20 9.14
Nwilo and Badejo (2005), several major oil spills in the coastal zone were the 1980 241 600,511.00 19.24 42,416.83 7.06
GOCON’s Escravos spill in 1978 of about 300,000 barrels, SPDC’s Forcados 1981 238 42,722.00 1.37 5,470.20 12.802,171.40 5.07
Terminal tank failure in 1978 of about 580,000 barrels, and Texaco Funiwa-5’s 1982 252 42,841.00 1.3748,351.30 1.55 6,355.90 13.15
blowout in 1980 of about 400,000 barrels. Other oil spill incidents are those of 1983 1731984 151 40,209.00 1.29 1,644.80 4.09
the Abudu pipe line in 1982 of about 18,818 barrels, the Jesse Fire Incident 1985 187 11,876.60 0.38 1,719.30 14.48
which claimed about 1,000 lives, and the Idoho Oil Spill of January 1998, of 1986 155 12,905.00 0.41 552 4.28
about 40,000 barrels. The most publicized of all oil spills in Nigeria occurred on 1987 129 3 1,866.00 1.02 6,109.00 19.17
January 17, 1980, when a total of 37 million liters of crude oil got spilled into the 1988 208 9,172.00 0.29 1.955.00 21.31
environment. This spill occurred as a result of a blowout at Funiwa 5 offshore 1989 195 7,628.16 0.24 2,153.00 28.22
station. Nigeria’s largest spill was an offshore well blowout in January 1980 1990 160 14,940.82 0.48 2,092.55 14.01
v when an estim ated 200,000 barrels of oil (8.4 million U.S. gallons) spilled 1991 201 106,827.98 3.42 2,785.96 2.61
5*to the Atlantic Ocean from an oil industry facility, which damaged 340 hec­ 1992 378 51,187.96 1.64 1,476.70 2.88
tares of mangrove (Nwilo & Badejo, 2005). Table 17.1 below provides a summary 1993 428 9,752.22 0.31 2,937.08 30.12
of oil spill incidences in Nigeria between the period 1976 and 2005. These are 1994 515 30,282.67 0.97 2,335.93 7.71
official figures which, in most cases, may not adequately report all incidents of oil 1995 417 63,677.17 2.04 3,110.02 4.88
spillage. 1996 430 46,353.12 1.48 1,183.02 2.55
It is important to note here that spilled oil is most of the time lost to the 1997 339 81,727.85 2.62
environment. For example, Nwilo and Badejo (2006) pointed out that available 1998 399 99,885.35 3.20
records for the period of 1976 to 1996 indicate that approximately 6%, 25%, and 1999 225 16,903.96 0.54
69% respectively, of total oil spilled in the Niger Delta area, were on land, 2000 637 84,071.91 2.69120,976.16 3.88
swamp, and offshore environments. Also, between 1997 and 2001, Nigeria 2001 4122002 446 241,617.55 7.74
recorded a total number of 2,097 oil spill incidents. 2003 609 35,284.43 1.13
It must be recognized that oil spillage is not new. In fact, oil spills have 2004 543 17,104.00 0.55
been part of the history of oil production globally. “And it is not peculiar to 2005 496 10,734.59 0.34
Nigeria. The only difference, however, is that in other climes, response by both Total 9,107 3,121,909.8 550,232.9 22.80
governments and the oil companies are usually swift” (Nairaland.net, 2006). In 
addition, oil companies and the Nigerian government need to be concerned Source: Egberongbe, F.O.A, P. C. Nwilo, & O. T. Badejo, 2006 (based on data 
about the economic and environmental impacts of oil spills, and to swiftly de­ from Department of Petroleum Resources, Nigeria).
ploy “spill containment facilities” whenever spills occur. These include “oil 
skimmers used to recover and eliminate oil spills, oil spill containment devices, The other major negative consequence of oil exploration and exploitation is 
N4iergency spill kits, crude oil sludge control systems, stem jet refrigeration, gas flaring. This is a practice whereby the associated gas accompanying the 
bio-remediation product distribution, chemical clearing solutions” (Naira- production of crude oil is burnt off so as to maximize the production of crude 
land.net, 2006). oil. However, the prevailing consensus worldwide regarding gas flaring is that it 
is wasteful economically and environmentally. The burning of gas by flaring 
leads to the emission of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas.
i
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
232 Petroleum, the Environment, and the Niger Delta Sheriff Folarin and Henry Okodua 233
& Kretzmann, 1999). In response. Shell, government, and seven other neighbor­ international organizations, particularly when states are contracting parties to 
ing oil-producing communities like Asa-Ndoki, dismissed these claims (Shell, some conventions on human and environmental issues. The defense by the then 
1995; Daily Champion, 1994; The News, 1995). However, it was relative depri­ Nigerian Minister of External Affairs, Tom Ikimi, that the world had no business 
vation, the gap between expectation and actualization, like the one in the forego- in the happenings in Nigeria and the government handling of the Ogoni crisis 
■*» ing claims that explain why men rebel (Gurr, 1974), and more importantly, that was, as such, a ruse.
explicates the Niger Delta conflicts. Osaghae (1995a) argues that the approach Nigeria’s handling of the Ogoni crisis was a clear violation of the Harare 
of minorities in their demand for better living hitherto were passive, namely by Declaration on Human Rights in 1991, to which Nigeria was a contracting party 
delegation and petitions to the state and oil firms. The failure of these means to that compelled the Commonwealth to suspend Nigeria in 1995. Also, as a mem­
engender meaningful changes may explain why the Ogonis decided on a differ­ ber of the UN, Nigeria was aware of existing treaties and conventions on fun­
ent line of action in the early 1990s. Precisely in 1990, a non-political organiza­ damental human rights and freedoms to which it was bound by being a signa­
tion comprising Ogoni elite and traditional rulers, known as KAGOTE whose tory. Perhaps the Ogoni issue might not have elicited much passion and concern 
origin dates back to the 1970s, drew up and presented to the state the Ogoni Bill if not for the fact that the problem of environmental pollution and degradation 
of Rights. Among other things earlier highlighted, they demanded political had become a global concern. The world had come to terms with the fact that the 
autonomy within Nigeria and a fair access to and use of oil revenue derived environment was the common heritage of mankind and that environmental deg­
from Ogoniland to develop their homeland and language, as well as protection radation in any country could not be overlooked because it carried trans-border 
from Shell. As an instrument to pursue the actualization of the demands in the harm across nations. The focus on the environment thus brought the global 
Bill of Rights, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was searchlight on the activities of multinational oil corporations, whose relentless 
set up in 1990. drive for oil exploration and the attendant unscrupulous drive for profit often 
MOSOP followed the Bill of Rights up with intense campaigns at both the culminated in environment abuse and unconcern for their host communities, 
national and international levels with a view to publicizing the Ogoni predica­ especially in the developing countries. In the Niger Delta, the activities of the 
ment. In that effort, the Bill was presented to the United Nations Sub-Committee Royal Dutch Shell oil company had to come into sharp focus because it was the 
on. Human Rights on the Prevention from Discrimination and Protection of Mi- main culprit in Ogoniland (Okerenta, 2006).
** norities, the African Human Rights, and several other non-state actors such as Rather than take the necessary measures to assuage the wounded feelings of 
the General Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples’ Organization the Ogoni people, the Abacha regime embarked on a ruthless military pacifica­
at the Hague in 1993 (Okonta, 2000). The government and Shell initially re­ tion by establishing and deploying the notorious Rivers State Internal Security 
sponded to the Bill with indifference. However, as MOSOP began to secure Task Force in Ogoniland. The regime took steps that further made it lose credi­
public and international support, the state reacted by banning ethnic and other bility in the international system. For instance, it set up in November 1995 a 50- 
similar organizations, such as MOSOP and the Ethnic Minority Rights Organi­ man National Committee of Traditional Rulers and Leaders of Thought to ad­
zation of Africa (EMIROAF), both led by Saro-Wiwa. These two organizations vise it on sensitive diplomatic problems.
and the National Youth Council of Ogoni People were the three main organiza­ The timing of the execution of the Ogoni Nine which coincided with the 
tions which spearheaded the Ogoni insurrection. Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, New Zealand, in 1995 was embarrassing 
Attaching it to the Bill of Rights, MOSOP wrote to Shell, Chevron, and the to a global community that had pleaded for clemency so much and had been 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in December 1992, asking for assured even by Ikimi at the Summit that the Abacha regime was redressing the 
a favorable disposition to Ogoni demands or evacuation from the land. Other issue. Nelson Mandela had even staked his personal integrity to persuade the 
demands included the payment of $6 billion in accumulated rents and royalties Summit not to take a hard-line action against Nigeria, having been assured by 
for oil exploited in Ogoni fields from 1958; reparation of $4 billion for soil, General Abacha that all would end well (Fawole, 2004).
water, and air pollution; cessation of gas flaring; and commencement of negotia­ It was even more ridiculous that just when Ikimi had finished addressing the 
tion with Ogoni people. According to Osaghae (1995b), the significance of the Summit and granted interviews to the world press that the Nigerian government 
letter to the companies was that it showed the people’s loss of tonfidence in the was not going to and had not hanged the Ogoni leaders, he was confounded with 
*  state. According to them, it was time for “the Ogoni to fight for their own salva- the news that the nine activists had been hanged. The UN Commission on Hu­
■v tion because there is no government to deliver us” (p. 46). man Rights at its 52nd session in Geneva in April 1996 condemned the regime 
It is pertinent to note that in contemporary global politics, human rights and for continued violation of human rights; the Commonwealth through its Com­
the environment are no longer issues of domestic concern. Because such issues monwealth Ministerial Action Committee proposed the freezing of the personal 
may explode the international system, world leaders and states intervene posi­ assets of Nigerian rulers, imposition of a comprehensive ban on'Sporting activi­
tively and swiftly to put it asunder. This explains the limits of sovereignty in ties, severance of air ties unless the regime took urgent measures towards speedy
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
234 Petroleum, the Environment, and the Niger Delta Sheriff Folarin and Henry Okodua 235
restoration of democratic rule and showed respect for human rights. The report meter gas pipeline to transport natural gas from Nigeria to Benin, Ghana, and 
of the Fact-Finding Mission of the UN Secretary General to Nigeria also se- Togo— the West African Gas Pipeline (W AGP).
» verely indicted the regime for gross violations of Human Rights and the rule of 
law and recommended a quick return to democracy, among other things (Fa- 
wole, 1999). Conclusion
The Nigerian government from this time, simply sacrificed Nigeria’s age­
long hard-earned international respect and goodwill on the altar of incompetence This study has been ablq to review environmental issues central to the Niger 
and inordinate ambition to crush all local and external challenges in his quest to Delta crisis. It adumbrated the issues and subsequent conflicts within the un­
consolidate his powers. common perspective of the effective impact of domestic policies on foreign 
policies or external relations of a state. More importantly, the study has looked 
at the different costs of the emergent militant nationalism in the Delta on na­
The Economics of the Niger Delta Conflicts tional development and international relations of Nigeria. The study also discov­
ered the fact that the successive regimes in Nigeria considered the oil TNCs, 
The cost of the Niger Delta struggle/conflicts in economic terms may not really with which they had personal businesses, paramount in the hierarchy of Nige­
be estimable. Every party in the conflicts (the oil MNCs, the Nigerian state, the ria’s national interest. This probably explains the disposition of the nation’s 
people of the Niger Delta, and of course, the international community) appears foreign policies to protecting foreign business interests and securing their stakes 
to be mostly concerned with immediate benefits to interests represented. How­ in the Niger Delta.
ever, the overall adverse consequence of the situation is rarely considered by The Abacha approach seemed to have reared its ugly head again in both 
any. The people who have been in the struggle over the claim to a decent living Presidents Obasanjo and Yar’Adua eras. The continued neglect of the Delta 
as well as a decent environment have been abused, oppressed, and suppressed by areas despite increased exploration activities of many new foreign oil compa­
the elite using the instrument of the state. The reason for this is quite obvious; nies, a development prodded by an aggressive campaign by the Obasanjo ad­
She people are of little or no economic relevance to the government. This is ministration for foreign investment, exacerbated the Delta crisis. Several other 
because the government needs not depend on them for raising any significant militant groups have emerged, with a more ferocious approach under the 
revenue needed to run the state. The state thus over the years has misplaced its Yar’Adua dispensation. Their grievances include government’s seeming over­
primary responsibility of protecting lives and property to that of protecting the protection of the exploitative oil companies, growing impoverishment of the 
multinationals at the very expense of the people it is meant to govern. people, emergence of more slum settlements, increased environmental degrada­
The multinationals who seek more profits at the expense of the region have tion, and the recklessness of the current Yar’Adua administration in combating 
over the years opted for the cheaper but immoral and criminal alternative of the multiple militant groups who have been further irked by government’s insin­
flaring and venting gas and have in the process messed up the environment and cerity in carrying out the Niger Delta clause of the Seven-Point Agenda. The 
wasted so much resources even in the midst of hunger in the faces of so many MEND and NDPVF, among others in the struggle, have been abducting expatri­
around them. As earlier stated, it is on record that a financial loss to Nigeria of ates, holding MNCs and their home government to ransom and sometimes ask­
about $2.5 billion annually is traceable to gas flaring. Besides, the associated ing for ransom fees, and have been making the same old demands: good living 
loss of lives and failing health can never be sufficiently evaluated. The interna­ for Deltans, social responsibility on the part of the oil companies, and govern­
tional community at large is also paying heavily as these MNCs contribute their ment’s attention by way of physical and economic development, meaningful 
unsolicited fair share of toxic emissions to the environment thereby increasing allocation from the huge revenues coming from the oil-producing areas, as well 
the problems of global warming and rising sea levels all over. Moreover, every as the control of activities capable of destroying the ecosystem in the Delta 
disruption in the supply of crude from the Niger Delta has consistently had its region. It is hoped that the initial Yar’Adua-Jonathan initiative on the Seven- 
adverse impact on the world prices of crude oil. What this means is that every­ Point Agenda to dialogue with all stakeholders and deploy resources to the Delta 
body all over has had to pay more for petroleum products. The international for social rehabilitation and structural development would be faithfully imple­
jcommunity has not done enough to stem the ugly tide. For example, the World mented.
Bank has been widely criticized over its inability to require the use of Associ­ It is pertinent to note that the oil companies need to be more perceptive of 
ated Gas (AG) before approving its credit guarantees for the financing of the the plight of the people and be more socially responsible by contributing to their 
West African Gas Pipeline Project. Yet, the Bank has since November 2004 welfare, provide jobs for them, construct good roads, build decent low-cost 
approved $125 million in guarantees supporting the construction of a 678 kilo­ housing for them, increase academic scholarship awards to their children, build 
schools and hospitals, provide water and electricity to the communities, etc. Put
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
237
236 Petroleum, the Environment, and the Niger Delta Sheriff Folarin and Henry Okodua
differently, the problem would be lessened when oil companies get more com­ Atlas R.M. (1981). Microbial degradation of petroleum hydrocarbons: An experimental
mitted to their agreement with the government and the host communities by perspective. M icrobial Rev. 45(1), pp. 180-209.All is  R m  A Bartha R. (1992) Hydrocarbon biodegradation and oil spill biorcmediation. 
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Official handling of conflicts in Nigeria is often characterized by inadequacies 
as well as problematic and questionable styles that are filled with various kinds 
of human rights abuses. The Ogoni case of the mid-1990s, Odi in 1999, and 
Zaki Biam of 2002 are salient examples. Cases of genocidal killings can no 
doubt easily be established against the Nigerian state in each of these conflicts. 
Focusing on the Odi case, this chapter poses many questions such as: Why is 
the military option the most frequently employed by the government in the age 
of liberal democracy? Why did the citizenry become militarized? The chapter 
examines the four scientific conflict-handling styles and proposes the best op­
tion for the Nigerian state.
Introduction
Odi is a small town located along the Nun River in Bayelsa state, Federal Re­
public of Nigeria. It is the second largest town in the state, having a pre-|999 
population of 60,000 people (Human Rights and Civil Society Groups, 1999, 
p .l). In late 1999, a brigade of the Nigerian army invaded the town with a 
mandate to flush out local bandits in the aftermath of a treasonable act. Tragical­
ly, the town was completely wiped out, save for three buildings: an Anglican 
church, a bank (First Bank), and a public health center. The invasion which 
lasted from November 20-24, 1999, was led by one Lt. Col. Agbabiaka. Today,
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240 Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide Andrew Oseloka Sawyer 241
Odi remains underdeveloped, impoverished, and a highly and grossly unplanned kin (1944), a primary proponent of an international convention on the subject. 
city. The current administration of President Yar’Adua has empowered the Joint Lemkin’s definition o f the term centered on the requirement o f  a coordinated 
Military Task Force (JTF) in the Niger Delta to attack the Gbaramatu Kingdom plan to destroy the “essential foundations” of the life o f a group, with the aim o f 
which led to more despair on the part o f the indigenes of Odi (Onuorah and eliminating the group. In his words,
Ebiri, 2009, p.6). It is a ghost town in a region that is in desperate need o f  recov­
ery. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social 
Characteristically, the Nigerian state is known for the continued plunder of institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic 
its land and people. Today, crude oil has taken over from palm oil as the major existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liber­
attraction. For the peoples o f the Niger Delta area, however, oil represents the ty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individual’s belongings to such 
destruction o f  the natural environment upon which they depend for survival. groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the ac­
Their communal order, long violated by colonialists, has been further distorted tions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group. (Lemkin, 1944, p. 79)
by the exploitation o f  crude oil.
To facilitate exploitation o f  oil and gas resources, the Land Use Act o f  1978 The concept o f “genocide” received its first formal, legal recognition in the 
vested ownership and control of all land and mineral resources in the central context o f the Nuremberg trials. Although the Charter o f the Nuremberg Tribun­
government. Government could give away communal lands and forests to trans­ al did not expressly use the term, the definition o f  crimes against hum anity pro­
national oil companies for exploration and exploitation o f crude oil and gas at vided in Article 6(c) o f the Charter covered many acts today constituting geno­
will. These transnational oil companies have in turn significantly reduced arable cide; the indictment o f the criminals tried before the Tribunal expressly charged 
and productive land, and thus created avenues for both inter-ethnic and intra­ the defendants with genocide, and the prosecution made reference to the term 
ethnic dislocation and violence. during the proceedings (Ratner et al., p.27). The UN General Assembly initiated 
the process of elaborating the genocide convention in 1946; hence we have what 
The Problems is known today as genocide.
Article II o f the convention defines “genocide” as:
The official handling of conflicts in Nigeria is usually inadequate. The conflict 
resolution styles adopted by the Nigerian government show its preference for an [A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
iron-fisted approach to conflict. Like in most societies o f the world where gross part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
human rights violations are wished away, the response o f the Nigerian state to a. Killing members of the group;
each of these problems has been in three categories: outright denial, partial ac­ b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
ceptance of guilt, and total defiance. According to Albert (2003, p. 5) the gov­ c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
ernment either denies their activities or they state that their actions were for the about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
sake o f national security, or total defiance. d. Imposing measures to prevent births within the group; and
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (General As­
The research questions therefore identified by this study are: What are the sembly Resolution 1946, 96(1) cited in Ratner et al., 2001, p.27)
effects o f the current approach to handling conflicts? What are the alternative 
options o f solving these conflicts? In trying to explicate these, the research will Genocide, therefore, can be understood as a denial o f the right o f  existence 
focus on the oil conflict in the Niger Delta by adopting a systematic investiga­ o f entire human groups, as homicide is the denial o f the right to life o f  individual 
tion into the nature and causes o f Operation Hakuri II as genocide in Odi. It will human beings. Such denial of the right o f existence shocks the conscience o f  
also investigate the various roles played by the federal government in the mis­ mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other 
management o f  the resources and how these led to the eruption o f  violence contributions represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law 
among the youth and the subsequent genocide that ensued. and to the spirit and aims o f the United Nations (Res. 96(1) cited in Ratner et al.,
Using extant primary and secondary sources, the study will take an advoca­
cy approach. p. 28).
Oil as the Issue in Conflict
Genocide: A Definition
The Niger Delta has remained the treasure base of the Nigerian state in the past 
Although human history has witnessed many acts o f genocide, the concept is four decades. The area harbors over 95 percent o f Nigeria’s crude oil and gas
relatively new. The term finds its origins in the work of the jurist Raphael Lem-
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242 Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide Andrew Oseloka Sawyer 243
resources, which accounts for 90 percent of the country’s foreign exchange Unfortunately, the Nigerian state and its political leadership have at various 
earnings (Ogbogbo, 2005, p. 169). It is regarded to have a natural gas reserve of times attempted to protect transnational oil companies and to brazenly expro­
160 trillion cubic feet, while the crude oil reserve stood at 33 billion barrels. priate the revenue from oil. In doing this, they have come to be seen as the prob­
(Onuoha, 2004, cited in Ogbogbo 2005, p. 169). The marginalization of the lems of the people of the impoverished Niger Delta. This propelled the Ogoni to 
land-owning group and the wanton desiccation and destruction of their land present their Bill of Rights to the Nigerian state in 1990. Parts of the Bill af­
have bred a serious move by the people to have a say in how the resources from firmed:
their land are being managed. The struggle has become more virulent in recent 
times. Although the struggle for resource control dates back to pre-independence The Ogoni people before the advent of British colonialism were not conquered 
Nigeria, we shall be dwelling on the period of civilian rule from 1999. or colonized by any other group in present day Nigeria. That in 1951 we were 
Government officials have tended to explain away the Niger Delta crisis as forcibly included in the Eastern Region of Nigeria where we suffered utter neg­
an expected by-product of the country’s difficult transition to democracy. With lect. That we protested against this neglect. . . before the Willinks Commission 
ten years of democratic rule, the country’s democratic institutions have re­ of Inquiry into minority fears in 1958. That successive Federal administrations have trampled on every minority right enshrined in the Nigerian constitution to 
mained weak, and law enforcement structures are more prone than ever to mani­ the detriment of the Ogoni and has by administrative structuring and other nox­
pulation by national and regional political figures. Legislation that prevents ious acts transferred Ogoni wealth to other parts of the Republic. (Saro-Wiwa, 
communities from having a legal stake in the oil pumped from their environ­ 1990, pp. 6-8)
ments has remained intact, and the nation’s security forces have often reacted to 
violence with the form of brutality reminiscent of military rule. Civilians bear The Ogoni, under the leadership of their organization, the Movement for the 
the brunt of the crisis when they get caught variously between rival gangs, mili­ Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) mobilized to peacefully challenge the part­
tias, and security forces (The International Crisis Group, 2006a, p. 6). nership of oil and gas transnationals and the Nigerian State. In the process, the 
Historically, the Niger Delta area populated by the Urhobo, Ogoni, Ijo, people expelled Shell oil company from their land and created a dual power 
Isoko, Itsekiri, and so on has engaged in serious struggles in response to the situation in which people’s power, for a moment, took primacy over the state. A 
crisis within the Nigerian state. It is pertinent to note here that the Niger Delta defining moment had arrived in the history of Nigeria. The attempts by the mi­
question cannot be addressed outside of the Nigerian crisis. Suffice it to say that norities in Nigeria to redefine their positions within the Nigerian state would 
the crisis in the Nigerian Delta is a manifestation or an expression of a more bring out of the government a renewed attempt to re-affirm its authority in the 
fundamental Nigerian crisis, which manifests in the Sharia controversy, ethnic restive region. Odi provided this opportunity. The Odi invasion exemplified the 
violence, one party dictatorship, corruption, massive impoverishment of the kind of violent response from the Nigeria government in its attempt to regain 
citizenry, and so on (Osuoka, 1999, p. 14). control of the situation.
Historically, the Niger Delta communities have suffered for and in defence 
of their resources. In the nineteenth century, local communities that attempted to 
assert their rights to the proceeds of palm produce suffered severe punishments The Odi Example
in the hands of colonial forces. For instance, on February 22, 1895, a British 
naval force working for George Taubman Goldie’s Royal Niger Company de­ Following the killing of seven police officers near Odi town in Kolokuma/Opo- 
stroyed Brass and Fishtown, killing over 2,000 community people for daring to kuma council area of Bayelsa State on November 4, 1999, and another five 
oppose unfair trading arrangement of British imperialists (Osuoka, 1999, p. 15). within the same council within a week (Chukwurah et al., 1999, p. 8), the stage 
During that era, community leaders such as Jaja of Opobo, Dappa Pepple of was set for a reprisal by the Nigerian state. The federal government ordered the 
Bonny, and Nana Olomu of Itsekiri were dethroned or exiled for daring to chal­ army to take control of the situation. Unofficial reports, quoting high casualty 
lenge the violence of the colonialists (Ikime, 1969, p. 2; Okonta & Douglas, figures hinted o f ‘heavy bombardment’ (Chukwurah et al., 1999, p. 8) of the Odi 
2001). junction of the East-West Road. Many people were also said to have fled Odi 
Just like in the days of imperial conquests, thousands of the Niger Delta town and the neighboring Kiama community. It was estimated that no fewer 
people have been killed in the contemporary period. Several of them have also than 50 trucks with about two thousand (2,000) soldiers (Asoya, 1999, p. 4) 
died in oil pipeline explosions because of over-aged and ill-maintained pipelines were deployed to Odi. It was gathered that the military invasion and the subse­
and other facilities that resulted in oil spills and blowouts. These oil spills have quent reinforcements continued until the entire area had been captured and its 
an inimical effect on human lives and the flora and fauna. Communities that rampaging youths humbled. Already the entire area had been declared a military 
depended solely on farming and fishing have seen their only source of livelihood zone and travelers turned back. The spokesperson for the Ijaw Youth Council 
destroyed by the transnational oil companies. (IYC), Isaac Osuoka claimed that about 200 persons including women and
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244 Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide Andrew Oseloka Sawyer 245
children who could not escape were killed (Osuoka, 1999, p. 17) by the invading and helpless women faces that show mourning. Even the butcher of Abuja did 
soldiers. It was also gathered that people from nine neighboring communities not see this! I hope one day Obasanjo will be put on trial for this, the murder of 
also fled to towns not affected by the “war.” Lady Kuti and other heinous crimes that apparently doesn’t bother the con­
science of this “Born Again Christian”: How any human being can support this 
sort of thing, especially in a “democracy” is a way beyond my imagination. 
(Senator Durojaiye, quoted in Tribune, Tuesday, November 23, 1999, p. 12)
Analyzing Odi as Genocide: Evidence from Graffiti
Another commentator was of the opinion that “the Federal government 
The Niger Delta people have always complained of neglect. For the 20 million knew that the criminals they were looking for were not in Odi at the time that 
residents of the 70,000 square kilometer Niger Delta (see Fuelling the Niger they went in . . . they were there to demonstrate that the Nigerian army had the 
Delta Crisis, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 118, 28 September 2006), a region capacity to kill. The whole area smelled of corpses after the army left” (Osuoka, 
of swamps, rivers, and tropical forests, alienation increased not only because cited in Ali, 1999, p. 3). Leaders of Human Rights and civil society groups who 
civilian rule failed to bring about expected improvements in average standards visited Odi, noted that they
of living, but also because many people continued to suffer the negative impacts 
of oil, violence, environmental degradation, and poverty. Nigeria’s federal sys­ Saw no single livestock, poultry or other domestic animal except a stray cat. . .
tem indirectly encouraged violence in the Niger Delta by rewarding those who The Odi invasion by our investigation was premeditated . . .So ruthless, savage 
posed the greatest threats to oil facilities with juicy oil contracts and government and thorough was the operation that it could only have been intended to achieve 
positions (Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 118, a genocide outcome. (Albert, 2003, p. 15)
28 September 2006).
Odi allegedly served as haven for some of the hoodlums that killed the No aspect of the community was spared. Places of worship and other sacred 
policemen. Notably, it would be recalled that the security situation in Bayelsa places, including sacred forests and groves, churches, ancestral shrines, and 
appeared to have deteriorated. Police reinforcement dispatched to the areas to burial places were demolished. His Royal Highness J.P.B. Komonibo, the Ama- 
control the situation were assaulted and forcibly turned back at illegal road nanaowoi of Odi noted, “all the records of Ogori. . . have been burnt and de­
blocks mounted by armed hoodlums (Oyeleye, 1999, p. 5). The Special Adviser stroyed by the soldiers” (Ombe, cited in Albert, 2003, p. 15).
to the president Doyin Okupe did not deny the fact that troops were deployed, However, the Obasanjo administration cannot deny that something akin to 
but went further to stress that “an intervention is imperative to avert a total genocide was carried out in Odi. This became more obvious with the graffiti left 
breakdown of law and order . . . and protect the lives and properties of ordinary behind by rampaging soldiers. According to Albert, one of the soldiers who 
citizens of the state” (Ali, 1999, p. 2). This position gives an insight into the considered the objectives of Operation Hakuri 11 to have been perfectly accom­
power and spirit that powered the invasion. plished wrote:
It was also alleged that Ken Nneweira (an indigene of Odi) was instrumen­
tal in causing the mayhem. However, was Nneweira too powerful for the police We will kill all Ijaws. Bayelsa will be silent forever. Nobody can save you. Shame to the Ijaw people. We go (will) kill all (jaw people with our gun. Ijaw 
to arrest? Why should truck loads of high-powered army personnel be the only face, monkey face. Odi where is your pride. Nigeria is Nigeria, Odi is dead.
option left to the government? Who is to be held responsible for this act of ge­ You are burnt. Odi is no more. Gone to the past. Pity. (Albert, 2003, p. 17)
nocide? While some are of the view that the soldiers should be investigated and 
tried for overshooting their mandate, a U.S.-based Human Rights Watch opined Another graffiti said most incisively “Next time there will be no trees left” 
that the Nigerian government should initiate criminal proceedings against the (Albert, 2003, p. 16). The effects of the genocide had such a negative impact on 
soldiers responsible for committing the Odi abuses (Ali, 1999, p. 3). Others are the socio-economic lifestyle of the people afterwards (UNDP, 2006, p. 125). 
of the view that the Nigerian state lacks the moral right to set up such panels and The military sent to quell the crisis in Odi community became agents of human 
should therefore be held responsible for their actions and inactions. One senator degradation. There were reported cases of rape in Odi by the soldiers sent to 
metaphorically described President Obasanjo as an “Abuja butcher,” after visit­ ensure “peace” in the community. Two years later, the community became filled 
ing Odi with some members of the senate for firsthand information following with fatherless babies.
the invasion of Odi. In his words:
What I saw in Odi reminds me of a phrase in Latin: horri willet wizzel, meaning 
horrible sight, agonizing embarrassing, shameful. This was what I saw. 1 saw a 
degradation of human habitation and sadness written on the faces of hapless
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Z'lO Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide Andrew Oseloka Sawyer 247
1 heory and Knowledge of Conflict-Handling Styles as it increases the intensity of the conflict as was the case in the Niger Delta today. 
Ways of Tackling the Odi Genocide The attack on Odi was a flawed strategy to stem militancy in the Niger Delta. 
> The approach must change for peace to reign in the Niger Delta.
(jcnflict is a social reality. It is a phenomenon that is widely know,n all over the 
world, it could be seen as an integral part o f human existence. Consequently, 
pome means or approaches are recommended for transforming such conflicts. J o in t P ro b lem  S o lvin g\
There exists a spectrum of methods for resolving conflicts in a global age. There 
is no universally accepted and binding approach or procedures for dealing with This is a conflict-handling style that leads to a win-win outcome. It deals with 
conflicts. However, some of the following approaches are generically known: the underlying issues in the conflict as all parties involved in the conflict con­
domination, avoidance, accommodation, collaboration, compromising, confron­ structively listen to one another. The structural root causes of the conflict are 
tation, and problem solving. However, for the purpose of this chapter, we will addressed leading to their resolution. This appears to be the best option available 
discuss avoidance, confrontation, problem solving, and collaboration in relation for a lasting resolution of the conflict in the Niger Delta. This is so because the 
to the 1999 Odi genocide. issues underpinning the crisis in that volatile region of the country can only be 
resolved when all parties are ready to shift grounds and tell themselves the truth. 
Only then will peace reign in the conflict-tom area. The recent amnesty granted 
A vo idan ce to the militants can be considered a joint problem-solving strategy. Even then, it 
has to be more transparent without the gray areas which it possesses now (Ebiri, 
Avoidance is usually an unwise approach. It leaves the root causes o f the con- 2009, pp. 1-2).
fb-ct unaddressed. It usually occurs when one party in a potential conflict ignores 
the issue in the conflict or downplays the significance of such issues in the con­
flict. It is an unhealthy way o f handling conflict because it is seen as a means of C o llabora tion
1 j^lponing the conflict. This is a dangerous style or approach to conflict, but 
mo^t often than not, the Nigerian government adopts this destructive approach. This conflict-handling style is related to the disposition of being assertive and 
As it were, the ongoing disturbances in the Niger Delta that resulted in the Odi cooperative. It requires active listening and dialogue. And most importantly, the 
genocide happened as a result of the avoidance by the government officials, understanding will enable them come up with a better solution that will result in 
before now, of the issues in the Niger Delta crisis left unattended to and ignored a win-win situation. This style is more socially adaptive, as whatever is reached 
by the past governments. The adoption of conflict avoidance by the federal gov­ after the horse trading is usually accepted by the parties in conflict. Most negoti­
ernment o f Nigeria no doubt led to lawlessness, banditry, and militarization of ations are o f this nature (Ojiji, 2006, p. 123), such that even though getting to 
the Niger Delta. the final solution can be quite tedious, the outcome is usually binding to the 
parties. The Nigerian state can also adopt this approach, but prefers the iron-fist 
approach which shows the superiority of the government. Unless the state offi­
Confrontation cials are ready to swallow their pride and the militants are ready to sheath their 
swords, the conflict may be far from over.
Confrontation is the direct opposite of avoidance. It is a more deadly and de­
structive approach to resolving conflict. Its ‘lose-lose’ outcome leads to the 
intensification of a conflictual situation, since it employs the use o f physical The Link between National Security, Global Capital, and 
attacks on the parties involved. Generally, confrontation involves the use of Citizenship in the Odi Genocide
violence. Ojiji opines that “there is a considerable degree or lack o f  understand- 
ng o f  each other’s position as each one tries to hold on to their views” (Ojiji, The concept, national security means different things to different people. In its 
!0G6, p. 124). This approach was used by the Nigerian government against the ordinary sense, security is the state of being secured and free from apprehension, 
own Of Odi. This conflict-handling style gave birth to the death of thousands of and having confidence o f  safety and freedom from danger or risk. National secu­
ioverty stricken people and the destruction o f  Odi. rity as a concept has two perspectives: the traditional and the broader perspec­
This approach is not appropriate. It offers no lasting resolution o f the con- tives. Traditionally, national security is seen as the state of military preparedness 
lict, rather, it creates room for grudges and wounds in the minds o f people, and to defend a country against external threats. From the broader perspective, na-
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2-18 Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide Andrew Oscloka Sawyer 249
tional security covers not only the military preparedness of a country, but also Thus they have been incapable of achieving operational efficiency and institu­
includes political, social, economic, and environmental securities (Essien, 2008, tional solidarity and stability. They have engendered fractures and conflicts 
k i ■ 38). The conception o f  national security by John Mroz as “relative freedom (Hutchful, 1998, p. 602) in the Nigerian socio-political systems and have failed 
from harmful threats” and that o f Ian Bellany as “relative freedom from war to achieve any significant success in the task of national defense.
Coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence Clientelism is the very channel through which one joins the dominant class 
I o f any war that should occur” (Essien, 2008, p. 40) typify the cold-war era and a practice which is then seen as fundamental to the continued enjoyment of 
thinking about national security (Barry Buzzan, as cited in Nwolise, 2006). This the perquisite of that class (Joseph, 1991, p. 55). The state in Nigeria is essen­
is more so following Stalin’s dictum that “everyone imposes his own system as tially comparable to the state in most developing countries which are minimally 
far as his army has power to do so” (South Magazine, 1983, cited in Essien, industrialized and in which the majority of the population is tied to agrarian 
2008, p. 36). pursuits often of marginal or precarious profitability. The state enjoys a pre­
National security from the Nigerian perspective is state centric and focuses eminent position because the nation was created by foreign conquest and domi­
on the military. It is within this broad context of national security that Nwolise nation and not through a gradual process of aggregation or expansion of indi­
( 1985, p. 24) rightly argues, genous societies. Continued foreign penetration and domination o f  economy 
after political independence, together with the constraints to peripheral capitalist 
A country may have the best army in terms of training and equipment, the most industrialization in the world economy (Joseph, 1991, p. 55), meant that access 
efficient police force, the most efficient customs men, the most active secret to the state remained disproportionately important in the struggle for resources 
service agents, and best quality prison, but yet be the most insecure nation in for upward mobility. “Clientelism,” “patronage systems,” and “patron-client 
the world, as a result of defense and security problems from within—bad gov­
ernment, alienated and suffering masses, ignorance, hunger, unemployment, clusters,” are terms used interchangeably to refer to the same phenomenon. It 
and even activities of foreign residents or companies. has an anthropological origin (Joseph, 1991, p. 56). According to James Scott 
(1972, p. 62):
> In this same sense, Ujornu (2002, p. 34) argues that the consolidation of the 
iffllion’s military capacities as a key approach to national security emphasizes The patron-client relationship—an exchange relationship between roles—may 
the role of conventional militaiy and paramilitary institutions in the maintenance be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely in­
o f national security. strumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits 
History has it that most o f the crisis experienced in Nigeria since indepen­ or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by 
dence bordering on national security had their roots in the military and the pa­ offering general support and assistance, including personal services to the pa­
ramilitary (especially the police). It is evident that following Nwolise’s argu­ tron.
ment above, national security cannot be guaranteed by a large body o f security 
or military forces, because, these organizations have perpetrated many atrocities The study of clientelism as a crucial “mechanism of power” (Flynn, 1974, 
leading to insecurity in the Nigerian society (Ujornu, 2002, p. 34). Examples of p. 133), especially in developing societies, proliferated very rapidly during the 
these atrocities include bloody coup d ’etat, dictatorship, corruption, oppression, 1970s. Joseph (1991, p. 57) quoting Weingrod, saw a difference in the use o f  the 
human rights abuses, and state terrorism (Ujornu, 2000, pp. 38-39). The last notion o f  “patronage” by anthropologists and by political scientists. For the 
three were exemplified in this discussion. All these untold hardships unleashed former, it is “a type of social relationship,” while for the latter it is a feature of 
on Nigerians are the characteristics o f the military regimes and their civilian government.” In the case with Nigeria, it will be argued that this distinction is 
collaborators. In linking this issue of national security to global capital and citi­ not a meaningful one. Patron-client ties reflect a social relationship which has 
zenship, three things readily come to mind: colonialism, clientelism, and pre- also become a crucial element o f the governmental process.
bendalism. These concepts ultimately lead to underdevelopment. Nigeria, in the decades following independence, has never had a stable 
Colonialism simply means control by one power over a depertdent area or state-power, and the form o f politics which operated at all levels including the 
petjjpie (Webster's, 1991, p. 261). This definition suggests superiority and infe- current administration can be termed “prebendal politics.” A “prebend is an 
rjO'-ity. One power detects the pace the lower power will follow because that office or state, typical o f feudal China and Europe, which an individual procures 
higher power is in control. The maintenance of national security has eluded the through examinations or as a reward for loyal service to a lord or ruler. Joseph 
military because they have had to depend on their colonial masters for direction (1991, p. 59) quoting Max Weber captures it thus:
to enable them to handle their own domestic problems. This situation is a carry­
over from their colonial origins, and these military institutions have continued to We wish to speak of ‘prebends' and of a 1prebendal’ organization of office 
be notorious for coercion, intimidation, and oppression (Ujornu, 2002, p.35). wherever the lord assigns to the official rent payments for life, payments which
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250 Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide Andrew Oseloka Sawyer 251
are somehow fixed to objects or which are essentially economic usufruct from gradation and to attack Saro-Wiwa’s character and motives (Fleshman, 2002, p. 
lands or other sources. They must be compensations for the fulfillment of ac- 157). Fleshman went on to prove that the oil companies and their owners (Unit­
v, tual or fictitious office duties; they are goods permanently set aside for the eco­ ed States and the European Union) played a pivotal role in the pauperization of 
nomic assurance of the office. * the Niger Delta,” Mobil as a “Partner in Oppression,” (Fleshman, 2002, p. 158) 
and Chevron as mixing “Blood and Oil” (Fleshman, 2002, p. 159).
The peculiar political and economic conditions o f the post-colonial world Another example is tlje Halliburton bribe scandal where Albert “Jack” Stan­
have contributed to the entrenchment o f  a form of state organization, and of ley, an American national, pleaded guilty before a Houston Federal Court to 
attitudes regarding the uses of state office, which are pre-modem. Instead of serially bribing some unnamed Nigerian federal government officials to the tune 
constitutional and legal systems, as well as the stated impersonal norms, deter­ of $182 million (Akanimo, 2008, p. 6). The bribes were given through two 
mining the form o f this state organization, such legal-rational features largely agents to win some contracts related to the $6 billion liquefied natural gas 
serve to camouflage extensive prebendal practices. (LNG) plant in Bonny, Rivers State (Akanimo, 2008, p. 6). These “powerful” 
In agreement with Joseph (1991, p. 62), this work contends that clientelism unnamed Nigerians would have made sure that whatever policy the government 
and prebendalism are two o f the fundamental principles o f political organization was going to make regarding that liquefied gas would have favored Halliburton 
and behavior in Nigeria. A person (man or woman) seeks the support of a “god­ and not any other multinational company because o f their financial involvement. 
father” while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods— loans, scho­ Therefore, whatever happens favors the metropolis, and the poor citizenry bear 
larships, licenses, plots o f urban land, oil blocks (as exemplified by develop­ the brunt, just as the poor citizens of Odi had the genocida! act meted out on 
ments in the Niger Delta), promotion and employment— and the main resource them without any qualms of mind on the part o f both the MNCs and the Nige­
o f the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a piece o f the state. One 
can pose such arguments in the nomination o f ministers and other governmental rian government.
appointments. For one to do business he/she would need an import and export 
license, building and other permits. There are so many other benefits accruable 
Ho political positions. Prebendalism, therefore, is a consequence of patrimonial- Interpreting the Geneva Convention as a Further 
‘ism as northern Nigeria demonstrates with its traditional (patrimonial) emirates Strategy for Resolving the Odi Genocide
which have evolved in the contemporary context to embrace a prebendal use of 
state offices (Joseph, 1991, p. 63). Following the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 
Having shown that national security is patriarchal in nature in the Nigerian August 8, 1945, the attack on Odi can best be regarded as genocide. Specifical­
case, and that colonialism, clientelism, and prebendalism are necessary ingre­ ly, the Statute o f  the International Tribunal for the prosecution o f persons re­
dients for the linkage, it is pertinent to note that the multinational companies sponsible for serious violations of International Humanitarian law committed in 
(MNCs) in the case o f the Niger Delta are responsible for generating the global the territory o f the former Yugoslavia since 1991, May 25, 1993, as amended 
capital. This was evident in the recent imbroglio between the National Assem­ should be meted out to all those who took part actively and those that handed 
bly, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant down the orders. Everything under this statute, from Article 1 to 29 (Ratner et 
wing o f  the Ijaw Youth Council (1YC), and one o f the multinational oil compa­ al., pp. 365-370), should be carried out as they are related to the protection o f 
nies in laying accusations and counteraccusations on who arms the militants. It civilians in time o f war otherwise known as the Geneva Convention IV. Empha­
also explains the roles played by Shell, Mobil, and Chevron in the heydays o f sis will be laid here on some articles to buttress my point.
the crisis during the administrations of Generals Babangida, Abacha, Abubakar, The crimes committed at Odi in 1999 fall within the ambit of Geneva Con­
and President Obasanjo. Fleshman (2002, p. 157) showed the role o f  Shell in vention IV as related to treatment of civilians.
coercing Babangida and Abacha to exterminate Saro-Wiwa and the structure o f 
the Movement for the Survival o f Ogoni People (MOSOP). He proved this by The Geneva Convention forbids:
demonstrating through leaked company and Nigerian government documents 
how “Shell closely monitored Saro-Wiwa’s foreign travels and instigated the a. Willful killing;
'Babangida and Abacha regimes to crush MOSOP’s structures on the ground” b. Torture or inhuman treatment;c. Wilfully causing great suffering or serious injuiy to body or health;
(Fleshman, 2002, p. 157). He went on to show that Saro-Wiwa’s arrest on mur­ d. Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by rrfili- 
der charges in 1994 inaugurated an international campaign for his release and tary necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (Article 2)
generated unwanted public scrutiny of Shell’s Nigerian operations. Yet Shell’s e. Wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified 
public relations strategy was to “deny MOSOP’s charges o f environmental de­ by military necessity;
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252 Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide Andrew Oseloka Sawyer 253
f. Attack or bombardment by whatever means of undefended towns, villag­ For the Nigerian state to move forward, it is important that broad-based 
es, dwellings, or buildings; negotiations with Niger Deltans be held. Such negotiations should involve eth­
g. Seizure of destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to nic councils from the region, religious groups, and other civil society organiza­
religion, charity and education, arts and sciences, historic monuments, and tions. Special reference should be made on expanded issues of local resource 
works of arts and sciences; and
h. Plunder of public or private property. (Article 3) control as called for by Special Committee on Oil Producing Areas in 2002. In addition, the venue of the negotiation should be within Niger Delta to enhance 
Article 4 of the Geneva Convention condemns genocide in its entirety; it is a greater transparency and local participation. It is equally important that the deli­
punishable crime against humanity. Hence, genocide means any of the following berations take into consideration the special needs of individual communities in 
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, the region, with the mind of proffering possible options for addressing them.
racial, or religious group, as such; The Nigerian government should therefore be compelled to reform such legislations as the Petroleum Act and the Land Use Act that effectively deny 
a. Killing members of the group; local control of resources. Heavy-handed military operations should be discou­
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; raged both among the militants and the government, and negotiations between 
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring the federal government and the Niger Delta groups should be encouraged. 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; Transparency in the administration of budget and expenditure should be made a 
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and prerequisite for aid grants to federal, state, and local governments as a means of 
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Article 4) ending the relationships between local and state administrative practices that 
have largely failed to address corruption.
The following acts shall be punishable: Illicit and semi-illicit payment to the military and paramilitary security 
forces deployed to protect oil installations should be brought to an end. The joint 
a. Genocide; venture partnerships should also be refashioned to reflect local participation and 
b. Conspiracy to commit genocide;
c. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; ownership. Thus, there is the need to encourage more talks (negotiation) be­
d. Attempt to commit genocide; and tween the government and local groups.
e. Complicity in genocide. (Article 4) (Ratner et al., 2001, pp. 235-236). Environmental impact assessment (EIA), as defined by global best practic­
es, should be carried out on individual companies’ projects in the region. In 
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention condemns every act that can be classi­ collaboration with community groups (to make the study more transparent), the 
fied as a crime against humanity—for example, murder, extermination, torture, community’s assent should be sought for and obtained before proceeding with 
rape, persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, and other inhumane infrastructure and other developments.
acts. The rulings of independent arbitration and court decisions looking into 
Individual criminal responsibility as ascribed in Article 7 of the Geneva environmental claims must be implemented. Both the federal government and 
Convention should equally be considered: companies should ensure that they pay this share of pollution compensation 
awards. More importantly, there is a need to implement these suggestions, and at 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided the same time inaugurate a monitoring and evaluation team that will monitor 
and abetted in planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in their progress, setbacks, and any other issue that must be put into consideration 
Articles 2 to 5 of the present statute, shall be individually responsible for to forestall future crises.
the crime; In conclusion, in interpreting the Geneva Convention as a further strategy 
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or for resolving the Odi genocide, this work aligns with the stipulations in Articles 
Government, as responsible government officials, shall not relieve such 2 to 5 of the present statute that if the crime was committed by a subordinate 
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment; and
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present sta­ (soldiers that executed the act), that does not relieve his superior of criminal 
tute was committed by a subordinate [soldiers that executed the Odi geno­ responsibility. If the superior knew or had reasons to know that his/her subordi­
cide] does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or nate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to 
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or take necessary and responsible measures to prevent such acts to punish the per­
had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and responsible petrators thereof, he or she can be held responsible. There is no doubt that an 
measures to prevent such acts to punish the perpetrators thereof. approach such as collaboration and joint problem solving, if systematically 
implemented, will guarantee a gradual reduction of the incessant crisis in the
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255
Andrew Oseloka Sawyer
2 5'I Oil Conflict in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the Odi Genocide
Nwolise, O.B.C. (2006). (Ed.). Challenges of sustainable democracy. Ibadan: John Ach- 
Niger Della. Odi and the entire Niger Delta region which have remained volatile 
will then experience relative peace. Both the federal government and the ram­ Ogbogbo^C.'b . N 2005 ̂ T he Niger Delta people mrd the ~ - o n , r o l  - B i c t ,  I960-
paging youths should be encouraged to adopt an alternative to violence in their 
relations. However, the government should play a leading role in enabling the peace and conflict inAjrica, pp. ( tntro(iuction to peace and
return of peace to the oil-rich but volatile region. Ojiji, 0 . ( 2006) Conflto h av in g  Books Limited.
References O m b ^  ( ^ R o y a l  Highness recounts experience on the invasion of Odi. The Come,. 
Agbo, E. (1999). Bayelsa and the Odi genocide. Sunday Times, December 5, p. 28. O n u o ^ M ^ n d E b ir i, K. (2009). Niger Delta crisis: Over 60 feared dead. In The Guar- 
Akanimo, S. (2008). Halliburton: How government officials were bribed with $182m. In 
The Nation Saturday, September 6, p. 6 OsuokaT'L^O999). Killing spree in Bayelsa. Retrieved May 12, 2008, from
Albert, I.O. (2001). Introduction to third-party intervention in community conflicts. Iba­
dan: John Archers Publishers Limited. O Tuesday, November, 23.
Albert, I.O. (2003). The Odi massacre o f 1999 in the context o f the graffiti left by the Ramer S R & Abrams, J.S. (2001). (Eds.). Accountability for human rights atrocit.es ,n
invading Nigerian Army (PEFS monograph, New Series No I). Ibadan: University of 
Ibadan, Department of Political Science. R b i " 3 ? O f S ^ i S ^ S ^ d e v e l o p m e n t  problem in Nigerian 
Ali, B.A. (1999). Nigeria: Focus on the deployment of troops in Odi. Retrieved July 23, Sem lism : The OMPADldnitiative. (N.SER Monograph Series No. 11). Ibadan:
2007, from http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/irinw-I23099.html.
Asoya, S. ( 1999). The Odi killings. The News. Vol. 29 (08), 04 December. ~ r,, w fw f K (1990) Ogoni bill o f rights. Port Harcourt: Saros International Publishers. 
Best, G.S. (Ed.). (2006). Introduction to peace and conflict studies in West Africa. Iba­ Scott J. (1972) Patron-cfient politics and political change in Southeast Asia. American
dan: Spectrum Books Limited.
Chukwurah, H., Orimolade, A., & Ogoigbe, E. (1999). Bloody shoot-out in Bayelsa. U jom ?'M 2000r& l«S'and n S | PS y  in Nigeria: Critical issues in the search for 
■>0^ N ational Concord. Tuesday, November 23.
Hbiri, K. (2009). Protests rage against JTF: Government links politicians with militants. 
In The Guardian. June 12, pp. 1-2.
Essicn, F.E. (2008). Niger Delta conflict and Nigeria’s national security. Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
Fleshman, M. (2001). The international community and the crisis in Nigeria’s oil produc­
ing communities. Retrieved May 14, 2008, from ACAS Bulletin: It’s About Oil! 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006874/articles/html. Webster Inc.
Flynn, P. (1974). Class, clientelism, and coercion: Some mechanism of internal depen­
dency and control. Journal o f Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. 12(2), pp. 
133-156.
Human Rights and Civil Society Groups. (1999). Genocide in Odi. Retrieved on July 6, 
2007, from http://www.africaaction.org/resources/ejoumals.php.
Hutchful, E. (1998). (Ed.) The military and militarism in Africa. Senegal: CODESRIA.
Ikime, O. (1969). Niger Delta rivalry: Itsekiri-Urhobo relation and the European pres­
ence. 1884-1936. London: Longman.
International Crisis Group. (2006a). Fuelling the Niger Delta crisis. (Crisis Group Africa 
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International Crisis Group. (2006b). The swamps of insurgency: Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
v.mrest. (Crisis Group Briefing No. 115). Retrieved June 15, 2008, from 
m  www.crisisgroup.org.
Jo.' eph, R. (1991). Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria the rise and fall o f the 
Second Republic. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.
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CSection V onclusion
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Chapter Nineteen
Conclusion
Olutayo C. Adesina, Akanmu G. Adebayo, and 
RasheedO. Olaniyi
Two dissimilar forces at work in contemporary Africa—homogenization and 
hegemonization, both o f which are offshoots of the globalization process— have 
compounded the continent’s problems in the global age. Globalization and glob­
al forces have moved significantly to affect national cultures and have gone 
ahead to negate cultural boundaries (Akoh, 2008, pp. 163-175) in ways pre­
viously unknown. In a world in which there are no longer definable frontiers 
geographically and where the spread of ideas has gone unhindered, marginality 
and crisis are the symptoms of a much deeper malaise unleashed by globaliza­
tion. The reasons are obvious. Globalization has become a new way o f legitimiz­
ing the ideas and practices of relations of superiority and inferiority. In other 
words, it has become an effective instrument o f not only socio-economic but 
also political domination. In the process, all much older principles o f domination 
such as gender, religion, region, race, ethnicity, etc. have acquired new mean­
ings. In several locales, globalization has also developed, defined, or redefined 
the society’s structure o f power, complete with all forms of control, appropria­
tion, and exploitation. The changing conditions created by globalization has 
therefore led not only to deep contestations, but has also altered patterns o f exis­
tence and reasoning. Thus, while many assumptions and positions have attended 
the effects of globalization, several positions have also emphasized certain as­
pects such as development, equity, and social justice, and how these orient the 
dynamics of thinking in the global age (Stiglitz, 2002; Chomsky, 2003; Wolf,
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260 Conclusion Olutayo C. Adesina, Akanmu G. Adebayo, and Rasheed O. Olaniyi 261
2004). The consequences these offer for action in Africa have been assessed by and June 2008 was displaced and misplaced aggression spurred by unprece­
several authors in this volume. dented rising costs of living occasioned by a series of price and interest rare 
While contemporary globalization has coincided with the triumph o f global shocks, galloping inflation and high gasoline prices. As life became more and 
capitalism and neo-liberal democracy (Amuwo, 2009,'p. 37), the African condi­ more unbearable for ordinary South Africans, reinforcing failed government policies and lack of social delivery, less skilled foreigners who live amongst 
tion in the age o f globalization on the other hand has been rooted in acts o f polit­ them became easy targets of senseless attacks, looting, rape and murder.
ical brigandage, ethnic rivalry and hegemony, leadership struggles, economic \
slavery, under-development, brain drain, corruption, reprisal and revenge at­ There is no gainsaying the fact that wars, civil wars, ethnic rivalries, and 
tacks, and inordinate ambitions (Abaagye & Bah, 2005, p. 281; Oche, 1998, p. complex emergencies have punctuated the last 40 years o f African history 
117). Any political progress in the last 30 years has been irrelevant to most (Nwolise, 1997, p. 39), but the history of the continent in the last two decades 
Africans (Calderisi, 2006, p. 60). From this perspective, it is therefore easy to has been that o f acute and unprecedented strife. According to Chris Garba 
accept Mamdani’s position (2004, p. 3) that “the modem political sensibility (1998), “[a]s recently as 1998, people in about 14 o f Africa’s 53 countries 
sees most political violence as necessary to historical process.” [were] engaged in armed conflicts simultaneously. These violent conflicts have 
Several policies enthroned and entrenched by globalization have at the end taken severe economic and social tolls on the continent, seriously undermining 
o f the day compounded the African problem. Specifically, the World Trade development efforts in many countries” (p. 149). An estimated 20 million 
Organization (WTO) has served primarily the U.S. government and corporate people are known to have been displaced by conflict in the Great Lakes region 
interests over developing country and civil society interests (Cavanagh & Mand- countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo; Somalia, 
er, 2004, p. 66). Also, the debt crisis sucked the vitality out o f  African econo­ Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote D’Ivoire. But if the crisis o f the early 
mies. Rather than working to help reduce the problems associated with this, the periods were symptomatic o f changing conditions such as decolonization and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the governments o f  the creditor nations the Cold War, the crises witnessed in recent years were the results of the post- 
did what they could to make sure the poverty-stricken countries of Africa and Cold War era and the overweening effects of globalization. The continent cannot 
other developing countries fulfilled their debt obligations, whatever the costs to but remain prostrate as the forces o f globalization and tyranny have combined to 
their people (Stiglitz, 2007, p. 220). What this meant for underdeveloped coun­ hold on tightly to the continent’s jugular.
tries has been amplified by Collier (2007, p. 91): “The lack of capital inflows is The unending cycle of catastrophe, tyranny, economic problems, and civil 
only half the story' o f  why global capital markets are not working for the bottom wars have not sent a good signal for the future. The continent is experiencing a 
billion. I he other half is that their own capital flows out o f  them.” The privatiza­ failure of its structures and systems. This has led to pertinent questions: Is Africa 
tion strategy, also an essential component of globalization, has succinctly been imploding and fragmenting? Is the state really becoming more corrupt, oppres­
described as “a means o f taking over enterprises and penetrating markets so sive, and inefficient? Or is the continent rejuvenating itself? How much o f this 
much as it is a means of eliminating structures of production which could com­ was really a problem of the global disorder created by globalization? The 
pete or challenge an imperially dominated world” (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001, p. process o f rolling back the nation-state in Africa has assumed a frenetic dimen­
93). This has been amplified by Hoogvelt (2001, p. 121) when he asserted that sion. African youths are now growing up in a world highly dissimilar to that of 
globalization is nothing more than the deepening phase o f  capitalist integration. their fathers and grandfathers. It is a brave new world where the aspirations o f a 
This deepened the exploitation and subjugation of the African continent. Thus, new generation can no longer be taken for granted. The problematic nation-state, 
like the earlier phases, poverty and unemployment on the African continent which had become the primary defining entity of African nations in the contem­
began to reach an intolerable level. Indeed, inadequate income is a strong pre­ porary world, is being forced to reassess itself. The movement o f the planet into 
disposing condition for an impoverished life (Sen, 2000, p. 87). The implica­ unipolarity and multi-civilizational world order also has significance for Africa 
tions were clear and far-reaching. Africans began to move out o f  the continent in as these have affected the equilibrium built in the days of the Cold War.
droves, with at least 70,000 skilled graduates abandoning the continent every The African continent has a plurality of systems that has made it to be iden­
year (Calderisi, p. 5). People also began to revolt and resist government policies. tified as the new Tower of Babel. The crises and conflict on the African conti­
Others took out their anger and frustration on fellow Africans: migrants from nent have had monumental economic, political, social, and psychological conse- ^ 
sister African countries. A salient example of such transferred aggression was quences. The relative decline of the continent and the rise o f the developing 
the case of acute xenophobia in South Africa. As noted by Amuwo (2009 p 
57): countries o f Asia have brought into bold relief the polar opposite effects o f glo­balization on different parts of the world. While China, India, and the Asian 
Tigers are on the same trajectory o f  focused development, the countries o f Afri­
The immediate cause of the virulent xenophobia that gripped several townships 
in South African major cities of Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape Town in May ca are still battling with the problems of ethnicity and underdevelopment. The 
younger African generation is growing up to love American culture and ways of
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262 Conclusion Olutayo C. Adesina, Akanmu G. Adebayo, and Rasheed O. Olaniyi 263
life. The passion for consumption and an urbane life has opened a new battle- the restrictive embrace of the state. Globalization has left an indelible impres­
front, one in which new questions are being asked and new values are being sion on the minds of the brave and younger generation of Africans. Although we 
constructed. In the process, the world has come to taint Africa as the land of still live in a world that conforms to a Western template, Africa, like Asia, has to 
conflict, corruption, and crisis. begin to recognize the plurality of its structure and the need to reinvent the con­
However, from the depth of marginality and crisis comes a glimpse o f hope. tinent.
^ T h e  crisis situation has allowed the continent to adopt new paradigms and strat­
egies. The new strategy ranged from Nigeria’s rapprochement with the Niger 
Delta militants to East Africa’s use of Swahili as a tool o f integration. For Bar- References
kawi (2006), in his incisive study of the variable processes o f interconnectedness 
and how this has affected the nation-state in the contemporary world, he af­ Abaagye, F., & Bah, M.S. (2005). Tortuous road to peace: The dynamics o f regional. 
firmed that war does not just tear nations apart; it brings people and places to­ United Nations and international humanitarian interventions in Liberia. Pretoria: 
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(in this volume) who asserted that Kiswahili was used not only as a liberation migrants in France and South Africa. In A. G. Adebayo & O. C. Adesina (Eds.), 
language in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa during apartheid, but Globalization and transnational migrations. Africa and Africans in the contempo­
also recently played a crucial role in the expansion o f the East African Commu­ rary global system, pp. 36-63. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publish­
nity (EAC), which was expanded in 2007 to include Rwanda and Burundi, two ing-
countries wracked by unremitting civil war and genocide. The expansion of the Barkawi, T. (2006). Globalization and war. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
EAC as a tool o f integration immediately posed the fundamental question of the Calderisi, R. (2006). The trouble with Africa. Why foreign aid isn't working. New York: 
i Ijple o f Kiswahili in relation to other languages in the process o f identity forma- Palgrave Macmillan.
t*J'n in the EAC. This arose from the fact that many citizens o f  Rwanda and Cavanagh, J., & Mander, J. (Eds.). (2004). Alternatives to economic globalization: A 
Burundi who lived in Tanzania over an extended period as political refugees not better world is possible. San Francisco: Bcrrett-Kochler Publishers, Inc.Chomsky, N. (2003). Hegemony or survival: America s quest for global dominance. New 
only speak Kiswahili but have also adopted it and institutionalized it through use York: Metropolitan Books
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accelerated in the past two centuries, each generation has been called upon to Hoogvelt, A. (2001). Globalization and the post-colonial world: The new political econ­
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360). The challenges o f  marginality, crises, and underdevelopment have conti­ Kawoya, V., & Makokha, M. (2009). The case of Kiswahili as a regional broadcasting 
nuously stared Africa in the face. The continent has no reason not to meet such language in east Africa. Journal o f Pan African Studies 2(8), pp. 11-37.
new challenges head-on. Thus, as Africans look forward to sustained develop­ Mamdani, M. (2004). Good Muslim, bad Muslim. America, the cold war, and the roots o f 
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opment. The construction o f the nation-state in Africa on a structure based and political stability in the west African sub-region. Africa Peace Review 1(1), p. 39.
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riority has become anachronistic in the age of globalization. The'acute depen- Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Printing Press Division.
dejj^c on the rentier state and the deeply rooted attitude of keeping the other Petras J., & Veltmeyer, H. (2001). Globalization unmasked: Imperialism in the 21" 
. groups down have also gone with the Cold War. The world is now witnessing a century, Halifax, NS: Femwood Publishing Limited.
rapid configuration of the world based on mobility of peoples and the waning of Sachs, J.D. (2005). The end o f poverty. New York: Penguin Books.
the global dominance o f the Western powers. The state is having its powers Sen, A. (2000). Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Stiglitz, J.E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
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reality and by a generation that has begun to entertain other ambitions beyond Wolf, M. (2004). Why globalization works. New Haven: Yale University Press.
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
Index
Abuja, 22 Asia, 7, 26, 32, 65, 121, 168, 169; 
Accra, 22 Asian Tigers, 261; South, 89; 
Acheulian, 32 Southeast, 40
Addis Ababa, 66 Association of South East Asian 
Adebayo, Akanmu G., xvi Nations (ASEAN), 168 
Adesina, Olutayo C., xvi Australia, 15, 33 
Afghanistan, 6, 22, 93 Awolowo, Obafemi, 210
Africa, xv, xvi, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 
15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, 37, 38, Bakweri women, 72
39, 40, 65, 90, 106, 118, 121, Baptist missionaries, 73
125, 127, 128, 168, 169, 170, Bauchi, 94
175, 181, 192, 213; African Bello, Ahmadu, 210
Rural Women Day, 77; Afri­ Benin, 24, 33, 34, 77
can Union (AU), 64, 65, 66, Boko Haram, 5
68; sub-Saharan African Sta­ brain drain, 21
tes, 122, 125 Brazil, 32, 35, 36, 40
Afro-Brazilians, 35 Brazilian architecture, 36
Aguda, 35 Bretton Woods institutions, 6, 169
ajobi, 53, 54; alajobi, 43, 44, 52, British Consul, 91
54 Burundi, 9, 61, 63, 65, 66, 262
ajogbe, 53, 54; alajogbe, 53, 54 
Ake, 9,81,82, 83,87 Cable News Network (CNN), 226 
American, 4; citizens, 4; Indians, Cairo, 4 
34; occupation, 6 Calabar, 4
Americo-Liberians, 184, 185 Cameroon, 4, 71, 72, 74, 76, 78;
Anan, Kofi, 93 National Union (CNU), 77 
anti-globalization, 5, 6 Canada, 5 
Arab, 22, 23, 189; Arabic, 66; Cancun, 25
Arabic script, 64 capitalism, 16, 17; unbridled, 27 
Argentina, 35, 36 capitalist, 6 
Aristotle, 33, 48 Casablanca, 4 
Asante, 34 cassava, 34
UNIVERSITY OF IB
DAN LIBRARY
266 Index Index 267
Central Bank o f Nigeria (CBN), Economic Commission of West globalization, xv, xvi, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Igbo, 34, 37
I 13, 156 African States (ECOWAS), 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20,21, Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), 234, 
"Chile, 32, 35, 40, 169 128, 168 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 244
China, 5, 10, 21, 167,261 Egypt, 33, 40; Egyptian pyramids, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 54, Imhotep, 33 
.choiceless democracies, 24 33 55, 83, 84, 89, 90, 97, 103, imperialism, 16
Cicero, 49 El-Zakzaky, 91 104, 105, 107, 118, 1£2, 149, India, 5, 10,21, 167, 169, 170,261 
citizenship, 9 Environmental Impact Assessment 150, 167, 168, 169, 170, 182, industrial capital, 15 
clientelism, 8, 249, 250 (EIA), 253 220, 259, 263; of development, industrialized nations, 9, 13 
Cold War, 16 Ethiopia, 173, 174, 175 26; glocalization, 84; and Information and Communication 
communism, 16 ethnic conflict, 211,212 transnational migrations, xvi; Technologies (ICT), 7, 20 
community based organizations EU-ACP (European Union-Africa, and the unending frontier, xvi; Intellectual Property Rights, 23 
(CBOs), 8, 133, 135, 136, 137, Caribbean, and Pacific), 20 o f world economy, 26 International Bank for Reconstruc­
139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145 Europe, 15, 16, 21, 32, 65, 92, 93, globe, 45 tion and Development (IBRD), 
compatriotism, 43, 46,47, 50, 52 168, 174; European, 4, 16; Eu­ Gothenburg, 5, 6 108
Congo, Democratic Republic of, ropean Union (EU), 126, 127, grassroots, 24; resistance, 24 International Finance Corporation 
64, 261 128 Great Lakes, region, 261 (IFC), 109
cosmopolitanism, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50 Ewe, 34, 35 Greeks, 33, 40, 49 International Labour Organization
Cote d ’Ivoire, 174,261 Group o f Eight (G8), 25 (ILO) , 153
c risis, 3 fair trade, 10 Gumi, Shaikh, 90 International Monetary Fund
Cuba, 35, 36, 40 fatwa, 92 (IMF) , 25, 26, 38, 39, 40, 105, 
cultural, 6, 83, 84; hybridity, 82; Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), Haiti, 35 107, 260
imperialism, 6 113, 139 Harare Declaration on Human International NGOs, 6
cyber cafe, 4 female circumcision, 7 Rights, 233 Internet, 6, 10, 45, 93, 97
Fernando Po, 35 Hausa, 66 Iran, 91
Dahomey, 35 foreign direct investment (FDI), 20, highly industrialized economies, Iraq, 6, 22
Daniel, Isioma, 95 21, 120, 125, 127, 152 164 isakole, 203
Danish, 92, 93, 95 free market ideology, 4 hijab, 95 Isara, 82
Darfur, 7, 182, 187, 189 free trade, 8 HIV/AIDS, 6, 122, 134 Islam, 10, 23, 90
Das Kapital, 16 Friedman, T., xvi Hobson, J.A., 17 ivory tower, 5
Dasuki, Ibrahim, Sultan o f Sokoto, Friends o f  the Earth, 230 hometown associations, 7 Izala, 90
92 homo erectus, 31 
Davos, 25 Gaining, Johan, 17 homo sapiens, 33 JamaatuI Izalat al-Bid’ah wa Iqama 
de Sousa, F.F., 35 gari, 34, 35 Human Development Index (HDI), as Sunnah, 90 
developing, 20; world, 20, 122; General Agreement on Trade and 113 Janjaweed, 188 
countries, 23, 125, 169 Tariffs (GATT), 20, 119 Huntington, S., 22 Japan, 21
diaspora, 7, 35, 36, 202 genocide, 182, 190, 240,241 Hutu, 183 Joint Military Task Fore (JTF), 240 
Doe, Samuel, 185 Ghana, 32, 77; Ghanaians, 22,34 joint-stock companies, 15 
Doha, 25 global, 3; capital, 7, 8; economy, 7, Ibadan, xv, 96; Government Col­ Jyllands Posten, 92
Douala, 73, 77 18; governance, 7, 15, 18; lege, 82; University of, xv, 4, 
identity, 3; issues, 7; media, 24 Kabba, 10, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 
Fast Africa, 9 ,61 ,67 , 262 10; politics, 22; processes and Ifa, 36 77, 78; onikaba, 85 
East African, 9; Community interconnections, 3; restructur­ Ife Descendants Union, 202 Kaduna, 91,95 
(EAC), 9, 61, 63, 68, 262; In­ ing o f  capitalism, 3; South, 4, Ife-Modakeke crisis, 7, 197, 198, Kano, 4, 95
tegration Taskforce, 67; Kis- 6, 8; trade, 163; village, 10, 20, 201,206 Kant, Immanuel, 49, 50 
wahili Commission, 66 54, 55 Igala, 37 kenke, 34
UNIVERSI Y OF IBADAN LIBRARY
268 Index Index 269
Kennesaw, xv, 24; University, xv, Movement for the Emancipation of Onitsha, 94 Seattle, 5, 25 
24 the Niger Delta (MEND), 226, Organization for Economic Coop­ sekete, 34 
Kenya, 4, 9, 32, 62, 64, 67 250 eration and Development Shiite, 91
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 91, 92 Movement for the Survival of (OECD), 23, 167 Sierra Leone, 173, 174, 175, 186, 
-Jvinyarwanda, 64 Ogoni Peoples (MOSOP), 232, Organization o f Islamic Conference 261
hCiswahili, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 243, 250 (OIC), 93 slave trade, 15; trans-Atlantic, 35 
67, 262 Mozambique, 65, 126,262 ori s as, 36 Somalia, 173, 261; Somalis, 4 
Kuwait, 95 Muna, Madam Ama Tutu, 78 Oslo, 5 Sotho, 66
Kyoto Protocol, 176 outsourcing, 4 South, 5, 9, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 24, 
Nasrullahi-Fathi Society of Nigeria 26, 27
Lagos, 36, 94 (NASFAT), 93 Pakistan, 22, 93 South Africa, 65, 262; African 
Land Use Act; 240, 253; Land Use National Patriotic Front o f Liberia Palestinian Territory, 22 Preferential Treatment Trade 
Decree, 200 (NPFL), 187 patriotism, 48 Area (PTA), 168 
Latin America, 7, 121, 168, 169, National Population Commission Pentecostal, 5 South America, 26 
170 (NPC), 139 Plato, 33, 48 Southern Hemisphere, 5 
Lebauon, 93 neo-bipolarism, 16 polio, 6 Soyinka, Wole, 81, 83, 84, 92 
left-wing student unionism, 5 neo-Marxism, 17 Pope John Paul II, 96 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
Lenin, V.I., 17 New International Economic Order popular culture, 9 107, 108, 114 
liberalization, 9, 18, 83, 119, 149 (NIEO), 24 poverty, 120, 122, 167, 170, 172, Stiglitz, J., xvi 
Liberia, 174 New Partnership for African De­ 173, 174; alleviation, 117, 118; Stone Age, 31
Low Income Countries Under velopment (NEPAD), 128, 129 alleviation programs, 6; reduc­ structural adjustment program 
Stress (L1CUS), 175 Niger, 174; Niger Delta, 6, 8, 163, tion, 169 (SAP), 20, 24
* 225, 226, 230, 234, 235, 236, privatization, 104, 106, 108, 113, Sudan, 4, 175, 189, 261; Sudan 
Madagasar, 124 239, 240, 246, 247, 250, 254, 114, 124 Federal Democratic Alliance 
Magubane, Zine, xv 262 Puerto Rico, 40 (SFDA), 190; Sudan People’s 
Maiduguri, 94 Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Liberation Movement (SPLM), 
Malawi, 24, 124 Force (NDPVF), 226 Quebec, 5 187
Malaysia, 167, 169 Niger Republic, 174, 175 Qur 'an, 90, 95 Swahili, 66, 262 
Mamdani, Mahmood, 22 Nigeria, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 32, 35, 91, Sweden, 5
Mandela, Nelson, 233 93,94, 97, 104, 106, 113, 114, Ransome-Kuti, Rev and Mrs., 82, 
Mano River area, 7, 181, 193; 124, 175, 210, 230, 240,248, 85 Taiwan, 5
conflict, 184 262; NIGCOMSAT, 26; north­ Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Tanzania, 62, 63, 64, 66 
marginality, 3, 192; marginaliza­ ern, 6; Television Authority 186 Technical Committee on Privatiza­
tion, xv, 3, 9, 16 (NTA), 26 Rushdie, Salman, 91, 92 tion and Commercialization 
Marx, Karl, 16, 17 Nigerian Muslims, 89, 92 Rwanda, 7, 9, 61, 64, 66, 175, 181, (TCPC), 114 
Mau Mau, 65 non-govemmental organizations 190, 261,262 Thatcher, Margaret, 105 
Mazrui rebellion, 65 (NGOs), 4, 7, 134 Tiv-Jukun ethnic crisis, 7, 209, 
Mexico, 170 North, 13, 14, 15, \16, 18, 24; Saker, Rev Alfred, 73, 74 211, 218, 219, 222; conflict, 
Middle East, 2 2 ,2 3 ,9 0 ,9 1 ,9 7 , 174 America, 15 Sankoh, Foday, 186 221
military dictatorship, 6 Norway, 5 Santeria, 35 ,40  , Togo, 32, 34 
Millennium Development Goals Sao Tome, 35 Tolbert, William, 185 
(MDG), 129 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 108, 214, 235 Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 226 transnational, 15, 77; corporations, 
Modakeke Progressive Internation­ Odi, 8 Satanic Verses, The, 91, 92 15, 19; interconnections, 37 
al, 202 Ogboni cult, 85, 86 Saudi Arabia, 95, 96 Trilateral Commission, 25 
Mohammad, Prophet, 92, 95 Ogoni, 6; Ogoniland, 231 Sawa women, 71, 73, 75, 77, 78 Trinidad, 35, 40
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
About the Contributors
O lajide O. Akanji holds a doctorate degree in Political Science from the Uni­
versity o f  Ibadan, Nigeria. He currently teaches political science in the Depart­
ment of Political Science of the same university. His areas o f specialization 
include conflict and security issues, human rights, citizenship, and governance 
studies. His latest publication is “Group Rights and Conflicts in Africa: A Criti­
cal Reflection on Ife-Modakeke, Nigeria,” International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights (Volume 16, No I, 2009).
Jt
Osita Agbu is an Associate Research Professor at the Nigerian Institute of In­
ternational Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science 
from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is the editor of Children and Youth 
in the Labour Process in Africa (CODESRIA, 2009); and author of The Iron 
and Steel Industry and Nigeria’s Industrialization: Exploring Cooperation with 
Japan (Institute o f  Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO, 2007), West A frica’s 
Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peace-Building (CODESRIA, 2006), and 
Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria (Nordic 
Africa Institute, 2004).
Moses T. Aluaigba is a Research Fellow at the Aminu Kano Centre for Demo­
cratic Research and Training, Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano,
Nigeria. He is currently a doctoral candidate in Political Economy and Devel­
opment Studies at the University of Abuja, Nigeria. He was a Fulbright Visiting 
Scholar in African Studies at Ohio University Athens from August 2008 to May 
2009. His contributions on various areas o f political economy are published as 
book chapters and articles in national and international journals. His research * 
} interests include democracy, democratization in Nigeria, ethnic conflicts, con­
flict resolution, and research methods
Ronald Olufemi Badru is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Philoso­
phy, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is a lecturer in philosophy at the Depart-
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
274 About the Contributors About the Contributors 275
ment of Politics and International Relations, Lead City University, Ibadan, Nige­ rural livelihoods and food security; small-scale rural enterprises, sm all scale/co 
ria, and at the Saints Peter & Paul Major Seminary, New Bodija, Ibadan, an operative dairy enterprises; rural credit and rural financial institutions; rural 
affiliate o f  the University o f Ibadan, Nigeria. He has published in both local and resource management; economic analysis of small-scale farming systems and 
international journals. He has also attended and presented papers at local and project analysis.
■** international conferences. His areas of research interest include African meta­
physics and epistemology, global justice, democracy and governance, peace and Flavius Mayoa Mokake is a graduate student in the Department o f  History, 
conflict. University of Buea, Cameroon. He has a chapter in an edited book, Cameroon. 
The Stakes and Challenges fo r  Governance and Development (2009). He is 
H. O. Danmole, Ph.D., is currently Professor and Head, Department o f  History, currently involved in a project on “Street Children and Lumpen Youth. Child­
Lagos State University, Ojo. Formerly Professor o f History at the University of hood and Youth Livelihood at the Margins.”
Morin, he was at various times the Head of the Department o f History. A sea­
soned scholar, Professor Danmole has contributed extensively to books as well David Omeiza IVloveh is 3 doctoral candidate and an assistant lecturer in the 
as local and international journals. He is currently working on a book-length Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. His M.Sc. 
study entitled “Between Ilorin and Lagos: Studies in Islamic Cultural History of research (2007) was on the Political Economy of Privatization in Nigeria. Mo- 
Yorubaland.” veh has authored several articles in books and journals, including the African 
Journal o f  Social Policy and  Administration.
Sheriff Folarin lectures in the Department of Political Science & International 
Relations at Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria. He is also currently M waiiakom bo M oham m ed Noordin is a lecturer of Kiswahili language and 
the International Students Officer of the university. A member o f the U.S. State literature at Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya. She has recently submitted a Ph.D.
Alumni and IVLP, Folarin won the Fulbright Scholarship grant for the Study of thesis at Moi University, Kenya. She is the co-editor of Kiswahili. A Tool fo r  
the United States Institute on Foreign Policy in 2007, which took him and 18 Development: The Multidisciplinary Approach (Moi University Press, 2001). 
Mothers from across the world to the Walker Institute o f International & Area She is currently working on a study of Islamic feminism on the culture o f Swa­
Studies (WIIAS)/Department of Political Science, University o f South Carolina, hili women.
USA. Folarin is well published in the areas of foreign policy and diplomatic 
history. O lalekan Emmanuel O badem i is a lecturer with the Department o f  I inancial 
Studies, Redeemer’s University, Nigeria. He is about completing a Ph.D. in 
Agbo Uchechukwu Johnson is lecturer of Political Science at Taraba State Finance having already obtained an M.Sc. in Economics from University o f 
University, Jalingo, Nigeria. He earned his Ph.D. from Ahmadu Bello Universi­ Ado-Ekiti, M.Sc. in Agric-economics from University of Ibadan, postgraduate 
ty, Zaria, Nigeria. He is co-author o f Communication fo r  Health and Sustainable diploma in Financial Management from Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, 
Development in Nigeria (2008), co-author of Parties and Politics in Nigeria, and a bachelor’s degree in Agric-economics from Obafemi Awolowo Universi­
1999-2009 (2009). He has numerous journal publications. He is currently work­ ty, Nigeria. He is the author of “Money, Banking and the Economy. He has 
ing on a book, Early Warning Study o f  Socio-economic and Political Issues in published extensively in several academic journals.
Africa in the Post Cold War Era.
Samuel Oluwole Ogundele is Associate Professor of Anthropological Archaeo­
Olayinka Idowu Kareem is a research fellow at the Centre for Public-Private logy at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. He obtained his doctorate 
Cooperation and a Ph.D. candidate o f the Department o f  Economics, University from the University o f Ibadan. He has been Visiting Professor at the University 
o f Ibadan, Nigeria. He has worked on diverse areas such as the application of of Ghana, Legon, and University o f the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South 
econometrics in trade and development, pension and social protection as well as Africa, during which he served on the archaeological research team on the Ma- 
economic governance. He has authored a number o f articles in both local and pungubwe Hill Complex in the Limpopo Valley region of South Africa. He is
international journals. He is currently doing a study on Nigeria’s trade relations author and/or co-author of several books on aspects of African archaeology and 
with China and the European Union. *anthropology.
F.amon Lenihan is the Director, Centre for Sustainable Livelihoods, University Ayo Ogunsiji, a senior lecturer at the Department of English, University of 
College Cork, Ireland. His main areas o f expertise include exploring the two- Ibadan, Nigeria, obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Ibadan. His research 
way linkages between HIV/AIDS, nutrition, and food/agricultural production; interests cover applied English linguistics and discourse stylistics as demonstrat-
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY
z / o About the Contributors
ed in many of his publications such as “Attitudinal Meaning in Soyinka’s Ake, 
Isara and Ibadan,” Le Linguiste, Antewerp; “Utilitarian Dimensions o f Language 
S in the Multilingual Nigerian Context,” Journal o f  Social Sciences, Faisalabad; 
“Aspects o f the Phono-Graphological Design in Soyinka’s ‘Faction’” NEBULA, 
Australia. He is currently co-editing a book on Language, Literature and Dis- 
> course.
H enry Okodua teaches economics in the Department o f Economics and Devel­
opment Studies, Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria, where he is also a doctoral 
candidate. He is an active member of the Development Research Group in his 
university and also a member of the Nigerian Economic Society (NES). He 
earned his B.Sc. degree in economics from the University o f  Ilorin, Morin, Nige­
ria, and an M.Sc. degree in economics from the University o f  Benin, Benin City, 
Nigeria.
Aloysius-Michaels Okolie is a senior lecturer in the Department o f Political 
Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He earned his Ph.D. from the University 
o f Nigeria, Nsukka. A 2004 Fulbright scholar on U.S. foreign policy, Aloysius- 
Michaels has authored several peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters. 
Vfe is the author o f Political Behaviour (Nigeria, 2004), Statistics fo r  Political 
Data Analysis (Nigeria, 2005); co-author of Law, Politics and Mass Media in 
Nigeria (Nigeria, 2004); and co-editor of State and Economy (Nigeria, 2005). 
He is currently working on a book-length study o f contemporary readings in 
foreign policy making and implementation in Nigeria.
Stephen Onakuse received his B.Agric. degree from the University of Agricul­
ture, Abeokuta; M.Sc. degree from the University o f  Ibadan in Environmental 
Biology; and Ph.D. in Food Science and Technology from University College, 
Cork, Ireland. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of Food Business & 
Development and a Research Fellow with the Centre for Sustainable Liveli­
hoods at the University College Cork. His areas o f research include the use of 
indigenous knowledge within communities.
Andrew Oseloka Sawyer is a doctoral candidate o f Peace and Conflict Studies 
Program, University of Ibadan. He was a visiting scholar at Kennesaw State 
University, Kennesaw, Georgia, USA, in 2008. His research interests are mili- 
!SIy disarmament, resource conflicts, inter-/intra-religious conflicts and strategic 
studies. He has presented a number of academic papers in Nigeria and in the 
United States of America.
V >
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY