NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS I — - . - f - Jo u rn a l o f th è D e p a rtm e n t of C lassics, U n iv e rs iy o f Ib a d a n , Ib ad a n , N igeria . Voi. 30 (2018) Voi. 31 (2019) UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY jjj | NIGERIA AND THE CLASS1CS Voi. 30 (2018) and Voi. 31 (2019) CONTENTS VOLUME 30 - 2018 t «RI I K IMMANENCE AND IJAW TRANSCENDENCE IN J.P. CLARK'S SONG OF A GOAT. - Fred Emi, BRIS1DE R \l) l \N D MARKET DYNAMICS IN COLONIAL ADO-EKITI, I I 9 ( ) ( ) -| % ( ) ) . - Fola sode DARÀ MOLA & Monsoni MERITALA J l ISERIT. ERIT: FATALISM AND ÀYÀNMÓ IN ANCIENT GREEK AND TRADITIONAL YORUBA PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS. -Dosede Adefìola, ADEBOWALE I ADI RSHIP AS A BANE TO DEVELOPMENT IN T.M. ALUKO'S ‘!IS WORSHIPFUL MAJESTY - Yakohn Adegboyega. ADF.OTI \ ARRATING THE NATION IN TAYO OLAFIOYE'S THEPARLIAMENT IDIOTE: TRYSTOF THE RINATORS - Salomon Olusayo. OLANIYAN RV IVAI. STRATEGY IN AN ERA OE ANOM1E: A READING OE U Gl ITER MOTIF IN REMI RA JES/I HARVEST OF LA UGHTERS - Kazeem A DEB1YI-A DELABU : I l / l \ S I IIP IN MARCUS CIC'ERO'S DE ORATORE - Rev. Fr. Kenneth Adewole, ADESINA ◄ V O LU M E 31-2019 GRECO-ROMAN VOYAGES: THE MOBILITY OF THE CLASSICS. Ili W C ES IORS COME FROM EVERTAVI IERE - Luke ROMAN M II CONCEPÌ OF SUMMUM BONUM IN Gl IANAIAN SOCIO-CULTURAL DISCOURSE - Jonathan Asante, OTCHERE UNIVERSITY OF IBAD N LIBRARY iv I NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018) and Voi. 31 (2019) BETRAYAL IN ALUKO'S ONE MAN. ONE MATC'HET AND BU LGAKOVS THE MASTER AND MARGARITA - Yaknbu Adegboyega. ADEOTI CURI STI ANISATION OF GOVERNANCE AND POLITICISATION OF RE1.IG10N IN THE DAYS OF EMPEROR CONSTANTINE: LESSONS FOR CONTEMPORARY NIGF.RIAN STATE - Samuel Olawalosin. OKANLAWON VOTE BUYING, ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN NIGERIA - Olnsegnn Peier.OKE AR I AND PRAGMATISM OF PRAYERS IN HOMER: SOME RI.FLECTION IN YORUBA PRAYERS - GUI Olnwalosin. ADEKANNBI AN EXPLICATION OF THE LEXICO-SEMANTIC C'ONTEXT AND C( )-TEXT OF HAMLET FOR PIDGIN (OCA P/KIN) - Odirin V. ABONYI MORAL MOTIVATION: A SOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE - Abraham Lincoln. NUTSHUGAH YORUBA I RADITIONAL MEDICINE PRACTITIONERS IN ONITSHA AND IGBO-YORUBA RELATIONS. 1980s - 2014 -Elnk Akaninvene, UFOT & Maritala MONSURU DISEASE MANAGEMENT IN ANCIENT TIMES: PAUL’S ‘THORN IN I NI F I.E S H '(2 CORINTHIANS 12:7) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DISI ASE MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA'S PENTECOSTAl. CHURCHES - Olnbayo ().. OBIJOLE & Olnrokan O.. OLOWOYEYE UNIVERSITY OF IB DAN LIBRARY 33 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 QUISER/T, E R IT’: FATALISM AND A YÀNMÓ IN ANCIENT GREEK AND TRADITIONAL YORÙBÀ PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS. Bosede Adefiola, ADEBOWALE Department o f Classics, University o f Ibadan. Ibadan, Nigeria. olusegunbosede@gmail.com Abstract Fataiism isa philosophica! concept generaily used lo referto thè beliefthat man is powerless io do or change anything in thè face o f future events which are believed to be inevitable. The idea is that there is no point trying to control thè future. Thus. thè concept o f fataiism often leads to thè altitude o f resignation in thè conviction that man does not bave control over thè events in his lite, hence ’what svilì be svili be'. Many ancient Greek philosophers. especially thè Stoics. used thè terni indirai for fataiism and argue in support of and against thè concept. For instance. one o f thè famous arguments o f thè ancient Greek philosophers is that if an event is fated, it would be futile to make an\ concerted effort to avoid or bring it about. The Yorùbà, like thè Greeks. use words such as àyànmó (destiny). keniani (fate), àkosilè (predeterminalion) ainong otliers lo describe thè l'utility of trying to change or control what has been predetermined or predestined. Therefore. thè concept of fataiism is greatly reflected in various traditional Yorùbà proverbs and songs. The question which tliis paper focuses on is: is man really helpless in thè face o f fataiism? Tliis paper engages a comparative and criticai analysis method o f enquiry to react to tliis question. keyw ords: Fataiism, Greek Philosopher, àyànmó, Yorùbà, Belief Introduction Is man really helpless in thè face o f fate or destiny? Is there anything like destiny or fate? I llese are questions that bave mystified humanity ihroughout history. People frolli various backgrounds bave strived to ascertain thè roles played by fate in human lives and bave contemplated thè efl'ect o f divine or diabolica! power, as well as thè influence ofgenetics and environment in determining w hetheror not man has controlover his lot in life.To go by Heraclitean idea, everything depended on destiny. In relation to tliis philosophical idea, many theories bave been developed over eenturies to explain events in m an's lite, two o f such theories are Fataiism and Determinisi!!. The terms fataiism, determinisi!! and predeterminism bave been used interchangeably in translating thè Greek word 'inaimi'. Tliese terms are used to stress thè futility o f human efforts in uttempting tocontain thè foreordination o f destiny or fate. I lowever, while determinism expresses that even event has its determining conditions in its immediate antecedents. fataiism, on thè otlier liand. emphasises that "all events take place according to a predetermined and inevitable destili) that canno! be controlled or influenccd" (Adebowale. 2017:45). The ancient Greeks believed that fate was thè \\ ili oftlie gods and played an important role in shaping and determining human lite \\ liich is beyond human control. Homer, thè ancient Greek poct, in Iliaci, portrays characters struggling witli thè notion o f fate, questioning and fighting against it btit llnally resigning themselves to their UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 34 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 fates. The Yorùbà, like thè ancient Greeks, believe that all human beings have àyànrnó or ìp.r (destiny. fate) which is expected to come to pass irrespective o f efforts made to change or alter : This belief usually stands as thè basis for explaining several inexplicable fortunes or miseries is human lite that shape thè attitude o f thè individuai, both in ancient Greece and traditional Yorùhi society, to that o f resignation that ’what will be. vvill be' and there is nothing man can do to thwart! thè will o f thè gods. Many scholars like Richard (1962). Kane (1966) and Segai (2001) ha \; considered thè conception o f fata li sm in line with theconcept o f inorai responsibility. They argue: on whether or not man could be held responsible for bis actions in thè face o f destiny. This paper. with its focus on Stoics and Yorùbà philosophical thoughts, however. examines thè notion cf fatalism from attitudinal perspective o f resignation to thè common saying *what will bc. will be' investigates thè notion that man is helpless in thè face ofcertain destined events in his Iifé using ths Lazy or Idle Argument. Ancient Greek philosophy and thè question of fatalism fhe ancient Greek philosophers were thè first thinkers to search for causes o f events ra tf^ than attributing controlling o f events to thè gods. These philosophers attempted a transformation f l pre-philosophical debatesabout gods controlling events in human fife. Someconveyed theconcer: Yj fatalism and determinism through their philosophical thoughts and doctrines. Por instar».=. I leraclitus. a pre-Socratic philosopher. believed that "every event in thè world is determined. a.-id wholly determined, by causes” and that "thè law o f causation admits o f no exception whateNer" (Stace. 1920:76). Pythagoras, another pre-Socratic philosopher. expressed thè doctrine : l determinism through his theory o f metempsychosis or transmigration o f thè soni. Accordine i metempsychosis' theory, thè soul reincarnates after thè death of thè body and thè forni into u hich itt soni reincarnates is detennined by thè deeds of thè previous life. l.eucippusand Democritus, know nastheatom istsand materialists were. however. thè firs: : Greek philosophers to have fully projected thè idea ofdeterm inism. To these atomists, all aspects j cxistence are determined by physical laws. According to them, thè physical matter o f thè unberse operates in fixed, knowable laws. The atomists are o f thè mind that every physical matter - composed o f small. smooth, and round atoms, energy atoms can be found throughout thè bodie> I both humans and animals and even thè rest o f thè world. The atoms, as described by thè atorr constitute thè smallest particles that forni thè constituents o f any solid body (Russell, 1975: 81 Russell (1975:87) explains that to Leucippus, thè full solid body orm atterrequiresavacuum inoród to give room for movement and multiplicity. These solid bodies fili thè vacuimi through an automated movement beyond their control. The atomists are o f thè view that nature itself is jusxa causai play o f atoms. With this notion, it can be inferred that man and thè cntire universe obe> i s cosmic law o f (lux and are subject to laws beyond their control. Thus, thè basis o fthe tea c h in g o fà r atomists is thè deterministic principle that "nothing happens without reason, but everything happei. through a reason o f necessity and thè principle o f univcrsal causaiity” (Composta. 1988:87). R us^l sums up thè argument o f thè atomists thus: ... everything is composed o f atoms, which are physically, but not geometrically indivisible; that between thè atoms there is empty space: that UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 35 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASS1CS Voi. 30 (2018 atoms are indestructible; that they always have been, and always vvill be. in motion... and their movements are determined outside them (Russell. 1975:83). Frorn thè above, it can be surmised that thè movement oFthe atoms are determined as the\ hover in motion unconsciously without thè ability to control themselves or their own movement. and since man isacom bination ofatom ic particles. it is beyond his power to control hisactionsorthe eventsof his lite. Socrates, a contemporary ofthèatom ists, analyses thè tenet offatalism anddeterminism frorn another perspecti ve. Socrates held thè view that thè soni o f man makes an oblivious choice in thè pre- existence o f what its rebirth should be. Many o f Plato's dialogues make references to thè destiny of thè soni before and after death. The myth o f Er. as narrated in Plato's Republic, describes thè procedure through which man is determined by thè choices he makes for his next life. This notion serves as thè centrai theme o f Plato's theory o f immortality o f thè soul. In this myth. Er. thè son of Armenius. a Pamphylian. was killed in a baule and ten days later thè bodies o f thè war victims were found decayed except that o f Er; he was found whole and thè body was taken away for burial. On thè twelfth day, while he lay on thè pyre, about to be cremated, he carne to life again; and there, Plato relates what Er had seen in thè Underworld. According to Plato. Er saw thè souls ofdifferent people choosing their various lots. For instance. he saw thè soul o f Orpheus “choosing thè life o f a swan out ofenm ity to thè race o f women. hating to be born o f a woman because they had been his murderers"; he also observed "thè soul o f Thamyras choosing thè life o f a nightingale” . Er did not only see thè souls o f humans choosing their lots. but he also saw thè souls o f birds, like swan and other musicians, wanting to be men and many others like Agamemnon. Odysseus and Ajax. choosing thè life o f an eagle. private man and Non respectively. After choosing their lots Plato explains what follows thus: All thè souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in thè order o f their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them thè genius whom they had severally chosen. to be thè guardian o f their lives and thè fulfiller o f thè choice: this genius led thè souls first to Clotho. and drew them within thè revolution of thè spinelle impelled by Iter hand. thus ratifying thè destiny ofeach; and then. w hen they were fastened to this. carried them to Atropos. who spun thè threads and made them irreversible (Plato The Republic, Book X. 620a - e). The Pythagoreans and both Socrates and Plato endeavoured to hold man responsible for his actions b> linking human freedom with determinism and causai law. Pythagoras indicated that thè past decds affect future events while Socrates and Plato signified that whatever choice man makes affeets thè future events o f his life. According to Greek mythology; Clotho. Lachesis and Atropos with a collective name: Aloipui (Moirai) Fates, were thè daughters o f thè Goddess o f Nccessity known as Them is. These sisters "skilfully structured and controlled thè metaphorical thread o f life ofevery human frorn birth to death" (Adebowale, 2017:44). The Greek mythology. as expounded by Adebowale (2017:44-45) designated each sister with responsibi 1 ity. For instance, Clotho. thè Spinner, had thè responsibility of UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 36 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 weaving thè thread o f lite: while, Lachesis, thè Apportioner. measured thè length o f thè thread and Atropos. thè Unturnable. cut thè thread with Iter great shear. With thè collective activities o f thè sisters. the> personified thè inevitability o f human destiny. Stoic Determ inism and Fatalism A paradigm shift on thè concept o f fatalism carne with Stoicism. Stoicism was one o f thè philosophical schools ofthought that flourished during thè Hellenistic age. It was fotinded, by Zeno ot C'itium. in Athens. The Stoic philosophy is primarily concerned with conduct. end o f man and his cliief good. which is happiness. For this happiness to be attained. thè Stoics believe that man must lead a lite that is in accordance with nature. To live according to nature, a man isto conform him selftothe laws o f thè universe silice thè universe is governed by thè law o f nature. The ethical end, therefore. according to thè Stoics. consists essentially in submission to thè divinely appointed order ofthe world. The Stoics see virtue as thè only good from which happiness emanates. Virtue, to thè Stoics. means living according to reason and reason tells man that all that happens must happen in order to actuate a superior goodwill by God, who is immanentlv conceived. Hence, a man is virtuous when he \\ishes that which happens and nothing else. The Stoics' view o f fate is entirely based on their perception ofthe universe as a u Itole. Zeller observes that. to thè Stoics. "individuai things and personsonly come intoconsideration asdependent parts o f this whole" (Zeller. 1880:177). Everything is, in every manner. determined by this relation, consequently, it is subject tothe generai order ofthe world. Most ofthe arguments ofthe Stoics on thè concept o f fatalism and determinism carne from thè testimony o f later writers such as Sextus Empiricus. Alexander o f Aphrodisias, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Aetius, Eusebius and Cicero who uroteextensiveK on thè Stoics, Epicureans and new Academy philosophy. This is due tothe factthat \ irttmlly all o fth e writings o fth e Stoics are lost. I he determinism tliesis o f thè Stoics argues that everything happens by fate and that everything that happens in thè universe is fully determined to thè last detail by Zeus. The Stoics eonsider fate as a "rational account o f thè things ordered in thè universe by providence” and believe that fate is an escapable, invincible and inflexible series o f causes (Meyer, 1999:253). According to thè Stoics, thè universe is one including all existing things and is governed by nature in order for it to bave an everlasting government o f being in a certain cliain and order. The Stoics are o fthe opinion that nothing in thè universe Comes to be without a cause— thè first things become thè causes of things that come to be after tliem and as such. all things are bound to one another. To thè Stoics. nothing Comes to be in thè universe that in such a way that something else does not, in any case, follow on it: nor can any o fth e things that followed be dctached from thè things preccding it. The Stoics' conception o f fate was rigorously criticised in ancicnt Greecc and by contemporary philosophers. For instance. thè Epicureans criticisc thè Stoics notion o f fate as worse llian thè traditional belief in gods. for this. according to thè Epicureans, destroys freedom and responsibility. Epicurus, thè founder o f Epicureanisni. assumes that belief in fate as thè Stoics interpret it. can be dcscribcd as a fatai ist belief that thè future seeins to be fixed independently of human ehoice. One ofthe important forimi lated objections by thè Stoics in antiquity was known as thè l.azy Argumenl. As reported by Cicero, thè argument States: UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY MGER1A AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 If it is fated for you to recover from this disease, then you vvill recover, whether you cali thè doctor or not; similarly. if it is fated for you not to recover from thè disease. then you will not recover whether you cali thè doctor or not. But one or thè other is fated. so there is no point in calling thè doctor (Cic. Fai. 28-29 [LS 55S2-3]). - ' i thè argument above. Cicero shows that thè idle argument is purported to show thè _::empting to take charge o f one's fate. This argument could lead to a life o f inaction and I: > evident that it is called thè Lazy Argument because all activities will be removed from r . at an outcome is determincd by antecedent event(s), nothing is necessary to be done in fc • ■ i occur or not to occur. Buller ( 1995: I I I ) uses another version o fan idle argument as i Either I will be killed in thè air raid or 1 will not. l i lf I will be killed. I will be killed whatever precautions I take. 2' So. i f I will be killed. all precautions will be ineffective (from 2). ) ? i If I will not be killed. I will not be killed whatever precautions 1 neglect. i .; ' i So. if I will not be killed. all precautions will be superfluous (from3). - i Therefore. all precautions are pointless (from I. 2 and 3). . . isidering Buller and Cicero's idle arguments. it is glaring that thè arguments depend on --:dge premises. From thè two arguments. ( I ) if death is fated, either from sickness or air j --teverthe forni o f precaution taken. thè precaution w ill be ineffective, (2) ifsurvival is fated. . ■ : irm o f precautions neglected will be superfluous. The arguments can be concluded to infer atever precautions taken or not taken make no difference silice whatever is fated cannot be hence. a precaution that is futile or gratuitous is a waste o f tiine. Criticising this line o f Hospers (1967:323) rejects thè premises saying: These two hypothetical propositions are about as clearly false as any empirical proposition can be. It is a plain empirical fact, which any set of statistics will bear out, that tliose who neglect to take precautions stand a higher chance o f being killed and tliose who do take precautions stand a higher chance o f remaining alive. iere. Hospers is o f thè opinion that if certain precautions that can be taken are taken there is :■ - ity o f keeping oneself alive. Meyer (1999: 253). considering thè Lazy Argument ofthe -gues that thè argument "failaciously infers that ifan outcome is antecedently determined. - •- ig I do is necessary in order for it to occur." The Stoics. however, believe that even if r - :ated. it stili might require spccilìc antecedentcauses. thereby introducing thè Co-fated -’egarding this tlieorv. Cicero (Fai. 30. [LS 55S2-3]) deelares oftlic Stoics tlius: UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 38 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 "For", he [Chrysippus] says, “there are some cases that are simple, others complex. A case o f what is simple is 'Socrates will die on that day'; whether he does anything or not, there is a fixed day for his death. Bnt if it is fated that ■Oedipus will be born to Laius,' one will not be able to say 'whether Laius has slept with a woman or not'; thè matter is complex and 'co-fated"' - for that is what he calls it. because it is fated bollì that Laius will sleep with his w ile and that he will beget Oedipus by Iter. Just as if someone had said "Milo will wrestle in thè Olympic games" and someone else answered "So. whether he has an opponent or not. he will wrestle." he would be wrong. for "he will wrestle" is complex. For without an opponent there is no w resti ing. So all captious arguments of that sort can be refuted in thè sanie way. "Whether you cali in thedoctoror not, you will get well" is captious; it is as fated to cali in thè doctor as it is to get well. Tliese cases, as I said, Chrysippus calls "co-fated." From thè above. Cicero shows that troni thè Stoics point o f view. iftw o events are co-fated. thè other is necessary for thè fated event to liappen. From thè Stoics' co-fated theory, it can be inferred that ifcalling thè doctor is necessary for thè recovery, then recovery is fated. so too is calling thè doctor. In tliis case, then, it will be crroneous and misleading to draw an inference from thè assumption that recovery is fated no matter what is donc or not done. The theory o f Co-fated o f thè Stoics eclioes thè concept o f determinism more than fatalism. fiere, thè Stoics believe that every event is caused by a previous event according to laws that necessitated eacli event. Thus. thè Stoics' belief in fate is simply a belief in determinism. To thè Stoics. there are a series o f causes, w liicli because o f thè unchanging laws o f nature, is sufficient for thè effeets. The Stoics believe that thè series o f events stretches back into thè distant past and without disruption, continues into thè future. However. tliis chain ofeauses does not make thè different links in thè causai chain unnecessary. By saying that some events are co-fated, thè Stoics mean that if thè km s o f nature and thè past is what it is. '4 then follows that certain intermediate events are fated ifthè outeome is fated. If. for instance, a persoli is fated to drive his car from a place to another on a particular day. it is also fated that there would be fuel in that car on that particular day. Yorùbà Pliilosophical Concept of Àyànmó The belief in destiny permeates Yorùbà culture, likc that o f most cultures o f thè world. The Yorùbà concepì o f destiny is expressed in connection with thè pliilosophical perccption o f ori (personality soni). Many Yorùbà scholars like Wande Abimbola (1971), Olusegun Gbadegesin ( 1983). M. A. Makinde (1985). Olusegun Ladipo (1992). S. A. Alli (1995), E. O. Oduwolc (1996) bave debated exlensively thè relation between ori and destiny. Ori in tliis context is regarded as thè immaterial cntity known as inner head (ori-imi) whicli is responsible for thè actuality and u'orth o f a man in thè reai world. Ori.for thè Yorùbà. is considered not only as thè bearer o f destiny but also thè essence o f human personality that rules, Controls and guides all m an's life activities (Idowu. 1996:18-4 ). According to thè Yorùbà mytli o f creation. there are certain supernatural forces behind thè acquisition o f ori. UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 39 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 In thè Yorùbà myth ofcreation, thoughat variance with othercreationaccounts, Òrìsànlà, thè - -div inity, is saddled with thè responsibility o f forming thè body which he later passes on to xiùmarè. thè Supreme Deity, for thè impartation o f ènti, thè life force, into thè lifeless form eed by Òrìsànlà. However, before coming into thè world. thè human-to-be goes to thè Àjàlà’s -» - -ehouse to choose an uri from thè large number in thè warehouse. Ironically though, Ajàlà, in thè ; :h. who has thè responsibility o f moulding a fitting uri. is described as a drunkard, debtor, and an -.sponsib leand careless workman whothrough sheernegligence, moulds headsof di verse traitsand butes. Attimes. he makes thè kind of uri which Yorùbà cali ori-rere, fortunate ori: at othertimes, - ’tiriikti, unfortunate ori, isw hat is triade (Morakinyo 1983:78). Getting thè uri. asconceived by rakinyo ( 1983:72), “ is done by kneeling before Olódùmarè" who then bestows on humans their ■ ino. The idea o f ciyànmó is conceived and explained in various terms depending on how it is . . ired. Idowu (1996:183) explains ways o f one acquiring Iris destiny thus: According to thè generai conception, a persoti obtains his destiny in one of thè three ways: he kneels down and chooses his destiny; for a destiny which comes upon a person in this way. we bave thè name À-kùnlè-yàn- 'tirai which is chosen while kneeling'; or he kneels down and receives his destiny; for this, we bave thè name À-kiinlè-gbà— ’that which is received kneeling*. or his destiny is affixed to him - for ibis, we bave thè name Ayàmnó - 'that which is affixed to one'. The word 'destiny ' has been described in various terms by different scholars. for instance .idegesin (1998:47) depicts it as "pre-ordained portion o f life wound and sealed up ono/7." and r er explains that "human beings bave an allotment o f this destiny which determines thè generai . -se o f life." Ori is regarded as thè compass o f an individual's destiny. Oladipo (1992:37) . nansively sees destiny as thè belief that every person has his biography written before coming to . world which consequentlv implies that anything one does is not something done out o f free will - : something done in fulfìlment o f preordained history. Balogun (2007) describes human destiny as . mysterious power that is believed to control thè events o f human life. Destiny or predestination. Yorùbà philosophical concept, is thè belief that whatever happens or will happen has been rdained. The various terms (Akimlèyàn. àkimlègbà. kàilàrà. àkosilè and àyànntó) ttsed to express thè . -ept o f destiny convey thè notion that whatever is conferred on man is unalterable and thus mes his portion throughout life (Idowu 1996:184). In Yorùbà philosophical analysis, it is lield :: .:t no man can achieve anything contrary to his allotment portion through akimlèyàn, àkitnlègbà, ■l sarà, àkosilè oràyànmó. There are several sayings among thè Yorùbà s that contimi their strong ief in thè strength o f destiny and thè fact that it is unchangeable. For instance. wlien a persoti is . . struggling tosucceed but thè effortsare to noavail. tlicy dee lare "ìiyàivng ò gbóùgìm, uri leléjò" . w/o/destiny is unchangeable; it is a mailer o f ori). Ilowevcr, tlirce o f illese terms are used sistently namely; àyànmó.kàdàrà and àkosilè. Most times, àyànmó is used in positive matters .• kàilàrà and àkosilè are often used in negative circumstances cspecially, wben sympathising -omeone who has lost a lovcd one to deatli. Exprcssions sudi as; "eniii kò bài gbakàilàrà yóò UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 4 0 NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 ìs 'tikmforo " (he that does not accept his fate or destiny, svili be forced to accept cmptiness), "àkn\ : kò leè là sé " (that svhich is svritten cannot go unfulfìlled). Ayànmó is believed to be a mysterious power controlling human events. This mysterious power is usually accredited to Olódùmarè, thè Supreme Being; he is believed to have pre- existentially fixed all thè events that would take place in a m an's earthly existence. Mence, thè saying: "ewé kan kò leèjabó làraigiki Olórun ina mò si” (there is no leaf that svili drop o ff a tre­ timi escapes thè notice o f God). The implication o f this expression is apparent; nothing can happe- to human in this lite svithout G od's knosvledge and sanction. An interesting part o f thè procedure o f destiny allotment is described by Idosvu in thè follosving manner: When thè rite before Olódùmarè is completed. thè person starts on his svay into thè svorld. He arrives at thè gates betsveen heaven and earth. and encounters thè Onibodè- 'The Gate Keeper' - to svhoin he must anssver some questions before he passes through. The questions and anssvers go something as follosvs: ONIBODÈ: Where are you going? PERSON: I am going into thè svorld. ONIBODÈ: Wliat are you going to do? PERSON: I am going to be borii to a man named X. o fa svoman named Y. in thè tos\- o f Z. I shall be an only son. I shall grosv up to be handsome and in favoer svilii everybody; everything I touch svili prosper...At thè age o f ninety, I shall be ili for a short svliile and then die peacefully in my house, to be mourned by all and to be accorded a grand burial. ONIBODÈ: Tó (it is sealed). And so thè person passes into thè svorld svith his destiny doubly sealed. By thè passing into thè svorld. he forgets at once svliat has happened to him in heaven. including thè content of his destiny (Idosvu. 1996:184). Corroborating Idoss u 's asscrtion above. Asvolalu and Dopami! (2005).explain that svhen thejoum r is being I l i a d e into thè svorld. ori. in thè forni o f hum an's doublé passes thè gate situated betsvee* heaven and earth. There. thè Onibodè Ormi (thè heavcn's gate keeper) asks him/her to declar: his/her destiny. tliey state: There thè destiny is doubly and lìnally sealed. and man is born into thè svorld. Bui he forgets everything about his destiny. It is only his Ori, guardian angel orcounterpart that knosvsall about his destiny, and therefore guides him throughout lite. But thè Yorùbà believe that there is alsvays thè UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 41 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 Oracle divinity, Òrùnmìlà, who is present when m an's destiny is sealed before Deity. He also knows all about man’s destiny, and he can alvvays put him in line with regard to his duties and obligations, vvhat to do and what to avoid, so that all may be well with him (Awolalu and Dopamu, 2005:184- 185). From thè above, "thè Tinished’ person becomes a thing in thè womb, born o f a woman” and passes into thè world with a sealed destiny which was known to him at a point but is later forgotten. The Greeks, unlike thè Yorùbà, believe that man chooses his own destiny without thè interference o f thè gods as presented by Plato in his myth o f Er. In Plato’s myth. it is believed that Er died in a baule, but his body was stili intact some days after his death, refusing to decompose as it was supposed to. The myth reveals that Er’s soul then sojourned to thè super-sensible realm where he was made to see how human destiny is chosen and sealed by thè three daughters o f Necessiti: Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos. The souls, after their contact with these three daughters o f Necessiti-. passed beneath thè throne o fNecessity and began their journey "to thè plain o f Oblivion. through a terrible and stifling heat” . Though Plato’s focus here is on thè process o f reincarnation. a criticai analysis shows that any soul that is being born or reborn had to choose his destiny during each reincarnation process. Thus, thè souls, like thè Yorùbà metaphorical head - uri, were led io thè ■Riverof Forgetfulness’’ from which they were all required lo drink a measure o f thè water in order to prevent them from knowing and remembering what has been determined for them by thè lot -hosen by each o f them. And as thè story goes, in thè middle o f thè night, they fell asleep. and then "there was a sound o f thunder and a quaking o f thè earth, and they were suddenly wafted then one •nis way. one that, upward to their birth like shooting stars” . From thè discussion so far, thè Greek and Yorùbà conceptions o f human destiny can be : nstrued in two broad related senses. From both angles, there is an unconscious self that makes a -ee choice of his life course; it also refers to that which is chosen, thè human destiny or lot. This ; -nception fundamentally attributes thè choice o f human destiny to his own choice o f thè lot or luck ■at had already been determined for him. Since thè choice made by thè unconscious self is "Known to thè now conscious person who is now in thè world, it is possible for such a person to : auge in a project that is not part o f thè destiny allotted to him. Whatever effort is devoted to such • cation would result in futility (Gbadegesin 1983:183). The implication o f this is that thè indation for many o f thè events that would occur in thè life o f an individuai person has already ~een laid before him and that once a person’s destiny is sealed, nothing can be done to alter it. The Greek and Yorùbà philosophical conceptions o f fatalismi or Àyànmó are a step away - m thè generai belief o f fatalism. At a glance, it seems that an individuai is responsible for thè iceofh isow n lot and in line with thè generai notion o f fatalism, once a choice has been made. it rrevocably sealed. In other words, cenain events o f human life are such that cannot but occur and -ce everything is not within human control, what is going to happen will happen, quiserit, crii -at will be will be). However, Oduwole (1996:53) contests thè so-called act o f choice present in t r . acquisition o f ori before coming into thè world; she does not consider man as having freedom of ; ;e in acquiring an ori. To Iter, thè choice o f ori is forced on man by forces more powerful than ■ mself. A criticai analysis o f Oduwole’s submission shows that whatever choice o f ori a man UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 4 2 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 chooses, his destiny is stili beyond him because each ori has an affixed destiny, either for good fortune or for misfortune. General Analysis of thè Greek and Yorùbà Conception of Fatalism From thè concep tof fatalism, itseem sthat once thè issue ofan individuali destiny is settled before thè soul or ori departs from heaven, everything is sealed and nothing can be done to alter or enhance thè destiny. From thè Stoicsargument, belief in fatalism leadsto laziness or idleness. Man> Yorùbà scholars have argued thè possibilities o f averting human destiny; for instance, Abimbola (1976:115) argues that it becomes almost impossible to alter a m an's destiny once a person has chosen his destiny by selecting an ori; pointing out that even thè gods do not have thè power to avert human destiny. Idowu (1996:186) also argues that thè Yorùbàsare incurably fatalistic in their belief in ori and human destiny. Oduwole (1996:48) extensively argues for thè possibility o f giving a fatalistic interpretation to thè Yorùbà concepì o f ori and human destiny. She claims that for thè Yorùbà. a person’s biography has been written before hiscom ing into thè world, in such a way that his vvhole lite is guided and controlled not by his choice but by his preordained destiny. Oduwole (1996:52) maintains that a fatalistic interpretation o f thè Yorùbà conception o f ori and human destiny is more consistent with Yorùbà belief than any other interpretation. However, there are certain Yorùbà ideologies and practical experiences whose interpretations are capable o f making thè Yorùbà concepts o f destiny and predestination. and thè fatalistic interpretation given to thè Yorùbà concept o f ori and human destiny inappropriate and absurd. Idowu ( 1996:186) alludes to thè fact that thè Yorùbà concept o fthe inalterability o f destiny is considerably modified. From Idowu’s notion. it is not out o f context to assert that thè Yorùbà people considerably believe that m an's destiny can be altered one way or thè other, either for good fortune or misfortune. Fashina asserts that thè Yorùbà: belief System and philosophy o f ori as predestination does not foreclose thè strong moral and philosophical insistence that a person must work hard to achieve success in life instead o f expecting his/her ori to give success to thè lazy and idle person (Fashina, 2009:255). Fashina’s proclamation goes along with thè Yorùbà proverbs that àtélewó enikìilem niije (literally, one 's paini does not deceive one) and isé l ’oògìmìsé (work is antidote to poverty). These expressions have deeper connotations than thè literal one given above; they mean that success cannot be attained without one working for it even if one has chosen a good destiny. This idea is reflected in excerpt from Ifà Divination below as quoted in Fashina: Bi Ori enibei dora If one’s Ori is good hvòn ni kóyò nio One should joy in limits Nitori isé kìi po ni Because, hard work does not kill Ayò ni i pò ’yàn But idleness kills a person A difó firn Akèré omo Onisnn 'ko Divined for thè frog, son o f thè king o f brooks Ti wón ni yóoj ’oba Who was destined to reign UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 43 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 Ayò àyòjù, Akerewàfi lame He was idle. relying on destiny to work out thè success E e wàa wo omo alaigboran O! Come and see how thè indolence heir Bi ina ori Èsù ti h jó won Is gutted by fire from Esu’s furnace! (Fashina. 2009:255). : he above excerpt shovvs that success cannot be attained vvithout hard work even if one is destined :'or it. Using thè Stoics' theory o f co-fatedness, if one is destined to be successful, he is also necessarily destined to work hard in order for thè fated outcome to come true. Hence, both thè Stoics and Yorùbàs believe that a person’s action is necessary for one’s fate to come true. There are other factors that thè Yorùbà believe can alter an individuali destiny. One o f such is an individual’s inordinate appetite and ambition; this can alter thè fortune from good to bad. The Yorùbàs refer to this as àfowófà (that which one brings upon oneself). Idowu ( 1996: 190) States that an individual's destiny “can be affected for thè worse by his own character.” According to him, “thè Yorùbà believe that a good destiny without character is worthless” ; hence. thè saying: ìwà i ’baàwùre (character is thè king o f fortune). Examining thè concept o f ìwà (character) in relation to destiny. it is glaring that an individuai should not expect his good destiny to be fulfilled automatically; he must work in partnership with his destiny by procuring and practising good character. Another factor that can alter a person's destiny for worse is referred to as thè malevolent forces in thè world that operate through human agents. Idowu (1996:187) refers to this as omo aróyé i children o f thè world) or elénìni (thè implacable) such as witches and “anyone who is given to evil practices or machination’’. The Yorùbà believe that these agents have thè power to destroy people’s lots, no matter how good thè destiny they have chosen. Ogbè-Èdi, quoted in Idowu (1996: 188), States: "Ori kùnlè óyàn 'wà, elénìni ò jé kó se é (Ori knelt and chose thè portion, elénìni hinders it from its fulfilment.” The Yorùbà believe that malevolent forces which they cali ‘ayé ' have immense power that it can alter thè operation o f nature, hence thè saying: Bi e ri ayé, e sci fi’óyé, if you encounter ayé, flee from ayé, Bi e ri ayé, e sa f'àyé : if you encounter ayé, flee from ayé: fi ès é ir ' ayé ìjimèrè duchi, The primevai ìjimèrè was black, Ayé nàà I’ ó t ‘ aso ìjimèrè b ' epo; this aye it is that soaked ijimere’s clothes in palm oil; Arà "yé nàà F ó p ’ògìdàn; this ayé it is that slew ògìdàn Ógìdànolóólà ijù; Ògìdàn thè surgeon o f thè wilderness Bi e ri ayé, e sa f ’àyé. if you encounter ayé, flee from ayé (Idowu, 1996:189-190). From thè above, it is evident that human destiny can be enhanced or augmented through hard work; il can also be altered either for good or bad. On thè surface, thè concept o f fatalism seems to paralyse thè spirit and will o f man providing thè easy pretext o f man absolving h im selfof thè responsibility o f thè deeds o f his life believing that UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN LIBRARY 44 | NIGERIA AND THE CLASSICS Voi. 30 (2018 what will be vvill be, no matter his actions or inactions. He does not care to promote his p e rsona li leaving everything to fate. However. by thè foregoing, it can be summed that hunians have significant roles to play through their own actions or inactions vvith regards to generai life experiences. What happens to man is, therefore, not just pre-arranged (fated) to happen but certain (in) actions caused thè eventuality or prevented it. The argument ofthè Stoics about co-fated events shows that even if everything is destined or fated, a person can stili do something about what happens: therefore. a man has some abilities and control over thè happenings in his life. The co- fated theory o f thè Stoics also shows that if thè fated events are to occur, choices are needed. In other words, decisions are to be made by individuals. The Stoics argue that man does not only contribute to what happens but also contributes as a free agent linking thè argument to their doctrine o f causes. The Stoics reiterate that "fate is an order and series o f causes since thè connection of cause to cause generates things front itse lf’ (Cicero. Div. 1.125 [LS 55L: SVF 2.921]). Conclusion The concept o f predestination is one that has been long debated both in scholarship and everyday life. Scholars have appraised thè phenomenon of predestination from two major theoretical frameworks which are fatalism and determinism. These terms have been used by scholars to emphasize thè futility o f m an’s efforts in attempting to contain thè foreordination o f fate or destiny. While fatalism holds that all events take place according to a predetermined and inevitable destiny. determinism opines that every event has its determining conditions in its immediate antecedents (Adebowale, 2017: 45). In line with these two theoretical anchors, this paper attempted a comparative studv o f thè helplessness o f man in thè face o f predestination in thè Yorùbà and thè Greek traditions. The paper finds that in thè Greek tradition. modem philosophical thoughts have dismissed fatalism. which attributes events to G od's control over everything for a cause and effect parameter o f human experiences as thè basis o f human fate. This is thè crux o f determinism. The Yorùbà in their own worldview subscribe to predestination which is expressed with terms such as Ori and Avemmo. The assumption is that thè human life is predestined and human beings are subject to fate. However. there are also Yorùbà philosophical thoughts which express thè inevitability o f m an's role in what becomes o f him. These are expressed in their manv proverbs which give credence to human efforts such as àlélewó enikìi lan nii je, isé l'oògìmìsé. The paper concludes that humans have significant roles to play through own actions and inactions with regard to their life experiences. What happens to man is not just prearranged to happen but certain actions or inactions bring about thè consequence or avert it. The paper. therefore. submits that man must take account for a large cluink o f what becomes o f their lives rather than submitting to fate. References Abimbola. W. 1976. I/o. an Exposilion o f (fa Liierary Corpus. London: Oxford University Press. Adebowale, B.A. 2017. Oedipus' Moral Responsibility in Sophoclcs' Oedipus Tyrannus Inlernaiional Journal oj Humaniiies and Social Sludies. Voi. 5 Issue 9. 44-52. Awolalu, .1.0. and P.A. Dopami! 2005. 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